Building a Socialist Anti-Corruption Institutional System with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era

Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, bearing in mind its original aspiration and founding mission and shouldering the trust of the people, has waged a great anti-corruption struggle. We are “with tenacity and perseverance that is always on the road, making precise and sustained efforts to resolutely win the tough and protracted battle against corruption.” [1]1 A classical Chinese metaphor for the relationship between the ruler and the people, originating from Xunzi and later cited by Tang Dynasty Emperor Taizong: the people (water) can support the ruler (boat) or overthrow him. An anti-corruption institutional system that addresses both symptoms and root causes is taking shape in our country. To explore more deeply, from the theoretical level of basic Marxist theory, the mechanism by which corruption arises and the construction of an anti-corruption institutional system, we conducted an exclusive interview with Professor Lu Pinyue of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, a senior scholar undertaking related research projects.

I. Anti-Corruption Is an Age-Old Problem That Old Systems Cannot Solve

▲ (Interviewer, abbreviated ▲ hereafter): Professor Lu, hello! Thank you for accepting this exclusive interview! Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, the anti-corruption struggle has been a crucial lever for our Party’s comprehensive and strict governance of the Party. After more than ten years of unremitting and forceful anti-corruption efforts in the New Era, the anti-corruption struggle has achieved an overwhelming victory and is being consolidated comprehensively, yet the situation remains grave and complex. May I ask why our Party places such importance on the anti-corruption struggle?

● (Interviewee, abbreviated ● hereafter): The anti-corruption struggle must be understood not only from the people’s moral indignation at corrupt elements, but also from the height of the Party’s historical mission, from the historical destiny of the Chinese nation in the New Era. In 2012, the moment Xi Jinping assumed the post of General Secretary, he solemnly declared to all of China and the world through Chinese and foreign journalists: “The people’s aspiration for a better life is our goal.” By the 20th National Congress of the CPC, this goal was further clarified as “advancing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation on all fronts through Chinese-path modernization.” The fight against poverty and the anti-corruption struggle are the two most concrete and fundamental grips for achieving this great goal. The poverty alleviation battle directly benefits the people, establishing a new starting point for realizing this great goal; while the “tough and protracted battle against corruption” is about comprehensively and strictly governing the Party, providing political guarantees for achieving this great goal. This opens a new journey of comprehensively building a modern socialist country and marching toward the second centenary goal. [2]2 Xi Jinping, "Speech at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection" (January 18, 2022). After clearly stating our Party’s goal, Comrade Xi Jinping then solemnly declared: “Under the new circumstances, our Party faces many severe challenges, and there are many urgent problems within the Party that need to be resolved. In particular, problems such as corruption, detachment from the masses, formalism, and bureaucracy among some Party cadres must be tackled with great effort. The whole Party must be alert. To forge iron, one must be strong. Our responsibility is to work with all Party comrades to ensure that the Party supervises itself and governs itself strictly and comprehensively, effectively solve the prominent problems within the Party, improve work style, and maintain close ties with the masses, so that our Party will always remain the strong leading core of the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” This passage can be seen as the political declaration of the Communist Party of China’s anti-corruption efforts in the New Era. Whether it can be achieved is the “key” [3]3 A reference to the principle of “comprehensive and strict governance of the Party” (全面从严治党), which holds Party organizations responsible for the conduct of their members and emphasizes that discipline applies equally to all. determining whether we can break out of the historical cycle of rise and fall, and whether we can lead the Chinese people to complete the great cause of building a strong country and national rejuvenation. Especially in the current severe international situation where the world faces changes unseen in a century and hegemonic forces encircle China, the success or failure of anti-corruption will be a matter of life and death for the Party and the state. Corrupt elements are not only morally bankrupt human garbage, but also historical criminals who harm the Chinese nation. Without winning the anti-corruption struggle, Chinese Communists cannot account to the Chinese nation, cannot account to the Chinese people, and cannot account to future generations. This is the deeper significance of the anti-corruption struggle.

▲: The anti-corruption struggle is indeed extremely necessary. It is not only the issue of social fairness and justice that the people care about most, but also a major issue concerning the historical destiny of the country and the nation. However, solving it is extremely difficult. It is a fundamental problem that no society in history and no other country or region in the contemporary world can fundamentally solve. From a theoretical perspective, why is eliminating corruption so difficult? And what is the criterion for measuring the success of anti-corruption?

●: Anti-corruption is indeed an age-old problem for human society, because the risk of corruption always accompanies public power. British sociologist Michael Mann once said, “Societies are constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power.” Any society must establish a system of public power; otherwise, it will fall into endless chaos. Public power is a double-edged sword. It can be used for public good to benefit the country and its people, or it can be used for private desires to harm the country and its people. Com

▲: Historically, various countries and regions around the world have formulated diverse anti-corruption systems and measures. Why have they failed to succeed?

