British Archives and the Historical Writing of the Eighth Route Army’s War of Resistance

The Eighth Route Army was the people’s army led by the Chinese Communist Party during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. It was the main force persisting in the enemy‑rear war of resistance in North China and other regions, the backbone of China’s war of resistance, and it made indelible historical contributions to the final victory of the World Anti‑Fascist War. The enemy‑rear war of resistance conducted by the Eighth Route Army is an important field in the study of the history of the War of Resistance; domestic research has already yielded abundant results. In recent years, archival materials on the Chinese Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army’s war of resistance held in foreign repositories have attracted increasing attention. The archives of the Foreign Office and the War Office in the British National Archives contain a large quantity of materials on the Chinese Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army during the War of Resistance. Fully excavating and organising these archives is of significant academic value for further enriching and deepening research on and historical writing about the Eighth Route Army’s enemy‑rear war of resistance.

八路军是抗日战争时期中国共产党领导的人民军队，是坚持在华北等地区敌后抗战的主力军，是中国抗战的中坚力量，为世界反法西斯战争的最后胜利作出了不可磨灭的历史贡献。八路军敌后抗战是抗战史研究的重要领域，国内相关研究已取得丰硕成果。近年来，国外馆藏的中国共产党和八路军抗战档案史料受到重视。英国国家档案馆的外交部档案和陆军部档案中收藏了大量抗战时期中国共产党和八路军的资料，充分发掘和整理这些档案，对进一步丰富和深化八路军敌后抗战研究和历史书写具有重要学术价值。

**The Eighth Route Army’s War of Resistance in Embassy Reports**

大使馆报告中的八路军抗战

During the War of Resistance, the British Embassy in China used its diplomatic intelligence network in China to gather intelligence on the Chinese Communist Party and regularly submitted it in the form of monthly reports to the British Foreign Office. The contents covered the development of the Chinese Communist Party, the construction of resistance bases, and the anti‑Japanese activities of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, providing rich materials for studying and writing the history of the Eighth Route Army’s enemy‑rear war of resistance.

抗战时期，英国驻华大使馆利用其驻华外交情报网，搜集中国共产党的情报，并由驻华大使馆定期以月报的形式汇总呈报英国外交部。内容涉及中国共产党的发展、抗日根据地的建设、八路军和新四军的抗日活动等方面，为研究和书写八路军敌后抗战的历史提供了丰富资料。

After the outbreak of the all‑nation war of resistance, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr succeeded Sir Hughe Knatchbull‑Hugessen as British Ambassador to China and soon held his first meeting with Zhou Enlai and others. This meeting gave Clark Kerr an initial understanding of the Chinese Communist Party’s views on the war of resistance and its political ideas. In 1938, with Clark Kerr’s help, the Eighth Route Army Office in Hong Kong was established, primarily responsible for securing international aid for the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. On 29 April, Clark Kerr reported in detail to the British Foreign Office on the Eighth Route Army’s war of resistance: “After the Japanese occupation of Taiyuan, they had to halt their advance south of the Yellow River in order to consolidate their lines of communication, because their lines of communication had been seriously harassed by the Eighth Route Army.” [1]1 “太原府” (Taiyuan Fu) refers to the prefectural city of Taiyuan. Thereafter, Clark Kerr regularly reported to the British government on the Eighth Route Army’s resistance in North China. In early July, Edgar Snow sent Clark Kerr a proposal concerning the Eighth Route Army’s armed defence of Wuhan. At the same time, Clark Kerr also received a report from *The Times* correspondent in China, Peter Fleming, on the Eighth Route Army’s resistance in North China. Influenced by Snow and Fleming, Clark Kerr developed a strong interest in the Eighth Route Army; he even discussed with Snow the feasibility of visiting Yan’an.

