Modernization Is Not an Ideology but Development Experience

When I worked in the United States and Britain, they were promoting the Thatcher revolution and the Reagan neoliberal revolution, which in turn drove the subsequent wave of large-scale globalization.

我在美国、英国工作的时候，那里正在推行撒切尔革命、里根新自由主义革命，继而推动后面一波大规模的全球化。

If we digest and apply this experience to the environment China finds itself in today, we should also emphasize two points: first, in promoting globalization in the next stage, we must attach great importance to the role of private enterprises; second, we need to further open up and form closer cooperative relations with the Global South. The Global South consists either of agricultural countries or of economies whose technological needs still tend toward the low-to-medium end. China's technology is at the upper-middle level. If it combines with the needs of the Global South, a joint force for modernization can be formed. Why has the Belt and Road Initiative succeeded? Precisely because it meets the development needs of the participating countries and regions.

把这一经验消化、应用到中国现在所处的这个环境，也应该强调两点：第一，我们下一步推动全球化，一定要重视民营企业的作用；第二，我们还需要进一步开放，并与“全球南方”形成更紧密的合作关系。“全球南方”要么是农业国家，要么经济技术需求还偏向于中低端。中国的技术处于中端偏上，如果跟“全球南方”的需求结合起来，就能够形成现代化合力。为什么“一带一路”能够成功，正因为它契合了共建国家和地区的发展需求。

Before the 2008 international financial crisis, many Americans talked about free trade; not talking about free trade was politically incorrect. But now, if you talk about free trade in the United States, people might think you are a "madman." In recent years, the United States has been promoting economic nationalism and trade protectionism, while China has hoisted the banner of free trade. Personally, I think China can do more and do better. The power of China's nationwide, full-domain opening up should not be underestimated. It could even be said that one should not underestimate the power of the United States to destroy the free trade system, nor should one underestimate the power of China to reshape the free trade system.

2008年国际金融危机之前，很多美国人讲自由贸易，不讲自由贸易政治上俨然是不正确的。但现在，如果在美国讲自由贸易，可能会让人觉得你是一个“疯子”。近年来，美国一直在搞经济民族主义、贸易保护主义，中国则扛起了自由贸易的旗帜。个人觉得，中国还可以做得更多，还可以做得更好。中国的全境、全域的开放，这个力量不要低估。甚至可以说，不要低估美国破坏自由贸易体系的力量，也不要低估中国重塑自由贸易体系的力量。

Openness is a distinct hallmark of Chinese-path modernization. Under the new circumstances, where will the new start of opening up go? What new contributions can China make in promoting joint openness in the world? In this speech, I will mainly share and exchange views with you on these issues.

开放是中国式现代化的鲜明标识。新形势下，开放再出发将向何处去？在推动世界共同开放中，中国可以作哪些新贡献？这次演讲，我主要围绕这些问题跟大家作一些分享、交流。

In dealings with all sides, we still need a mindset of peace and win-win.

跟各方交往，还是要有一种和平思维、双赢思维

In modern times, modernization first developed in Western countries, then spread to the whole world, forming several main models:

近代以来，现代化首先在西方国家得到发展，继而扩散到全世界，形成了几种主要模式：

The first model can be called the Latin American model. The Latin American economy is highly dependent on the Western economy, with many industries related to the national economy and people's livelihood controlled by European and American multinationals. This economic structure has created two forces: one extremely pro-Western, the other extremely anti-Western, which on the political level manifests as a struggle between the extreme left and the extreme right.

第一个模式，我们可称为拉美模式。拉美经济高度依赖西方经济，很多国计民生产业都被欧美大公司掌握。这一经济结构造成了两股力量，一股力量极端亲西方，一股力量极端反西方，表现在政治上便是极左和极右之争。

The second model manifests as high dependence within the system, mainly referring to Japan, the "Four Asian Tigers," and European countries such as Germany, most of which are U.S. allies. U.S. allies, in fact, are very hierarchical. Countries in this tier—Japan, South Korea, Germany—are dependent on the United States in security and foreign affairs, lacking fully independent sovereignty, so they have to scrutinize their own independence.

