Mao Zedong on the Zunyi Conference

In January 1935, the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held during the Long March in Zunyi, i.e., the Zunyi Conference, was an extremely important meeting at which the Communist Party of China opened a new chapter during the period of the New Democratic Revolution. It left a brilliant mark on the history of the CPC and possessed historic significance as a great turning point. The Zunyi Conference was not only closely linked to Mao Zedong but also changed his political career, becoming a major turning point in Mao Zedong’s life. Sorting through the materials, it is not difficult to find that Mao Zedong discussed the Zunyi Conference many times in his relevant writings. So, in which documents did Mao Zedong discuss the Zunyi Conference, how did he understand and evaluate it, and what value does this understanding and evaluation have? Judging from the main research results on the Zunyi Conference in the current academic circles, there has not been much attention paid to the above questions. Therefore, this article intends to sort out and explore the basic documents, core viewpoints, and historical value of Mao Zedong’s discussions on the Zunyi Conference, in order to further deepen and enrich the study of Mao Zedong and the Zunyi Conference.

1935年1月，长征途中在遵义召开的扩大的中央政治局会议，即遵义会议，是新民主主义革命时期中国共产党开新局一次极为重要的会议，在中共党史上留下浓墨重彩的一笔，具有历史性的伟大转折意义。遵义会议不仅同毛泽东紧密相关，而且改变了毛泽东的政治生涯，成为毛泽东人生的重大转折点。梳理资料不难发现，毛泽东在有关著述中多次论及遵义会议。那么，毛泽东在哪些文献中曾论及遵义会议，是如何认识和评价遵义会议的，这一认识和评价具有怎样的价值，就目前学界有关遵义会议的主要研究成果来看，对上述问题的关注尚且不多。由此，本文拟梳理和探讨毛泽东论遵义会议的基本文献、核心观点及历史价值，以期进一步深化和丰富毛泽东及遵义会议研究。

I. Basic Documents of Mao Zedong’s Discussions on the Zunyi Conference

一、毛泽东论遵义会议的基本文献

Through retrieval, sorting, and analysis of materials such as the *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, the *Collected Works of Mao Zedong*, and the *Selected Letters of Mao Zedong*, a rough count shows that Mao Zedong discussed the Zunyi Conference in 20 writings, mentioning it a total of 40 times. Among these, it appears 11 times in the *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, 29 times in the *Collected Works of Mao Zedong*, and 0 times in the *Selected Letters of Mao Zedong*. If we further examine the timeline, Mao Zedong discussed the Zunyi Conference 36 times before the founding of the People’s Republic of China and only 4 times after its founding. The earliest of Mao Zedong’s 20 writings to discuss the Zunyi Conference was in December 1936, and the latest was in September 1963. See Table 1 for specific statistical details.

通过对《毛泽东选集》《毛泽东文集》《毛泽东书信选集》等资料的检索及梳理分析，粗略统计毛泽东论及遵义会议的著述有20篇，谈论遵义会议共40次。其中，《毛泽东选集》出现11次，《毛泽东文集》出现29次，《毛泽东书信选集》则为0次。如果再进一步从时间线来看，毛泽东谈论遵义会议在新中国成立前为36次，而新中国成立后只有4次，毛泽东在20篇著述中论及遵义会议最早是在1936年12月，最后一次为1963年9月，具体统计情况详见表1。

In addition, in Volume 15 of the *Selected Important Documents Since the Founding of the Party (1921–1949)*, Mao Zedong’s article “On the New Stage” discusses the Zunyi Conference 4 times, 3 of which are identical to the article “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War.” In Volume 19 of the *Selected Important Documents Since the Founding of the Party (1921–1949)*, the article “Telegram from Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang to Zhou Enlai on Discussing the Past Central Line (February 21, 1942)” discusses the Zunyi Conference twice.

此外，《建党以来重要文献选编（一九二一—一九四九）》第15册，毛泽东在《论新阶段》一文论及遵义会议4次，其中3次和《中国共产党在民族战争中的地位》一文相同。《建党以来重要文献选编（一九二一—一九四九）》第19册，《毛泽东、王稼祥关于讨论过去中央路线问题给周恩来的电报（一九四二年二月二十一日）》一文论及遵义会议2次。

II. Mao Zedong’s Understanding and Evaluation of the Zunyi Conference

二、毛泽东对遵义会议的认识与评价

Mao Zedong’s understanding and evaluation of the Zunyi Conference constitute the core content of his discussions on it. Mao Zedong’s multiple discussions on the Zunyi Conference have clear viewpoints and are continuous. These discussions either sum up experience or blaze new trails, embodying the spirit of independence and self-reliance and daring to innovate that the Chinese Communists, represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, adhered to in the process of integrating the basic principles of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution and solving a series of problems in the Chinese revolution.

毛泽东对遵义会议的认识与评价是他论遵义会议的核心内容。毛泽东有关遵义会议的多次论述，观点鲜明且具连续性。这些论述或为总结经验，或为开辟新路，体现了以毛泽东同志为代表的中国共产党人在将马克思主义基本原理同中国革命具体实践相结合，解决中国革命一系列问题的过程中坚持的独立自主、勇于创新的精神。

(A) The Zunyi Conference Corrected Serious “Left” Errors within the Party

（一）遵义会议纠正了党内“左”倾严重错误

Sorting through the aforementioned documents, it can be seen that Mao Zedong expressed this important viewpoint in his earliest discussion of the Zunyi Conference. In December 1936, in his work “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” he pointed out: In the revolutionary war, besides the two errors of Chen Duxiu’s Right opportunism and Li Lisan’s “Left” opportunism, the Communist Party of China also committed two other errors. One of these was “the ‘Left’ opportunism of 1931 to 1934, which caused extremely serious losses to the Agrarian Revolutionary War, resulting in the failure to defeat the enemy in the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign and the loss of the base areas and the weakening of the Red Army. This error was corrected at the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in Zunyi in January 1935.” [1]1 The Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign (1933–1934) was the last major military campaign by the Chinese Communist Party’s Red Army against the Nationalist forces’ encirclement campaigns in Jiangxi, ending in defeat and the start of the Long March. Clearly, Mao Zedong’s understanding and evaluation of the Zunyi Conference began with its correction of “Left” opportunist errors within the Party. In Mao Zedong’s view, the “Left” line of 1934 was the most serious of the three “Left” lines that occurred within the Party from 1927 to 1935. On October 14, 1938, Mao Zedong’s article “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War” again discussed the Zunyi Conference: “The Zunyi Conference corrected the serious errors of principle of a ‘Left’ opportunist nature committed in the struggle of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign.” However, the Zunyi Conference mainly opposed “opportunism in war,” which was “a reflection of the war environment.” Therefore, the Zunyi Conference “placed the question of war first” and “mainly only solved military problems.”

