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Talent Cultivation in the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army

张宽:东北抗日联军的人才培养

· · Modern Chinese History · Chinese Social Sciences Net - Chinese Social Sciences Today, 8 September 2025 · 10 min read

The study life of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army (hereinafter referred to as the “Anti-Japanese United Army”) exhibited the epochal character of “adapting to war.” This not only defined the practical forms and content of the Army’s study during the War of Resistance but also played a crucial role in the condensation and eruption of its own ideological power, as well as in the maintenance and enhancement of its combat effectiveness.

东北抗日联军(以下简称“抗联”)的学习生活呈现出“适应战争”的时代面貌,这不仅规约着抗战时期抗联学习的实践样态与内容设置,而且对其自身思想力的凝聚与迸发、战斗力的维系与提升等都起着重要作用。

Exploring Diverse and Rich Forms of Study

探索丰富多样的学习形式

Zhou Baozhong, a commander of the Anti-Japanese United Army, pointed out: “Cadres are the lever for advancing revolutionary work and the pivot for solving problems.” He believed that in training and cultivating cadres, one should intensify the study of the struggle experience of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, and should take Mao Zedong and Zhu De as models. The Northeast region must step up the work of remolding and cultivating cadres to meet the demands of the objective environment. The Anti-Japanese United Army units universally established political-military schools, field schools, temporary training classes, and the like. For example, in 1936, the Anti-Japanese United Army set up the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army Political-Military School in the Tangwang River area; the students were “platoon and company-level cadres transferred from various armies, divisions, and regiments.” [1]1 Zhou Baozhong (1902–1964) was a leading commander of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army. Zhu De (1886–1976) was a co-founder of the People’s Liberation Army and a key military leader of the CPC.

抗联将领周保中指出:“干部是推展革命工作的杠杆,是解决问题的枢纽。”他认为,培养和训练干部,应加紧学习马克思、列宁、斯大林的斗争经验,应该以毛泽东、朱德为榜样。东北地区必须加紧改造和培养干部工作,达到客观环境的要求。抗联部队中普遍开办了政治军事学校、随营学校、临时训练班等。如1936年,抗联部队在汤旺河地区开办东北抗日联军政治军事学校,学员“都是从各军、师、团调来的连排级干部”。

However, faced with the increasingly stringent military offensives of the Japanese and puppet forces and the dire reality of an extreme shortage of cadres, many political-military schools fell into a state of existing in name only. For instance, the Third Army of the Anti-Japanese United Army once sent all the instructors and students of its political-military school into the main forces preparing to break through the Japanese-puppet military offensives; although the school nominally still existed, it had in fact been disbanded. Temporary training classes and field schools were both temporarily organized according to the needs of war. Among them, temporary training classes were further divided into short-term training classes, night training classes, cadre training classes, military-political training classes, and so on. The curriculum of the training classes prioritized political study, supplemented by military study. Field schools were an important base for promoting and training large numbers of lower-level political and military personnel. The “Enrollment Advertisement of the Field School of the Second Army of the Northeast People’s Revolutionary Army” [2]2 The Northeast People’s Revolutionary Army was a predecessor of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, active in the mid-1930s. clearly stated the purpose of establishing the field school: “This army, fearing no difficulties whatsoever, has specially established a field school to train lower-level cadres who are resolute in resisting Japan and saving the nation for each unit.”

但是,面对日伪军事进攻日趋严密,干部万分缺乏的现实困境,许多政治军事学校陷入名存实亡的境地,如抗联第三军曾将政治军事学校的教官、学生全部派到准备冲破日伪军事进攻的主要部队中去,名义上学校虽然存在,但是实质已经解散。临时训练班和随营学校都是根据战争需要临时组建的,其中,临时训练班又分为短期训练班、夜间训练班、干部训练班、军政训练班等,训练班课程设置以政治学习为主、军事学习为辅。随营学校是提拔训练大批下层政治军事工作人员的重要基地,《东北人民革命军第二军随营学校招生广告》中曾明确指出创办随营学校的目的,即“本军不怕一切困难,特为各部队训练下级坚决抗日救国的干部成立随营学校”。

In addition to the above organizations, companies also universally established tactical and marksmanship study groups, literacy classes, political discussion groups, singing classes, Lenin groups, and so on, for all soldiers. The task of these grassroots organizations was to concretely implement the content of study for each individual soldier. It should be noted that the various armies of the Anti-Japanese United Army repeatedly attempted to normalize and stabilize study life, such as by strictly formulating and implementing “daily literacy” activities; in case of urgent military situations, students in training classes would be promptly transferred elsewhere for instruction. However, under the special conditions of war, faithfully carrying out study plans according to the original schedule was undoubtedly a luxury. At that time, no matter what form of study practice was adopted, it had to revolve around actual combat conditions and military operations; the temporary termination of study plans or study arrangements also became a regret for the Anti-Japanese United Army units. Moreover, due to prolonged operations behind enemy lines, the Anti-Japanese United Army units suffered from an extreme shortage of printing equipment and materials, as well as a severe scarcity of study resources. The soldiers either hand-copied teaching materials, made their own teaching aids, or utilized captured enemy supplies, doing everything possible to overcome difficulties.

