The Zunyi Conference: Turning a New Page

The Zunyi Conference, held from January 15 to 17, 1935, in fact established Comrade Mao Zedong’s leading position within the Party Central Committee and the Red Army, began to establish the leading position of the correct Marxist line represented mainly by Comrade Mao Zedong within the Party Central Committee, began to form the Party’s first generation central collective leadership with Comrade Mao Zedong at its core, opened a new stage in which the Party independently resolved the practical problems of the Chinese revolution, and was a turning point of vital importance in the Party’s history.

1935年1月15日至17日召开的遵义会议，事实上确立了毛泽东同志在党中央和红军的领导地位，开始确立以毛泽东同志为主要代表的马克思主义正确路线在党中央的领导地位，开始形成以毛泽东同志为核心的党的第一代中央领导集体，开启了党独立自主解决中国革命实际问题新阶段，在党的历史上是一个生死攸关的转折点。

Before the Zunyi Conference

遵义会议之前

Summing up the lessons from defeat was an important part of the Zunyi Conference.

总结失败的经验教训，是遵义会议的重要内容。

At the end of 1934, the Central Red Army suffered its heaviest losses since the start of the Long March. On December 1, the Central Red Army, except for the 34th Division of the Fifth Red Army Corps and the 18th Regiment of the Third Red Army Corps which were cut off on the east bank of the Xiang River, all crossed the Xiang River, but its strength had sharply fallen from more than 80,000 at the start to just over 30,000. This was a serious consequence of erroneous military leadership. [1]1 The Battle of the Xiang River (November-December 1934) was a costly breakthrough operation during the Long March in which the Central Red Army suffered heavy casualties.

1934年年底，中央红军遭受了自长征以来最严重的损失。12月1日，中央红军除红五军团第三十四师、红三军团第十八团被阻于湘江东岸外，全部渡过湘江,但人数已由出发时的8万余人锐减为3万余人。这是军事上的错误领导造成的严重后果。

After the main force of the Central Red Army crossed the Xiang River, where would it go? The original plan was to head toward western Hunan to join up with the Second and Sixth Red Army Corps. But this strategic intention was detected by the Chiang Kai-shek clique, which ordered He Jian, the “Commander-in-Chief of the Pursuit Forces,” to assemble nearly 200,000 troops in the area of Hongjiang and Zhijiang in Hunan, and Songtao, Tongren, and Shiqian in Guizhou, set up four defensive lines, and lay a pocket formation, in an attempt to trap the main force of the Central Red Army.

中央红军主力渡过湘江后向何处去？原打算往湘西一带与红二、六军团会合。但这一战略意图，被蒋介石集团觉察，遂命“追剿军总司令”何键在湖南洪江、芷江，贵州松桃、铜仁、石阡一带集结近20万军队，设置四道防线，布好口袋阵，企图让中央红军主力进入包围圈。

On the question of the direction of the Red Army’s strategic shift, a debate broke out within the Party Central Committee leadership. Mao Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang, and Zhang Wentian began to criticize the Party’s military line, arguing that the defeats since the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign [2]2 The Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign (1933-1934) was the last of a series of campaigns by the Chinese Communist Party’s Red Army to break the Nationalist forces’ encirclement, ending in defeat and leading to the Long March. had been caused by the erroneous line in military leadership. Since the roads to join the Second and Sixth Red Army Corps were already heavily guarded by Chiang Kai-shek’s concentrated forces, the Central Red Army had lost the opportunity to head for western Hunan. Mao Zedong therefore proposed to the Party Central Committee: abandon the plan to go to western Hunan to join the Second and Sixth Red Army Corps, and instead march toward Guizhou, where the enemy’s strength was weak, and establish a base area on the Sichuan-Guizhou border.

在红军战略转移的方向问题上，党中央领导内部发生了争论，毛泽东、王稼祥、张闻天开始批评中央的军事路线，认为第五次反“围剿”以来的失败是由于军事领导上的错误路线造成的。鉴于去红二、六军团的道路已被蒋介石集结重兵把守，中央红军已失去到湘西的先机，故毛泽东向党中央建议：放弃去湘西同红二、六军团会合的计划，改向敌人力量薄弱的贵州前进，到川黔边建立根据地。

On December 12, the Party Central Committee held an emergency meeting in Tongdao, Hunan. [3]3 The Tongdao Meeting (December 12, 1934) was an emergency meeting of the Party Central Committee during the Long March where Mao Zedong first proposed abandoning the original plan to join the Second and Sixth Red Army Corps. At the meeting, Mao Zedong strongly advocated advancing into Guizhou, but Bo Gu and Li De [4]4 Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian) was the head of the Party Central Committee at the time; Li De (Otto Braun) was a Comintern military adviser. resolutely opposed him, still pinning their hopes on joining the Second and Sixth Red Army Corps. Because opinions were not unified, the meeting was unable to make a decision on the general direction of the strategic shift, but it did decide to march westward to occupy Liping in Guizhou. Since the controversy continued, after entering Guizhou the Central Political Bureau held a series of meetings on the march, around the issues of the fate of the Party and Red Army, decision-making power, and command authority.