梳理前述文献可知，毛泽东最早一次谈论遵义会议时就表达了这个重要观点。1936年12月，他在《中国革命战争的战略问题》中指出：中国共产党在革命战争中，除了犯过陈独秀右倾机会主义和李立三“左”倾机会主义两个错误之外，还犯过两个错误，其中一个是“一九三一年至一九三四年的‘左’倾机会主义，这个错误使得土地革命战争受到了极端严重的损失，得到了在第五次反‘围剿’中不能战胜敌人反而丧失了根据地削弱了红军的结果。这个错误是在一九三五年一月扩大的中央政治局的遵义会议时纠正过来了”。显然，毛泽东对遵义会议的认识和评价，是从纠正党内“左”倾机会主义错误开始的。在毛泽东看来，1934年“左”倾路线，是1927年至1935年党内发生的三次“左”倾路线中最为严重的一次。1938年10月14日，毛泽东《中国共产党在民族战争中的地位》一文再次论及遵义会议，“遵义会议纠正了在第五次反‘围剿’斗争中所犯的‘左’倾机会主义性质的严重的原则错误”，但遵义会议主要反对“战争中的机会主义”，这是“战争环境的反映”，因此，遵义会议“把战争问题放在第一位”，“主要只解决了军事问题”。

In Mao Zedong’s view, the reason “Left” errors occurred was that “when a national enemy had invaded and the national bourgeoisie and the upper petty bourgeoisie had already changed, our policies did not follow suit but remained the same as before.” Some comrades within the Party “did not humbly learn from past experience, did not understand China’s historical and social conditions, the characteristics of the Chinese revolution, or the laws of the Chinese revolution, and did not have a unified understanding of the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution.” At the same time, “some leading cadres overestimated the enemy situation and tasks, and, disregarding actual circumstances, mechanically copied foreign experience.” For this reason, “the Central Red Area [2]2 The Central Red Area refers to the main Communist base area centered on the Jiangxi-Fujian border region, also known as the Central Soviet Area, which was the primary base of the Chinese Soviet Republic before the Long March. once paid an extremely heavy price over a long period of three years (before the Zunyi Conference) before it was corrected through lessons learned in blood.” This precisely reflects the great achievement of the Zunyi Conference.

在毛泽东看来，“左”倾错误之所以会发生，是因为“当一个民族敌人打进来，民族资产阶级、上层小资产阶级已经变化了的时候，我们的政策没有跟着变，还是过去的一套”，党内一部分同志“不去虚心领会过去的经验，对于中国的历史状况和社会状况、中国革命的特点、中国革命的规律不了解，对于马克思列宁主义的理论和中国革命的实践没有统一的理解”，同时，“一部分领导干部对敌情和任务估计过分，并且不看实情，机械地搬用外国经验”，为此，“中央红色区域，曾经在三年的长时间内（遵义会议以前），付出了极大的牺牲，然后才从血的教训中纠正过来”，这正体现出遵义会议的伟大成就。

Regarding the specific manifestations of the “Left” errors within the Party, Mao Zedong held different views in different texts. He believed these errors included both opportunist errors—the Zunyi Conference corrected “serious errors of principle of a ‘Left’ opportunist nature”—and dogmatist errors—the Zunyi Conference “criticized dogmatism”—as well as subjectivist errors—“the so-called two-line struggle of the leaders of the ‘Left’ opportunist line from the September 18th Incident [3]3 The September 18th Incident (1931) was a Japanese military attack on Mukden (now Shenyang) that led to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and is often cited as the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War. to the Zunyi Conference was subjectivist,” etc. There were both organizational errors and military errors. Although Mao Zedong believed that the “Left” errors within the Party had multiple dimensions, his view that the Zunyi Conference corrected serious “Left” errors within the Party was consistent and repeatedly emphasized.

对于党内“左”倾错误的具体表现，毛泽东在不同文本中有不同看法，他认为这些错误既有机会主义错误——遵义会议纠正了“‘左’倾机会主义性质的严重的原则错误”；也有教条主义的错误——遵义会议“批判了教条主义”；还有主观主义的错误——“从‘九一八’至遵义会议的‘左’倾机会主义路线领导者们的所谓两条战线斗争是主观主义的”等，既有组织上的错误，也有军事上的错误。虽然毛泽东认为党内“左”倾错误具有多重性，他对于遵义会议纠正党内“左”倾严重错误的看法却一以贯之并多次强调。

(B) The Zunyi Conference Promoted Unity within the Party and the Red Army

（二）遵义会议促进了党内和红军内部的团结

In “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War,” Mao Zedong pointed out that the Zunyi Conference “united the Party and the Red Army, enabling the Party Central Committee and the main forces of the Red Army to successfully complete the Long March, move to the forward positions of the War of Resistance, and implement the new policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front.”

毛泽东在《中国共产党在民族战争中的地位》中指出，遵义会议“团结了党和红军，使得党中央和红军主力胜利地完成了长征，转到了抗日的前进阵地，执行了抗日民族统一战线的新政策”。

The reason the Zunyi Conference was able to unite the Party and the Red Army was naturally because it was based on correcting the “Left” errors within the Party. However, after the Zunyi Conference, Mao Zedong did not directly assume the position of Party leader but instead recommended Zhang Wentian to take that role. This was undoubtedly out of consideration for uniting comrades within the Party. Deng Xiaoping once pointed out that the reason Mao Zedong let Zhang Wentian, who had previously sided with the Wang Ming line, serve as leader was “to unite comrades who had made mistakes, especially in difficult times. Comrade Mao Zedong’s policy of correctly handling intra-Party issues united everyone, enabling them to get through the most difficult moment and complete the Long March.” [4]4 Wang Ming (1904–1974) was a senior CPC leader associated with the “Left” line that dominated the Party in the early 1930s, which Mao Zedong later criticized. Zhang Wentian (1900–1976) was a CPC leader who initially supported Wang Ming’s line but later sided with Mao. At the same time, considering that “if historical issues were discussed at the meeting, it would inevitably drag on for two or three weeks,” the Zunyi Conference appropriately shelved historical issues during discussions, preventing the meeting’s central topic from shifting. This actually avoided the expansion of intra-Party contradictions and safeguarded intra-Party unity.

遵义会议之所以能团结党和红军，自然是因为建立在纠正党内的“左”倾错误基础之上。但遵义会议后，毛泽东没有直接担任党的负责人，而是推举张闻天担任党的负责人，这无疑是出于团结党内同志的考虑。邓小平曾指出，毛泽东之所以要让曾经站在王明路线一边的张闻天担任负责人，“就是要把犯错误的同志团结起来，特别是在困难的时候。毛泽东同志正确处理党内问题的政策，使大家团结起来了，渡过了最困难的时刻，完成了长征”。同时，考虑到“如果在大会上讨论历史问题，势必要扯两三个星期”，遵义会议讨论时适度搁置历史问题，防止会议中心议题转移，实际上避免了党内矛盾的扩大，维护了党内团结。

Although Mao Zedong pointed out at the Politburo meeting of the CPC Central Committee in December 1940 that the “Left” policies of the later period of the Soviet movement had caused the army to lose nine-tenths of its strength and the Soviet areas to lose more than nine-tenths, actually greater than the losses during the Li Lisan line, and that the Zunyi Meeting resolution “was in fact a line error” yet it was only stated as a military error at that time, and that the Zunyi Meeting resolution needed revision, this view was ultimately shelved because some comrades disagreed with raising the errors of the later period of the Soviet movement as line errors. Shortly afterward, in the directive on the current situation and policies drafted by Mao Zedong for the CPC Central Committee (the policy part of which was included in the second volume of the *Selected Works of Mao Zedong* under the title “On Policy”), he only stated that “in the later period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War there were many excessively Left policies,” and that such excessively Left policies were “errors of ‘Left’ opportunism,” without mentioning line errors. This approach was undoubtedly still for the purpose of maintaining internal unity.

