An Analysis of Overseas Research on the Chinese Communist Party’s Anti-Corruption Efforts in the New Era

The Chinese Communist Party has waged an unprecedented anti-corruption struggle in the New Era and achieved an overwhelming victory, drawing keen attention and research from overseas academic circles. Some overseas scholars have called on the international academic community to face squarely the Chinese Communist Party’s anti-corruption actions in the New Era, to discuss related issues with a more serious and prudent attitude, and to reflect on and even reconstruct existing research paradigms. Overall, overseas academic circles have engaged in heated discussions on related issues mainly from multiple perspectives, including the motivations, effects, institutions, and development of the Chinese Communist Party’s anti-corruption struggle in the New Era, among which there are many objective and fair views. A systematic review and critical reflection on the research work of overseas scholars can help deepen domestic research. At the same time, it can also provide a broad international perspective for us to continue taking the path of anti-corruption with Chinese characteristics and to shape an international image of integrity and clean governance.

I. The Chinese Communist Party’s Anti-Corruption Actions in the New Era Have Opened a New Stage in China’s Corruption Governance

Many overseas scholars have given positive evaluations of the Chinese Communist Party’s anti-corruption actions in the New Era, believing that, compared with previous anti-corruption efforts, they exhibit distinctly different new features and new forms, represent a key step toward completely eliminating corruption, and have opened a new stage in China’s

First, the anti-corruption actions of the Communist Party of China in the New Era have demonstrated unprecedented resilience. The core manifestation of this anti-corruption resilience lies in its rare breadth and durability. On the one hand, the anti-corruption actions in the New Era adhere to the principles of no forbidden zones, full coverage, and zero tolerance, covering all levels and fields of power operation and involving all public officials exercising public authority. On the other hand, the anti-corruption actions in the New Era exhibit unshakable political will and determination, upholding the basic concept that “anti-corruption is always on the way” and maintaining a high-pressure anti-corruption posture at all times. Andrew Wedeman, Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University, regards it as “the most durable, sustained, and intense crackdown on corruption in the reform era” and also “the latest offensive

Second, the Chinese Communist Party’s anti-corruption actions in the New Era exhibit more pronounced institutionalized characteristics. The strategic focus of anti-corruption in the New Era lies in strengthening institutionalized supervision over the exercise of power, emphasizing “confining power within the cage of institutional regulations,” and striving to compress the institutional space for corruption to occur, eliminating the systemic and structural soil in which corruption breeds and spreads. Xiaoxiao Li of the University of Central Oklahoma emphasizes that after the launch of the large-scale anti-corruption campaign, “people realized that this was not a short-lived anti-corruption movement, but a core task of advancing institutional construction under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.” Melanie Manion, Professor of Political Science at Duke University, believes that the most notable feature of the Chinese Communist Party’s anti-corruption struggle in the New Era lies in “the progress of anti-corruption institutionalization and a credible commitment to good governance,” which “has significantly changed the incentive structure of the Chinese Communist Party and the government to reduce corruption opportunities and structural obstacles to anti-corruption.”

Third, the Chinese Communist Party’s anti-corruption actions in the New Era exhibit a governance orientation shifting from campaign-style control to routine prevention. In the New Era, the Chinese Communist Party has adhered to addressing both symptoms and root causes, using high-pressure anti-corruption to eliminate the stock of corruption, thereby creating a favorable social and political environment for realizing institutionalized and law-based anti-corruption. Its strategic essence lies in gradually shifting from campaign-style punishment and crackdown operations toward institutionalized, proceduralized, and law-based routine governance, while simultaneously strengthening preventive reforms such as clean governance institution building and legal system construction alongside large-scale corruption punishment. Some overseas scholars believe that “as the storm subsides, anti-corruption enforcement will become more routinized, standardized, and institutionalized,” and that “China’s process of controlling corruption may gradually shift from a mechanism based on discipline inspection commissions to a mechanism centered on law.” Carlos D. Ramirez, Professor at George Mason University, emphasizes that “the process of controlling corruption will be exceptionally long,” and that “as China’s modernization process continues to accelerate, the Chinese Communist Party may be in a better position to implement reforms for preventing and controlling corruption.” Manion goes further, stating: “If an anti-corruption campaign is defined as ‘a brief period of intensive enforcement,’ then the latest anti-corruption action is not a campaign at all, but China’s new normal.”

