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“Construction”: A Preliminary Exploration of the CPC’s Political Engineering in Party Governance and National Governance

朱国伟:“建设”:中国共产党治党治国的政治工程学初探

· · CPC History & Party Building · School of Marxism, Wuhan University · Research on Contemporary Chinese Marxism, 2024, no. 2 · 30 min read

“Construction” has become a daily political discourse of the Communist Party of China, and many themes related to “construction” (such as Party building, state building, etc.) have also become basic topics in academic research. Yet perhaps because it is used daily without conscious reflection, the academic community has not regarded “construction” itself as an academic concept with overarching or generalizing capacity. If we are to “take what we are doing as the center,” interpret Chinese practice, and construct Chinese theory, then “construction” is undoubtedly precisely what the Communist Party of China is doing in governing the Party, governing the state, and managing political affairs; it is an iconic concept for constructing an academic discourse system with Chinese characteristics. Generally speaking, the construction of an academic discourse system must align with historical practice and intuitive experience. When we attempt to conceptualize the “phenomenon” of the CPC’s practice of governing the Party and the state, it means that this concept is required to possess universal explanatory power. If the discursive centrality of the word “construction” can evoke academic resonance, then it provides the possibility of acknowledging its generalizing capacity and its status within the academic discourse system. And around the academic construction of the discourse of “construction,” the framework of a political engineering of party politics with Chinese characteristics will also become necessary. The task of this article is to attempt an explanatory account of the logical possibility of this thesis, in the hope of offering a modest spur to induce others to come forward with valuable contributions.

“建设”已成为中国共产党的日常政治话语,而与“建设”相关的诸多主题(如党的建设、国家建设等)也已成为学术研究中的基本议题。但也许因日用而不觉,学术界并未将“建设”本身视为一个具有统摄性或概括能力的学术概念。如果说要“以我们正在做的事情为中心”,解读中国实践、构建中国理论,那么,“建设”无疑正是中国共产党管党治党、治国理政正在做的事情,是构建中国特色学术话语体系的标识性概念。一般而言,一个学术话语体系的建构要契合历史实践和直观经验。当我们试图将中国共产党治党治国的实践“现象”概念化,就意味着要求这个概念具有普遍性的解释力。如果“建设”这个词的话语中心性能够唤起学术共鸣,那么,也就为承认它的概括能力及其在学术话语体系中的地位提供了可能。而围绕“建设”话语的学术建构,中国特色的政党政治工程学框架的搭建也将成为必要。本文的任务即在于尝试对这一立论的逻辑可能性作解释性说明,以期抛砖引玉之功。

Seeking General Theoretical Categories Centered on the Communist Party of China

寻求以中国共产党为中心的一般性理论范畴

The question “What is the Communist Party of China and what does it intend to do?” has been clearly answered politically and has also received considerable elucidation in scholarly terms. Yet from what starting point to construct a categorical system for understanding the CPC, thereby building a scholarly research system of the CPC and forming an academic discourse system centered on the CPC, still urgently awaits a breakthrough. An academic system is supported by a series of general theoretical categories. “So-called categories are the most universal essences by which human thinking reflects and summarizes objective things, that is, the concepts of the most universal properties and the most universal connections.” [1]1 This is a Chinese scholarly definition of “category,” likely drawn from Marxist philosophical sources. Simply put, categories are “those concepts that reflect phenomena and relations with broad commonality.” [2]2 Another Chinese scholarly definition of “category,” emphasizing broad commonality. So-called general theoretical categories are basic concepts that run through research topics and fields; they are the foundational components that enable a theory to possess the capacities of description, explanation, prediction, and reflection. To find such general categories, it is first necessary to clarify whether the subject orientation of the theoretical categories possesses centrality in terms of diachronic and spatial dimensions, thereby making it possible for the theoretical categories to be general. In other words, when we place the Communist Party of China at the center of research, the search for such general theoretical categories requires returning to its history and understanding the historical circumstances, discursive features, and practical forms through which the CPC’s original aspiration and founding mission were established. As for tracing the Party’s history, Mao Zedong tells us “it is almost necessary to start from the Revolution of 1911.” [3]3 Mao Zedong, “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship” (1949), referring to the 1911 Revolution that overthrew the Qing dynasty.

“中国共产党是什么、要干什么”这个问题在政治上已有了明确回答,在学理上业已作较多阐释。但从何而起构建理解中国共产党的范畴体系,借以建构中国共产党的学术研究体系,形成以中国共产党为中心的学术话语体系却仍亟待破题。学术体系是由一系列一般性理论范畴支撑的。“所谓范畴,就是人的思维用来反映和概括客观事物的最普遍的本质,也就是最普遍的性质和最普遍的联系的概念。”简单来说,范畴就是“那些反映着广泛的共同性的现象和关系的概念”。而所谓一般性理论范畴即具有研究主题、研究领域贯通性的基本概念,它是使理论具有描述、解释、预测和反思能力的基础性构成。而要找到这样的一般性范畴首先需要明确理论范畴的主体指向在历时性和空间性上是否具有中心性,从而使理论范畴具有一般性成为可能。换言之,当我们将中国共产党置于研究中心,这种一般性理论范畴的寻求就需要回到其历史,理解中国共产党初心使命得以确立的历史情境、话语特征和实践形式。而对于追溯党的历史,毛泽东告诉我们“从辛亥革命说起差不多”。

After the failure of the “Constitutional Reform and Modernization” [4]4 The “Hundred Days’ Reform” of 1898, a failed reform movement led by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. to save the nation from subjugation and ensure its survival, Chinese revolutionaries’ quest for an ideal state transformed into social-historical action centered on political parties. In the early years of the Republic of China after the Revolution of 1911, Zhang Shizhao’s [5]5 Zhang Shizhao (1881–1973), a Chinese intellectual, journalist, and politician active in the early Republic. theory of “destroying parties to create genuine parties” [6]6 A phrase used by Zhang Shizhao to advocate dissolving existing political cliques and forming genuine, programmatic parties.—aiming to destroy existing parties and rebuild true ones—was highly influential, seeking party politics to achieve the goal of saving the nation through parties. During this period, whether it was Huang Xing’s [7]7 Huang Xing (1874–1916), a key revolutionary leader and co-founder of the Kuomintang. statement that “the essential element for the establishment of the Republic depends entirely on political parties,” or Sun Yat-sen’s [8]8 Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), founding father of the Republic of China and first leader of the Kuomintang. subsequent approach of “building the state through the party,” with the idea that “once the state is built, then it can be governed,” both expressed a recognition of the particularity of the relationship between political parties and the state in modern China. The “New People’s Study Society” [9]9 A student society founded in 1918 by Mao Zedong and Cai Hesen in Changsha, initially focused on moral and intellectual reform. founded by Mao Zedong, Cai Hesen, [10]10 Cai Hesen (1895–1931), early CPC leader and close associate of Mao Zedong. and others initially took “renewing scholarship, cultivating character, and improving popular customs” as its purpose, adhering to a reformism that enlightened people’s minds through scholarship. Later, they gradually realized the need to “organize a party—the Communist Party. Because it is the initiator, propagandist, vanguard, and combat headquarters of the revolutionary movement.” [11]11 A paraphrase of views expressed in letters between Mao Zedong and Cai Hesen in 1920–1921. “Only then will the revolutionary movement and the labor movement have a nerve center.” [12]12 Ibid. The concept of “new people” gradually shifted toward “creating a party,” and reform turned into revolution. In 1924, Yun Daiying’s [13]13 Yun Daiying (1895–1931), early CPC leader and theorist. “Creating a Party” [14]14 An article by Yun Daiying published in 1924 in the journal *China Youth*. even stated: “We must create the most powerful revolutionary party for China; there is no other way to save China.” The “First Program of the Communist Party of China” [15]15 The founding program adopted at the First National Congress of the CPC in 1921. already took “carrying out social revolution” as “the Party’s fundamental political purpose.” From “reform” [16]16 The Chinese term *weixin* (维新) literally means “renewal” and refers specifically to the 1898 reform movement. to “new people” to “creating a party,” this actually underwent a logic that shifted from focusing on state institutions, to exerting effort on caring for society, to finally seeking salvation through political parties. This historical process of selection precisely falls within the theoretical framework of “party-state-society,” only manifesting as a historical progression of “state-society-party.” This also reveals the unique role of the Communist Party of China in its relationship with the state and society.

