Mao Zedong’s Strategic Thinking in Responding to the “Anti-China Chorus”

Situated in the treacherous Cold War landscape, the newly founded People’s Republic of China once faced an external crisis that Mao Zedong called the “anti-China chorus.” In response to anti-China forces of different natures, Mao adopted different resolution plans, assessed the overall nature of the anti-China forces from a global strategic perspective, and dialectically pointed out the possibility that negative elements could be transformed into positive ones. Mao believed that the fundamental way to break the anti-China forces and seize the initiative lay in uniting as one and independently advancing China’s socialist construction. Today, on our journey toward the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, we must directly confront the accelerated evolution of changes unseen in a century. In this regard, Xi Jinping has clearly pointed out: “Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, we have been soberly aware that upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics in the New Era is an arduous and great social revolution, and that various hostile forces will never allow us to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation smoothly. On this basis, I have repeatedly stressed to the whole Party that we must carry out a great struggle with many new historical features, and that we must be prepared to make more arduous and more strenuous efforts.” To cope with the “grave and complex international situation and the huge risks and challenges that have followed one after another,” we must dare to struggle and be good at struggling, continuously enhance our ability to struggle, and handle external suppression and containment that may arise and escalate at any time with high-level struggle wisdom. Therefore, reviewing Mao Zedong’s strategic thinking in responding to the “anti-China chorus” can provide certain historical insights for the current advancement of the great cause of Chinese-path modernization.

置身波诡云谲的冷战格局，新中国一度面临被毛泽东称作“反华大合唱”的外部危机。面对不同性质的反华力量，毛泽东采取不同化解方案，以全球战略视野评估反华力量总体性质，辩证指出消极要素蕴藏向积极面转化的可能。毛泽东认为，破解反华力量和争取主动权的根本，在于团结一致、独立自主地推进我国社会主义建设。当下，我们在实现中华民族伟大复兴的征程上，需直面百年未有之大变局的加速演进。对此，习近平明确指出：“党的十八大以来，我们清醒认识到，新时代坚持和发展中国特色社会主义是一场艰巨而伟大的社会革命，各种敌对势力绝不会让我们顺顺利利实现中华民族伟大复兴。基于此，我向全党反复强调，必须进行具有许多新的历史特点的伟大斗争，必须准备付出更为艰巨、更为艰苦的努力。”为应对“严峻复杂的国际形势和接踵而至的巨大风险挑战”，我们必须敢于斗争，善于斗争，不断增强斗争本领，以高度的斗争智慧处理随时可能出现和升级的外部打压和遏制。因此，回顾毛泽东应对“反华大合唱”的战略思路，可以为当前推进中国式现代化伟业提供一定历史启示。

I. The Tense Situation of the International “Anti-China Chorus”

一、国际“反华大合唱”的紧张局势

In the mid-20th century, the “anti-China chorus” was rampant. When analyzing the international situation, Mao Zedong decomposed it into “three voices,” represented by the United States, India, and the Soviet Union respectively. During this period, anti-China forces almost formed a mutually echoing posture, creating a certain degree of external pressure on the development of the newly founded China.

20世纪中叶，“反华合唱”甚嚣尘上，毛泽东在分析国际局势时将其分解为“三重声部”，分别以美国、印度与苏联为代表。这一时期，反华力量几乎形成彼此呼应的态势，给新中国发展造成一定外部压力。

The newly founded China faced provocation and blockade from the Western “free world.” Economically, the United States maintained a comprehensive embargo against China, imposing more than five hundred additional categories of embargoed goods on China compared to the “international embargo list applicable to the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries.” [1]1 “Striking out on all fronts” (四面出击) is a phrase used by Mao in 1950 to describe a strategic posture of engaging multiple adversaries simultaneously, which he later advised against. Militarily, China was surrounded by a vast number of U.S. military bases; “in Japan alone, the United States had over eight hundred military bases.” [2]2 Mao Zedong, “The Situation in the Taiwan Strait and Our Policy,” 8 September 1958, in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 7, 422. The “ten fleas” metaphor was used by Mao on several occasions to describe the overextension of US global power. In 1958, Mao Zedong said while meeting with a Cambodian delegation: “Our external difficulties are also very great, namely that the United States is opposing us. There are U.S. bases in Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Thailand; the Philippines and Thailand have also joined military alliances.” [3]3 The First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–55) had established the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu as flashpoints. The 1958 bombardment was a concentrated artillery barrage, not an invasion, designed to test US resolve and support Arab nationalism. From September 1958 to May 1961, the United States continuously violated China’s territorial seas and airspace, prompting China to issue a total of one hundred and forty-eight serious warnings. [4]4 “Brinkmanship” (战争边缘政策) was a term coined by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to describe the policy of pushing a situation to the verge of war without actually entering it. Mao’s inversion of the term was a deliberate rhetorical counter. Politically, the United States long obstructed the newly founded China from joining the United Nations and hindered China’s achievement of national reunification. At the end of 1957, the United States attempted to downgrade the ambassadorial-level Sino-U.S. talks on the Taiwan issue, causing the talks to be suspended. Thereafter, it spread and promoted the “two Chinas” issue internationally, continuously escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait. [5]5 Mao Zedong, “Conversation with Nehru,” 19 October 1954, in *Mao Zedong’s Diplomatic Writings*, 168.

新中国受到西方“自由世界”挑衅与封锁。在经济方面，美国对中国持续实行全面禁运，对中国制定的禁运物资较“苏联和东欧国家适用的‘国际禁单’项目还要多五百余种”。在军事方面，新中国周围环绕数量庞大的美国军事基地，“单单在日本，美国就有八百多个军事基地”。1958年，毛泽东在接见柬埔寨代表团时说：“我们外部困难也很大，就是美国同我们作对，台湾、南朝鲜有美国基地，日本、菲律宾、南越、泰国也有它的基地，菲律宾、泰国还参加军事同盟。”从1958年9月到1961年5月，美国不断侵犯新中国领海领空，为此，中国总计发布一百四十八次严重警告。在政治方面，美国长期阻挠新中国加入联合国，并阻碍新中国实现国家统一。1957年末，美国企图降级讨论台湾问题的中美大使级会谈，致使会谈中断，此后更在国际上散播推行“两个中国”议题，使台海紧张局势不断升级。

India was the second non-communist-led country to establish diplomatic relations with the newly founded China. From 1950 to 1958, China and India experienced a period of friendly coexistence. India reached an understanding with China on matters such as calling for a ceasefire on the Korean Peninsula, supporting the newly founded China’s entry into the United Nations, and affirming that China’s Taiwan belongs to China. [6]6 The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion was an armed uprising in Lhasa against Chinese rule, which was suppressed by the People’s Liberation Army. In 1955, India

印度是与新中国建交的第二个非共产党领导的国家。1950年至1958年，中印曾有一段友好共处时期，印度在号召朝鲜半岛停战、支持新中国进入联合国、申明中国台湾属于中国[7]等事宜上都与新中国达成默契。1955年，印度等国共同邀请中国参与万隆会议。会议上，面对一些国家对共产主义运动的质疑污蔑，尼赫鲁积极声援中国。在周恩来倡议的“求同存异”精神引领下，会议成功举行，形成建立在“和平共处五项原则”基础之上的“十项原则”。此时，新中国与印度的融洽友善，体现了旧有殖民体系瓦解后亚洲人民联合起来创造世界新秩序的愿望。但是，殖民历史造成的隐忧并未彻底散去。一方面，英美势力与印度右翼势力相呼应，将印度的噶伦堡培养成西藏反叛势力和西方间谍的集中地，由此达到利用边界争议分化中印的目的，即“加强亚洲中立主义反对中共的情绪”；另一方面，印度精英对于殖民主义历史遗留问题既想反抗旧的殖民主义，又企图继承殖民主义在西藏非法获得的特权。西藏叛乱事件后，尼赫鲁正式提出中印边界问题，要求中国全盘接受印度的主张，尤其是承认由昔日英国殖民者划定的麦克马洪线，并命令印军进驻争议地带，建设哨所。1959年8月，中印军队在争议地带发生武装冲突，印军在冲突中率先开枪，六小时后中国才还击，印方共有两人伤亡。冲突发生后，印度方反应强烈，谴责中国发动“冷战”，与西方舆论共同挑拨中国与其他边境国家的关系，渲染“中国威胁论”。由此，“倾盆大雨的造谣污蔑都落到中国头上”。

During the same period, Sino-Soviet relations turned from warm to cold. "In 1958, the Soviet Union proposed establishing a long-wave radio station and a joint fleet, which was in fact an attempt to gain military control over China, and subsequently political control over China." Mao Zedong resolutely rejected this: "Why raise the issue of equal ownership? This is a political question. When it comes to political conditions, not even half a finger is acceptable... On this issue, we can do without aid for ten thousand years." With "control and counter-control" as the point of contention, Sino-Soviet contradictions thus unfolded. Thereafter, in preparation for negotiations with Britain and the United States on the nuclear test ban treaty and the US-Soviet summit, the Soviet Union unilaterally ceased providing atomic energy technical assistance to China and withdrew some technical experts; after visiting the United States, Khrushchev came to China to attend the tenth anniversary celebrations of the founding of the People's Republic of China, and during talks with the Chinese side suggested that China release American spies in China, blamed China for allowing the Dal