II. Motivational Perspective: The “Multi-Layered Driving Force System” of the Chinese Communist Party’s Anti-Corruption Actions in the New Era

Why has the Chinese Communist Party launched such a large-scale anti-corruption campaign? This is the core question discussed in overseas academic research on China’s anti-corruption issues. Most overseas scholars believe that although this campaign is undoubtedly directed at internal corruption problems, solving the corruption problem is not the sole motivation; behind it lies a more complex “multi-layered driving force system.”

(1) Eliminating Corruption Threats and Consolidating the Foundation of Governance

Some overseas scholars believe that the corruption problem is the greatest threat to the Chinese Communist Party’s long-term governance. Although sustained anti-corruption efforts have brought corruption under effective control, its momentum of breeding and spreading has not been fundamentally curbed; in some areas, it has instead intensified. Andrew G. Walder, Professor at Stanford University, believes that today, “corruption within the bureaucracy has become so severe and corrosive that it has become the greatest threat to stable governance,” and that Chinese Communist Party leaders “clearly feel that corruption is approaching crisis levels, endangering political stability and the Party’s survival.” Therefore, addressing and eliminating this threat is the main motivation for the Chinese Communist Party to launch anti-corruption actions. Xiaojun Li, Associate Professor at the University of British Columbia, measured the degree of local corruption in China and concluded that “corruption is threatening China’s social and political stability. This prompted the Chinese Communist Party to launch a nationwide anti-corruption campaign after the 18th National Congress.” [1]1 The 18th National Congress of the CPC, held in 2012, marked the beginning of the Xi Jinping era and the launch of the large-scale anti-corruption campaign. In addition, some empirical studies have reached similar conclusions, arguing that “the main motivation for anti-corruption is to increase the public’s political support.”

(2) Rectifying Moral Norms and Reshaping Social and Political Culture

Some overseas studies further focus on the cultural motivations and educational significance of the Chinese Communist Party’s anti-corruption actions in the New Era, embedding political culture as a deep-seated driving force and explanatory variable into a new research framework. Macabe Keliher, Associate Professor at Southern Methodist University, and others believe that the main challenge the Chinese Communist Party faces on the anti-corruption issue is: “reconstructing the legitimate and compliant elements in the political order, so that law-abiding concepts and behaviors are rewarded, while simultaneously redefining certain customary corrupt, bribery, and favor-granting behaviors as illegal acts.” The anti-corruption actions in the New Era are intended to reshape the political morality of bureaucrats and the shared concepts of political operation, indicating that “the leadership is striving to change China’s political culture.” Kerry Brown, Director of the Lau China Institute at King’s College London, views this anti-corruption campaign as an important path to reshape the identity and moral norms of Chinese Communist Party members, arguing that its purpose is “to ensure that the Party’s political vision and organizational functions return to the strategic core position, and to make Party members clearly aware of this,” and therefore “this is an anti-corruption campaign to fight for the Party’s soul.”

(3) Breaking Down Reform Barriers and Advancing Substantive Reforms

Some overseas scholars also believe that the motivation and purpose of the Chinese Communist Party’s anti-corruption campaign in the New Era lie in breaking through the barriers of vested interests and advancing a substantive agenda of political and economic reform. Guilhem Fabre, professor at Paul Valéry University Montpellier 3, emphasizes: “Behind the high-pressure anti-corruption drive, the real aim is to shake up vested interest groups, abolish their harmful policies, and establish a society based on fairness and justice.” Other scholars argue that the goal of the anti-corruption campaign in the New Era is to resolve the deep-seated problem of collusion between power and wealth, to break the interference of vested interest groups in the reform process, and thereby “to advance more substantive and sensitive economic reforms” and “to reform the existing growth and development model.”

III. Effects Perspective: An Assessment of the Impact of the Chinese Communist Party’s Anti-Corruption Campaign in the New Era

The Chinese Communist Party’s anti-corruption campaign in the New Era has not only advanced China’s corruption governance process but has also had a broad impact on political, economic, and social development, and has generated a powerful spillover effect, profoundly altering international anti-corruption rules and patterns. Overseas academia often assesses its complex impact from the perspective of policy effects.