在经历了“维新变法”救国图强失败之后,中国革命者对理想国度的探求转变为以政党为中心的社会历史行动。辛亥革命后的民国初年,章士钊的毁党再造真正的政党的“毁党造党”说影响甚大,旨在求政党政治,已达以党救国的目的。期间,不论是黄兴所说,“民国成立之要素,端赖政党”,还是之后孙中山所采取的“以党建国”,“待国建好了,再去治它”的思路,都表达了对近代中国政党和国家关系特殊性的认识。毛泽东、蔡和森等所创建的“新民学会”成立之初以“革新学术,砥砺品行,改良人心风俗”为宗旨,奉行以学术启人心智的改良主义。而后逐渐意识到“要组织党——共产党。因为他是革命运动的发动者、宣传者、先锋队、作战部”。“革命运动、劳动运动,才有神经中枢。”“新民”的观念逐渐转向“造党”,改良转向革命。1924 年恽代英的《造党》更是说:“我们必须为中国造一个最有力量的革命党,除了这没有法子救中国。”《中国共产党第一个纲领》即将“实行社会革命”作为“党的根本政治目的”。从“维新”到“新民”再到“造党”,这实际上经历了一个从着力于国家制度,到发力于关心社会,再到求救于政党的逻辑,而这个历史的选择过程恰位于“政党—国家—社会”的学理框架内,只是表现为“国家—社会—政党”的历史递进。而这也显露出中国共产党在与国家、社会关系中的独特角色。

Under the traditional “state-society” analytical paradigm, political parties are regarded as intermediaries between state and society, treated as a part under either a state-centered perspective or a society-centered perspective, or else concealed within them. Although, in the view of Frank J. Goodnow, [17]17 Frank J. Goodnow (1859–1939), American political scientist and legal scholar, author of *Politics and Administration*. political parties, while bearing part of the function of expressing state will, must also shoulder the important function of promoting coordination among various institutions. As a holistic force that threads things together, this is the proper work of political parties. E. E. Schattschneider [18]18 E. E. Schattschneider (1892–1971), American political scientist known for his work on party government. discovered that the decentralization of American political parties inevitably leads to party fragmentation, and a fragmented party can hardly speak of discipline. How can a party without discipline ensure the passage and implementation of its governing program? How can a party that cannot match its words with deeds assume public responsibility? How can a party that cannot assume public responsibility form a responsible party government? His answer was to start with organizational reconstruction to achieve party unity. However, this runs into the cornerstone of the American political system—federalism and the separation of powers. And shaking this political system’s foundation is impossible. Samuel P. Huntington [19]19 Samuel P. Huntington (1927–2008), American political scientist, author of *Political Order in Changing Societies*. believed that countries undergoing modernization achieve political stability by possessing at least one strong political party, so that it can “horizontally integrate social groups and vertically assimilate social and economic classes.” [20]20 A paraphrase of Huntington’s argument in *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968). However, the nature of a political party determines its relationship with state power and with society, and the functions it should bear also differ. Looking back at modern Chinese history and Western political thought, it can be found that the above expectations for the role of a strong party and the emphasis on the centrality of political parties can only remain a political ideal under the competitive party system of capitalist countries, whereas in China it is a historical choice and a historical conclusion since modern times.

在传统的“国家—社会”分析范式下,政党被视为国家与社会的中介物,被作为国家中心视角或社会中心视角下的一部分对待,或者说隐匿其中。虽然,在古德诺(Goodnow)看来,政党肩负着一部分国家意志的表达功能的同时,更必须肩负起促进各机构之间相互协调的重要功能。作为一个穿针引线的整体力量,是政党的本职工作。谢茨施耐德(Schattschneider)发现,美国政党的分散必然造成政党分裂,而分裂的党是谈不上什么纪律的,而一个没有纪律的政党如何保证执政纲领的通过与施行?一个不能言行一致的政党如何承担公共责任?一个不能承担公共责任的政党如何组建一个负责任的政党政府?他的答案是从组织再造起步,实现政党统一。然而,这碰到了美国政治体制的基石—联邦主义和分权主义。而动摇这一政治制度基础是不可能的。亨廷顿(Huntington)认为,处于现代化之中的国家达到政治稳定,至少拥有一个强大的政党。以便“在‘横向’上能将社会群体加以融合,在‘纵向’上能把社会和经济阶级加以同化”。然而,政党性质决定了其与国家政权、与社会的关系,所应承担的功能亦有别。回溯中国近代历史和西方政治思潮,可以发现,以上对强大政党的角色期待,对政党中心性作用的强调,仅仅能够成为资本主义国家竞争性政党制度下的政治理想,而在我国却是近代以来的历史选择和历史结论。

In China, the party is the precondition of the state, which is first of all a historical stipulation. “Without the Communist Party, there would be no New China” is not an ideological discourse or a political declaration, but a true portrayal of China’s nation-state building. Differences in the mode of historical action determine differences in current role positioning. The Communist Party of China, which combines the roles of leader and ruling party, differs from ruling parties in capitalist countries. Its ruling status does not mean holding the narrow government in the administrative sense, but rather integrating the Party’s organization and functions into the state power system, fulfilling its leadership responsibility by exercising control over various state institutions, including the legislature, judiciary, and administration. On the course of the laws of social history, the Communist Party of China is the helmsman of the ship of state. The CPC recognizes that “to govern the state, the Party must first be governed well; only when the Party thrives can the state be strong.” [21]21 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” (November 8, 2021), *Qiushi*, no. 1 (2022). “As long as the Marxist ruling party does not have problems, the socialist state will not have major problems.” [22]22 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the National Conference on Organizational Work” (July 3, 2018), *People’s Daily*, July 5, 2018. Thus, governing the Party and governing the state, as two sides of the same coin, are unified in the historical practice of the CPC. The simplified “state–society” paradigm may obscure the CPC, the most important variable in contemporary Chinese politics. Furthermore, on the one hand, history since modern times tells us that it is appropriate to understand the CPC through the categories of party–state–society relations. On the other hand, the centrality of the CPC in China’s historical development shows that when we seek general theoretical categories in the relationship between the party, the state, and society, it is inevitable to take the CPC as the subject center for constructing theoretical categories. By integrating the behaviors of governing the Party and governing the state (“governing the Party and the state”) and breaking the separation between subject and subject behavior in the study of the CPC, it is also necessary. Therefore, finding a window and finding general theoretical categories is a theoretical demand for understanding the CPC.

在中国,政党是国家的前提,首先是历史的规定性。“没有共产党就没有新中国”不是一种意识形态话语和政治宣示,而是中国民族国家建设的真实写照。历史行动方式的差异决定了当下角色定位的差异。作为领导者和执政者身份兼具的中国共产党,不同于资本主义国家的执政党,它的执政身份不是对行政学意义上狭义政府的执掌,而是将党的组织和功能融入政权系统,通过对包含立法、司法、行政等不同国家机构的执掌来实现领导之责。在社会历史规律的航道中,中国共产党是国家之舟的舵手。中国共产党认识到,“治国必先治党,党兴才能国强。”“只要马克思主义执政党不出问题,社会主义国家就出不了大问题”。可见,治党和治国作为一体两面统一于中国共产党的历史实践。而简约化的“国家—社会”范式,有可能遮蔽中国共产党这个当代中国政治中最为重要的变量。进而言之,一方面,近代以来的历史告诉我们,使用政党—国家—社会关系范畴来理解中国共产党是恰当的。另一方面,中国共产党在我国历史发展中的中心性说明,当我们在政党与国家、社会的关系中寻找一般性理论范畴时,将中国共产党作为理论范畴建构的主体中心是必然的。通过将管党治党与治国理政(“治党治国”)的行为统合起来,打破中国共产党的研究中将主体和主体行为分割的局面也是必要的。因而,找到一个窗口,找到一般性的理论范畴是理解中国共产党的理论诉求。

The possibility of “construction” as a conceptual window

“建设”作为概念窗口的可能

Even if we confirm that it is necessary and feasible to take the CPC, the subject governing the Party and the state, as the center for constructing general theoretical categories, we have only established the subject category of the analytical paradigm. The materialist conception of history “does not seek a category in every era, but always stands on the basis of real history; it does not explain practice from ideas, but explains various ideological forms from material practice.” [23]23 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1960), p. 43. Furthermore, constructing general theoretical categories centered on the CPC should not be sought from some existing academic concept; the only effective way is to extract them from its social and historical practice of governing the Party and the state.

即便我们确认了将治党治国主体的中国共产党作为一般性理论范畴建构的中心是必要和可行的,但也只是确立了分析范式的主体范畴。唯物主义的历史观“不是在每个时代中寻找某种范畴,而是始终站在现实历史的基础上,不是从观念出发来解释实践,而是从物质实践出发来解释各种观念形态”。进而言之,建构以中国共产党为中心的一般性理论范畴,不应从某种既有的学术概念中去寻找,只有从其治党治国的社会历史实践中去抽炼才是有效的途径。

Looking back at history, in August 1919, Sun Yat-sen led the founding of the journal *Construction* (*Jianshe*), which can be said to be the theoretical publication of the Chinese Kuomintang (then called the “Chinese Revolutionary Party”). In the inaugural issue of this journal, Sun Yat-sen lamented: “In the eight years since the Xinhai Revolution, [24]24 The Xinhai Revolution of 1911 overthrew the Qing dynasty and established the Republic of China. our international status has still not been able to keep pace with the great powers, and domestically there is still bureaucratic corruption, military tyranny, political mischief, and the people displaced. Why? Because after revolutionary destruction, there has been no construction.” [25]25 Sun Yat-sen, “Foreword to *Construction*,” in *Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen*, vol. 5 (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1985), p. 89. Therefore, “we publish the *Construction* magazine to advocate the trend of construction thought and to expound the principles of construction.” [26]26 Ibid. However, history has proven that “to lead the two great revolutions of China’s democratic revolution and China’s socialist revolution to complete fulfillment, no other party (whether a bourgeois party or a petty-bourgeois party) except the Communist Party of China is capable.” [27]27 Mao Zedong, “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship” (June 30, 1949), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 4 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991), p. 1478. History chose the CPC to create the conditions for “construction.” The bright prospect of “building a new China” guided the Party’s various tasks during the revolutionary war period. As Mao Zedong said, the entire purpose of the Chinese Communists leading the revolution is “to build a new society and a new state for the Chinese nation.” [28]28 Mao Zedong, “On New Democracy” (January 1940), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 2 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991), p. 663. For the Party, winning the revolutionary war “was only the first step in a long march of ten thousand li.” [29]29 Mao Zedong, “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” (March 5, 1949), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 4, p. 1438. “The serious task of economic construction lies before us.” [30]30 Ibid., p. 1437. “After the victory of the revolution, we must rapidly restore and develop production, deal with foreign imperialism, and steadily transform China from an agricultural country into an industrial country, building China into a great socialist state.” [31]31 Ibid., p. 1437. Thus, revolution is for the sake of construction; “only by destroying the old and rotten can we build the new and sound.” [32]32 Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government” (April 24, 1945), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991), p. 1097. To achieve this goal, “actively building” “a nationwide, mass-based, ideologically, politically, and organizationally fully consolidated, Bolshevikized Communist Party of China” [33]33 Mao Zedong, “Introducing *The Communist*” (October 4, 1939), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 2, p. 602. to realize the historical responsibility of the Party’s leadership became a “great project.” [34]34 Ibid., p. 602. Mao Zedong referred to building the CPC as a “great project of Party building.”