第二个模式，表现为体制内的高度依赖，主要指日本、“亚洲四小龙”以及德国等欧洲国家，大都是美国的盟友。美国的盟友，其实是非常等级化的。日本、韩国、德国这一圈层的国家在安全和外交领域依赖美国，没有完全独立的主权，因此它们不得不审视自己的独立性。

The third model can be summarized as the model of being isolated outside the system, or an external isolation model. The former Soviet Union and today's Cuba and North Korea are representatives.

第三个模式，可归纳为体制外的被孤立模式或者说外部的孤立模式。以前的苏联、今天的古巴和朝鲜是代表。

New China is indeed a special case. Since reform and opening up, our modernization has both achieved development and maintained independence; our development has both integrated into the world economic system and preserved political and economic independence and autonomy. This is very difficult.

新中国确实是一个特例。改革开放以来，我们的现代化既获得了发展，也保持了独立；我们的发展既融入了世界经济体系，又保持了政治、经济独立与自主。这是非常不容易的。

Personally, I think that since modern times, China has generally experienced two waves of opening up: the first was the forced opening up after the two Opium Wars; the second was the reform and opening up after 1978, when we actively connected with the world. The rise of the Shenzhen city cluster and the development and opening up of Pudong were both related to this wave of opening up.

个人觉得，中国近代以来大体已经经历了两次开放：第一次是两次鸦片战争后的被迫开放；第二次是1978年后的改革开放，我们主动跟世界对接，深圳城市群的崛起和浦东开发开放都跟这次开放相关。

At the time of the second wave of opening up, China's entry into the world system involved many factors: one was geopolitics—the United States, then confronting the Soviet Union, was relatively friendly toward China; another was the demand of capital—after the Thatcher revolution and the Reagan neoliberal revolution, where would Western capital go? The core of neoliberalism is privatization and financial deregulation. The question was: where would capital go? China became a "new frontier" for capital. In addition, the West at that time had an illusion that after reform and opening up, China would become a country similar to Western countries and would not pose pressure on the Western hegemonic system.

第二波开放时，中国加入世界体系有很多要素：一个是地缘政治，即当时的美国为了对付苏联，跟中国比较友好；一个是资本的需求，撒切尔革命、里根新自由主义革命后，西方资本去哪里呢？新自由主义的核心是私有化与放松金融管制。问题是：资本去哪里？中国成为资本的一个“新边疆”。此外，当时的西方还有一个幻想，即认为中国改革开放后会成为类似西方的国家，不至于对西方霸权体制构成压力。

Today, we want to continue opening up, but the United States not only no longer talks about free trade but also has a prevailing "anti-globalization." This is a new situation. If we want to develop, we must open up. In fact, the Five-Sphere Integrated Plan of Chinese-path modernization sets a very high standard. To achieve this goal, we certainly need a broad environment of openness. Under these circumstances, we should make a very scientific judgment of the international situation. Some situations require our special attention:

今天我们想继续开放，但是美国不仅已经不讲自由贸易了，而且盛行“反全球化”，这是一个新情况。我们要发展，肯定要开放。实际上，中国式现代化的“五位一体”是非常高标准的。实现这一目标，肯定还是要有开放的大环境。在这一情况下，我们应当对国际局势作出非常科学的判断。有一些情况需要特别引起我们的高度关注：

For example, the rate of development in the West has indeed declined in recent years, but this is relative, not absolute decline. Looking at today, the United States is still one of the faster-growing countries in the world.

比如，西方的发展速度近年来确实有所下降，但这是相对而言的，不是绝对的衰落。今天来看，美国还是世界上发展速度较快的国家。

For another example, those who study international relations must note that although this is an era of multipolarity, we must have a scientific assessment of multipolarity. Apart from the United States, which now does not pursue multipolarity, which other countries like or dislike pursuing multipolarity? From my observation, France very much likes multipolarity, and the Global South is also willing to promote multipolarity. This is because multipolarity means that international society should be more democratic and not let the U.S. hegemony dominate everything. But at the same time, we need to consider: what is the impact of multipolarity on China? We cannot view multipolarity abstractly; we must carefully assess "what kind of multipolarity is favorable to China, what kind of multipolarity may be unfavorable to China," and "what specific impact is the ongoing multipolarity having on China?"

