The Secret Communications of the Eyuwan Soviet Area During the Agrarian Revolutionary War and Their Historical Role

In recent years, the struggle of the Chinese Communist Party on the hidden front during the period of the new-democratic revolution has drawn increasing academic attention, yielding many new results. The Eyuwan Soviet Base Area was the second largest Soviet area after the Central Soviet Area during the Agrarian Revolutionary War, "an important Party-building base for our Party and also one of the birthplaces of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army," and it created the glorious history of "the red flag never falling for twenty-eight years." [1]1 "Twenty-eight years of the red flag never falling" refers to the fact that the Eyuwan Soviet Area persisted in revolutionary struggle for 28 years from its creation in 1927 to the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. At that time, the Eyuwan Soviet Area was surrounded by the Kuomintang's tight blockade, making it difficult for personnel and supplies to enter or leave. Military struggles were extremely frequent and the living environment was exceptionally harsh. Under these circumstances, establishing and improving secret communications became an extremely important and urgent task for the Party Central Committee and the Soviet area. With the leadership and assistance of the Party Central Committee, the secret communication network of the Eyuwan Soviet Area was gradually established and improved, playing a positive role in the creation, development, and expansion of the Eyuwan Soviet Area.

近年来，新民主主义革命时期中国共产党在隐蔽战线的斗争情况日益受到学界关注，涌现了不少新成果。鄂豫皖苏区根据地是土地革命战争时期仅次于中央苏区的第二大苏区，“是我们党的重要建党基地，也是中国工农红军的诞生地之一”，创造了“二十八年红旗不倒”的辉煌历史。当时，鄂豫皖苏区处于国民党的严密封锁包围之中，人员和物资进出困难，军事斗争极其频繁，生存环境异常恶劣，在这种情况下，建立健全秘密交通，成为党中央和苏区一项极其重要的紧迫任务。在党中央的领导和帮助下，鄂豫皖苏区的秘密交通网络逐步建立完善，对鄂豫皖苏区的创建、发展和壮大发挥了积极作用。

The Establishment of Secret Communications in the Eyuwan Soviet Area

鄂豫皖苏区秘密交通的建立

Our Party recognized the extreme importance of secret communications work very early. In April 1925, the Party Central Committee pointed out: "The importance of this work (i.e., inner-Party communications—note by the author) in organizational terms is equal to the blood vessels of the human body; the flow or stagnation of blood vessels affects the life or death of a person" (CCP Organizational History Materials (1921.7–1949.9), Vol. 8, CCP History Press, 2000, p. 59). After the failure of the Great Revolution, under the White Terror, establishing a nationwide secret communications network became urgently necessary. The Party's August 7th Conference demanded the establishment of a nationwide inner-Party communications network as soon as possible. [2]2 The August 7th Conference was an emergency meeting of the CCP Central Committee held on August 7, 1927, in Hankou, which decided to launch armed resistance against the Kuomintang. Following the instructions of the Party Central Committee, secret communications in the Eyuwan Soviet Area were gradually established and developed, which can be divided into the following two types:

我们党很早就认识到秘密交通工作的极端重要性，1925年4月，党中央指出：“这种工作（即党内交通——引者注）在组织上的重要，等于人身上的血脉，血脉之流滞，影响于人的生死”（《中国共产党组织史资料（1921.7—1949.9）》第8卷，中共党史出版社2000年版，第59页）。大革命失败后，白色恐怖之下，建立全国性的秘密交通网络迫在眉睫。党的八七会议要求尽快建立全国性的党内交通网络，遵照党中央指示，鄂豫皖苏区的秘密交通逐步建立并发展完善，具体可以分为以下两种类型：

One type was established by the Party Central Committee, consisting of communication lines and stations directly under the central authority; these were secret communication lines from the outside to the Soviet area. At the same time, the Party Central Committee also assisted Soviet area Party organizations at all levels in establishing secret communication networks. The Party Central Committee successively opened two secret communication lines from Shanghai to the Eyuwan Soviet Area, one eastern and one western. On the eastern line, in the winter of 1929, a central communications station was set up in Dianbu Town, Hefei, with four branch stations including Zhengyangguan in Shou County, and more than 20 communicators. When the central authorities sent people to the Eyuwan Soviet Area, they mostly chose the eastern line. On the western line, before April 1931, when the central authorities sent people to Eyuwan, they mostly went through the Wuhan communications station and then via Xiaogan. After the Wuhan station was destroyed, another secret communication line was opened, passing through communications stations in Zhengzhou, Xinyang, Luoshan, and Guangshui to enter the Soviet area.