全民族抗战爆发后，卡尔接替许阁森出任英国驻华大使，不久与周恩来等人进行了初次会面。此次会面使卡尔对中国共产党的抗战主张和政治理念有了最初的了解。1938年，在卡尔的帮助下，八路军驻香港办事处成立，主要负责争取国际社会对八路军和新四军的援助工作。4月29日，卡尔向英国外交部详细报告了八路军的抗战情况：“日军占领太原府后，不得不停止向黄河以南进军，以巩固他们的交通线，因为他们的交通线受到了八路军的严重袭扰。”之后，卡尔定期向英国政府报告八路军在华北的抗战情况。7月初，埃德加·斯诺给卡尔寄送了一份关于八路军武装保卫武汉的建议。同时，卡尔还收到了英国《泰晤士报》驻华记者皮特·弗莱明发来的一份关于八路军在华北抗战的报告。在斯诺和弗莱明的影响下，卡尔对八路军产生了浓厚兴趣，他甚至和斯诺探讨了访问延安的可行性。

In 1939, after the establishment of the Southern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the Eighth Route Army Office in Chongqing, they adopted a flexible international united front policy, actively establishing contacts with British, American and other foreign agencies in China. Clark Kerr’s interactions with Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu and others became increasingly close. It can be said that Clark Kerr was one of the first senior British government officials to come into contact with important leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army. Through his dealings with Zhou Enlai and others, Clark Kerr gained a greater understanding of the Chinese Communist Party; he was dissatisfied with the anti‑communist actions of the Kuomintang die‑hards and deeply admired the determination of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army to resist Japan. In 1941, he reported to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden: “The Chinese Communist Party emphasises that China’s task is to resist the Japanese aggressors, and the Eighteenth Group Army [2]2 The Eighteenth Group Army was the official National Revolutionary Army designation of the Eighth Route Army during the War of Resistance. is also willing to cooperate under this aim.” However, “the Communists find themselves in a situation where they actively fight the Japanese but are regarded with suspicion by the National Government, which supplies them with a pitifully small amount of strategic materiel.” After the outbreak of the Southern Anhui Incident, [3]3 The Southern Anhui Incident (January 1941) was a clash in which Kuomintang forces attacked the New Fourth Army, killing or capturing thousands and leading to a major crisis in the united front. Clark Kerr strongly advised the British government to join the United States in pressuring the Kuomintang to prevent the situation from worsening. In January 1942, Clark Kerr reported to Eden: “Determination to fight the war of resistance to the end and to uphold the united front remain the keynote of Communist policy.”

1939年，中共中央南方局和八路军驻重庆办事处设立后，采取灵活的国际统一战线政策，主动与英、美等国驻华机构建立联系。卡尔与周恩来、董必武等人的交往日益密切。可以说，卡尔是最早接触中国共产党和八路军重要领导人的英国政府要员。在与周恩来等人的交往中，卡尔对中国共产党有了更多的了解，他对国民党顽固派的反共行为不满，对八路军和新四军的抗战决心非常钦佩。1941年，他向外交大臣艾登报告说：“中国共产党强调中国的任务是抗击日本侵略者，第十八集团军也愿意在这个目标下合作。”然而，“共产党人发觉自己处于这样一种境地：他们积极抗击日军，却遭到国民政府的猜忌，政府补给的战略物资少得可怜”。皖南事变发生后，卡尔极力建议英国政府联合美国对国民党施压，以阻止事态的恶化。1942年1月，卡尔向艾登报告：“决心抗战到底和坚持统一战线，仍然是共产党政策的基调。”