再如，学国际关系的人一定要注意，尽管现在是一个多极化时代，但对多极化要有科学的评估。除了美国现在不追求多极化，还有哪些国家喜欢或不喜欢追求多极化？据我观察，法国就很喜欢多极化，“全球南方”也愿意推动多极化。这是因为，多极化意味着国际社会应当更为民主一点，不能让美国霸权主导一切。但同时，我们需要考虑的是，多极化对中国的影响怎么样？我们不能抽象地看待多极化，而要认真评估“什么样的多极化对中国有利，什么样的多极化可能对中国不利”以及“现在正在发生的多极化，对中国有何具体影响”等。

For yet another example, we also need an objective assessment of the Global South. The Global South is indeed an increasingly important international political force, and its main concerns are threefold: first, inequality of interests. The Global South believes that the distribution of interests in the international community is unequal and that they have not received enough help from the international community. Second, inequality of responsibilities, mainly manifested in climate issues. The Global South is a victim of climate change, but Western societies do not want to assume their due responsibilities and try to shift this responsibility to the Global South. Third, inequality of rights within international organizations. In the United Nations and many regional organizations, the representation and voice of the Global South are still insufficient.

又如，对“全球南方”也要有客观的评估。“全球南方”确实是一股越来越重要的国际政治力量，其关注点主要有三个：第一个是利益不平等。“全球南方”认为国际社会的利益不平等，获得国际社会帮助不够。第二个是责任不平等，主要表现在气候问题上。“全球南方”是气候变化的受害者，西方社会却不想承担应当承担的责任，试图把这个责任转嫁到“全球南方”。第三个是国际组织里面的权利不平等。在联合国，在众多地区组织里，“全球南方”的代表性、话语权等还不够大。

Based on current development, the Global South seems to be just a global political movement; it has not been institutionalized. The boundaries of the Global South are relatively vague and constantly changing. The United States does not sincerely hope that the Global South can unite and truly exert influence. As we see, the United States used Congressional power in an attempt to expel China from the "Third World" and actively helped India to let India represent the Global South.

就目前的发展情况看，“全球南方”似乎还只是一个全球性的政治运动，并未组织化。“全球南方”的边界相对模糊，并不断在变化。美国也不会真心希望“全球南方”能团结起来，真正发挥影响力。大家看到，美国动用国会的力量，妄图把中国开除出“第三世界”，还主动帮助印度，让印度来代表“全球南方”。

On these issues, we must have our own judgment. In dealings with all sides, we still need a mindset of peace and win-win. On the issue of "small packages breaching the American small market," we should indeed consider their feelings and also consider actively changing and improving our own business model. If we produce everything ourselves and only regard overseas as a market, we will encounter many troubles. If BYD produces 10,000 out of 20,000 parts itself, and distributes the other 10,000 to other European countries for production, wouldn't that help achieve greater development in the global market? Look at Tesla; its supply chain and industrial chain are very broadly laid out.

对于这些问题，我们要有自己的判断能力。在跟各方交往的过程中，还是要有一种和平思维、双赢思维。在“小小包裹冲垮美国小市场”这个问题上，确实要考虑到他们的感受，也要考虑积极改变和完善我们自己的经营模式。什么都是自己生产，光把海外视为一个市场，是会碰到很多麻烦的。如果比亚迪2万个零件，我们自己生产1万个，其他1万个在欧洲其他国家布局，是不是有助于在全球市场实现更大的发展？我们去看看特斯拉，它的供应链、产业链布局就非常广。

Facing changes unseen in a century, I think we don't need to be pessimistic or nervous. Among all countries, our situation is the best. We need to maintain strategic composure, avoid major mistakes, and persist in doing our own things well.

面临百年未有之大变局，我觉得不用那么悲观乃至紧张。在所有国家里，我们的情形最好。我们要有定力，不犯大的错误，坚持把自己的事情做好。

Chinese-path modernization must consider not only economics but also strategic considerations.

中国式现代化，不光要看经济，还要有战略考量

Regarding the advancement of Chinese-path modernization, I have some thoughts to share with you:

关于推进中国式现代化，我有一些看法想跟大家分享：

On the one hand, development is still the absolute principle.

