The Historical Status and Value of the Zunyi Conference

From January 15 to 17, 1935, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held an enlarged meeting in Zunyi (i.e., the Zunyi Conference), achieving a great historical turning point, producing far-reaching influence, and occupying an extremely important historical status in the Party’s history, with eternal value.

1935年1月15日至17日，中央政治局在遵义召开扩大会议（即遵义会议），实现了伟大的历史转折，产生了深远的影响，在党的历史上具有极其重要的历史地位，有着永恒的价值。

The Zunyi Conference distinctly embodied the Party’s political quality of adhering to self-revolution.

遵义会议鲜明体现了党坚持自我革命的政治品质

In late September 1933, Chiang Kai-shek launched the fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign against the Central Soviet Area with 500,000 troops. The interim Central Committee of the CPC, headed by Bo Gu, directly led this counter-“encirclement and suppression” struggle, handing over full command of the Red Army to the Comintern’s military advisor, Li De. Li De abandoned the effective active defense policy that had succeeded in the previous four counter-“encirclement and suppression” campaigns, adopted military adventurism, advocated “defending the enemy at the gates,” and fought regular warfare, positional warfare, and fortress warfare against the Kuomintang army equipped with new-style weaponry, consuming strength in a war of attrition with the enemy. The result was that the enemy advanced step by step, while the Red Army suffered repeated heavy losses. After a bitter year of fighting, it still failed to break the Kuomintang army’s “encirclement and suppression.” By October 1934, the main force of the Central Red Army had no choice but to abandon the base area and implement a strategic shift. Because the troops carried out a “moving-house” style of operation, when they broke through the Kuomintang army’s fourth blockade line at the Xiang River from November 27 to December 1, the Red Army paid a heavy price, sharply decreasing from over 86,000 at the start of the march to just over 30,000.

1933年9月下旬，蒋介石以50万大军对中央苏区发动了第五次“围剿”，以博古为首的中共临时中央直接领导这次反“围剿”斗争，把红军的指挥大权完全交给共产国际的军事顾问李德。李德废弃过去四次反“围剿”中行之有效的积极防御方针，实行军事冒险主义，主张“御敌于国门之外”，与用新式装备武装起来的国民党军队打正规战、阵地战、堡垒战，同敌人拼消耗，结果是敌人步步推进，红军屡遭严重损失，苦战一年，仍未打破国民党军的“围剿”。到1934年10月，中央红军主力不得不撤离根据地，实施战略转移。由于部队实行大搬家式的行动，11月27日至12月1日突破国民党军第四道封锁线湘江时，红军付出了惨重的代价，由出发时的8.6万余人锐减至3万余人。

After the Xiang River Campaign, the command task of the Red Army had shifted to Zhou Enlai’s shoulders. Mao Zedong’s correct proposal to change the direction of the march received support from Zhou Enlai and others. Through fierce debates at the Tongdao Conference, the Liping Conference, and the Houchang Conference, people reached a basically unanimous understanding of the errors in the Central Committee’s military command. Under these circumstances, the conditions were ripe for convening a Political Bureau meeting to sum up experiences and lessons and correct the errors in leadership.

湘江战役之后，红军的指挥任务已经转移到周恩来肩上，毛泽东关于改变行军方向的正确主张得到周恩来等的支持，先后经过通道会议、黎平会议、猴场会议的激烈争论，人们对于中央军事指挥的错误问题有了基本一致的认识，在这种形势下，召开一次政治局会议，总结经验教训，纠正领导上的错误的条件已经成熟。

The Zunyi Conference reorganized the central leadership organs, electing Mao Zedong as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau; designating Zhang Wentian to draft a resolution, which, after review by the Standing Committee, was to be distributed to Party branches for discussion; and abolishing the “Three-Person Group” [1]1 The “Three-Person Group” (三人团) was an ad hoc decision-making body established before the Long March, composed of Bo Gu, Li De, and Zhou Enlai, which held supreme military and organizational authority. established before the Long March, while still retaining Zhu De and Zhou Enlai, the highest-ranking military commanders, as the military commanders, with Zhou Enlai being the person entrusted by the Party with the final decision on military command.

