Multidisciplinary Perspectives on CPC Party Building Research and Their Integration

In January 2022, the Seventh Congress of the National Association for Party Building Research was convened. General Secretary Xi Jinping issued important instructions on Party building research, emphasizing the need to deepen understanding of the laws of Party building in the New Era, continuously improve the disciplinary, academic, and discourse systems of Party building, and continue to contribute wisdom and strength to advancing Party building in the New Era. Since reform and opening up, and especially since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, as understanding of the CPC’s core leadership role in China’s economic and social development and modernization process has deepened, academia has increasingly emphasized the Party’s role in the study of Chinese issues. Scholars from different disciplines have paid growing attention to Party building issues, conducting research on related topics from their respective disciplinary perspectives and producing a substantial body of work. However, constrained by disciplinary boundaries, there remains a lack of effective exchange and integration among different disciplines in the research process, and a situation of mutual support and interactive integration has not yet formed. This article, based on a review of research on CPC Party building from the three disciplines of political science, sociology, and management, will elucidate the strengths and shortcomings of each discipline’s approach to CPC Party building research and explore pathways for integrating multidisciplinary CPC Party building research.

2022年1月，全国党的建设研究会第七次会员代表大会召开，习近平总书记对党的建设研究工作作出重要指示，强调要加深对新时代党的建设规律的认识，不断完善党的建设学科体系、学术体系、话语体系，继续为推进新时代党的建设贡献智慧和力量。改革开放以来特别是党的十八大以来，随着对中国共产党在中国经济社会发展和现代化进程中的领导核心地位的认识不断深化，学界在中国问题研究中越来越强调中国共产党的角色，不同学科的学者越来越关注党的建设问题，从各自的学科视角对党的建设相关问题展开研究，形成了大量成果。但是，囿于学科的分野，不同学科在研究过程中还缺乏有效的交流与融合，尚未形成相互支撑、互动融合的局面。本文将在对政治学、社会学和管理学三个学科有关中共党建研究进行梳理的基础上，阐明它们关于中共党建研究的优点及不足之处，探讨多学科中共党建研究的融合之道。

I. CPC Party Building Research from the Perspective of Political Science

一、政治学视野下的中共党建研究

In modern times, China, once a great nation that had long led global trends, fell into a passive situation of being carved up by others. It was modern political parties that shouldered the heavy responsibility of saving the nation from peril. The CPC, guided by Marxism as its ideological compass, built a rigorous organizational system, developed strong capacity for social mobilization, led the Chinese people to victory in the New Democratic Revolution, established a modern state, and became the dominant force in China’s modernization process. Political science research on CPC Party building takes this as its logical starting point. Starting from the Party’s ideas and characteristics, proceeding through a demonstration of the necessity of the CPC’s comprehensive leadership in China’s modernization process, and ultimately arriving at the goal of improving the Party’s leadership and governance methods to advance the modernization of national governance, political science research on CPC Party building has formed three closely connected and clearly layered aspects.

近代以来，中国从曾经长期领先世界潮流的泱泱大国，陷入了任人宰割的被动局面。正是现代政党承担起了挽救民族危亡的重任。以马克思主义为思想指南的中国共产党，构建起严密的组织体系，形成强大的社会动员能力，领导中国人民取得新民主主义革命胜利，建立了现代国家，成为中国现代化进程的主导性力量。政治学对中共党建的研究正是以此为逻辑起点。政治学关于中共党建的研究从政党的理念与特质出发，经过对中国共产党在中国现代化进程中全面领导地位的必然性论证，最终落脚到完善党的领导方式和执政方式以推进国家治理现代化发展的目标，形成了政治学关于中共党建研究紧密相连、层次分明的三个方面。

(I) Ideas and Characteristics: The Conceptual Construction of the “Mission-Oriented Party”

（一）理念与特质：“使命型政党”的概念建构

In the process of modern China’s political development, countless political forces competed with one another. Why did only the CPC ultimately succeed? Academia has offered various explanations. The CPC’s original aspiration and founding mission of “seeking happiness for the Chinese people and rejuvenation for the Chinese nation” is the fundamental premise for its ability to win popular support. From this perspective, political science research on CPC Party building focuses on linking the people’s happiness and national rejuvenation with the Party’s conscious sense of mission, emphasizing that the CPC is a new type of political party with a strong sense of historical mission. The “mission-oriented Party” has become an important conceptual construction in political science research on CPC Party building. As early as 2004, Yang Guangbin and others proposed that, based on the nature and role of ideas, political parties can be divided into mission-oriented parties and broker parties: “A mission-oriented party is a party whose main purpose is to attract people to convert to and believe in its ideas, rather than to win public office by expanding voter support.” In recent years, some scholars have focused on examining the CPC’s “mission-oriented Party” characteristics, emphasizing that this is the fundamental difference between the CPC and bourgeois parties, or even all other parties. Some scholars have noted that, from the perspectives of nature, role, function, status, mission, and responsibility, “the CPC is a mission-oriented party dedicated to achieving national prosperity and strength, the great rejuvenation of the nation, and world peace and shared prosperity.” That the CPC, bearing such a heavy mission, must constantly focus on strengthening its own construction has become a basic consensus among researchers of Chinese political issues. Particularly for contemporary China, “facing various challenges in the historical process of national rejuvenation, continuously strengthening Party building, and advancing self-revolution while promoting social revolution, is the magic weapon for the success of China’s revolution, construction, and reform.” Overall, placing political Party building in the first position, strengthening ideological Party building and theoretical Party building, advancing comprehensive and strict governance of the Party through self-revolution, and continuously opening up new realms of mission-oriented Party building are the basic experiences of the ruling Party building over the more than seventy years since the founding of New China, promoting “the gradual maturation and stabilization of the Chinese paradigm of ruling Party building.” It can be said that the concept of the “mission-oriented Party” has become one of the most important contributions of political science to CPC Party building research.

近代以后的中国政治发展进程中，有无数的政治力量相互竞逐，为什么只有中国共产党最终成功？学界提出了各种各样的解释。中国共产党“为中国人民谋幸福、为中华民族谋复兴”的初心和使命，是其能够赢得民众认同的根本前提。从这个角度出发，政治学关于中共党建的研究，着重将人民幸福、民族复兴与中国共产党的使命自觉勾连起来，强调中国共产党是具有高度历史使命感的新型政党，“使命型政党”成为政治学关于中共党建研究的重要概念建构。早在2004年，杨光斌等人就提出，从理念的本质和角色可将政党划分为使命政党和掮客政党，“使命政党是一个以吸引人们归依并信奉其理念为主要目的，而非以扩大选民支持而赢得公职选举为主要目标的政党”。近年来，一些学者着重考察中国共产党的“使命型政党”特质，强调这是中国共产党与资产阶级政党甚至与所有其他政党的根本不同所在。有学者提到，从性质、作用、角色、地位、使命和责任等角度来看，“中国共产党是一个致力于实现国家繁荣富强、民族伟大复兴、世界和平共荣的使命型政党”。肩负如此重任的中国共产党必须时刻注重加强自身建设，成为中国政治问题研究者的基本共识。特别对当代中国来说，“面对民族复兴历史进程中的各种挑战，不断加强党的建设，在推进社会革命的同时不断推进自我革命，是中国革命、建设和改革取得成功的法宝”。总体来看，将党的政治建设摆在首位，强化思想建党和理论强党，通过自我革命来积极推进全面从严治党，不断开辟使命型政党建设的新境界，是新中国成立七十多年来执政党建设的基本经验，推动“执政党建设的中国范式逐步成熟和定型”。可以这样说，“使命型政党”概念已经成为政治学对中共党建研究最重要的贡献之一。

(II) Demonstration of Necessity: The Party’s Comprehensive Leadership in the Modernization Process

（二）必然性论证：现代化进程中党的全面领导

From a global perspective, early-modernizing countries such as Britain and the United States relied mainly on market and social forces to initiate the modernization process, while countries like Germany and France relied mainly on state forces to lead modernization. In contrast, modern China lacked both a strong central state power and mature social forces. Who would lead the Chinese revolution to victory, and then organize China’s modernization, enabling the Chinese nation to stand once again among the nations of the world, became a pressing era question for the Chinese people. The Kuomintang’s “semi-centralist” state building could neither effectively mobilize the whole society to win the national war of resistance and save the nation from peril, nor integrate all social resources to promote China’s modernization process. Only the CPC, implementing “comprehensive centralism,” led the Chinese people to victory in the revolution, established New China, and laid the basic political prerequisite for China’s modernization. However, “for a considerable period in China’s journey toward modernization, the total amount of social resources was generally in a relatively weak state; this fact imposes its own stipulations on social regulation.” This stipulation lies in the CPC’s dominant position in China’s modernization process. In other words, China’s modernization process must uphold and strengthen the Party’s comprehensive leadership, thereby gathering limited social resources to promote China’s modernization. This is the fundamental experience summary of the CPC leading Chinese-path modernization to achieve historic achievements. “China’s historical logic dictates that organizing a political party, and then using the party to mobilize society to build a modern state, is the basic path for China to become a modern state.” Practice also shows that “the CPC is the core agent of China’s modern state building.” The process of “building the state through the party” determines that China follows a party-led modernization development path. “The CPC leads social revolution and dominates national governance by strengthening its own construction, and becomes the dominant force leading national construction and modernization development.” “Chinese political construction and political development must fully grasp the important role of Party building within it.” For this reason, some scholars have even elevated “upholding the Party’s leadership over all work” to the level of a “principle,” emphasizing that “with political construction as the guide, with the Marxist mission-oriented Party as the goal, and with unity, solidarity, and synergy as the orientation… we should achieve the comprehensive generation of a pattern of strengthened, comprehensive, and excellent Party leadership through integrated fusion.”