回顾历史,1919 年 8 月,孙中山领导创办了可以说是中国国民党(时称“中华革命党”)理论刊物的《建设》杂志。在该刊的发刊词中,孙中山感叹:辛亥革命“八年以来,国际地位犹未能与列强并驾,而国内则犹是官僚舞弊,武人专横,政客捣乱,人民流离者,何也?以革命破坏之后,而不能建设也”。“故发刊‘建设杂志’,以鼓吹建设之思潮,展明建设之原理”。然而,历史证明:“领导中国民主主义革命和中国社会主义革命这样两个伟大的革命到达彻底的完成,除了中国共产党之外,是没有任何一个别的政党(不论是资产阶级的政党或小资产阶级的政党)能够担负的”。历史选择了中国共产党来创造“建设”的条件,“建设新中国”这个光明前途引导着党在革命战争时期的各项工作。正如毛泽东所说,中国共产党人领导革命的一切目的,“在于建设一个中华民族的新社会和新国家”。对于党来说,取得革命战争的胜利“只不过是像万里长征走完了第一步”。“严重的经济建设任务摆在我们面前”。“在革命胜利以后,迅速地恢复和发展生产,对付国外的帝国主义,使中国稳步地由农业国转变为工业国,把中国建设成一个伟大的社会主义国家。”可见,革命是为着建设的,“只有破坏旧的腐朽的东西,才能建设新的健全的东西”。而为了达成这一目的,“积极地建设”“一个全国范围的、广大群众性的、思想上政治上组织上完全巩固的、布尔什维克化的中国共产党”,以实现党的领导的历史责任,就成为“伟大的工程”。

“The Communist Party of China governs China to lead the people in building the country better and making the people’s lives better.” [35]35 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Meeting Commemorating the 95th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China” (July 1, 2016), *People’s Daily*, July 2, 2016. After the founding of New China, the CPC led the people, using the tools of construction, to better build our country. Mao Zedong pointed out: “We have the Marxist-Leninist weapon of criticism and self-criticism. We can get rid of bad styles and maintain good ones. We can learn what we did not know. We are not only good at destroying the old world, we are also good at building a new one.” [36]36 Mao Zedong, “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee,” p. 1439. After completing the socialist revolution, “construction” became a keyword for the CPC’s own historical periodization, giving the verb “construction” the meaning of an era. This means that “construction” became the practical theme of the CPC after the socialist revolution. Although “reform” is a parallel historical periodization term, what it refers to is actually the “new period of reform, opening up, and socialist modernization.” [37]37 This is the official designation of the period from 1978 to 2012 in CPC historiography. After the exploration and twists and turns of socialist construction, since reform and opening up, the focus of the work of the Party and the state has shifted to socialist modernization centered on economic construction, and “construction” has become the central discourse. It is in the historical context of reform, opening up, and socialist modernization that we call Deng Xiaoping the “chief architect.” [38]38 Deng Xiaoping was widely called the “chief architect of reform and opening up.” In the New Era, under the directional and qualitative stipulations of “what kind of socialism with Chinese characteristics to uphold and develop, and how to uphold and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics,” [39]39 This is the first of the three major era questions raised at the 19th National Congress of the CPC in 2017. “what kind of socialist modernized powerful country to build and how to build a socialist modernized powerful country, what kind of long-term governing Marxist party to build and how to build a long-term governing Marxist party” [40]40 These are the second and third major era questions raised at the 19th National Congress. have become new era issues. Overall, the content of the CPC’s leadership of China’s socialist construction can be summarized into two practical categories: governing the Party and governing the state, which are mainly manifested as Party building and state building. This “construction” is decomposed into an overall blueprint design from the “three-step” strategy [41]41 The “three-step” strategy for modernization was proposed by Deng Xiaoping in 1987: first, double the 1980 GNP and ensure adequate food and clothing by 1990; second, double the 1990 GNP and achieve a relatively comfortable life by 2000; third, reach the level of moderately developed countries by the mid-21st century. to the “new three-step” strategy, [42]42 The “new three-step” strategy was proposed at the 19th National Congress in 2017: first, achieve a moderately prosperous society by 2020; second, basically realize socialist modernization by 2035; third, build China into a great modern socialist country by the mid-21st century. presented in various planning (program) documents, and forming a multi-level, multi-stage arrangement including historical tasks, central tasks, strategic tasks, and central work, basic work, and routine work. The Party leads the people to realize this through different leadership methods, such as political, ideological, and organizational ones.

“中国共产党在中国执政,就是要带领人民把国家建设得更好,让人民生活得更好。”新中国成立后,中国共产党带领人民,运用建设的工具,更好建设我们的国家。毛泽东指出:“我们有批评和自我批评这个马克思列宁主义的武器。我们能够去掉不良作风,保持优良作风。我们能够学会我们原来不懂的东西。我们不但善于破坏一个旧世界,我们还将善于建设一个新世界”。在完成社会主义革命后,“建设”已成为中国共产党对自身历史分期的关键词,使“建设”这个动词具有了时期的意义。这意味着,“建设”成为社会主义革命后中国共产党的实践主题。虽然,“改革”是与其并列的历史分期话语,但其所指的实为“改革开放和社会主义现代化建设新时期”。经历过社会主义建设的探索和曲折后,自改革开放以来,党和国家工作的重点转移到以经济建设为中心的社会主义现代化建设上来,“建设”成为中心性话语。正是在改革开放和社会主义现代化建设的历史语境下,我们称邓小平为“总设计师”。新时代以来,在“坚持和发展什么样的中国特色社会主义、怎样坚持和发展中国特色社会主义”的方向和性质的规定下,“建设什么样的社会主义现代化强国、怎样建设社会主义现代化强国,建设什么样的长期执政的马克思主义政党、怎样建设长期执政的马克思主义政党”成为新的时代课题。总体来看,中国共产党领导我国社会主义建设的内容可以概括为管党治党和治国理政两个实践范畴,二者又主要表现为党的建设和国家建设。这种“建设”分解为从“三步走”到“新三步走”的总体蓝图设计,呈现在诸种规划(计划)文件中,并形成包括历史任务、中心任务、战略任务和中心工作、基础工作、经常性工作等多层次、多阶段的安排,而党通过政治的、思想的、组织的等不同领导方式带领人民群众来实现。

“Construction” is the process of realizing the meaningful world and good things we anticipate. The process of “construction” is the self-improvement and development of socialism, the comprehensive progress of society, and the process of realizing the full and free development of the individual. In the CPC’s practice of “construction,” Party building is a dependent variable, unfolding around the central task of socialist construction. At the same time, it is also an independent variable existing as the “playwright” of history, [43]43 This metaphor draws on Marx’s *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.” The “playwright” here refers to the active, creative role of the Party in making history. leading and promoting the realization of social revolution through the method of self-revolution. Furthermore, “construction” is the central theme or general practical category of the CPC’s struggle practice since the founding of New China, especially after the completion of the socialist revolution. Therefore, “construction” becomes a window academic concept and a general theoretical category for explaining the Party’s historical practice. Or, it is necessary to observe and explain the Party’s historical practice of governing the Party and the state through this concept. It is not only internal to “what the CPC is,” but also directly indicates “what the CPC does,” and supplementarily answers “how the CPC does it.”

“建设”是我们所期待的意义世界和美好事物的现实化过程。“建设”的过程是社会主义的自我完善和发展,是社会的全面进步和人的全面自由实现的过程。在中国共产党的“建设”实践中,党的建设是一个因变量,其围绕着社会主义建设的中心任务展开。同时,它又是作为历史的“剧作者”存在的自变量,以自我革命的方式引领和推动社会革命的实现。进而,“建设”是中国共产党自新中国成立以来特别是社会主义革命完成后斗争实践的中心主题或者说一般性实践范畴。因而,“建设”也就成为解释党的历史实践的窗口性学术概念和一般性理论范畴。或者说有必要通过这一概念去观察和解释党的治党治国的历史实践。它不仅内在于中国共产党“是什么”,而且还直接表明了中国共产党“干什么”,并且补充性回答了中国共产党“怎么干”。

“Construction” is the practical unfolding of the stipulations of a Marxist party

“建设”是马克思主义政党规定性的实践展开

As is well known, the proletariat takes as its historical mission the smashing of the old world and the building of a new one. Marx and Engels pointed out in *Theses on Feuerbach*: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” “Construction” expresses the active planning and historical intervention of the historical subject. Marx believed that it is precisely this social technology (which Marx called “technology”) that “reveals the active relation of man to nature, the direct process of the production of his life, and thereby the process of his social relations and the mental conceptions that flow from those relations.” In the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels criticized the utopian socialists and communists for replacing “the historical conditions of emancipation” with “fantastic conditions” and “the gradual organization of the proletariat into a class” with “a specially designed social organization.” For in the view of these utopians, “the future history of the world is the propagation and implementation of their social plans.” “They think that people only need to understand their system to recognize it as the best plan for the best society.” “Therefore, they reject all political action, and especially all revolutionary action.” Furthermore, in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Marx also criticized “Lassalle’s fantasy” of relying on “state aid” rather than the workers’ conscious “building of a new society.” In summary, the classical Marxist writers advocated that the proletariat organize itself, in a planned and revolutionary manner, to build its own good society. Thus, the practice of “construction” makes it possible for us to shift our attention from understanding what the Communist Party of China, as a Marxist political party, seeks to pursue, to *how* it realizes what it seeks.