遵义会议改组了中央领导机构，选举毛泽东为中央政治局常委；指定张闻天起草决议，委托常委审查后，发到支部中去讨论；取消长征前成立的“三人团”，仍由最高军事首长朱德、周恩来为军事指挥者，周恩来是党内委托的对于指挥军事下最后决心的负责者。

On February 8, at the Yuanzi Street in the Zhaxi area, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee passed the “Resolution of the Central Committee on the Summary of the Campaign against the Enemy’s Fifth ‘Encirclement and Suppression.’” The resolution held that the Zunyi Conference resolution comprehensively and systematically reflected the results of the criticism at the meeting of the military command errors of Bo Gu and Li De, concentratedly reflected the wisdom of the Party and the Red Army at that time, and, from an overall perspective, carried out a general design for how to persist in, restore, develop, and open up a new situation for the revolution after suffering severe losses. The resolution clearly pointed out: “The enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau points out the errors in the Party’s past military leadership” and “the Party bravely exposed these errors, educated itself through them, and learned how to better lead the revolutionary war to complete victory. After exposing these errors, the Party was not weakened but strengthened.”

2月8日，在扎西地域的院子街，中共中央政治局通过了《中央关于反对敌人五次“围剿”的总结的决议》。决议认为，遵义会议决议全面、系统反映了会上批评博古、李德军事指挥错误的成果，集中反映了当时党和红军的智慧，站在全局的高度，对遭受严重损失后的革命如何坚持，如何恢复和发展，如何打开革命新局面，进行了总体设计。决议明确指出：“政治局扩大会指出过去党在军事领导上的错误”“党勇敢的揭发了这种错误，从错误中教育了自己，学习了如何更好的领导革命战争到彻底的胜利。党在揭发了这种错误之后，不是削弱而是加强了。”

The Zunyi Conference was a great self-revolution in the history of the CPC. Through this self-revolution, the Party corrected the military command errors of the “Left” dogmatists, not only opening a new journey for the Red Army’s Long March from suffering severe setbacks to victory, but also opening a new journey for the Chinese revolution to move toward victory; through this self-revolution, the Party’s first generation of central leadership collective with Comrade Mao Zedong at its core began to take shape, and the Party became stronger.

遵义会议是中国共产党历史上一次伟大的自我革命。通过这次自我革命，党纠正了“左”倾教条主义者的军事指挥错误，不仅开启了红军长征从遭受严重挫折到胜利的新征程，而且开启了中国革命走向胜利的新征程；通过这次自我革命，开始形成以毛泽东同志为核心的党的第一代中央领导集体，党更强大了。

The Zunyi Conference opened the path for adapting Marxism to the Chinese context.

遵义会议开辟了马克思主义中国化的道路

From the late 1920s to the early 1930s, within the international communist movement and the CPC, there prevailed the erroneous tendency to dogmatize Marxism, sanctify the resolutions of the Comintern, and sanctify the experience of the Russian revolution. Among these, Wang Ming was the most representative figure. Wang Ming’s “Left” dogmatism, because it had a theoretical veneer, had a great deceptive effect, making it difficult for people to recognize its errors and harm. Moreover, Wang Ming and others directly received support from the Comintern, which also caused some who originally did not approve of or criticized Wang Ming to turn around and endorse and support him.

20世纪20年代后期到30年代前期，在国际共产主义运动中和中国共产党内，盛行把马克思主义教条化、把共产国际决议和俄国革命经验神圣化的错误倾向，其中，王明是最有代表性的人物。王明“左”倾教条主义由于具有理论色彩，具有很大的迷惑作用，使人们不容易识别其错误和危害。加之王明等直接得到共产国际的支持，也使得一部分本来不赞成或批评王明的人转而赞同并支持他。

The Chinese Communists, mainly represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, attached importance to integrating theory with practice, combining Marxist theory with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. Mao Zedong believed that the correct and unwavering struggle strategy of the Communist Party could never be produced by a few people sitting in a room; it could only be produced in practical experience. “The victory of the Chinese revolutionary struggle depends on Chinese comrades understanding Chinese conditions.”

