“When the Enemy Advances, We Advance”: The Eighth Route Army’s Path to Victory in North China

During the War of Resistance against Japan, in the face of the Japanese army’s fierce offensives under the “cage policy” and the “burn-all, kill-all, loot-all” campaigns, Mao Zedong proposed a revolutionary guerrilla strategy: transform defensive warfare into offensive warfare, implement quick-decision battles within protracted war, use interior-line operations to pin down exterior-line operations, and especially emphasized “turning the enemy’s base areas into base areas for guerrilla warfare.” This thinking gave birth to the tactical marvel of “when the enemy advances, we advance”—when Japanese and puppet troops attacked the base areas, the main forces of the Eighth Route Army instead penetrated deep into enemy-occupied areas, joining with the masses to carry out a strategic counterattack of “you come to my home, I go to yours,” thereby completely bankrupting the Japanese army’s plan for “total war” and plunging it into the quagmire of protracted war. Among the many classic cases, the “three-three system” [1]1 The “three-three system” (三三制) was a tactical formation used by the Eighth Route Army, in which a squad was divided into three groups of three to four soldiers each, allowing flexible dispersal and concentration to reduce casualties from enemy fire. combat squads, the heroic deeds of the armed work teams, and the “red-and-black ledger” system all manifest the unique charm and practical effectiveness of the “when the enemy advances, we advance” strategy.

抗日战争时期，面对日军“囚笼政策”与“三光扫荡”的凶猛攻势，毛泽东提出革命性游击战略：将防御战转化为进攻战，在持久战中实施速决战，以内线作战牵制外线作战，尤其强调“要把敌人的根据地变为游击战争的根据地”。这一思想催生出“敌进我进”的战术奇观——当日伪军进攻根据地时，八路军主力反而深入敌占区，与民众结合开展“你到我家来，我到你家去”的战略逆袭，从而使日军“总力战”图谋彻底破产，并深陷持久战泥潭。在众多经典案例中，“三三制”战斗小组、武工队的英勇事迹以及“红黑账”制度，无不彰显着“敌进我进”策略的独特魅力和实战效果。

“Three-Three System” Combat Squads:

“三三制”战斗小组：

Combat Cells Spreading Like Liquid Mercury

如水银泻地般的战斗细胞

Facing the three-dimensional blockade network constructed by the Japanese army’s “iron-wall encirclement” tactics, the Eighth Route Army deconstructed its main forces into countless tactical neurons. This tactical fission of “breaking up the whole into parts” was by no means a passive retreat; rather, it transformed elite combat power into “war molecules” capable of penetrating the enemy’s heartland. Through the flexible organization of “three-three system” combat squads, a minimal combat closed loop was formed: core Party members or veterans served as the tactical core, seasoned soldiers were responsible for firepower output, and new recruits or militia undertook support tasks. This echelon configuration built a unique logic of survival—even if partially damaged, survivors could still carry combat experience back to the main force, achieving “controllable losses and sustainable combat power.”

面对日军“铁壁合围”战术构筑的立体化封锁网，八路军将主力部队解构为无数战术神经元。这种“化整为零”的战术裂变绝非消极退守，而是将精锐战力转化为可渗透进敌人心脏地带的“战争分子”， 通过“三三制”战斗小组的灵活编组形成最小作战闭环：骨干党员或老兵担任战术核心，成熟战士负责火力输出，新兵或民兵承担辅助任务。这种梯次配置构建起独特的生存逻辑——即便局部受损，幸存者仍能携带战斗经验回归主力，实现“损失可控、战力永续”。

These combat squads seeped into enemy-occupied areas like liquid metal: hiding in caves by day, raiding vital routes by night. They specifically targeted the Japanese army’s weak points—precisely cutting telephone lines to paralyze communications, directionally demolishing railway bridges to cut off transport, mobile ambushing of supply convoys to disrupt their rhythm, and targeted elimination of traitors to dismantle the puppet army network. Their operational principles read like a textbook on guerrilla warfare: lightning raids of “strike and vanish,” the stealth technique of “breaking up the whole into parts,” combined with the precision strike of “injuring ten fingers is not as good as cutting off one,” [2]2 A classical Chinese military maxim from the *Han Shu* (Book of Han), emphasizing the value of destroying an enemy’s key strength rather than inflicting scattered damage. causing the Japanese army to lose all advantage of heavy weapons and fall into the tactical dilemma of “can see but cannot hit, can chase but cannot surround.”