众所周知,无产阶级是将打碎旧世界,建设新世界作为历史使命的。马克思、恩格斯在《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》中指出:“哲学家们只是用不同的方式解释世界,而问题在于改变世界。”“建设”所表达的是历史主体的主动筹划及其历史干预。马克思认为,正是这种社会性技术(马克思称为“工艺学”)“揭示出人对自然的能动关系,人的生活的直接生产过程,从而人的社会生活关系和由此产生的精神观念的直接生产过程”。马克思和恩格斯在《共产党宣言》中对空想的社会主义和共产主义者用“幻想的条件”代替“解放的历史条件”,“由一种特意设计出来的社会组织”代替“无产阶级的逐步组织成为阶级”的做法给予了批判。因为在这些空想主义者看来,“今后的世界历史不过是宣传和实施他们的社会计划”。“他们以为,人们只要理解他们的体系,就会承认这种体系是最美好的社会的最美好的计划。”“因此,他们拒绝一切政治行动,特别是一切革命行动”。此外,马克思在《哥达纲领批判》中还批判了依赖“国家帮助”而不是工人自觉“建设一个新社会”的“拉萨尔的幻想”。概而言之,马克思主义经典作家主张的是无产阶级自己组织起来,有计划的、革命性的建设属于自己的美好社会。因而,“建设”的实践为我们将注意力从理解作为马克思主义政党的中国共产党要追求什么,转变为它“如何”实现其所求成为可能。

The history of human society is a natural history, but it is not a metaphysical history independent of human beings; it is not self-planning, but rather the result of purposeful pursuit by people within the resultant force of history. And human planning is realized through the political intermediary—the state—and its leader—the political party. As a political party aimed at intervening in social reality, it does not need to maintain a nominal value neutrality or a specific distance from the entire history encompassing the past, present, and future, as a historian would. On the contrary, what it must do is to represent a specific class or the people in making choices, to “design” the future with full purpose, and to realize the pursuit of a good life through holding political power without concealment. The Party’s governance enables the masses of the people to “consciously create their own history” and makes it possible for the anarchy within social production to be “replaced by a planned, conscious organization.” The people, organized, propelled, and guided by the Party, play a historical role as the creators of history. Consequently, history becomes living, human, and “constructible.” Therefore, only through “construction” can the behavior of governing the Party and the state be truly “understood from the perspective of the subject” and “understood as practice”; only then can the subject and domain of building socialism with Chinese characteristics be examined from a “state of motion” and a “living state,” thereby truly regarding socialism as “something essentially changing”; and only then can socialism and the good life move from theoretical advocacy and moral commitment to genuine social practice. Of course, “construction” itself is historical; it proceeds according to the conditions and requirements provided by specific history, but these conditions are observed and utilized within the blueprint of the future. In other words, “construction” itself is situated within history, possessing a temporal structure of past, present, and future. At the same time, in reality, it is subject to multiple constraints from political, economic, cultural, social, geographical, and other real structures. Yet it is precisely “construction” based on historical conditions that manifests the Party’s historical subjectivity and conscious historical initiative. As mentioned earlier, “revolution” is directed toward “construction”; the former emphasizes “breaking down,” the latter “building up.” “Social revolution is based on the contradictory movement of productive forces and relations of production; it is not merely a social movement to destroy the old political superstructure, but even more so a movement for new social construction.” [44]44 Xi Jinping, “Speech at a Conference Commemorating the 110th Anniversary of the Birth of Comrade Mao Zedong” (December 26, 2023), *People’s Daily*, December 27, 2023.

人类社会历史是一个自然历史,但它并不是一个形而上学的、独立于人之外的历史,它不是自我规划的,而是在其中的人在历史的合力中有目的的追求的结果。而人的规划是通过政治中介——国家——及其领导者——政党——来实现的。作为旨在介入社会现实的政党,它无需像历史学家那样对包含过去、现在和将来的整个历史保持名义上的价值中立或特定距离。恰恰相反,它要做的就是代表特定的阶级或代表人民作出选择,完全具有目的性地“设计”未来,并毫不掩饰地通过执掌政权来实现对美好生活的追求。党的执政使人民群众“自觉地自己创造自己的历史”,使社会生产内部的无政府状态为“有计划的自觉的组织所代替”成为可能。人民在党的组织、推动和引导下,作为历史的创造者发挥历史性的作用。进而,历史成为活生生的,属人的,可“建设”的。因而,只有在“建设”中,才能真正把治党治国的行为“从主体方面去理解”,“当作实践去理解”;才能真正把中国特色社会主义建设的主体和领域,从“运动的状态”“活的状态”去考察,从而把社会主义真正“看做本质上变化的东西”;才能使社会主义和美好生活从理论倡导和道德承诺真正走向社会实践。当然,“建设”本身是历史性的,它根据具体的历史提供的条件和要求进行,只是这一条件是在未来的蓝图中被观察和使用的。换言之,“建设”本身是处于历史中的,有着过去、现在和未来的时间结构。同时,又在现实中受制于政治的、经济的、文化的、社会的、地理的等现实结构的多元约束。但正是基于历史条件的“建设”彰显着党的历史主体性地位和历史主动性自觉。如前所述,“革命”是指向“建设”的,前者重在“破”,后者重在“立”。“社会革命以生产力和生产关系的矛盾运动为基础,不仅仅是一种破除旧的政治上层建筑的社会运动,更是一种新的社会建设运动。”

The generality of the theoretical category of “construction” does not imply the consistency of the practical category. Defeating the enemy is achieved “step by step,” and the “cause of construction” is also learned and developed “step by step.” “The understanding of the laws of building socialism must go through a process. It must proceed from practice, from having no experience to having experience, from having less experience to having more experience, from building socialism, this unknown realm of necessity, to gradually overcoming blindness, recognizing objective laws, and thereby gaining freedom, achieving a leap in understanding and reaching the realm of freedom.” [45]45 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Enlarged Central Work Conference” (January 30, 1962), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 8, p. 300. This also requires that “we always think about problems, make decisions, and handle affairs based on national conditions, neither reaching for what is beyond our grasp nor sticking to old ways, maintaining historical patience, and adhering to steady progress, advancing step by step, and sustained advancement.” [46]46 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Seminar on the Study and Implementation of the Spirit of the 20th National Congress of the CPC” (February 7, 2023), *People’s Daily*, February 8, 2023. On this historical foundation, construction continues “generation after generation.” As a project of historical succession, “having successors” thus becomes the Party’s “fundamental plan.” [47]47 “The fundamental plan for the Party and the state is to have successors.” See *Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party’s Centenary Struggle* (November 11, 2021). “To forge iron, one must be strong oneself,” and the quality of Party building becomes the fundamental guarantee for the quality of socialist construction (state construction) led by the Party. Of course, when “the bricks for building socialism are not yet fired,” what a Marxist political party does is not to wait passively, but to actively learn, strive to liberate “the new social factors latent in society itself,” and carefully tend to the “sprouts of the new things” that represent the direction of development. [48]48 “The new social factors latent in society itself” and “sprouts of the new things” are drawn from Lenin’s discussion of the sprouts of communism in *The Great Beginning* (June 1919). Promoting the Two Integrations, using the new achievements of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times to arm the entire Party, educate the people, and guide practice, and creating conditions to “facilitate the transformation of things,” are requirements for exerting historical initiative to achieve qualitative change through quantitative change. The direction, capability, and effectiveness of Party building and state building are not only the “touchstone” for testing the Party’s nature but also ultimately determine the fate of the Party and the fate of socialism.

“建设”的理论范畴的一般性并不意味着实践范畴的一致性。战胜敌人是“一步一步地”实现的,“建设事业”也是“一步一步地”学会和发展的。“对于建设社会主义的规律的认识,必须有一个过程。必须从实践出发,从没有经验到有经验。从有较少的经验,到有较多的经验,从建设社会主义这个未被认识的必然王国,到逐步地克服盲目性、认识客观规律、从而获得自由,在认识上出现一个飞跃,到达自由王国。”这也要求“我们始终从国情出发想问题、作决策、办事情,既不好高骛远,也不因循守旧,保持历史耐心,坚持稳中求进、循序渐进、持续推进”。在这个历史基础上,“一茬接一茬”的接续建设。而作为一个历史接续的工程,“后继有人”也就成为党的“根本大计”,“打铁必须自身硬”,党的建设质量就成为党所领导的社会主义建设(国家建设)质量的根本保证。当然,“建设社会主义的砖头现在还没有烧好”的时候,马克思主义政党所做的不是消极等待,而是积极学习,努力解放“社会本身孕育着的新社会因素”,精心照料那代表发展方向的“新事物的幼芽”。而推进“两个结合”,用马克思主义中国化时代化的新成果武装全党、教育人民、指导实践,为“促成事物的转化”创造条件,是发挥历史主动性以量变达成质变的要求。而党的建设和国家建设的方向、能力、效果不仅是检验党的性质的“试金石”,也最终决定着党的命运和社会主义的命运。

The Limitations of the Social Engineering Category of “Construction”