●: The various methods of governing corruption in history, along with the lessons of their successes and failures, serve as a historical mirror for the anti-corruption struggle in the New Era. Apart from socialist countries, all state systems in which exploiting classes hold power (which we collectively call the old system) are themselves systems that oppress and exploit the people, and therefore possess an inherently corrupt nature. How could a system with such an inherently corrupt nature fight corruption? This is precisely the inherent paradox of the anti-corruption system under the old system, and it is also the fundamental reason for its inevitable failure.

The force driving anti-corruption under the old system actually comes from the people. First, the people are the creators of history; the social material wealth and cultural wealth that sustain the ruling power of the exploiting classes are all created by the people, and even the armed forces that directly protect the state of the exploiting classes must rely on the people. Therefore, to maintain its rule, the old system had to accept the people's demands for anti-corruption to a certain extent. Second, out of fear of the people's power of resistance, the formidable force of popular uprisings compelled the rulers to impose restrictions on their own corrupt practices of oppressing and exploiting the people. This gave rise to an inherent contradiction within the old system's anti-corruption efforts: the contradiction between reflecting the people's will to fight corruption and safeguarding the fundamental interests of the ruling clique. This is precisely the reflection of class struggle in the issue of anti-corruption. In China, the above-mentioned power of the people to create history, channeled through culturally-minded individuals who sympathized with the people, formed the people-centered thought (民本思想), which became an excellent cultural tradition of China, giving rise to the concept that "water can carry a boat, but it can also overturn it" [1]1 A classical Chinese metaphor for the relationship between the ruler and the people, originating from Xunzi and later cited by Tang Dynasty Emperor Taizong: the people (water) can support the ruler (boat) or overthrow him.. This was the social spiritual foundation of anti-corruption in China's feudal society. However, when this people-centered thought was reflected within the feudal ruling class, it inevitably underwent a qualitative change: anti-corruption had to be premised on safeguarding the fundamental interests of the feudal ruling clique. Consequently, the history of anti-corruption in ancient China contains both the valuable spiritual heritage of Chinese culture—the people-centered thought reflecting the people's will, the noble character of honest officials, and valuable anti-corruption measures—and the feudal poisons of the supremacy of imperial power, hierarchical privileges, and using the fight against corruption as a pretext for corruption itself. The former drove historical progress, while the latter doomed this feudal "anti-corruption" to degenerate into corruption and ultimately fail.

As for China’s old system, because the people’s desire for anti-corruption formed a powerful force, and simultaneously out of the need to maintain a unified regime, from the time of Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty [n2] China established an anti-corruption institutional system that governed the entire country. The imperial court specially appointed “imperial censors” (侍御史) to supervise all officials, and the thirteen supervisory regions nationwide were directly dispatched by the imperial court with full-time supervisory officials called “regional inspectors” (刺史), whose cases were reported directly to the court. Starting from this point, various anti-corruption policies emerged in succession. The legal code of the Eastern Han dynasty stipulated that the descendants of corrupt officials were barred from holding office for three generations. Zhu Yuanzhang, the founding emperor of the Ming dynasty, even used the horrifying torture of “flaying and stuffing with straw” (剥皮实草) to punish corrupt officials: the skin was stripped off and stuffed with straw, then set up in front of the government office as a warning. The intensity of this anti-corruption effort cannot be said to be insufficient. Yet because these systems were in the hands of feudal rulers, with the aim of safeguarding the fundamental interests of the rulers, they were ultimately bound to fail. Take the “flaying and stuffing with straw” torture as an example: the Ming founder originally thought that from then on corrupt officials would disappear, but the fact was that this measure could only be effective for a time. It even led to an acute shortage of officials, to the point where the absurd situation arose of having to appoint already-convicted corrupt officials to handle anti-corruption official business. And the fundamental reason for its failure lies precisely in the aforementioned principal contradiction: taking the people’s anti-corruption demands as a means, while the end was to maintain the corrupt interests of the bureaucratic clique. From this arose the anti-corruption paradox: using corruption to “fight corruption” inevitably leads to greater genuine corruption. Its concrete manifestation was that the supervisory officials who held the power of “anti-corruption” and the high-ranking eunuchs who attended the emperor possessed the great power to determine the life and death of other officials. In the name of anti-corruption, they persecuted loyal and upright officials who did not submit to their will, forcing all officials into fear and compelling them to offer bribes and curry favor. “Anti-corruption power” thus gradually transformed into corrupt privilege. Even if the emperor was an enlightened ruler, he had no good strategy to deal with this, leading to an endless stream of unjust cases, not to mention that the emperor himself was highly dependent on these powerful ministers and eunuchs to maintain his rule. Another example: the Kuomintang, which ruled old China, in order to maintain its regime, was also determined to fight corruption, but in the process of investigating cases it was discovered that the source of corruption was actually the four big families [n3] that served as the pillars of the party-state regime. Therefore, fighting corruption was equivalent to eliminating the Kuomintang regime itself, so it could only be hastily wrapped up, corruption grew increasingly rampant, and it was finally overthrown by the people. From this it can be seen that under the old system, no matter what ingenious anti-corruption measures were employed, without exception they inevitably led to the growing spread of corruption, ultimately driving the people to rebel, and it was impossible to escape the historical cycle of rise and fall. [n4]