一类由党中央建立，直属于中央的交通线和交通站，这是从外部通往苏区的秘密交通线；同时，党中央还协助苏区各级党组织建立秘密交通网络。党中央先后开辟了东西两条从上海到鄂豫皖苏区的秘密交通线：在东线，1929年冬于合肥店埠镇设立了中央交通中站，下设寿县正阳关等4个分站，有交通员20余人，中央派人到鄂豫皖苏区大多选择东线；在西线，1931年4月以前，党中央派人到鄂豫皖多由武汉交通站转孝感进入，武汉交通站被破坏后，另外开辟了经郑州、信阳、罗山、广水交通站进入苏区的秘密交通线。

The other type was established by the Soviet area itself, consisting of secret passages from the Soviet area to the outside, directly under the Soviet area or its Party organizations at all levels. For example, in March 1930, the Lu'an Central County Party Committee held a joint conference in Qilingwan and decided to "establish a permanent communications network and regular fixed communications work" (Selected Materials on Financial and Economic History of the Eyuwan Revolutionary Base Area, Hubei People's Publishing House, 1989, p. 416). In May 1930, the Xinyang Central County Party Committee rectified and strengthened secret communication stations such as the Fayuan Hutong Hotel and the Yuenan Datong Hospital in Xinyang city, and also set up several liaison stations in Huangchuan, Xi County, and elsewhere. In April 1931, the CPC Wanxibei Special Committee was established, building a communications network between the Wanbei (Shou County) Central County Party Committee and the Eyuwan Soviet Base Area, and also helping the Fuyang County Party Committee set up 18 liaison points centered on Changguan, Caozhai, and Shenqiu (History of the Eyuwan Revolutionary Base Area, Anhui People's Publishing House, 1998, pp. 317–325). During the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the Party Central Committee and the Party organizations in the Eyuwan Soviet Area and surrounding areas gradually formed a secret communications network with cities such as Wuhan, Xiaogan, Xinyang, and Hefei as nodes and the Pinghan, Longhai, and Jinpu railways as well as the Yangtze River and Huai River as lines, making important historical contributions to the revolutionary struggle in the Eyuwan Soviet Area and its surrounding areas.

另一类由苏区建立，是从苏区通往外部的秘密通道，直属苏区或苏区各级党组织。例如，1930年3月，六安中心县委在七邻湾召开联席会议，决定“建立永久的交通网与经常固定的交通工作”（《鄂豫皖革命根据地财经史资料选编》，湖北人民出版社1989年版，第416页）。1930年5月，信阳中心县委整顿并加强了信阳城内法院胡同旅社、豫南大同医院等秘密交通站点，同时在潢川、息县等地设立了多处联络站。1931年4月，中共皖西北特委成立，建立了皖北（寿县）中心县委与鄂豫皖苏区根据地的交通网络，同时帮助阜阳县委以长官、曹寨、沈丘为中心建立了18个联络点（《鄂豫皖革命根据地史》，安徽人民出版社1998年版，第317~325页）。土地革命战争时期，党中央和鄂豫皖苏区及周边地区党组织逐步形成了以武汉、孝感、信阳、合肥等城市为点和以平汉、陇海、津浦铁路以及长江、淮河为线的秘密交通网络，为鄂豫皖苏区及周边地区的革命斗争作出了重要历史贡献。

The Historical Significance of Secret Communications in the Eyuwan Soviet Area

鄂豫皖苏区秘密交通的历史意义

The tasks undertaken by the Party's secret communications mainly included three types: first, transmitting various documents and intelligence; second, transporting emergency supplies to the Soviet area and shipping out materials from the Soviet area; third, escorting cadres in and out of the Soviet area or between Party organizations in the White areas. Under the Kuomintang's tight blockade and brutal "encirclement and suppression" campaigns, completing these tasks required superb skills and was a key issue that affected the whole situation when any part was touched. [3]3 "Pulling one hair may move the whole body" is a Chinese idiom meaning that a small change in one part can affect the whole situation. On this, the Party Central Committee once pointed out: "The reconnaissance and communications in the Red Army are by no means a technical problem; today they have become a serious problem" (Selected Important Documents Since the Founding of the Party (1921–1949), Vol. 7, Central Party Literature Press, 2011, p. 610). During the Agrarian Revolutionary War, secret communications played an important role in the development and expansion of the Eyuwan Soviet Area.