除上述组织以外,连队中还普遍设有面向全体战士的战术与射击研究班、识字班、政治讨论会、唱歌班、列宁小组等,这些基层组织的任务是将学习内容具体落实到每个战士。需要指出的是,抗联各军曾多次尝试将学习生活常态化和固定化,如严格制定和落实“每日识学”活动,如遇紧急军情,会及时将训练班的学生转移到他处授课。但在战争的特殊环境下,如实按照原定计划落实学习安排无疑是一种奢望。其时,无论何种学习实践方式,均要围绕实际战况与军事行动展开,学习计划或学习安排临时终止也成为抗联部队的遗憾。更由于长期处于敌后作战,抗联部队印刷设备及印刷材料极度匮乏、学习资源极其短缺,战士们或手抄教材,或自制教具,又或利用缴获的敌人物资,千方百计克服困难。

Also constrained by the war environment, the study methods of the Anti-Japanese United Army soldiers were divided into centralized instruction and self-study. During relatively stable periods, centralized instruction was the most effective way to conduct study. However, in an environment where the Japanese and puppet forces frequently launched military offensives, stability was especially rare, and instability became the norm. Regular centralized instruction became unsustainable, and the Anti-Japanese United Army soldiers could only resort to self-study during intervals between battles or during rest periods, thereby enhancing their survival skills and combat capabilities in complex environments.

同样受战争环境所限,抗联战士们的学习方式也分为集中授课与个人自学。在相对稳定时期,集中授课是开展学习最有效的途径。但是,在日伪军频繁发动军事进攻的环境中,稳定尤为难得,不稳定反而成为常态,规律的集中授课难以为继,抗联战士们只能利用战斗间隙或休息时间开展自学,以此提升自身在复杂环境中的生存技能和作战能力。

The Unique Study Model of “Rifle Barrel + Pen Barrel”

“枪杆子+笔杆子”的

The Anti-Japanese United Army, based on the special environment of the Northeast region and the needs of the war, creatively developed a unique study model of “rifle barrel + pen barrel.” In this model, “rifle barrel” refers to military training and the enhancement of combat capabilities, while “pen barrel” refers to ideological-political education and cultural study.

独特学习模式

Military training was an important component of “rifle barrel” education, encompassing two aspects. The first was the study of military skills, mainly including conventional weapons training and tactical study. In terms of conventional weapons training, the Anti-Japanese United Army soldiers learned to use rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, and other conventional weapons, engaging in basic training such as marksmanship, grenade throwing, and bayonet drill. After crossing the border into the Soviet Union, they also learned auxiliary subjects such as climbing, jumping, crawling, obstacle crossing, construction of various field fortifications, flag signaling (hand flags, telephones), anti-gas and anti-toxin measures, first aid, and basic medical knowledge. In terms of tactical study, the Anti-Japanese United Army units placed great emphasis on learning and studying guerrilla tactics, including attack, defense, and ambush, and on learning how to conduct operations against Japanese-puppet military offensives in an environment where the enemy was strong and they were weak. The second was special skills training. The Anti-Japanese United Army soldiers needed to learn special skills such as skiing, swimming, and boat handling, as well as skills for surviving in severe cold, such as keeping warm and finding food and water sources, in order to adapt to the complex terrain and natural environment of the Northeast region.