“建设”的社会工程学范畴的局限性

In the history of academic development, this process of “consciously creating one’s own history,” and the discussions on state intervention and social planning, have gradually been conceptualized into a theoretical category centered on the term “social engineering.” Traditional “natural engineering” emphasizes the use of science to make natural resources serve humanity and benefit it; it “is essentially the unity of the integration process, integration method, and integration mode for constructing a new artificial existence.” “From the perspective of acquiring and changing things, the essence of engineering is construction.” “Social engineering” is a concept corresponding to “physical engineering” or “natural engineering.” In 1916, Max Weber used the metaphor of social engineering in *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism*, and jurist Roscoe Pound introduced “social engineering” into the field of jurisprudence relatively early. In Pound’s view, social engineering is a political act intervening in social interest relations, and the execution of engineering is the design of laws or institutions. In 1979, Qian Xuesen and Wu Jiapei published the article “Social Engineering: The Technology for Organizing and Managing Socialist Construction,” calling the technology for organizing and managing socialist construction social engineering. [49]49 Qian Xuesen and Wu Jiapei, “Social Engineering: The Technology for Organizing and Managing Socialist Construction,” *Economic Management*, no. 1 (1979). Subsequently, research on social engineering in domestic academia gradually enriched. Overall, research on social (system) engineering mainly has three dimensions: first, emphasizing its technical dimension originating from engineering; second, emphasizing the dimension of transforming social relations directed at social construction; third, emphasizing the systematic and comprehensive dimension in thinking and operation derived from the concept of systems engineering. In summary, currently, social engineering is mainly understood as methods and practices aimed at solving social problems, guided by social science theory, to transform the social world and adjust social relations.

在学术发展史上,这种“自觉地自己创造自己的历史”的过程,关于国家干预、社会计划的讨论,逐渐概念化为以“社会工程”为中心语词的理论范畴。传统的“自然工程”强调利用科学,使自然资源为人类所使用,为人类谋取福利,其“实质上就是建构一个新的人工存在物的集成过程、集成方式和集成模式的统一”。而“从对物的获取和改变角度来看,工程的本质是建造”。“社会工程”是与“物理工程”或者“自然工程”相对应的概念。1916 年,韦伯(MaxWeber)在《儒教与道教》中就使用了社会工程的隐喻,法学家罗斯科·庞德(Roscoe Pound)则较早地将“社会工程”引入法学领域。在庞德看来,社会工程是一种介入社会利益关系的政治行为,工程的执行即是法律或制度设计。1979 年,钱学森、乌家培发表了《组织管理社会主义建设的技术社会工程》一文,把组织管理社会主义建设的技术叫作社会工程。随后国内学术界社会工程的研究逐渐丰富起来。总体来看,社会(系统)工程的研究主要有三个维度,一是强调其发自于工程学的技术性维度;二是强调指向社会建设的社会关系改造维度;三是强调源自系统工程观念,在思维和操作上的系统性、综合性维度。概括来说,当前,主要将社会工程理解为旨在解决社会问题,以社会科学理论为指导,改造社会世界、调整社会关系的方法和实践。

As for the representative views of neoliberals, for example, Karl Popper believed that “all social engineering, no matter how much it prides itself on its realism and its scientific nature, is doomed to remain a utopian dream.” Popper opposed holistic social planning, arguing: “Just as the main task of the physical engineer is to design machines and improve and repair them, the task of the piecemeal social engineer is to design social institutions and rebuild and operate existing social institutions.” Hayek regarded rational social construction as “the fatal conceit.” James C. Scott’s research shares similar views with Popper; “social engineering” is the core concept of his critical study of state intervention. He refers to projects aimed at improving the human condition as “utopian large-scale social engineering,” arguing that “a state that ignores the values, hopes, and goals of its people in fact poses a fatal threat to the good life of humanity.” Marx, in “The British Rule in India,” clarified that in Asia, the department of public works managed by the central government had been one of the three government departments since ancient times (the other two being the finance department and the war department), an economic function that “all Asiatic governments” “could not but” perform. As for the issue of the relationship between authority and autonomy implied behind this, Engels also gave an answer: “It is absurd to treat the principle of authority as absolutely evil and the principle of autonomy as absolutely good. Authority and autonomy are relative things, and their spheres of application vary with the different stages of social development.” Research based on the Chinese context finds that under the unified leadership of the Communist Party of China, through overall planning, forceful promotion, and sustained persistence, various forces are aggregated to form a strong national capacity for good governance, effectively promoting the implementation of the giant social engineering project of eliminating poverty.

而就新自由主义者的代表性观点来看,如波普尔(Karl Popper)认为,“一切社会工程,不管它多么地以自己的现实主义和自己的科学性自诩,都注定了依然是一种乌托邦的梦想”。波普尔反对总体性的社会筹划,他认为:“正如物理工程师的主要任务是设计机器并改进和检修机器一样 , 零碎社会工程师的任务就是设计社会制度并重建和运转现有的社会制度”。哈耶克(Hayek)则视理性的社会建构行为为“致命的自负”。斯科特(James C.Scott)的研究有着与波普尔相似的观点 ,“社会工程”是其对国家干预的批判性研究的核心概念。他把试图改善人类状况的项目指称为“乌托邦式的大型社会工程”,认为“无视其国民的价值、希望和目标的国家,事实上会对人类美好生活构成致命的威胁”。而马克思在《不列颠在印度的统治》中即以阐明,在亚洲,由中央政府管理的公共工程部门是从远古的时候起一直就有的三个政府部门之一(其余两个是财政部门和战争部门),是“亚洲的一切政府”都“不能不执行”的一种经济职能。而就其背后所隐含的权威与自治的关系问题,恩格斯同样也有了回答:“把权威原则说成是绝对坏的东西,而把自治原则说成是绝对好的东西,这是荒谬的。权威与自治是相对的东西,它们应用的范围是随着社会发展阶段的不同而改变的。”基于中国场景的研究发现,在中国共产党的统一领导下,统筹谋划,强力推进,持之以恒,将各种力量聚合在一起,形成的强大国家善治能力,有效推动了消除贫困的巨型社会工程的实施。

It is evident to all that the Communist Party of China and the socialist construction it leads have not fallen into the situation predicted and criticized by Popper and others. On the one hand, this depends on whether we acknowledge that the people can form basic consensus and whether the people’s production and life practices possess historical temporary stability; on the other hand, it depends on how Popper, Hayek, and others understand Marxism or scientific socialism. Popper did not specify the time period for “gradual” in his “piecemeal social engineering”; his theory is vague and full of personal subjective preferences, and Marxists do not understand history as monolithic. Marxists are not prophets, but they have discovered the conditions for the full and free development of human beings. In fact, in the practice of “construction,” the CPC’s approach characterized by policy experiments such as “demonstration zones” and “pilot zones” indeed shares similarities with Popper’s “trial and error method” and falsification principle. However, “One who fails to plan for the whole is inadequate to plan for a part.” [50]50 A classical Chinese saying from the Qing dynasty text *The Art of War in the Context of the Whole Situation* (《寤言二·迁都建藩议》), emphasizing the need for comprehensive planning. It is precisely by properly handling the relationship between “top-level design” and “crossing the river by feeling the stones,” [51]51 A metaphor for pragmatic, incremental reform, famously used by Deng Xiaoping to describe China’s reform and opening up approach. and effectively applying the working principle of “an effective market and a competent government,” that China has achieved stable and sustained development and created remarkable achievements. Currently, “a major historical task before us is to make the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics more mature and well-defined, and to provide a more complete, stable, and effective institutional system for the development of the Party and the state, for the well-being and happiness of the people, for social harmony and stability, and for the long-term peace and order of the country. This project is extremely grand; it must be a comprehensive and systematic reform and improvement, a linkage and integration of reforms and improvements in all fields.” [52]52 Quoted from Xi Jinping’s speech at the 18th Collective Study Session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee on February 17, 2014. The CPC’s practice of governing the Party and the state is a unity of mission guidance and problem orientation. The advancement of what we refer to as the “grand project” is a process of combining unified and decentralized approaches, overall design, and gradual implementation.

有目共睹的是,中国共产党及其所领导的社会主义建设并没有陷入波普尔等人所预测、所批判的境况。这一方面,取决于我们是否承认人民能够形成基本共识,人民的生产生活实践是否具有历史的暂时稳定性;另一方面,取决于波普尔、哈耶克等人如何理解马克思主义或科学社会主义。波普尔并未规定其“渐进的社会工程”中“渐进”的时间周期,它的理论是模糊的,充满了个人主观喜恶,而马克思主义者也并非把历史理解为铁板一块。马克思主义者不是预言家,但却发现了满足人的全面自由发展的条件规定。实际上,在“建设”的实践中,中国共产党以“示范区”“试验区”等政策试验为特征的做法恰恰与波普尔的“试错法”和证伪原则有着相似之处。但“不谋全局者,不足谋一域。”正是良好处理了“顶层设计”与“摸着石头过河”的关系,有效运用了“有效市场、有为政府的工作原则”,我国才实现了稳定而持久的发展,创造了举世瞩目的成就。当前,“摆在我们面前的一项重大历史任务,就是推动中国特色社会主义制度更加成熟更加定型,为党和国家事业发展、为人民幸福安康、为社会和谐稳定、为国家长治久安提供一整套更完备、更稳定、更管用的制度体系。这项工程极为宏大,必须是全面的系统的改革和改进,是各领域改革和改进的联动和集成”。中国共产党的治党治国实践是使命引领与问题导向相统一,我们所指的“宏大工程”的推进是统分结合、总体设计、渐进实施的过程。