一方面，发展还是硬道理。

Competition between major powers is mainly a competition between development models. Personally, I think today's United States has a development-oriented model, which can be called primitive capitalism version 2.0. Its regulation of capital comes from where? Mainly from the bipartisan consensus in the United States, but today the two parties are increasingly lacking consensus. Under these circumstances, capital has instead gained unprecedented freedom. Therefore, we should not underestimate the ability of U.S. capital to reshape the U.S. government.

大国之间的竞争，主要是一个发展模式之争。个人觉得，今天的美国是以发展为导向的模式，可将其称为原始资本主义2.0版。它对资本进行监管，力量来自哪里呢？主要来自美国两党共识，但今天两党越来越没有共识。在这样的情况下，资本反而获得了前所未有的自由度。所以，我们不要低估美国资本重塑美国政府的能力。

In the era that classical Marxist writers were concerned about, the state was the agent of capital. U.S. capital had never directly jumped into politics. This time, Musk publicly came out so prominently to engage in elections; it is indeed a major political event of great significance in U.S. history.

在马克思主义经典作家关注的那个时代里，国家是资本的代理人，美国资本从来没有直接跳出来搞政治。这次马斯克公开站出来如此高调搞选举，在美国历史上确实是具有重大意义的一个政治事件。

At the same time, the connotation and extension of the Fourth Industrial Revolution are still evolving, and we have no reason to underestimate its impact on politics, economy, society, and international order. I am very worried about this: the world is hyping the AI competition between China and the United States, but objectively speaking, all "meaningful competition" mainly occurs between U.S. companies, not between Chinese enterprises and U.S. companies.

同时，第四次工业革命的内涵和外延还在不断发展，我们没有任何理由低估其对政治、经济、社会和国际秩序的影响。我非常担心这一点：世界上都在渲染中美人工智能的竞争，但客观地看，所有“有意义的竞争”主要发生在美国公司之间，而不是中国企业和美国公司之间。

The technologies of the first, second, and third industrial revolutions were relatively dispersed, gradually spreading from Britain and other places to other countries. The wave of artificial intelligence, up to today, is mainly concentrated in two regions of the United States: one is the narrow strip from Silicon Valley in California to Texas, and the other is from Boston to New York.

第一次、第二次、第三次的工业革命技术是相对分散的，从英国等地开始逐渐传播至其他国家。人工智能浪潮到今天为止，主要集中在美国的两个区域，一块是加利福尼亚州硅谷到得克萨斯的狭长地带，另一块是从波士顿到纽约。

In the past, technology was a tool; now, artificial intelligence is instead shaping us, which is frightening. Therefore, our development model needs adjustment. At the 2024 China International Import Expo, I chatted with an Italian official. I told him bluntly: if Europe does not adjust, it will be finished. Europeans are good at making rules, which makes it difficult for new technologies to land. "Industry 4.0" was first proposed by Germany, but how has it been implemented? French President Macron has been calling on Europe to reduce regulation, but the EU still has taken no action.

以前技术就是工具，现在人工智能反过来会塑造我们，这是可怕的。为此，我们的发展模式要调整。在2024年进博会上，我跟意大利的一位官员聊天。我直言，欧洲再不调整就完了。欧洲人善于做规则，使得新技术很难落地。“工业4.0”最早是德国提出来的，但执行情况如何呢？法国总统马克龙一直在呼吁欧洲要减少监管，但欧盟依然没有什么动作。

Now look at China's situation. We examined three fields: biomedicine, the internet, and artificial intelligence. These are also fields that can represent new quality productive forces.

再看中国的情况，我们考察了三个领域：一个是生物医药，一个是互联网，一个是人工智能。这也是可以代表新质生产力的几个领域。

In biomedicine, we used to imitate, but now we have reached the stage of original creation. However, many of our hard-developed products are bought by U.S. companies for a few hundred million dollars, while their actual value is tens of billions of yuan in market capitalization. After the drugs are produced, we have to import them again, which is very regrettable.