同一时期，中苏关系由暖转寒。“1958年苏联提出要搞长波电台、联合舰队，实际上是要在军事上控制中国，接下来就会是在政治上控制中国。”毛泽东坚决拒斥：“为什么要提出所有权各半的问题？这是一个政治问题。要讲政治条件，连半个指头都不行……在这个问题上，我们可以一万年不要援助。”以“控制与反控制”为交锋点，中苏矛盾就此展开。此后，苏联为准备与英美就禁止核试验问题的谈判和美苏首脑会议，单方面停止向中国提供原子能技术援助，并撤回部分技术专家；访美后，赫鲁晓夫来华参加新中国成立十周年庆典，与中方会谈时建议中国释放美国在华间谍，责怪中国放任达赖喇嘛叛逃，造成国际共产主义运动陷入被动，甚至暗示可使台湾像“远东共和国”那样独立。这些议题都是涉及中国主权的大是大非问题，为毛泽东、周恩来等人严正驳斥，赫鲁晓夫因而在公开讲话中映射中国“像公鸡好斗那样热衷于战争”。伴随上述一系列事件爆发，中苏在理解未来世界走向、帝国主义性质、世界解放运动和如何建设社会主义等问题上的分歧不断加大，中苏关系濒临破裂。

II. Distinguishing Anti-China Forces of Different Natures and Adopting Different Response Plans

二、辨析不同性质的反华力量采取不同应对方案

In response to the successive “anti-China choruses” internationally, Mao Zedong adopted different response plans on the basis of distinguishing anti-China forces of different natures. By grasping the principal contradiction on the international front, New China avoided falling into a situation of “striking out on all fronts” amid a rhythm of “tension and relaxation,” won international solidarity, and issued to the vast number of countries a just voice supporting national liberation and peaceful development.

针对国际上此起彼伏的“反华大合唱”，毛泽东在辨析不同性质的反华力量基础上采取不同应对方案。通过掌握国际方面主要矛盾，新中国在“张弛”间避免陷于“四面出击”的处境，争取了国际团结，并向广大国家发出支持民族解放与和平发展的正义之声。

(A) Handling Sino-U.S. Relations: Flexibly Carrying Out Struggle and Diplomacy

（一）处理中美关系：灵活开展斗争与外交

During this period, because the United States imposed military deterrence and economic blockade on New China, obstructed China’s complete reunification, and interfered in the world’s national liberation movements, the principal aspect of the Sino-American contradiction was diplomatic contradiction. Faced with the intimidation and encirclement of the world’s most powerful country and its camp, China neither responded passively nor acted rashly. Instead, based on the concrete situation in the world, it discerned the weaknesses beneath America’s strength and effectively restrained and struggled against it. Mao Zedong vividly analogized: “The United States is a strong power, but the territory it has occupied is too vast. Its ten fingers are pressing down ten fleas and cannot move them; it cannot even catch a single flea. Once its forces are dispersed, things become difficult.” [2]2 Mao Zedong, “The Situation in the Taiwan Strait and Our Policy,” 8 September 1958, in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 7, 422. The “ten fleas” metaphor was used by Mao on several occasions to describe the overextension of US global power. In July 1958, Iraq announced its withdrawal from the US-engineered Baghdad Pact. US and British forces then invaded Jordan and Lebanon, threatening the national independence movements of the Arab peoples and attempting to control the Middle East region. Prior to this, the situation in Taiwan had also grown increasingly tense: in March 1958, the United States announced the merger of its military institutions stationed in Taiwan, establishing the “U.S. Taiwan Defense Command”; in May, the United States chose Taiwan for its first missile test launch in the Far East, an unmistakable gesture of deterrence against the People’s Republic of China. In August 1958, when the world’s attention was focused on the Middle East, the People’s Liberation Army bombarded Kinmen, [3]3 The First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–55) had established the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu as flashpoints. The 1958 bombardment was a concentrated artillery barrage, not an invasion, designed to test US resolve and support Arab nationalism. both demonstrating its resolve to defend sovereignty and providing practical support to the world revolution. This move greatly shook the United States, prompting it to immediately dispatch half of its aircraft carrier fleet to the Taiwan Strait. Mao Zedong used the “noose” theory to analogize America’s global military strategy: on the surface, its military bases were deployed on a vast scale, but in reality it was being strung up by “nooses” such as Lebanon, Taiwan, Kinmen, and Matsu. China could use these nooses, with the momentum of a small force overcoming a large one, to restrain and strike at the United States—that is, to “use the brinkmanship policy to counter the Americans’ brinkmanship policy.” [4]4 “Brinkmanship” (战争边缘政策) was a term coined by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to describe the policy of pushing a situation to the verge of war without actually entering it. Mao’s inversion of the term was a deliberate rhetorical counter. In the process of the United States attempting to turn Taiwan into a dependency or even a trusteeship and fabricating the “two Chinas” issue, Mao Zedong, through the bombardment of Kinmen, once again declared that the Taiwan issue is China’s internal affair. At the same time, exploiting the US desire to extricate itself, he prompted the United States to resume the previously suspended Sino-American ambassadorial-level talks.

这一时期，由于对新中国实行军事威慑和经济封锁、阻碍中国完全统一、干涉世界民族解放运动等，中美矛盾的主要方面属于外交矛盾。面对世界上最强大的国家及其阵营的威逼围剿，中国并非被动应对，也非鲁莽出击，而是依据世界具体形势，洞悉美国强大之下的弱点并加以有效牵制、斗争。毛泽东形象比喻道：“美国是强国，霸占的地区太宽，它的十个指头按着十个跳蚤动不了啦，一个跳蚤也都抓不住。力量一分散，事情就难办了。”1958年7月，伊拉克宣布脱离美国策划的巴格拉军事条约。美军、英军随即入侵约旦、黎巴嫩，威胁阿拉伯人民的民族独立运动，试图控制中东地区。而在此前，台湾局势也愈发紧张：1958年3月，美国宣布合并驻台军事机构，成立“美军驻台协防军援司令部”；5月，美国在远东的第一次试验导弹发射即选择在台湾，对中华人民共和国有着不言而喻的威慑意味。1958年8月，当世界各国目光都聚焦中东时，中国人民解放军炮打金门，既展示了捍卫主权的决心，也以实际行动支援了世界革命。这一举措极大震动了美国，使其立刻调动半数航母编队前往台湾海峡。毛泽东以“绞索”理论来喻指美国的全球军事战略：看似军事基地铺排庞大，实则被黎巴嫩、台湾、金门、马祖等“绞索”套上，而中国可以利用这些绞索，以四两拨千斤之态势牵制打击美国，也即用“战争边缘政策对付美国人的战争边缘政策”。在美国试图将台湾转变为附庸国乃至托管地，制造“两个中国”议题过程中，毛泽东以炮打金门的方式再次声明台湾问题是中国内政，同时利用美国急于脱身心理，促使美国恢复此前中断的中美两国大使级会谈。

(2) Handling Sino-Indian Relations: Striving for Unity on the Basis of Appropriate Struggle

（二）处理中印关系：适度斗争基础上争取团结

With regard to India, Mao Zedong analyzed the nature of the state in diplomatic exchanges, pointing out the potential dual orientation of newly independent nationalist countries. Mao Zedong clearly recognized that capitalism could be divided into imperialism, which oppresses other nations, and nationalism, which occupies an intermediate position. He said: nationalist countries “were originally the rear area of imperialism, but because they also oppose imperialism, they transform into the rear area of our proletariat, the rear area of socialism.” Therefore, India could either degenerate into national chauvinism under the inducement of imperialist forces and domestic right-wing forces, acting as an anti-China hatchet man, or, possessing anti-colonial aspirations, it could be an ally worth winning over. In modern times, both China and India were once reduced to semi-colonies or colonies, suffering imperialist aggression and oppression. Thus, in the process of the national liberation movement, the independence of India and China became two banners. A shared historical memory once allowed China and India to reach mutual understanding under the Cold War structure. Mao Zedong once sincerely stated in a conversation with Nehru: “We Easterners have a feeling of uniting, a feeling of defending ourselves… We have a great commonality, and that is that we all have to deal with imperialism.” [5]5 Mao Zedong, “Conversation with Nehru,” 19 October 1954, in *Mao Zedong’s Diplomatic Writings*, 168. Nehru, when evaluating the Asian-African Conference, also pointed out: “Western countries may not like it, because they have long been deciding our destiny. But whether they like it or not, this matter is always inevitable… The conference will signify the awakening of Asia and Africa after two hundred years of domination and exploitation by Western countries.”