从世界范围来看，早发现代化国家如英美等主要依靠市场和社会的力量来启动现代化进程，而德法等则主要依靠国家的力量来主导现代化发展。与之不同的是，近代以后的中国，既缺乏有力的中央国家权力，亦没有成熟的社会力量，谁来领导中国革命取得胜利，进而组织中国的现代化事业，使中华民族重新屹立于世界民族之林，成为中国人民苦苦思索的时代难题。国民党“半集中主义”的国家建设，既不能有效动员全社会力量来赢得民族抗战胜利以挽救民族危亡，也不能整合全社会资源来推动中国的现代化进程。只有实行“全面集中主义”的中国共产党领导中国人民取得革命胜利，建立了新中国，为中国的现代化建设奠定了基本政治前提。但是，“在中国社会走向现代化相当长的一段时期内，社会资源总量总体上处于较贫弱的状况之中，这一事实会给社会调控施加自己的规定性”。这个规定性就在于中国共产党在中国现代化进程中的主导性地位。换句话说，中国的现代化进程必须坚持和加强中国共产党的全面领导，进而将有限的社会资源聚集起来推动中国的现代化建设，这是中国共产党领导中国式现代化取得历史性成就的根本经验总结。“中国的历史逻辑决定了组织政党，由政党动员社会建设现代国家，是中国走向现代国家的基本道路。”实践也表明，“中国共产党是中国现代国家建设的核心能动者”，“以党建国”的历程决定了中国走的是一条政党主导型现代化发展道路，“中国共产党通过加强自身建设来领导社会革命和主导国家治理，并成为引领国家建设和现代化发展的主导性力量”。“中国政治建设与政治发展必须充分把握党的建设在其中的重要作用。”正因为如此，有学者甚至将坚持党对一切工作的领导上升到“原理”的高度，强调应“以政治建设为统领，以马克思主义使命型政党为目标，以团结、统一、合力为取向……实现一体化融合的加强党的全面而卓越领导格局的全面生成”。

(III) Empirical Examination: Improving the Party’s Leadership and Governance Methods

（三）经验性考察：完善党的领导方式和执政方式

The aforementioned political scientists’ research on the unique characteristics of the Chinese Communist Party’s ideas and its comprehensive leadership role in China’s modernization process is, relatively speaking, primarily a normative argument. In addition, people’s examination of the Chinese Communist Party’s leading core position in contemporary China, and how the Chinese Communist Party strengthens its own building, maintains and consolidates this position, is more of an empirical expression. After the founding of New China, the Chinese Communist Party sought to extensively embed Party organizations within various non-Party organizations, constructing a concentric-circle structure with Party organizations at its core. On November 9, 1949, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee adopted the “Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Organizing Party Committees within the Central People’s Government” and the “Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Establishing Party Groups within the Central People’s Government,” strengthening the Party’s leadership over state organs at the central level. [5]5 The Political Bureau of the Central Committee (中央政治局) is the top leadership body of the Chinese Communist Party, responsible for major decisions between plenary sessions of the Central Committee. In 1953, this practice extended to the local level, thereby establishing the Party’s absolute leadership over state organs from top to bottom. After the completion of the socialist transformation in 1956, the Chinese Communist Party had already extensively distributed Party organizations within enterprises, government organs, schools, mines, and other units, and clearly designated Party organizations as the leading core in these units. Thus, the Chinese Communist Party “actually became the core force of Chinese society, and thereby also became the axis of Chinese society’s operation and development,” and the party-centered political form of contemporary China gradually took shape. While this form unleashed powerful political energy, it also led to a series of problems due to excessive concentration of power. After reform and opening up, Deng Xiaoping, reflecting on the chaos of the “Cultural Revolution” period, pointed out that it was necessary both to uphold Party leadership and to improve Party leadership. However, for a period after the 13th National Congress of the CPC proposed the reform of separating Party and government, people’s misunderstanding of the Party’s unified leadership led to a weakening of Party leadership in practice and produced negative effects. In academic research, after the 1990s, political science research on Chinese politics mainly focused on the relationship between state and society, neglecting the role of the ruling Chinese Communist Party in contemporary Chinese politics. Since the New Era, in China’s political practice and theoretical research, people have recognized the need to “bring the Party back in.” Political science research on party-centered political forms is precisely a positive response to China’s actual political practice. Guo Dingping proposed that since reform and opening up, the Chinese Communist Party, through reforms of the Party and state leadership system, improving and perfecting the multi-party cooperation system, developing socialist democracy, and building a socialist country under the rule of law, has constructed “a new model of state governance based on the rule of law, with mutual embedding of Party and state and the Party as the center.” The Chinese Communist Party has thus become a “governing party,” meaning it has constructed “a compound governance with the Party at the center, under Party leadership, featuring multi-party cooperation and the participation of multiple subjects.” In this new model, the Chinese Communist Party drives state building and state governance through Party building, such as by continuously adjusting the Party’s recruitment strategy to enhance the advanced nature and representativeness of Party organizations, thereby playing a role in elite selection, social integration, and identity construction to drive state building. The decisive position of the Chinese Communist Party in the state governance of contemporary China requires, under the principle of upholding the Party’s comprehensive leadership, continuous improvement of the Party’s leadership methods and governing methods. Some scholars have proposed that in the process of modernizing state governance, it is necessary to promote cultural modernization to construct a new type of political culture, strengthen legal education for Party members and cadres, and shape the main force for governing according to law, in order to achieve the legalization of the Party’s governing methods.

前述政治学者对中国共产党的理念特质及其在中国现代化发展进程中全面领导地位的研究，相对来说主要是一种规范性论证。此外，人们关于中国共产党在当代中国的领导核心地位，以及中国共产党如何加强自身建设、维护和巩固这种地位的考察，则更多是一种经验性表达。新中国成立以后，中国共产党力图将党的组织广泛嵌入到各种非党组织当中，构建起以党的组织为核心的同心圆结构。1949年11月9日，中央政治局通过《中共中央关于在中央人民政府内组织中国共产党党委会的决定》 和《中共中央关于在中央人民政府内建立中国共产党党组的决定》 ，在中央层面加强了党对政权机关的领导。1953年这个做法向地方层面继续延伸，这样就自上而下地确立起党对政权机关的绝对领导。1956年社会主义改造完成以后，中国共产党已经将党的组织广泛分布到企业、机关、学校、矿山等单位当中，并明确党的组织在这些单位中的领导核心地位。这样，中国共产党“实际上成为中国社会的核心力量，进而也成为中国社会运转和发展的轴心”，当代中国以政党为中心的政治形态逐渐形成。这个形态在迸发出强大的政治能量的同时，也由于权力过于集中，导致了一系列问题。改革开放以后，邓小平在反思“文革”时期的混乱时指出，既要坚持党的领导，又要改善党的领导。不过，党的十三大提出党政分开改革以后的一段时间里，人们因对党的一元化领导产生误解而在实践中导致党的领导弱化并产生了消极影响。学术研究中，20世纪90年代以后，政治学关于中国政治的研究主要关注国家与社会的关系，忽视了执政的中国共产党在当代中国政治中的作用。新时代以来，在中国的政治实践和理论研究中，人们认识到需要重新“将政党带进来”。政治学关于政党中心式政治形态的研究正是对中国现实政治实践的积极回应。郭定平提出，改革开放以来，中国共产党通过党和国家领导制度改革，健全完善多党合作制度、发展社会主义民主和建设社会主义法治国家等，构建起“一种基于法治的政党与国家相互嵌入、以政党为中心的国家治理新模式”。中国共产党因此而成为“治理型政党”，即中国共产党建构起“一种党领导下的多党合作、多元主体共同参与的政党中心的复合型治理”。在这个新模式中，中国共产党通过党的建设来驱动国家建设和国家治理，如通过不断调整政党的录用策略来提升党组织的先进性和代表性，进而发挥精英选拔、社会整合和认同构建的作用来驱动国家建设。中国共产党在当代中国国家治理中的决定性地位，要求在坚持党的全面领导原则下，不断改善党的领导方式和执政方式。有学者提出，在国家治理现代化的进程中，要通过推进文化的现代化来构建新型政治文化、加强党员干部法治教育、塑造依法执政主体力量等手段来实现党的执政方式法治化。

In addition to the three aspects mentioned above, research on topics such as the Party-state system and Party-state relations also contains some content on CPC Party building research, which can generally be classified into one of the three categories above, so it will not be repeated here.