以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人重视理论联系实际，把马克思主义理论和中国革命具体实践结合起来。毛泽东认为，共产党的正确而不动摇的斗争策略，决不是少数人坐在房子里能够产生的，它是要在实际经验中才能产生，“中国革命斗争的胜利要靠中国同志了解中国情况”。

The Zunyi Conference criticized the strategic line of purely defensive warfare adopted by Bo Gu and Li De in the fifth counter-“encirclement and suppression” campaign. This line “enabled the enemy’s strategic tactics of protracted warfare and fortress warfare to achieve their goal.” The meeting also criticized Bo Gu and Li De for committing principled errors on the issue of strategic shift and implementing the breakout, which was “basically not resolute and combative, but a panicked, fleeing, and moving-house style of action.” Because they frequently avoided battle, “the Red Army’s morale could not be raised, it was excessively fatigued, and could not get a moment’s rest, thus casualties reached an unprecedented level.” The meeting’s conclusion was: “The future development of the purely defensive line: either reckless desperate struggle, or flightism; there can be nothing else besides these.”

遵义会议批判了博古、李德在第五次反“围剿”中单纯防御的战略路线。这一路线，“就使敌人持久战与堡垒主义的战略战术，达到了他的目的。”会议还批判博古、李德在战略转变与实行突围的问题上，同样犯了原则上的错误，“基本上不是坚决的与战斗的，而是一种惊慌失措的逃跑式的以及搬家式的行动”。由于经常避战，“就使得红军士气不能发扬，过分疲劳，得不到片刻的休息，因而减员到空前的程度。”会议的结论是：“单纯防御路线发展的前途：或者是不顾一切的拼命主义，或者是逃跑主义，此外决不能有别的东西。”

The Zunyi Conference criticized the strategic and tactical principles of “Left” dogmatism, restored the correct strategic and tactical principles of the first four counter-“encirclement and suppression” campaigns in the Central Soviet Area, and demanded that “Red Army commanders at all levels possess highly mobile warfare tactics” and “a resolute and rapid shift from positional warfare tactics (short, swift assaults) to mobile warfare tactics.”

遵义会议批判了“左”倾教条主义的战略战术原则，恢复了中央苏区前四次反“围剿”的正确战略战术原则，要求“红军各级指挥员具有高度的运动战战术”，“从阵地战战术（短促突击）到运动战战术的坚决的迅速的转变”。

Because the Zunyi Conference established correct strategic and tactical principles that conformed to the laws of the Red Army’s warfare in China, the Central Red Army, under the command of Mao Zedong and others, flexibly changed the direction of operations according to changes in actual circumstances, taking the initiative everywhere. Although after the Zunyi Conference, the Central Red Army still changed the strategic direction of its advance many times, each change was made based on actual conditions such as the enemy’s and our own situation, the mass base, and geographical conditions, thus avoiding suffering heavy losses or even total annihilation. Because the method of thinking was correct, they moved step by step toward a place where they could preserve themselves, ultimately finding the best foothold, successfully achieving the goal of the strategic shift, and completing the Long March.

由于遵义会议确立了符合中国红军作战规律的正确战略战术原则，中央红军在毛泽东等指挥下，根据实际情况的变化，灵活变换作战方向，处处主动。尽管在遵义会议之后，中央红军仍多次改变战略进军方向，但都是从敌我情况、群众基础、地理条件等实际情况出发作出的，避免了遭受惨重损失，甚至是全军覆灭的命运。由于思想方法对头，一步一步朝着保全自己的地方走，最终找到最佳落脚点，胜利实现了战略转移的目标，完成了长征。

The Zunyi Conference was conducted under the tense conditions of war. In just three short days, it was impossible to discuss the rights and wrongs of all major issues in the Party’s work over many years. Therefore, the meeting did not comprehensively discuss issues related to the political line. Nevertheless, the meeting ended the rule of “Left” dogmatism in the Party Central Committee, began to establish the leading position in the Party Central Committee of the correct Marxist line mainly represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, and opened the way for the entire Party to advance the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context.

遵义会议是在紧张的战争形势下进行的，在短短的三天时间里，对多年来党的工作中所有重大问题的是非展开讨论，是不可能的。因而，会议没有全面地讨论政治路线方面的问题。尽管如此，会议结束了“左”倾教条主义在党中央的统治，开始确立以毛泽东同志为主要代表的马克思主义正确路线在党中央的领导地位，为全党推进马克思主义中国化打开了道路。

The Zunyi Conference opened a new stage for the Party to independently and autonomously solve the practical problems of the Chinese revolution.