During the Pacific War, because the armed forces led by the Chinese Communist Party, including the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, grew rapidly and showed a strength that could not be ignored in the World Anti‑Fascist War, senior British politicians such as Eden and Churchill began to look at the Chinese Communist Party in a new light. In 1942, Sir Horace Seymour succeeded Clark Kerr as Ambassador to China. He strengthened contacts with the Southern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the Eighth Route Army Office in Chongqing and paid even more attention to the Eighth Route Army’s enemy‑rear war of resistance. In 1943, the British Embassy wrote in a report: “Although the Eighth Route Army is indeed poorly equipped compared with the troops of the Central Government, they have actually alone resisted and stemmed the tide of the Japanese army’s further infiltration into North and Northwest China.” The guerrilla warfare conducted by the Eighth Route Army in North China “tied down large numbers of Japanese troops and, to a considerable extent, prevented the Japanese from exploiting the agricultural resources of the occupied areas.” In 1944, the Far Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office received two reports on the Eighth Route Army’s war of resistance: from 1943 to 1944, the casualty rate on the North China battlefield gradually shifted in favour of the Eighth Route Army. When in 1944 the Japanese army transferred troops from North China to the south, the Eighth Route Army seized the opportunity to attack the Japanese in Shandong, Hebei, Shanxi, northern Jiangsu and other places; “they fought at night, moving through the mountains like invisible ghosts, flickering like tongues of fire around Japanese strongholds and communication lines.” From January to June 1944, the Eighth Route Army killed or wounded more than 66,000 Japanese troops, captured 303 Japanese soldiers, and induced 45 to surrender. In 1945, following Comrade Mao Zedong’s instruction to “annihilate the enemy and puppets, expand the liberated areas, and shrink the occupied areas,” the Eighth Route Army launched spring and summer offensives. Regarding the Eighth Route Army’s counter‑offensive, the British archives record: “In early January, the main forces of the Seventh and Eighth Sub‑districts of the Taihang Liberated Area began attacking the Japanese and puppet troops south of the Beijing‑Hankou Railway and north of the Longhai Railway. By 29 January, the Eighth Route Army had liberated one million people, recovered 1,250 square kilometres of territory, and captured more than 40 Japanese and puppet strongpoints.”

太平洋战争期间，由于中国共产党领导的八路军、新四军等抗日武装力量迅速壮大，在世界反法西斯战争中展现出不容忽视的力量，艾登、丘吉尔等英国政要开始以新的眼光看待中国共产党。1942年，薛穆接替卡尔出任驻华大使，他加强了与中共中央南方局和八路军驻重庆办事处的联系，更加关注八路军的敌后抗战。1943年，英国大使馆在报告中写道：“尽管与中央政府的军队相比，八路军的装备确实很差，但他们实际上已经单独抵抗并阻止了潮水般的日军进一步渗入中国北方和西北地区。”八路军在华北开展的敌后游击战，“牵制了大批日军，并在很大程度上阻止了日本人开发沦陷区的农业资源”。1944年，英国外交部远东司收到两份关于八路军抗战的报告：从1943年至1944年，华北战场的伤亡率逐渐向有利于八路军的方向转变。1944年日军从华北抽调兵力南下，八路军乘势在山东、河北、山西、江苏北部等地向日军进攻，“他们在夜间作战，像无形的幽灵在山间移动，像舞动的火舌在日军据点和交通线周围闪烁”。从1944年1月至6月，八路军共毙伤日军6.6万余人，俘虏日军303人，日军投诚45人。1945年，八路军根据毛泽东同志“消灭敌伪，扩大解放区，缩小沦陷区”的指示，发动了春季攻势和夏季攻势。关于八路军的反攻，英国档案这样记载：“1月初，太行解放区第七、第八分区的八路军主力部队，开始进攻平汉铁路以南、陇海铁路以北的日伪军。截至1月29日，八路军已解放100万人口，收复1250平方公里领土，攻克40多个日伪据点。”

In sum, the British Embassy reports at that time presented, from the perspective of an ally, the great process by which the Eighth Route Army persisted in the enemy‑rear war of resistance and gradually grew to become an important force in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti‑Fascist War.