尽管毛泽东在1940年12月的中共中央政治局会议上指出，苏维埃运动后期“左”的政策使军队损失十分之九，苏区损失不止十分之九，实际上比立三路线时的损失还大，遵义会议决议“实际上是路线上的错误”却只说是那时军事上的错误，遵义会议的决议需要修改。但这一观点最终因为某些同志不同意提苏维埃运动后期的错误是路线错误而搁置。毛泽东稍后在为中共中央起草的关于时局与政策的指示（其中政策部分编入《毛泽东选集》第二卷，题为《论政策》）中，只说在土地革命战争后期有许多过左的政策”，这种过左政策是“‘左’倾机会主义的错误”，而没有提路线错误。这一做法无疑仍是出于维护内部团结的目的。

At the Politburo meeting of the CPC Central Committee in November 1943, Mao Zedong stated in his speech that the Zunyi Meeting only concentrated on clarifying the military line, because during the Long March the central leadership’s military command was the central issue, and “only in this way could we unite our internal ranks.” Earlier, Mao Zedong had said, “The Zunyi Meeting actually changed a political line. After the Zunyi Meeting, the old line could no longer function politically, militarily, or organizationally, but the legacy of subjectivism in ideology still remained,” and “the remnants of subjectivism and sectarianism had not been eliminated, or still existed quite seriously.” This outcome was precisely for the need to maintain unity. A speech by Zhou Enlai in 1972 confirmed this conclusion; he mentioned, “If we had said at that time that the whole thing was a line issue, many people would have temporarily held back, and it would have hindered the Party’s progress,” and “This was Chairman Mao’s dialectical materialism: to resolve contradictions, first resolve the principal contradiction, and put the secondary ones aside for later.” Zhang Wentian’s explanation was that without doing so, “our unity would have become impossible, and thus the Zunyi Meeting could not have achieved victory,” and he regarded this as a model for inner-Party struggle.

1943年11月中共中央政治局会议上，毛泽东发言称，遵义会议只集中弄清军事路线，因为中央在长征中，军事领导是中心问题，“只有如此才能团结我们的内部”。此前，毛泽东称“遵义会议，实际上变更了一条政治路线。过去的路线在遵义会议后，在政治上、军事上、组织上都不能起作用了，但在思想上主观主义的遗毒仍然存在”，“主观主义与宗派主义的残余，并没有肃清，或者还很严重地存在着”。这一结果，正是出于维护团结的需要。1972年周恩来的一次讲话印证了这个结论，他提到“如果当时说整个都是路线问题，有很多人暂时会要保留，反而阻碍党的前进”，“这是毛主席的辩证唯物主义，解决矛盾首先解决主要的矛盾，其次的放后一点嘛”。张闻天对此的解释则是，不如此做，“我们的联合会成为不可能，因而遵义会议不能取得胜利”，并将此作为党内斗争的示范。

The Zunyi Meeting’s promotion of unity within the Party and the military also relied on comrades who actively maintained unity. Ye Yonglie once recorded in his interview notes a small-scale conversation by Mao Zedong, who said that at that time Politburo meetings often had two opinions: on one side were Mao Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang, and Zhang Wentian, totaling three votes; on the other side were four votes. Each meeting was three votes against four, and the problem could never be resolved. So Mao Zedong said, “I will bring in the people below who support our views, and you bring in the people below who support your views, and hold an enlarged meeting,” and proposed that, in addition to the Politburo members and alternate members in Zunyi, the responsible comrades of the Military Commission and the main leaders of each army corps should be invited to attend the meeting. This proposal was supported by Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, and others, and Bo Gu also agreed. As Mao Zedong said, “Without the support of all comrades who opposed the ‘Left’ line, including some very important comrades who had made errors in the third ‘Left’ line, the success of the Zunyi Meeting would have been impossible.” When discussing the issue of the leadership line, even though Mao Zedong clearly stated that from the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee to the Zunyi Meeting, “the political strategy, military strategy, and cadre policy adopted by the central leading organs were erroneous in their main aspects,” he also specifically pointed out, “At that time, the comrades who made errors had no dispute with us on the basic issues of opposing Chiang Kai-shek, advocating land revolution, and Red Army struggle.” Therefore, the Zunyi Meeting did not completely negate these comrades who had made errors, but instead strove to win them over to the correct line, again for the purpose of unity.

遵义会议促进党内军内团结，也离不开主动维护团结的党内同志。叶永烈曾在采访手记中记载了毛泽东的一次小范围谈话，称当时政治局开会经常是两种意见，一边是毛泽东、王稼祥、张闻天共三票，一边是四票。每次开会都是三票对四票，永远不能解决问题。于是，毛泽东就说，“我把拥护我们主张的下面的人找来，你们把拥护你们主张的下面的人也找来，搞个扩大会议”，并提议除在遵义的政治局委员、候补委员，把军委的负责同志和各军团的主要领导人都请来参加会议。这一建议得到周恩来、张闻天等人支持，博古也表示同意。正如毛泽东所言，“反‘左’倾路线的一切同志，包括第三次‘左’倾路线错误中的很重要的某些同志，没有他们的赞助，遵义会议的成功是不可能的”。在谈及领导路线问题时，毛泽东即便明确党的六届四中全会至遵义会议时期，“中央领导机关所采取的政治策略、军事策略和干部政策在其主要方面都是错误的”，也特意指出，“当时犯错误的同志在反对蒋介石、主张土地革命和红军斗争这些基本问题上面，和我们之间是没有争论的”。因此，遵义会议对待这些犯错误的同志并没有全盘否定，而是把犯错误的同志努力争取到正确的路线这边来，同样是出于团结的目的。

Precisely because of the active maintenance of unity within the Party and the military by many parties, the Zunyi Meeting “pointed out that the correction of errors in military leadership within the Party was not a division within the Party, but on the contrary, it strengthened unity, put military leadership on the correct path, and further enhanced the prestige of the Party and the Military Commission.” Mao Zedong, in his political report “On the New Stage” at the Seventh National Congress of the CPC, further summarized: “After the Zunyi Meeting and the overcoming of Zhang Guotao’s error, our Party was at its most united and unified period since the Sixth National Congress.”

正是由于多方对党内军内团结的积极维护，遵义会议“指出党内对于军事领导上错误的纠正，不是党内的分歧，相反的更加团结，使军事领导走上正确的道路，使党与军委的威信更加提高”。毛泽东更是在党的七大的政治报告《论新阶段》中总结指出：“遵义会议与克服张国焘错误之后，我们的党是第六次全国代表大会以来最团结最统一的时期了。”

(3) The Zunyi Meeting inaugurated a new stage in which the Chinese Communist Party independently resolved China’s revolutionary problems

（三）遵义会议开创了中国共产党独立自主解决中国革命问题的新阶段

On October 4, 1939, Mao Zedong pointed out in the “Foreword to *The Communist*”: “It was only after the Zunyi Meeting (the Politburo meeting held in Zunyi, Guizhou, in January 1935) that the Party thoroughly embarked on the path of Bolshevization.” The so-called “Bolshevization” “essentially lies first of all in being adept at applying Leninism to the specific and special conditions of each country,” that is, what is commonly referred to as integrating the basic principles of Marxism with China’s concrete reality. The reason Mao Zedong believed that the Party only thoroughly embarked on the path of Bolshevization after the Zunyi Meeting was mainly due to the independent consciousness and ability demonstrated by the Chinese Communists during the Zunyi Meeting process.