遵义会议开启党独立自主解决中国革命实际问题的新阶段

Before the Zunyi Conference, because the Party’s theoretical and practical levels were not yet high, it could not independently and autonomously solve the practical problems of the Chinese revolution; some practical problems had to rely on the guidance and assistance of the Comintern and the CPSU (Bolsheviks) to resolve.

在遵义会议以前，由于党的理论水平和实践水平还不高，不能独立自主地解决中国革命实际问题，一些实际问题要靠共产国际、联共（布）指导和帮助来解决。

After the main force of the Central Red Army began the Long March in October 1934, because Bo Gu and Li De pursued flightism, the Red Army was brought to the brink of extinction. If the most pressing problem of military command errors was not solved, the Party and the Red Army might have faced annihilation. It was at this moment that the CPC’s communication with the Comintern was severed. After the CPC Central Committee moved into the Central Soviet Area, its contact with the Comintern was conducted through the Shanghai Central Bureau. At that time, the Shanghai Central Bureau had three radio stations: one could contact the Central Soviet Area and other Soviet areas, one contacted the Comintern, and the third was a backup station. At the time of the Central Red Army’s departure for the Long March, the CPC Central Committee’s representative in Shanghai, Sheng Zhongliang, was arrested and defected on October 5, 1934. Shortly thereafter, the relevant radio operators of the Shanghai Central Bureau were also arrested and defected one after another, and all three radio stations were destroyed. Thus, from the start of the Long March, the CPC Central Committee completely lost contact with the Comintern.

在1934年10月中央红军主力开始长征后，由于博古、李德推行逃跑主义，使红军几乎处于绝境。不解决当时最主要的军事指挥错误问题，党和红军有可能面临覆灭的命运。就在这时，中国共产党与共产国际的通信联络中断了。中共中央迁入中央苏区后，与共产国际的联系是通过上海中央局进行的。当时上海中央局有三部电台，一部可与中央苏区及其他苏区联系，一部与共产国际联系，还有一部是备用电台。在中央红军长征出发之时，中共中央驻上海代表盛忠亮于1934年10月5日被捕叛变，之后不久上海中央局的有关报务工作人员也相继被捕叛变，三部电台都遭到破坏。这样，自长征出发后，中共中央与共产国际就完全中断了联系。

The severance of communications between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Communist International, along with the pressing situation, forced the Chinese Communist Party to independently resolve the practical problems it then faced. Fortunately, the Chinese Communist Party already possessed the capability and conditions to independently resolve the practical problems of the Chinese revolution.

中共中央同共产国际中断联系，紧迫的形势逼着中国共产党去独立自主解决当时面临的实际问题。幸运的是，中国共产党已经具备独立自主解决中国革命实际问题的能力和条件。

First, through seven years of practice in the Agrarian Revolutionary War, a group of leading cadres with practical experience and prestige, represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, had grown up. Mao Zedong had worked in the Central Committee of the CPC. After the failure of the Great Revolution, he returned to Hunan to lead the Autumn Harvest Uprising on the borders of Hunan and Jiangxi. After the uprising suffered setbacks, he led the troops to shift in a timely manner to the Jinggang Mountains, establishing the first revolutionary base area and raising the banner of the armed independent regime of the workers and peasants in areas where enemy forces were weak. Mao Zedong’s experience in establishing the Jinggang Mountains and the Central Revolutionary Base Area and in building the Party and the Red Army, along with the theory of the revolutionary path of encircling the cities from the countryside that he put forward, had a great influence on other revolutionary base areas. In October 1928, the Eastern Hubei Special Committee of the CPC once proposed “learning the method of the Jinggang Mountains in Jiangxi.” Xi Zhongxun, when discussing the revolutionary struggle in the Northwest, once said that in the struggle against the enemy and in the struggle against opportunism within the local Party, “under the call of Mao Zedong and Zhu De to develop revolutionary armed forces and establish revolutionary base areas in the South, we groped our way and found the correct path, forging a correct line.” [2]2 Xi Zhongxun (1913–2002) was a Chinese communist revolutionary and a senior leader of the People’s Republic of China, later serving as Vice President. The quote refers to the influence of Mao Zedong and Zhu De’s model of base area building on the revolutionary movement in the Northwest region. It can be seen that Mao Zedong enjoyed high prestige within the Party and the Red Army.

