Issues Related to Hadapu and the Long March of the Red Army

On September 18, 1935, the Central Red Army arrived at Hadapu, south of Min County in Gansu (present-day Tanchang County) during the Long March. On September 22, at a meeting of cadres at and above the regimental level of the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment convened in Hadapu, Mao Zedong clearly stated: “The national crisis is deepening day by day; we must continue our actions and complete the original plan of marching north to resist Japan. First, we must go to northern Shaanxi, where Liu Zhidan’s Red Army is.” From this point onward, Mao Zedong and the Central Red Army specified the forward direction of the Long March from “marching north” to “going to northern Shaanxi.” At present, there are already many research results on issues related to Hadapu and the Red Army’s Long March, but some details still merit further exploration and clarification. This article intends to sort out and analyze these issues based on relevant historical materials, with the aim of advancing related research to greater depth.

1935年9月18日，中央红军长征到达甘肃岷县以南（今宕昌县）的哈达铺。9月22日，毛泽东在哈达铺召开的陕甘支队团以上干部会议上明确提出：“民族的危机在一天天加深，我们必须继续行动，完成北上抗日的原定计划。首先要到陕北去，那里有刘志丹的红军。”由此，毛泽东和中央红军明确把长征的前进方向由“北上”具体化为“到陕北去”。目前对于哈达铺与红军长征相关问题，已有不少研究成果，但仍有一些细节值得进一步探讨和厘清。本文拟依据相关史料，就此问题展开梳理分析，以期推动相关研究继续走向深入。

I. On “Newspapers Determining the Direction” at Hadapu

一、关于在哈达铺“报纸定方向”

Regarding the question of the Central Red Army finding a foothold for the Long March at Hadapu, the claim that “newspapers determined the direction” has long drawn scholarly attention. In authoritative standard Party history texts, the account that news of the northern Shaanxi Soviet area was obtained through newspapers in Hadapu is basically adopted. For instance, *The History of the Communist Party of China*, Volume 1, points out that after the Central Red Army reached Hadapu, “Here, based on information obtained from local newspapers that the Red Army and base area in northern Shaanxi still existed, Mao Zedong proposed going to northern Shaanxi.” *One Hundred Years of the Communist Party of China* states that at Hadapu, “Mao Zedong and others learned from a newspaper that there was a fairly large base area and Red Army activity in northern Shaanxi.” *The Chronicle of Mao Zedong* notes that before entering Hadapu, Mao Zedong instructed the advance troops “to find some ‘spiritual food’ in Hadapu, any newspapers and magazines from recent or relatively recent dates.” “During his stay in Hadapu, Mao Zedong learned from Kuomintang newspapers that there was a fairly large Soviet area and a considerable number of Red Army troops in northern Shaanxi.” These accounts all affirm the source of information from newspapers. By consulting historical materials, the relevant claims can be grouped into two types.

关于中央红军在哈达铺找到长征落脚点的问题，“报纸定方向”的说法一直备受学界关注。在权威党史正本中，基本采取了在哈达铺通过报纸获取陕北苏区消息的说法。比如，《中国共产党历史》第一卷指出，中央红军到达哈达铺后，“在这里，根据从当地找到的报纸上获悉的陕北红军和根据地仍然存在的情况，毛泽东提出到陕北去”。《中国共产党的一百年》指出，在哈达铺，“毛泽东等从一张报纸上得知陕北有相当大的一块根据地和红军活动的情况”。《毛泽东年谱》指出，进哈达铺前，毛泽东就指示先头部队“到哈达铺找些‘精神食粮’，只要是近期和比较近期的报纸杂志都找来”。“在哈达铺期间，毛泽东从国民党报纸上了解到陕北有相当大的一片苏区和相当数量的红军。”这些说法都肯定了报纸这一信息来源。通过查阅史料，相关说法可以归为两种。

One type only vaguely refers to “Kuomintang newspapers.” The previously cited *Chronicle of Mao Zedong* is an example. Ye Jianying, Li Weihan, Yang Chengwu, Geng Biao, and others, when recalling this matter in their memoirs, also state that they learned the news from Kuomintang newspapers, but none specify which particular newspaper. For example, Ye Jianying recalled, “Together with several comrades, I saw news about the Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet area in Kuomintang newspapers and thus proposed to the Central Committee the suggestion of marching north to northern Shaanxi.” Li Weihan recalled that before reaching Hadapu, by a river market town, he saw Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, and others “leafing through a Kuomintang local newspaper, which carried news that Chiang Kai-shek had sent a large army to ‘encircle and suppress’ the northern Shaanxi ‘Communist bandits’ Liu Zhidan. Only then did we concretely learn that there was such a large Red Army actively operating in the northern Shaanxi Soviet area. The Party Central Committee immediately decided to go to the northern Shaanxi Soviet area to join forces with the northern Shaanxi Red Army.” According to Yang Chengwu’s recollection, Mao Zedong said at the cadres’ meeting at Hadapu, “Thank the Kuomintang newspapers for providing us with relatively detailed news about the northern Shaanxi Red Army: there is not only Liu Zhidan’s Red Army but also Xu Haidong’s Red Army, and a base area!” Geng Biao also recalled that while lodging at a peasant’s home in Hadapu, “I noticed the walls were plastered with fresh newspapers and began to browse them. Inadvertently, I found a newspaper carrying a piece of news saying something like ‘Communist troops attacked Zhiluo Town but fled without success…’ I was overjoyed. Whether the news reported by the Kuomintang newspaper was accurate or not, it was beyond doubt that there was a Red Army in northern Shaanxi, and it was fighting the enemy. I told the landlord I wanted to buy this newspaper, gave them a silver dollar as compensation, and carefully cut that palm-sized piece of news from the wall with a knife. The old fellow was utterly puzzled and kept asking, ‘What use is it?’ I said, ‘This is more precious than finding a gold nugget.’ I wrote a letter and, together with that piece of newspaper, sent it to the corps headquarters for forwarding to the Central Committee.”

一种只笼统地说是“国民党报纸”。前引《毛泽东年谱》即是如此。叶剑英、李维汉、杨成武、耿飚等人在回忆中提到此事时，也称是从国民党报纸上获知的消息，但均没有指出具体是哪种报纸。比如，叶剑英回忆，“和几位同志从国民党报纸上看到有关陕甘苏区的消息，遂向中央提出北上陕北的建议”。李维汉回忆，在到哈达铺前，在河边的一个圩场上，看到毛泽东、周恩来、彭德怀、刘少奇等人“正在翻阅一张国民党的地方报纸，上面登了蒋介石派大军‘围剿’陕北‘共匪’刘志丹的消息。我们才具体得知有这样大的红军在陕北苏区积极活动。党中央随即决定到陕北苏区与陕北红军会师”。又据杨成武回忆，毛泽东在哈达铺团以上干部会议上说，“感谢国民党的报纸，为我们提供了陕北红军的比较详细的消息：那里不但有刘志丹的红军，还有徐海东的红军，还有根据地！”耿飚也回忆，在哈达铺借宿在一户农民家里时，“发现墙上糊满了新报纸，便浏览起来。无意中，我发现有张报纸上登着一则消息，说什么‘共军进攻直罗镇，未克而逃……’我大喜过望。国民党的报纸报道的消息是否准确，且不管他，但陕北有红军，而且与敌人战斗着，是毫无疑问的了。我向房东说明要买下这张报纸，给了他们一块光洋作赔，便用小刀仔细地从墙上起下了那块巴掌大的消息。老乡大惑不解，一再问：‘有甚用？’我说：‘这可比拣个金娃娃还宝贵哩。’我写上一封信连同那块报纸一起，派人送到军团部转报中央”。