总之，当时英国大使馆的报告以盟国视角呈现了八路军坚持敌后抗战并逐步发展壮大成为中国人民抗日战争暨世界反法西斯战争重要力量的伟大进程。

**The Eighth Route Army’s War of Resistance in Military Intelligence**

军事情报中的八路军抗战

After the outbreak of the all‑nation war of resistance, the British military departments sent additional military attachés and military intelligence personnel to China. They were responsible for gathering operational information on the China theatre, regularly compiling reports on the military situation between China and Japan, and were under the dual leadership of the Ambassador to China and the military intelligence departments. Unlike the diplomatic departments, the military attachés and military intelligence personnel paid more attention to the Eighth Route Army’s military operations, such as unit organisation, strategy and tactics, weapons and equipment, and operational conditions.

全民族抗战爆发后，英国军事部门向中国增派了武官和军事情报人员。他们负责搜集中国战场的作战信息，定期汇编中日战况报告，接受驻华大使和军情部门的双重领导。与外交部门不同的是，驻华武官和军事情报人员更关注八路军的军事作战情况，如部队编制、战略战术、武器装备以及作战条件等方面。

First, military intelligence contains a rough record of the Eighth Route Army’s development process. At the beginning of the Eighth Route Army’s reorganisation, the British side recorded the reorganisation of the Red Army in northern Shaanxi and the Eighth Route Army’s area of operations, emphasising that the Eighth Route Army was subordinate to the Second War Zone and under the command of Yan Xishan. As the Eighth Route Army grew and developed in enemy‑rear operations, the British paid increasing attention to it, and also recorded the Kuomintang’s restrictions on its growth. In 1940, the National Government demanded that all Eighth Route Army units south of the Yellow River be withdrawn to the north of the Yellow River and restricted the size of the Eighth Route Army. In early 1941, Clark Kerr telegraphed Eden and stressed: “The Communist forces already number 500,000. They are fighting in the most dangerous areas within the Japanese lines; far from being reduced, their numbers should be increased.” In July 1942, Brigadier General Grimsdale, the military attaché, reported to Military Intelligence Section 2 of the War Office: “The Eighteenth Group Army can muster one million trained and partly trained soldiers in North China, but only part of them have weapons.” In July 1945, the British War Office had a detailed report on the Eighth Route Army’s organisation and strength; the archives show that the Eighth Route Army already had 367,000 regular troops.

首先，军事情报对八路军的发展过程有大致的记载。在八路军改编之初，英国方面就记载了红军在陕北接受改编的情况，以及八路军的作战区域，强调八路军隶属于第二战区，归阎锡山指挥。随着八路军在敌后作战中发展壮大，他们对八路军越来越关注，对国民党限制八路军的发展情况也有记载。1940年，国民政府要求黄河以南的八路军全部撤到黄河以北，并限制八路军的数量。1941年初，卡尔在电报中向艾登强调：“共产党部队已有50万兵力。他们在日军防线内最危险的区域作战，部队人数非但不应削减，反而应当增加。”1942年7月，驻华武官格里姆斯代尔准将向陆军部军情二处报告说：“第十八集团军在华北可以集结100万受过训练和部分训练的士兵，但只有一部分人有武器。”1945年7月，英国陆军部对八路军的编制和兵力有详细的报告，档案显示八路军已有正规部队36.7万人。

Second, military intelligence highly evaluated the Eighth Route Army’s guerrilla warfare. In October 1938, the British government received a military intelligence report on guerrilla warfare in North China, which stated: “Guerrilla warfare may be causing the Japanese more trouble than the positional warfare conducted by regular troops in the south.” “Guerrilla warfare causes an average of about 100 Japanese deaths per day, with an estimated 150 wounded… In order to counter guerrilla warfare, the Japanese are forced to deploy about 175,000 troops in North China.” In July 1944, Major Stowers of Military Intelligence Section 2 of the British War Office wrote in a report: “On most fronts, guerrilla warfare is auxiliary to positional warfare, but in China, guerrilla warfare ties down the majority of the Japanese army. Before March 1944, at least 22 divisions, 64% of the Japanese troops in China, were engaged in rear‑area operations against the Eighth Route Army. Even after the start of the Henan Offensive (the Battle of Central Henan), this proportion was still 47%.” At the same time, the Kuomintang troops fighting in the enemy‑rear suffered disastrous defeats. “In 1941, the Kuomintang troops fighting in the enemy‑rear numbered close to one million; now they are only 20,000–30,000.” Many of these Kuomintang units were destroyed by the Japanese, “but shamefully, a large part went over to the Japanese; over 60% of the puppet troops came from the Kuomintang army.”