1939年10月4日，毛泽东在《〈共产党人〉发刊词》中指出：“只在到了遵义会议（1935年1月在贵州遵义召开的中央政治局会议）以后，党才彻底地走上了布尔什维克化的道路。”所谓“布尔什维克化”，“实质首先在于善于把列宁主义运用到每个国家的具体特殊条件中来”，即通常所说的把马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际相结合。毛泽东之所以认为遵义会议后党才彻底走上布尔什维克化的道路，主要源于遵义会议过程中中国共产党人表现出的独立自主意识与能力。

Under the command of Wang Ming’s “Left” dogmatism, the Red Army passively responded to the fifth counter-encirclement campaign, ultimately suffering defeat and severe weakening. Subsequently, the Battle of the Xiangjiang River caused the Red Army to pay a heavy price, with losses exceeding the total reduction in personnel when breaking through the first three blockade lines. The main force of the Red Army, which had numbered over 86,000 at the start, was sharply reduced to less than 40,000, with casualties and losses exceeding half, and was finally forced to undertake the Long March. This is what Mao Zedong meant when he said, “The 12,500-kilometer Long March is glorious, but in fact it was because of committing line errors that we were pursued by the enemy and had no choice but to march.”

在王明“左”倾教条主义指挥下，红军被动应付第五次反“围剿”，最终失利并遭严重削弱。接下来，湘江之战又使红军付出惨重代价，损失人数超过突破前三道封锁线时的减员之和。红军主力由出发时八万六千多人，锐减到不足四万，伤亡折损过半，最后被迫长征。这就是毛泽东所说的，“一万二千五百公里的长征是光荣的，但实际上是由于犯了路线错误，被敌人追赶得不得不走的”。

The serious harm that Wang Ming’s “Left” dogmatism brought to the Chinese revolution led many comrades in the Party and the Red Army to recognize the errors of the Wang Ming line. The Zunyi Meeting criticized the errors of Wang Ming’s “Left” dogmatist line. The “Resolution on the Summary of the Campaign to Counter the Enemy’s Fifth ‘Encirclement and Suppression’” drafted after the meeting criticized the military opportunist errors of Bo Gu and Li De, as well as their errors of arbitrary and autocratic leadership and organizational style. This was the first time in the Party’s history that a central document severely criticized a Comintern advisor, demonstrating the independent consciousness of the Chinese Communists.

王明“左”倾教条主义给中国革命带来的严重危害，令党和红军中的许多同志认识到王明路线的错误，遵义会议批判了王明“左”倾教条主义路线的错误，会后起草的中共中央《反对敌人五次“围剿”的总结的决议》，批判了博古、李德在军事上的机会主义错误以及组织和领导作风上独断专行的错误。这是党的历史上第一次以中央文件形式对共产国际顾问进行严厉批评，表现出了中国共产党人的独立自主意识。

It is noteworthy that the previous correction of Chen Duxiu’s Right opportunism and Li Lisan’s “Left” opportunism differed greatly from this correction of the “Left” error: the former were corrected under the direct intervention of the Comintern, while the latter was corrected spontaneously by comrades within the Party, integrating the basic principles of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, under circumstances where the Chinese Communist Party had lost contact with the Comintern. The Zunyi Meeting in fact established Mao Zedong’s leadership position in the Party Central Committee and the Red Army, and this was also decided independently by the Chinese Communists. This all indicated to a certain extent that the Chinese Communist Party already possessed the ability to independently explore the path of the Chinese revolution. “Since the Zunyi Meeting, our Party has independently implemented policies, independently decided guidelines, maintained an independent position, and acted according to China’s conditions.”

值得注意的是，之前纠正陈独秀右倾机会主义和李立三“左”倾机会主义与这次纠正“左”倾错误有着巨大区别——前者是在共产国际的直接干预下纠正的，而后者是在中国共产党与共产国际失去联络的情况下，党内同志将马克思主义基本原理与中国革命具体实践相结合，自发团结起来加以纠正的。遵义会议事实上确立了毛泽东在党中央和红军的领导地位，也是由中国共产党人独立自主决定的。这都在一定程度上表明，中国共产党已经具备了独立自主探索中国革命道路的能力。“我们党自遵义会议以后，是独立地执行政策，独立地决定方针，保持独立的地位，按中国情况办事。”

There is no doubt that independence became an important successful experience of the Chinese Communist Party in leading the Chinese revolution. In the ten years from the Zunyi Meeting to the convening of the Seventh National Congress of the Party, “the main members of the Central Committee were elected by the Fourth Plenary Session and the Fifth Plenary Session; only five elected by the Sixth Congress remain, that is, of the current twenty-five Central Committee members, the vast majority were elected by the Fourth and Fifth Plenary Sessions, the two plenary sessions that turned somersaults. The Sixth Plenary Session in 1938 also elected three. Precisely in these ten years, the number of somersaults turned was a little less, the amount of trouble stirred up was a little less, and our work could be considered to have made progress.” Mao Zedong regarded this as “a very important experience.”

毫无疑问，独立自主成为中国共产党领导中国革命实践中的重要成功经验。从遵义会议到党的七大召开的十年里，“中央委员会主要的成员，是四中全会和五中全会选举的，六次大会选举的现在只剩下五位，就是说现在的二十五位中央委员中，绝大多数是四中全会、五中全会选举的，就是翻筋斗的两次全会选举的。六中全会1938也选了三位。恰恰在这十年中，筋斗翻得少了一点，乱子闹得少了一点，我们的工作还算有进步”。毛泽东认为这“是一条很重要的经验”。

In March 1961, Mao Zedong stated at the Central Work Conference in Guangzhou: “Some people say my art of war relies on two books, one is *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* and the other is *The Art of War by Sunzi*. I have read *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, but I had not read *The Art of War by Sunzi* at that time. At the Zunyi Conference, Kai Feng said: ‘Your stuff is not necessarily brilliant; it’s nothing more than *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* plus *The Art of War by Sunzi*.’ I asked him one question: ‘How many chapters does *The Art of War by Sunzi* have in total? What is the title of the first chapter? Please tell me.’ He could not answer. I said: ‘You haven’t read it either, so how do you know that I am familiar with *The Art of War by Sunzi*?’ Kai Feng himself had not read *The Art of War by Sunzi*, yet he claimed that I used it. At that time, when fighting, the situation was so tense; who still cared about *The Art of War by Sunzi* or any combat regulations? They were all forgotten. When fighting, you have to estimate the enemy’s and our own situation and make decisions quickly; who still remembers those books? Haven’t some of you studied the Four Major Courses? [9]9 The Four Major Courses (四大教程) refers to the four basic military training manuals used in the Red Army at the time, emphasizing standardized tactical doctrine. Do you use the Four Major Courses every time you fight? If so, that would be completely dogmatic!” From this, it can be seen that what Mao Zedong meant by independence and self-reliance was neither to treat ancient Chinese books as dogma, nor to treat Marxism as dogma, and even less to treat foreign experience as dogma: “Foreign experience, no matter which country it comes from, can only serve as a reference.”