其一，7年的土地革命战争实践，以毛泽东同志为代表的一批有实践经验、有威望的领导干部成长起来。毛泽东曾在中共中央工作过，大革命失败后，回到湖南领导湘赣边界秋收起义。在起义受挫后，率领部队及时转移到井冈山，创建了第一个革命根据地，在敌人力量薄弱的地区树立起工农武装割据的旗帜。毛泽东创建井冈山、中央革命根据地和建设党与红军的经验，提出的农村包围城市的革命道路理论，对其他革命根据地产生了很大影响。1928年10月，中共鄂东特委曾提出“学江西井冈山的办法”。习仲勋在谈到西北革命斗争时曾说，在与敌人斗争中，在与地方党内机会主义斗争中，“在毛泽东和朱德在南方发展革命武装与建立革命根据地的号召下，使我们在摸索中，找到了正确的道路，锻炼出了一条正确的路线。”可见，毛泽东在党和红军中有很高的威望。

Zhou Enlai had long worked in the Central Committee of the CPC, serving as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, head of the Organization Department of the Central Committee, and secretary of the Central Military Commission. He was the earliest major leader of the Party to engage in military work. In the spring of 1933, together with Zhu De, he commanded the First Front Army of the Red Army to achieve victory in the Fourth Counter-Encirclement and Suppression Campaign in the Central Base Area, creating an unprecedented example in the history of the Red Army of a large army group annihilating the enemy through ambush. Zhou Enlai was a leader in the leading posts of the Central Committee of the CPC who was both rich in organizational and military work experience and highly respected.

周恩来长期在中共中央工作，担任中央政治局常委、中央组织部部长和中央军委书记，是党最早从事军事工作的主要领导者。1933年春，与朱德指挥红一方面军取得了中央根据地第四次反“围剿”的胜利，创造了红军战争史上前所未有的大兵团伏击歼敌的范例。周恩来是中共中央领导岗位上既有丰富组织、军事工作经验，又深孚众望的领导人。

Zhu De was one of the leaders of the Nanchang Uprising. He successively served as commander of the Fourth Red Army, commander-in-chief of the First Red Army Corps, commander-in-chief of the First Front Army of the Red Army, commander-in-chief of the Red Army, and chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Soviet Republic. He was known as the “Father of the Red Army.”

朱德是南昌起义的领导人之一，先后任红四军军长、红一军团总指挥、红一方面军总司令、红军总司令、中华苏维埃共和国中央革命军事委员会主席等职，被称为“红军之父”。

Second, some leading comrades in the Party who had implemented erroneous “Left” policies gradually came to recognize their harmfulness in practice. They began to view the problems of the Chinese revolution from the perspective of reality and became prestigious Party leaders.

其二，在党内一些执行过“左”倾错误方针的中央领导同志在实践中也逐渐认识到其危害性，开始从实际出发看待中国革命问题，并成为有威望的党的领导者。

Zhang Wentian was one of the members of the Standing Committee of the Provisional Central Political Bureau of the CPC established in the latter half of September 1931. In practice, he gradually came to recognize the harmfulness of “Left” errors to the revolution. After the Long March began, Zhang Wentian marched together with Mao Zedong, discussing the erroneous military command of Bo Gu and Li De since the Fifth Counter-Encirclement and Suppression Campaign, and his views gradually aligned with Mao Zedong’s. His transformation played an important role in correcting the errors of “Left” dogmatism.