The other type specifies the exact newspaper titles. For example, *The History of the Communist Party of China in Gansu* holds that “the sources of newspapers were multiple and from several titles,” including “*Ta Kung Pao*, *Jinyang Daily*, *Central Daily News*, etc.” Some also believe that the newspapers Mao Zedong and other central leaders perused were “the July and August issues of *Ta Kung Pao*, *Republican Daily*, *Central Daily News*, *Xi’an News*, and *Shaanxi Daily*.” Others argue that the source of the news was Tianjin’s *Ta Kung Pao*. This claim mainly originates from Zhang Wentian and his wife Liu Ying. The article “The Developing Soviet Revolutionary Movement in Shaanxi and Gansu,” written by Zhang Wentian during his stay in Hadapu, primarily cites materials from Tianjin’s *Ta Kung Pao*. This article is a “reading notes on newspapers” written by Zhang Wentian on September 22, 1935, in Hadapu and published in issue No. 3 of *Forward* on September 28. In this article, Zhang Wentian excerpted news items from the July and August 1935 issues of Tianjin’s *Ta Kung Pao* that he saw in Hadapu, related to the northern Shaanxi Red Army and the 25th Red Army led by Xu Haidong. For instance, he excerpted from the July 23 issue of Tianjin’s *Ta Kung Pao*: “The Communist bandits in northern Shaanxi are extremely rampant; of the 23 counties in all of northern Shaanxi, hardly one is not ‘reddened’; eight counties are completely reddened, and over ten are half reddened. The Communist forces now have the power to expand their area without using military force.” From the August 1 issue of Tianjin’s *Ta Kung Pao*: “Entrenched in northern Shaanxi is the 26th Red Army; its exact strength is impossible to ascertain, but it has over 10,000 guns. The bandit army commander Liu Zhidan commands three divisions, the main bandit force, and under him there are fourteen guerrilla detachments.” “Xu Haidong led over 3,000 fierce bandits in mid-July, breaking out from Shang County, Luonan, Zhen’an, and Zhashui counties,” “after which his bandit force passed through Lantian, emerged from the Luonan mountain pass, and infiltrated the Yinjiahui town area of Chang’an County; another group broke out through Ziwukou.” Based on previously known information that “the 25th Army led by Comrade Xu Haidong had previously occupied Liangdang and Huixian in southern Gansu, approached Tianshui, captured Tai’an, crossed the Wei River, and reached the border of Shaanxi and Gansu, achieving many great victories,” Zhang Wentian also inferred that “it now seems they have already established contact with the 26th Army in northern Shaanxi.” Therefore, Zhang Wentian pointed out in the article: “From various reactionary newspapers, it appears that the Red Army and Red guerrilla units are developing extensively in both Shaanxi and Gansu provinces.” Regarding the content of this article, *The Chronicle of Zhang Wentian* notes, “The notes detailed and analyzed the information disclosed in Tianjin’s *Ta Kung Pao* about Red Army activities in Shaanxi and Gansu and the northern Shaanxi revolutionary base area, and on this basis revealed the Central Committee’s intention to lead the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment to settle in northern Shaanxi: ‘to coordinate, cooperate, and converge with the 25th and 26th Armies and the Tongnanba guerrilla zone, and to assist, organize, and lead the guerrilla movement developing in this area,’” thereby fulfilling the task set at the Mao’ergai Meeting [1]1 The Mao’ergai Meeting (毛儿盖会议) was a Politburo meeting held in August 1935 in Mao’ergai, a town in northern Sichuan, during the Long March. It reaffirmed the decision to march north and called for linking up with Soviet areas in the Shaanxi-Gansu border region. of “linking the Soviet guerrilla zones existing in the Shaanxi-Gansu border area into a contiguous Soviet area.”

另一种则点出具体报名。比如，《中国共产党甘肃历史》认为，“报纸的来源，有多种和多张”，“有《大公报》《晋阳日报》《中央日报》等”。也有人认为，毛泽东等中央领导翻阅的是“七、八月份的《大公报》《民国日报》《中央日报》《西安报》《陕西日报》”。还有人认为，消息的来源是天津《大公报》。这种说法主要来源于张闻天及其夫人刘英。张闻天在哈达铺期间撰写的《发展着的陕甘苏维埃革命运动》一文，所引资料主要来自天津《大公报》。该文是张闻天 1935年9月22日在哈达铺写的一篇“读报笔记”，发表于 9月28日出版的《前进报》第3期。张闻天在这篇文章中摘录了他在哈达铺期间看到的 1935年七八月间天津《大公报》上的一些与陕北红军和徐海东率领的红二十五军有关的消息。如其中摘录 7月23日天津《大公报》载：“陕北匪共甚为猖獗，全陕北二十三县几无一县不赤化，完全赤化者有八县，半赤化者十余县。现在共党力量已有不用武力即能扩大区域威势。”8月1日天津《大公报》载：“盘踞陕北者为红二十六军，其确实人数究有若干，现无从统计，但其枪有万余。匪军军长刘志丹辖三师，为匪主力部队，其下尚有十四个游击支队。”“徐海东于七月中旬率悍匪三千余众，由商县、雒南、镇安、柞水等县突围而出”，“其后匪部即过兰田，出洛南山口，窜长安县境之引驾回镇，另有一股由子午口窜出”。张闻天根据此前已知道的“徐海东同志所领导的二十五军以前曾占领甘南之两当、徽县，逼近天水，陷泰安，渡渭长，而至陕甘之交，取得许多伟大胜利”，还推断出“现在想来已与陕北之二十六军取得了联系”。因此，张闻天在文章中指出：“从各种反动报纸上看来，红军与赤色游击队在陕甘两省内正在普遍的发展着。”关于这篇文章的内容，《张闻天年谱》指出，“笔记将天津《大公报》上所披露的红军在陕甘活动和陕北革命根据地的情况详细摘录并进行分析，在此基础上透露了中央率领陕甘支队落脚陕北的意向：‘同二十五、二十六军及通南巴游击区取得配合，协同动作及汇合，并给在这个地区中开展着的游击运动以帮助、组织、领导’”，完成毛儿盖会议提出的“联系存在于陕甘边之苏维埃游击区域成为一片的苏区”的任务。

Zhang Wentian’s wife, Liu Ying, also repeatedly mentioned Tianjin’s *Ta Kung Pao* when recalling this period of history. In her memoirs, she said: “When the advance troops captured Hadapu, they obtained many newspapers from the local post office, mainly the July and August issues of Tianjin’s *Ta Kung Pao*. Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, and Bo Gu [2]2 Bo Gu (博古, 1907–1946), also known as Qin Bangxian, was a senior leader of the CPC who served as the General Secretary of the Party from 1931 to 1935. He was a member of the Central Committee during the Long March. read these newspapers, talking with great excitement. It turned out that from the news carried in these newspapers, they knew for certain: there was a Soviet base area in northern Shaanxi, with a Red Army and guerrilla forces. This was truly a godsend.” In an interview, she similarly recalled: “It was September 21, 1935. Chairman Mao, Zhang Wentian, and other central leading comrades arrived at Hadapu, a small town in southern Gansu. The advance troops sent a batch of Tianjin’s *Ta Kung Pao*, and the few of them were overjoyed after reading them. From the newspapers, they learned that all 23 counties in northern Shaanxi had Red Army or guerrilla activity. Liu Zhidan’s main force of the 26th Red Army had three divisions with over 10,000 guns. Xu Haidong’s 25th Red Army had 3,000 elite troops and had already moved to the Shaanxi-Gansu border. After learning these circumstances from the newspapers, the Party Central Committee made the crucial decision to make northern Shaanxi the foothold for the Red Army’s Long March.”

张闻天夫人刘英也多次在回忆这段历史时谈到天津《大公报》。她在回忆录中说：“先头部队攻占哈达铺的时候，在当地的邮局得到了不少报纸，主要是七、八月间的天津《大公报》。毛泽东、张闻天、周恩来、博古他们翻读着这些报纸，谈得眉飞色舞。原来，从这些报纸登载的消息，他们确切地知道：陕北有苏区根据地，有红军，有游击队。这真是喜从天降。”在一次采访中，她同样回忆道：“那是 1935年9月21日，毛主席、张闻天等中央领导同志到了甘肃南部的一个小镇哈达铺。先头部队送来一批天津《大公报》，他们几个看后高兴极了。从报上得知，陕北23个县，全有红军或游击队活动。刘志丹的红二十六军主力部队有三个师1万多枝枪。徐海东的红二十五军有精兵3000，已经转移到了陕甘边界。从报上了解了这些情况以后，党中央作出了把陕北作为红军长征的落脚点的至关重要的决定。”

There is also a claim that it was the *Shanxi Daily*. For example, according to Nie Rongzhen’s recollection: after the troops reached Hadapu, “they obtained a copy of the Kuomintang’s *Shanxi Daily*, which carried a piece of news about Yan Xishan’s troops attacking the陕北 Red Army under Liu Zhidan,” and “they immediately sent a cavalry messenger to deliver this newspaper to Comrade Mao Zedong,” feeling that “this was truly a piece of heavenly good news.” According to another recollection by Li Fuchun, “At Hadapu, the First Column found a copy of the *Shanxi Daily*, on which was printed news of the Kuomintang’s Yan Xishan troops attacking the Northern Shaanxi Red Army under Liu Zhidan. In this way, the Central Committee learned that there was a fairly large Soviet area and a considerable number of Red Army troops in Northern Shaanxi.”

还有说法认为是《山西日报》。比如，据聂荣臻回忆：部队到哈达铺后，“得到了一张国民党的《山西日报》，其中载有一条阎锡山的部队进攻陕北红军刘志丹部的消息”，“赶紧派骑兵通信员把这张报纸给毛泽东同志送去”，并感到“这真是天大的喜讯”。又据李富春回忆，“在哈达铺，一纵队找到一张《山西日报》,上面登着国民党阎锡山部进攻陕北红军刘志丹部的消息。这样，中央得知陕北有相当大的一片苏区和相当数量的红军”。

In addition, there are other similar accounts, but regardless of which account, the fact that the information was obtained from newspapers—or, further, from the vehicle of Kuomintang newspapers—is widely accepted.

此外，还有其他的一些类似说法，但不管哪种说法，从报纸或者进一步说是国民党的报纸这一载体上获取消息，则是广受认可的。

Of course, a decision as major as settling in Northern Shaanxi could not, in fact, have been made solely on the basis of news from one or several newspapers. The so-called “newspapers determining the direction” more reflects the Red Army’s longing, after undergoing successive life-and-death trials and constant displacement, to establish a stable base area and thereby open up a new revolutionary horizon. As Liu Ying put it: “Since the night we crossed the Yudu River, the Central Committee had always wanted to find a foothold and create a new base area. Where exactly to go, no one was clear. … Now that we learned there was a Red Army territory in Northern Shaanxi, it was only natural that we decided to settle there.” Yang Shangkun, recalling this period, also said: “The troops had been on a long march and were truly exhausted! Moreover, for a considerable period of the Long March we had traveled through Tibetan areas, where the population was sparse and there were historically inherited ethnic estrangements, making it very difficult to recruit soldiers and raise grain. Everyone hoped to find a more populous area to create a base.” And at Hadapu, they happened to obtain from newspapers the news that the Northern Shaanxi Red Army and the Red 25th Army, also on the Long March, had already reached the Shaanxi-Gansu border. Thus, marching north to join forces with these two Red Army units not only aligned with the Central Red Army’s established policy of “marching north,” but was also not far from Hadapu. It was precisely on the basis of these circumstances that the Party Central Committee decided at Hadapu to continue northward, to establish and consolidate a base area in Northern Shaanxi.