The essence of “anti-corruption” under the capitalist system is similar. The bourgeois democratic system emerged in the struggle of the bourgeoisie leading the masses against the corruption of church theocracy and the feudal aristocracy. The people’s will against corruption was embodied through democracy and the rule of law, which is worth learning from. However, once this “democracy and rule of law” is built on the capitalist economic base, it is ultimately inevitably dominated by the all-pervasive power of capital. From this arises the principal contradiction of the capitalist anti-corruption system: the contradiction between responding to the people’s anti-corruption will and safeguarding the fundamental interests of the capital monopoly groups, with the latter inevitably taking the dominant position. Consequently, the capitalist “anti-corruption system” is essentially a corrupt system established by the power of capital under the banner of “democracy and the rule of law.” This is manifested in the following aspects.

First, in order to realize their fundamental interests, each capital monopoly group, through a series of “democratic and rule-of-law” procedures, institutionalizes and legalizes the corrupt practice of “using money to buy power.” The pathway is for capital to manipulate party elections through political contributions, using the people’s votes to elect chief executives and parliament members at all levels who represent the interests of various capital groups, who then appoint administrative officials and judges at all levels, and further through the lobbying industry to buy off parliament and administrative officials, enabling the power of capital to dominate the government decision-making process. This multi-party electoral system gives rise to a series of “legalized corruptions,” such as the “revolving door” where outgoing politicians circulate among politics, business, and academia, which has in fact become a bridge connecting capital and government relations.

Second, each capital monopoly group, under the banner of “checking power,” protects its corrupt practices. For example, the “multi-party mutual checks and balances” of parliament is touted as “checking corruption,” but in essence it is a means for various parties to threaten each other, a bargaining chip for mutual cover-ups of corruption. Once a corruption case is exposed, they sling mud at each other, muddying the waters so that the common people cannot distinguish truth from falsehood, genuine corruption is protected, while the innocent often suffer political frame-ups. This system allows some politicians who are adept at using corrupt means to achieve their political goals to thrive. Western scholars specializing in the study of Western corruption have pointed out: “In fact, corrupt politicians are more competitive than their non-corrupt colleagues, because the former are able to invest in their political careers the substantial resources and relational networks they have accumulated in illegal markets… gaining the upper hand in competition with their ‘honest’ colleagues.” Another example is the system of public disclosure of officials’ assets, which some people extol as “the best means of anti-corruption.” But once empty theoretical imagination is put into practice, its effect is precisely the opposite. Corrupt officials will use their family members and confidants to transfer and conceal their illegal assets, and the assets they declare all have legitimate sources. Ordinary people cannot investigate the complex origins of these assets, and thus cannot effectively supervise them. Hence, “asset disclosure” becomes a political show whose authenticity people cannot discern, degenerating into a prop to cover up corruption. The Taiwan authorities of China implemented an official asset declaration system from 1993, yet not a single major corrupt official was ever uncovered through this system. Practice has proven that this declaration system is in fact a decorative ornament to conceal corruption.

From this it can be seen that, like the feudal system, the capitalist system cannot solve the problem of corruption. This is determined by the corrupt nature of the exploiting class system itself; such a system is essentially a corrupt system that squeezes the people’s flesh and blood, and it cannot function without corruption. This is the reason why some people advocate that corruption is the “lubricant of the system.” The so-called “anti-corruption” under this system is essentially a reluctant response to pressure from the people, with the fundamental purpose still being to maintain the rule of the exploiting class. The system that can fundamentally solve the problem of anti-corruption can only be the socialist system in which a political party representing the fundamental interests of the people leads the people to be masters of the country.

II. The Causes and Main Manifestations of Corruption under the Conditions of the Socialist Market Economy

▲: Indeed, societies where exploiting classes are dominant are essentially maintained by a certain degree of corruption, so it is impossible to establish a genuine anti-corruption system. Then why does corruption still occur in socialist society? What are its types of manifestation?