党的秘密交通承担的任务主要有三项：一是传递各种文件和信息情报；二是向苏区输送紧急物资和从苏区运出物资；三是护送干部进出苏区或往来于白区各地党组织之间。在国民党的严密封锁和残酷“围剿”下，完成上述任务需要高超的技术，是牵一发而动全身的关键问题。对此，党中央曾指出：“红军中的探访与交通决不是技术问题，在今天更成为严重的问题”（《建党以来重要文献选编（1921—1949）》第七册，中央文献出版社2011年版，第610页）。土地革命战争时期，秘密交通对于鄂豫皖苏区的发展壮大发挥了重要作用。

First, secret communications were a key guarantee for the Party Central Committee to exercise political leadership over the Eyuwan Soviet Area. According to the recollection of Zheng Weisan: "The Central Committee's policies and calls played a great role; everyone took them as the basis. All the masses participating in the revolution had faith in the Central Committee's policies and calls, believing that it would be good to act accordingly" (Ni Zhongwen, "Recalling Comrade Zheng Weisan's Discussion on Several Major Issues in the History of the Eyuwan Soviet Area," Journal of Wuhan University, 1983, No. 3). The Eyuwan Soviet Area mainly maintained close contact with the Party Central Committee through secret communications, promptly transmitting the Central Committee's instructions to the Soviet area and also reporting the Soviet area's situation to the Central Committee. The Party's political leadership over the Eyuwan Soviet Area was reflected both in sending military and political cadres to the Soviet area and in transmitting the Central Committee's line, principles, and policies to the Soviet area. Through the secret communication lines, the Party Central Committee dispatched a large number of Party, government, military, and technical cadres to the Eyuwan Soviet Area, ensuring the Party's leadership over the work of the Soviet area. Liu Huaqing recalled: "Our biggest problem was the shortage of cadres. The provincial Party committee repeatedly wrote reports to the Central Committee asking for cadres, especially senior military cadres" (Liu Huaqing Memoirs, PLA Publishing House, 2007, pp. 36–39). Eyuwan Soviet area secret communicators escorted a large number of cadres such as Xu Jishen, Xu Xiangqian, Shen Zemin, Zhang Qinqiu, Cheng Fangwu, and Song Kanfu in and out of the Soviet area, enriching and strengthening the Party's leadership over the revolutionary struggle in the Eyuwan Soviet Area. Tao Bingzhe was long responsible for the secret communication line between the Party Central Committee and the Eyuwan Soviet Area. Between 1930 and 1934, he traveled countless times between Shanghai and the Eyuwan Soviet Area. The Central Committee's instructions and documents were transmitted by him to the Soviet area, and the Soviet area's work reports and requests were handed over to him to relay to the Central Committee (Selected Party History Materials of West Anhui, Vol. 2, printed by the Party History Research Office of the Lu'an Municipal Party Committee in 2012, pp. 94–98). Song Kanfu, Xu Yixin, Cai Wei, and Wang Zigang, escorted by communicators, arrived at the Eyuwan Soviet Area, and they cooperated to create the Soviet area's radio communication system. Through secret communications, the flow of information and personnel between the Party Central Committee and the Eyuwan Soviet Area was effectively guaranteed, enabling the Central Committee to grasp the struggle situation in the Soviet area and promptly indicate the direction of struggle.