12月12日，党中央在湖南通道召开紧急会议。毛泽东在会上力主向贵州进军，而博古、李德等人坚决反对，仍把希望寄托在与红二、六军团的会合上。由于意见不统一，故会议未能对战略转移的大方向作出决定，但作出了西进占领贵州黎平的部署。鉴于争论仍在继续，进入贵州后，中央政治局在行军途中召开了一系列会议，围绕党和红军前途命运以及决策权、指挥权等问题不断展开讨论。

On December 18, the Central Political Bureau held a meeting in Liping, Guizhou. [5]5 The Liping Meeting (December 18, 1934) was a meeting of the Central Political Bureau that approved Mao Zedong’s proposal to move toward Guizhou. After fierce debate, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang, and the majority of comrades supported Mao Zedong’s proposal to march west, cross the Wujiang River northward, and establish a base area on the Sichuan-Guizhou border. The meeting adopted the “Decision of the Central Political Bureau on the Strategic Policy,” and decided to sum up the experience and lessons of military command since the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign after capturing Zunyi. On January 1, 1935, the Central Political Bureau held a meeting at Macheng in Weng’an County, Guizhou. [6]6 The Macheng Meeting (January 1, 1935) was a Central Political Bureau meeting that reaffirmed the plan to establish a base on the Sichuan-Guizhou border and criticized Bo Gu and Li De. The Macheng Meeting criticized Bo Gu and Li De’s insistence on not crossing the Wujiang River but instead turning back to join the Second and Sixth Red Army Corps, reaffirmed the proposal put forward by Mao Zedong and approved by the Liping Meeting to establish a new base area on the Sichuan-Guizhou border, and adopted the “Decision of the Central Political Bureau on the Plan of Action after Crossing the River.” To strengthen the Central Political Bureau’s leadership over the Military Commission and change the situation in which Li De made arbitrary decisions on military matters, the meeting also decided: “With respect to operational directives and the selection of the time and place of operations, the Military Commission must report to the Central Political Bureau.” Two days later, on January 3, the Central Secretariat instructed the commanders of each army corps to transmit this decision to cadres at the regimental level and above.

12月18日，中央政治局在贵州黎平召开会议。经过激烈争论，周恩来、张闻天、王稼祥等多数同志赞同毛泽东关于西进渡乌江北上、到川黔边建立根据地的意见。会议作出了《中央政治局关于战略方针之决定》，并决定攻入遵义后总结第五次反“围剿”以来军事指挥上的经验教训。1935年1月1日，中央政治局在贵州瓮安县猴场召开会议。猴场会议批评了博古、李德坚持不过乌江而要回头与红二、六军团会合的主张，重申由毛泽东提出并经黎平会议同意的在川黔边地区建立新根据地的主张，并作出了《中央政治局关于渡江后新的行动方针的决定》。为加强中央政治局对军委的领导，改变军事上由李德专断的状况，会议还决定：“关于作战方针，以及作战时间与地点的选择，军委必须在政治局会议上做报告。”两天后的1月3日，中央书记处责成各军团首长将这个决定向团级以上干部传达。

On January 2, with the assistance of the Second Division of the First Red Army Corps, leaders Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, and others crossed the Wujiang River safely together with the Military Commission column and the follow-up forces. By January 6, the main force of the Central Red Army had all crossed the Wujiang River from three ferry crossings. On January 7, the Second Division of the First Red Army Corps captured Zunyi city. This provided the conditions for convening the Zunyi Conference.

1月2日，在红一军团第二师的协助下，毛泽东、朱德、周恩来等领导人随同军委纵队和后续部队安全渡过乌江。至6日，中央红军主力分别从三个渡口全部渡过乌江。1月7日，红一军团第二师袭占遵义城。这就为召开遵义会议提供了条件。

Establishing Mao Zedong’s Leading Position

确立毛泽东的领导地位

In the moment of crisis, daring to wage a resolute struggle against the erroneous line, and being able to make correct decisions on the strategy and tactics of the Party and the Red Army on major issues—Mao Zedong’s core role was evident to all.