●: The old system is essentially corrupt, and its anti-corruption is forced by popular pressure. The socialist system led by the Communist Party fundamentally requires the elimination of corruption, because the fundamental interests of the people it represents are inherently incompatible with corruption

However, the phenomenon of corruption has not disappeared because the Communist Party of China holds power. This is because power is a double-edged sword: “Wherever there is power, there is the risk of being corroded.” Our Party represents the fundamental interests of the people, which must be realized through the exercise of public power by cadres at all levels. This may encounter erosion from domestic and foreign social forces that seek to use public power for illegal purposes, as well as from the personal greed of those in power. With the development of the market economy, the social forces that erode public power have also grown. The American political scientist Samuel Huntington pointed out that the rapid development process toward a modern state breeds social turmoil, a phenomenon people call the “transition paradox.” Corruption exhibits a similar “transition paradox”: affluence does not reduce people’s greed for wealth; on the contrary, with the development of productive forces and the rise of the market economy, the rolling tide of wealth increases people’s desire for money and the opportunities for corruption. Thus, the more the economy develops, the more widespread and serious corruption becomes. Before the 18th National Congress of the CPC, the spread of corruption in China had reached an extremely severe level,

Under the conditions of the socialist market economy, the corruption that emerges can be divided into several main types, based on differences in their inducements and pathways.

The first type is political corruption — corruption involving the formation of cliques and factions within the cadre ranks around job promotions and the struggle for power and profit. General

The second category is economic corruption — corruption involving power-money transactions in government-business and government-society relations. This is the most fundamental form of corruption. Capital must operate within a certain policy environment, and policies must be implemented by officials at all levels. Consequently, capital pursuing profit maximization seeks to ensnare officials through various social relationships, using money, shares, cultural relics and treasures, travel and entertainment, and sexual favors to cater to officials' preferences, thereby securing project contracts, obtaining government procurement orders, illegally acquiring product approvals and business licenses, and acquiring land at low prices. This type of corruption often involves enormous sums of money, directly harms people's livelihoods, and is the most detested by the people. Corruption in "government-society relations" manifests in power-money and power-power transactions in the evaluation of projects, professional titles, and various honors. General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out: "The people most detest corruption. If we do not offend hundreds or thousands of corrupt elements, we will offend 1.4 billion people. This is an unmistakably clear political account, an account of popular support. We must persist in rectifying work styles, enforcing discipline, and combating corruption to unite the Party, the military, and the people, and to solidify the political foundation of the Party's governance." [2]2 Xi Jinping, "Speech at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection" (January 18, 2022).

The third category is social corruption — corruption in official-citizen relations. General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out: "The country is the people, and the people are the country. To secure the country and defend the country is to win the people's hearts. The Chinese Communist Party is rooted in the people, its blood flows from the people, and its strength lies in the people." In terms of performing official duties, officials at all levels are public servants of the people; all their work is to serve the people using the power entrusted by the people, which must not be conflated with the treatment they enjoy in their work and daily life. However, some of our officials suffer from serious bureaucratism and a sense of privilege, believing that holding an official position makes them superior to others. They do not care about the hardships of the people, only about their own official positions and the preferences of their superiors. They pursue only "achievement projects" and "image projects" that can catch the eyes of their superiors, indulging in "putting on a show" rather than "doing real work," and are keen on "creating a temporary stir" rather than "benefiting a region." They "grovel, flatter, and fawn before their leaders, but strut about arrogantly, overbearingly, and insolently before subordinates and the masses," and even extort money from the masses, embezzle funds meant for people's livelihoods, and accept bribes to make rulings that violate the principle of justice. This type of corruption in official-citizen relations severely damages the flesh-and-blood ties between the Party and the people and is extremely harmful.

The fourth category is foreign-related corruption — corruption in international exchanges. The world today is undergoing changes unseen in a century. Hegemonic states and their allies, aiming to contain China's development, do everything possible to steal our country's confidential information and intellectual property rights. They lure relevant personnel with money and beautiful women, then coerce them, sparing no means to corrupt them and their relatives, even reducing them to international spies who betray national interests. The wider China opens its door to the outside world, the greater the likelihood of this type of corruption occurring. Its harmfulness is self-evident and must be eliminated with thunderous measures.