其次，军事情报对八路军的游击战予以高度评价。1938年10月，英国政府收到一份关于华北游击战的军事情报，情报认为：“游击战对日军造成的困扰可能比南方正规军进行的阵地战更为严重。”“游击战平均每日造成约100名日军死亡，伤员估计约150人……为了应对游击战，日军方面被迫在华北部署约17.5万兵力。”1944年7月，英国陆军部军情二处斯托尔斯少校在报告中写道：“在大多数战线上，游击战是阵地战的附属，但在中国，游击战却牵制了大部分日本军队。在1944年3月之前，至少有22个师，占在华日军64%的部队，在后方与八路军交战。即使在河南攻势（豫中会战）开始后，这一比例仍有47%。”与此同时，在敌后作战的国民党军队却遭受惨败。“1941年，在敌后作战的国民党军队接近100万人，可现在只剩下两三万人。”这些国民党部队有许多被日军摧毁，“但可耻的是，其中很大一部分投奔了日军，60%以上的伪军来自国民党军队”。

Finally, military intelligence analysed the difficulties faced by the Eighth Route Army in counter‑“mopping‑up” operations. In 1942, the Japanese launched large‑scale “mopping‑up” operations against the Eighth Route Army in eastern Hebei and central Hebei. The Japanese penetrated deep into the bases, established blockades, and “used the same method that Chiang Kai‑shek had employed in his ‘encirclement and suppression’ of the Red Army in Jiangxi, building a network of blockhouses in belts about one mile wide.” “In many villages in North China, about two‑thirds of the houses were burned by the Japanese.” “The Japanese adopted semi‑guerrilla tactics, with lightly equipped units moving quickly, sometimes wearing civilian clothes or even Chinese army uniforms, making night raids and surrounding villages.” In addition, intelligence believed the Eighth Route Army faced other difficulties: first, a shortage of weapons and ammunition—“operations without captured weapons and ammunition were considered failures”; the Eighth Route Army destroyed railway lines not only to disrupt enemy communications but also to obtain metal for making guns; second, a shortage of medicines and medical instruments—during the difficult period of counter‑“mopping‑up” operations, amputations were performed with butcher knives and carpenter’s saws, surgical sutures were made with sewing needles, and many operations were performed without anaesthetics.

最后，军事情报对八路军在反“扫荡”作战中的困难作出了分析。1942年，日军对冀东和冀中八路军发动大规模“扫荡”。日军深入根据地，建立封锁线，“采用当年蒋介石在江西‘围剿’红军的办法，在防线上建起了一圈圈宽度在一英里左右的碉堡网”。“华北不少村落中大约三分之二的房屋都被日军焚毁。”“日军采用半游击战术，轻装部队快速移动，有时穿着平民服装，甚至是中国军队服装，夜间突袭，包围村庄。”此外，情报认为八路军还面临其他困难：一是缺少武器弹药，“没有缴获武器弹药的作战被认为是失败的”，八路军破坏铁路既是为了破坏敌人交通，也是为了获得制造枪械的金属；二是八路军缺少药品和医疗器械，在反“扫荡”的艰难时期，截肢手术用的是屠刀和木工锯，手术缝合针使用缝衣针，很多手术是在没有麻醉剂的情况下进行。

Through British military intelligence, one can see the Eighth Route Army conducting flexible and varied guerrilla warfare in extremely harsh enemy‑rear conditions, fighting and tying down large numbers of Japanese troops in North China while also growing continuously, fully demonstrating the advantages of the Eighth Route Army’s enemy‑rear war of resistance.