针对印度，毛泽东在外交来往中分析国家性质，指出新近独立的民族主义国家潜在的双重面向。毛泽东清楚认识到，资本主义可以区分为压迫其他民族的帝国主义和处于中间状态的民族主义。他说：民族主义国家“本来是帝国主义的后方，但因为它又反帝，就转化为我们无产阶级的后方，社会主义的后方”。因此，印度既可能在帝国主义势力与国内右翼势力诱导下蜕变为民族沙文主义，充当反华打手，也具有反殖民主义愿望，是可以争取的同盟军。在近代，中印两国都一度沦为半殖民地或殖民地，受到帝国主义侵略和压迫，因此，在民族解放运动过程中，印度与中国的独立便成为两面旗帜。共通的历史记忆一度让中印双方在冷战格局下达成相互理解。毛泽东曾在与尼赫鲁的谈话中诚恳指出：“我们东方人有团结起来的感情，有保卫自己的感情……我们有一个很大的共同点，那就是我们都要对付帝国主义。”尼赫鲁也在评价亚非会议时指出：“西方国家也许不喜欢它，因为它们长期以来一直在决定我们的命运。但是不管它们喜欢不喜欢，这件事总是不可避免的……会议将表示亚洲和非洲在受到西方国家两百年来的统治和剥削后的觉醒。”

Against this background, Mao Zedong strove for unity as much as possible on the basis of adhering to principles and engaging in appropriate struggle. After the Tibetan Rebellion incident, [6]6 The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion was an armed uprising in Lhasa against Chinese rule, which was suppressed by the People’s Liberation Army. Nehru repeatedly expressed sympathy and support for the rebels amid the Western anti-China clamor. In response, Mao Zedong stated that open reasoning and struggle should be carried out, so that New China could make its voice heard with neither haughtiness nor humility in the world public opinion arena. For example, when revising an editorial, Mao Zedong changed the previous vague accusation: “Change it to ‘British imperialist elements and Indian expansionist elements, colluding in villainy, openly interfering in China’s internal affairs, and attempting to take Tibet away.’ Directly target Britain and India, without evasion.” [7]7 “One finger among ten” (十个指头中的一个手指头): A Chinese idiom meaning a minor part of a larger whole, used by Mao to suggest that Sino-Soviet differences were a small issue compared to the overall relationship. Subsequently, the People’s Daily published “The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru’s Philosophy,” refuting Nehru’s fallacies regarding Tibet’s democratic reform. On the basis of conducting struggle with reason and restraint, Mao Zedong rationally de-escalated the dispute and strove to reach unity with India. When revising the Foreign Ministry’s draft reply to the Indian Foreign Secretary, Mao Zedong added a passage expressing China’s desire for peace, pointing out that even though the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan had joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization aimed at China, China would still not treat these three countries as enemies, let alone India, which had not joined this treaty. In this regard, Mao Zedong sincerely said: “We cannot treat friends as enemies; this is our state policy… The quarrel between our two countries is merely an episode in the millennia-long friendly relations between our two countries… Indian friends, what are your thoughts? Would you agree with our way of thinking?” [8]8 The McMahon Line: A border line between China and India drawn by British colonial authorities in 1914, not recognized by the Chinese government. After the Kongka Pass incident on the western sector of the Sino-Indian border, [9]9 Zhang Wentian (1900–1976): A senior Chinese Communist Party leader and diplomat, who served as China’s ambassador to the Soviet Union and later as a vice minister of foreign affairs. China showed great restraint and sincerity in the process of consultation and negotiation. Mao Zedong proposed that, to avoid disputes, where the actual lines of control of the Chinese and Indian armies were within twenty kilometers of each other, each side should withdraw ten kilometers, creating a no-weapons zone and a peace zone, so as to achieve the effect of military retreat and political advance in international public opinion. “Nehru said both sides should withdraw from Longju; I expanded it to the entire line of actual control. Our love of peace has reached its extreme.” [10]10 “peaceful evolution” (和平演变) — a U.S. Cold War strategy, articulated by John Foster Dulles, aimed at subverting socialist states from within through ideological and cultural infiltration rather than military force. This proposal, issued in the form of a letter from the Premier, was acknowledged even by Indian political figures as “full of a spirit of reconciliation.” This fully demonstrated the profound connotation of New China’s concept of sovereignty: China’s external struggle for sovereignty was clearly directed at imperialism. As for border disputes formed with neighboring countries within the colonial system, they should, on the premise of “sovereignty belongs to me,” be resolved through consultation between the two sides at an appropriate time, reaching a mutually understanding outcome, so that the powerless and the violated in the old world could unite to create new relations and a new order in the new world. After achieving national independence, this move undoubtedly pointed to a more thorough revolution to crush the shadow of colonialism.

在这一背景下，毛泽东在坚持原则、适当斗争基础上尽量争取团结。西藏叛乱事件后，尼赫鲁在西方反华喧嚣声中多次表达对叛乱分子的同情支持。对此，毛泽东表示要进行公开的说理与斗争，在世界舆论场发出属于新中国不卑不亢的声音。例如，在修改社论时，毛泽东改变过去宽泛指责的立场：“改为‘英国帝国主义分子与印度扩张主义分子，狼狈为奸，公开干涉中国内政，妄图把西藏拿了过去’。直指英、印，不要躲闪”。此后，《人民日报》发表《西藏的革命和尼赫鲁的哲学》一文，驳斥了尼赫鲁对西藏民主改革的谬论。在开展有理有节斗争的基础上，毛泽东理性地为纷争降火，努力与印度达成团结。在修改外交部对印度外交部外事秘书的答复稿件时，毛泽东加写一段话，表明中国追求和平的心愿，指出：即便菲律宾、泰国、巴基斯坦加入了旨在针对中国的东南亚条约组织，中国依然不会将这三个国家当作敌人，更不用说没有参加这一条约的印度。对此，毛泽东诚恳地说：“我们不能把友人当敌人，这是我们的国策……我们两国之间的吵架，不过是两国千年万年友好过程中的一个插曲而已……印度朋友们，你们的心意如何呢？你们会同意我们的这种想法吗？”中印边界西段空喀山口冲突发生后，中方在协商谈判过程中表现出极大的克制与诚意。毛泽东提议，为避免纠纷，中印军队的实际控制线相距在二十公里内的，各退十公里，创造一个无枪地带与和平地带，以达到军事上后撤，政治上进攻的国际舆论效益，“尼赫鲁说双方撤出朗久，我就扩大成整个实际控制线，我们爱好和平就达于极点了”。这份以总理致信形式发出的提议，即便是印度政界人士也承认“富有和解精神”。这充分展现出新中国主权概念的深刻内涵，中国外争主权的对象清晰地指向帝国主义。针对在殖民体系中形成的与邻国的边界分歧，则应基于“主权在我”的前提，由双方在合适的时间进行协商，达成彼此谅解的结果，使旧世界中的无权者、受侵犯者，团结起来创造新世界的新关系和新秩序。在实现民族独立后，这一举措无疑指向更加彻底地碾碎殖民主义阴影的革命。

(3) Handling Sino-Soviet Relations: Controlling Disputes and Striving for Unity

（三）处理中苏关系：控制争议争取团结

Faced with the intensifying Sino-Soviet differences, out of overall considerations, China hoped to maintain unity with the Soviet Union and confine the contentious issues to “one finger among ten.” [7]7 “One finger among ten” (十个指头中的一个手指头): A Chinese idiom meaning a minor part of a larger whole, used by Mao to suggest that Sino-Soviet differences were a small issue compared to the overall relationship. Khrushchev, in his speech at the 21st Congress of the CPSU, openly insinuated criticism of China’s path of socialist construction. Mao Zedong, however, stressed the importance of unity, stating that the report of the 21st Congress of the CPSU generally conformed to the spirit of the Moscow Meeting and represented an improvement over the report of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. As for the differences, he said, “Let’s wait and see. There are differences between us, but let’s not talk about them for now.” On several issues where Sino-Soviet differences existed, Mao repeatedly emphasized shelving disputes for the time being, not only to avoid conflict and maintain exchanges but also to allow historical development to naturally demonstrate which path was correct, thereby creating a basis for consensus and keeping Party-to-Party relations normal and friendly. Regarding Khrushchev’s excessive praise of the United States as a force for world peace after the Camp David meeting, the Chinese Communist Party leadership held differing views. Mao pointed out that toward the United States, one must be prepared for both peace and struggle, and not merely harbor illusions of peace: “For example, to destroy China—does he, the Soviet Union, think he won’t be destroyed? He will be destroyed all the same… One day, when the West turns hostile, he will find himself passive.” Nevertheless, Mao adhered to the principle that the proletarian parties of each country should correct their own errors, believing that “it is better for them to correct such mistakes domestically; correction by foreign parties is not good.” However, the Soviet Union precisely violated this principle established at the 1957 Moscow Meeting. On February 6, 1960, after the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border dispute, the Central Committee of the CPSU criticized China in an oral communication. In its reply, the CCP stated that it could not agree with the CPSU Central Committee’s criticism and accusations: “We suggest that our two fraternal parties each reserve their own opinions and calmly await the development of objective facts to prove the truth and judge right and wrong.” Through its own words and actions, the CCP demonstrated to the greatest extent possible its pursuit of more equal socialist state-to-state and Party-to-Party relations.