The various types of corruption listed above often interweave, transmit, and act as mutual causes and effects. Political corruption, as the "biggest corruption," is the internal cause of other forms of corruption and the source of power for corruption. Government-business corruption is the source of interests for corruption. The two become entangled with each other, giving rise to various other forms of corruption. Moreover, due to the aforementioned "transformation paradox," the higher the level of modernization and the wealthier the society, the more varied the forms of corruption become, the more hidden the pathways, and the more severe the anti-corruption situation grows. Therefore, how to fundamentally curb the above types of corruption and eliminate the "transformation paradox" of corruption has become a huge challenge in the New Era. To solve this challenge, it is necessary to establish an anti-corruption institutional system that addresses both the symptoms and the root causes.

III. The Essential Characteristics and Basic Framework of the New-Era Chinese Anti-Corruption Institutional System

▲: Corruption occurring under the conditions of a socialist market economy is extremely harmful, so it is necessary to establish an anti-corruption system to govern it. Then, what is the essential difference between the resulting socialist anti-corruption system with Chinese characteristics and the anti-corruption systems of class-exploiting societies?

●: The essential characteristics of a thing are determined by its principal contradiction and the principal aspect of that contradiction. The essence of the system of rule of the exploiting classes is to exploit and oppress the people, so the principal contradiction of their “anti-corruption system” is the contradiction between being compelled to respond to the people’s will for anti-corruption and essentially safeguarding the fundamental interests of the ruling clique. Such an “anti-corruption system” may fight corruption to a certain extent, but it will ultimately fail because it must uphold the fundamental interests of the ruling class. In contrast, the principal contradiction of the socialist anti-corruption system with Chinese characteristics is the contradiction between the anti-corruption will of the Communist Party of China, which represents the fundamental interests of the broad masses of the people, and the extremely small number of social groups and individuals who seek illegal gains through corruption. The anti-corruption will of the CPC, representing the fundamental interests of the broad masses of the people, occupies an absolutely dominant position and holds an overwhelming advantage, while the extremely small number of social groups and individuals who seek illegal gains through corruption are in a perilous situation where everyone denounces them and they encounter danger at every turn. This determines the essence of the anti-corruption institutional system with Chinese characteristics for the New Era, and is the fundamental reason for its inevitable success. Precisely because of this, since the 18th National Congress of the CPC [n], the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core has led the people of the whole nation, with

▲: What role do the essential characteristics of the anti-corruption system play in the process of forming the anti-corruption institutional system? What is the basic architecture of the socialist anti-corruption institutional system with Chinese characteristics for the New Era formed by such essential characteristics?

●: The essence of a system determines its basic architecture; the basic architecture is the practical form and the path of realization of the system's essence, and its goal is to resolve the principal contradictions it faces in accordance with the requirements of the system's essence. Therefore, the basic architecture of a system is gradually generated in the practice of implementing the system's essence and resolving its principal contradictions. The basic architecture of the socialist anti-corruption institutional system with Chinese characteristics formed in this way mainly comprises the following levels.

The first level can be summarized as "one foundation" — carrying out the anti-corruption struggle by upholding comprehensive and strict governance of the Party, upholding the Party's leadership, and upholding the supremacy of the people. This foundation is the essence of the socialist anti-corruption institutional system with Chinese characteristics. Upholding the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee is the fundamental requirement of China's socialist system. The people demand anti-corruption, but only under the centralized and unified leadership of a strong political party representing the fundamental interests of the people can organized force be formed to carry out anti-corruption. Practice has proven that wherever the Party's leadership is weak and lax, corrupt elements run amok, and corruption runs rampant. The top-down connection between the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee and the role of primary-level Party organizations as fighting bastions is the fundamental guarantee of the anti-corruption struggle. Adhering to the value of the supremacy of the people is the source of the Party's leadership capacity and the foundation of the Party's establishment. Party leadership does not mean the "first-in-command" [n] has the final say, but rather adheres to the fundamental purpose of the supremacy of the people and exercises leadership according to the principle of democratic centralism.

The second level is "two answers" — realizing anti-corruption through "the people supervising power" and "the Party's self-revolution." To realize the anti-corruption will of the broad masses of the people, our Party has found two answers. The first answer is "letting the people supervise power." On the eve of the founding of New China, some democratic personages hoped that the Chinese Communist Party could withstand the test of governance and not fall into the historical cycle of rise and fall. Mao Zedong "gave the first answer, which was 'letting the people supervise the government.'" [n] General Secretary Xi Jinping has elevated Mao Zedong's thought to a new height, institutionalizing the people's supervision of power: "Let the people supervise power, let power operate in the sunlight, and confine power within the cage of institutions." [n]

The second answer is to institutionalize the concept of "supremacy of the people" into the Party's ideological purpose and institutional system, and to carry out self-revolution. General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: "Through unremitting efforts, the Party has found a second answer to the historical cycle of rise and fall — self-revolution. The Party's capacity for self-purification, self-improvement, self-renovation, and self-enhancement has been significantly strengthened. The lax and soft situation in Party governance has been fundamentally reversed. A clean and upright political ecosystem within the Party is constantly being formed and developed, ensuring that the Party never changes its nature, its color, or its flavor." [n] Self-revolution is carried out through two aspects: building the Party through ideology and building the Party through politics.