除了上述三个方面，在有关党政体制、党政关系等议题的研究中，也有中共党建研究的部分内容，总体上可以归入到上述三者中的某一个方面去，此处不再赘述。

II. Sociological Perspectives on CPC Party Building Research

二、社会学视野下的中共党建研究

Political parties originate in society, are constrained by the social environment while simultaneously shaping it. In modern society, “political parties have become a special kind of organization, an effective machine, possessing vision and efficacy that other organizations lack, in order to meet certain needs of society.” Political parties have thus become an important object of sociological research. Unlike political science, which studies the role and status of the Chinese Communist Party and the paths and methods of Party building from perspectives such as modernization and modern state construction, sociology, which was restored after reform and opening up, more often situates Party building within the development and evolution of contemporary Chinese society, exploring how the Chinese Communist Party strengthens its own building to adapt to rapidly changing Chinese society. Enhancing the Chinese Communist Party’s adaptability or adjustability has become an important topic of academic concern. Compared to political science, which focuses more on the Party’s adjustment or adaptation at the macro level, such as ideology, sociology is more concerned with the Party’s adaptive development at the organizational level, examining from an “empirical” perspective how the Chinese Communist Party adjusts, with particular attention to the process of Party building and the mechanisms of interaction between the Party and society.

政党起源于社会，受社会环境的制约同时又塑造着社会环境。在现代社会中，“政党已变成一种特殊的组织，一架有效的机器，具有其他组织所没有的眼光和效能，以此来满足社会的某种需要”。政党因此成为社会学的重要研究对象。与政治学主要从现代化建设和现代国家建构等角度研究中国共产党的角色地位以及党的建设的路径方法不同，改革开放以后恢复的中国社会学更多将党的建设置于当代中国社会的发展演变中进行考察，探讨中国共产党如何通过加强自身建设来适应快速变动的中国社会，增强中国共产党的调适性或适应性成为学界关注的重要议题。相比于政治学更关注中国共产党在意识形态等宏观层面的调适或适应，社会学则更加关心中国共产党在组织层面的适应性发展，从“实然”的角度考察中国共产党如何进行调适，尤其注重党建的过程以及政党与社会之间的互动机制。

After reform and opening up, China’s economic and social system underwent fundamental changes. Economically, there was a transition from a planned economy to a socialist market economy, gradually breaking the previous situation where resources were highly concentrated in the Party and government. Socially, with the dissolution of rural people’s communes and urban work-unit systems, the previous situation where urban and rural residents were bound by the household registration system and unable to move also became unsustainable, and “free-flowing resources” and “free activity spaces” in society continuously emerged. While greatly unleashing the vitality of Chinese society, these changes in the economic and social system also posed new challenges to the ruling Chinese Communist Party. Sociological research on CPC Party building takes this as its logical starting point.

改革开放以后，中国经济社会体制发生了根本性变革。经济上，从计划经济体制向社会主义市场经济体制转型，原本那种资源高度集中于党和政府的局面逐渐被打破；社会上，随着农村人民公社和城市单位制的解体，原本那种依靠户籍制度将城乡居民束缚起来而无法流动的局面也无以为继，社会上的“自由流动资源”和“自由活动空间”不断出现。经济社会体制变革在极大地释放中国社会活力的同时，也对执政的中国共产党提出了新的挑战。社会学对中共党建的研究是以此为逻辑起点的。

(I) Focusing on New Fields: Organizational Embedding of the Ruling Party

（一）关注新领域：执政党的组织嵌入

Unlike the situation before reform and opening up, when public ownership dominated and Party organizations had broad coverage, after reform and opening up various economic and social organizations outside the system emerged continuously. These organizations operate independently, assume sole responsibility for their profits and losses, and manage themselves, remaining outside the control and influence of Party organizations, creating numerous “blank spots” in grassroots Party building. In particular, after the 15th National Congress of the CPC explicitly designated the non-public sector as an important component of the socialist market economy, China’s non-public economic organizations developed rapidly. By the end of 2001, the number of Party organizations established in “non-public” enterprises nationwide had exceeded 71,000, an increase of 2.1 times compared with 1997. Nevertheless, by the end of 2003, only about 7% of private enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises nationwide had established Party organizations. Faced with this situation, the most direct response of the CPC was to embed Party organizations within them. As early as the 14th National Congress of the CPC in 1992, Jiang Zemin pointed out: “In other various types of economic organizations, we must proceed from actual conditions and promptly establish and improve Party organizations and work systems.” In 1994, the “Decision of the Central Committee of the CPC on Several Major Issues Concerning Strengthening Party Building,” adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee of the CPC, stated that “various newly established economic organizations and social organizations are increasing day by day, and it is necessary to proceed from actual conditions to establish Party organizations and carry out Party activities,” thereby raising the requirement to strengthen Party building in new economic organizations and new social organizations. However, unlike units within the system, in “two new” organizations—units outside the system that have no administrative subordination or resource dependence relationship with the Party and government—Party building work faces greater difficulties. Taking non-public enterprises as an example, some investors harbor a guarded mentality, fearing that Party building work might affect the enterprise’s production and operations. Of course, some non-public enterprises also adopt a relatively positive attitude toward Party building, even proactively establishing enterprise Party branches or upgrading branches to Party committees. Investigating the reasons, some accept the ruling Party’s organizational embedding because Party building can better enhance the enterprise’s political connections and secure a better institutional environment for enterprise development; or because Party building can broaden the channels for enterprises to obtain information resources and policy support; or because Party organizations can guide private enterprises to invest more in productive activities, significantly improving enterprise performance. For social organizations, Party building plays an important role in their growth. Some scholars, through case studies of social organizations, have found that Party building has undergone a continuous progression from “talking about Party building,” to “doing Party building,” to “promoting Party building,” and to “integrating Party building,” achieving “the same-frequency resonance of social organization development progression and Party building coupling evolution.” [6]6 “Same-frequency resonance” (同频共振) is a metaphor borrowed from physics, used here to describe the synchronized and mutually reinforcing development of social organizations and Party building. Therefore, in the face of the ruling Party’s embedding actions, many social organizations actively identify and effectively utilize the space for Party building to create advantages for their own development. In fact, a situation of “two-way embedding” has formed between social organizations and Party organizations, [7]7 “Two-way embedding” (双向嵌入) refers to a reciprocal relationship where both the Party and social organizations actively embed themselves into each other’s operations and structures. thereby enhancing their ability to acquire social capital.

与改革开放前公有制一统天下局面下党的组织广覆盖不同，改革开放以后，各种体制外经济社会组织不断出现，它们自主经营、自负盈亏、自我管理，游离于党的组织掌控和影响之外，形成大量基层党组织建设的“空白点”。特别是中共十五大明确非公有制经济是社会主义市场经济的重要组成部分以后，中国的非公有制经济组织迅猛发展。2001年底，全国“非公”企业建立党组织数量已突破7.1万个，比1997年增加了2.1倍。尽管如此，到2003年底，全国私营企业和外商投资企业中只有约7%的单位建立了党组织。面对这种情况，中国共产党最直接的应对方式，就是将党的组织嵌入其中。早在1992年中共十四大上，江泽民就指出：“在其他各种经济组织中，也要从实际出发，抓紧建立健全党的组织和工作制度。”1994年中共十四届四中全会通过的《中共中央关于加强党的建设几个重大问题的决定》 指出，“各种新建立的经济组织和社会组织日益增多，需要从实际出发建立党的组织，开展党的活动”，从而提出了加强新经济组织和新社会组织党建的要求。但是，与体制内单位不同，在“两新”组织这种与党和政府之间无行政隶属关系、无资源依赖关系的体制外单位中，党的建设工作面临着更多的困难。以非公有制企业为例，有的出资人因担心党建工作会影响企业的生产经营而存有戒备心理。当然，也有些非公有制企业对党建工作抱有比较积极的态度，甚至主动积极地建立企业党支部或将支部升格为党委。究其原因，人们或因党建工作能够更好地增强企业的政治关联，为企业发展争取更好的制度环境，或因党建能够拓宽企业获得信息资源和政策支持的渠道，或因党组织能够引导民营企业投入更多的生产性活动而显著提升企业绩效水平，而更愿意接受执政党的组织嵌入。对社会组织来说，党建工作对社会组织的成长具有重要作用。一些学者通过对社会组织案例的研究发现，党建工作经历了从谈党建、做党建、促党建到融党建的连续推进，“实现了社会组织发展进阶与党建耦合演化的同频共振”。因此，面对执政党的嵌入行动，许多社会组织会主动识别和有效利用党建的空间，为自身发展创造优势。实际上，社会组织与党组织之间形成了一种“双向嵌入”的态势37，从而增强了自身的社会资本获取能力。