张闻天是1931年9月下半月成立的中共临时中央政治局常委之一，在实践中逐渐认识到“左”倾错误对革命的危害性。长征开始后，张闻天与毛泽东一起行军，谈论第五次反“围剿”以来博古、李德的错误军事指挥，同毛泽东的意见逐渐一致。他的转变对纠正“左”倾教条主义错误有重要作用。

Wang Jiaxiang, elected as an alternate member of the Political Bureau at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC, had previously implemented erroneous “Left” policies. However, during the Fifth Counter-Encirclement and Suppression Campaign, he began to recognize the errors in Li De’s military command and repeatedly argued with Li De. After the Long March began, the Red Army’s situation became increasingly perilous, and Wang Jiaxiang became even more convinced that Li De’s erroneous command was leading the Red Army to a dead end.

中共六届五中全会上被选为中央委员、政治局候补委员的王稼祥曾执行过“左”倾错误方针，但在第五次反“围剿”时，开始认识到李德军事指挥的错误，多次同李德发生争论。长征开始后红军处境日渐危急，王稼祥更加认为李德的错误指挥是把红军引向绝路。

Third, in various base areas, a group of leading cadres with practical experience, ability, and prestige also emerged. In the Central Base Area, there were Chen Yi, Peng Dehuai, Nie Rongzhen, Liu Bocheng, Deng Zihui, Zhang Dingcheng, Tan Zhenlin, Li Fuchun, Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zemin, and others; in the Northeast Jiangxi Base Area, there was Fang Zhimin; in the Hunan-Hubei-West Base Area, there were He Long, Zhou Yiqun, and others; in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Base Area, there were Xu Xiangqian, Kuang Jixun, Zeng Zhongsheng, and others; in the Hunan-Jiangxi Base Area, there was Ren Bishi; in the Shaanxi-Gansu Border Area, there were Liu Zhidan, Xie Zichang, Xi Zhongxun, and others; in the Northern Fujian Base Area, there was Huang Dao.

其三，在各根据地也涌现出一批有实践经验、有能力、有威信的领导干部。在中央根据地有陈毅、彭德怀、聂荣臻、刘伯承、邓子恢、张鼎丞、谭震林、李富春、邓小平、毛泽民等，在赣东北有方志敏等，湘鄂西有贺龙、周逸群等，鄂豫皖有徐向前、邝继勋、曾中生等，湘赣有任弼时等，陕甘边有刘志丹、谢子长、习仲勋等，闽北有黄道等。

Fourth, the vast majority of Red Army cadres and soldiers gradually came to recognize, from the harsh reality of the defeat in the Fifth Counter-Encirclement and Suppression Campaign in the Central Soviet Area and the severe losses suffered after the start of the Long March, that this was the result of “Left” military command. During the Fifth Counter-Encirclement and Suppression Campaign in the Central Soviet Area, many cadres developed doubts and dissatisfaction with the errors in the military command of the principal leaders of the Central Committee. Some corps commanders repeatedly raised criticisms in combat telegrams and reports. Peng Dehuai even cursed Li De after the Guangchang Campaign, saying, “The son sells his father’s land without the father’s heart aching.” [3]3 The Guangchang Campaign (April 1934) was a major battle during the Fifth Counter-Encirclement and Suppression Campaign in the Central Soviet Area, where the Red Army suffered heavy losses due to the erroneous military command of the “Left” line. Peng Dehuai (1898–1974) was a prominent Red Army commander who later became a Marshal of the People’s Republic of China. Mao Zedong and others also repeatedly put forward their own correct opinions, but these were not accepted. This discontent grew day by day, reaching its peak after the Xiangjiang River Campaign. Among the cadres, especially the senior cadres, there was brewing sentiment demanding the correction of errors in military command and a change in leadership. Many believed that if this key issue were not resolved, the future of the Party and the Red Army would be extremely dangerous.

其四，广大红军干部、战士从中央苏区第五次反“围剿”失利及长征开始后遭到严重损失的残酷事实中，逐渐认识到这是“左”倾军事指挥造成的结果。在中央苏区第五次反“围剿”中，许多干部对中央主要领导人在军事指挥上的错误产生怀疑和不满，一些军团指挥员多次在作战电报、报告中提出批评意见，彭德怀甚至在广昌战役后骂李德“崽卖爷田心不痛”。毛泽东等也多次提出自己的正确意见，但都没有被接受。这种不满情绪日益增长，到湘江战役之后达到顶点。在干部特别是高级干部中，酝酿着要求纠正军事指挥错误、改变领导的意见。许多人认为，不解决这个关键问题，党和红军的前途极其危险。

The Zunyi Conference, convened independently by the Chinese Communist Party, not only smoothly resolved the pressing problems then faced but was also conducted better than those held under the guidance and assistance of the Communist International and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), indicating that the Party was maturing politically. Chen Yun, in his report to the Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on the situation of the Red Army’s Long March and the Zunyi Conference, pointed out: “Our Party has truly matured, especially the Party’s leaders have matured.”