生物医药我们以前是仿制，现在走到了原创阶段。但是，我们很多自己辛苦研发出来的东西被美国公司花几亿美元就买走了，其实际价值却有上千亿元市值。药品生产后，我们又要进口，非常可惜。

As for the internet, the gaming industry is a typical example. "Black Myth: Wukong" is very popular, but there are still a large number of games that, for various reasons, cannot obtain approval numbers.

就互联网而言，游戏产业颇为典型。《黑神话：悟空》很红，但还有大量游戏，因为各种原因得不到批号。

In recent years, China's published papers in basic AI research have caught up with the United States, and in some areas are far more numerous and of higher quality than those of the United States. But why are our related applications relatively few, and mostly imitative? Many enterprises, unable to find opportunities, go to Silicon Valley. What does that show? People find that more than two-thirds of "unicorn" enterprises in Silicon Valley are founded by first- or second-generation immigrants, including many who left China.

近年来，中国在人工智能基础研究领域发表的论文赶上了美国，在一些领域甚至远远多于美国，质量也高于美国，但为什么我们的相关应用偏少，亦步亦趋的偏多？很多企业找不到机会就跑到硅谷，表明什么？大家发现，硅谷2/3以上的“独角兽”企业都是一代、二代移民创立的，包括很多从中国出去的。

Last time I returned to Zhejiang, people were discussing the U.S.-China chip dispute. Someone joked: this is not a chip dispute between China and the United States; it is a chip dispute between Zhejiang people who have ended up in the United States and China. It is not that we lack creativity or technical ability; the key problem is how to land it. "Made in the United States" is not "made by Americans"; it is made in the United States by a group of smart people from around the world; the United States merely provides the site and platform. How can we change this? I think we can look at the examples of Singapore and Vietnam and promote the landing of creative ideas and industrial applications through comprehensive institutional openness and effective management.

我上次回浙江，大家在讨论中美芯片之争。有人开玩笑说，这哪是中美芯片之争，而是流落到美国的浙江人跟中国的芯片之争。不是我们没有创意、没有技术能力，关键问题在于如何落地。“美国制造”不是“美国人制造”，而是世界上一批聪明人在美国制造，美国更多只是提供场地、平台。怎么改变？我觉得可以看看新加坡和越南的迹象，以制度全面开放与有效管理推进创意落地、产业应用。

I think Singapore manages very well. I worked there for many years; we can learn from it. What does regulation mean? First let the child be born, then figure out how to nurture and manage it well. If you don't even let the child be born, what kind of regulation is that? No development is not regulation; regulation based on development is real regulation. Many countries in the world do it this way; we should have confidence.

我觉得，新加坡管理得非常好。我在那边工作多年，我们可以学学。什么叫监管？先要让小孩生下来，接着再想办法培养好、管理好。小孩都不让生下来，那叫什么监管？不发展不叫监管，在发展基础上的监管才叫监管。世界上很多国家都是这样做的，我们要有信心。

On the other hand, we must persist in deepening high-level opening up.

另一方面，坚持深化高水平开放。

The Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CPC clearly proposed "expanding autonomous opening up" and "expanding unilateral opening up toward the least developed countries." On multiple occasions, I have further called for expanding unilateral opening up toward underdeveloped countries. Unilateral opening up is not opening up without principles; it is precisely promoted according to our own needs, including determining which contents can be prioritized according to our needs, advancing step by step, spreading from points to areas, and then fully promoting after pilot projects mature. This is an important variable in reshaping the world trade landscape.

中共二十届三中全会明确提出“扩大自主开放”“扩大对最不发达国家单边开放”。我在多个场合进一步呼吁扩大对不发达国家的单边开放。单边开放不是无原则的开放，而是根据自身需要精准推动的，包括确定哪些内容可以根据自身需求优先实施，循序渐进，由点带面，通过试点成熟后再全面推广。这是重塑世界贸易格局的一个重要变量。

Last time I gave a lecture at a national ministry, I said: do not overemphasize reciprocal opening up. There has been no truly reciprocal opening up in world history. Developed countries like Britain and the United States all practiced unilateral opening up. The greatest thing about the United States is unilateral opening up. The United States has three major open systems: the education and talent open system, which made the United States the world's largest education base and talent center; the corporate open system, which provides the United States with a steady stream of outstanding entrepreneurs from all over the world; and the financial open system, which alone established the international status of Wall Street.