在危急关头敢于与错误路线作坚决的斗争，在重大问题上能够对党和红军的战略战术作出正确的决策，毛泽东的核心作用有目共睹。

On January 9, 1935, Mao Zedong entered Zunyi with the Military Commission column, and together with Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang, lodged in the residence of Yi Shaoquan, a former brigade commander of the Guizhou Army, on Gushi Lane in the new district of Zunyi.

1935年1月9日，毛泽东随军委纵队进驻遵义，同张闻天、王稼祥住在遵义新城古式巷原黔军旅长易少荃的宅邸。

On the third day after entering Zunyi, Mao Zedong delivered a speech at a mass meeting of the entire Zunyi county, explaining the policies of the Communist Party of China and the Red Army, stating that the Communist Party of China was willing to unite with all sections of the people and all armies in the country to resist Japan, and emphasizing that only the Soviets could save China.

进驻遵义第三天，毛泽东就在遵义全县民众大会上发表演说，讲述中国共产党与红军的各项政策，指出中国共产党愿意联合国内各界人民、各方军队一致抗日，强调只有苏维埃才能救中国。

From January 15 to 17, the Central Political Bureau held an enlarged meeting (commonly known as the Zunyi Conference). At the meeting, Mao Zedong delivered a lengthy speech on the various controversial issues since the start of the Long March, primarily the most pressing military line issue. In his speech, he criticized Bo Gu’s report for attributing the failure of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign mainly to factors such as the enemy being strong and we being weak, arguing that the failure was caused by errors in military command and in strategy and tactics; he also pointed out that Bo Gu and Li De had replaced the decisive defensive battle with a purely defensive line, replaced mobile warfare with positional warfare and fortress warfare, and supported the purely defensive strategic line with the tactical principle of so-called “short thrusts,” leading to losses for the Red Army. Mao Zedong stressed that this line was completely contrary to the basic principles of strategy and tactics that had brought the Red Army victory.

1月15日至17日，中央政治局在遵义召开扩大会议（通称“遵义会议”）。毛泽东在会上就长征以来各种争论问题，主要是最紧迫的军事路线问题，作了长篇发言。他在发言中批评博古报告中谈到的第五次反“围剿”失败的主要原因是敌强我弱等观点，认为其失败主要由军事指挥上和战略战术上的错误造成；还指出博古和李德以单纯防御路线代替决战防御，以阵地战、堡垒战代替运动战，以所谓“短促突击”的战术原则支持单纯防御的战略路线，使红军招致损失。毛泽东强调，这一路线同红军取得胜利的战略战术的基本原则是完全相反的。

Mao Zedong’s views won the support of the majority of participants. The Central Political Bureau entrusted Zhang Wentian, based on Mao Zedong’s views and suggestions and the content of most people’s speeches, to draft the “Resolution of the Central Committee on the Summary of the Campaign to Counter the Enemy’s Fifth ‘Encirclement and Suppression’,” which was to be submitted to a meeting of the Central Political Bureau for approval before being printed and distributed.

毛泽东的意见，得到大多数与会者的支持。中央政治局委托张闻天根据毛泽东的意见建议和大多数人的发言内容，起草《中央关于反对敌人五次“围剿”的总结的决议》，会后提交中央政治局会议通过后再印发。

The Zunyi Conference proposed changing the Liping Meeting’s decision to establish a base area on the Sichuan-Guizhou border, deciding that the Red Army should cross the Yangtze River northward and establish a base area to the southwest or northwest of Chengdu. The meeting elected Mao Zedong as an alternate member of the Standing Committee of the Central Political Bureau, abolished the “Three-Man Group,” [7]7 The “Three-Man Group” was the highest military command organ of the Party Central Committee at the time, composed of Bo Gu, Li De, and Zhou Enlai, which was abolished by the Zunyi Conference. and removed Bo Gu and Li De from the supreme military command. It decided that the main leaders of the Central Military Commission, Zhu De and Zhou Enlai, would continue to command the military, with Zhou Enlai being the person entrusted by the Party to make the final decision on military command. After the meeting, the Standing Committee of the Central Committee divided its responsibilities, with Mao Zedong assisting Zhou Enlai in military command. Deng Xiaoping, who attended the meeting, later recalled: Although in name he (Mao Zedong) was neither General Secretary nor Chairman of the Military Commission, his actual command of the army and his decisions on major issues were recognized by other leaders.