中国共产党独立自主召开的遵义会议，不仅顺利解决了当时面临的紧迫问题，而且比共产国际、联共（布）指导和帮助下开得更好，表明党在政治上走向成熟。陈云在共产国际执行委员会书记处会议上报告红军长征和遵义会议情况时指出：“我们党真正成熟起来了，尤其是党的领导人成熟了。”

From the Zunyi Conference onward, independence became the principle for the Chinese Communist Party in resolving major issues of the Chinese revolution.

自遵义会议开始，独立自主便成为中国共产党解决中国革命重大问题的原则。

The Zunyi Conference is a model of our Party’s adherence to the spirit of struggle and the correct conduct of inner-Party struggle.

遵义会议是我们党坚持斗争精神、正确开展党内斗争的典范

Adhering to daring to struggle is our Party’s fine tradition. Before the Zunyi Conference, when the Party struggled against erroneous tendencies under the guidance and assistance of the Communist International and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), there were often problems of excess or impropriety in methods and means. Wang Ming’s “Left” dogmatism was even more excessive. They not only “mercilessly struck” at Li Lisan and others who had committed errors of “Left” adventurism and at comrades they considered to have committed errors of “conciliationism,” but also struck at a group of important cadres such as He Mengxiong, Lin Yunan, and Li Qiushi, who had previously opposed the “Li Lisan line.” After the “Left” dogmatic line began to be implemented in the Party organizations of the revolutionary base areas and the Kuomintang-controlled areas, they arbitrarily labeled comrades who were doubtful, dissatisfied, or unsupportive as “Right opportunists,” “rich peasant line,” “double-dealers,” and so on, subjecting them to “ruthless struggle.” This caused a large number of outstanding Communist Party members and cadres to be slandered and harmed, inflicting heavy losses on the Party.

坚持敢于斗争是我们党的优良传统，遵义会议之前，党在共产国际、联共（布）指导和帮助下同错误倾向作斗争时，在方式方法上往往存在过火或欠妥问题。王明“左”倾教条主义更是过分，他们不仅“无情打击”犯过“左”倾冒险主义错误的李立三等人和被他们认为是犯“调和主义”错误的同志，而且也打击曾经反对过“立三路线”的何孟雄、林育南、李求实等一批重要干部。“左”倾教条主义方针在革命根据地和国民党统治区党组织中开始贯彻后，他们对怀疑、不满或者不支持的同志，动辄扣上“右倾机会主义”“富农路线”“两面派”等帽子，加以“残酷斗争”，使大批优秀的共产党员和干部受到污蔑和伤害，给党造成重大损失。

At the Zunyi Conference, everyone severely criticized the errors committed by Bo Gu and others, especially the errors in military command since the Fifth Counter-Encirclement and Suppression Campaign in the Central Soviet Area. However, they were still treated as comrades, and the method of presenting facts and reasoning to help them was adopted. This was because Bo Gu and others’ views on the basic issues of the Chinese revolution—such as opposing imperialist aggression against China, especially opposing Japanese imperialist aggression, carrying out the agrarian revolution, and using armed force to overthrow the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang—were consistent with the Party’s fundamental program. Li De, as a foreigner who came to China to support the Chinese people’s revolution, also had a commendable spirit. Before coming to the Central Soviet Area, as a member of the Military Advisory Group of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, he had also done some work for the counter-encirclement and suppression struggles in various base areas. Although they had committed errors of “Left” dogmatism, they were still members of the revolutionary ranks.