首先，秘密交通是党中央对鄂豫皖苏区实施政治领导的关键保障。据郑位三回忆：“中央的政策、号召起大作用，谁都以此为根据，所有参加革命的群众都信仰党中央的政策、号召，认为照那样做就好”（倪忠文：《回忆郑位三同志谈鄂豫皖苏区历史中的几个重大问题》，《武汉大学学报》1983年第3期）。鄂豫皖苏区主要通过秘密交通与党中央保持密切联系，将中央的指示及时传达到苏区，同时也将苏区的情况反映到中央。党对鄂豫皖苏区的政治领导，既体现在向苏区派遣军政干部，又体现在向苏区传递党中央的路线、方针和政策。党中央通过秘密交通线，向鄂豫皖苏区派遣了大批党政、军事和技术干部，保证了党对苏区工作的领导。刘华清回忆说，“我们最大的问题是缺少干部，省委多次向中央写报告要干部，特别是高级军事干部”（《刘华清回忆录》，解放军出版社2007年版，第36~39页）。鄂豫皖苏区秘密交通员曾护送许继慎、徐向前、沈泽民、张琴秋、成仿吾、宋侃夫等大批干部进出苏区，充实并加强了党对鄂豫皖苏区革命斗争的领导。陶秉哲曾长期负责党中央和鄂豫皖苏区的秘密交通线，1930年至1934年间，他无数次往返于上海和鄂豫皖苏区之间，中央的指示和文件由其经手下达到苏区，苏区的工作汇报、请示交他上达中央（《皖西党史资料辑要》第2册，中共六安市委党史研究室2012年刊印，第94~98页）。宋侃夫、徐以新、蔡威、王子纲在交通员的护送下抵达鄂豫皖苏区，他们通力合作创建了苏区的无线电通信系统。通过秘密交通，党中央与鄂豫皖苏区之间信息和人员的流动得到有效保障，使得党中央能掌握苏区的斗争情况并及时指明斗争方向。

Second, secret communications provided a guarantee for breaking the enemy's tight economic blockade against the Soviet area. The Kuomintang's blockade of the Soviet area was extremely brutal, declaring that it must "deprive the enemy of even a grain of rice or a spoon of water to supply, and even an ant or mosquito to inform." [4]4 "Deprive the enemy of even a grain of rice or a spoon of water to supply, and even an ant or mosquito to inform" is a Kuomintang slogan describing the thoroughness of their blockade. They set up checkpoints layer by layer in towns and villages around the Eyuwan Soviet Area. Shortages of daily necessities such as salt, cloth, and ammunition became major obstacles to the survival and development of the Soviet area, and the safe transport of materials became a matter of life and death for the Soviet area. To break the enemy's blockade, Party organizations in the Eyuwan Soviet Area set up secret communication stations in the form of department stores, cloth shops, teahouses, and restaurants along and around the secret communication lines, using them as cover to transport urgently needed military and civilian supplies such as medicines, medical equipment, printing equipment, communication equipment, cloth, salt, guns, and ammunition to the Soviet area. After being camouflaged, these supplies were carried by communicators or transferred through various social connections to reach the Soviet area. For example, in May 1929, during the early days of the Red Army hospital in the Eyuwan base area, they purchased medicines and equipment from Wuhan through secret communications, gradually equipping the hospital. In the autumn of 1931, Cheng Mingyuan, head of the Hefei communications station, led an armed communications team to transport a batch of weapons and ammunition from Pukou. When they reached near Wangzicheng in Hefei County, they were intercepted by the enemy. After a fierce battle, they broke free and finally completed the transport mission. In the winter of 1930, the Party organization sent Yan Wendou to Hefei to set up a bookstore as a secret communications station, purchasing large quantities of stationery, medicines, and other necessary supplies for the Soviet area. Later, the bookstore was destroyed by the enemy, and Yan Wendou opened the Meilin Store and Tongde Pharmacy to secretly transport urgently needed supplies such as medicines to the Soviet area, persisting until 1934 when he was forced to withdraw. The Liulin communications station in Xinyang County, through various connections, purchased flashlights, batteries, pens, pocket watches, and Western medicines from Jigongshan and Hankou and sent them to the base area. For supplies from the Central Committee and surrounding Party organizations to support the base area, lightweight items were carried separately by communicators, while bulky items were transferred to the destination by armed plainclothes personnel. In April 1931, when the Kuomintang army launched an "encirclement and suppression" campaign against the Eyuwan Soviet Area, the Soviet area was extremely short of supplies. Communicator Li Letian delivered an important piece of intelligence: the Kuomintang army was about to move to Zhengyangguan in Shou County to garrison, with the aim of controlling the large quantities of salt, medicine, grain, and other daily necessities there. The Eyuwan Sub-Bureau attached great importance to this information and adopted a long-distance raid tactic, occupying Zhengyangguan before the enemy and capturing large quantities of urgently needed supplies such as medicines, medical equipment, salt, grain, cloth, kerosene, and paper. [5]5 The Eyuwan Sub-Bureau refers to the Eyuwan Central Sub-Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, the leading body in the Eyuwan Soviet Area. (Ma Qijun ed., Famous People and Shou County Culture, Anhui University Press, 2016, p. 101). Almost all daily necessities for the Red Army in the Soviet area, such as clothing, hats, shoes, socks, flashlights, umbrellas, and medicines, were supplied through secret communications. The location and establishment of each communications station, whether as a shop, a hotel, a clinic, or a family unit, were carefully designed using local social relations. Moreover, most of the secret communicators were locals familiar with local customs and habits, using social occupations as cover to struggle against the enemy in various forms, playing a huge role in solving the material supply problems of the Red Army troops, Party and government organs, and hospitals.