(A) The Political Effects of the Chinese Communist Party’s Anti-Corruption Campaign in the New Era

Regarding the issues of social trust and political identity, most overseas studies find that the large-scale anti-corruption campaign has indeed enhanced public trust in and support for the government, thereby further consolidating the Party’s social foundation for governance. Yan Sun, professor at the City University of New York, and others argue: “The effectiveness of high-level anti-corruption and the public’s expectations of top-down anti-corruption have, at least in the short term, significantly strengthened the Party’s ruling position and foundation through the anti-corruption movement.” However, other studies find the situation to be more complex. Some scholars argue that from the perspective of enhancing political trust and consolidating the ruling foundation, “policies such as anti-corruption, poverty reduction, and environmental restoration, which appear to be appreciated by the public, should be continued and expanded,” with anti-corruption policy being only one of its complex influencing factors. Similarly, Narisong Huhe of the University of Strathclyde and others argue: “The anti-corruption campaign has indeed had a positive impact on social trust at both the central and local levels, but compared with other long-term influencing factors such as the modernization process, rising education levels, and increasing diversification, the impact of anti-corruption remains relatively limited.” Additionally, some studies find that the complex impact of the anti-corruption campaign on social trust can exhibit certain diachronic changes: “Corruption investigations have, to some extent, suppressed respondents’ support for higher-level authorities,” but “this does not rule out the possibility that sustained corruption investigations could increase public political support in the long term.” Regarding the issues of the bureaucratic system and official behavior, some overseas scholars focus on the impact of the anti-corruption campaign on bureaucratic control and the shift in official behavior under high-pressure anti-corruption from actively seeking merit to passively avoiding blame. They argue that the anti-corruption campaign has significantly “enhanced the Chinese Communist Party’s political capacity to use political rules and Party discipline to regulate Party members and cadres,” but it may also produce certain negative effects, dampening the initiative of Party members and cadres, and even “leading to a certain degree of paralysis in the functional organs of the Party and state, making officials’ inaction, lazy governance, and slack governance more common.” Of course, this observation has certain limitations and is insufficient to fully reflect the structural transformation of cadre behavior. Other overseas scholars hold the opposite view, arguing that high-pressure anti-corruption has actually prompted positive changes in official behavior: “There is no evidence that leading cadres abandon decision-making for fear of being implicated in anti-corruption. On the contrary, if they cannot ensure the normal functioning of government and promote economic growth, they will face the risk of being removed from their posts.”

Regarding the issue of elite mobility, some overseas scholars focus on analyzing the complex impact of the sustained advancement of the anti-corruption campaign on elite mobility. First, concerning the mobility of elites outside the system. Some scholars argue that the large-scale anti-corruption campaign has increased the uncertainty of officials’ career development while also reducing career benefits and expectations, thereby leading to a decline in the flow of talent into the system and a reduction in the supply of political elites. Some studies find that high-pressure anti-corruption, through the two mechanisms of “expected economic returns” and “career development prospects,” “forces capable young elites to abandon joining the civil service,” producing a negative impact on the “supply of cadres.” Second, concerning the mobility of elites within the system. Some scholars argue that under the sustained high-pressure anti-corruption situation, the selection and appointment of cadres exhibit a clear tendency toward elitism and anti-clientelism, making the flow of talent within the system more consistent with the meritocratic standard of “having both moral integrity and professional competence, and appointing people on their merits.” Some studies show that the anti-corruption campaign in the New Era exhibits a significant anti-clientelist tendency in cadre selection and appointment, thereby constructing analytical frameworks such as “connections penalty.”

(B) The Economic Effects of the Chinese Communist Party’s Anti-Corruption Campaign in the New Era