面对中苏分歧愈演愈烈，出于全局考虑，中国希望能与苏联保持团结，将争议问题控制在“十个指头中的一个手指头上”。赫鲁晓夫在苏共二十一大的讲话中公开映射批判中国的社会主义建设道路。毛泽东则强调，要以团结为重，他表示苏共二十一大报告总体符合莫斯科会议精神，较苏共二十大报告有进步，至于分歧部分，“看看以后再说。我们之间是有分歧的，但现在不要说”。在中苏数个有分歧的问题上，毛泽东多次强调暂且搁置争议，不仅想避免纷争、维系往来，也希望以历史的发展自然展示道路正确与否，以创造形成共识的基础，使两党关系保持正常友好。对于在戴维营会议后，赫鲁晓夫过分推崇美国作为世界和平力量，中国共产党领导人持不同意见。毛泽东指出，对美国需要做和平与斗争两手准备，而不能仅抱有和平幻想：“比如破坏中国，你苏联他就不要破坏呀？他还是要破坏嘛……有一天，西方一翻脸，他就处于被动。”不过，毛泽东秉持由各国无产阶级政党自己纠正错误的原则，认为“这种错误，他们国内自己纠正比较好，外国来纠正不好”。但是，苏联恰恰打破了这一在1957年莫斯科会议上建立起来的原则。1960年2月6日，在中印发生边界纠纷后，苏联共产党中央在口头通知中对中国表示批评。在回复中，中国共产党表示不能同意苏共中央的批评指责：“我们建议，让我们两个兄弟党各自保留自己的意见，冷静等候客观事实的发展来证明真相和判断是非吧。”中国共产党以自身言行最大可能地展示出对更平等的社会主义政党和国家关系的追求。

Faced with differences with India and the Soviet Union, China adhered to principles, combining unity with appropriate struggle, clearly expressing its stance on specific events while showing goodwill and valuing bilateral relations. Due to various historical reasons, Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated over a period of time, but it cannot be simplistically concluded that Mao’s strategy of struggle and unity was wrong, or that China’s diplomatic efforts were futile. It must be recognized that New China had just stepped onto the world stage, and its diplomatic moves concerned not only the relevant countries but also neighboring nations and the entire world. Regarding the Sino-Indian conflict, in addition to sincere consultations with India, China also fully communicated with leaders of neighboring countries concerned about the incident. For instance, when Mao discussed the matter with leaders from Afghanistan, Indonesia, and other countries, he stated China’s attitude toward the Sino-Indian differences, conveyed its desire for peace and unity, and pointed out: “The unity of the whole of Asia on the basis of the Bandung Principles is the general trend; quarrels cannot solve problems.” China’s understanding of sovereignty and its approach to handling border disputes also won recognition from peoples of other former colonies and regions. For example, some African figures expressed support for China: “Opposing the McMahon Line created by British imperialism, they pointed out that on the black African continent, there are currently many ‘McMahon Lines,’ which must be abolished in the future.” [8]8 The McMahon Line: A border line between China and India drawn by British colonial authorities in 1914, not recognized by the Chinese government. At a time when the world was closely watching the Asia-Pacific situation and internal differences within the socialist camp, China’s words and actions demonstrated outstanding qualities, helping to dispel some misunderstandings about New China and enabling people to gain a deeper understanding of the newborn socialist regime in the East. This created favorable conditions for China to open up a broader global diplomatic situation and establish more extensive economic, political, and cultural ties.

面对与印度、苏联的分歧，中国坚持原则，在适度斗争基础上加以团结，既毫不含糊地表达了中国对具体事件的态度方针，又展现出友善与对双方关系的重视。由于各种历史原因，中印、中苏关系在一段时期内相继恶化，但不能简单据此认为，毛泽东的斗争与团结策略是错误的，或中国的外交努力是徒劳的。需要看到的是，新中国刚刚步入世界舞台，其外交举措不仅关涉相关国家，而且是周边国家乃至全世界关注的焦点。针对中印冲突，除与印度进行诚恳商榷，中方还与关切这一事件的周边国家领导人进行充分沟通，如毛泽东在与阿富汗、印度尼西亚等多国领导人洽谈时，都表明了对中印分歧的态度，传递了和平团结的愿望，指出：“整个亚洲在万隆原则上团结起来，这是大势所趋，吵架不能解决问题。”中国对主权问题的理解和处理边界纷争的方式，也获得同为前殖民地国家、地区的人民认同，如一些非洲人士就表示支持中国：“反对英帝国主义制造的麦克马洪线，指出在黑色非洲大陆，目前就存在着许多‘麦克马洪线’，将来非废除不可。”在全世界密切关注亚太局势和社会主义阵营内部分歧之际，中国的言行举措展现出杰出品质，有利于消除一些人对新中国的误会，让人们更深入了解东方新生的社会主义政权，从而为中国打开更广泛的全球外交局面以及建立更普遍的经济、政治、文化联系创造了有利条件。

III. Interpreting the Essence and Impact of the “Anti-China Chorus” with Dialectical Materialism

三、以唯物辩证法解读“反华大合唱”的实质及影响

At a time when anti-China forces were rampant, some comrades expressed that they were “very worried and very puzzled.” In addition to proposing specific means of struggle based on concrete circumstances, Mao Zedong also analyzed the essence and overall impact of the “anti-China chorus” from a high vantage point using dialectics. This served to boost morale and unify thinking with correct understanding, minimizing its negative effects as much as possible and turning unfavorable factors into favorable conditions for building socialism. Although the anti-China “wind and waves were fierce” during this period, with both East and West presenting a “stormy” atmosphere, Mao still adhered to a spirit of revolutionary optimism, pointing out the possibility of opening up a bright prospect amid the atmosphere of the “anti-China chorus.”

在反华力量甚嚣尘上之际，一些同志表示对此“很担心，很想不通”。除结合具体情况提出斗争手段，毛泽东还高屋建瓴地辩证分析了“反华大合唱”的实质及总体影响，从而以正确的认识鼓舞精神、统一思想，尽可能削弱其消极影响，将不利因素转化为建设社会主义的有利条件。尽管这一时期反华“风浪正猛”，东西方皆呈现出“疾风骤雨”的气象，但毛泽东依然秉持革命乐观主义精神，指出了在“反华大合唱”的空气中开辟光明前景的可能性。

(I) A Comprehensive Interpretation of the Essence of the “Anti-China Chorus”: “Great Support for China, Minor Opposition to China”

（一）全面解读“反华大合唱”的实质：“大拥华，小反华”

Mao pointed out that one should neither overestimate the strength of anti-China forces nor underestimate the energy of world people supporting New China. In early 1960, China participated in the East Pakistan Industrial and Agricultural Exhibition, and the Chinese exhibition sparked a wave of visits throughout Dhaka city and other cities in East Pakistan. At the New Delhi World Agricultural Fair, the Chinese pavilion attracted over 3.5 million visitors, the highest among all national agricultural pavilions. Based on this, Mao wrote a commentary titled “On the Question of Anti-China,” pointing out that the world’s anti-China forces accounted for only a tiny fraction of the world’s population, “estimated to be only a few percent of all humanity, say five percent, at most no more than ten percent. The truly anti-China elements are just a small handful.” The anti-China forces themselves were also intermittent: “When there is an issue to exploit, such as the Tibet issue and the Sino-Indian border issue, they oppose for a while.” At the same time, the anti-China camp, especially within the imperialist camp, was not united; imperialist countries in different positions had their own interests and calculations. For example, Britain and the United States, in order to maintain their relatively large spheres of influence, “have become conservative, while West Germany and Japan want to expand. West Germany wants to expand; the United States does not approve, and Britain even less so.” In July 1959, Mao read a summary of Zhang Wentian’s speech at a foreign ministry internal discussion meeting. [9]9 Zhang Wentian (1900–1976): A senior Chinese Communist Party leader and diplomat, who served as China’s ambassador to the Soviet Union and later as a vice minister of foreign affairs. The summary noted: “On many issues of common interest to the West, Britain and the United States are united in opposing us.” Mao added a supplementary remark after this sentence: “But on other issues, even some extremely important ones, Britain and the United States are not united in dealing with us; there are serious differences.” The internal divisions within the anti-China forces would inevitably affect the sustainability of anti-China activities, potentially providing a relatively stable international environment for New China’s construction. Therefore, Mao judged that the overall situation of the so-called “great anti-China” was that “about ten percent of the world’s people oppose us for long periods but intermittently.” In spatial terms, New China had over ninety percent neutral and friendly forces to unite; in temporal terms, New China could strive for peaceful coexistence with the vast majority of countries during the intervals between anti-China episodes. Overall, “it is actually great support for China, minor opposition to China.” Amid the clamor of international hostile forces, Mao reversed the thinking and analyzed the obscured favorable conditions: the anti-China camp had fragility and unsustainability; within the anti-China wave lay vast areas of “support for China”; apart from intermittent anti-China periods, there existed long periods of peace that could be fully utilized. This constituted the favorable environment and focal point for New China to advance its domestic and international work.