当然，落脚陕北这样大的决定，事实上并不会仅仅因为一种或几种报纸的消息就能作出。所谓的“报纸定方向”，更多反映的是红军在经历重重生死考验、颠沛不定后，对于建立稳定的根据地进而开辟革命新天地的憧憬。正如刘英所言：“自从夜渡于都河以来，中央一直想找一个落脚点，创立新的根据地。究竟上哪儿，谁也不明确。……现在得知陕北有一块红军的地盘，很自然的，就决定到陕北落脚了。”杨尚昆回忆这段历史时也说：“部队经过长途征战，的确非常疲劳啊！何况，长征中相当一段时期在藏民区行进，那里人口稀少，又有历史上遗留下来的民族隔阂，扩军、筹粮都很困难，大家都希望早点找到一个人口较多的地区创造根据地。”而在哈达铺，恰好从报纸上得到了陕北红军和同样在长征的红二十五军已经到达陕甘边界的消息，这样，前往陕北与这两支红军会师，不仅与中央红军既定的“北上”方针相契合，而且已经距离哈达铺不远。正是基于这些情况，党中央在哈达铺决定继续向北，到陕北建立和巩固根据地。

On September 27, 1935, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held a meeting in Bangluo Town, Tongwei County, Gansu Province. At this important meeting, Jia Tuofu, who had served as Secretary-General of the Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee and had been following the Central Red Army on the Long March, attended as a non-voting participant, providing crucial intelligence for the Party Central Committee’s understanding of the Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area. According to relevant materials, after learning the news about the Northern Shaanxi Red Army, Mao Zedong immediately “summoned Jia Tuofu to inquire about the details of Northern Shaanxi.” “Jia Tuofu gave Mao Zedong a detailed report on the activities of the Shaanxi-Gansu guerrilla forces and the Red 26th Army before the destruction of the Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee in July 1933, as well as the situation of the Shaanxi revolutionary struggle,” and “suggested that the Central Committee settle and take root in Northern Shaanxi.” Combining the intelligence provided by Jia Tuofu with the information obtained from the newspapers at Hadapu, the Bangluo Town meeting “formally decided to march to Northern Shaanxi, to defend and expand the base area.” On October 22, 1935, Mao Zedong said at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee: “The Bangluo Town meeting (attended by Standing Committee comrades) changed the decision of the E’gai meeting. Because by then we had obtained new materials, learning that there was such a large Soviet area and Red Army in Northern Shaanxi, we changed the decision, to defend and expand the Soviet area in Northern Shaanxi.” The “new materials” Mao Zedong referred to here should refer to the relevant information obtained from the newspapers at Hadapu and from Jia Tuofu.

1935年9月27日，中共中央政治局常委在甘肃省通渭县榜罗镇开会。在这次重要会议上，曾任中共陕西省委秘书长、一直跟随中央红军长征的贾拓夫列席会议，为党中央了解陕甘苏区提供了重要情报。据相关资料，在得知陕北红军的消息后，毛泽东立即“找来贾拓夫，询问陕北详情”。“贾拓夫将1933年7月陕西省委被破坏以前陕甘游击队、红二十六军的活动及陕西革命斗争的情况”，向毛泽东作了详细汇报，并“建议中央到陕北立足扎根”。结合贾拓夫提供的情报和在哈达铺报纸上获取的信息，榜罗镇会议“正式决定前往陕北，保卫和扩大根据地”。1935年10月22日，毛泽东在中共中央政治局会议上说：榜罗镇会议（由常委同志参加）改变了俄界会议的决定。因为那时得到新的材料，知道陕北有这样大的苏区与红军，所以改变决定，在陕北保卫与扩大苏区。毛泽东这里说的“得到新的材料”，应该就是指在哈达铺报纸上以及从贾拓夫那里获取的有关信息。

II. On Hadapu as a “Gas Station” on the Red Army’s Long March

二、关于哈达铺是红军长征路上的“加油站”

Hadapu was an important stop on the Red Army’s Long March. The main forces of the First, Second, and Fourth Front Armies of the Red Army all passed through here. At Hadapu, the Red Army received relatively good replenishment and rest in material, manpower, political, and spiritual terms. It not only restored physical strength and expanded the ranks, but also unified thinking and boosted morale, enhancing combat effectiveness. General Yang Chengwu, recalling this period, once said: Hadapu was “truly a gas station on our Long March.”

哈达铺是红军长征路上的一个重要途经地。红一、红二、红四方面军主力，都曾到过这里。红军在哈达铺从物质上、兵源上、政治上、精神上得到了较好的补给休整，既恢复了体力、壮大了队伍，又统一了思想、鼓舞了士气，战斗力得到提升。杨成武将军回忆这段历史时曾说：哈达铺是“我们长征途中名副其实的加油站”。

In material terms, Hadapu provided ample material supplies and medical treatment for the exhausted, hungry, and cold Red Army soldiers. When they arrived at Hadapu after traversing snow-covered mountains and grasslands and enduring continuous fierce battles, the vast majority of Red Army commanders and fighters were in rags and physically very weak. Peng Dehuai once said that the journey from E’gai to Hadapu took about seven or eight days, “with sparse population and difficult supplies.” Many Red Army soldiers were skin and bones, very frail, and “during the march, it was common to see comrades fall dead by the roadside for no apparent reason.” Although Hadapu was located on the edge of Gansu, it was a relatively prosperous market town, densely populated and rich in products. Since the majority of Hadapu’s population were Han and Hui, the language was the same, communication was convenient, and the local populace had a favorable impression of the Red Army, objectively providing favorable conditions for the Red Army to replenish supplies and rest. In addition, “the enemy garrison at Hadapu, in their hasty flight, left behind several hundred dan [3]3 A *dan* (石) is a traditional Chinese unit of dry volume for grain, roughly equivalent to 100 liters or about 60 kilograms of rice. of rice, white flour, and over 2,000 jin [4]4 A *jin* (斤) is a traditional Chinese unit of weight, equal to 0.5 kilograms. of salt, providing timely material replenishment for the Red Army soldiers who had been marching in the snow mountains and grasslands for months and were often in a state of hunger.” From the capture of Hadapu on September 18, 1935, to their departure on the 25th, the Central Red Army rested at Hadapu for a total of seven days. During this period, the Party Central Committee decided to issue each person one silver dollar to improve their meals. The General Political Department of the Red Army also specifically put forward the slogan “Everyone must eat well.” Yang Dinghua, who followed the Central Red Army on the Long March, once recalled: “Each company’s mess unit slaughtered chickens, ducks, and pigs, and every day there were three meals, each with three meat dishes and two vegetable dishes. The soldiers ate until their mouths were greasy and shiny. Everyone was beaming with joy and delight.”

从物质上看，哈达铺为疲惫不堪、饥寒交迫的红军将士提供了充足的物质补给和医药救治。当经历雪山草地以及连续不断的激烈战斗后到达哈达铺时，广大红军指战员衣衫褴褛，身体已相当虚弱。彭德怀曾说，从俄界到哈达铺，沿途走了约七八天，“人烟稀少，给养困难”，许多红军战士骨瘦如柴，体质很弱，“行军时常见道旁有同志无故倒地就死了”。哈达铺虽地处甘肃边缘，但却是一座较为繁华的集镇，人口稠密，物产丰富。由于哈达铺人口多为汉族、回族，语言相通，交流方便，当地群众对红军亦有好感，客观上为红军进行补给和休整提供了有利条件。再加上，“哈达铺守敌在仓促逃跑时留下了几百石大米、白面和2000多斤食盐，使数月来在雪山草地中行军，时常处于饥饿状态下的红军战士得到了及时的物质补充”。从 1935年9月18日攻占哈达铺至25日离开，中央红军在哈达铺前后休整了7天。在此期间，党中央决定给每人发一块大洋改善伙食。红军总政治部还特意提出“大家要吃得好”的口号。随中央红军长征的杨定华曾回忆：“各个连队伙食单位，都割鸡杀鸭，屠猪宰羊，每天三顿，每顿三荤两素，战士们食得满嘴是油，光溜溜的。大家眉飞色舞，喜气洋洋。”