First, adhere to building the Party through ideology, internalize the concept of "supremacy of the people" in the heart, and "establish the system of remaining true to our original aspiration and founding mission." [n] Letting the people supervise power is certainly very important, but this supervision is, after all, an external factor for leading cadres. To fundamentally eliminate corruption, it is necessary to internalize the Marxist value of "supremacy of the people" in the heart, to regard the belief in "remaining true to our original aspiration and founding mission" as the ideological realm of life's pursuit, thereby consciously carrying out self-revolution, strictly demanding oneself, and rejecting corruption from the heart.

Second, adhere to building the Party through politics, advance comprehensive and strict governance of the Party, use the system of intra-Party regulations to persistently rectify work style and enforce discipline, and maintain zero tolerance for corruption. In his report to the 20th National Congress of the

The third level is the "three mechanisms" — establishing the mechanisms that ensure officials "dare not be corrupt, cannot be corrupt, and do not want to be corrupt," purifying the governing subject, and cultivating an "immune mechanism" against corruption within the anti-corruption subject. How are the above-mentioned "one foundation" and "two answers" [3]3 A reference to the principle of “comprehensive and strict governance of the Party” (全面从严治党), which holds Party organizations responsible for the conduct of their members and emphasizes that discipline applies equally to all. to be implemented in the conduct of cadres in office, so that the anti-corruption struggle is institutionalized? We know that any institution is a practical operational mechanism designed to achieve a certain purpose. Through a profound analysis of the phenomenon of corruption, General Secretary Xi Jinping

Among the four levels above, “one foundation” and “two answers” constitute the general outline of the methodological system for the anti-corruption struggle in the New Era, running through the overall anti-corruption institutional framework. Realizing the “three mechanisms” of “dare not corrupt, cannot corrupt, and do not want to corrupt” is the construction of the governing主体 itself, establishing a three-tier immune mechanism against corruption. Rectifying work style by correcting the “four forms of decadence” [3]3 A reference to the principle of “comprehensive and strict governance of the Party” (全面从严治党), which holds Party organizations responsible for the conduct of their members and emphasizes that discipline applies equally to all. is about eliminating the social environment that breeds the virus of corruption. These four levels form the overall architecture of the methodological system for the anti-corruption struggle in the New Era, ensuring that the firm anti-corruption will of the Chinese Communist Party, which represents the fundamental interests of the vast majority of the people, always occupies an absolutely dominant position and holds an overwhelming advantage in the complex anti-corruption struggle, thereby guaranteeing the success of the anti-corruption effort.

IV. The Central Link of Anti-Corruption: The “Three Nos” Institutional System for Caging Power

▲: In the overall architecture above, establishing the “three nos” immune mechanism for the vast number of cadres is of utmost importance. So, how is the institutional system for realizing the cadres’ “three nos” to be established?

●: Establishing the “three nos” institutional system is very important. It enables the “one foundation” and “two answers” to be realized on the governing主体 through a complete set of institutions, and is the central link in the overall anti-corruption institutional architecture. Its purpose is to set up three anti-corruption checkpoints for the subjects involved in corrupt acts. “Do not want to corrupt” is the institutional checkpoint for ideological quality, “cannot corrupt” is the institutional checkpoint for the process of power operation, and “dare not corrupt” is the institutional checkpoint for supervision and investigation, thereby realizing “caging power.” Each of the three has its own principal contradictions and difficulties to face, and whether these difficulties can be overcome becomes the key to determining the success of the anti-corruption effort.

▲: So, what are the contradictions and difficulties that the institutions of these three checkpoints are meant to address? And how are they to be resolved?

●: Let us begin with the institution of “dare not corrupt.” If those in power subjectively “want to corrupt” and, in the process of exercising power, “can corrupt,” then their last line of defense is whether they dare to corrupt, which depends on the cadres’ weighing of the consequences of abusing power for personal gain. Therefore, the institutions for realizing “dare not corrupt” are mainly the supervision system and the judicial system. General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out that we must continuously increase pressure on the “dare not corrupt” front, always maintain an unchanged zero-tolerance deterrence and a constant high-pressure punitive force, resolutely punish those who do not stop or withdraw their hands and those who act recklessly, resolutely investigate and punish corruption where political issues and economic issues are intertwined, resolutely prevent leading cadres from becoming spokespersons and agents of interest groups and power blocs, and resolutely prevent the collusion of government and business, the penetration of capital into the political sphere, and other acts that damage the political ecosystem and the economic development environment. From the 18th National Congress of the CPC to the 20th National Congress of the CPC, national discipline inspection and supervision organs filed and investigated a total of over 4.648 million cases, punished 4.573 million people, recovered at least 11,946 fugitives from abroad, and recovered illicit money amounting to approximately 47.7 billion yuan. The intensity of the anti-corruption effort, rare in the world, has achieved an overwhelming victory over corruption that wins the applause of the people and leaves corrupt elements in a state of constant fear.