我上次到一个国家部委讲课，就说不要过于强调对等开放。世界历史上没有什么真正的对等开放，发达的国家如英国、美国都是单边开放的。美国最伟大的地方就是单边开放，美国有三大开放系统：教育人才的开放系统，使得美国成为世界上最大的教育基地与人才中心；企业开放系统让美国拥有源源不断的来自世界各地的优秀企业家；金融开放系统更是一举缔造了华尔街的国际地位。

In a sense, deepening high-level opening up and expanding unilateral opening up is also a good way to build a community with a shared future for mankind. The United States is not monolithic. Wall Street, agricultural states, the scientific community, many local governments, and ordinary people hope to continue engaging with China. The current political logic of the United States does not entirely align with capital logic, market logic, or technology logic. At the 2024 China International Import Expo, I met several entrepreneurs. They said: any good product, when sold in China, will find a huge market. Expanding unilateral opening up can dissolve confrontational thinking, expand common interests, and help better aggregate global high-quality resources such as capital, technology, markets, and talent.

在某种意义上，深化高水平开放、扩大单边开放也是构建人类命运共同体的好办法。美国不是一体的，华尔街、农业州、科学界、很多地方政府和普通百姓是希望同中国继续交往的。现在美国的政治逻辑并不完全符合资本逻辑、市场逻辑和科技逻辑。在2024年进博会上，我碰到好几位企业家。他们表示，任何一个好的商品，到中国销售，就能发现一个大市场。扩大单边开放可以化解对立思维、做大共同利益，推动全球资金、技术、市场、人才等诸多优质资源更好地汇聚在一起。

China's greatest success is Chinese-path modernization. The Global South has also suffered greatly from the West. The West does not give them technology, but merely regards them as a market, and links trade and investment with them to political factors such as human rights. Modernization is not an ideology; it is development experience. Can we summarize China's experience of achieving both development and independence through Chinese-path modernization and provide it to the Global South as a reference for development?

中国最成功的是中国式现代化。“全球南方”也是深受西方之苦的。西方不给它们技术，而只是把它们看成一个市场，还把对它们的贸易投资跟人权等政治因素结合起来。现代化不是一种意识形态，而是发展经验。我们能不能把中国式现代化既发展又独立的经验总结一下，提供给“全球南方”作为发展参照？

In advancing Chinese-path modernization, we must consider not only economics but also strategic considerations. I have noticed that economies such as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore have strategically ceded some economic activities to international actors. We should also actively refine this thinking. Currently, some cities in the Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta allow wholly foreign-owned hospitals to enter, with the aim of creating a development pattern of "you have me, and I have you."

推进中国式现代化，我们不光要看经济，还要有战略考量。我发现日本、韩国和新加坡等经济体都战略性地让渡出一些经济活动给国际行为主体，我们也应积极细化这个思路。现在长三角、珠三角一些城市，允许外资独资医院进入，目的就是打造“你中有我，我中有你”的发展形态。

The world is chaotic enough; China should try its best to do something for the international community. Many things are beyond our control; what we can control is ourselves. At such a critical moment, our self-understanding is very important. Only with a correct self-perception can we unleash our potential, achieve high-quality and sustainable development, and at the same time make more contributions to the international community.

世界够乱了，中国应当尽量为国际社会做一点事。很多东西不是我们能把握的，我们能把握的就是我们自己。在这样一个关键时刻，我们对自己的认识很重要。只有自我认知正确，才能把潜力发挥出来，在实现自身高质量发展、可持续发展的同时为国际社会多作一些贡献。

(Zheng Yongnian: Honorary Dean, School of Political Economy, Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Presidential Chair Professor, School of Management and Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; Dean, School of Public Policy; Dean, Qianhai Institute of International Affairs; former Director, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore.)

（郑永年 上海交通大学政治经济研究院名誉院长，香港中文大学（深圳）校长学勤讲座教授、公共政策学院院长、前海国际事务研究院院长，曾任新加坡国立大学东亚研究所所长。）