这些战斗小组如液态金属渗入敌占区：昼伏岩穴，夜袭要道。他们专挑日军软肋下手——精准切割电话线瘫痪通讯，定向爆破铁路桥截断运输，机动伏击辎重队打乱节奏，定向锄奸瓦解伪军网络。其行动准则堪称游击战教科书：“一击即离”的闪电突袭，“化整为零”的隐身遁术，配合“伤其十指不如断其一指”的精准打击，让日军重武器优势尽失，陷入“看得见打不着，追得上围不住”的战术困境。

These combat cells were in fact the nerve endings of the Eighth Route Army, serving both as intelligence tentacles—transmitting real-time reports on Japanese troop movements through a coded communication system—and as tactical fulcrums, igniting a continuous strategic beacon in enemy-occupied areas. When the Japanese army discovered that every village harbored hidden eyes and every path was strewn with traps, its “public security strengthening movement” [3]3 The “public security strengthening movement” (治安强化运动) was a series of campaigns launched by the Japanese army in North China from 1941 to 1942 to consolidate control over occupied areas through military suppression, economic blockade, and political indoctrination. completely degenerated into a farce of chasing shadows. This infiltration tactic of “you within me” forced the Japanese army to deploy over 70% of its forces for rear-area defense.

这些战斗细胞实为八路军的神经末梢，既是情报触角，通过密语系统实时回传日军动向；又是战术支点，在敌占区点燃持续不断的战略烽火。当日军发现每个村庄都暗藏眼线，每条小径都布满陷阱时，“治安强化运动”彻底沦为捕风捉影的闹剧。这种“你中有我”的渗透战法，迫使日军将70%以上兵力用于后方守备。

Armed Work Teams: Daggers Plunged into the Enemy’s Heart

武工队：插向敌人心脏的尖刀

Facing the Japanese army’s “gradual nibbling” and “grid blockade” of the North China base areas, the Eighth Route Army pushed the “when the enemy advances, we advance” strategy to a new height. In 1942, Nie Rongzhen [4]4 Nie Rongzhen (1899–1992) was a senior commander of the Eighth Route Army and a key leader of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, one of the main anti-Japanese base areas in North China. proposed the operational concept of “going to the enemy’s rear behind the enemy,” giving birth to the armed work teams (武工队), which integrated special operations, political psychological warfare, and mass work. These “strategic assault teams” composed of military-political elites became the key fulcrum for breaking through the Japanese army’s “total war” system.

面对日军对华北根据地的“渐进蚕食”与“网格封锁”，八路军将“敌进我进”战略推向新高度。1942年，聂荣臻提出“到敌后之敌后去”的作战构想，催生出集特种作战、政治攻心、群众工作于一体的武装工作队（武工队），这些军政精英组成的“战略突击队”成为突破日军“总力战”体系的关键支点。

The armed work teams abandoned traditional harassment models and implemented “strategic counter-penetration.” With 3-to-5-person special operations squads as the basic unit, they disguised themselves as merchants or peasants and, taking advantage of the Japanese army’s “mopping-up” campaigns, infiltrated the core areas that the Japanese regarded as “model public security zones”—the outskirts of county towns, along railway lines, and in the gaps between blockhouses. The “point-line-plane” penetration network constructed by the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region [5]5 The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region (晋察冀军区) was a major Eighth Route Army command covering parts of Shanxi, Chahar, and Hebei provinces, established in 1937. placed intelligence posts around every enemy stronghold and ambush teams along every major transport route. Along the Beijing-Baoding railway, the “four-step rail removal method” emerged: by precisely destroying screws, fishplates, sleepers, and laying mines, it paralyzed the Japanese transport lines by over 40% on average each month. Outside Shijiazhuang, a classic case of “disguised grain requisition” unfolded, where armed work team members, pretending to be puppet troops, cleverly seized a Japanese intelligence station and captured codebooks and personnel rosters.

武工队摒弃传统袭扰模式，实施“战略反渗透”。以3～5人特战小组为基本单元，化装为商贩、农民，借日军“扫荡”之机潜入其视为“模范治安区”的核心地带——县城近郊、铁路沿线、碉堡间隙。晋察冀军区构建的“点线面”渗透网络，使每个敌据点周边布设情报哨，每条交通要道潜伏突击组。北平—保定铁路沿线诞生的“拆轨四步法”，通过精准破坏螺丝、夹板、枕木、埋雷，使日军运输线月均瘫痪超40%；石家庄郊外更上演“伪装征粮”经典战例，武工队员假扮伪军智取日军情报站，缴获密码本及花名册。