(II) Facing New Strata: The Ruling Party’s Elite Co-optation

（二）面对新阶层：执政党的精英吸纳

After the founding of New China, China gradually formed a social structure of “two classes, one stratum,” including workers, peasants, and intellectuals, a situation that persisted for nearly thirty years. After reform and opening up, this situation underwent significant changes, giving rise to “ten major social strata,” including the stratum of state and social managers, the stratum of managers, and the stratum of private entrepreneurs. Theoretically, the working class is the firm political foundation of the CPC as a proletarian party, and the peasant class is its reliable political ally. In contrast, the new economic and social strata that emerged during reform, such as private entrepreneurs, are new phenomena and new issues that the CPC must confront. How to handle the relationship with these new economic and social groups tests the political wisdom of the CPC. Unlike the communist parties of many other former socialist countries, which rejected new economic and social forces at the door due to rigid ideology, the CPC continuously promoted the Sinicization of Marxism to enhance ideological adaptability, laying the foundation for the organizational co-optation of new economic and social groups. In May 2000, Comrade Jiang Zemin, presiding over a forum on Party building work in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Shanghai in Shanghai, pointed out: “Today’s private entrepreneurs developed under our Party’s reform policies and the call to take the lead in getting rich; many of them were originally laborers.” The first half of this statement responded to the societal debate at the time about whether the private economy had “original sin,” and the second half responded to the societal debate about whether private entrepreneurs were an exploiting class. In his “July 1st” speech in 2001, Jiang Zemin emphasized that private entrepreneurs and other new social strata “are also builders of the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” thereby clarifying the identity positioning of the private entrepreneur stratum. These two speeches by Jiang Zemin effectively lifted, economically, legally, and politically, the curse that had been tightly bound to the private economy and private entrepreneurs, providing a theoretical prerequisite for their organizational co-optation. One of the important topics in sociological research on Party building is the ruling Party’s co-optation of new economic and social groups, because “the new social stratum is a group with immense energy and wisdom; they not only possess wealth but also have broad social influence. If they are politically excluded from the ruling Party, the cost could be enormous.” [8]8 This quote reflects a sociological argument that excluding wealthy and influential new social strata from political participation could lead to instability or opposition. History has shown that the CPC did not do this; instead, it boldly embraced the private economy and co-opted private entrepreneurs into the Party’s organization. The CPC’s strategy of co-opting new social elites indicates its effort to channel more social interests into the existing political system, reflecting the Party’s inclusiveness. Unlike the presupposition of classical Western political sociology that the rise of the middle class will impact social stability, China’s new economic and social groups are clearly supporters, not challengers, of the existing regime. This is also an important experience in maintaining political and social stability in China since reform and opening up.

新中国成立以后，中国逐渐形成了工人、农民和知识分子在内的“两个阶级、一个阶层”的社会结构，这种状况一直持续将近三十年。改革开放以后，这种状况发生了显著的变化，出现了包括国家与社会管理者阶层、经理人员阶层、私营企业主阶层等在内的“十大社会阶层”。从理论上来说，工人阶级是作为无产阶级政党的中国共产党的坚定政治基础，农民阶级是其可靠政治同盟。与此不同，在改革中出现的私营企业主等新兴经济社会阶层则是中国共产党需要面对的新现象新问题，如何处理与新兴经济社会群体的关系考验着中国共产党的政治智慧。与其他许多前社会主义国家共产党因僵化的意识形态而拒新兴经济社会力量于大门之外不同，中国共产党通过不断推动马克思主义的中国化以增强意识形态的适应性，为从组织上吸纳新兴经济社会群体奠定了基础。2000年5月，江泽民同志在上海主持召开江苏、浙江、上海党建工作座谈会时指出：“现在的私营企业主，是在我们党的改革政策和带头致富号召下发展起来的，许多人本来就是劳动者。”这一讲话，前一半回应了当时社会上关于私营经济是否存在“原罪”的争论，后一半回应了当时社会上关于私营企业主是否是剥削阶级的争论。2001年“七一”讲话中，江泽民强调，私营企业主等新社会阶层“也是有中国特色社会主义事业的建设者”，从而明确了私营企业主阶层的身份定位。江泽民的这两次讲话，实际上从经济上、法律上和政治上解除了紧扣在私营经济和私营企业主头上的咒语，为从组织上对之进行吸纳提供了理论前提。社会学关于党建研究的重要议题之一，就是执政党对新兴经济社会群体的吸纳问题，因为“新社会阶层是一个极具能量和智慧的群体，他们不但拥有财富，而且也有广泛的社会影响，如果在政治上将他们排除在执政党之外，付出的代价可能是非常巨大的”。历史已经表明，中国共产党没有这样做，而是大胆地拥抱私营经济，将私营企业家吸纳到党的组织中来。中国共产党对新社会精英的吸纳策略表明其力图将更多的社会利益引导到现有的政治体系之中，这体现了党的包容性。与西方经典政治社会学理论所预设的中产阶级的崛起将对社会的稳定带来的影响不同，中国的新兴经济社会群体显然是现有政权的支持者而非挑战者，这也是改革开放以来中国保持政治社会稳定的重要经验所在。

(III) Facing New Groups: The Spatial Turn in Grassroots Party Building

（三）面向新群体：基层党建的空间转向

With the deepening advancement of China’s reform and opening up, the original situation in which various social production factors (such as labor, capital, technology, etc.) were concentrated in relatively fixed public ownership units has undergone a fundamental transformation, giving rise to entirely new fields that are completely different from traditional public ownership units, including urban commercial buildings, marketplaces, and online media. In terms of characteristics, compared with traditional public ownership units, these new fields have a looser relationship with the Party and the government, and the mobility and individualization of practitioners in these new fields are also stronger. Taking couriers and delivery workers among the new employment groups as an example, many people often choose to switch to another job after working for a period of time. Strengthening Party building in new fields has become an important component of consolidating the Party’s governing foundation. In May 2019, the “Opinions on Strengthening and Improving Urban Grassroots Party Building Work” issued by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee proposed to “continuously improve the quality of Party organization and work coverage in new fields.” [9]9 General Office of the CPC Central Committee, “Opinions on Strengthening and Improving Urban Grassroots Party Building Work,” May 2019. The report of the 20th National Congress of the CPC emphasized “strengthening Party building in new economic organizations, new social organizations, and new employment groups.” [10]10 Report to the 20th National Congress of the CPC, October 2022. The Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee once again emphasized “exploring effective ways to strengthen Party building in new economic organizations, new social organizations, and new employment groups.” [11]11 Decision of the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, July 2024. However, unlike traditional unit Party building or urban community Party building, Party building in new fields lacks a relatively stable carrier. Where to place Party organizations becomes the primary challenge for Party building in new fields. In practice, people have re-aggregated various elements of new fields through the reconstruction and production of space, providing basic platforms and carriers for the implantation of Party organizations and the conduct of Party building work. In recent years, some scholars have focused on introducing the concept of “space” and related theories into the study of urban grassroots Party building. Some scholars believe that during the New Democratic Revolution period, Mao Zedong’s relevant theories on “armed independent regimes of workers and peasants” already included “spatial consciousness.” [12]12 “Armed independent regimes of workers and peasants” (工农武装割据) is a strategy Mao Zedong developed during the Jinggangshan period (1927–1930), combining armed struggle, land revolution, and base area construction. In the history of the CPC, “the material space of Party history contains rich Party history information, and its construction, disappearance, functioning, and morphological changes embody specific Party history logic.” [13]13 Internal scholarly reference to the material remnants of Party history (buildings, sites, artifacts) as carriers of political meaning. From the perspective of Party building, Zhang Han was an early scholar to introduce the concept of space into the study of urban grassroots Party building. Through a case study of the governance mechanism of Ningbo Tianyi Square, he found that the CPC enhanced its organizational network and governance capacity in new urban governance spaces through measures such as regionalized Party building. [14]14 Zhang Han, “Regionalized Party Building and the Governance of New Urban Spaces: A Case Study of Ningbo Tianyi Square,” early 2010s. Wang Rui proposed that, compared with traditional Party building, Party building in new fields requires more attention to spatial thinking. He analyzed the effective realization mechanism of Party building in new fields from three dimensions: spatial structuring, spatial re-organization, and spatial socialization. [15]15 Wang Rui, “Spatial Thinking in Party Building in New Fields,” mid-2010s. In recent years, the concept of space has been further expanded to encompass physical space, economic space, social space, and political space, forming a three-dimensional spatial thinking in grassroots Party building research. The spatial turn in urban grassroots Party building research has become an important point of intersection for the multidisciplinary integration of sociology, human geography, and the study of CPC history and Party building.

随着中国改革开放的纵深推进，原本各种社会生产要素（如劳动力、资本、技术等）聚集于相对固定的公有制单位中的情形发生根本性转变，形成了包括城市商务楼宇、商圈市场和网络媒体等在内的与传统公有制单位完全不同的新兴领域。从特征上来说，相比于传统的公有制单位，新兴领域与党和政府的关系更加松散，新兴领域从业人员的流动性和个体化也更强。以新就业群体中的快递员和外卖员为例，很多人在工作一段时间后往往会选择转行去体验另一份工作。加强新兴领域党的建设成为巩固党的执政基础的重要组成部分。2019年5月，中共中央办公厅印发的《关于加强和改进城市基层党的建设工作的意见》 就提出，要“不断提升新兴领域党的组织和工作覆盖质量”。党的二十大报告强调，“加强新经济组织、新社会组织、新就业群体党的建设”。党的二十届三中全会再次强调，“探索加强新经济组织、新社会组织、新就业群体党的建设有效途径”。但是，与传统的单位党建或城市社区党建不同，新兴领域党建缺乏相对稳固的载体，党的组织安放何处成为新兴领域党建的首要难题。实践中，人们通过空间的再造和生产将新兴领域的各类要素重新聚集起来，为党组织的植入和党建工作的开展提供基本的平台和载体。近年来，一些学者着重将“空间”的概念和相关理论引入城市基层党建研究中。有的学者认为，新民主主义革命时期，毛泽东关于“工农武装割据”的相关理论中就已经包括“空间意识”。在中共党史上，“党史物质空间隐含着丰富的党史信息，其建构、消失、发挥作用和形态变化，体现着特定的党史逻辑”。从党的建设来说，张汉较早地将空间概念引入城市基层党建研究，其通过对宁波天一广场治理机制的个案考察，发现中国共产党通过区域化党建等措施增强了自身在城市新治理空间中的组织网络和治理能力。王锐提出，相比于传统党建，新兴领域党建更需要注意空间思维，其从空间结构化、空间再组织化和空间社会化三个维度，剖析了新兴领域党建有效的实现机制。在近年来的研究中，空间的概念得到进一步拓展，涵盖了物理空间、经济空间、社会空间以及政治空间，在基层党建研究中形成了立体化的空间思维。城市基层党建研究的空间转向，成为社会学、人文地理学和中共党史党建学多学科交叉的重要结合点。