抗联根据东北地区的特殊环境和战争需要,创造性地发展出“枪杆子+笔杆子”的独特学习模式。其中,“枪杆子”指军事训练与作战能力提升,“笔杆子”指思想政治教育与文化学习。

“Pen barrel” education was the core content of Anti-Japanese United Army education, mainly encompassing two aspects. The first was ideological-political education. The Anti-Japanese United Army units placed great emphasis on conducting ideological-political education activities. Through methods such as convening Party member meetings, political discussion groups, propaganda teams, and newspaper-reading groups, they helped officers and soldiers understand important issues such as the Party’s revolutionary history, the Party’s policies and guidelines, important Party documents, the significance of the national liberation war, the current revolutionary situation in China, and the protracted nature of the national revolutionary war movement in the Northeast. In the study of ideological-political education, Party members played a model and backbone role. Political workers frequently brought important documents of the CPC Central Committee, provincial Party committee publications, the *Beiman National Salvation News*, [3]3 *Beiman National Salvation News* was a newspaper published by the CPC’s North Manchurian Provincial Committee to mobilize resistance against the Japanese occupation. and other important materials for discussion at lower-level Party branches, creating a wave of studying political issues among the Party membership. The second was basic cultural education. Because most of the Anti-Japanese United Army soldiers had a low level of education, the units organized a large number of basic cultural education activities. In addition to general subjects such as literacy, writing, arithmetic, and Chinese pinyin, some people also learned to identify and draw maps, telegraph codes, and so on. Furthermore, due to the complex war environment in the occupied Northeast region, involving Japan, Korea, the Soviet Union, and other countries, in order to strengthen understanding of the Japanese aggressors, improve language translation and communication skills, and facilitate the leadership of the anti-Japanese forces, the Anti-Japanese United Army units advocated and encouraged soldiers to learn Japanese, Russian, Korean, and other languages.

军事训练是“枪杆子”教育的重要组成部分,包括两个方面。一是军事技能学习,主要包括常规武器训练和战术学习。常规武器训练方面,抗联战士们学习使用步枪、机枪、手榴弹等常规武器,开展射击、投弹、刺杀等基本训练,在越境赴苏联后,还学习了升降跳跃、匍匐行进、障碍通过、各种野战阵地工事构筑、手旗通信(手旗、电话)、防毒害、急救及简单医疗知识等辅助科目。战术学习方面,抗联部队极为注重学习和研究包括进攻、防御、伏击等在内的游击战术,学习如何在敌强我弱的环境中进行反日伪军事进攻作战。二是特种技能培训。抗联战士需要学习滑雪、游泳、操舟等特种技能,还需要学习在严寒中维持生存的技能,如保暖、寻找食物和水源等,以适应东北地区复杂地形条件和自然环境。

Cultivating a Large Number of High-Quality Anti-Japanese War Talents

“笔杆子”教育是抗联教育的核心内容,主要包括两个方面。一是思想政治教育。抗联部队高度重视开展思想政治教育活动,通过召开党员大会、政治讨论班、宣传队、读报组等方式,帮助将士们理解党的革命历史、党的方针政策、党的重要文件、民族解放战争的意义、目前中国革命形势、东北民族革命战争运动的长期性等重要问题。在思想政治教育学习中,党员起了模范骨干作用,政治工作员经常将中共中央重要文件、省委刊物、《北满救国报》等重要内容拿到下级支部讨论,在党员群体中形成了研究政治问题的热潮。二是基础文化教育。由于抗联战士们大多文化程度较低,部队组织了大量基础文化教育活动,除了识字、写字、算术、汉语拼音等一般科目外,有些人还会学习识别与绘制地图、电报符号等。此外,因东北沦陷区战争环境复杂,涉及日本、朝鲜、苏联等国,为了加强对日本侵略者的了解、提高语言翻译及语言交流能力、便于领导抗日队伍,抗联部队提倡并鼓励抗联战士学习日语、俄语、朝鲜语等。

The Anti-Japanese United Army’s actions of organizing and persisting in study despite all difficulties cultivated a large number of anti-Japanese war talents who possessed both military skills and firm political convictions. This greatly enhanced the combat effectiveness and cohesion of the Anti-Japanese United Army and made an important contribution to the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.

培养大量高素质抗战人才

First, it focused on cultivating comprehensively capable anti-Japanese war cadre talents, building a backbone force for the survival and development of the Anti-Japanese United Army units. The shortage of cadres was an urgent problem commonly faced by all armies of the Anti-Japanese United Army. Therefore, in study and education, the Anti-Japanese United Army units always attached importance to the cultivation and training of cadres. Even when they crossed the border into the Soviet Union for brief rest and reorganization, they still placed great emphasis on ideological-political education and persisted in studying Marxism-Leninism. Through the combination of military training and ideological-political education, the Anti-Japanese United Army units cultivated outstanding cadre talents. For example, at the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army Political-Military School in the Tangwang River area, most of the leaders and local responsible persons of the Third and Sixth Armies of the Anti-Japanese United Army had studied at this school. This school ran a total of three sessions and trained nearly 300 military-political cadres. These talents played an important role in various units of the Anti-Japanese United Army and became the backbone force of the War of Resistance.