The armed work teams transformed enemy-occupied areas into an “invisible battlefield.” In the southern Hebei region, they pioneered a “white skin, red heart” dual-power system: on the surface, they set up baojia heads [6]6 The baojia system (保甲制度) was a traditional Chinese household registration and mutual-responsibility system, co-opted by the Japanese occupation forces for grassroots control. to deal with the Japanese and puppets, while secretly establishing “anti-Japanese democratic councils.” Data from Qinghe County in 1943 showed that 76% of villages achieved a smooth transition of political power, and the Japanese-puppet grassroots rule degenerated into a mere “mouthpiece.” The tunnel fortifications in Ran Village, central Hebei, constructed a three-dimensional combat space: on the surface, they set up “deceptive stoves” and “fake landmines”; underground, they opened reception rooms, rest areas, and weapons depots, forming an underground fortress with a complete drainage system. During the “May Day mopping-up campaign” of 1942, [7]7 The “May Day mopping-up campaign” (五一大扫荡) was a large-scale Japanese offensive in central Hebei from May to June 1942, aimed at destroying the Eighth Route Army’s base areas. the militia, relying on the tunnels, killed or wounded 267 Japanese and puppet troops at the cost of one casualty. The “Wild Goose Brigade” on Baiyangdian Lake [8]8 Baiyangdian Lake is a large freshwater lake in Hebei Province, where local guerrilla forces known as the “Wild Goose Brigade” (雁翎队) operated during the war. refitted 28 speedboats into waterborne fortresses; in 1943, a raid on the Pinghan Railway Bridge created a case of destroying a Japanese armored train with zero casualties. In eastern Hebei, a 20-person armed work team fought across seven counties in three months, destroying the Japanese “pacification demonstration zone.”

武工队将敌占区转化为“隐形战场”。冀南地区首创“白皮红心”双重政权体系，表面设置保甲长应付日伪，暗中建立“抗日民主会”。1943年清河县数据显示，76%的村庄实现政权平稳过渡，日伪基层统治沦为“传声筒”。冀中冉庄地道工事构建起立体作战空间：地面布设“迷惑灶”“假地雷”，地下开辟会客厅、休息室、武器库，形成排水系统完备的地下堡垒。1942年“五一大扫荡”中，民兵依托地道以1人伤亡代价毙伤267名日伪军。白洋淀“雁翎队”将28艘快船改装为水上堡垒，1943年突袭平汉铁路桥创造零伤亡击毁日军装甲列车的战例；冀东20人武工队三个月转战七县，摧毁日军“肃正示范区”。

The upgraded tactics created by the armed work teams—“when the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy camps, we harass; when the enemy retreats, we pursue; when the enemy tires, we strike”—completely shattered the Japanese army’s presupposed battlefield of “advancing at the front, stabilizing in the rear.” This ubiquitous guerrilla warfare in the enemy’s heartland left the Japanese army in a dilemma of being unable to protect both ends, and the “enemy-occupied areas” they had painstakingly built ultimately turned into a new front line ablaze with war, reversing the strategic passive situation.

武工队创造的“敌进我退，敌驻我扰，敌退我追，敌疲我打”升级版战术，彻底打破日军“前方进攻、后方稳固”的预设战场。这种在敌心脏地带无处不在的游击战法，使日军陷入首尾难顾的困境，其苦心经营的“敌占区”最终变为烽火连天的新前线，战略被动局面由此逆转。

The “Red-and-Black Ledger”: A Political Blade for Psychological Attack

“红黑账”：攻心为上的政治利刃

The deep dimension of the “when the enemy advances, we advance” strategy was the political-psychological offensive and defensive battle waged by the Eighth Route Army on the enemy’s rear battlefield. The “red-and-black ledger” system, pioneered by the military and civilians in central Hebei, used precise psychological manipulation as its blade to strike directly at the nerve center of the Japanese “use Chinese to control Chinese” [9]9 “Use Chinese to control Chinese” (以华制华) was a Japanese occupation policy of ruling through Chinese puppet regimes and collaborators. ruling system, and can be called the pinnacle of the wisdom of people’s war.

“敌进我进”战略的深层维度，是八路军在敌后战场展开的政治心理攻防。冀中军民首创的“红黑账”制度，以精准的心理操控为刃，直插日伪“以华制华”统治体系的神经中枢，堪称人民战争智慧的巅峰之作。

This system was by no means a simple record of good and evil; rather, it constructed a quantitative evaluation governance system. Using the village as the unit, it established a file database for puppet personnel, forming a multi-dimensional evaluation model from “number of times oppressing the common people” to “frequency of tipping off the enemy,” from “attitude toward grain requisition” to “family class background.” Archives from a certain county in central Hebei show that in 1943, several hundred dynamic files were established, of which 72 people were marked as “targets for winning over.” The supporting dual-track mechanism of “red-dot incentives + black-dot deterrence” turned political stance into a bargaining chip for survival: 3 red dots could be exchanged for a “protection pass,” 5 red dots for a “merit certificate”; while 2 black dots triggered a warning, and 5 black dots placed one on the “elimination list.” This quantitative management turned moral judgment into a survival game, generating immense psychological pressure.