III. Research on CPC Party Building from the Perspective of Management Science

三、管理学视野下的中共党建研究

Alan Ware once mentioned, “It is hard to imagine that the politics of contemporary states is not party politics,” [16]16 Alan Ware, *Political Parties and Party Systems* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 1. which succinctly reveals the important position of political parties in the modern world. Especially for a late-developing country like China, the unique position of the long-ruling CPC in contemporary China determines that the characteristic of China’s political and social operation is that the CPC first manages itself well, and then manages the entire country well. Simply put, “Running China’s affairs well depends on the Party, and the key lies in the Party governing itself and governing it strictly.” [17]17 A standard formulation in CPC discourse, frequently used since the 18th National Congress (2012). How to effectively manage and govern the Party well, in order to better lead Chinese society to continuously move forward, is the basic foothold of management science’s attention to CPC Party building research. As early as 2011, some had already proposed exploring the scientificization of Party building from the perspective of management science, believing that this new attempt could broaden work horizons and provide new ideas for Party building. They explored the points of convergence between modern management science and Party building research from six aspects, including introducing learning organization theory to build a learning-oriented Party and drawing on performance evaluation theory to construct a Party building work effectiveness evaluation system. [18]18 Early 2011 article proposing management-science approaches to Party building scientificization. In recent years, an increasing number of scholars have attempted to introduce concepts, theories, and methods from modern management science to advance Party building research.

艾伦·韦尔曾提到，“很难想象，当代国家的政治并非政党政治”，一语道破了政党在现代世界中的重要地位。尤其对中国这样的后发国家来说，长期执政的中国共产党在当代中国的独特地位，决定了中国政治社会运行的特点就是，中国共产党首先把自己管好，再管好整个国家。简单来说就是，“办好中国的事情，关键在党，关键在党要管党、从严治党”。如何有效地把党管好治好，以更好引领中国社会不断向前发展，是管理学关注中共党建研究的基本立足点。早在2011年，就已经有人提出要从管理学的视角来探讨党的建设科学化问题，认为这种新的尝试可以开阔工作视野，为党建提供新思路，并从引进学习型组织理论建设学习型政党、借鉴绩效评估理论构建党建工作效果评估体系等六个方面探讨了现代管理学与党的建设研究间的契合之处。近年来，越来越多的学者试图引入现代管理学的概念、理论和方法来推进党的建设研究。

(1) Focusing on the Self-Governance of the Political Party

（一）关注政党的自我治理

Leaders of the CPC recognized the relationship between managing the Party well and managing the state well at an early stage. In early 1992, during his talks in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Shanghai, and other places, Deng Xiaoping emphasized the need to select good successors and that there must be no problems within the Communist Party, stating, “The key is that our Communist Party must do a good job internally and have no incidents; then we can sleep soundly.” [19]19 Deng Xiaoping, “Talks in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Zhuhai,” January–February 1992, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, vol. 3. This clearly established the foundational role of the CPC’s self-management in the overall governance of the state. However, due to its super-large scale, the CPC faces extremely high difficulty and complexity in management. “Large political parties generally face unique challenges such as improving the quality of Party building, balancing intra-Party power relations, motivating collective behavior of Party members, and managing organizational complexity.” [20]20 Scholarly observation on the generic challenges of large political parties, applied here to the CPC. This determines that governing and managing the Party must involve innovative concepts and methods. Introducing the concept of governance is one of the important explorations of management science regarding CPC Party building research. At the Second Plenary Session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out the need to “more prominently apply the concept of governance, systematic thinking, and dialectical thinking to govern, manage, and build the Party.” [21]21 Xi Jinping, speech at the Second Plenary Session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, January 2023. There has been considerable discussion on what governance is; its basic connotations include the plurality rather than singularity of subjects, the consultative rather than commanding nature of processes, and the multi-directional rather than purely top-down flow of power. When the concept of governance is applied to governing and managing the Party, it also differs significantly from traditional Party management. Some scholars have mentioned that Party management is primarily an activity in which leaders at all levels integrate and utilize internal resources of the Party organization to achieve political goals such as seizing, participating in, or holding state power. It emphasizes top-down command and obedience, has a strong administrative color and hierarchical concept, focuses on efficiency, and pays less attention to democracy. [22]22 Distinction between “Party management” (traditional, top-down) and “Party governance” (participatory, rule-based). In contrast, Party governance places greater emphasis on transparency, accountability, and characteristics such as “responsiveness from top to bottom and inside to outside, effectiveness of Party governance, and broad participation” in the process of governing and managing the Party. [23]23 Characteristics of Party governance as defined in the cited literature. Furthermore, Party governance can be divided into broad and narrow senses. Broadly defined, Party governance actually includes the Party’s own internal governance and the Party’s governance of the state or society; some scholars even include the coordination of inter-party relations as an important part of Party governance. Narrowly defined Party governance refers only to the former. [24]24 Broad vs. narrow definitions of Party governance, as used in Chinese political science. In terms of elements, the Party governance system includes four aspects: governance subjects, governance objectives, governance environment, and governance methods. The subjects of Party governance are mainly the Party organization itself and the objects of governance. The objective is to strive for and consolidate governing power through internal governance. Risks and challenges in the environment require the Party to enhance its adaptability. Institutionalization is an important method of Party governance and a key dimension for measuring the Party’s governance capacity. [25]25 Four-element framework for the Party governance system. Therefore, the CPC should strengthen interactive governance between leading cadres and ordinary Party members, strengthen network governance among Party organizations at all levels, and use the method of rule of law to achieve its goal of good governance. [26]26 Prescriptive recommendations for achieving “good governance” (善治) within the CPC. It can be seen that “governance” has become an important theoretical concept in the study of CPC Party building within the field of management science.

中国共产党领导人很早就认识到管好党和管好国家之间的关系。1992年初，邓小平在武昌、深圳、上海等地的谈话中强调要选好接班人，共产党内部不能出问题，“关键是我们共产党内部要搞好，不出事，就可以放心睡大觉”56，明确地提出了中国共产党自身管理在整个国家治理中的基础性地位。但是，中国共产党因其超大规模，面临着管理上的极高难度和复杂性。“大型政党普遍面临着提升党的建设质量、平衡党内权力关系、激励党员集体行为、治理组织复杂性等独有难题。”这就决定了管党治党必须有创新的理念和方法，引入治理理念是管理学关于中共党建研究的重要探索之一。在二十届中央纪委二次全会上，习近平总书记指出，要“更加突出运用治理的理念、系统的观念、辩证的思维管党治党建设党”。关于什么是治理已有不少探讨，其基本的内涵在于，主体的多元性而非单一性、过程的协商性而非命令性、权力运行的向度上下互动而非单一自上而下等。当治理理念被用于管党治党时，其与传统的政党管理也有明显的不同。有学者提到，政党管理主要是各级领导者对政党组织内部资源进行整合运用，以实现夺取、参与或执掌国家政权等政治目标的活动，其强调的是自上而下的命令与服从，具有强烈的行政色彩和等级观念，注重效率而较少关注民主。与此不同，政党治理则更加强调在管党治党过程中注重透明性、责任性，以及“上下与内外的回应性、治党有效性、广泛参与性”等特点。进一步来看，政党治理有广义和狭义之分。广义的政党治理实际上包括政党自身内部治理以及政党对国家或社会的治理，甚至还有学者将党际关系协调也作为政党治理的重要内容，而狭义的政党治理仅指前者。从要素来看，政党治理体系包括治理主体、治理目标、治理环境、治理方式四个方面：政党治理的主体主要是政党组织自身以及治理对象，目标则是通过内部治理争取并巩固执政权力，环境中的风险和挑战需要政党提高适应性，而制度化是政党治理的重要方式，也是衡量政党治理能力的重要维度。因此，中国共产党应从强化领导干部与普通党员间的交互式治理、强化各级党组织之间的网络治理，以及运用法治的方法，来实现自身的善治目标。可以看到，“治理”已经成为管理学界开展中共党建研究的重要理论概念。

(2) Highlighting the Leadership of Party Building in Grassroots Social Governance