透过英国军事情报，可以看到八路军在敌后艰苦卓绝的环境下开展灵活多变的游击战，在华北抗击和牵制大量日军的同时，自身也不断发展壮大，充分展现了八路军敌后抗战的优势。

**The Eighth Route Army’s War of Resistance in Reports by British Journalists and Nationals**

英国记者和侨民报告中的八路军抗战

The Chinese People’s War of Resistance won the respect and support of peace‑loving people around the world. Many British journalists and nationals went deep into the enemy‑rear resistance bases in North China to conduct on‑the‑spot interviews and investigations, and even lived and fought together with the Eighth Route Army officers and men. In October 1937, the British journalist James Bertram came to the Shaanxi‑Gansu‑Ningxia Border Region, conducted an exclusive interview in Yan’an with Comrade Mao Zedong, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, and also interviewed Peng Dehuai and other Eighth Route Army commanders. In 1939, the British teacher Ralph Lapwood visited the Jin‑Cha‑Ji [4]4 Jin‑Cha‑Ji (Shanxi‑Chahar‑Hebei) was the first and one of the largest CCP‑led anti‑Japanese base areas in North China. resistance base and was received by Nie Rongzhen, Xiao Ke and other Eighth Route Army commanders. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, the British teachers Michael Lindsay and William Band went to the Jin‑Cha‑Ji resistance base to work. These eyewitnesses not only gave rich and detailed descriptions of the resistance bases and the Eighth Route Army’s guerrilla warfare, but also to a certain extent revealed the reasons why the Eighth Route Army’s enemy‑rear war of resistance achieved victory.

中国人民抗日战争赢得了世界爱好和平人民的尊重与支持，许多英国记者和侨民深入华北敌后抗日根据地进行实地采访和调查，甚至和八路军将士一起生活战斗。1937年10月，英国记者贝特兰来到陕甘宁边区，在延安对中共领导人毛泽东同志进行了专访，还采访了彭德怀等八路军将领。1939年，英籍教师赖朴吾前往晋察冀抗日根据地访问，受到聂荣臻、萧克等八路军将领的接见。太平洋战争爆发后，英籍教师林迈可、班威廉奔赴晋察冀抗日根据地工作。这些亲历者对抗日根据地和八路军的游击战不仅有丰富详尽的描述，而且在一定程度上揭示了八路军敌后抗战取得胜利的原因。

In 1941, a British national who had lived in a North China resistance base reported on the Eighth Route Army’s tunnel warfare: in central Hebei, villagers built underground shelters to evade the Japanese. Later these shelters were connected by tunnels within the villages, and finally linked several villages, giving rise to an interesting form of tunnel warfare. The guerrillas could escape from Japanese encirclements through the tunnels; the tunnels were protected by landmines above and had various traps below. The use of landmines had progressed considerably and caused heavy casualties to the Japanese. The report also gave a very high appraisal of the resistance bases and the Eighth Route Army’s guerrilla warfare: almost the whole of North China formed guerrilla fronts organised by the Eighth Route Army, creating multiple permanent and non‑permanent resistance bases; the Japanese could only penetrate them during large‑scale “mopping‑up” operations. “These guerrilla fronts severely hindered Japan’s plunder of resources in North China.”