这套制度绝非简单的善恶记录，而是构建起量化评估的治理体系。以村庄为单位建立伪职人员档案库，从“欺压百姓次数”到“通风报信频率”，从“征粮态度”到“家庭成分”，形成多维评估模型。冀中某县档案显示，1943年即建立数百份动态档案，其中72人被标注为“可争取对象”。配套的“红点激励+黑点威慑”双轨机制，将政治立场转化为生存筹码：3个红点兑换“保护通行证”，5个红点换取“立功证明书”；而2个黑点即触发警告，5个黑点列入“锄奸名单”。这种量化管理将道德评判转化为生存博弈，制造出强大的心理压迫。

On the southern Hebei battlefield, the Eighth Route Army posted notices directly on blockhouse iron doors and puppet soldiers’ bedsides, creating “confrontational propaganda.” In Wei County, southern Hebei, a spectacle emerged: the “red-and-black ledger” notice stood side by side with Japanese army proclamations. A puppet platoon leader received red dots for “assisting transport” but also black dots for “forcibly conscripting laborers”; the exposure of this contradiction gave rise to cognitive confusion. In Shenze County, the bizarre scene of “black flags flying for three days” [10]10 “Black flags flying for three days” refers to a tactic where the Eighth Route Army would publicly display black flags at the homes of unrepentant collaborators as a warning of impending punishment. forced a puppet company commander to plead for “reform and self-renewal.” The accompanying drum ballad “The Legend of the Red-and-Black Ledger” was sung in the markets, reinforcing the system’s deterrence through a narrative of cause and effect: those entangled in the black ledger were executed, while those with a full red ledger were employed, constructing a clear expectation for survival.

在冀南战场，八路军将布告直接张贴于碉堡铁门、伪军床头，形成“对位宣传”。冀南威县曾现奇观：“红黑账”布告与日军告示并列，伪军排长既因“协助运输”获红点，又因“强征民夫”被记黑点，矛盾曝光催生认知错乱。深泽县更现“黑旗飘扬三日”的奇景，迫使伪军中队长求情“改过自新”。配套的《红黑账传奇》鼓书在集市传唱，以因果叙事强化制度威慑：黑账缠身者遭处决，红账满贯者获任用，构建起清晰的生存预期。

The true power of the “red-and-black ledger” lay in creating an atmosphere of “all-time, all-space surveillance.” Every puppet official became a “transparent person,” with their ruling behavior directly linked to their survival probability. In Shenze County, 29 out of 37 puppet regimes had fallen into paralysis by 1944. According to statistics, 68% of the intelligence for the “white skin, red heart” regimes in central Hebei came from internal sources. The Japanese army realized that its rule had fallen into a “quantum superposition state”—every puppet soldier was both a tool of repression and a potential traitor. Data from the North China Area Army in 1943 showed that the desertion rate of puppet troops soared by 400%, and the rate of passive combat reached 72%, completely undermining the strategic foundation of “using Chinese to control Chinese.”

“红黑账”的真正威力，在于制造“全时空监视”的氛围。每个伪职人员都成为“透明人”，其统治行为与生存概率直接挂钩。深泽县37个伪政权中，29个在1944年前陷入瘫痪。据统计，冀中“白皮红心”政权68%的情报源自内部。日军惊觉其统治陷入“量子叠加态”——每个伪军既是镇压工具，又是潜在叛徒。1943年华北方面军数据显示，伪军逃亡率飙升400%，作战消极率达72%，彻底瓦解“以华制华”战略根基。

“When the enemy advances, we advance” was a strategic innovation in Mao Zedong’s military thought. It was by no means passive avoidance of battle, but a model of breaking the deadlock through wisdom. In desperate circumstances, the Eighth Route Army creatively employed the “three-three system” harassment, armed work team infiltration, and “red-and-black ledger” psychological attack, turning the Japanese rear into a front line for counterattack and plunging the enemy into a quagmire of dispersed forces and severed supply lines. The essence of this tactic lies in turning passivity into initiative, trading space for time, and accumulating small victories into great ones. It demonstrates that the key to strategic victory lies in breaking through conventional thinking, hearing the thunder in silence, and opening a path to survival in the midst of desperation.

“敌进我进”是毛泽东军事思想的战略创举，绝非消极避战，而是以智慧破局的典范。八路军在绝境中开创性运用“三三制”袭扰、武工队渗透、“红黑账”攻心，将日军后方转化为反攻前线，使敌陷入兵力分散、补给断绝的泥潭。这一战术精髓在于化被动为主动，以空间换时间，积小胜为大胜，它昭示着战略制胜的关键在于突破常规思维，于无声处听惊雷，在绝境中开辟生路。

(The author is an associate professor at the School of Marxism, Nanjing Tech University)

（作者系南京工业大学马克思主义学院副教授）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心