抗联克服一切困难组织学习、坚持学习的举动,培养了大量既具备军事技能又具有坚定政治信念的抗战人才,极大地提升了抗联的战斗力和凝聚力,为中国人民抗日战争胜利作出了重要贡献。

First, emphasis was placed on cultivating well-rounded cadres for the War of Resistance, building a backbone force for the survival and development of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army (NAUA). The shortage of cadres was an urgent problem commonly faced by all NAUA units. Therefore, in education and study, the NAUA consistently attached importance to the cultivation and training of cadres. Even during brief periods of crossing into the Soviet Union for rest and reorganization, they still placed great emphasis on ideological and political education and persisted in studying Marxism-Leninism. Through the combination of military training and ideological-political education, the NAUA cultivated outstanding cadres. For example, at the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army Political-Military School in the Tangwang River region, most of the leading cadres and local principal responsible persons of the NAUA’s Third Army and Sixth Army had studied at this school. The school ran for three sessions, training nearly 300 military-political cadres. These personnel played an important role in various NAUA units and became the backbone force of the War of Resistance.

第一,着重培养素质全面的抗战干部人才,为抗联部队生存和发展培养中坚力量。干部缺乏是抗联各军普遍面临的紧迫问题,因此,在学习教育中,抗联部队始终重视对干部的培养与训练,即使在越境赴苏进行短暂休整时,也依然极其重视思想政治教育,坚持学习马克思列宁主义。通过军事训练和思想政治教育的结合,抗联部队培养出了优秀的干部人才,如汤旺河地区的东北抗日联军政治军事学校,抗联第三军和六军的大部分领导和地方主要负责人都曾在这所学校学习。这所学校共举办三期,培养了近 300名军政干部,这些人才在抗联的各个部队中发挥了重要作用,成为抗日战争的中坚力量。

Second, the comprehensive elevation of military skills and tactical levels provided a solid force for resisting the military offensives of the Japanese and its puppet forces. The Anti-Japanese United Army greatly enhanced its combat effectiveness by constructing a professional military training system; for example, the establishment of a radio communication school cultivated communications technology personnel suited to the wartime demands of the time. In addition, “actual struggle is the best learning.” The Anti-Japanese United Army units adhered to a combat-oriented training approach, combining theoretical knowledge with practical operations, learning tactics in battle, and acquiring survival skills in harsh environments, thereby improving actual combat capabilities. For instance, in response to the “collective hamlets” [5]5 “Collective hamlets” (集团部落) refers to the policy implemented by the Japanese Kwantung Army in northeastern China from the mid-1930s, forcibly relocating rural populations into fortified, guarded settlements to cut off support for anti-Japanese guerrilla forces. and military offensives of the Japanese and puppet forces, the Anti-Japanese United Army units specially convened plenary discussions in training classes to deliberate on the meaning of and countermeasures for “turning the enemy’s scheme against him, using poison as an antidote to poison” [6]6 “Turning the enemy’s scheme against him, using poison as an antidote to poison” (将计就计,以毒攻毒) is a Chinese idiom describing the tactic of exploiting an opponent’s strategy or methods for one’s own advantage. — that is, “when the enemy concentrates villages, if we can mobilize the masses to destroy them, then destroy them; after the concentration has already taken place, we should seize opportunities to infiltrate, elect our personnel to serve as baojia heads [7]7 Baojia (保甲) was a traditional Chinese system of household registration and mutual responsibility, revived and reorganized by the Japanese puppet regime in Manchuria for surveillance and control., so as to carry out underground work in coordination with the military operations of the Anti-Japanese United Army.” This model of study and discussion, closely tied to actual combat, not only enabled breakthroughs in survival difficulties and compensated for weaknesses but also significantly raised tactical levels, dealing heavy blows to the Japanese aggressors.

第二,军事技能与战术水平的全面提升,为抵御日伪军事进攻构筑坚强力量。抗联通过构建专业化军事训练体系,极大地提升了部队的战斗力,如无线电通讯学校的开办,培养出适应当时战争需求的通信技术人才。另外,“对于实际斗争即是最好学习”,抗联部队坚持实战化训练导向,将理论知识与实际操作相结合,在战斗中学习战术,在艰苦环境中学习生存技能,提升实战能力。如针对日伪军的“集团部落”和军事进攻,抗联部队专门召开训练班全体讨论会,讨论“将计就计,以毒攻毒”的意义及其对策方针,即“敌人归屯时,能发动群众摧毁则摧毁之;已经归屯后,则利用机会打进去,推选我方人员充当保甲长,以开展地下工作,配合抗联部队的军事行动”。这种贴近实战的学习研讨模式不仅能够突破生存困境、弥补劣势,更能够显著提升战术水平,沉重打击日本侵略者。