At the macro level, many overseas scholars observe that in the short term, large-scale high-pressure anti-corruption will have a certain degree of impact on socioeconomic development, and may even impact certain industries. However, in the long run, thoroughly eliminating corruption can create a favorable growth environment for economic transformation and high-quality development. Cheng Li of the University of Hong Kong and others also emphasize: “Any decline in consumption due to reduced corruption will not cause irreparable damage to the economy; on the contrary, it will be helpful.” “Importantly, in the long run, successful anti-corruption consolidates the political foundation, the economy will be boosted, thereby enabling deeper economic reforms, which will enhance the resilience of China’s economy.” At the micro level, a large number of studies provide empirical evidence of the positive impact of anti-corruption policies on market entities. For example, the anti-corruption campaign can promote R&D investment, financing, and innovation (e.g., the number of valid patents) of listed companies; improve corporate financial reporting quality (FRQ); accelerate the actual output efficiency of R&D investment in politically connected firms; buffer the positive correlation between corporate business entertainment expenditures (BEE) and stock price crash risk; enhance the efficiency of capital and labor allocation, thereby improving corporate performance; and so on. However, in other studies, these impacts appear more complex, and may even produce certain negative effects. Some studies find that in the process of anti-corruption, “in terms of fiscal subsidies to private enterprises, the value of political connections has actually increased. Although the debt cost of state-owned enterprises has declined, the influence of political connections persists.” In addition, “there is a positive micro-level correlation between anti-corruption and the performance of both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises,” indicating that state-owned enterprises benefit more from the anti-corruption campaign than non-state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, some studies find that anti-corruption has had a significant negative impact on the “hotel accommodation and catering industry” and the “luxury goods industry.”

(C) The International Effects of the Chinese Communist Party’s Anti-Corruption Campaign in the New Era

Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, the Communist Party of China has continuously intensified efforts to govern cross-border corruption, focused on building an integrated mechanism for fugitive repatriation and asset recovery, accelerated the process of constructing foreign-related laws and regulations on anti-corruption, deeply participated in the reform of the international anti-corruption governance system, and steadily raised the level of institutionalization and law-based governance in international anti-corruption cooperation, thereby providing Chinese experience and wisdom for advancing corruption governance and exerting a broad influence on the structure and rules of international corruption governance. Overseas academic circles have keen

IV. The Institutional Perspective: The Institutionalization Progress of the Chinese Communist Party's Anti-Corruption Campaign in the New Era

In the New Era, progress in the institutionalization of corruption governance has provided new avenues for overseas scholars to explain the historic achievements of the Chinese Communist Party's anti-corruption campaign. Overall, overseas scholars have focused primarily on the following three major institutional reforms.

(i) Reform of the Party's Discipline Inspection System

In existing overseas research, the lack of an independent and authoritative anti-corruption agency was seen as a major factor constraining China's anti-corruption efforts. However, since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, the reform of the Party's discipline inspection system and its results have shifted this perception. Some overseas scholars have observed that the Chinese Communist Party has strengthened Party leadership over the discipline inspection commissions through measures such as "constructing a vertical management system centered on the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection" and "strengthening central inspection tours," effectively curbing the breeding and spread of corruption. Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, a professor at the Copenhagen Business School in Denmark, believes that the "most direct impact" of the anti-corruption campaign in the New Era "has been to strengthen the power of the discipline inspection commissions," which "plays a crucial role in ensuring that the Party and its members possess the capacity and moral quality to lead the country." Ling Li, from the Department of East Asian Studies at the University of Vienna in Austria, summarizes three major institutional transformations in the Party's disciplinary system: promoting the politicization of disciplinary institutions, retaining and enriching mobilization resources, and simplifying the procedures for investigating and gathering evidence in cases, which "has significantly expanded the corruption investigation capacity of the discipline inspection commissions."

(ii) Reform of the National Supervision System

Regarding the reform of the national supervision system, discussions in overseas academic circles have mainly focused on its impact on the Party's anti-corruption capacity and its mechanisms of action. Some scholars believe that this reform helps eliminate structural contradictions and institutional conflicts within the existing anti-corruption system, advancing the institutionalization process of China's corruption governance. Christopher Carothers, a researcher