（二）突出党建引领基层社会治理

The unique position of the Communist Party of China in China determines that it is likewise an indispensable actor in the modernization of social governance. However, unlike the period before reform and opening up, when under conditions of absolute public ownership the Party’s organizations relied on administrative power to exercise strong control over society, after reform and opening up resources have gradually been dispersed into the hands of an increasing number of social actors. The situation in which Party organizations absolutely controlled all social resources no longer exists, and the Party’s absolute dominant position in social life is likewise unsustainable. All of this requires that the mode of action of Party organizations undergo a corresponding transformation, that is, a shift from an administrative mode to a socialized mode. Therefore, the report of the 20th National Congress of the CPC pointed out the need to “advance the guidance of primary-level governance by Party building,” and the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CPC once again stressed the need to “strengthen the guidance of primary-level governance by Party building.” [27]27 The Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CPC was held in July 2024. Although “guidance of governance by Party building” appeared for the first time in official documents only at the 20th National Congress, from a practical perspective, primary-level governance since the 18th National Congress of the CPC has already reversed the earlier trend of the gradual marginalization of Party organizations, and primary-level Party organizations have gradually returned from the margins to the center. [28]28 The 18th National Congress of the CPC was held in November 2012. These phenomena in practice are an important entry point for management scholars to intervene in the study of CPC Party building. Generally speaking, people examine the inevitability of Party building guiding primary-level governance from a long-term historical perspective, holding that the weak organization of Chinese society in modern times is the fundamental reason for its inability to compete with the Western powers. The historical experience of the CPC winning revolutionary victory and great achievements in socialist construction through effectively organizing society teaches us that it is necessary to better organize society through Party transformation and innovation in order to adapt to the tasks of governance under marketized environmental conditions. From the perspective of practical mechanisms, unlike the totalistic governance model before reform and opening up and the polycentric governance model of Western societies, the governance guided by Party building embodies a Party-integrated governance model, which differs from the former two in four aspects: distribution of authority, logic of construction, structural form, and mode of integration. Compared with network governance, the integrated governance approach embodied in Party building-guided governance, while possessing the basic elements of network governance, is characterized by the dominant role of Party organizations within the governance network, integrating primary-level society by strengthening the capacity of Party organizations. The results show that Party building-guided governance has important strategic significance for promoting service-oriented government reform, guiding the orderly development of publicness in Chinese society, and achieving full coverage of governance networks. For primary-level Party organizations with limited resources under market economy conditions, to play an integrating and guiding role in primary-level social governance, strengthening their own construction to enhance political and organizational functions becomes an inevitable choice. The report of the 20th National Congress of the CPC emphasized that the Party should lead social revolution through its self-revolution, which is precisely the reasoning behind this. [29]29 “Self-revolution” (自我革命) refers to the Party’s proactive efforts to reform and purify itself from within, a key concept in Xi Jinping’s thought on Party building.

中国共产党在中国的独特地位决定了其同样是社会治理现代化进程中不可或缺的角色。但是，与改革开放以前那种绝对公有制条件下党的组织依托行政权力而对社会具有强大的控制力不同，改革开放以后，资源逐渐分散到越来越多的社会主体手中，党组织绝对控制各种社会资源的情况不再，政党在社会生活中的绝对主宰地位也无以为继，这些都要求党组织的行动方式随之转型，即从行政化方式向社会化方式转变。因此，党的二十大报告指出，要“推进以党建引领基层治理”，党的二十届三中全会再次强调，要“加强党建引领基层治理”。尽管党建引领治理在党的二十大才首次出现在官方文件中，但是从实践来看，党的十八大以来的基层治理已经一改此前一段时间党组织不断边缘化的现象，党的基层组织逐渐从边缘回到中心。这些实践中的现象是管理学者介入中共党建研究的重要切入点。一般来说，人们从历史的长程视角考察党建引领基层治理的必然性，认为近代以来中国社会的弱组织性是其无法与西方列强竞争的根本原因。中国共产党通过有效组织社会赢得革命胜利和社会主义建设伟大成就的历史经验启示我们，要通过政党的变革与创新更好地组织社会以适应市场化环境条件下的治理任务。从实践机制来看，与改革开放前的总体性治理模式和西方社会的多中心治理模式不同，党建引领治理所体现的是政党整合式治理，其在权威分布、建构逻辑、结构形态和整合方式四个方面都与前两者有所不同。与网络治理相比，党建引领治理所体现的统合治理方式虽然具有网络治理的基本要素，但是其特点在于党的组织在治理网络中发挥着主导作用，通过强化党组织的能力来统合基层社会。结果表明，党建引领治理对于推动服务型政府改革、引领中国社会公共性有序发展、实现治理网络全覆盖具有重要的战略意义。对于市场经济条件下资源有限的基层党组织来说，要在基层社会治理中发挥整合、引领作用，加强自身建设以强化政治功能和组织功能成为必然选择。党的二十大报告强调要以党的自我革命引领社会革命，说的正是这个道理。

(3) Exploring the Application of Emerging Technologies in Party Building

（三）探寻新兴技术在党建中的运用

The development of political parties is deeply embedded in a specific economic and social environment, and technology is an important component of this environment. The connotation of “technology” may differ across eras, but technological change and development will inevitably have a significant impact on political parties. Some scholars have noted that the development of modern railway transportation, printing technology, and electromagnetic technology provided important conditions for the smooth convening of the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China. [30]30 The First National Congress of the CPC was held in July 1921, marking the founding of the Party. The development of the new round of technological revolution requires that the CPC both fully utilize information technology to carry out Party building work and uphold and strengthen the Party’s overall leadership, effectively using new technologies to advance the standardization, institutionalization, and rule-of-law orientation of various tasks. As early as 2010, then-Vice President Xi Jinping pointed out: “Applying new technologies such as mobile phones to Party building work is not only an objective requirement of the development of the information age, but also an important manifestation of Party building work keeping pace with the times and carrying out reform and innovation.” [31]31 This quotation is from a speech by Xi Jinping in 2010 when he was Vice President of the People’s Republic of China. The embedding of modern technology into Party building work has gone through a development process from e-Party affairs, to online Party affairs, to digital Party building. As a new practice of governing the Party and running it strictly in the digital age, it is mainly characterized by platformization of positions, visualization of ideology, matrixization of organization, and modularization of functions. Management studies primarily focus on the mechanism of modern technology’s role in Party building, which is of great significance for ensuring that technology effectively serves Party building goals and improves the quality of Party building work. We know that modern technology can provide strong support for the standardization and normalized management of Party building work, effectively enhancing the management level of Party building work. For example, Party building information management systems bring workflow standardization and data precision to the digital management of Party member information and Party organization activities, and big data analysis technology also plays a positive role in the quantitative evaluation and scientific decision-making of Party building work. At the same time, modern technology enables Party building work to better adapt to changes in the external environment. Technologies such as big data, cloud computing, artificial intelligence, the mobile internet, and blockchain provide a comprehensive, multi-level system integration platform for Party building work. The construction of digital Party building platforms integrates multiple Party building work modules such as organizational management, Party member education, and propaganda services, achieving optimal allocation and coordinated operation of Party building resources. Of course, the complexity of technological systems and the rapid pace of their iteration may lead to system imbalances in the process of Party building work adapting to them. In particular, the lack of overall planning in digital Party building, with Party affairs information scattered across different vertical and horizontal functional departments, and the absence of mechanisms for information sharing, exchange, and cooperation among various actors, directly affects the effectiveness of Party building. If Party organizations cannot promptly adjust their Party building work methods in accordance with technological development and changes in the social environment, they will fall into a passive position. At the same time, in the process of promoting digital Party building, some localities, by overemphasizing technical indicators and data statistics while neglecting actual work effects and the needs of Party members and the masses, may instead cause Party building work to become superficial and fail to truly function. Therefore, when utilizing modern technology, Party building work must fully leverage its positive effects while simultaneously being vigilant against and avoiding the negative effects brought by technology. It is necessary to strengthen top-level design and institutional supply, focus on dynamic adjustment and meeting individualized needs, reinforce an orientation toward actual results, strengthen supervision and evaluation, and achieve high-quality development of Party building work in terms of system planning, work methods, and technological application.

政党的发展深深嵌入在一定的经济社会环境当中，技术便是这个环境的重要组成部分。不同时代“技术”的内涵可能有所不同，但是技术的变革与发展一定会对政党产生重要的影响。有学者提到，现代铁路交通、印刷技术以及电磁技术等的发展，为中国共产党第一次全国代表大会的顺利召开提供了重要条件。新一轮科技革命的发展，要求中国共产党既要充分运用信息技术开展党建工作，也要坚持和加强党的全面领导，有效运用新技术来推进各项工作规范化制度化法治化。早在2010年，时任国家副主席的习近平就指出：“将手机等新技术应用到党建工作中，既是信息化时代发展的客观要求，也是党建工作与时俱进、改革创新的重要体现。”现代技术嵌入党建工作，经历了从电子党务、网络党务到数字党建的发展过程，作为数字化时代管党治党新的实践，其主要表现为阵地平台化、思想可视化、组织矩阵化、功能模块化等特点。管理学主要关注现代技术在党建中的作用机制，对于确保技术有效服务党建目标、提升党建工作质量有重要意义。我们知道，现代技术能够为党建工作的标准化、规范化管理提供有力支持，有效提升了党建工作的管理水平。例如，党建信息管理系统为党员信息和党组织活动的数字化管理带来了工作流程标准化与数据精确化，大数据分析技术在党建工作量化评估和科学决策方面也起到积极作用。同时，现代技术使党建工作能够更好地适应外部环境变化。诸如大数据、云计算、人工智能、移动互联网和区块链等技术，为党建工作提供了一个全方位、多层次的系统整合平台。数字党建平台的构建，整合了组织管理、党员教育、宣传服务等多个党建工作模块，实现了党建资源的优化配置与协同运作。当然，技术系统的复杂性和更新换代的快速性可能导致党建工作在适应过程中出现系统失衡。尤其是数字党建缺乏统筹规划，党务信息分散于不同的纵向、横向职能部门，各主体之间也没有形成信息共享、互通合作机制，直接影响党建效能发挥。如果党组织不能及时根据技术发展和社会环境变化调整党建工作方式，则会陷入被动。同时，一些地方在推行数字党建过程中，由于过于注重技术指标和数据统计，忽视了实际工作效果和党员群众的需求，反而会导致党建工作流于表面，无法真正发挥作用。因此，党建工作在运用现代技术时，必须充分发挥其积极作用，同时警惕并避免技术带来的负面效应，要加强顶层设计与制度供给，注重动态调整与满足个性化需求，强化实际效果导向，加强监督评估，从系统规划、工作方式和技术应用方面实现党建工作的高质量发展。