毛泽东指出，不能过高估计反华力量，也不能过低估计世界人民支援新中国的能量。1960年初，中国参加东巴基斯坦工农业展览，中国的展览在整个达卡城及东巴基斯坦其他城市中掀起了一股参观热潮。在新德里世界农业博览会中，中国馆参观人数多达三百五十多万人，为众国家农业馆中参观人数最多者。据此，毛泽东撰写题为《关于反华问题》的批语，指出世界反华的力量只占世界人口的极小部分，“估计共只占全人类的百分之几，例如说百分之五吧，最多不过占百分之十。真正反华的，不过是一小撮人”。反华力量本身也是间歇性的，“有题目可借，例如西藏问题和中印边界问题，他们就反一阵”。同时，反华阵营内部尤其是帝国主义阵营内部并不团结，处于不同地位的帝国主义国家有各自利益盘算，如英美为维系自身较大势力，“变得保守起来，而西德、日本则要扩张。西德要扩张，美国不赞成，英国更不赞成”。1959年7月，毛泽东阅览张闻天在外交部务虚会议上的发言纪要。纪要指出：“在西方许多共同利害问题上，英国同美国是一致反对我们的。”毛泽东在此句后补充指出：“但是在另外一些问题上，甚至是某几个极重要问题上，英美并不是一致对付我们，而是有严重分歧的。”反华力量内部充满分裂，势必会影响反华的持续性，从而可能为新中国开展建设提供相对稳定的国际环境。因此，毛泽东判断，所谓“大反华”总体情况是，“世界上有百分之十左右的人长期地但是间歇地反对我们”。在空间维度上，新中国拥有九成以上中立与友善力量能够团结；在时间维度上，新中国能在间歇性反华阶段外争取与绝大部分国家和平共处，总体而言“其实是大拥华，小反华”。国际敌对力量喧嚣之际，毛泽东扭转思维，剖析出被遮蔽的有利条件：反华阵营有脆弱性、不可持续性；反华浪潮中潜藏着大片“拥华”地带；在间歇性反华外，存有长时期能够充分利用的和平阶段。这便构成新中国推进国内和国外工作的有利环境和着力点。

(II) Dialectical Analysis of the Impact of Anti-China Activities: Objectively Beneficial to the People of the World and the Chinese People

（二）辩证分析反华的影响：客观上有利于世界人民与中国人民

When New China completed the socialist transformation and entered the stage of large-scale socialist construction, the “anti-China chorus” undoubtedly added discordant external “noise.” How to understand the overall impact of anti-China activities on China and the world was also related to whether domestic confidence could be consolidated and a consensus on construction formed. Mao dialectically pointed out that anti-China activities should not be regarded as purely negative elements; instead, the situation should be used to transform them into positive elements, benefiting China’s construction and the world’s national liberation movements.

当新中国完成社会主义改造，步入大规模社会主义建设阶段，“反华大合唱”无疑为此增加不和谐的外部“杂音”。如何理解反华对中国与世界造成的总体影响，这也关系到能否凝聚国内信心，形成建设共识。毛泽东辩证指出，不能将反华视为纯粹的消极要素，而应借势将之转化为积极要素，助益于中国建设与世界民族解放运动。

Mao Zedong believed that anti-China forces objectively benefit the awakening of the world’s people, enabling China to gain more steadfast support: “Anti

毛泽东认为，反华力量在客观上反而有利于世界人民的觉醒，使中国获得更多坚定的支持，“反华反共对我们有好处。一是暴露了反动派的面目，在人民面前丧失威信”。例如，当国际反华势力谎称中印边界冲突原因在于中国试图侵略印度领土时，中国主动提出，在争议地区相距二十公里内，双方军队各退十公里创造无枪地带，以极具和平精神的方案揭露了谎言。毛泽东认为，这一进程将削弱反华势力的公信力，中国和平真诚的国际形象将经受住历史考验，得到更广大世界人民的理解与承认。毛泽东鼓励中国人民，要相信世界人民拥有判断事件走向与辨析是非的智慧：“我们准备被孤立，这是一方面。另一方面，我们能得到许多国家、许多人民的拥护，许多共产党的拥护。我们从来相信广大群众，我们不会孤立。”

Beyond this, anti-China forces could also become a driving force for socialist construction, stimulating the potential of the Chinese people and raising the consciousness of the world’s people. Mao Zedong pointed out: “Being opposed by China has its benefits: first, it can expose the enemy; second, it can make us angry. Do not let the anger show; it must be turned into strength.” “I think that the current Cold War and international tension are disadvantageous to the capitalist world but relatively advantageous to the world’s people’s revolution.” Here, Mao Zedong’s judgment was well-aimed. At a time when the United States had shifted its strategy toward the socialist camp to “peaceful evolution” and Khrushchev was advocating a “policy of peaceful coexistence” to reach a compromise with the United States and achieve the goal of “co-governing the world,” the artificial incitement of anti-China sentiment exposed the hypocrisy of Western imperialism: it “not only has a side that speaks of peace, but also a side of war.” If Western imperialism treats China this way today, it will treat other countries in the socialist camp the same way tomorrow, and the world’s anti-imperialist liberation wave the day after. This can enable the people of all China and the entire world to understand the dual nature of imperialism and recognize the infeasibility of a plan that seeks peace solely through compromise. “It will arouse the majority of the world’s people to awaken; they will see that imperialism, reactionary nationalism, and revisionism are deceivers. The whole world is extremely bright. The thicker the dark clouds, the greater the light. When the rainy season passes, clear skies will come.” Under external pressure, the people of New China could more quickly coalesce and coordinate. Just as the humiliating experience of modern China signing unequal treaties with imperialists awakened the Chinese people’s fervor to save the nation, and the existential threat of national subjugation during the War of Resistance Against Japan fostered a broad anti-Japanese national united front, the anti-China posture under the Cold War structure likewise made the Chinese people clearly realize: to seize the initiative in the brutal international struggle, China must become stronger and achieve modernization more rapidly, transforming anger and a sense of humiliation into a driving force for socialist construction. In this sense, anti-China sentiment constitutes an external condition for the Chinese people to build consensus and move toward the future.

除此之外，反华力量还能成为社会主义建设的推动力，刺激中国人民的潜力，提升世界人民的觉悟。毛泽东指出：“反华有好处，一可以暴露敌人，二可以使我们怄气，愤怒不要表现出来，要变成力量。”“我看现在冷战和国际紧张对资本主义世界不利，而对世界的人民革命比较有利。”在此，毛泽东的论断有的放矢。在美国将对社会主义阵营的方针策略转变为“和平演变”，赫鲁晓夫力主“三和政策”以与美国达成妥协从而实现“共治世界”的目标之际，人为煽动反华暴露了西方帝国主义的虚伪性，它们“不只是有讲和平的一面，还有战争的一面”。西方帝国主义今日对中国如此，明日对社会主义阵营其他国家也是如此，后日对世界反帝国主义解放浪潮亦是如此，这就能使全中国和全世界人民了解帝国主义的两面性，认清单纯以妥协求和平方案的不可行性。“激起世界大多数人民觉醒起来，他们会看到帝国主义、反动民族主义、修正主义是骗子。全世界极为光明。乌云越厚，光明越多。黄梅季节过去，晴天到来。”在外部压力下，新中国人民就能够更快速凝聚协同起来。正如近代中国与帝国主义签订不平等条约的屈辱经历唤醒了中国人民的救国热忱、抗日战争中亡国忧患促成广泛的抗日民族统一战线，冷战格局下的反华态势同样使中国人民清晰意识到：为在残酷的国际斗争中掌握主动权，必须使中国更加强大、更加快速地实现现代化，将愤怒和受辱感转化为建设社会主义的推动力。在这个意义上，反华构成中国人民凝聚共识、迈向未来的外部条件。

In sum, Mao Zedong, relying on dialectical thinking, saw the possibility of transforming anti-China sentiment into a favorable external condition. With a high degree of confidence in the theory, he pointed out that anti-China forces were merely a small faction on a world scale and that China would not therefore become closed and isolated. Mao Zedong encouraged the Chinese people to unite with the world’s people in an open and positive attitude, to establish ties with most neutral or potentially friendly countries, and to actively guide and transform the emotions stirred by external pressure into the subjective initiative for carrying out socialist construction.