In addition, the Red Army also raised a large amount of supplies at Hadapu. Xu Guozhen, a founding major general from Gansu, wrote in his article “Raising Grain on the Long March”: “At Hadapu, we raised a large quantity of grain, mainly purchased with silver dollars. At the same time, we also bought salt, medicine, and other items the troops needed from merchants and the people.” The Red Army’s advance detachment, at Li Chuan Town, more than 20 li from Hadapu, “intercepted the enemy’s transport column and captured a large quantity of cloth and cotton,” “solving the problem of keeping warm.” On August 1, 1936, upon learning that the Second and Fourth Front Armies were marching north and would soon arrive in southern Gansu, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Peng Dehuai, who were in Northern Shaanxi, sent a telegram to the Second and Fourth Front Armies. While informing them of the enemy situation in southern Gansu, they specifically noted: “From Baozuo to Hadapu is 500 li, with five or six dangerous passes,” “North of Lazikou, you leave the Tibetan area; the terrain is open, the population is dense, convenient for the troops to rest and reorganize.” At the end of August 1936, after the Second and Fourth Front Armies arrived at Hadapu, the not-wealthy people of Hadapu once again gave all they had to support the Red Army. Chen Zhenguo of the Second Front Army recalled: “At that time, Hadapu was quite prosperous, there were many things, and they were cheap. The people treated us very warmly. After more than two months of life on the grasslands, seeing no people and having no grain to eat, suddenly coming to such a good place, we were simply overjoyed. As soon as the troops settled in, they bought chickens and pigs to improve their meals, and everyone ate well for several days.” Yang Xiushan, also of the Second Front Army, said: “For Red Army soldiers who had come out of the snowy mountains and grasslands, coming to such a good place was truly like arriving in heaven.” The people of Hadapu and the Red Army were as close as one family, helping the Red Army raise a large amount of grain. It happened to be autumn, and the people had a surplus of grain, so the Red Army’s grain collection went relatively smoothly. At the same time, due to the shortage of medicine and doctors during the Long March, many wounded and sick soldiers had their treatment delayed. Hadapu happened to be a well-known medicinal materials distribution center, with many traditional Chinese medicine shops, which were just right for treatment and recuperation. At that time, many wounded and sick Red Army soldiers received attentive care and medical treatment at Hadapu. The material replenishment and physical treatment created favorable conditions for the Red Army commanders and fighters to recover their strength and health and to march toward Northern Shaanxi.

此外，红军在哈达铺还筹集到大量物资。甘肃籍开国少将徐国珍在《长征路上筹粮》一文中讲道：“我们在哈达铺筹集了大批粮食，主要是用银元买的，同时，还从商人和群众那里买到了盐巴、药品和部队需要的东西。”红军先头部队，在距离哈达铺20多里的理川镇，“把敌运输队截获了，缴获了大批的布匹和棉花”，“解决了御寒问题”。1936年8月1日，获悉红二、红四方面军北上即将到达甘南，在陕北的毛泽东、周恩来、彭德怀致电红二、红四方面军，在通报甘南敌情时还特意介绍说，“包座到哈达铺五百里，有险隘五六处”，“拉〔腊〕子口以北即脱离番区，地势宽敞，人烟稠密，便于部队之休息、整理”。1936年8月底，红二、红四方面军到哈达铺后，并不富裕的哈达铺人民再次倾其所有支援红军。红二方面军的陈振国回忆，“当时哈达铺比较繁荣，东西很多，也比较便宜，群众待我们也很热情。两个多月的草地生活，见不到群众，吃不上粮食，现在一下子来到这样好的地方，我们简直高兴坏了。部队一驻下来，就买鸡买猪，改善伙食，大家美美地吃了几顿”。同在红二方面军的杨秀山也说：“从雪山草地走出来的红军战士，来到这样的好地方，真像是到了天堂。”哈达铺群众与红军亲如一家人，帮助红军筹集到大量粮食。时逢秋季，群众余粮较多，所以红军筹粮较为顺利。同时，长征中红军因缺医少药，许多伤病员耽搁了治疗。哈达铺恰是远近闻名的药材集散地，有许多中药店，正好可治病调理。当时很多红军伤病员在哈达铺得到了悉心照顾和医治。物质上的补给和身体上的救治，为红军指战员恢复体力和健康，向陕北进军创造了有利条件。

From the perspective of troop strength, the Red Army replenished its forces in Hadapu, strengthening its armed power. At present, there are few records of the Central Red Army expanding its ranks in Hadapu, but both the Second and Fourth Front Armies have recollections and records of expanding their ranks when passing through the area. Zhang Ziyi of the Second Front Army recorded in his diary: “Arrived at Hadapu today… held a departmental meeting to discuss the policy of raising grain and funds and expanding the Red Army.” Xiang Hansheng of the Second Front Army recalled, “Apart from providing material support to the Red Army, the masses also had over 1,000 people join the Red Army. At the same time, local democratic political power was established, and a worker-peasant guerrilla force of over 2,000 people was formed, strengthening the revolutionary forces.” Yan Hanwan, then head of the Civil Affairs Section of the Political Department of the 18th Division of the Sixth Army Corps, recalled that local people enthusiastically enlisted: “The Front Army headquarters ordered each division to immediately organize troop-expansion work teams and send them to the countryside to recruit. The task was: one guarantee to recruit one squad, one district to recruit one company, one county to recruit one regiment.” In about ten days, “a total of nearly 3,000 new soldiers were recruited, greatly expanding the army and changing the situation.” The Fourth Front Army’s troop expansion was also effective. The *History of the Chinese Communist Party in Gansu* records that the Fourth Front Army established county- and township-level Soviet political power and local armed forces in Min County (including present-day Dangchang): “The Hadapu area guerrilla force had three battalions under its command, totaling about 2,000 people.” “In just over a month, more than 3,000 young people in the Min-Tao-West region joined the Red Army and were organized into one new regiment.” Of course, these figures include other places in southern Gansu, but Hadapu should have been an important station for troop replenishment. For the Long March troops, who had suffered severe attrition, this undoubtedly played a role of “refueling.”

从兵源上看，红军在哈达铺进行了兵源补充，壮大了武装力量。目前关于中央红军在哈达铺扩红的记载较少，但红二、红四方面军途经该地区都有扩红的回忆和记载。红二方面军张子意在日记中记载：“本日到达哈达铺……召开部务会议，讨论筹集粮资政策与扩红。”红二方面军向汉生回忆，“人民群众除了物资上大力支援红军外，有1000多人参加了红军队伍，同时还建立了地方民主政权，成立了2000多人的工农游击队，壮大了革命的力量”。时任红六军团十八师政治部民运科长严汉万回忆，当地群众踊跃参军，“方面军司令部指示各师立即组织扩兵工作团，分赴农村进行扩兵，任务是：一个保征一个班，一个区征一个连，一个县征一个团”；十天左右的时间，“共招了新兵近3000人，大大扩充了军队，改变了局面”。红四方面军扩红也卓有成效。《中国共产党甘肃历史》记载，红四方面军在岷县（包括今宕昌）建立了县乡苏维埃政权和地方武装，“哈达铺地区游击队，下辖3个营，约2000余人”。“在1个多月时间里，岷洮西地区就有3000多名青年参加红军，被编为1个新兵团。”当然，这些数字是包括陇南其他地方的，但哈达铺应是重要的兵源补充站。这对于减员严重的长征部队来说，无疑起到了“加油”作用。

From a political perspective, Hadapu was not only an important assembly point for the Red Army’s Long March but also an important reorganization site, further establishing the Party’s absolute leadership over the military. The Red Army conducted political training for cadres in Hadapu. On the morning of September 22, Mao Zedong pointed out at a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee held in Hadapu: “To consolidate the troops, we need to understand the cadres,” and “The current cadres are the cream; they should be protected,” clearly raising the requirement to understand and protect cadres. That afternoon, Mao Zedong attended a meeting of cadres at the regimental level and above, first carrying out ideological and political work, waging a resolute struggle against Zhang Guotao’s separatist errors, and further enabling the broad masses of Red Army commanders and fighters to see the situation clearly and unify their thinking. Subsequently, to implement the spirit of the E’luo Meeting [5]5 The E’luo Meeting (September 12, 1935) was an enlarged meeting of the Politburo held in E’luo, Gansu, which condemned Zhang Guotao’s separatist activities and decided to reorganize the Red Army into the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment., the First Army Corps, Third Army Corps, and the Military Commission Column were reorganized, and the establishment of the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army was formally announced, with Peng Dehuai as commander and Mao Zedong as political commissar, under which there were “three columns, totaling over 8,000 people.” After the reorganization, the organizational structure of the troops was significantly optimized, the Party’s leadership over the military was strengthened, and the troops’ combat effectiveness was markedly enhanced, providing a strong guarantee for the march to northern Shaanxi. In August and September of the following year, the Second and Fourth Front Armies also assembled in Hadapu successively, using it as their command center to launch the “Cheng-Xian-Hui-Liang Campaign” and the “Min-Tao-West Campaign.” Through reorganization and assembly, all three main forces of the Red Army gathered strength in Hadapu and set out again, ultimately achieving a victorious rendezvous.