Thus, “construction” under the category of social engineering is discussed from three different dimensions: affirmative (mainly by Chinese scholars), neutral (mainly by legal scholars), and negative (mainly by neoliberals). On the one hand, this indicates that the theoretical connotation of social engineering is inconsistent, or that social engineering theory does not yet possess the comprehensiveness and explanatory power that a mature theory should have. On the other hand, the study of social engineering uses the general term “social” to distinguish itself from physical or natural engineering, but social engineering discourse cannot or has not found its core related discourse, failing to establish a proper academic discourse system. It can be said that the current thinking on social engineering in Chinese academic circles is largely influenced by Qian Xuesen’s [53]53 Qian Xuesen (1911–2009), a renowned Chinese scientist and a key figure in China’s missile and space program, who also wrote on systems engineering and social engineering. view of social engineering, advocating the use of pluralistic and systematic perspectives to understand, plan, and manage society. However, upon careful examination, it can still be found that its macro-methodological significance is greater. Bai Shuying [54]54 Bai Shuying, a contemporary Chinese sociologist at Harbin Institute of Technology, known for her work on social engineering theory. believes that social engineering has not moved beyond conceptual discussion and philosophical speculation to address social problems. Current social engineering research is, to a large extent, equivalent to the philosophy of social engineering. Li Bocong [55]55 Li Bocong, a contemporary Chinese philosopher of technology at the University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, known for his work on engineering philosophy. suggests strengthening research on constructive social engineering (as opposed to revolutionary social engineering) and recommends using political science and political philosophy as theoretical backgrounds. However, researchers in social engineering have not crossed disciplinary boundaries. Currently, the study of social engineering, which has yet to break new ground, is gradually shifting its focus to social governance and national governance, but it still uses social engineering theory in a normative sense and has not yet found the core subject of engineering practice—the Communist Party of China—and naturally cannot discover the true practical mode of engineering—“construction.”

可见,社会工程学范畴下的“建设”被从肯定(以我国学者为主)、中性(以法学学者为主)、否定(以新自由主义为主)三个不同的维度加以探讨。一方面,这说明社会工程的理论内涵具有非一致性,或者说社会工程理论还不具备一个成熟的理论所应具有的统摄性和解释力。另一方面,社会工程学的研究使用“社会”统称,以与物理或自然工程相区别,但社会工程话语无法或没有找到与其相关联的核心话语,未能建立起应有的学术话语体系。可以说,目前我国学术界关于社会工程的思想在很大程度上受钱学森社会工程观的影响,主张用多元的、系统的观点去认识社会、规划和管理社会。但是,细细审视,仍可发现其宏观方法论意义更大些。白淑英认为,社会工程并没有走出概念的探讨、跳离哲学的思辨,而走向社会问题的解决。当前的社会工程研究在很大意义上等同于社会工程哲学研究。李伯聪建议加强对建设性的社会工程(与革命性的社会工程相对)的研究,并建议以政治学和政治哲学为理论背景。但社会工程学的研究者并未跨越学科边界。当前,一直未破题的社会工程学研究,虽逐渐将研究目光转向社会治理、国家治理,但仍然在规范意义上使用社会工程理论,仍未找到工程实践的核心主体——中国共产党,自然也就无法发现工程的真正实践方式——“建设”。

“Construction”: Toward the Political Engineering of the Communist Party of China

“建设”:通向中国共产党的政治工程学

In the discourse of the Communist Party of China, the discourse of “construction” is governed by the discourse of “engineering,” and engineering thinking serves the behavior of “construction.” Related discourses include: regarding law-abiding by all citizens as the “foundational project” of “advancing the construction of the socialist rule-of-law system with Chinese characteristics”; regarding “building a strong education system” as the “foundational project for comprehensively advancing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation through Chinese-path modernization”; regarding “increasing the technological content of our military construction” as “accelerating the implementation of major strategic projects in defense technology and weaponry”; regarding “comprehensively advancing the integrated construction of ideological and political courses in universities, middle schools, and primary schools” as “an important project” for strengthening the Party’s leadership over the construction of ideological and political theory courses, and so on. The “construction” of these projects unfolds under the theme and direction of socialist construction and under “popular support,” which is “the greatest politics.” If “the people’s aspiration for a better life is our goal,” then not only is Chinese-path modernization construction the greatest politics at present, but all “construction” related to the people’s aspirations and popular support is political. This implies the necessity of understanding “construction” from the perspective of political engineering.

在中国共产党的话语中,“建设”话语是由“工程”话语所统领的,工程思维服务于“建设”行为。相关话语诸如:把全民守法作为“推进中国特色社会主义法治体系建设”的“基础工程”;把“建设教育强国”作为“以中国式现代化全面推进中华民族伟大复兴的基础工程”;把“提高我军建设科技含量”作为“加快实施国防科技和武器装备重大战略工程”;把“统筹推进大中小学思政课一体化建设”作为加强党对思想政治理论课建设的领导的“一项重要工程”,等等。这些工程的“建设”是在社会主义建设的主题和方向下,在“民心”这个“最大的政治”下展开的。如果说,“人民对美好生活的向往 , 就是我们的奋斗目标”。那么,不仅中国式现代化建设是当前最大的政治,一切与人民的向往、与民心所向相关的“建设”都是政治的。而这意味着有必要从政治工程的角度去理解“建设”。

Viewed from the theoretical lineage of political engineering, James Mackay published the article “Political Engineering” in 1914 and the book *National Happiness: The Beginning of Political Engineering* in 1915, attempting to establish a political science engineering based on Bentham’s utilitarianism. More attention has been paid to Sartori’s *Political Development and Political Engineering* (1968) and Benjamin Reilly’s *Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific* (2006), both of which emphasize the artificial nature of political institutional design. However, the first clear definition of political engineering was provided by Ashu M. G. Solo. He considers the use of the term political engineering to refer to the design of political systems to be an inappropriate usage, and defines political engineering as: the application of engineering, computer science, mathematics, or natural sciences to solving political problems. This more contemporary definition has not yet been developed in depth. A related field that has received more attention is the study of constitutional (constitutionalist) engineering. Bao Gangsheng believes that constitutional engineering can be defined as the purposeful design of a country’s constitution and political institutions to achieve certain expected political goals. The meaning of political engineering is similar, the difference being that the former places greater emphasis on the constitution, while the latter places greater emphasis on political institutions in a general sense. Hu Wei argues that China’s democratic construction agenda, under the leadership of the CPC, involves top-level design, clarifying goals, models, strategies, and paths, formulating roadmaps and timetables, and implementing and advancing them in a planned, step-by-step, and rhythmic manner, which in practice constitutes China’s political engineering or constitutional engineering of democracy. The international academic community has published dozens of political science monographs with keywords such as “constitutional engineering,” “political engineering,” “electoral engineering,” “institutional engineering,” “democratic construction,” and “constitutional design” in their main or subtitles. There are already hundreds of related academic papers. Constitutional engineering has become a rapidly growing new field in comparative political science over the past 20 years. However, existing studies of political or constitutional (constitutionalist) engineering have ultimately remained within a Western perspective, stopping at the fields of political construction (especially democratic construction) or rule-of-law construction. In a sense, the study of constitutional (constitutionalist) engineering remains an application of Pound’s social engineering of law. Clearly, this does not reflect or align with the practice of the CPC in governing the Party and the state, such as emphasizing political construction as “fundamental construction” and ideological construction as “basic construction” within the great project of Party building, while designating the strengthening of intra-Party supervision as an “important basic project.” [56]56 Pound’s social engineering of law: A theory proposed by American legal sociologist Roscoe Pound, viewing law as a tool for social engineering to balance competing interests.

从政治工程的理论脉络看,詹姆斯·麦凯(James Mackay)1914 年发表了《政治工程》一文,1915 年出版《国家幸福:政治工程学的开端》,试图基于边沁的功利主义建立一门政治科学工程学;受关注较多的则是萨托利(Sartori)的《政治发展与政治工程学》(1968)和本杰明·赖利(Benjamin Reilly)的《民主与多样性:亚太地区的政治工程》(2006),他们都强调政治制度设计的人为性质。但首次对政治工程作出明确界定的是阿舒·索罗(Ashu M. G. Solo)。他认为用政治工程一词指设计政治体制,是一个不恰当的用法,并将政治工程定义为:将工程学、计算机科学、数学或自然科学应用于解决政治问题。只是这一更具时代性的定义尚未做展开研究。与政治工程(学)较为相关且受到较多关注的是宪法(宪政)工程(学)的研究。包刚升认为,宪法工程学可以定义为对一个国家的宪法和政治制度进行有目的的设计 , 以达成某些预期的政治目标。政治工程学的含义是相似的 , 差异在于前者更重视宪法 , 后者更重视一般意义上的政治制度。胡伟认为,中国的民主建设议程 , 在中国共产党的领导下 , 进行顶层设计 , 厘清目标、模式、战略和路径 , 制定路线图和时间表 , 并有计划、有步骤、有节奏地加以实施和推进,实际构成了中国民主的政治工程学或宪政工程学。国际学术界已出版主标题或副标题带有“宪法工程学”“政治工程学”“选举工程学”“制度工程学”“民主建构”“宪法设计”等关键词的政治学专著达数十部。相关学术论文已有数百篇。宪法工程学已成为最近 20 年比较政治学快速成长的新兴领域。然而,既有的政治或宪法(宪政)工程(学)研究最终停留在了西方视野中,止步于政治建设(特别是民主建设)或法治建设领域。而宪法(宪政)工程学的研究某种意义上仍是庞德法律社会工程学的应用。显然,这并不能反映或契合中国共产党治党治国的实践,如在党的建设伟大工程中强调政治建设是“根本性建设”,思想建设是“基础性建设”,而把强化党内监督作为“重要基础性工程”。