1941年，一位在华北抗日根据地生活过的英国侨民在报告中记述了八路军的地道战：在河北中部，村民们为了躲避日军，建造了地下避难所。后来这些避难所通过村庄内部的地道连接起来，最后连通了几个村庄，一种有趣的地道战形成了。游击队可以通过地道从日军包围圈逃脱，地道上方有地雷保护，地下有各种陷阱。地雷的使用有了相当大的进步，给日军造成了大量伤亡。报告还对抗日根据地和八路军的游击战给予很高评价：几乎整个华北都是八路军组织的游击战线，形成了多个永久和非永久的抗日根据地，日军只有在大规模“扫荡”时才能渗透其中。“这些游击战线，使日本对华北地区的资源掠夺受到严重阻碍。”

Gunther Stein, who interviewed in Yan’an for nearly five months, believed that the Chinese Communist Party and the people’s army it led “had succeeded in awakening a stagnant peasant society.” Similarly, another national wrote in a report: “The North China peasants, who had previously been indifferent to politics, now understood the meaning of the war of resistance and were willing to endure all hardships to continue resisting… They took great risks to help hide Eighth Route Army soldiers.” In 1943, when the Japanese conducted a large‑scale “mopping‑up” operation against the Jin‑Sui resistance base, the Eighth Route Army’s field hospitals were forced to evacuate; patients were hidden in specially prepared caves or disguised and scattered in small villages. The villagers “gave the wounded better food than they ate themselves, hid them when necessary, and protected them.” In 1945, *The Times* published two reports by nationals, mentioning that villages in the North China resistance bases that were good at making firecrackers had converted to producing landmines. “In one courtyard I saw men, women and children making black powder, casting landmine casings, and stacking the loaded landmines neatly. There is a shortage of metal here, so they hollow out large stones to make stone landmines.” In the Jin‑Cha‑Ji Border Region, each village organised 50 stretchers and 100 permanent porters; “this was not difficult in the border region, because the villages are generally large and populous.” In contrast, the Kuomintang troops in Henan were bitterly hated by the broad masses of peasants. One report stated: “The Kuomintang troops in Henan, because of corruption and abuse, extorted food from peasants who had suffered successive famines, and the peasants hated them to the bone.”

曾在延安采访近5个月的冈瑟·斯坦因认为，中国共产党及其领导的人民军队“成功地唤醒了一个停滞不前的农民社会”。无独有偶，另一位侨民也在报告中写道：“以前对政治漠不关心的华北农民，现在也懂得了抗战的意义，愿意忍受一切困难而继续抵抗……他们冒着巨大风险帮助隐藏八路军战士。”1943年，日军对晋西北抗日根据地大“扫荡”，八路军战地医院被迫疏散，病人被藏在专门准备的山洞里，或伪装分散在小村庄里，村里的百姓“给伤员提供的食物比自己吃得好，必要时把他们藏起来，并保护他们”。1945年，《泰晤士报》刊登了两份侨民报告，报告提到华北抗日根据地那些善于制作鞭炮的村庄已经转型生产地雷了。“在一个院子里我看到男人们、女人们还有孩子们在制作黑火药，铸造地雷套管，并将装好火药的地雷整齐地堆放。这里金属短缺，所以他们掏空大石头制作石头地雷。”在晋察冀边区，每个村庄组织有50个担架和100个固定的搬运人员，“这在边区并不困难，因为村庄一般很大，人口很多”。与之相反，在河南的国民党军队却遭到广大农民的痛恨。有报告称：“在河南的国民党军队由于贪污腐败、胡作非为，向连续遭遇饥荒的农民勒索粮食，农民对他们恨之入骨。”