从政治上看，哈达铺不仅是红军长征的重要集结地，还是红军长征的重要整编地，进一步确定了党对军队的绝对领导权。红军在哈达铺进行了干部政治整训。9月22日上午，毛泽东在哈达铺召开的中央政治局常委会议上指出，“为了巩固部队，需要了解干部”，“现在的干部是精华，应该注意保护”，明确提出了解干部、保护干部的要求。当天下午，毛泽东出席团以上干部会议，首先开展了思想政治工作，与张国焘分裂主义错误进行了坚决的斗争，进一步使广大红军指战员认清形势，统一思想。随后，为落实俄界会议精神，对红一军、红三军和军委纵队进行改编，正式宣告成立中国工农红军陕甘支队，彭德怀为司令员，毛泽东为政委，下辖“三个纵队，共八千多人”。经过整编，部队组织结构明显优化，党对军队的领导力增强，部队战斗力明显提升，为向陕北进军提供了有力保证。次年8月至9月，红二、红四方面军也先后在哈达铺集结，并将其作为部队指挥中心，发起了“成徽两康战役”和“岷洮西战役”。经过整编和集结，红军三大主力都从哈达铺积蓄力量再出发，并最终胜利会师。

From a spiritual perspective, the replenishment and rest in Hadapu gave the Red Army a completely new spiritual outlook and inspired revolutionary morale. As mentioned earlier, Hadapu’s flourishing commerce and abundant products provided ample supplies for the Red Army’s Long March. The Red Army improved its diet here, bathed and had haircuts, and mended uniforms, with everyone looking radiant and spirited. Mao Zedong’s poem “The Long March” [6]6 “The Long March” (七律·长征) is a classical seven-character regulated verse by Mao Zedong, written in 1935, celebrating the Red Army’s arduous journey., Zhang Wentian’s “The Developing Soviet Revolutionary Movement in Shaanxi-Gansu,” and the song “To Northern Shaanxi” written overnight in Hadapu by Peng Jialun, propaganda section chief of the First Column, are all clear evidence left by this period. According to Yang Shangkun’s recollections, Mao Zedong, at the meeting of cadres at the regimental level and above, “told everyone that there were Red Army troops in northern Shaanxi and the new direction of the detachment’s advance.” “After hearing the news that there were Red Army troops in northern Shaanxi, everyone was very excited.” At the same time, Mao Zedong clearly explained to everyone at this meeting the matter of Zhang Guotao’s split with the Central Committee. “Originally, the Central Committee did not allow the matter of Zhang Guotao’s split to be casually discussed among the lower ranks, but many middle- and lower-level cadres still found out, and their morale was not good along the way. Now, knowing that there were Red Army troops and base areas not far ahead, morale generally rose.” Mao Zedong also encouraged everyone, saying: “Our line is correct. The number of people in our northern advance vanguard is a bit small now, but that also makes our target smaller, not conspicuous. Everyone need not be pessimistic. We are still more numerous than when the Fourth Army of the Red Army went down Jinggangshan in early 1929!” “From here to the northern Shaanxi revolutionary base area founded by Liu Zhidan is only about seven or eight hundred li. Everyone should cheer up and continue northward.” After hearing this, the broad masses of Red Army commanders and fighters swept away the gloomy mood caused by crossing snow mountains and grasslands, as well as Zhang Guotao’s refusal to go north and his splitting of the Party and the Red Army. From central leaders to ordinary soldiers, everyone was beaming with joy, filled with the excitement and anticipation of nearing “home,” and “spiritedly set foot on the final leg of the journey to the anti-Japanese front.” It can be seen that the Red Army received a crucial “refueling” of revolutionary morale and spirit in Hadapu, providing powerful spiritual impetus for the victory of the Long March.

从精神上看，哈达铺的补充休整，使红军的精神面貌焕然一新，鼓舞了革命斗志。如前所述，哈达铺繁盛的商贸和丰饶的物产，为红军长征提供了充足的给养。红军在这里改善了伙食，洗澡理发，缝补军装，个个容光焕发，精神抖擞。毛泽东创作的《七律·长征》，张闻天的《发展着的陕甘苏维埃革命运动》，还有第一纵队宣传科长彭加伦在哈达铺连夜创作的歌曲《到陕北去》等，都是这段历史留下的明证。据杨尚昆回忆，毛泽东在团以上干部会议上，“把陕北有红军以及支队新的进军方向告诉了大家”。“听说陕北有红军的消息后，大家都非常振奋。”同时，毛泽东在这次会议上把张国焘同中央闹分裂的事给大家讲清楚了。“本来，中央不让向下面随便讲张国焘闹分裂的事，但是，许多中下级干部还是知道了，一路上情绪不太好。现在，大家知道了前面不远的地方就有红军和根据地，情绪普遍高涨起来。”毛泽东还鼓励大家说：“我们的路线是正确的。现在我们北上先遣队人数是少一点，但是目标也就小一点，不张扬，大家用不着悲观，我们现在比一九二九年初红四军下井冈山时的人数还多哩！”“从现地到刘志丹创建的陕北革命根据地不过七八百里的路程。大家要振奋精神，继续北上。”广大红军指战员听后，一扫爬雪山过草地，以及张国焘拒绝北上分裂党和红军而产生的阴霾情绪。从中央领导到普通战士，个个喜形于色，有了快到“家”的兴奋和憧憬，“精神抖擞地踏上了奔赴抗日征程的最后一段路程”。可见，红军在哈达铺从革命斗志和精神上获得至关重要的“加油”鼓劲，为长征胜利提供了强大的精神动力。

It is worth noting that the reason Hadapu could become an important “refueling station” on the Red Army’s Long March was inseparable from the Red Army’s strict implementation of the Party’s mass discipline and ethnic and religious policies. Before entering Hadapu, Mao Zedong instructed the troops to “strictly enforce discipline” and “severely punish violators.” After arriving in Hadapu, the Red Army was strictly disciplined, did not take a single needle or thread from the people, distributed captured rice and flour to relieve the poor masses, and actively helped the masses with their labor. “The local Hui and Han masses were deeply moved, repeatedly praising the Red Army as the army of the common people, and enthusiastically vacated houses for the Red Army, sent firewood, grass, and boiling water.” When the troops left, the masses spontaneously and warmly saw them off and enthusiastically joined the Red Army. To better implement the Party’s ethnic policy, the General Political Department of the Red Army also formulated and promulgated the “Code of Conduct for Hui Areas,” ordering all troops to strictly observe it, and wrote slogans such as “Protect the Hui people, protect the mosques.” “The Red Army implemented the Party’s ethnic policy through its own actions, winning the support of the local people of all ethnic groups. They took out their own grain, clothing, fodder, and other items to give to the Red Army, vying to let the Red Army stay in their homes, and provided meticulous care for the Red Army’s wounded and sick.” According to the recollections of Tang Chenggong of the 6th Division of the Second Army Corps, “During the ten or so days of rest in Hadapu, the army corps commanders… demanded that commanders and fighters consciously observe Hui customs and habits everywhere, pay special attention to protecting mosques, and consult the ‘imam’ if there were any problems. Several senior officers of the army corps went deep among the Hui people to do united front work with the imams. Therefore, in our daily life, the recuperation of the weak and the sick received a lot of help from the local Hui people.” These facts not only reflect the deep bond between the Red Army and the people of Hadapu but are also an important reason and powerful testimony to why Hadapu became a “refueling station” on the Long March.

值得注意的是，哈达铺之所以能成为红军长征路上的重要“加油站”，离不开红军严格执行党的群众纪律和民族宗教政策。进哈达铺前，毛泽东就指示部队要“严整纪律”，“违者严处”。到哈达铺后，红军纪律严明、与百姓秋毫无犯，还将缴获的大米、白面分发救济贫困群众，积极帮助群众劳动。“当地回汉群众感慨万分，连连称赞红军是老百姓的军队，热心地给红军让出住房，送来柴草和开水。”当部队离开时，群众自发热情相送，并踊跃参加红军。为了更好地贯彻党的民族政策，红军总政治部还制定颁布了《回民地区守则》，通令各部队认真遵守，并书写“保护回民、保护清真寺”等标语。“红军身体力行贯彻党的民族政策，赢得当地各族群众的拥护。他们纷纷拿出自家的粮食、衣物、饲草等送给红军，争着抢着让红军住到自己家里，对红军伤病员给予无微不至的照顾。”据红二军团六师的汤成功回忆，“在哈达铺休整十来天，军团首长……要求指战员处处自觉遵守回民风俗习惯，特别注意保护清真寺，有什么问题，请教‘阿訇’。军部几位首长深入回民中去，对阿訇做团结工作。因此，我们的生活上，体弱者和病员的休养，得到当地回民的很多帮助”。这些不仅体现了红军与哈达铺人民的鱼水深情，更是哈达铺成为长征路上“加油站”的重要因由和有力见证。

Looking at the entire history of the Red Army’s Long March, there were many large and small “refueling stations” along the way, but the “refueling station” at Hadapu has its special significance. Hadapu is the only “refueling station” visited by all three front armies, and it was the “refueling station” for the final sprint to victory in the Long March. The Party Central Committee and the First Front Army “refueled” here, found their foothold in northern Shaanxi, and placed the main base of the Chinese revolution in the northwest; the Second and Fourth Front Armies “refueled” here, marched toward the grand rendezvous of the three armies, and seized the final victory of the Long March.

纵观整个红军长征史，长征路上有过大大小小的许多“加油站”，但哈达铺这个“加油站”有其特殊意义。哈达铺是唯一的三个方面军都到过的“加油站”，是长征胜利最后冲刺的“加油站”。党中央和红一方面军在这里“加油”，找到落脚地陕北，把中国革命大本营放在西北；红二、红四方面军在这里“加油”，走向三军大会师，夺取长征最后胜利。

III. On the Relationship between the Hadapu Meeting, the E’luo Meeting, and the Bangluo Town Meeting

三、关于哈达铺会议与俄界会议、榜罗镇会议的关系

The E’luo Meeting, the Hadapu Meeting, and the Bangluo Town Meeting were three important meetings held successively after the Party Central Committee entered the northwest, playing a significant role in the Central Committee’s “strategic decision to make northern Shaanxi the main base for leading the Chinese revolution.” The author believes that to clarify issues related to Hadapu and the Red Army’s Long March, it is necessary to examine the Hadapu Meeting in connection with the E’luo Meeting and the Bangluo Town Meeting, conducting systematic research.