总之，毛泽东凭借辩证思维看到将反华转化为有利外部条件的可能性，以高度的理论自信指出，反华只是世界范围内的一小股势力，中国不会因此走向封闭孤立。毛泽东鼓舞中国人民，以开放积极的态度团结世界人民，与大多数中立或潜在友好国家建立联系，并积极将由外部压力激发的情绪引导转化为开展社会主义建设的主观能动性。

IV. The Fundamental Force to Weaken the Anti-China Wave: Independently and Self-Reliantly Advance Socialist Construction

四、削弱反华浪潮的根本力量：独立自主推进社会主义建设

Although the anti-China issue was deliberately manufactured by foreign hostile forces, Mao Zedong did not regard it as merely a diplomatic problem. In response to the blockade and slander by anti-China forces, China naturally had to counterattack and clarify matters. However, this could still fall into the rhythm of anti-China sentiment, leading to a passive situation of following suit and being exhausted from coping. The Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, proceeded from historical materialism, analyzed the patterns and prospects of the emergence of anti-China forces, and firmly grasped the initiative in solving the problem in their own hands. Mao Zedong pointed out that anti-China forces often use domestic incidents in China as a pretext to stir up activities: “If there is a topic to exploit… they will oppose for a while.” The anti-China forces’ use of pretexts to create momentum often has several aims: to infringe on China’s sovereignty; to pressure China and slow its development; to stigmatize China in the eyes of the world’s people and weaken the influence of socialist New China. In short, the imperialists’ goal in opposing China is not only to obtain direct benefits such as resources and leverage but also to undermine New China’s construction plan, thereby using the failure of New China’s modernization path to highlight the sole correctness of their own path. Mao Zedong pointed out: “New things always have people opposing them. Once they are accomplished, people stop opposing them. If people oppose you, it means you haven’t done well yet. People believe in revolutionary victory, but they don’t believe in the construction aspect.” The construction path needs construction achievements to prove itself. “It needs to be proven domestically, and it also needs to be proven internationally.” Mao Zedong pointed out that the fundamental method for reducing the arrogance of anti-China forces at the source lies in China uniting itself, doing its domestic work well, and accelerating socialist construction, using internal factors to drive the transformation of external factors. On this, he said: “In short, the center of all problems lies in our own unity and in doing our own work well.” “If we manage ourselves well, we need not fear others opposing China.” If construction and production can be smoothly advanced, it will not only effectively dissolve the pretexts of anti-China forces but also increase the cost of opposing China, reduce the benefits of opposing China, and make anti-China efforts futile. Mao Zedong predicted that as China’s total and per capita domestic production gradually ranked among the world’s top, the intervals between anti-China campaigns would be greatly lengthened. “This will force the Americans to establish diplomatic relations with us and do business on an equal footing; otherwise, they will be isolated.” It can be seen that Mao Zedong always grasped the direction of history with a dynamic and dialectical methodology. In his view, there was a trend of mutual rise and fall in the balance of power between China and the anti-China side; anti-China forces could not sustain themselves for long, and those hostile to China could transform into partners for China’s development; China would not always be in the passive position of being opposed—this depended on the development of New China itself. Then, regarding how to carry out socialist construction, Mao Zedong considered it from multiple angles.

虽然反华议题由国外敌对力量刻意制造，但毛泽东并不认为这仅仅是外交问题。针对反华势力的封锁和抹黑，中国自然有必要予以回击与澄清，不过，这依然可能落入反华节奏，导致一种亦步亦趋、疲于应付的被动局面。以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人从唯物史观出发，分析反华势力涌现的规律与远景，将解决问题的主动权牢牢把握在自己手上。毛泽东指出，反华力量往往借助中国国内事端开展活动，“有题目可借……他们就反一阵”。反华势力借题造势往往有几重目的：侵害中国主权；向中国施压，延缓中国的发展；在世界人民面前污名化中国，削弱社会主义新中国的影响力。总之，帝国主义反华的目的不但在于获取资源、操控权等直接利益，还在于动摇新中国的建设方案，进而以对新中国现代化道路的失败反衬出自身道路的唯一正确性。毛泽东指出：“新事物总有人反对，搞成了就不反对，人家反对就是你还没有搞好。革命胜利，人家是相信的，建设方面人家不相信。”建设道路需要建设成果来证明。“在国内需要证明，在国际也需要证明。”毛泽东指出，从源头上消减反华势力的嚣张气焰，根本方法在于中国自身团结一致，做好国内工作，加快社会主义建设，以内因推动外因的转化。对此，他说：“总之，一切问题的中心在于我们自己的团结和自己的工作都要做得好。”“管好了自己，就不怕人家反华。”如果能顺利推进建设生产，那么不仅能够有力化解反华势力的话柄，还能增加反华成本，降低反华收益，使反华无功而返。毛泽东预言，随着国内生产总产量与人均产量逐渐位居世界前列，反华的间歇时间将被极大拉长。“这会迫使美国人同我们建交，并且平等地做生意，否则他们就会被孤立。”可见，毛泽东始终以动态辩证的方法论把握历史走向，在他看来，中国与反华方面在力量对比之间存在此消彼长的趋势；反华力量无法长时期维系自身，与中国敌对者有可能转化为中国发展的合作伙伴；中国不会始终处于被反对的被动局面，这取决于新中国自身发展。那么，对于如何开展社会主义建设，毛泽东从多角度进行了思考。

(1) Adhere to Establishing an Independent and Complete National Economic System

（一）坚持建立独立完整的国民经济体系

Facing severe external challenges and pressures, establishing an independent and complete industrial system, especially an industrial system, was the top priority for ensuring national security and development. Regarding this key strategy, Mao Zedong had already given a far-sighted explanation on the eve of the founding of New China. At the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party, Mao Zedong formally proposed for the first time the development goal of establishing an independent and complete industrial system, laying the fundamental tone for New China’s industrial development. After the founding of New China, facing many difficulties and challenges, Mao Zedong unswervingly adhered to the development concept of establishing a complete industrial system. For example, when reading and commenting on the Soviet textbook *Political Economy*, Mao Zedong, regarding the textbook’s introduction that China “set itself the task of establishing a complete industrial system,” pointed out that this was the result of struggle and debate with the Soviet Union: “In the past, they and some Eastern European countries all wanted us not to build a complete industrial system.” History has proven that this development goal laid the economic foundation for China to unswervingly carry out socialist construction amid the raging storms of international turmoil. In addition to advocating the establishment of an independent and complete industrial system, Mao Zedong also systematically planned the overall development of the economy. Industry is not isolated but embedded within the overall structure of the national economy. Without an independent and complete national economic system, there would be no independent and complete industrial system. Based on the profound lessons of the Soviet Stalinist model, Mao Zedong pointed out that only coordinated development among agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry could enable the long-term healthy development of the industrial system. Combining the experiences and lessons of China’s own construction, Mao Zedong pointed out that it was necessary to explore a construction path of coordinated development among various industries, “giving priority to the development of heavy industry while simultaneously developing industry and agriculture,” in order to balance immediate interests with long-term interests.

面对严峻的外部挑战与压力，建立独立完整的产业体系尤其是工业体系，是保障国家安全与发展的重中之重。对于这一关键战略，毛泽东在新中国成立前夕便已做过高瞻远瞩的阐释。在党的七届二中全会上，毛泽东第一次正式提出建立独立的完整的工业体系的发展目标，为新中国工业事业发展奠定根本基调。新中国成立后，面对诸多困难挑战，毛泽东毫不动摇秉持建立完整工业体系的发展理念。例如，在阅读评议苏联《政治经济学教科书》时，毛泽东针对教科书介绍的中国“给自己提出建立完整的工业体系的任务”，指出这是与苏联争论斗争后的成果：“过去，他们和东欧的一些国家都曾经要我们不搞完整的工业体系。”历史已证明，这一发展目标为我国在国际风波狂澜中坚定不移开展社会主义建设奠定了经济基础。除主张推进建立独立完整的工业体系，毛泽东还系统谋划经济全局发展。工业并非孤立的，而是内嵌于整体国民经济结构的整体。没有独立完整的国民经济体系，就不会有独立完整的工业体系。基于苏联斯大林模式的深刻教训，毛泽东指出只有农业、工业（轻工业、重工业）之间协调发展才能使工业体系长远健康发展。结合中国自身建设的经验教训，毛泽东指出，要探索一条各产业间协调发展的建设道路，“在优先发展重工业的条件下，工农业同时并举”，以平衡当下利益与长远利益。

(2) Abandon Slave Mentality and Bravely Explore a Construction Path Suited to National Conditions