Third, the simultaneous elevation of cultural standards and political literacy provided ideological guarantees for ultimately winning the war. Through study, the cultural level of the Anti-Japanese United Army soldiers rose markedly; the Anti-Japanese United Army commander Xu Hengzhi [8]8 Xu Hengzhi (许亨植, 1909–1942) was a Korean-Chinese commander of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, active in the resistance until his death in battle. and others progressed from “being unable to write anything in the past to now being able, in the course of two months of progress, to write reports and longer letters.” At the same time, political-ideological education strengthened the soldiers’ revolutionary conviction and patriotic fervor. The conduct of training classes, political discussion meetings, and the like helped soldiers deeply understand, at the ideological level, important issues such as the Communist Party’s revolutionary propositions, the significance of the anti-aggression war, and the protracted and complex nature of the war, thereby strengthening their perseverance and character in holding their positions and fearing no sacrifice.

第三,文化水平与政治素养同步提升,为最终赢得战争胜利提供思想保障。通过学习,抗联战士的文化水平显著提升,抗联将领许亨植等人从“过去不能写东西,在两个月中间的进步,现在都能写报告书和较长的信”。与此同时,思想政治教育增强了战士们的革命信念和爱国热情。训练班、政治讨论会等的开展,能够帮助战士们从思想深处理解共产党的革命主张、反侵略战争的意义、战争的长期性复杂性等重要问题,坚定其坚守阵地、不怕牺牲的毅力和品格。

The study practices of the Anti-Japanese United Army are a microcosm of the Chinese Communist Party’s 14 years of arduous and bitter resistance against the Japanese aggressors. Their experience teaches us that the enhancement of combat effectiveness does not rely solely on upgrades in equipment and technology; more importantly, it requires realizing the significance of “promoting combat through study” via knowledge acquisition, and shaping absolute loyalty to the principle of “the Party commands the gun” [9]9 “The Party commands the gun” (党指挥枪) is a foundational principle of the Chinese Communist Party’s military doctrine, asserting the Party’s absolute leadership over the armed forces. through ideological education.

抗联的学习实践是中国共产党14年艰苦卓绝抵抗日本侵略者的缩影,其经验启示我们,战斗力提升不单纯依赖装备技术升级,更需要通过知识学习实现“以学促战”的重要意义,通过思想教育塑造“党指挥枪”的绝对忠诚。

(This article is a phased result of the National Social Science Fund Youth Project “Collection, Collation, and Research of Diaries and Letters of Anti-Japanese United Army Soldiers and Commanders” [21CDJ020].)

(本文系国家社科基金青年项目“抗联将士日记和书信的收集、整理与研究”(21CDJ020)阶段性成果)

(The author is an associate professor at the School of Marxism, Lanzhou University.)

(作者系兰州大学马克思主义学院副教授)

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑:同心

Notes

  1. Zhou Baozhong (1902–1964) was a leading commander of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army. Zhu De (1886–1976) was a co-founder of the People’s Liberation Army and a key military leader of the CPC. ↩
  2. The Northeast People’s Revolutionary Army was a predecessor of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, active in the mid-1930s. ↩
  3. *Beiman National Salvation News* was a newspaper published by the CPC’s North Manchurian Provincial Committee to mobilize resistance against the Japanese occupation. ↩
  4. The Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army (东北抗日联军) was a communist-led guerrilla force operating in China’s northeastern provinces (Manchuria) during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and the preceding Japanese occupation of Manchuria from 1931.
  5. “Collective hamlets” (集团部落) refers to the policy implemented by the Japanese Kwantung Army in northeastern China from the mid-1930s, forcibly relocating rural populations into fortified, guarded settlements to cut off support for anti-Japanese guerrilla forces. ↩
  6. “Turning the enemy’s scheme against him, using poison as an antidote to poison” (将计就计,以毒攻毒) is a Chinese idiom describing the tactic of exploiting an opponent’s strategy or methods for one’s own advantage. ↩
  7. Baojia (保甲) was a traditional Chinese system of household registration and mutual responsibility, revived and reorganized by the Japanese puppet regime in Manchuria for surveillance and control. ↩
  8. Xu Hengzhi (许亨植, 1909–1942) was a Korean-Chinese commander of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, active in the resistance until his death in battle. ↩
  9. “The Party commands the gun” (党指挥枪) is a foundational principle of the Chinese Communist Party’s military doctrine, asserting the Party’s absolute leadership over the armed forces. ↩