俄界会议、哈达铺会议和榜罗镇会议是党中央进入西北后相继召开的三个重要会议，对于党中央“作出以陕北作为领导中国革命大本营的战略决策”起到了重要作用。笔者认为，要厘清哈达铺与红军长征相关问题，有必要将哈达铺会议同俄界会议、榜罗镇会议联系起来考察，作系统性研究。

The E’jie Conference [n7] laid a solid foundation for the Hadapu Conference and the Party Central Committee’s decision to make the final stop in northern Shaanxi. The E’jie Conference was the first enlarged meeting of the Politburo held after the Party Central Committee entered the northwestern region. In terms of content, first, it discussed and adopted the “Resolution on the Errors of Comrade Zhang Guotao,” [n8] exposing and criticizing Zhang Guotao’s splittist errors from the political line, holding that the dispute between the Central Committee and Zhang Guotao “is in essence a principled divergence in the assessment of the current political situation and the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves,” and “calling on all comrades in the Fourth Front Army who are loyal to the Communist Party to unite around the Party Central Committee and wage a resolute struggle against this tendency, so as to consolidate the Party and the Red Army.” Second, it reorganized and streamlined the Red Army forces heading north, strengthening the Party’s leadership over the army and enhancing the troops’ mobility and combat effectiveness. The conference decided: “The First Red Army Corps, the Third Red Army Corps, and the Military Commission Column are to be reorganized into the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, with Peng Dehuai as commander, Lin Biao as deputy commander, Mao Zedong as political commissar, Wang Jiaxiang as director of the Political Department, and Yang Shangkun as deputy director; Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, and Wang Jiaxiang are to form a five-person group for military leadership; Li De, Ye Jianying, Deng Fa, Cai Shufan, and Li Weihan are to form the Reorganization Committee to preside over the army’s reorganization.” Third, it focused on discussing the Red Army’s future strategic direction, continuing to uphold the policy of resisting Japan by marching north. However, because the First and Fourth Front Armies had already separated, the Red Army’s northward forces were greatly reduced, so the original plan to “create a base area in Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu” was adjusted. It was decided to use guerrilla warfare to “open up communication with the international community, regroup and rest the forces, expand the Red Army ranks, first create a base area in a place close to the Soviet Union, and later develop eastward.” In his concluding remarks, Mao Zedong also pointed out: “The idea of first winning victory in one or several provinces cannot be denied; it is so now and will be so in the future, only not in Jiangxi, but in Shaanxi and Gansu.” Although the E’jie Conference changed the plan to create a base area in Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu, it still regarded the Shaanxi-Gansu region as the hope for the Chinese revolution, intending to first pass through northern Shaanxi and northeastern Gansu to establish a base area near the Soviet Union, obtain assistance to strengthen its forces, and then develop into the broader Shaanxi-Gansu region. Although this plan later changed due to new intelligence obtained in Hadapu, the policy of persisting in resisting Japan by marching north and the general direction of advancing toward Shaanxi and Gansu, as determined by the conference, did not change, and it thus laid the foundation for the Hadapu Conference and the Party Central Committee’s decision to make the final stop in northern Shaanxi.

俄界会议为哈达铺会议和党中央决策落脚陕北奠定了坚实基础。俄界会议是党中央进入西北地区后召开的第一次政治局扩大会议。从内容上看，一是讨论通过《关于张国焘同志的错误的决定》，从政治路线上对张国焘分裂错误进行了揭露和批判，认为中央与张国焘的争论，“其实质是由于对目前政治形势与敌我力量对比估计上有着原则的分歧”，并“号召红四方面军中的全体忠实于共产党的同志团结在党中央的周围，同这种倾向做坚决的斗争，以巩固党与红军”。二是对北上红军部队进行缩编整顿，加强党对军队的领导，提高部队的机动性和战斗力。会议决定：“红一军、红三军、军委纵队编为中国工农红军陕甘支队，彭德怀为司令员、林彪为副司令员，毛泽东为政治委员，王稼祥为政治部主任、杨尚昆为副主任；由毛泽东、周恩来、彭德怀、林彪、王稼祥成立五人团进行军事领导；由李德、叶剑英、邓发、蔡树藩、李维汉组成编制委员会，主持部队整编工作。”三是着重讨论红军今后的战略方针问题，继续坚持北上抗日的方针，但因红一、红四方面军已经分开行动，红军北上的兵力大为减少，遂调整原定“在川、陕、甘创造根据地的计划”，决定以游击战争方式，“打通同国际的联系，整顿和休养兵力，扩大红军队伍，首先在与苏联接近的地方创造一个根据地，将来向东发展”。毛泽东还在结论中指出：“一省数省首先胜利，是不能否认的，现在如此，将来也是如此，不过不是在江西，而是在陕、甘。”俄界会议虽然改变了在川陕甘创建根据地的计划，但仍将陕甘地区视为中国革命的希望所在，打算先经过陕北、甘东北，到靠近苏联的地区建立根据地，获得援助壮大力量后，再到陕甘广大区域发展。尽管该计划后因在哈达铺得到新的情报而发生变更，但会议确定的坚持北上抗日的方针和向陕甘进军的大方向并没有改变，也因此为哈达铺会议和党中央决策落脚陕北奠定了基础。

The Hadapu Conference was a continuation and major breakthrough of the E’jie Conference. The Hadapu Conference should include two levels of meetings: one was the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo on the morning of September 22, 1935; the other was the meeting of cadres at the regimental level and above of the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment on the afternoon of the same day. In terms of content, the Standing Committee meeting mainly discussed organizational work, implementing the E’jie Conference’s decision to reorganize the northward Red Army into the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment, and reorganizing the troops into three columns. The meeting of cadres at the regimental level and above held that afternoon first endorsed the E’jie Conference’s decision, waged a political struggle against Zhang Guotao’s splittism, and unified thinking; it formally announced the establishment of the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army; based on information obtained from newspapers during the stay in Hadapu, it proposed to “complete the original plan of resisting Japan by marching north,” “first go to northern Shaanxi,” and encouraged everyone to “lift their spirits and continue northward.” According to Yang Shangkun’s recollection, the E’jie Conference “only made a decision to reorganize the First Front Army into the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment; the actual reorganization was carried out in Hadapu. Because the military situation was urgent, the troops continued northward after the meeting.” It can be seen that the E’jie Conference only made the decision to reorganize, and the actual reorganization was completed only in Hadapu. At the same time, the Hadapu Conference also decided to “send Xie Juezai and Mao Zemin to Xinjiang to establish a communication station and try to open up international relations.” This was also continuing to carry out the tasks of the E’jie Conference. In terms of the choice of development direction and final stop, these two conferences also differed. The E’jie Conference, in view of Zhang Guotao’s splittist behavior severely weakening the Red Army’s northward forces, adjusted the original strategic policy of creating a base area in Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu, and planned to create a base area near the Soviet Union to obtain international assistance. The Hadapu Conference was different. At this time, Mao Zedong and other central leaders had confirmed from newspapers that there was a Red Army led by Liu Zhidan in northern Shaanxi, so they made a prompt decision, initially clarifying the direction of advancing toward northern Shaanxi, joining forces with the Red Army in northern Shaanxi, and making the final stop in northern Shaanxi. This was clearly an important adjustment and breakthrough of the E’jie Conference.

哈达铺会议是俄界会议的延续和重大突破。哈达铺会议应包括两个层面的会议：一个是 1935年9月22日上午的中央政治局常委会议；另一个是当天下午陕甘支队团以上干部会议。从内容上看，政治局常委会议主要讨论了组织工作问题，贯彻执行俄界会议关于北上红军整编为陕甘支队的问题，将部队改编为三个纵队。当日下午召开的团以上干部会议，首先拥护俄界会议决定，开展与张国焘分裂主义的政治斗争，统一了思想；正式宣告成立中国工农红军陕甘支队；根据在哈达铺期间从报纸上得到的信息，提出要“完成北上抗日的原定计划”，“首先要到陕北去”，并鼓励大家要“振奋精神，继续北上”。据杨尚昆回忆，俄界会议“对红一方面军改编为陕甘支队，也只作了个决定，正式改编是在哈达铺进行的。因为军情紧急，会后部队继续北上”。可见，俄界会议只是作出整编的决定，整编工作实际到哈达铺才完成。同时，哈达铺会议还决定“派谢觉哉、毛泽民去新疆建立交通站，设法打通国际关系”。这也是在继续执行俄界会议的任务。在发展方向和落脚点选择上，这两个会议也有不同。俄界会议鉴于张国焘分裂行为严重削弱红军北上的力量，调整了原拟到川陕甘创建根据地的战略方针，计划到靠近苏联的地区创建根据地，以便获取国际援助。哈达铺会议则不同，此时毛泽东等中央领导已从报纸上确知陕北有刘志丹的红军，于是当机立断，初步明确了向陕北进军，与陕北红军会师，到陕北落脚。这显然是对俄界会议的重要调整和突破。

The Bangluo Town Conference [n9] further confirmed and developed the content of the Hadapu Conference. Reorganizing the troops to continue resisting Japan by marching north and finding the forward direction for the Red Army’s Long March were the two major contributions of the Hadapu Conference, and also issues that the subsequent Bangluo Town Conference needed to further clarify. The Bangluo Town Conference also included two levels of meetings. First, on September 27, 1935, a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo was held in Bangluo Town, Tongwei County, which changed the E’jie Conference’s decision to establish a base area near the Soviet Union, determining that the Party Central Committee and the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment would make the final stop in northern Shaanxi, “formally deciding to go to northern Shaanxi, defend and expand the base area.” Second, on September 28, a meeting of cadres at the company level and above of the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment was held. Mao Zedong attended the meeting and delivered a report on the current situation and tasks, focusing on five issues: “(1) the seriousness of Japan’s aggression in the north; (2) the situation of the northern Shaanxi base area and the Red Army; (3) the economic and political conditions for the north to become a new anti-Japanese front; (4) avoiding combat with the Kuomintang army and quickly concentrating in northern Shaanxi; (5) strictly enforcing discipline, paying full attention to mass work, publicizing the significance of our army’s northward march to resist Japan, and paying attention to recruiting new soldiers.” At the same time, “it called on the entire detachment to break through the final pass of the Long March—the Guyuan-Pingliang blockade line—and join forces with the comrades in northern Shaanxi.” It can be seen that the Hadapu Conference only proposed going to northern Shaanxi, while the Bangluo Town Conference formally decided, in the form of a Politburo meeting, that the Red Army’s Long March would end in northern Shaanxi, further confirming the content of the Hadapu Conference. On the basis of the Hadapu Conference, the Bangluo Town Conference further resolved the specific location issue of establishing a base area in Shaanxi and Gansu that the E’jie Conference had not resolved, and determined the major strategic decision to defend and expand the northern Shaanxi Soviet area. This was of decisive significance for the Party Central Committee and the Red Army to make the final stop in northern Shaanxi, and for making northern Shaanxi a forward base for resisting Japan and the main base for leading the Chinese revolution.