（二）摒弃奴隶思想，勇于探索符合国情的建设道路

In order to unite the entire Party and the whole people and create a consensus on taking the path of independent construction, Mao Zedong pointed out that the long-standing slave mentality must be discarded. “There exists a slave mentality. Some people in our country today still have this spiritual influence, so we must break down superstitions.” This mentality has two historical sources: first, the prolonged political, economic, and spiritual enslavement and humiliation of the Chinese people in modern times, giving rise to a “disease of fearing America” and a “disease of fearing the West”; second, when New China embarked on its construction journey, it was impoverished and weak, urgently needing to learn from the experiences of others and predecessors. In this process, a “take-it-all” mindset of wholesale imitation of the Soviet construction path emerged within the Party, encouraging a trend of mechanically copying Marxist classical theories and classical development models. In response, Mao Zedong criticized pointedly: “We publish Marxist books but dare not write prefaces or add a single word; we are still in a slave position.” “Our comrades now have a dispirited spirit, which is a manifestation of a slave state, like Jia Gui in the Peking opera *Famen Temple* [17]17 *Famen Temple* is a traditional Peking opera in which the character Jia Gui, a eunuch, is so accustomed to standing in servitude that he dares not sit down even when permitted, symbolizing a servile mentality., who, having stood for so long, dares not sit down.” From this criticism, one can glimpse the problem of dogmatic learning and imitation that appeared during the construction process. The founding of New China and the victory in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea [18]18 The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea (1950–1953) was the Chinese name for the Korean War, in which Chinese forces intervened to support North Korea against a U.S.-led coalition. greatly inspired the Chinese people. However, to thoroughly reverse the suppressed and unconfident state of the Chinese people at the level of national social development and culture, it was necessary to discard the psychology of hoping to carry out construction with aid from “authoritative states” or “powerful states,” to integrate the principles of Marxism with China’s specific realities, and, based on China’s actual conditions, principal contradictions, and the propositions of the era, to fully draw on the rich experience of decades of Chinese revolution, broadly mobilize and stimulate the enthusiasm and wisdom of the masses, explore a path of socialist construction suited to China’s national conditions, and produce experience, results, theory, and confidence through independent practice. Mao Zedong pointed out that as the times develop, the practice of later generations will continuously surpass that of their predecessors; for example, the October Revolution and Lenin’s *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* surpassed Marx’s understanding in the 19th century. The Chinese Revolution likewise surpassed Marx’s expectations: “Our practice has surpassed Marx; practice gives rise to principles… Do not belittle yourselves, do not look down on yourselves.” “Marxism itself was created; you cannot copy books mechanically.” On the basis of fully absorbing and learning from the excellent development experiences of foreign countries, and in light of the specific international situation and construction goals, Mao Zedong refined the construction line into: “Rely mainly on our own efforts while making external assistance subsidiary, break down superstitions, independently engage in industry, agriculture, technological revolution, and cultural revolution, defeat the slave mentality, bury dogmatism, earnestly learn from the good experiences of foreign countries, and also study their bad experiences as a warning.” At a time of “high winds and choppy waters” [19]19 “High winds and choppy waters” is a Chinese idiom used here to describe a perilous international situation. when China was simultaneously confronting the world’s two strongest powers, the construction line proposed by Mao Zedong was of great historical significance for uniting and inspiring the entire Party and the whole people, concentrating efforts to open up a path of socialist construction unique to China, and thereby fundamentally curbing anti-China forces.

为团结全党全民，创造走独立自主建设道路的共识，毛泽东指出，必须摒弃长期存在的奴隶思想。“存在一种奴隶思想。现在我国有些人中还有这种精神影响，所以要破除迷信。”这种思想有两个历史来源：一是近代以来中国人民在政治、经济、精神上长期受奴役与受欺辱，产生一种“恐美病”“恐西病”；二是新中国开启建设征程时积贫积弱，亟须借鉴学习他人和前人经验。在这一过程中，党内出现对苏联建设路径全面模仿的“拿来主义”思维，助长了对马克思主义经典理论和经典发展模式照搬照抄的风气。对此，毛泽东意有所指地批评道：“我们出版马克思主义的书籍，不敢写前言，赞一词，还处于奴隶地位。”“我们的同志现在有精神不振的现象，是奴隶状态的表现，像京剧《法门寺》里的贾桂一样，站惯了不敢坐。”从这段批评中，可管窥在建设过程中出现的教条式学习模仿问题。新中国成立、抗美援朝战争胜利等极大鼓舞了中国人民，而要在国家社会发展和文化层面彻底扭转中国人民被压抑、不自信的局面，就必须摒弃希望通过“权威国家”“强大国家”提供援助来开展建设的心理，使马克思主义原理同中国具体实际相结合，根据中国的现实条件、主要矛盾、时代命题，充分汲取几十年中国革命丰富经验，广泛调动激发人民群众的积极性与智慧，探索一条符合中国国情的社会主义建设道路，在独立自主的实践中出经验、出成果、出理论、出信心。毛泽东指出，随着时代发展，后人的实践将不断超越前人，如十月革命和列宁的《帝国主义论》就超越了马克思在19世纪的认识。中国革命同样超越了马克思的预计：“我们的实践超过了马克思，实践当中是要出道理的……不要妄自菲薄，不要看不起自己。”“马克思主义本身就是创造出来的，不能抄书照搬。”在充分汲取学习外国优秀发展经验的基础上，结合具体的国际形势与建设目标，毛泽东将建设路线完善为，“自力更生为主，争取外援为辅，破除迷信，独立自主地干工业、干农业、干技术革命和文化革命，打倒奴隶思想，埋葬教条主义，认真学习外国的好经验，也一定研究外国的坏经验——引以为戒”。在同时与世界两大最强国家对峙的“风高浪急”之际，毛泽东提出的建设路线对于团结鼓舞全国人民，凝心聚力开辟出一条独属于中国的社会主义建设道路，从而对在根本上阻遏反华势力，具有重要历史意义。

(III) Firmly Adhere to the Socialist Development Path and Guard Against “Peaceful Evolution”

（三）坚定社会主义发展道路，警惕“和平演变”

Through Mao Zedong’s unremitting efforts, the Chinese Communists formed a profound consensus that developing the productive forces and advancing socialist construction were the fundamental solutions to the anti-China problem. For example, Zhou Enlai summarized three strategies for responding to the isolation imposed by anti-China forces: “First, establish an independent economic system; second, make breakthroughs in cutting-edge national defense; third, maintain Party unity.” On this basis, Mao Zedong also added the requirement of building a technical contingent: “To build an industrial system, we must establish a technical contingent… Each major region and each province must build a proletarian theoretical contingent and a technical contingent.” The fundamental prerequisite for developing the productive forces and advancing socialist construction was to adhere to the socialist path. During this period, as the Soviet Union’s domestic and foreign policies underwent an overall shift, Mao Zedong began to think more deeply about the issue of adhering to the socialist path and guarding against “peaceful evolution” within the specific world political and economic landscape. “Peaceful evolution” was a “soft” confrontation method conceived by John Foster Dulles [20]20 John Foster Dulles was U.S. Secretary of State from 1953 to 1959, known for his staunch anti-communist stance and advocacy of “peaceful evolution” as a strategy to undermine socialist states. in response to the U.S.-Soviet standoff, differing from direct confrontation but equally capable of undermining the opponent. From late 1958 to early 1959, Dulles delivered a series of speeches, including “Policy for the Far East,” “The End of the Cold War,” and “The Role of Law in the Cause of Peace.” In these speeches, Dulles proposed the idea of “peaceful evolution.” “Seeking peace through justice and law instead of force… this is a relatively new concept.” Dulles explained: “Abandoning weapons does not mean maintaining the status quo, but means peaceful change.” This meant that, in addition to maintaining troops worldwide, the United States would use international law to restrict the “illegal” actions of communist regimes, provide economic aid to underdeveloped countries to keep them away from communist “interference,” and infiltrate communist regimes through free trade and personnel exchanges, thereby curbing the expansion of “international communist” forces. Dulles pointed out: “Such practices will accelerate the evolution of government policies within the Sino-Soviet bloc.” Mao Zedong’s understanding of the “peaceful evolution” policy also underwent a process of change. Initially, Mao Zedong interpreted Dulles’s speeches more as a contraction of U.S. diplomatic offensives: “Facts prove that the imperialists are on the defensive, with no offensive at all… Dulles no longer talks about the brink of war or the position of strength.” “To extinguish revolution and revolutionary war and perpetuate capitalist rule—this is Dulles’s goal. The imperialists have basically shifted to a position of maintaining the status quo.” However, Mao Zedong soon realized the offensive edge of “peaceful evolution” against the socialist camp beneath its surface of contraction: as the United States pursued the “peaceful evolution” policy, the Soviet Union became increasingly conciliatory toward international imperialism and domestic privileged groups, and forced China to make similar concessions. Anti-China sentiment existed in multiple forms, not only armed intervention but also covert erosion. Mao Zedong pointed out that high vigilance must be maintained against this: “Peaceful transformation of whom? It means transforming our countries, carrying out subversive activities, internally turning us toward his way of thinking… using peaceful transformation to corrode us.” Faced with the Soviet Union’s increasingly shifting policies, Mao Zedong did not regard this as a temporary or localized special issue, but as a universal question of whether socialist countries could maintain their revolutionary spirit and preserve the essence of socialism in the face of “peaceful evolution”—a deceptive, long-term subversive means—under the new, complex international environment. Therefore, Mao Zedong pointed out that in advancing the process of socialist construction, leading cadres in particular must be modest and prudent, guard against arrogance and impetuosity, seek truth from facts, always maintain flesh-and-blood ties with the masses, and always be servants serving the people. Under the historical conditions of the long-term coexistence of socialist and capitalist countries, how could socialist China, while participating in the construction of the world system and engaging in political, economic, and cultural exchanges with capitalist countries, maintain its “self-centered” stance without being subverted or infiltrated, while further advancing the cause of socialist development? This was a serious proposition of the era. Viewed in historical context, Mao Zedong’s judgment was extremely acute; preventing “peaceful evolution” remains an important issue that China must pay attention to in its development process to this day.