1961年3月，毛泽东在广州中央工作会议上的讲话中指出：“有人讲我的兵法靠两本书，一本是《三国演义》，一本是《孙子兵法》。《三国演义》我是看过的，《孙子兵法》当时我就没有看过。在遵义会议上，凯丰说：你那些东西，并不见得高明，无非是《三国演义》加《孙子兵法》。我就问他一句：你说《孙子兵法》一共有多少篇？第一篇的题目叫什么？请你讲讲。他答不出来。我说：你也没看过，你怎么晓得我就熟悉《孙子兵法》呢？凯丰他自己也没看过《孙子兵法》，却说我用的是《孙子兵法》。那时打仗，形势那么紧张，谁还管得什么孙子兵法，什么战斗条令，统统都忘记了的。打仗的时候要估计敌我形势，很快作出决策，哪个还去记起那些书呢？你们有些人不是学过四大教程吗？每次打仗都是用四大教程吗？如果那样就完全是教条主义嘛！”由此可见，毛泽东所讲独立自主，既不把中国古书当教条，也不把马克思主义当教条，更不把外国经验当教条，“外国经验，不管是哪一个国家的，只能供参考”。

In September 1963, Mao Zedong again discussed the Zunyi Conference in his article “Revolution and Construction Must Both Rely on Oneself”: “In the past, we were like students having our hands held while learning to write. From the founding of the Party in 1921 to 1934, we suffered from having our hands held by our teachers. The program was drafted by the teachers, and the resolutions of the Central Committee plenary sessions were also drafted by the teachers. Especially in 1934, we suffered great losses. After that, we learned to think for ourselves. It took us several decades to understand China. How can it be that Chinese people do not understand China’s situation? True understanding of independence and self-reliance began with the Zunyi Conference.” At the Zunyi Conference, the Communist Party of China (CPC) broke free from the direct influence and control of the Communist International and began to independently resolve its own internal contradictions. From then on, the CPC began a new period of independently leading the Chinese revolution. This is the true portrayal of Mao Zedong’s poem written in February 1935: “Idle boast the strong pass is a wall of iron, / With firm strides we are crossing its summit.” [10]10 These lines are from Mao Zedong’s poem “Loushan Pass” (忆秦娥·娄山关), written in February 1935 shortly after the Zunyi Conference.

1963年9月，毛泽东在《革命和建设都要靠自己》一文中再论遵义会议，“过去我们就是由先生把着手学写字，从一九二一年党成立到一九三四年，我们就是吃了先生的亏，纲领由先生起草，中央全会的决议也由先生起草，特别是一九三四年，使我们遭到了很大的损失。从那之后，我们就懂得要自己想问题。我们认识中国，花了几十年时间。中国人不懂中国情况，这怎么行？真正懂得独立自主是从遵义会议开始的”。遵义会议上，中国共产党摆脱了共产国际直接影响与控制，开始独立自主解决自己内部的矛盾，从此，中国共产党开始了独立自主领导中国革命的新时期。这正是1935年2月毛泽东所写“雄关漫道真如铁，而今迈步从头越”的真实写照。

(4) The Zunyi Conference Was a Critical Turning Point in the Development of the CPC

（四）遵义会议是中国共产党发展的关键转折

In Mao Zedong’s understanding, the Zunyi Conference was an extremely important meeting, a critical turning point in the development of the CPC and even in the course of the Chinese revolution.

在毛泽东的认识中，遵义会议是一次极为重要的会议，是中国共产党发展乃至中国革命历程中的关键转折。

The Zunyi Conference was a turning point in the Party’s line. Mao Zedong mentioned many times that the Party’s line after the Zunyi Conference was correct: “From 1921 to the Zunyi Conference in 1935, it took fourteen years to end the dominance of multiple erroneous lines over the entire Party.” Liu Shaoqi also believed that “since the War of Resistance Against Japan, it should be said that since the Zunyi Conference, the line and policies of the Party Central Committee have been completely correct.” However, Mao Zedong also believed that “a correct line can still lead to individual mistakes; the Zunyi Conference itself is evidence of this.” On February 21, 1942, Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang stated again in a telegram to Zhou Enlai: “From the September 18th Incident [11]11 The September 18th Incident (九一八事变) of 1931 was a Japanese invasion of Manchuria, which the CPC later judged as a period of erroneous line in the Central Committee. to the Zunyi Conference (a total of three years and four months), the Central Committee’s line was erroneous. After the Zunyi Conference, the Central Committee’s line was correct.” Although Mao Zedong acknowledged that the Zunyi Conference “did not completely solve the problems” and that the “Left” deviationist line was criticized but not thoroughly eliminated, even this incomplete criticism “still played a key role in saving the Party and saving the Chinese revolution.” Therefore, both the Party’s second historical resolution and the third historical resolution emphasize that the Zunyi Conference “was a life-and-death turning point in the Party’s history.” [12]12 The “second historical resolution” refers to the *Resolution on Certain Historical Questions since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China* (1981), and the “third historical resolution” refers to the *Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century* (2021).

遵义会议是党的路线转折点。毛泽东曾多次提及，遵义会议以后党的路线是正确的，“从1921年到1935年遵义会议，经过十四年的时间，才结束了多次错误路线对全党的统治”。刘少奇也认为，“抗战以来，应该说是遵义会议以来，党中央的路线和方针是完全正确的。”但毛泽东同时认为，“路线正确是可能犯个别错误的，遵义会议的一篇，就是证据”。1942年2月21日，毛泽东、王稼祥在给周恩来的电报中再次提出：“‘九一八’至遵义会议（共三年又四个月）中央路线是错误的。遵义会议以后中央路线是正确的。”尽管毛泽东承认，遵义会议“未完全解决问题”，“左”倾路线虽被清算却并不彻底。即便这是一次不彻底的清算，仍然“起到了挽救党、挽救中国革命的关键性作用”。因此，党的第二个历史决议和第三个历史决议都强调，遵义会议“在党的历史上是一个生死攸关的转折点”。

Starting from the Zunyi Conference, the Party’s ideological building [13]13 “Ideological building” (思想建设) is a key component of Party building, referring to the Party’s efforts to instill Marxist theory and correct political thinking in its members. embarked on the right track. Ren Bishi pointed out that in the period before the Zunyi Conference, the CPC “did not pay much attention to leadership in the ideological sphere, and sometimes even neglected it.” The Zunyi Conference corrected the sectarianism caused by “the remnants of the past Li Lisan line that had not been eliminated” and “the political errors in principle at that time.” “The sectarianism that existed in our Party’s history and played a harmful role no longer existed after several changes since the Zunyi Conference.” Mao Zedong even believed that the Party’s preparation for the ideological transformation of rectifying the three styles [14]14 “Rectifying the three styles” (整顿三风) refers to the Yan’an Rectification Movement (1942–1945), which targeted subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party formalism. began with the Zunyi Conference.