榜罗镇会议进一步确认和发展了哈达铺会议的内容。整编部队继续北上抗日和找到红军长征前进方向，是哈达铺会议的两大贡献，也是随后榜罗镇会议要进一步明确的问题。榜罗镇会议也包括两个层面的会议。一是 1935年9月27日在通渭县榜罗镇召开的政治局常委会议，改变俄界会议关于到靠近苏联地区建立根据地的决定，确定党中央和陕甘支队到陕北落脚，“正式决定前往陕北，保卫和扩大根据地”。二是9月28日召开的陕甘支队连以上干部会议。毛泽东出席会议并作当前形势和任务报告，重点讲了五个问题：“（一）日本侵略北方的严重性；（二）陕北根据地和红军状况；（三）北方可成为抗日新阵地的经济、政治条件；（四）避免同国民党军作战，迅速到陕北集中；（五）严格整顿纪律，充分注意群众工作，宣传我军北上抗日的意义，注意扩充新战士。”同时，“号召全支队突破长征的最后关口——固原、平凉封锁线，同陕北的同志会合”。可见，哈达铺会议只是提出要到陕北，榜罗镇会议则以政治局会议的形式正式决策了红军长征落脚陕北，进一步确认了哈达铺会议的内容。榜罗镇会议在哈达铺会议基础上进一步解决了俄界会议所未能解决的在陕甘建立根据地的具体地点问题，确定了保卫与扩大陕北苏区的重大战略决策，这对党中央和红军落脚陕北，以及把陕北作为抗日的前进阵地和领导中国革命的大本营，具有决定性的意义。

Therefore, regarding the final stop in northern Shaanxi, the E’jie Conference proposed the concept, the Hadapu Conference clarified the direction, and the Bangluo Town Conference made the decision. From this perspective, the Hadapu Conference played a key role in linking the preceding and the following among the three conferences. The three were consistent in persisting in resisting Japan by marching north and closely linking the establishment of a base area with saving the nation from peril; in finding the forward direction for the Red Army’s Long March, they progressed layer by layer, becoming increasingly clear and definite.

因此，就落脚陕北而言，俄界会议是提出构想，哈达铺会议是明确方向，榜罗镇会议是作出决策。由是观之，哈达铺会议在三个会议中起到承前启后的关键作用。三者在坚持北上抗日，把建立根据地与拯救民族危亡紧密联系起来上一脉相承；在寻找红军长征前进方向上是层层递进，愈加清晰和明确。

IV. On the Strategic Significance of the Red Army’s Clarification of the Long March’s Final Stop in Hadapu

四、关于红军在哈达铺明确长征落脚地的战略意义

The Party Central Committee’s finding of the Long March’s final stop in Hadapu had important strategic significance.

党中央在哈达铺找到长征落脚地，具有重要的战略意义。

From the overall perspective of the Long March, it accelerated the historical process of the Red Army’s victory in the Long March. After the Central Red Army set out on the Long March, where exactly it would settle and establish a base area was always a major issue under consideration by the Party Central Committee. It had successively planned to settle in western Hunan, the Sichuan-Guizhou border area, the Sichuan-Yunnan-Guizhou border area, western Sichuan, and northwestern Sichuan, but all these plans were rendered impossible by the enemy’s pursuit and interception or by the barrenness of the localities. After joining forces with the Fourth Front Army, the Central Committee advocated moving north, striving to create the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area as a place to settle, but this came to nothing because Zhang Guotao, driven by personal ambition, insisted on moving south and openly went against the Central Committee. To avoid further splits within the Party and the Red Army, Mao Zedong and others had no choice but to lead the First and Third Army Corps and the Central Military Commission column northward ahead of the rest. Thereafter, the E’guo Meeting [n10], given the insufficient strength of the northward-moving Red Army, decided to abandon the plan to establish a base in the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu area and prepared to establish a base near the Soviet Union. Up to this point, the Party and the Red Army still had only the general direction of northward resistance against Japan; exactly where to settle had not yet been determined. It was precisely at this moment that, coincidentally, the great news about the Red Army in northern Shaanxi was obtained from newspapers in Hadapu — a timely help, a sudden turn of events. [n11] Therefore, Mao Zedong decisively proposed at Hadapu, “Go to northern Shaanxi,” promptly pointing out the strategic direction and destination for the Long March’s advance. Soon after, the Bangluo Town Meeting [n12] “changed the E’guo Meeting’s decision to establish a base near the Soviet Union” and formally made the decision to “place the foothold of the Party Central Committee and the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment in northern Shaanxi,” confirming the decision made at Hadapu. It was by following the correct direction proposed at Hadapu that the Party Central Committee and the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment reorganized and continued their advance, ultimately achieving the great victory of the Long March.

从长征总体视角看，加速了红军长征胜利的历史进程。中央红军自长征出发以后，究竟要到哪里去落脚和建立根据地，一直是党中央考虑的重大问题。曾先后打算落脚湘西、川黔边、川滇黔边、川西及川西北等地，均因敌人的围追堵截或地方贫瘠而无法实现。与红四方面军会师后，中央主张北上，力图创建川陕甘苏区作为落脚地，但因张国焘野心作祟，执意南下，与中央公然背道而驰而作罢。为避免党和红军进一步分裂，毛泽东等不得不率红一、红三军和军委纵队先行北上。此后，俄界会议鉴于北上红军力量不足，决定放弃建立川陕甘根据地的计划，准备到靠近苏联的地方建立根据地。直至此时，党和红军仍然只有北上抗日大方向，究竟到何处落脚尚未确定。正当此时，恰巧在哈达铺从报纸上获知陕北红军的重大喜讯，可谓雪中送炭，柳暗花明又一村。因此，毛泽东在哈达铺果断提出“到陕北去”，及时指明了长征前进的战略方向和目的地。不久，榜罗镇会议“改变俄界会议关于接近苏联建立根据地的决定”，正式作出“把中共中央和陕甘支队的落脚点放在陕北”的决策，确认了哈达铺的决定。正是沿着哈达铺提出的正确方向，党中央和陕甘支队重整行装继续前进，最终取得长征的伟大胜利。

From the perspective of national resistance against Japan, it was an important link in adhering to the policy of northward resistance against Japan. Before the Central Red Army’s Long March, the Central Committee of the CPC had already clarified the strategic goal of northward resistance against Japan. After the September 18th Incident [n13], “at the critical juncture of national crisis, the Chinese Communist Party was the first to raise high the banner of armed resistance against Japan,” issuing a series of declarations on resistance against Japan. In October 1933, it signed an agreement to resist Japan and oppose Chiang Kai-shek with the 19th Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army stationed in Fujian. In July 1934, the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army Northward Anti-Japanese Vanguard Detachment, formed from the Seventh Army Corps, was the first to raise the banner of northward resistance against Japan. During the Long March, even in the face of severe circumstances, the Party and the Red Army continued to hold high the banner of northward resistance against Japan. In June 1935, after the First and Fourth Front Armies of the Red Army joined forces, the Party Central Committee’s strategic advocacy of northward resistance against Japan became even more resolute. On June 15, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and others issued the “Declaration Against Japan’s Annexation of North China and Chiang Kai-shek’s Betrayal of the Country,” calling for “resolute warfare against Japan, recovery of all lost territories, and expulsion of Japanese imperialism from China.” On June 29, Mao Zedong clearly stated at the Lianghekou Meeting, “We must propagate opposition to Japanese imperialism among the troops,” and believed that “this can best mobilize the masses.” On August 17, Mao Zedong said to Yang Chengwu regarding the “Letter to All Compatriots on Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation” (i.e., the August 1st Declaration) [n14] issued by the CPC delegation to the Comintern in the name of the Party Central Committee, “The line of northward resistance against Japan is the correct line, decided by the Central Committee after studying the current situation,” and instructed that “the reasons why the Central Committee decided to cross the grasslands and move north to resist Japan must be clearly explained to the comrades.” On September 12, the E’guo Meeting criticized Zhang Guotao’s southward splitist behavior, holding that Zhang Guotao “seriously underestimated the intensification of the current revolutionary situation nationwide, especially the upsurge of the nationwide anti-Japanese national revolutionary movement triggered by the aggressive invasion of Japanese imperialism,” and thus “lost confidence in creating a new Soviet area in northwestern China, which is on the front line of resistance against Japan.” The E’guo Meeting adhered to the strategic policy of northward resistance against Japan, planning first to establish a base in areas near the Soviet Union and then to seek opportunities to develop eastward. After arriving at Hadapu, the Party Central Committee found the foothold for the Red Army’s Long March, proposed going to northern Shaanxi, and the strategic policy of northward resistance against Japan became increasingly clear and feasible. As Mao Zedong said: “The national crisis is deepening day by day; we must continue to act and complete the original plan of northward resistance against Japan.” He also called on all commanders and fighters: “Advance victoriously; it is only seven or eight hundred li to northern Shaanxi. That is our destination, our forward position for resistance against Japan!” It is evident that one of the important purposes of the Red Army’s clear proposal at Hadapu to go to northern Shaanxi was to more closely link the establishment of base areas with national resistance against Japan.