Furthermore, some scholars have called for introducing systems theory into Party building research, arguing that “it is necessary to draw on the intellectual achievements of systems cybernetics in studying Party building, so that the various elements of the Party organization can fully exert the control function of comprehensive and strict governance of the Party.” [32]32 The superscript “81” in the original text refers to a footnote number in the source article; it is retained here as a citation marker. Other scholars have examined the development and evolution of intra-Party supervision and its logic from the perspective of organizational behavior. These are all beneficial attempts, but compared with the aspects mentioned above, they have not formed a major influence; they remain more as individual attempts, with few results. After the 19th National Congress of the CPC put forward the requirement to continuously improve the quality of Party building, the concept of quality from management studies was introduced into Party building research, leading to a proliferation of research results. Some scholars have even attempted to explore issues more characteristic of management thinking, such as evaluation criteria for the quality of Party building. However, overall, this type of result is still mainly used by traditional scholars of CPC history and Party building or scholars of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context, who emphasize discussing Party building quality from a political perspective. This is not a genuine application of the concept of quality in the management sense and does not seem to belong to the same topic as Party building research from a management perspective.

此外，还有些学者呼吁将系统论思想引入党建研究，认为“研究党的建设很有必要借鉴系统控制论的思想成果，使党的组织各种要素充分发挥从严治党的控制功能”81。也有的学者从组织行为的角度对党内监督的发展演进及其逻辑进行了考察。这些都是有益的尝试，但是相对上述几个方面来说，没有形成大的影响，更多只是个别的尝试，成果还不多。党的十九大提出不断提高党的建设质量的要求后，管理学中的质量概念被引入到党建研究中，涌现出大量的研究成果。有的学者还试图探讨党的建设质量评价标准等更具管理学思维的问题。但是，总体来说，这类成果主要还是传统的中共党史党建学者或马克思主义中国化学者在使用，突出从政治的角度谈党建质量，不是真正的管理学意义上质量概念的运用，与管理学视角下的党建研究似乎并非同一议题。

IV. Integration of Multi-disciplinary Perspectives in CPC Party Building Research

四、中共党建研究多学科视角的融合

In recent years, as the study of CPC history and Party building has become a first-level discipline under the category of law, research on CPC history and Party building has entered a spring of development. Looking across academia, in addition to traditional experts in CPC history and Party building, many researchers from the discussions above are also dedicated to the study of CPC Party building. At the same time, we must recognize that exchanges between different disciplinary fields remain insufficient. This not only reflects the limited interaction between traditional CPC history and Party building scholars and researchers from other disciplines studying CPC Party building—manifested in the former rarely integrating into other fields or paying attention to the latter’s achievements—but also shows that disciplines such as political science, sociology, and management pay insufficient attention to the research findings of traditional CPC history and Party building scholars. The lack of exchange and dialogue between disciplines has led to a certain degree of “fragmentation” in CPC Party building research. On many occasions, “we have to confront certain important factors that we previously excluded or set aside, and have to ‘bring them back or incorporate them.’” [33]33 This quotation is adapted from the work of the Western Marxist theorist Stuart Hall, who discussed the need to “bring back” factors previously excluded in analysis. Currently, research on CPC Party building across different disciplines urgently needs to resolve these difficulties in order to achieve further integration and improve the quality of Party building research.

近年来，随着中共党史党建学成为法学门类下的一级学科，中共党史党建研究迎来了发展的春天。放眼学术界，除了传统的中共党史党建研究专家外，从上述讨论中可以看出，还有众多研究者致力于中共党建的研究。与此同时，我们也必须认识到，不同学科领域之间的研究交流尚显不足。这不仅反映了传统中共党史党建研究学者与其他学科的中共党建研究者之间的交流偏少，表现为前者很少融入其他学科领域，也较少关注其他学科在中共党建研究方面的成果，同时也显示出政治学、社会学和管理学等学科对传统中共党史党建学者的研究成果关注不足。不同学科间缺少交流和对话，导致中共党建研究有一定程度的“碎片化”，许多时候“我们不得不面对某些我们以前已经排除在外、悬置起来的重要因素，并不得不‘把它们重新带回来或纳入进来’”。当前不同学科关于中共党建研究亟待破解这些难题，以更进一步融合起来，提高党建研究的质量。

First, political science research on Party building needs to move beyond hollow conceptual construction. In contemporary China, political science research should naturally focus on the Chinese Communist Party and attach importance to in-depth exploration of CPC Party building. As discussed earlier, political science has conducted Party building research from dimensions such as the CPC’s mission consciousness, China’s modernization process, and modern state building, achieving considerable results. However, a close examination of some political science research outcomes on CPC Party building reveals that their shortcoming lies in the fact that grand narrative logic often obscures many key historical details. Methodologically, some research findings essentially make arguments in leaps, jumping from one historical period to another, selecting only data favorable to their argument while ignoring the historical context behind the data. At the same time, although some scholars attempt to deepen research on CPC Party building through conceptual construction—proposing concepts such as the mission-oriented party and the governance-oriented party, demonstrating political scientists’ efforts to build an independent knowledge system for CPC Party building research—overly hasty conceptual construction may not suffice to capture the essence and characteristics of the Chinese Communist Party. From the perspective of concept production, the mission-oriented party is not a concept originally proposed by domestic scholars. Nenni [34]34 Pietro Nenni (1891–1980) was an Italian socialist politician. The distinction between “missionary” and “broker” parties appears in his writings on party typology. long ago distinguished parties into missionary parties and broker parties based on the nature of ideology and its role in shaping a party’s attitudes and activities. The former primarily aim to win “ideological converts,” while the latter mainly seek to maximize votes to win elections. It is evident that the concept of the “mission-oriented party” has long existed, and Nenni’s classification is not necessarily scientific or reasonable. As for the governance-oriented party, which party in any country that is in power does not “govern”? Therefore, such concepts are still insufficient to fully reflect the uniqueness of the Chinese Communist Party, a point that can also be glimpsed from the subsequent academic response to these concepts.

第一，政治学的党建研究需要走出空洞的概念构建。在当代中国，政治学研究自然应聚焦于中国共产党，并且重视对中共党建的深入探讨。前文所述，政治学从中国共产党的使命自觉、中国的现代化进程以及现代国家建设等维度展开党建研究，取得了不少成果。然而，细察政治学领域关于中共党建研究的部分成果，可以发现其不足之处在于，宏大叙事逻辑往往掩盖了众多关键的历史细节。从方法上来说，有些研究成果所作的论证基本上是跳跃性的，从一段历史到另一段历史，只截取其中对自己有利的资料进行论证，而忽视了资料背后的历史情境。同时，尽管一些学者尝试通过概念建构来深化对中共党建的研究，提出了诸如使命型政党、治理型政党等概念，展现了政治学者在构建中共党建研究独立知识体系方面的努力，但过于急切的概念建构可能并不足以概括中国共产党的本质和特征。从概念生产来看，使命型政党也不是国内学者提出的概念，南尼很早就从意识形态的本质及其在形塑政党的态度和活动中的作用差异入手，将政党区分为使命型政党（Missionary Parties）和经纪型政党（Broker Parties），前者主要以赢得“意识形态上的皈依者”为目标，后者则主要以最大化选票赢得选举为目标。可见“使命型政党”这一概念早已有之，且南尼的划分也不见得就科学合理。至于治理型政党，无论哪个国家，只要是执政党，谁不“治理”呢？因此，相关概念尚不足以充分反映中国共产党的独特性，这一点从学术界后续对这些概念的反响中也可窥见一斑。

Second, management science research on Party building needs to broaden its historical perspective. With the evolution from rule to management and then to governance, the concept of governance has been introduced into CPC Party building research. Party governance, as an important concept in management science research on CPC Party building, broadly includes both the party’s self-governance (internal governance) and the party’s governance of the state and society (external governance). In recent years, with the central level’s call to use Party building to lead grassroots governance, it has aroused great interest in academia, especially among management scholars, who have conducted extensive field investigations and theoretical demonstrations. On this basis, academia has proposed various concepts such as “unified governance” and “integrated governance,” viewing them as models of governance innovation in the New Era. However, few have considered whether today’s governance innovation practices have historical roots. In fact, the Party-building-led model in today’s grassroots governance practice—using the penetration of Party organizations to overcome the limitations of departmental fragmentation under bureaucratic governance—was already evident in the “unified leadership system” [35]35 The “unified leadership system” (一元化领导体制) refers to the centralized leadership structure established in the Chinese Communist Party’s base area in Yan’an during the 1940s, which concentrated Party, government, and military authority under the Party committee. of the Yan’an period, already demonstrating such a function. Unfortunately, today’s governance researchers pay insufficient attention to history, especially the history of social governance under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, merely “discovering” and “summarizing” governance innovation experiences or models in practice. Some scholars have even bluntly stated that those “models are not models at all… at best, they are efforts to promote institutional innovation; at worst, they are merely performance-driven boasts.” [36]36 This quotation is from a Chinese scholar criticizing the proliferation of local governance “models” as often being driven by cadre performance incentives rather than genuine innovation.