从遵义会议开始，党的思想建设步入正轨。任弼时指出，在遵义会议以前的时期，中国共产党“对思想方面的领导是不大重视的，甚至有时是忽视的”。遵义会议纠正了由“过去立三路线的残余未能肃清”和“当时政治上的原则错误”导致的宗派主义，“我党历史上存在过并且起了不良作用的宗派，经过遵义会议以来的几次变化”之后就不存在了。毛泽东甚至认为，党内为整顿三风完成思想转变做准备即是从遵义会议开始的。

It was precisely based on the turning-point role of the Zunyi Conference that Mao Zedong first proposed that “the Seventh National Congress [15]15 The Seventh National Congress of the CPC was held in Yan’an from April to June 1945. should only make a conclusion on the history from the Fourth Plenary Session [16]16 The Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee was held in January 1931, a period associated with the dominance of the “Left” line. to the Zunyi Conference.” This provided an important reference for the formation of the first historical resolution in the history of the CPC’s development—the *Resolution on Certain Historical Questions*.

正是基于遵义会议的转折性作用，毛泽东率先提出“七大只作四中全会到遵义会议一段历史的结论”，这就为中国共产党发展史上第一个历史决议——《关于若干历史问题的决议》的形成提供了重要参考。

III. Mao Zedong on the Historical Value of the Zunyi Conference

三、毛泽东论遵义会议的历史价值

Mao Zedong’s understanding and evaluation of the Zunyi Conference are not only related to the historical contributions and historical status of the Zunyi Conference but also have important historical value for the cause of China’s revolution, construction, and reform, as well as for the study of the history of the CPC.

毛泽东对遵义会议的认识和评价，不仅事关遵义会议的历史贡献历史地位，而且对中国革命、建设、改革事业和中共党史研究具有重要的历史价值。

First, Mao Zedong’s understanding and evaluation of the Zunyi Conference not only provided important guidance for the *Resolution on Certain Historical Questions* in judging the historical status and historical contributions of the Zunyi Conference, but some of his important understandings and evaluations were directly adopted by the *Resolution on Certain Historical Questions*. Mao Zedong repeatedly discussed how the Zunyi Conference corrected the “Left” deviationist errors within the Party, laying the necessary foundation for the *Resolution on Certain Historical Questions*’s important statement that the Zunyi Conference “ended the dominance of the ‘Left’ deviationist line in the Party Central Committee.”

第一，毛泽东对遵义会议的认识和评价，不仅为《关于若干历史问题的决议》评判遵义会议的历史地位历史贡献提供了重要遵循，其中一些重要认识和评价更是直接为《关于若干历史问题的决议》采纳。毛泽东多次论述遵义会议纠正了党内的“左”倾错误，为《关于若干历史问题的决议》关于遵义会议“结束了‘左’倾路线在党中央的统治”这一重要表述奠定了必要基础。

The *Resolution on Certain Historical Questions* states: “After the Zunyi Conference, the political line of the Party Central Committee under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong was completely correct.” This view also absorbed Mao Zedong’s views on the Zunyi Conference. Furthermore, the first historical resolution also points out: “The Zunyi Conference concentrated all efforts on correcting the military and organizational errors that were decisive at the time, and this was completely correct. This meeting began the new leadership of the Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Zedong, which was the most significant change in the history of the CPC. It was precisely because of this change that our Party was able to victoriously conclude the Long March, preserve and temper the core cadres of the Party and the Red Army under the extremely arduous conditions of the Long March, victoriously overcome the Zhang Guotao line of retreat and flight and the establishment of a second Party… and organize the Anti-Japanese National United Front.” [17]17 Zhang Guotao (张国焘) was a senior CPC leader who, during the Long March, attempted to split the Party and establish a rival Central Committee. Similar expressions of these views can be found in Mao Zedong’s relevant writings on the Zunyi Conference.

《关于若干历史问题的决议》提到：“遵义会议后，党中央在毛泽东同志领导下的政治路线，是完全正确的。”这一观点同样吸收了毛泽东论遵义会议的观点。此外，第一个历史决议还指出：“遵义会议集中全力纠正了当时具有决定意义的军事上和组织上的错误，是完全正确的。这次会议开始了以毛泽东同志为首的中央的新的领导，是中共党内最有历史意义的转变。也正是由于这一转变，我们党才能够胜利地结束了长征，在长征的极端艰险的条件下保存了并锻炼了党和红军的基干，胜利地克服了坚持退却逃跑并实行成立第二党的张国焘路线……组织了抗日民族统一战线。”这些观点在毛泽东论及遵义会议的相关著述中都能找到类似表述。

In 1941, Mao Zedong drafted a document for the enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee held from September to October, titled “Draft Conclusion on the Question of the Central Leadership Line since the Fourth Plenary Session.” This draft pointed out that the Zunyi Conference “actually overcame ‘Left’ opportunism as a line,” solved the most important problems at the time—the erroneous military line, erroneous leadership methods, and erroneous cadre policies—and “substantially completed the transformation from one line to another, that is, overcame the erroneous line and restored the correct line.” Although this draft conclusion did not become an official resolution, “many of its important contents and ideological viewpoints were later absorbed into the *Resolution on Certain Historical Questions* adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC on April 20, 1945.”

1941年，毛泽东为9至10月召开的中共中央政治局扩大会议起草了题为《关于四中全会以来中央领导路线问题结论草案》，这一草案指出：遵义会议“实际上克服了当作路线的‘左’倾机会主义”，解决了当时最主要的问题——错误的军事路线、错误的领导方式和错误的干部政策，“实质上完成了由一个路线到另一个路线的转变，即是说克服了错误路线，恢复了正确路线”。尽管这一结论草案没有成为正式决议，但是，“它的许多重要内容和思想观点，后来被吸收在一九四五年四月二十日中共六届七中全会通过的《关于若干历史问题的决议》中”。

The *Resolution on Certain Historical Questions* was drafted and produced under the direct leadership of Mao Zedong; he was both the leader and the drafter. Therefore, it was logical and reasonable for the *Resolution on Certain Historical Questions* to absorb and adopt Mao Zedong’s important understandings and evaluations of the Zunyi Conference. In fact, Mao Zedong’s discussions on the Zunyi Conference also served as the basis for the *Resolution on Certain Historical Questions since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China* and the *Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century* to continuously deepen the evaluation of the Zunyi Conference’s historical status and historical contributions. For example, the *Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century* points out that the Zunyi Conference “opened a new stage in which the Party independently solved practical problems of the Chinese revolution.” This actually absorbed Mao Zedong’s important understanding that “true understanding of independence and self-reliance began with the Zunyi Conference.”