The dislocation of discourse stems from a dislocation in the starting point and direction of thinking. It can be believed that when researchers of social engineering, constitutional engineering, and other engineering fields turn to the practice of the CPC in governing the Party and the state and understand it from the perspective of the CPC, the study of engineering will inevitably shift to political engineering, and moreover, to political engineering centered on the political party (the CPC). In the past, “the prominent link in the process of engineering research was ‘design,’ including object design and process design.” However, the “design” of “engineering” is actually a graphical technical process, which undoubtedly loses the subjective attributes of the engineering constructors. Due to its descriptive nature, it cannot see the action characteristics of the subject in practice. As Lenin said, “The period of describing great tasks from the political standpoint has passed; the period of actually fulfilling these tasks has arrived.” [57]57 V. I. Lenin, “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government” (1918). “It was necessary at the time to show the people what we were going to build and what we were building, and to strive for those unprecedented new things. But can we continue to show the people what we are going to build? No! If we did, even the most ordinary worker would laugh at us. He would say: ‘Why do you keep telling us what you are going to build? Let us see your actions—whether you can build or not. If you cannot, then we are not on the same path; get out of here!’ He would be right in saying so.” [58]58 V. I. Lenin, “Report on the Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government” (1918). It can be seen that “construction” is not only the political responsibility of a Marxist political party but also reflects its governing capacity and concerns its ruling position.

话语的错位源于思考基点、思维指向的错位。可以相信,当社会工程、宪法工程等工程研究者转向中国共产党治党治国实践,站在中国共产党的视角去理解时,工程学的研究也必将会转向政治工程,而且是以政党(中国共产党)为中心的政治工程。过往来看,“工程研究过程中所突出的环节是‘设计’,它包括对象设计和过程设计”。然而,“工程”的“设计”实际上是一种图示化的技术过程,这无疑丢失了工程建设者的主体属性。因其描述性本质,也就无法看到实践中主体的行动特征。正如列宁所说,“应当从政治上描述伟大任务的时期已经过去,应当实际完成这些任务的时期已经到来”。“为了向人民表明我们要怎样建设和建设什么,要为哪些前所未有的新事物奋斗,这些东西在当初是必要的。但是,能不能继续向人民表明我们要建设什么呢?不能!要是这样,连一个最普通的工人也要取笑我们了。他会说:‘你怎么老是向我们说你要怎样建设,让我们看看你的行动,——你会不会建设。如果不会,那我们就走不到一块,滚你的吧!’他这样说是对的。”可见,“建设”不仅是马克思主义政党的政治责任,还反映其执政能力,关乎其执政地位。

Political engineering is a value system; it is a constructive process organized, led, and promoted by a political subject. Constructing a political engineering based on the CPC requires understanding both the political attributes of the CPC and the CPC’s view of “politics,” while also grasping the particularity of “engineering” technology. Marxism, which serves as the source of the standpoint, viewpoint, and method for CPC members to study and solve problems, itself possesses class character, or political character. In Anderson’s view, “historical materialism is also ‘scientific socialism’”; “it is the cause of understanding the present and grasping the future—a political project imbued with the revolutionary concept of the proletariat.” [59]59 Perry Anderson, *Considerations on Western Marxism* (1976). For a Marxist political party, the task of “construction” is political. Lenin emphasized, “Politics is the struggle between classes,” “but our struggle has two aspects: on the one hand, to smash what is left over from the bourgeois system,” and “on the other hand, the task—the task of construction.” [60]60 V. I. Lenin, “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government” (1918). Although the engineering technology of construction is a means to achieve specific goals, this technological neutrality makes its combination with specific values contingent. That is to say, the political direction pursued by the leader of construction determines the direction of construction. The Party, as the leader, uses state power to interact with economic forces, either promoting, hindering, or changing the direction of economic development. Of course, construction is a “totality of processes,” and “in this change, despite all apparent contingencies and despite all temporary setbacks, progressive development will ultimately be realized.” [61]61 Friedrich Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (1886). But without a political understanding of “construction,” one drifts with the tide in the great wave of construction, loses direction, and constantly negates the foundation of one’s own project, ultimately building the project on quicksand, inevitably leading to collapse. In this light, it is not difficult to understand why it is emphasized that the CPC is the highest political leadership force; why it is emphasized that upholding the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee is the highest political principle of the Party; why we emphasize that “on major issues of principle concerning the system, we must take a clear-cut stand and be firm, without any ambiguity. … If there is no problem with the direction, there will be no political problems”; [62]62 Xi Jinping, speech at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (2014). and why it is emphasized that the decisive role in the “Four Greats” is played by the new great project of Party building, and that “the Party’s political construction is the fundamental construction of the Party, determining the direction and effectiveness of Party building, and is crucial for comprehensively advancing the great struggle, the great project, the great cause, and the great dream.” [63]63 Xi Jinping, report to the 19th National Congress of the CPC (2017).

政治工程是一个价值系统,其是一个政治主体有组织地引领和推动的建构过程。建构基于中国共产党的政治工程学既要理解中国共产党的政治属性,还要理解中国共产党的“政治”观,同时还要把握“工程”技术的特殊性。作为中国共产党人研究和解决问题的立场观点方法来源的马克思主义,本身就具有阶级性或者说政治性。在安德森看来,“历史唯物主义也是‘科学的社会主义’”,“它是理解当前和把握未来的事业——一项带有无产阶级革命理念的政治工程”。对马克思主义政党而言,“建设”的任务是政治性的。列宁强调,“政治就是各阶级之间的斗争”,“但是我们的斗争有两个方面,一方面要粉碎资产阶级制度遗留下来的东西”,而“另一方面的任务——建设任务”。虽然,建设的工程技术是达成特定目标的手段,这种技术中立性使其与特定价值的结合是偶然的。也就是说,建设的领导者所追求的政治方向决定了建设的方向。党作为领导者运用国家权力与经济力相作用,或促进,或阻碍,或改变经济发展的方向。当然,建设是“过程的集合体”,“这种变化中,尽管有种种表面的偶然性,尽管有种种暂时的倒退,前进的发展终究会实现”。但如果没有对“建设”的政治性理解,在建设的大潮中随波逐流,迷失方向,不断否定自身的工程之基,最终使工程建立在流沙之上,而难免倾覆。这样我们也就不难理解,为何要强调中国共产党是最高政治领导力量;为何要强调坚持党中央集中统一领导是党的最高政治原则;为何我们强调“涉及制度层面的大是大非问题,必须旗帜鲜明、立场坚定,不能有丝毫含糊。……方向上就没有问题,政治上就不会出问题”;为何强调“四个伟大”中起决定性作用的是党的建设新的伟大工程,而“党的政治建设是党的根本性建设,决定党的建设方向和效果,事关统揽推进伟大斗争、伟大工程、伟大事业、伟大梦想”。

Conclusion

结语

Xi Jinping pointed out: “We should accelerate the construction of Chinese discourse and Chinese narrative systems, use Chinese theory to explain Chinese practice, and use Chinese practice to elevate Chinese theory, creating new concepts, categories, and expressions that integrate China and the world, and more fully and vividly present the Chinese story and the ideological strength and spiritual power behind it.” [64]64 “建设” (construction) — A key term in CPC discourse, referring to the systematic building and development of Party, state, and society, distinct from Western notions of “construction” as mere physical infrastructure. It implies a continuous, planned, and dialectical process of transformation. At present, China’s academic community is consciously constructing disciplinary systems, academic systems, and discourse systems. But realistically, to analyze the internal logic of the CPC’s historical practice and form a unique knowledge system with explanatory power, it is necessary to determine general theoretical categories centered on the historical practice of the CPC in governing the Party and the state, so as to help us integrate the fragmented results divided by disciplines and form a holistic understanding of the CPC. “Construction” is precisely such a concept with historical continuity and practical comprehensiveness. Answering well how the masses use the Party as an “organizational weapon” to build a new world is not only a fundamental question of Marxist party theory but also the theoretical and historical consciousness that should be possessed in summarizing and analyzing the rich historical practice of the CPC in governing the Party and the state and in refining basic theoretical categories.

习近平指出:“要加快构建中国话语和中国叙事体系,用中国理论阐释中国实践,用中国实践升华中国理论,打造融通中外的新概念、新范畴、新表述,更加充分、更加鲜明地展现中国故事及其背后的思想力量和精神力量。”时下,我国学术界正在自觉地构建学科体系、学术体系、话语体系,但现实地看,分析中国共产党历史实践的内在逻辑,形成有解释力的独特知识体系,需要以中国共产党治党治国的历史实践为中心确定一般性理论范畴,以帮助我们把被学科分割的碎片化的成果整合起来,形成对中国共产党的整体认知。而“建设”正是这样一个具有历史贯通性和现实统合性的概念。回答好人民群众如何使用党这个“组织武器”来建设新世界,不仅是马克思主义政党理论的基本问题,也是总结和分析中国共产党治党治国的丰富历史实践,凝练基本理论范畴所应有的理论自觉和历史自觉。

Undoubtedly, most of the content of this article is well known in academic circles, but taking the concept of “construction” as a guide to construct a specialized “political engineering,” and theorizing the practice of governing the Party and the state in the course of the CPC’s leadership of socialism with Chinese characteristics, is an attempt to establish a new paradigm for the study of the CPC. It is believed that this will help us understand the tension between historical initiative and historical determinacy in the CPC’s “construction,” and understand how it prevents its own incapacitation, state failure, government dysfunction, market anomie, and social disorder. This is even more an attempt to further understand what the CPC “is, does,” and “how it does it.” The political engineering centered on “construction” is essentially a process of transforming the world; it enables existing engineering-oriented social science research, which focuses on explanation and remains at the level of ideal construction of the real world, to find a fulcrum and be revitalized. At the same time, “construction” under the guidance of historical materialism emphasizes the practical dialectics of the co-presence and co-change of subject and object, which corrects the defects of purely objectified, polarized engineering thinking. In addition, it should be noted that this article uses “political engineering” to summarize this, aiming to achieve the connection and dialogue between Chinese and Western academic discourses, so as to better discover the CPC’s contribution to the growth of the knowledge system. Can we refine the CPC’s science of socialist construction, science of governance, or construction politics, or Party engineering? From which theoretical orientation is it more appropriate to advance and deepen the study of the CPC? These are also worth exploring.