遵义会议提出改变黎平会议关于在川黔边建立根据地的决定，决定红军北渡长江，在成都之西南或西北建立根据地。会议增选毛泽东为中央政治局常委，取消三人团，取消博古、李德的最高军事指挥权，决定仍由中央军委主要负责人朱德、周恩来指挥军事，周恩来为党内委托的对于指挥军事下最后决心的负责者。会后中央常委分工，毛泽东为周恩来在军事指挥上的帮助者。参加会议的邓小平后来忆述：尽管名义上他（毛泽东）没有当总书记或军委主席，实际上他对军队的指挥以及重大问题的决策，都为别的领导人所承认。

The Zunyi Conference ended the domination of Wang Ming’s “left” opportunist line within the Party Central Committee, in fact established Comrade Mao Zedong’s leading position within the Party Central Committee and the Red Army, began to establish the leading position of the correct Marxist line represented mainly by Comrade Mao Zedong within the Party Central Committee, saved the Party, saved the Red Army, and saved the Chinese revolution at the most critical juncture, and laid the foundation for the successful completion of the Long March.

遵义会议结束了王明“左”倾冒险主义在党中央的统治，事实上确立了毛泽东同志在党中央和红军的领导地位，开始确立以毛泽东同志为主要代表的马克思主义正确路线在党中央的领导地位，在最危急的关头，挽救了党、挽救了红军、挽救了中国革命，并为胜利完成长征奠定了基础。

Forming a New Central Collective Leadership

形成新的中央领导集体

The “Resolution on Certain Historical Issues” [8]8 The “Resolution on Certain Historical Issues” (1945) is an official Party document summing up the Party’s history up to 1945, adopted by the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee. points out: “After the Zunyi Conference, the political line of the Party Central Committee under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong was completely correct.”

《关于若干历史问题的决议》指出：“遵义会议后，党中央在毛泽东同志领导下的政治路线，是完全正确的。”

After the Zunyi Conference, Mao Zedong and the Military Commission column left Zunyi on January 19, 1935, and continued the Long March. In the period that followed, the Party Central Committee and the Central Red Army on the Long March continued to explore the direction and foothold of the advance, while further establishing and consolidating the new collective leadership.

遵义会议后，毛泽东和军委纵队于1935年1月19日离开遵义，继续长征路。在此后的一段时间里，长征路上的党中央和中央红军一方面继续探索前进的方向和落脚点，一方面进一步确立和巩固新的领导集体。

On January 26, Mao Zedong and others arrived at Tucheng.At that time, two brigades of the Sichuan Army had reached Chishui city before the Central Red Army to block its northward advance, while the pursuing Sichuan Army advanced to the area east of Tucheng. On January 28, the Military Commission column’s Cadre Regiment, the Third Red Army Corps, the Fifth Red Army Corps, and a part of the First Red Army Corps, from the north and south, launched a fierce attack on the enemy positioned in the Qinggangpo area east of Tucheng. The battle raged for the entire day but ended in failure. At that time, two more brigades of Sichuan Army reinforcements quickly arrived, and the two Sichuan Army brigades at Wanglongchang also attacked the Central Red Army from the flank and rear. In this situation, Mao Zedong proposed convening a meeting of the main leaders of the Central Political Bureau, which decided to immediately withdraw from the battle. Subsequently, the combat troops and the Military Commission column quickly crossed the Chishui River westward with light equipment, beginning the famous Four Crossings of the Chishui River campaign during the Red Army’s Long March. [9]9 The Four Crossings of the Chishui River (January-March 1935) was a legendary series of maneuvers by the Red Army, which outmaneuvered superior Nationalist forces and became a symbol of Mao’s military genius.

1月26日，毛泽东等人到达土城。这时，川军两个旅先于中央红军到达赤水城，以阻止其北进，尾追的川军则进至土城以东地区。1月28日，军委纵队干部团、红三军团、红五军团、红一军团一部从南北两面，向位于土城以东青杠坡地区之敌发起猛攻，激战终日，战斗失利。此时，川军后续部队两个旅迅速增援上来，位于旺隆场的川军两个旅也趁势从侧背向中央红军发起进攻。在此境况下，毛泽东提议召集中央政治局主要领导人开会，决定立即撤出战斗。随后，作战部队和军委纵队迅速轻装渡赤水河西进，开始了红军长征中举世闻名的四渡赤水之战。

On February 5, Mao Zedong and the Military Commission column arrived at the village of the “single rooster crowing in three provinces” on the border of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou (Jimingsansheng Village). [10]10 Jimingsansheng Village (literally “the village where a single rooster crows in three provinces”) is a location on the border of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou; the meeting there decided on the change of the Party leadership. Here, Mao Zedong talked with Zhou Enlai about the issue raised by Zhang Wentian concerning a change in the Party Central leadership. Regarding this matter, Zhou Enlai later recalled: “Luofu (Zhang Wentian) at that time proposed to change the leadership; he said Bo Gu was no good. I remember very clearly that Chairman Mao called me and said, Luofu now wants to change the leadership. We said then, of course it should be Chairman Mao, listen to Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao said, no, we should let Luofu serve for a period.” Subsequently, the Central Political Bureau decided that Zhang Wentian would take over from Bo Gu in assuming general responsibility within the Party. Although Mao Zedong did not “assume general responsibility” in form at this time, his breadth of vision, foresight, and leadership ability were further recognized by the Party and the Red Army.