To establish the main institutions that make those with corrupt intentions dare not corrupt, it is necessary to build a comprehensive, blind-spot-free supervision system for corrupt acts. To this end, the following points must be achieved: First, “we must insist on hunting both ‘tigers’ and ‘flies,’ insist on punishing every corrupt act and eliminating every corrupt practice, exert the greatest effort to solve the corruption problem, strive to create a clean and upright Party conduct, government conduct, and social atmosphere, and constantly win the trust of the people with new achievements in anti-corruption and integrity promotion.” If high-ranking big tigers are not eliminated, they directly harm the state power and the overall social situation; if “small flies” around the people are not eliminated, they worsen the social atmosphere and directly affect the Party’s image. Second, establish a supervision mechanism that embodies the Party’s centralized, unified leadership, “clearly stipulating that the investigation of corruption cases is mainly led by the higher-level commission for discipline inspection, and that the nomination and inspection of secretaries and deputy secretaries of discipline inspection commissions at all levels are mainly led by the higher-level commission for discipline inspection in conjunction with the organizational department.” Based on rich governance experience and in-depth investigation and research, General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out the crux of supervision work: “Some localities worry that investigating cases will damage their image and affect development, and sometimes there are situations where cases are suppressed and not investigated, or cases are concealed and not reported. Everyone eats from the same pot, making it very difficult to supervise others.” To this end, it is necessary to ensure the relative independence of the supervisory power of discipline inspection commissions at all levels, ensure the Party Central Committee’s vertical leadership over the national discipline inspection system through the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and break through the complex web of personal relationships and interests. Third, establish an institutionalized inspection mechanism, strictly controlling unnecessary interactions between inspection agencies and the units being inspected. At the same time, carry out supervision both inside and outside the Party, develop whole-process people’s democracy, promote the construction of “digital supervision” and “smart supervision,” ensuring that every report is investigated and pursued to the end. Establish a system for cadres to declare important personal matters, implement strict audits upon leaving posts and leaving office, and so on. Use modern digital technology to leave electronic traces for official activities that may breed corruption, thereby forming a sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of corrupt elements and forming a supervision system for “dare not corrupt.”

The difficulty faced in building the supervision system for “dare not corrupt” is that supervisory power is a double-edged sword; it is both a sharp tool against corruption and a power that can itself be used for

While severely cracking down on corrupt elements, we must also cherish the vast number of cadres. General Secretary Xi Jinping earnestly pointed out: “It is not easy for the Party to educate and cultivate a leading cadre. Once a problem arises in terms of clean governance, the Party organization’s years of cultivation and the cadre’s own previous efforts are destroyed in an instant.” [3]3 A reference to the principle of “comprehensive and strict governance of the Party” (全面从严治党), which holds Party organizations responsible for the conduct of their members and emphasizes that discipline applies equally to all. Therefore, strict management of cadres to ensure they dare not be corrupt is in itself a form of protection for cadres. While discipline inspection commissions at all levels rigorously investigate corruption, they must also be responsible to Party organizations and individual cadres, repeatedly verifying the facts, so as neither to let a single corrupt element slip through nor to wrong a single good cadre.

▲: So, how should we establish the institutional system for “being unable to be corrupt,” and what are the principal contradictions and difficulties it must resolve?

●: Establishing the institutional system for “being unable to be corrupt” means “perfecting the system for the exercise of power and the system of oversight and supervision, so that power is exercised with corresponding responsibility, the exercise of power is subject to oversight, dereliction of duty is investigated, and violations of law are prosecuted, ensuring that the power granted by the people is always used to seek benefits for the people.” If the main purpose of the power oversight system is to establish a mechanism for “daring not to be corrupt,” then the main purpose of the power exercise constraint system is to establish a mechanism for “being unable to be corrupt,” eliminating opportunities to exploit institutional loopholes for personal gain through the use of power. To this end, it is necessary to conduct in-depth analysis of the processes by which corruption occurs in various fields, identify the patterns of corruption, grasp the key links and focal points, and establish corresponding institutional constraint systems. General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: “We must effectively prevent and punish corruption at its source, strengthen the analysis of typical cases, extract regular patterns from them, deepen reforms in fields and links where corruption is frequent, and minimize institutional obstacles and institutional loopholes to the greatest extent possible.” We must use various technical means to establish “being unable to be corrupt” institutions in all fields; fill institutional loopholes; and guard against new types of corruption and hidden corruption.