通过毛泽东的不懈努力，中国共产党人形成了发展生产力和推进社会主义建设是根本解决反华问题的深刻共识。例如，周恩来总结过应对反华势力孤立的三条战略：“一、建立独立的经济体系；二、突破国防尖端；三、党的团结。”在此基础上，毛泽东还补充了建立技术队伍的要求：“搞工业体系，要建立技术队伍……各大区、各省要建立无产阶级的理论队伍和技术队伍。”发展生产力和推进社会主义建设的根本前提是坚持走社会主义道路。在这一时期，伴随苏联内外政策整体转向，毛泽东开始更为深刻地思考在具体的世界政治经济格局下坚持走社会主义道路、警惕“和平演变”的问题。“和平演变”是杜勒斯针对美苏对峙局面构思的一种异于直接对抗，但同样能瓦解对手的“软”对抗手段。1958年底至1959年初，杜勒斯接连发表《对远东的政策》《结束冷战》《法律在和平事业中的作用》等讲话。在讲话中，杜勒斯提出“和平演变”思路。“以正义和法律代替武力——来谋求和平……这是比较新的概念。”杜勒斯解释道：“放弃武器并不意味着维持现状，而是意味着和平的转变。”意思就是，除在世界范围内保持驻军外，美国还将运用国际法律限制共产党政权的“非法”行为，为不发达国家提供经济援助以远离共产主义“干涉”，通过自由贸易、人员来往对共产党政权进行渗透等,遏制“国际共产主义”势力扩张。杜勒斯指出：“这样的做法将使中苏集团内部的政府政策加速演变。”对于“和平演变”方针，毛泽东的认识也存在转变过程。一开始，毛泽东更多从美国外交攻势的收缩来理解杜勒斯的讲话：“事实证明，帝国主义采取守势，一点攻势都没有了……杜勒斯现在战争边缘不讲了，实力地位也不讲了。”“扑灭革命和革命战争，永保资本统治，这是杜勒斯的目的。帝国主义者已基本上转到维持现状的立场。”不过，毛泽东很快意识到“和平演变”在收缩表象下向社会主义阵营进攻的锋芒：随着美国推行“和平演变”政策，苏联对国际帝国主义与国内特权集团愈加妥协，并强迫中国做出同样的妥协。反华主义存在多种形态，不仅有武力干涉，还有隐性侵蚀。毛泽东指出，要对此保持高度警觉：“和平转变谁呢？就是转变我们这些国家，搞颠覆活动，内部转到合乎他的那个思想……用和平转变，腐蚀我们。”面对苏联政策日益转变，毛泽东并不将此视为一时一地的特殊问题，而是视为在新的复杂国际环境下，面对“和平演变”这一具有迷惑性、长期性的颠覆手段，社会主义国家能否坚持革命精神和能否保持社会主义本质的普遍问题。因此，毛泽东指出，在推进社会主义建设进程中，领导干部尤其要谦虚谨慎、戒骄戒躁、实事求是，始终与人民群众保持血肉联系，始终做为人民服务的勤务员。在社会主义国家与资本主义国家长期共存的历史环境下，社会主义中国如何在参与世界体系建构并与资本主义国家开展政治经济文化往来的过程中保持“以我为主”、不被颠覆渗透，同时进一步推进社会主义事业发展？这是一个严肃的时代命题。结合历史来看，毛泽东的判断极其敏锐，预防“和平演变”直到今天依然是中国在发展过程中需关注的重要问题。

V. Contemporary Implications of Mao Zedong’s Response to the “Anti-China Chorus”

五、毛泽东应对“反华大合唱”的当代启示

In the New Era, China’s development “has entered a period in which strategic opportunities and risks and challenges coexist, with increasing factors of uncertainty and unpredictability,” and it is necessary to “prepare to withstand major tests of high winds, choppy waters, and even dangerous storms.” Xi Jinping points out:

新时代中国发展“进入战略机遇和风险挑战并存、不确定难预料因素增多的时期”，需要“准备经受风高浪急甚至惊涛骇浪的重大考验”。习近平指出：“在重大风险、强大对手面前，总想过太平日子、不想斗争是不切实际的，得‘软骨病’、患‘恐惧症’是无济于事的……我们必须把握新的伟大斗争的历史特点，发扬斗争精神，把握斗争方向，把握斗争主动权，坚定斗争意志，掌握斗争规律，增强斗争本领，有效应对重大挑战、抵御重大风险、克服重大阻力、解决重大矛盾，战胜前进道路上的一切艰难险阻，不断夺取新时代伟大斗争的新胜利”。身处世界“百年未有之大变局”的历史节点，回顾毛泽东应对国际“反华大合唱”战略思想，可为我们提供生动的斗争智慧与斗争经验，助益我们更深刻理解新时代中国特色社会主义道路的整体布局。

First, distinguish between primary and secondary contradictions and the specific nature of anti-China forces, give targeted responses, and balance struggle with unity in the course of struggle. In the face of pressure from imperialist forces, one must dare to struggle and dare to make a dignified Chinese voice on the world stage of public opinion. On this point, Xi Jinping pointed out: “History will prove that the historical footsteps of the Chinese nation toward the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation are unstoppable. If any person or any force attempts, through hegemonic means, to impose their will on China, to change China’s direction of progress, or to obstruct the Chinese people’s efforts to create a better life of their own, the Chinese people will never agree!”

第一，辨析主次矛盾与反华势力具体性质，给予针对性回应，在斗争中兼顾团结。面对帝国主义势力施压，要敢于斗争，勇于在世界舆论场上发出不卑不亢的中国声音。对此，习近平指出：“历史必将证明，中华民族走向伟大复兴的历史脚步是不可阻挡的。任何人任何势力企图通过霸凌手段把他们的意志强加给中国、改变中国的前进方向、阻挠中国人民创造自己美好生活的努力，中国人民都绝不答应！”

Second, conduct a dialectical analysis of the international situation, make friends widely and deeply, and unite the majority of countries to build a backbone force for promoting world peace and development. “While firmly safeguarding world peace and development, seek one’s own development, and in turn better safeguard world peace and development through one’s own development.” China will always join hands with the forces for world peace, “stand on the right side of history, and stand on the side of human progress.” At present, the deepening advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative, the construction of a community with a shared future for mankind, and the exploration of the common values of all mankind demonstrate China’s sense of responsibility and noble value pursuit as a major country in the world.

第二，辩证分析国际局势，广交、深交朋友，团结大多数国家共筑推动世界和平发展的中坚力量。“在坚定维护世界和平与发展中谋求自身发展，又以自身发展更好维护世界和平与发展。”中国将始终与世界和平力量携手，“站在历史正确的一边，站在人类进步的一边”。当下，“一带一路”倡议深入推进、人类命运共同体构筑以及对全人类共同价值的探索，展现了中国作为世界大国的责任担当与高尚价值追求。

Third, independently and self-reliantly advance socialist construction, taking this as the foundation for defeating anti-China forces. We must uphold the Four Confidences and a people-centered approach, advance the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times, continuously enrich and improve Chinese-path modernization in practice, and use powerful facts to prove that history has not and will not “end”; while deepening reform and opening up, build a more resilient modern industrial system, especially proceeding from the bottom-line thinking of breaking through the “bottleneck” of US-Western technology and safeguarding national technological sovereignty, and carry out independent research and development of high-end technologies with solid steps to respond to major national strategic needs; we must both recognize the overall development trend of “the East rising and the West declining” and the objective reality that capitalist countries and socialist countries will coexist in the world for a long time, and maintain historical determination and patience in advancing China’s socialist modernization; “neither take the old path of closed-door rigidity nor the evil path of changing the banner,” remain vigilant against and prevent “peaceful evolution,” use the self-revolution of the Communist Party of China to drive social revolution, and soberly and firmly walk the “road to the examination” [21]21 “Road to the examination” (赶考之路) is a metaphor originating with Mao Zedong on the eve of the founding of the PRC, comparing the Party’s governance to sitting a crucial examination; Xi of the New Era.

第三，独立自主推进社会主义建设，以此作为挫败反华力量的根本。要坚持“四个自信”和以人民为中心，推进马克思主义中国化时代化，在实践中不断丰富完善中国式现代化，用强有力的事实证明历史没有也不会“终结”；在深化改革开放的同时，构建更具韧性的现代化产业体系，尤其要从突破美西方技术“卡脖子”现状和保障国家技术主权的底线思维出发，以扎实的步伐开展高端技术自主研发以回应国家重大战略需求；既要认识到“东升西降”的整体发展趋势，也要认识到资本主义国家与社会主义国家将长期在世界上共存的客观现实，对于推进中国社会主义现代化建设葆有历史决心与耐心；“既不走封闭僵化的老路、也不走改旗易帜的邪路”，警惕预防“和平演变”，以中国共产党的自我革命带动社会革命，清醒坚定地走好新时代“赶考”之路。

(Author’s bio: Hu Tianjiao, Lecturer, School of Marxism, Central Party School (National Academy of Governance))

（作者简介：胡天娇，中央党校（国家行政学院）马克思主义学院讲师）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心