其次，秘密交通为打破敌人对苏区严密的经济封锁提供了保障。国民党对苏区的封锁极其残酷，声称必须做到“使敌无粒米勺水接济，无蚍蜉蚊蚁之通报”。他们在邻近鄂豫皖苏区周围村镇层层设卡检查，食盐、布匹、弹药等民用、军用物资匮乏成为苏区生存和发展的重大障碍，物资的安全运输也成为关系苏区生死存亡的问题。为了打破敌人的封锁，鄂豫皖苏区党组织在秘密交通线沿线及周边地区以开设百货店、布店、茶楼饭馆等秘密交通站为掩护，为苏区输送药品、医疗器械、印刷器材、通讯器材、布匹、食盐、枪支弹药等紧缺且急需的军用、民用物资。这些物资经过伪装后，由交通员携带或利用一些社会关系辗转运到苏区。例如，1929年5月，鄂豫皖根据地红军医院创建初期，通过秘密交通到武汉购买药品器材，逐步充实了医院。1931年秋，合肥交通站站长程明远率武装交通队从浦口接运一批武器弹药返回，行至合肥县王子城附近时，遭敌拦截，经激烈战斗后摆脱敌人，最终完成了运输任务。1930年冬，党组织派颜文斗到合肥创办书店作为秘密交通站，为苏区购买了大批文具、药品及其他必需物资。后来书店被敌破坏，颜文斗重新开设美林商店、同德药房，为苏区秘密输送药品等急需物资，一直坚持到1934年才被迫撤退。信阳县柳林交通站通过各种关系，从鸡公山、汉口等地购得手电筒、电池、钢笔、怀表、西药等送到根据地。对于中央和周边地区党组织支援根据地的物资，轻便的由交通员分别携带，笨重的则由武装便衣转运到目的地。1931年4月，国民党军队对鄂豫皖苏区进行“围剿”，苏区物资十分匮乏。交通员李乐天送去一份重要情报：国民党军即将开赴寿县正阳关驻防，目的是控制正阳关的大批食盐、药品、粮食和其他日用品。鄂豫皖分局对此信息高度重视，采取长途奔袭战术，抢在敌军之前占领了正阳关，夺取了大批药品、药械、食盐、粮食、布匹、煤油、纸张等苏区急需的物资（马启俊主编：《名人与寿县文化》，安徽大学出版社2016年版，第101页）。苏区红军的日常用品，如衣帽、鞋袜、电筒、雨伞、医药等几乎都是通过秘密交通供应的。每个交通站的选址和设立，或开店铺，或设旅社，或建诊所，或组家庭，均利用当地社会关系精心设计；加之秘密交通员大多是本地人，熟悉当地风俗习惯，利用社会职业做掩护，同敌人进行各种形式的斗争，在解决红军部队、党政机关及医院物资供应方面发挥了巨大作用。