《关于若干历史问题的决议》是在毛泽东直接领导下起草和作出的，他是领导者也是起草者，因而，《关于若干历史问题的决议》吸收和采纳毛泽东论遵义会议的重要认识和评价顺理成章、合情合理。事实上，毛泽东对遵义会议的论述同样是《关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议》和《中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议》不断深化对遵义会议历史地位历史贡献评价的依据，例如，《中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议》指出：遵义会议“开启了党独立自主解决中国革命实际问题新阶段”，这实际上正是吸收了毛泽东所提出的“真正懂得独立自主是从遵义会议开始的”重要认识。

Second, Mao Zedong’s understanding and evaluation of the Zunyi Conference adhered to dialectical materialism and historical materialism. On March 5, 1944, in his article “On the Study of the Line, Work Style, and the Current Situation,” Mao proposed that the Seventh Party Congress should only draw conclusions on the period from the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee to the Zunyi Conference, and that these conclusions should focus on drawing lessons, take the future into account, not emphasize punishment, and only make political conclusions, so as to achieve the goal of curing the illness to save the patient. He particularly stressed: “As for the period from the Fourth Plenary Session to the Zunyi Conference, we should not negate everything. At that time, Comrades Bo Gu and Luo Fu and I worked together; we had common ground—all of us wanted to fight Chiang Kai-shek—and the point of divergence was how to fight Chiang Kai-shek, which was a tactical disagreement.” On the land issue, there was no dispute over the program in the Sixth Congress resolution concerning the confiscation of land from the landlord class and its distribution to peasants who had little or no land. The dispute arose after the confiscation, when Bo Gu, Luo Fu, and others advocated giving poor land to rich peasants and no land to landlords, whereas Mao Zedong disagreed. “If we negate everything in the past, that is a deviation. We must analyze problems and not negate everything in a sweeping manner. When I wrote ‘Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,’ I also said that good things should be preserved; this is seeking truth from facts.” On April 12, Mao published the article “Study and the Current Situation,” in which he further pointed out: “We should adopt an analytical attitude toward any problem and not negate everything.” Again using the example of the central leadership’s line during the period from the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee to the Zunyi Conference, he stressed: “We should make a two-sided analysis: on the one hand, we should point out that the political strategy, military strategy, and cadre policy adopted by the central leadership organs during that period were erroneous in their main aspects; on the other hand, we should point out that the comrades who made mistakes at that time had no disagreement with us on the basic issues of opposing Chiang Kai-shek, advocating the agrarian revolution, and the Red Army’s struggle.” That is to say, although Mao Zedong repeatedly held that the Zunyi Conference corrected the “Left” errors within the Party, he did not simply negate everything. The Party’s political line before the Zunyi Conference was erroneous, and after the conference it was correct, but this did not mean that because the Party’s political line before the Zunyi Conference was erroneous, all the Party’s lines, principles, and policies of that time should be negated. Instead, he stressed that “we should make a two-sided analysis,” seeing both the common ground and the points of divergence; only in this way could the attitude and principle of “seeking truth from facts” be upheld, and “if we negate everything in the past, that is a deviation.” This precisely embodies the method of dialectical materialism and historical materialism.

第二，毛泽东对遵义会议的认识和评价，坚持了辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义。1944年3月5日，毛泽东在《关于路线学习、工作作风和时局问题》一文中提出，党的七大只作六届四中全会到遵义会议一段历史的结论，这个结论应着重于取得经验教训，要照顾到以后，不重视惩办，只作政治结论，以达到治病救人的目的。他特别强调：“对四中全会到遵义会议这一段历史，也不要一切否定。当时我和博古、洛甫同志在一起工作，有共同点，都要打蒋介石，分歧点是如何打蒋介石，是策略上的分歧。”在土地问题上，对六大决议中关于没收地主阶级的土地，分配给无地或少地的农民的政纲，是没有争论的。争论是在没收后博古、洛甫等主张富农分坏田、地主不分田，而毛泽东是不同意的。“如果把过去一切都否定，那就是一种偏向。我们对问题要分析，不要笼统地一概否定。我在写《中国革命战争的战略问题》时，也说到要保留好的东西，这才是实事求是。”4月12日，毛泽东发表《学习和时局》一文又指出：“对于任何问题应取分析态度，不要否定一切。”他同样针对六届四中全会至遵义会议时期中央的领导路线问题举例，强调：“应作两方面的分析：一方面，应指出那个时期中央领导机关所采取的政治策略、军事策略和干部政策在其主要方面都是错误的；另一方面，应指出当时犯错误的同志在反对蒋介石、主张土地革命和红军斗争这些基本问题上面，和我们之间是没有争论的。”这就是说，毛泽东虽然多次认为遵义会议纠正了党内的“左”倾错误，但并不是简单否定一切。遵义会议前党的政治路线是错误的，之后党的路线是正确的，但并不能因为遵义会议前党的政治路线是错误的，就否定彼时党的一切路线、方针、政策，而是强调“应作两方面的分析”，既要看到共同点，也要指出分歧点，这样才是“实事求是”的态度和原则，“如果把过去一切都否定，那就是一种偏向。”这正体现了辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义的方法。

Third, the independence and self-reliance proposed by Mao Zedong in his understanding and evaluation of the Zunyi Conference has become an important historical experience of the Communist Party of China over more than a century of struggle. The “Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century” [18]18 The three historical resolutions refer to the “Resolution on Certain Historical Questions” adopted at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC in 1945, the “Resolution on Certain Historical Questions of the Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China” adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in 1981, and the “Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century” adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Nineteenth Central Committee in 2021. summarized ten historical experiences of the CPC’s century-long struggle, and independence and self-reliance is one of them. It can be said that the starting point of this historical experience lies in the Zunyi Conference and in Mao Zedong’s understanding and evaluation of it.

第三，毛泽东对遵义会议认识和评价所提出的独立自主，成为中国共产党百余年奋斗的重要历史经验。《中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议》总结了百年中国奋斗的十条历史经验，独立自主即是其中一条，可以说，这一历史经验的起点始于遵义会议，始于毛泽东对遵义会议的认识和评价。

As is well known, the Communist International made contributions to the founding and development of the Communist Party of China and to guiding the Chinese revolution—indeed, its contributions were very great. However, the Communist International’s understanding and knowledge of China’s national conditions and the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution were inevitably inadequate, and the harm it caused to the Chinese revolution to a certain extent cannot be evaded. The Communist International was not without responsibility for the Right and “Left” errors within the CPC. Mao Zedong pointed out: “All three ‘Left’ lines were connected with the Communist International, especially Wang Ming’s line.” [19] Therefore, in May 1930, in his article “Oppose Book Worship,” Mao wrote: “The victory of the Chinese revolution depends on Chinese comrades understanding Chinese conditions.” Thirty years later, on March 23, 1961, at a central work conference in Guangzhou, Mao still stressed: “The victory of the Chinese revolution depends on Chinese comrades understanding Chinese conditions; it cannot depend on foreign comrades understanding Chinese conditions, nor on foreign comrades helping us win battles. … For a period, our Party relied on the Communist International to write resolutions, give directives, and draft programs for us; the resolution of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee was written for us in Shanghai by Mif, the representative of the Communist International.” [20] However, after the Red Army’s Long March began, due to the interruption of communications, the CPC gradually lost contact with the Communist International. The Zunyi Conference was an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau convened by the CPC without instructions from the Communist International, and it independently resolved the urgent and important military and organizational issues of the time. History has proved that the two main issues successfully resolved at this conference were of extremely critical significance for the Party, the Red Army, and the Chinese revolution. Thus, the CPC began a new stage of independently exploring the Chinese revolution. Thereafter, Mao Zedong repeatedly stressed the importance of independence and self-reliance. On October 17, 1945, in “On the Chongqing Negotiations,” he stated: “China’s affairs must be handled by the Communist Party and by the people.” On December 25, 1947, in “The Present Situation and Our Tasks,” Mao firmly believed: “Our own destiny should be entirely in our own hands,” and should not tolerate the slightest interference from any other country. On June 15, 1949, in his speech at the preparatory meeting of the new Political Consultative Conference, Mao again stressed: “China’s affairs must be decided and handled by the Chinese people themselves.” Clearly, Mao Zedong repeatedly emphasized that the Chinese revolution must adhere to independence and self-reliance. Deng Xiaoping pointed out: “The Chinese revolution was victorious only because the Chinese Communists—with Comrade Mao Zedong as their outstanding representative—thought independently and formulated their own strategies and tactics in accordance with China’s actual conditions.” [21]