从民族抗战视角看，是坚持北上抗日方针的重要一环。中央红军长征之前，中共中央就已明确北上抗日的战略目标。九一八事变后，“在民族危机的严重关头，中国共产党率先高举武装抗日旗帜”，发表一系列抗战宣言。1933年10月，与驻福建的国民革命军第十九路军签订抗日反蒋协定。1934年7月，由红七军团组建的中国工农红军北上抗日先遣队率先打出北上抗日的旗帜。长征途中，即使面临严峻形势，党和红军依然高举北上抗日旗帜。1935年6月，红一、红四方面军会师后，党中央坚持北上抗日的战略主张更趋坚定。6月15日，毛泽东、朱德等发表《为反对日本并吞华北与蒋介石卖国宣言》，号召“坚决对日作战，恢复一切失地，驱逐日本帝国主义出中国”。6月29日，毛泽东在两河口会议上明确提出，“要在部队中宣传反对日本帝国主义”，并认为“这最能动员群众”。8月17日，毛泽东就中共驻共产国际代表团以中共中央名义发表的《为抗日救国告全体同胞书》（即《八一宣言》）对杨成武说，“北上抗日的路线是正确的路线，是中央研究了当前的形势后决定的”，并指示要“把中央为什么决定要过草地北上抗日的道理向同志们讲清楚”。9月12日，俄界会议批评了张国焘南下分裂行为，认为张国焘“对于全国目前革命形势的紧张化，特别是由于日本帝国主义的积极侵略而引起的全中国人民反日的民族革命运动的高涨估计不足”，“以致丧失了在抗日前线的中国西北部创造新苏区的信心”。俄界会议坚持北上抗日的战略方针，计划先到靠近苏联的地区创建根据地，再寻机向东发展。到哈达铺后，党中央找到了红军长征落脚地，提出到陕北去，北上抗日的战略方针愈发清晰和可行。正如毛泽东所说：“民族的危机在一天天加深，我们必须继续行动，完成北上抗日的原定计划。”他还号召全体指战员：“胜利前进吧，到陕北只有七八百里了，那里就是我们的目的地，就是我们的抗日前进阵地！”可见，红军在哈达铺明确提出到陕北去，重要目的之一就是把建立根据地与民族抗战更加密切联系在一起。

From the perspective of the overall strategic situation, it provided an important opportunity for the shift of the center of the Chinese revolution to the north. Since the rise of the modern bourgeois democratic revolutionary movement, the center of the Chinese revolution had always been in the south. From their inception, both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party regarded southern China as fertile ground for revolution and a center of activity. In the 1930s, as the Japanese invaders occupied the Northeast and encroached on North China, the revolutionary movement centered on resisting Japan and saving the nation grew increasingly intense in northern China. At the same time, after the Northern Expedition and the Central Plains War [n15], the warlords and reactionary ruling forces in the north were greatly weakened. At this point, the center of the Chinese revolution began to gradually shift from south to north. Before the Central Red Army’s Long March, as the various Red Army units in the south suffered defeats in the campaigns against “encirclement and suppression,” their base areas fell one after another, and the efforts and plans to establish base areas in southern regions such as western Hunan, the Sichuan-Guizhou border area, and the Sichuan-Yunnan-Guizhou border area during the Long March came to nothing. The Party and the Red Army urgently needed to find a more reliable and powerful support and base area in the north. After the First and Fourth Front Armies of the Red Army joined forces, the strategic policy formulated was “to create the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area base” and “to strive for victory in the northwestern provinces and even the whole of China”; it was later further pointed out that it was necessary to “rapidly form the leading center of the revolutionary movement in northwestern China and even the whole of China.” The Red Army’s clear proposal at Hadapu to go to northern Shaanxi pointed the way for the northward shift of the center of the Chinese revolution and the construction of a new strategic layout. After the victorious rendezvous of the Long March, the Wuqi Town Meeting [n16] not only “proclaimed the end of the Central Red Army’s Long March” but also clearly stated, “Now the general headquarters of the national revolution is here,” and that “the northern Shaanxi Soviet Area should lead the national revolution.” After the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment joined forces with the 25th Army and the 26th Army of the Red Army in northern Shaanxi, it “laid a solid foundation for launching a great situation of the Soviet movement in the Northwest and reddening the whole of China,” and “opened up a new phase of the Chinese revolution.” Thereafter, Mao Zedong deployed and commanded the battles of Zhiluo Town, the Eastern Expedition, the Western Expedition, and Shanchengbao, which completely bankrupted the Kuomintang’s attempt to encircle and annihilate the Red Army, giving the Chinese revolution a long-term and stable base in the Northwest. At the same time, the Party Central Committee and the Red Army’s settlement in northern Shaanxi caused Zhang Guotao’s splittism to collapse on its own, laying the foundation for the Red Army to recuperate, consolidate revolutionary forces, and achieve new development. In April 1945, Mao Zedong clearly stated in his report to the Seventh National Congress of the CPC: “Some say that northern Shaanxi is a bad place, barren and poor. But I say that without northern Shaanxi, we would have no place to stand. I say that northern Shaanxi is two points: one foothold, one starting point.”

从战略全局视角看，为中国革命中心向北方转移提供了重要契机。自近代资产阶级民主革命运动兴起以来，中国革命的中心一直都在南方。国共两党成立伊始，都将中国南方视为革命沃土和活动中心。20世纪30年代，随着日寇侵占东北，进犯华北，以抗日救亡为主题的革命运动在中国北方日益高涨。同时，经北伐战争和中原大战，北方军阀和反动统治力量大为削弱。此时，中国革命的中心开始逐渐由南向北转移。中央红军长征前，随着南方各路红军反“围剿”战争失利，各根据地相继陷落，以及长征途中在湘西、川黔边、川滇黔边等南方地区建立根据地的努力和计划落空，党和红军迫切需要向北寻找新的更可靠、更有力的依托和根据地。红一、红四方面军会师后，制定的战略方针是“创造川陕甘苏区根据地”，“以争取中国西北各省以至全中国的胜利”；后进一步指出，要“迅速的形成在中国西北部以及全中国的革命运动的领导中心”。红军在哈达铺明确提出到陕北去，为中国革命中心北移、构建新的战略布局指明了方向。长征胜利会师后，吴起镇会议不仅“宣告了中央红军长征结束”，更明确指出，“现在全国革命总指挥部到这里”，要“以陕北苏区领导全国革命”。陕甘支队与红二十五军、红二十六军在陕北会师后，“为开展西北苏维埃运动大局面、赤化全中国打下坚固的基础”，“开创中国革命新局面”。此后，毛泽东又部署和指挥了直罗镇战役、东征战役、西征战役、山城堡战役等，使国民党围歼红军的企图彻底破产，中国革命在西北有了长期稳固的大本营。同时，党中央和红军长征落脚陕北，使张国焘分裂主义不攻自破，为红军休养生息，整合革命力量，实现新的发展奠定了基础。1945年4月，毛泽东在党的七大报告中明确指出：“有人说，陕北这地方不好，地瘠民贫。但是我说，没有陕北那就不得下地。我说陕北是两个点，一个落脚点，一个出发点。”

History shows that adhering to the policy of northward resistance against Japan was the grand strategy of the Red Army’s Long March and the grand strategy of the Chinese revolution, and Hadapu was an important link in this. The important choice made at Hadapu prompted our Party to successfully shift the strategic center of the Chinese revolution to northern Shaanxi, thereby enabling it to establish a foothold in the Northwest and plan a new strategic layout. It was precisely because a foothold was found at Hadapu that the Chinese revolution passed through its lowest ebb, achieved a major historical turning point, and laid the foundation for the Chinese revolution to begin leading the national revolutionary movement nationwide with northern Shaanxi as its center.

历史表明，坚持北上抗日方针，是红军长征的大战略，是中国革命的大战略，而哈达铺则是其中的重要一环。哈达铺的重要抉择，促使我们党把中国革命的战略中心成功地转移到了陕北，从而得以立足西北，谋划新的战略布局。正是由于在哈达铺找到了落脚点，中国革命度过了最低谷，实现了重大历史转折，为中国革命开启以陕北为中心领导全国革命运动的历史进程奠定了基础。

(Author’s bio: Mao Lihong, Second-Level Researcher, Scientific Research Management Office, Party History and Local Records Office of the CPC Fujian Provincial Committee)

（作者简介：毛立红，中共福建省委党史方志办科研管理处二级调研员）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心