2月5日，毛泽东与军委纵队到达川、滇、黔边界的鸡鸣三省村。在这里，毛泽东同周恩来谈起张闻天提出的有关变换党中央领导的问题。对这件事，周恩来曾这样回忆道：“洛甫（张闻天）那个时候提出要变换领导，他说博古不行。我记得很清楚，毛主席把我找去说，洛甫现在要变换领导。我们当时说，当然是毛主席，听毛主席的话。毛主席说，不对，应该让洛甫做一个时期。”随后，中央政治局决定由张闻天接替博古在党内负总的责任。尽管毛泽东此时在形式上没有“负总责”，但是他的胸怀、远见和领导能力，却得到党和红军的进一步认可。

On February 8, to implement the spirit of the Zunyi Conference, the Central Secretariat issued the “Outline of the Resolution of the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Political Bureau on Summing Up the Experience and Lessons of the Campaign to Smash the Enemy’s Fifth ‘Encirclement and Suppression’,” which mainly summarized the experience and lessons from the defeat of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign and reaffirmed a series of correct basic principles of strategy and tactics generalized by Mao Zedong from the practical experience of war. Subsequently, Standing Committee members of the Central Political Bureau, including Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, and Chen Yun, went to the Military Commission column and the cadre meetings of each army corps to convey the spirit of the resolution. That month, Mao Zedong wrote a poem in which he said: “The myriad crags are steep and iron-hard, yet from this very point we stride the summit anew.”

2月8日，中央书记处为贯彻遵义会议精神，发布了《中央政治局扩大会议总结粉碎五次“围剿”战争中经验教训决议大纲》，着重总结了第五次反“围剿”失败的经验教训，重新肯定了毛泽东根据战争实践经验总结出来的一系列正确的战略战术的基本原则。紧接着，中央政治局常委毛泽东、张闻天、陈云等人陆续到军委纵队和各军团干部会议上传达该决议精神。当月，毛泽东作词一首，其中写道：“雄关漫道真如铁，而今迈步从头越。”

Not long after, at the Goudun Meeting, [11]11 The Goudun Meeting (March 1935) was a meeting of the Party Central Committee during the Long March at which Mao Zedong argued against an abortive plan to attack the entrenched Nationalist forces, thereby preventing a military disaster. Mao Zedong insisted on principle, convincing the majority as a minority, saving the Party Central Committee and the Central Red Army once again from the danger of total annihilation. After the meeting, Mao Zedong believed that operations could not be discussed collectively by so many people as before; command needed to be concentrated, and a small group of a few people should be established. On his proposal, the Party Central Committee decided that Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, and Wang Jiaxiang would form a new “Three-Man Group” to have full authority over military command. This completed the task of changing the Party Central Committee’s highest military command structure set in motion by the Zunyi Conference, further establishing and consolidating Mao Zedong’s leading position within the Party Central Committee and the Red Army.

不久，在苟坝会议上，毛泽东坚持原则，以少数说服多数，使党中央、中央红军再一次免遭全军覆没的危险。会后，毛泽东认为，作战不能像过去那么多人来集体讨论，指挥需要集中，还是成立一个几个人的小组。经他提议，党中央决定由周恩来、毛泽东、王稼祥组成新的“三人团”，全权指挥军事。这就完成了遵义会议改变党中央最高军事领导机构的任务，进一步确立和巩固了毛泽东在党中央和红军中的领导地位。

From the Zunyi Conference onward, the Communist Party of China began to independently apply the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism to solve the major issues concerning the future and destiny of the Chinese revolution, and began to mature politically. From then on, the history of the Red Army’s Long March turned a new page; the history of the Chinese revolution led by the Communist Party of China also turned a new page.

自遵义会议后，中国共产党开始独立自主地运用马克思列宁主义的基本原理，解决中国革命前途命运的重大问题，在政治上开始走向成熟。从此，红军长征的历史翻开了新的一页；中国共产党领导的中国革命的历史也翻开了新的一页。

(The author is a researcher at the Institute of Party History and Literature of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China)

（作者系中央党史和文献研究院研究员）