众所周知，共产国际对中国共产党的成立、发展及指导中国革命是有功劳的，甚至可以说功劳很大，但共产国际对中国国情、中国革命具体实践的认识和了解难免存在不足，给中国革命造成一定程度的危害也不容回避，中国共产党内的右倾、“左”倾错误，共产国际难脱干系，毛泽东指出：“三次‘左’倾路线都跟共产国际有关系，特别是王明路线。”因此，1930年5月，毛泽东在《反对本本主义》一文指出：“中国革命斗争的胜利要靠中国同志了解中国情况”。三十年后，1961年3月23日，毛泽东在广州中央工作会议上的讲话中仍然强调：“中国革命斗争的胜利要靠中国同志了解中国情形，不能依靠外国同志了解中国情形，或者是依靠外国同志帮助我们打胜仗。……我们党有一个时期依靠共产国际为我们写决议，作指示，写纲领，六届四中全会的决议就是共产国际代表米夫在上海替我们写的。”然而，红军长征后，因通讯联络中断，中国共产党逐渐失去了同共产国际的联系，遵义会议是中国共产党在没有共产国际指示背景下召开的一次扩大的政治局会议，独立自主解决了当时紧急而又重要的军事问题和组织问题。历史证明，这次会议成功解决的两个主要问题对于党和红军、中国革命都具有极为关键的重要意义。这样，中国共产党开始了独立自主探索中国革命的新阶段。之后，毛泽东多次强调独立自主的重要性。1945年10月17日，他在《关于重庆谈判》中提出：“中国的事情，要靠共产党办，靠人民办。”1947年12月25日，毛泽东在《目前形势和我们的任务》一文中坚信：“我们自己的命运完全应当由我们自己来掌握”，而不容许他国一丝一毫的干涉。1949年6月15日，毛泽东在新政治协商会议筹备会上的讲话中再次强调：“中国的事情必须由中国人民自己作主张，自己来处理”。显然，毛泽东多次强调中国革命必须坚持独立自主。邓小平指出：“中国革命就是中国共产党人，其中突出的代表是毛泽东同志，独立思考，根据中国的实际制定自己的战略和策略，才取得胜利的。”

After the founding of New China, Mao still emphasized the need to uphold independence and self-reliance. On April 25, 1956, in “On the Ten Major Relationships,” Mao proposed: “In principle, unity and independence are a unity of opposites; there must be both unity and independence.” From a philosophical height, he expounded that upholding independence and self-reliance requires handling the relationship between unity and independence well. In the 1950s and 1960s, the rupture in relations between the Chinese and Soviet parties and states once had an adverse impact on China’s socialist construction, but China’s socialist construction was not interrupted as a result. On September 3, 1963, Mao pointed out: “It was precisely at this time in 1960 that the Soviet Union withdrew its experts. It has been three years now, and our industrial construction has developed many of its own experiences. When the teacher leaves, the student learns on his own. Having a teacher has both advantages and disadvantages. Not having a teacher, reading books on one’s own, writing on one’s own, thinking about problems on one’s own—this is a truth.” Hence, he stressed that “both revolution and construction must rely on ourselves.”

新中国成立后，毛泽东仍强调要坚持独立自主。1956年4月25日，毛泽东在《论十大关系》中提出：“从原则上说，统一性和独立性是对立的统一，要有统一性，也要有独立性。”他从哲学的高度阐述了坚持独立自主，需要处理好统一性和独立性的关系问题。20世纪五六十年代，中苏两党两国关系的破裂，给中国社会主义建设一度造成不利的影响，但中国社会主义建设并未因此而中断。1963年9月3日，毛泽东指出：“正是在一九六〇年的这个时候，苏联撤走专家，到现在已经三年了，我们的工业建设搞出了许多自己的经验。离开了先生，学生就自己学。有先生有好处，也有坏处。不要先生，自己读书，自己写字，自己想问题。这是一条真理。”因而，他强调“革命和建设都要靠自己”。

Precisely because Mao Zedong attached great importance to the need for both revolution and construction in China to adhere to independence and self-reliance, independence and self-reliance became one of the living souls of Mao Zedong Thought. After reform and opening up, Deng Xiaoping proposed “taking our own road and building socialism with Chinese characteristics,” still emphasizing the need to uphold independence and self-reliance, and successfully opened up a path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Later, Deng Xiaoping also made many important expositions on upholding independence and self-reliance. Similarly, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping

正因为毛泽东高度重视中国革命和建设都要坚持独立自主，独立自主成为毛泽东思想活的灵魂之一。改革开放后，邓小平提出“走自己的道路，建设有中国特色的社会主义”，仍强调坚持独立自主，成功开辟了一条中国特色社会主义道路。后来，邓小平也有很多关于坚持独立自主的重要论述。同样，江泽民、胡锦涛和习近平都对坚持独立自主有很多重要论述。因此，在中国共产党成立一百周年之际，《中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议》把坚持独立自主作为十条历史经验的第四条，“走自己的路，是党百年奋斗得出的历史结论。党历来坚持独立自主开拓前进道路，坚持把国家和民族发展放在自己力量的基点上，坚持中国的事情必须由中国人民自己作主张、自己来处理。”而“中国的事情必须由中国人民自己作主张、自己来处理”，则出自前述毛泽东在新政协会议上的讲话。

In summary, Mao Zedong was not only the dominant figure and firsthand participant in the Zunyi Conference, making important contributions to its smooth convening and to the conference’s discussion and resolution of military and organizational issues, but he also repeatedly discussed the core content and important value of the Zunyi Conference, making important contributions to the Party’s three historical resolutions’ [18]18 The three historical resolutions refer to the “Resolution on Certain Historical Questions” adopted at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC in 1945, the “Resolution on Certain Historical Questions of the Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China” adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in 1981, and the “Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century” adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Nineteenth Central Committee in 2021. judgments on the historical status and historical contributions of the Zunyi Conference. Therefore, whether it is the precious historical value of the Zunyi Conference itself or the important historical and theoretical value of Mao Zedong’s discussions on the Zunyi Conference, we must always cherish and remember them.

综上，毛泽东不仅是遵义会议的主导者、亲历者，为遵义会议的顺利召开及会议讨论解决军事问题和组织问题作出了重要贡献，而且多次论及遵义会议的核心内容和重要价值，为党的三个历史决议对遵义会议的历史地位、历史贡献的评判作出了重要贡献。因此，无论是遵义会议弥足珍贵的历史价值，还是毛泽东论遵义会议的重要历史和理论价值，我们始终都需要珍惜和铭记。

(The author is a professor at the School of Marxism, Peking University)

（作者系北京大学马克思主义学院教授）

Online editor: Ma Jingren

网络编辑：马京仁