First, in Party and government organs, state-owned enterprises, and public institutions, we must strictly enforce systems regarding cadre selection and appointment, professional title evaluation, project approval, and award evaluation, putting an end to “pulling strings,” “exchange of power,” and the transfer of benefits before and after the fact, and accept public oversight through public announcements. This set of institutions is a unique creation of China’s whole-process people’s democracy and can prevent corruption in the above processes to the greatest extent possible.

Second, in the sphere of government-business interactions, the space for collusion between government and business and for power-money transactions must be blocked

Third, in the field of people's livelihood, electronic technology systems must be used to strictly record and investigate the flow of various types of government fiscal funds, such as transfer-payment funds, medical insurance funds, and pension funds, to strictly prevent corruption at every link, open channels for public reporting, and severely punish "small officials with big corruption." As for the field of foreign relations, even stricter supervision must be implemented, with the bottom line of ensuring national security.

The main difficulty in setting up a mechanism to "make it impossible to be corrupt" is the contradiction between the strictness of the system and fully mobilizing the creativity and initiative of cadres. If the system is comprehensive and strict, with strong rigidity and little discretionary power, it can maximize the realization of "making it impossible to be corrupt." If it is excessive, it will hinder enterprising leading cadres from making decisive decisions and implementing policies, and from boldly exploring and experimenting. Conversely, if the system reserves too much discretionary power, it will provide institutional loopholes and space for corruption

First, strictness must be the guiding principle; we must uphold comprehensive and strict governance of the Party. The system for restricting the exercise of power must not be compromised during implementation, so as to prevent creating opportunities for corruption. Once a system is established, it must be earnestly enforced, and no excuses may be found for refusing to implement it. General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: “Some of our systems are still not well

The principal contradiction faced in establishing an institutional system that makes officials “unwilling to be corrupt” is the contradiction between the Party’s original aspiration and founding mission and the erroneous trends of thought and unhealthy practices prevalent in society. Certain bourgeois liberalization trends that negate Marxism and the ideal of communism have spread in society, causing some cadres to waver in their ideals and convictions; the prevalence of the “Four Forms of Unhealthy Work Style”[1]1 A classical Chinese metaphor for the relationship between the ruler and the people, originating from Xunzi and later cited by Tang Dynasty Emperor Taizong: the people (water) can support the ruler (boat) or overthrow him. in society and the rampant open “petty corruption” have led some cadres to regard corrupt behavior as a normal part of human nature; because a market economy necessarily involves the participation of capital, unscrupulous capital will use money and sexual allure to “hunt down” Party members and cadres, gradually ensnaring some of them in its corrupt trap from which they cannot extricate themselves

Corruption is a chronic ailment that has plagued human society for thousands of years. Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era has made a great contribution to solving this age-old problem. The process of building China into a great modern socialist country in all respects will inevitably be a process of continuously developing and perfecting the system of anti-corruption institutions. Throughout this process, a high-pressure stance against corruption must always be maintained. Even if corruption is basically eliminated, the fight against corruption cannot be relaxed, because wherever there is power, there is the possibility of corruption; the fight against corruption is always ongoing!

(About the author: Lu Pinyue, graduated in 1981 from the graduate class of the Department of Philosophy at Renmin University of China. Currently a senior professor at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, and a distinguished research fellow at the Shanghai Research Center for Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. Recipient of the State Council Special Government Allowance. Recipient of the Second Higher Education Outstanding Ideological and Political Theory Course Teacher Award from the China Teacher Development Foundation, one of the first batch of Shanghai Municipal Ideological and Political Theory Teaching Masters, and the Shanghai Municipal Outstanding Contribution Award for Marxist Theory Teaching and Research. Chief expert for the major project of the National Social Science Fund, "Methodology of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era," and principal investigator for several key and general projects of the National Social Science Fund. Has published hundreds of articles, 10 monographs, and 2 translations. Three works have won second and third prizes in the Eighth Ministry of Education Outstanding Achievements in Social Sciences, and three works have won first prizes in the Shanghai Municipal Outstanding Achievements in Philosophy and Social Sciences. The work *Deep Generative Theory: A New Philosophical Realm of Natural Science* was selected for the "National Philosophy and Social Science Library," and *Capital* and the Contemporary World was included in the National Publication Fund project.)

Online editor: Tongxin