Finally, secret communications were an important driving force for social mobilization in the Eyuwan Soviet Area. The mass line is one of the three magic weapons for our Party to defeat the enemy. [6]6 The "three magic weapons" refers to the three key principles summarized by Mao Zedong for the CCP's victory in the revolutionary war: the united front, armed struggle, and Party building. The secret communication lines also played a positive role in mobilizing the masses of the Soviet area to participate in the revolution. In the winter of 1929, when the revolutionary base area on the Eyuwan border was first established, the Party organization in the Hefei area appointed Chen Liangji as deputy head of the central communications station and head of the branch station at the Chao Family Oil Mill in Sigutan, Lu'an. In the winter of 1932, Chen Liangji went to inspect work in the Zhongpaihe area of the southern countryside and actively cooperated with Yan Wendou and others to mobilize the masses to carry out the "grain-grabbing struggle," distributing grain to poor peasants. [7]7 The "grain-grabbing struggle" was a mass movement in which poor peasants forcibly seized grain from landlords and local bullies. These struggles brought hope to the poor peasants, who flocked to join the peasant associations, and the revolutionary forces grew day by day (Anhui CCP Historical Figures, Vol. 6, Anhui People's Publishing House, 2003, pp. 45–46). In the spring of 1932, the Red Twenty-fifth Army, based on information provided by Cao Guanghua, head of the Zhengyangguan liaison station under the Shou County Party Committee, held a mass meeting at the Fire God Temple to expose the Kuomintang's crimes of betraying national interests and persisting in civil war, and to propagate the Communist Party's stance on resisting Japan and opposing Chiang Kai-shek and related policies. [8]8 The Red Twenty-fifth Army was a Red Army unit active in the Eyuwan Soviet Area, later involved in the Long March. [9]9 The Fire God Temple is a temple dedicated to the Chinese fire god, often used as a meeting place. After the meeting, they organized teams to "overthrow the local tyrants and distribute the grain," distributing 1 million dan of hoarded grain to the starving people (History of the Chinese Communist Party in Lu'an, Anhui (1923–1949), CCP History Press, 2021, p. 300). [10]10 "Overthrow the local tyrants and distribute the grain" is a slogan of the land revolution, referring to the seizure of property from landlords and distribution to the poor. [12]12 Dan is a Chinese unit of dry volume for grain, equal to about 100 liters. All communications stations also actively sent new recruits to the Red Army and raised and transported military supplies. In May 1930, Guo Tianmin, secretary of the Yingshan County Party Committee, mobilized more than 30 young people to join the Red Army through various liaison stations, and also mobilized more than 20 people in Gaodian to join the Central Hubei Guerrilla (History of the Eyuwan Revolutionary Base Area, p. 323). [11]11 The Central Hubei Guerrilla was a guerrilla force active in central Hubei province. Lü Wenyuan and Liu Jin had long engaged in the Party's secret communications work and were extremely experienced. On New Year's Day 1933, entrusted with a heavy responsibility by the Party, they went to Xuchang to establish the Henan Provincial Working Committee. By the summer of 1933, Party and Youth League organizations in most parts of Henan had been restored and developed (Biographical Sketches of Figures from the Wuchang Peasant Movement Training Institute, Wuhan Press, 1997, pp. 326–327). Thus it can be seen that the secret communication lines and the many communicators were also efficient "seeders"; they scattered many revolutionary seeds in the Soviet area and its surrounding regions, becoming an important force in the Party's social mobilization.

最后，秘密交通是鄂豫皖苏区社会动员的重要推动力量。群众路线是我们党战胜敌人的三大法宝之一，秘密交通线在动员苏区群众参加革命方面也发挥了积极作用。1929年冬，鄂豫皖边区革命根据地初建，合肥地区党组织委任陈良季为交通中心站副站长兼六安思古潭晁家油坊分站站长。1932年冬，陈良季到南乡中派河一带巡视工作，积极配合颜文斗等发动群众，开展扒粮斗争，把粮食分给贫苦农民。这些斗争给贫苦农民带来了希望，他们纷纷要求参加农会，革命力量一天天壮大起来（《安徽中共党史人物传》第6册，安徽人民出版社2003年版，第45~46页）。1932年春，红二十五军根据寿县县委正阳关联络站站长曹广化提供的信息，在火神庙召开群众大会，揭露国民党出卖民族利益、坚持打内战的罪行，宣传共产党抗日、反蒋的主张及有关政策。会后组织打土豪分粮食队伍，将囤积的100万石粮食分给饥民（《中国共产党安徽省六安历史（1923—1949）》，中共党史出版社2021年版，第300页）。各交通站还积极为红军输送新兵、筹集运送军需品。1930年5月，应山县委书记郭天民通过各处联络站，动员30多名青年参加红军，又在高店动员20多人参加鄂中游击队（《鄂豫皖革命根据地史》，第323页）。吕文远、刘晋曾长期从事党的秘密交通工作，经验极为丰富。1933年元旦，他们肩负着党的重托到许昌组建河南省工作委员会。到1933年夏，河南大部分地区的党团组织得到了恢复和发展（《武昌农民运动讲习所人物传略》，武汉出版社1997年版，第326~327页）。由此可见，秘密交通线和广大交通员同时也是富有效率的“播种机”，他们在苏区及其周边地区散布了许多革命的种子，成为党的社会动员的一支重要力量。

(Author: Chen Dongfang, Professor at the School of Marxism, Henan Institute of Engineering)

（作者：陈冬仿，系河南工程学院马克思主义学院教授）

Online Editor: Tongxin

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