British journalists and nationals were also deeply impressed by the condition of total mobilisation of the people in the North China resistance bases. In March 1944, William Band, who had lived and worked in the North China resistance bases for nearly two years, submitted to Ambassador Seymour a “Report on the Communist Areas,” covering nine aspects including the resistance bases, the Jin‑Cha‑Ji Border Region government, the Eighth Route Army’s organisation and resistance activities. The report said: in the Jin‑Cha‑Ji resistance base, young people, workers, peasants and women all joined the anti‑Japanese national salvation associations; when the Eighth Route Army attacked Japanese strongpoints, guerrillas, militiamen and the local people all actively participated; the militia and self‑defence forces laid landmines, dug tunnels, carried ammunition and transported the wounded; the people brought picks and shovels for digging tunnels, and ladders for the troops to climb over trenches. In 1944, the British Foreign Office received a report on the International Peace Hospital in southeastern Jin (Shanxi). In this report, Dr. Müller [5]5 “米勒医生” likely refers to Dr. Richard Müller, a German doctor who served in the Eighth Route Army’s medical service; the name may also be rendered as “Miller.” highly praised the role of the militia, saying: “The remarkable development in the past few years is the people’s militia; now their military work is increasing, and they fight as many battles as the regular troops. This is also reflected in the increase in militia casualties.” In January 1945, *The Times* published an article entitled “Guerrilla Warfare in China.” In the article, the author described the militia in North China as the eyes and ears of the Eighth Route Army. It was precisely the effective coordination of the militia, self‑defence forces and the common people that enabled the Eighth Route Army to maximise the effect of guerrilla warfare and plunge the Japanese into the vast ocean of people’s war.

英国记者和侨民还对华北抗日根据地全民皆兵的境况印象深刻。1944年3月，在华北抗日根据地生活工作近两年的班威廉向薛穆大使呈报了一份《关于共产党地区的报告》，包括抗日根据地、晋察冀边区政府、八路军组织与抗日活动等九方面内容。报告中说：晋察冀抗日根据地的青年、工人、农民和妇女纷纷参加抗日救国联合会；八路军在攻打日军据点时，游击队、民兵以及当地老百姓都积极参加；民兵和自卫队埋地雷、挖地道、扛弹药、运伤员，老百姓携带挖隧道用的镐和铁锹，以及让部队爬过壕沟的梯子。1944年英国外交部收到一份关于晋东南国际和平医院的报告。在这份报告中，米勒医生高度评价了民兵的作用，他说：“我们过去几年的显著发展是人民民兵，现在他们的军事工作越来越多，战斗的次数也和正规军一样多了。民兵伤亡人数的增加也反映了这一点。”1945年1月，《泰晤士报》刊登了一篇题目为《中国的游击战争》的文章。在文章中，作者把中国北方的民兵誉为八路军的眼睛和耳朵。正是民兵、自卫队和老百姓的有效配合，八路军才能将游击战的效果发挥到极致，使日军陷入人民战争的汪洋大海之中。

Apart from the types of reports mentioned above, the British National Archives also hold other valuable historical materials on the Chinese Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army’s war of resistance. Although these archives cannot reflect the full picture of the Eighth Route Army’s war of resistance, they vividly and truthfully embody the historical position and role of the Eighth Route Army’s enemy‑rear war of resistance in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti‑Fascist War, present the basic forms and characteristics of the Eighth Route Army’s enemy‑rear operations, and to a certain extent answer the reasons why the Eighth Route Army could achieve victory in its enemy‑rear operations. Although the British side collected this intelligence and information with different motives, these historical materials, from the perspective of the “other,” corroborate the great significance of the Eighth Route Army’s war of resistance and provide new references for studying and writing the history of the Eighth Route Army’s war of resistance.

除上述几类报告外，英国国家档案馆还藏有中国共产党和八路军抗战的其他珍贵史料。这些档案虽然不能反映八路军抗战的全貌，但生动真实地体现了八路军敌后抗战在中国人民抗日战争暨世界反法西斯战争中的历史地位和作用，呈现了八路军敌后作战的基本形式和基本特征，一定程度上回答了八路军敌后作战能够取得胜利的原因。尽管英国方面在搜集这些情报资料时带有不同的动机，但这些史料从他者视角佐证了八路军抗战的伟大意义，为研究和书写八路军抗战历史提供了新的参考。

(The author, Xiao Ruping, is the chief expert of the National Social Science Fund major project “Research and Compilation of the Archives and Documents of the British Embassy in China during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression” and a professor in the School of History, Zhejiang University.)

（作者：肖如平，系国家社科基金重大项目“抗战时期英国驻华大使馆档案文献整理与研究”首席专家、浙江大学历史学院教授）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心