在遵义会议上，大家对博古等人犯的错误尤其是中央苏区第五次反“围剿”以来的军事指挥错误进行了严厉的批评，但还是当作同志对待的，采取摆事实讲道理进行帮助的方法。因为，博古等在反对帝国主义对中国的侵略，尤其是反对日本帝国主义的侵略，实行土地革命，武装推翻国民党的反动统治等中国革命基本问题上的观点，同党的根本纲领是一致的。李德作为一个外国人，来到中国支援中国人民革命，其精神也是值得肯定的，并且在到中央苏区之前，作为共产国际执行委员会远东局军事顾问组成员，也为各根据地的反“围剿”斗争做了一定工作。尽管他们犯了“左”倾教条主义错误，但仍然是革命队伍中的成员。

When Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang, and others criticized the errors in the military command of Bo Gu and Li De, they used concrete facts from the counter-encirclement and suppression campaigns in the Central Soviet Area to prove that “the purely defensive line in military affairs of Bo Gu and Li De was the main reason we could not smash the enemy’s fifth ‘encirclement and suppression’.” The majority of comrades attending the meeting agreed with their views.

毛泽东、张闻天、王稼祥等在批评博古、李德军事指挥错误时，以中央苏区反“围剿”作战中的确切事实，证明博古、李德“在军事上的单纯防御路线，是我们不能粉碎敌人五次‘围剿’的主要原因”。与会大多数同志赞同他们的意见。

Chen Yun, in his “Outline for the Transmission of the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC in Zunyi,” once said: Comrade Bo Gu did not fully and completely admit his mistakes; Comrade Kai Feng disagreed with the views of Mao, Zhang, and Wang; Comrade A (i.e., Li De—author’s note) completely and resolutely disagreed with the criticism of him. Despite this, for a period after the Zunyi Conference, Bo Gu remained the person in charge of the Central Committee of the CPC. After the “Cockcrow at the Border of Three Provinces” Meeting, when Zhang Wentian replaced Bo Gu as the person responsible for the overall work of the Central Committee, Bo Gu remained a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee and held the important post of acting director of the General Political Department. Although Li De was relieved of his command after the Zunyi Conference, he was sometimes allowed to attend certain military meetings and his opinions were sought. As for Kai Feng, he was not removed from his post because of his differing views from “Mao, Zhang, and Wang.”

陈云在《遵义政治局扩大会议传达提纲》中曾说：博古同志没有完全彻底的承认自己的错误，凯丰同志不同意毛张王的意见，A同志（即李德——引者注）完全坚决的不同意对于他的批评。尽管如此，遵义会议后一段时间，博古仍是中共中央总负责人。“鸡鸣三省”会议张闻天代替博古负中央总的责任后，博古仍然是中央常委，并担任总政治部代理主任的重要职务。李德在遵义会议后虽然被解除了指挥权，但有时让他参加一些军事会议，并征求他的意见。至于凯丰，没有因他对“毛张王”有不同意见而解除职务。

Mao Zedong later pointed out to foreign guests when discussing the Zunyi Conference: “The policy we adopted was to help comrades who had made mistakes to correct their mistakes, adopting an attitude of assistance, and thus we united the great majority of the Party.” [4]4 The Zunyi Conference (January 1935) was a pivotal meeting of the Chinese Communist Party during the Long March, at which Mao Zedong established his leadership and the “Left” dogmatist line was criticized.

毛泽东后来同外宾谈到遵义会议时指出：“我们采取的方针，是帮助犯错误的同志改正错误，采取帮助的态度，所以我们团结了党的绝大多数。”

The Zunyi Conference adopted a method of assistance toward the “Left” dogmatists, consolidating the Party’s unity and solidarity. Bo Gu and others also worked actively and played an important role in the later struggle against Zhang Guotao’s Rightist splittism. [5]5 Zhang Guotao was a senior CPC leader who, in the mid-1930s, attempted to split the Party and set up a rival central committee, a move later condemned as “Rightist splittism.” It can be said that the method of inner-Party struggle adopted at the Zunyi Conference provided a model for correctly carrying out inner-Party struggle in the future.

遵义会议对“左”倾教条主义者采取帮助的方式，巩固了党的团结和统一。博古等人也积极工作，在后来同张国焘右倾分裂主义的斗争中发挥了重要作用。可以说，遵义会议采取的党内斗争方式，为以后正确开展党内斗争提供了典范。

Online editor: Huihui

网络编辑：慧慧