无疑,本文的大部分内容都是学界熟知的,但以“建设”概念为牵引,建构专门的“政治工程学”,将中国共产党领导中国特色社会主义建设历程中治党治国实践理论化,则是构建中国共产党研究新范式的尝试。相信这有助于我们理解中国共产党“建设”中历史主动性与历史规定性之间的张力,理解其是如何防止自身失能,国家失败,政府失灵,市场失范,社会失序的。这更是进一步理解中国共产党“是什么、干什么”和“怎么干”的一种尝试。而以“建设”为中心的政治工程学其本质上是改造世界的过程,它使重在解释,停留在对现实世界理想建构的既有工程学取向的社会科学研究得以找到支点,焕发生机。同时,在唯物史观指导下的“建设”强调的是主客共在共变的实践辩证法,这使得单纯对象化的、极化的工程性思维缺陷得以矫正。此外,需要说明的是,本文使用“政治工程学”来加以概括,是旨在实现中西学术话语的联结和对话,以更好发现在知识体系成长上中国共产党的贡献。我们能否提炼中国共产党的社会主义建设学、治国理政学,亦或是建设政治学、政党工程学?从何种理论取向出发推进和加深对中国共产党的研究更合适?同样值得探讨。

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑:同心

Notes

  1. This is a Chinese scholarly definition of “category,” likely drawn from Marxist philosophical sources. ↩
  2. Another Chinese scholarly definition of “category,” emphasizing broad commonality. ↩
  3. Mao Zedong, “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship” (1949), referring to the 1911 Revolution that overthrew the Qing dynasty. ↩
  4. The “Hundred Days’ Reform” of 1898, a failed reform movement led by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. ↩
  5. Zhang Shizhao (1881–1973), a Chinese intellectual, journalist, and politician active in the early Republic. ↩
  6. A phrase used by Zhang Shizhao to advocate dissolving existing political cliques and forming genuine, programmatic parties. ↩
  7. Huang Xing (1874–1916), a key revolutionary leader and co-founder of the Kuomintang. ↩
  8. Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), founding father of the Republic of China and first leader of the Kuomintang. ↩
  9. A student society founded in 1918 by Mao Zedong and Cai Hesen in Changsha, initially focused on moral and intellectual reform. ↩
  10. Cai Hesen (1895–1931), early CPC leader and close associate of Mao Zedong. ↩
  11. A paraphrase of views expressed in letters between Mao Zedong and Cai Hesen in 1920–1921. ↩
  12. Ibid. ↩
  13. Yun Daiying (1895–1931), early CPC leader and theorist. ↩
  14. An article by Yun Daiying published in 1924 in the journal *China Youth*. ↩
  15. The founding program adopted at the First National Congress of the CPC in 1921. ↩
  16. The Chinese term *weixin* (维新) literally means “renewal” and refers specifically to the 1898 reform movement. ↩
  17. Frank J. Goodnow (1859–1939), American political scientist and legal scholar, author of *Politics and Administration*. ↩
  18. E. E. Schattschneider (1892–1971), American political scientist known for his work on party government. ↩
  19. Samuel P. Huntington (1927–2008), American political scientist, author of *Political Order in Changing Societies*. ↩
  20. A paraphrase of Huntington’s argument in *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968). ↩
  21. Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” (November 8, 2021), *Qiushi*, no. 1 (2022). ↩
  22. Xi Jinping, “Speech at the National Conference on Organizational Work” (July 3, 2018), *People’s Daily*, July 5, 2018. ↩
  23. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1960), p. 43. ↩
  24. The Xinhai Revolution of 1911 overthrew the Qing dynasty and established the Republic of China. ↩
  25. Sun Yat-sen, “Foreword to *Construction*,” in *Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen*, vol. 5 (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1985), p. 89. ↩
  26. Ibid. ↩
  27. Mao Zedong, “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship” (June 30, 1949), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 4 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991), p. 1478. ↩
  28. Mao Zedong, “On New Democracy” (January 1940), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 2 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991), p. 663. ↩
  29. Mao Zedong, “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” (March 5, 1949), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 4, p. 1438. ↩
  30. Ibid., p. 1437. ↩
  31. Ibid., p. 1437. ↩
  32. Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government” (April 24, 1945), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991), p. 1097. ↩
  33. Mao Zedong, “Introducing *The Communist*” (October 4, 1939), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 2, p. 602. ↩
  34. Ibid., p. 602. Mao Zedong referred to building the CPC as a “great project of Party building.” ↩
  35. Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Meeting Commemorating the 95th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China” (July 1, 2016), *People’s Daily*, July 2, 2016. ↩
  36. Mao Zedong, “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee,” p. 1439. ↩
  37. This is the official designation of the period from 1978 to 2012 in CPC historiography. ↩
  38. Deng Xiaoping was widely called the “chief architect of reform and opening up.” ↩
  39. This is the first of the three major era questions raised at the 19th National Congress of the CPC in 2017. ↩
  40. These are the second and third major era questions raised at the 19th National Congress. ↩
  41. The “three-step” strategy for modernization was proposed by Deng Xiaoping in 1987: first, double the 1980 GNP and ensure adequate food and clothing by 1990; second, double the 1990 GNP and achieve a relatively comfortable life by 2000; third, reach the level of moderately developed countries by the mid-21st century. ↩
  42. The “new three-step” strategy was proposed at the 19th National Congress in 2017: first, achieve a moderately prosperous society by 2020; second, basically realize socialist modernization by 2035; third, build China into a great modern socialist country by the mid-21st century. ↩
  43. This metaphor draws on Marx’s *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.” The “playwright” here refers to the active, creative role of the Party in making history. ↩
  44. Xi Jinping, “Speech at a Conference Commemorating the 110th Anniversary of the Birth of Comrade Mao Zedong” (December 26, 2023), *People’s Daily*, December 27, 2023. ↩
  45. Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Enlarged Central Work Conference” (January 30, 1962), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 8, p. 300. ↩
  46. Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Seminar on the Study and Implementation of the Spirit of the 20th National Congress of the CPC” (February 7, 2023), *People’s Daily*, February 8, 2023. ↩
  47. “The fundamental plan for the Party and the state is to have successors.” See *Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party’s Centenary Struggle* (November 11, 2021). ↩
  48. “The new social factors latent in society itself” and “sprouts of the new things” are drawn from Lenin’s discussion of the sprouts of communism in *The Great Beginning* (June 1919). ↩
  49. Qian Xuesen and Wu Jiapei, “Social Engineering: The Technology for Organizing and Managing Socialist Construction,” *Economic Management*, no. 1 (1979). ↩
  50. A classical Chinese saying from the Qing dynasty text *The Art of War in the Context of the Whole Situation* (《寤言二·迁都建藩议》), emphasizing the need for comprehensive planning. ↩
  51. A metaphor for pragmatic, incremental reform, famously used by Deng Xiaoping to describe China’s reform and opening up approach. ↩
  52. Quoted from Xi Jinping’s speech at the 18th Collective Study Session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee on February 17, 2014. ↩
  53. Qian Xuesen (1911–2009), a renowned Chinese scientist and a key figure in China’s missile and space program, who also wrote on systems engineering and social engineering. ↩
  54. Bai Shuying, a contemporary Chinese sociologist at Harbin Institute of Technology, known for her work on social engineering theory. ↩
  55. Li Bocong, a contemporary Chinese philosopher of technology at the University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, known for his work on engineering philosophy. ↩
  56. Pound’s social engineering of law: A theory proposed by American legal sociologist Roscoe Pound, viewing law as a tool for social engineering to balance competing interests. ↩
  57. V. I. Lenin, “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government” (1918). ↩
  58. V. I. Lenin, “Report on the Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government” (1918). ↩
  59. Perry Anderson, *Considerations on Western Marxism* (1976). ↩
  60. V. I. Lenin, “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government” (1918). ↩
  61. Friedrich Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (1886). ↩
  62. Xi Jinping, speech at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (2014). ↩
  63. Xi Jinping, report to the 19th National Congress of the CPC (2017). ↩
  64. “建设” (construction) — A key term in CPC discourse, referring to the systematic building and development of Party, state, and society, distinct from Western notions of “construction” as mere physical infrastructure. It implies a continuous, planned, and dialectical process of transformation. ↩
  65. “历史主动性与历史规定性” (historical initiative and historical determinacy) — A CPC theoretical pairing: historical initiative refers to the Party’s conscious, proactive role in shaping history, while historical determinacy refers to the objective constraints of historical conditions and laws, as understood through historical materialism.
  66. “政治工程学” (political engineering) — A neologism coined by the author to describe the CPC’s systematic, project-like approach to governing, drawing on engineering metaphors to highlight planned, goal-oriented transformation. It is not a standard term in Western political science.