(3) Reform of the Inspection System

Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, as the institutionalization and standardization of inspection work and its status and function in anti-corruption efforts have steadily increased, overseas academic circles have shown strong interest in it. Most scholars hold a positive view of the reform of the inspection system, noting the positive interaction between the inspection system and the existing anti-corruption institutional system. They believe it helps remedy structural defects in the existing institutional process and identify its main function as strengthening political supervision over Party members and cadres through a top-down exercise of authority, thereby reinforcing the Party’s anti-corruption capacity. Xuezhi Guo, a professor at Guilford College in the United States, argues that the reform of the inspection system “has played a major role in strengthening the vertical leadership system of the discipline inspection commissions and remedying the inherent defect of discipline inspection commissions at the same level supervising Party committees at the same level.” Yukyung Yeo, a professor at Kyung Hee University in South Korea, finds that central inspection work has remedied deficiencies in the existing discipline inspection system in terms of the scope of supervision, the leadership system, and investigative methods. Other scholars regard it as “a non-institutional mechanism used by the Chinese Communist Party to solve the problem of power delegation and seek compliance with provincial policies,” arguing that “in a short period of time, the central inspection teams have become a sharp weapon for smashing corruption networks and have the potential to achieve a major transformation toward a ‘clean’ government within the political system.” Still other scholars observe that the inspection system not only performs an efficient corruption governance function but also gives rise to more important state governance functions: “Although the original intention of inspections was to curb corruption, in recent years inspections have been used to broadly advance certain governance goals,” which resolves the paradox of “how the Party can simultaneously achieve power concentration and efficient governance in the New Era.”

V. Developmental Perspective: Research on Countermeasures for the CPC’s Anti-Corruption Actions in the New Era

Looking to the future, overseas academic circles have put forward some suggestions for the CPC to further improve its anti-corruption work. Although some of the countermeasure analyses provided by overseas scholars, based on different positions and perspectives, are sometimes inconsistent with or even contrary to China’s particularities, there are still some constructive opinions that are practical and pertinent and should be critically absorbed according to specific circumstances.

(1) The Path of Institutionalization and Rule of Law

Although some overseas scholars, when discussing the effectiveness of “campaign-style anti-corruption,” acknowledge that concentrated rectification is necessary and efficient under specific conditions, they are more concerned with “fundamental solutions” at the institutional and legal levels. They advocate that anti-corruption should gradually move from punitive actions to institutional regulation, emphasizing that the rule of law will necessarily help improve China’s corruption

Some overseas scholars also believe that China’s future

(3) The Cultural and Moral Path

To eliminate corruption at its root, some overseas scholars believe that wisdom should be drawn from fine traditional Chinese culture and sound government ethics, that lofty social and political moral norms should be established, that officialdom ethics and political culture should be reshaped, and that the civilizing and self-disciplinary effects of clean governance culture should be fully utilized. Tony C. Lee, a postdoctoral researcher at Humboldt University of Berlin, proposed: “A more effective approach is to choose a bottom-up method, creating a new social norm to oppose the social environment fostered by ‘guanxi’ [n3], reducing the public’s tolerance for corruption, taking pride in integrity and feeling shame at corruption.” Some overseas scholars also believe that meritocratic politics is an important way to solve the corruption problem, and that attention should be paid to the restraining effect of Confucian moral education on corruption, “placing greater emphasis on moral education for public officials, including the teaching of Confucian values in Party schools.” Other scholars have recognized that the root

VI. A Critical Reflection on Overseas Academic Research on the Chinese Communist Party’s Anti-Corruption Efforts in the New Era

Although the Party’s anti-corruption actions in the New Era have come to be taken seriously by a growing number of overseas scholars, beginning to break through and even reconstruct some established overseas explanatory paradigms and reshaping the Party’s image of integrity in overseas academic circles, there are still several issues in some overseas studies that merit discussion and response.

First, a functionalist interpretation of corruption governance. Some overseas scholars attribute a certain degree of functionalism or pragmatism to the Chinese Communist Party’s anti-corruption actions, while paying less attention to the value concern of “people-centeredness” and the political essence of integrity and honesty implicit in them. The Chinese Communist Party has always emphasized that power is entrusted by the people and must be exercised for the people: “The power in one’s own hands and the post one holds are bestowed by the Party and the people, to be used for the work of the Party and the people, and only to seek benefit for the people.” Corruption fundamentally contradicts the Party’s nature and purpose; the Party is resolutely opposed to corrupt phenomena. In fact, “people-centeredness” makes the Party’s anti-corruption work more resilient and thorough: “No other political party or country in the world today can punish corruption on such a large scale, with such intensity, and with such persistence as we can.”

Second, the academic standpoint of Western-centrism. The academic standpoint of Western-centrism in overseas research has long been criticized by academic circles both at home and abroad. It profoundly influences some scholars’ observations and explanations of China’s corruption and