第二，管理学的党建研究需要拓宽历史的视野。随着统治向管理及治理的演进，治理的理念被引入到中共党建研究中。政党治理作为管理学关于中共党建研究的重要概念，在广义上既包括政党自身的治理（内部治理），也包括政党对国家和社会的治理（外部治理）。近年来，随着中央层面关于推动以党建引领基层治理要求的提出，引起学界尤其是管理学者的极大兴趣，对之进行了大量的调查研究和学理论证。在此基础上，学界又提出了“统合治理”“整合治理”等各种各样的概念，视之为新时代治理创新的典范，但是却很少有人去思考今天的治理创新实践是否有历史上的渊源。实际上，今天基层治理实践中的党建引领模式，即以政党组织的贯穿来破解科层制治理下部门分割的局限，在延安时期的“一元化领导体制”中就有所表现，就已经展现出这样的作用。可惜的是，今天的治理研究者却对历史尤其是中国共产党领导下的社会治理史关注不够，只是去“发现”和“总结”实践中的治理创新经验或治理模式。有学者甚至直言，那些“模式根本不是什么模式……往好里说，是推进制度创新的努力，往不好里说，只是政绩驱动的标榜而已”。

Third, sociological research on Party building needs to reflect on the applicability of theories or concepts. Compared with political science and management, sociological research on CPC Party building is generally more nuanced and more theoretically creative. If political science primarily starts from theory to find fragmentary historical materials to support its theories, then sociology’s normativity lies more in developing theories from grassroots social practice investigations. At the same time, sociological research on CPC grassroots Party building prominently adopts perspectives such as process theory and interaction theory to explore the ruling party’s organizational embedding, elite co-optation actions, and the response strategies of social forces when facing the ruling party’s actions. Compared with the coarseness of political science, sociology appears more meticulous and vivid. Of course, sociological research on CPC Party building also faces the problem of over-borrowing Western social science theories or concepts in terms of applicability. For example, in recent years, an important practice in grassroots Party building has been the establishment of Party building spaces such as Party-mass service centers or Party-mass service stations, which have played a significant role in serving and uniting emerging fields and their practitioners. Some scholars have borrowed Western spatial theory to study Party building spaces, which has some heuristic value. However, some research outcomes uncritically borrow Western-derived concepts such as “spatial justice” and “spatial production,” incorporating any Party practice that exhibits spatial characteristics as evidence of the Chinese Communist Party’s “spatial consciousness,” which risks overgeneralizing the concept of space. As some scholars have pointed out, some people “have been swept off their feet by the spatial turn.” [37]37 This refers to a critical observation within Western geography and social theory about the over-enthusiastic adoption of spatial concepts following the “spatial turn” in the social sciences. Western spatial theory, after all, emerged from the soil of capitalist society. To explore the spatial action logic of the ruling party in the Chinese context, it is still necessary to combine local spatial categories to find a truly appropriate path. Introducing a spatial perspective into Party building research requires clarifying the value stipulations of Chinese-style spatial justice, fully emphasizing the active role of spatial factors in Party building practice, while also clearly defining the limits of applying a spatial perspective to Party building research.

第三，社会学的党建研究需要反思理论或概念的适用性问题。相比政治学和管理学，社会学关于中共党建的研究应该说更加细腻，更加具有理论的创造性。如果说政治学主要是从理论出发寻找片段的历史资料以支撑其理论，那么社会学的规范性在于其更多还是从基层社会实践调查来发展理论。同时，社会学关于中共基层党建的研究，突出从过程论、互动论等角度，探讨执政党的组织嵌入、精英吸纳行动，以及社会力量面对执政党行动时的反应策略。相比于政治学的粗放，社会学显得更加细致，也更生动。当然，社会学关于中共党建的研究也存在过度借用西方社会科学理论或概念的适用性问题。例如，近年来，基层党建的一个重要实践就是党群服务中心或党群服务站点等党建阵地的打造，在服务凝聚新兴领域及其从业人员中发挥了重要的作用。一些学者借用西方空间理论对党建阵地等党建空间进行研究，有一定的启发意义。不过，有的成果对西方舶来的“空间正义”“空间生产”等概念不假思索地借用，凡是体现出空间特征的政党实践都被纳入为证成中国共产党“空间意识”彰显的例证，未免有过度泛化空间概念的嫌疑。正如有学者指出的那样，有些人“被空间转向冲晕了头脑”。西方空间理论毕竟产生于资本主义社会土壤，探索中国语境下执政党的空间行动逻辑，还是需要结合本土的空间范畴才能寻找到真正合适的路径。将空间视角引入党建研究中，需明晰中国式空间正义的价值规定性，既要充分重视空间因素在党建实践中的能动性作用，又要明确将空间视角运用于党建实践研究的限度所在。

Fourth, research on CPC Party building from different disciplines should achieve knowledge integration. Compared with the three aforementioned disciplines, Party building, as an emerging field, has seen extensive involvement from political science and other social science disciplines, which have provided it with a wealth of academic theories, methods, and concepts. To further strengthen exchange and integration among disciplines, it is necessary to resolve the problems existing in the research on CPC Party building across these disciplines. First, the estrangement between different disciplines in CPC Party building research stems from the inherent mindsets of their research methods. Traditional scholars of CPC history and Party building primarily focus on textual research and document interpretation, lacking, to a certain extent, the application of social science theories and sufficient attention to social life practices. Conversely, research on CPC Party building from other disciplines either emphasizes institutional analysis or highlights social surveys, while paying insufficient attention to the aforementioned Party documents and leaders’ expositions. Second, the estrangement between different disciplines in CPC Party building research also arises from the limited perspective of domain-specific research. Judging from existing literature, scholars in political science, sociology, and management generally pay little attention to the findings of traditional CPC history and Party building researchers. Conversely, most traditional CPC history and Party building researchers focus only on the works of classical writers and leaders’ expositions, rarely engaging in dialogue with the findings of scholars in political science, sociology, and management. Third, the estrangement between different disciplines in CPC Party building research is also due to the lack of effective mechanisms for exchange and interaction. Generally speaking, traditional CPC history and Party building scholars rarely participate in academic conferences of disciplines such as political science, sociology, and management; conversely, scholars in political science, sociology, and management also seldom attend academic exchanges in the discipline of CPC history and Party building.

第四，不同学科下的中共党建研究，应当形成知识上的融合。相比上述三者，党的建设作为一个新兴的学科，政治学等其他社会科学学科大量地介入其中，为其提供了大量的学术理论、方法和概念。进一步加强各学科间的交流融合，需要化解上述各学科在中共党建研究中存在的问题。其一，不同学科在中共党建研究上的隔阂，源自研究方法的固有思维。传统的中共党史党建研究学者以文本研究、文献解读为主，在一定程度上对社会科学理论缺乏运用，对社会生活实践也缺乏足够的关注。反过来，其他学科关于中共党建的研究要么注重制度分析，要么突出社会调查，而对上述所提到的党的文件和领导人论述则关注不够。其二，不同学科在中共党建研究上的隔阂，也源自领域研究的视野局限。从既有的文献来看，政治学、社会学和管理学的学者一般不太关注传统中共党史党建研究者的成果。反过来，传统的中共党史党建研究者大多数也只关注经典作家的作品、领导人的论述等，较少与政治学、社会学和管理学学者的成果对话。其三，不同学科在中共党建研究上的隔阂，还缘于缺乏有效的交流互动机制。一般来说，传统的中共党史党建研究学者较少参加政治学、社会学和管理学等学科的学术会议，反过来，政治学、社会学和管理学学者亦不常参加中共党史党建学科的学术交流。

The reason for the lack of such exchange and interaction mechanisms is that some research may overemphasize the compilation and interpretation of leaders’ speeches, potentially lacking in academic depth. Additionally, there are opinions pointing out that certain research may overemphasize academic rigor, thereby neglecting the political nature inherent in CPC Party building research itself. Therefore, in recent years, the academic community has proposed the concept of “using scholarship to speak about politics” [38]38 “用学术讲政治” (yòng xuéshù jiǎng zhèngzhì) — a phrase used within Chinese academic and Party discourse to advocate for presenting political content (especially Party theory and policy) through rigorous scholarly methods, rather than through mere propaganda or rote repetition of official slogans., aiming to seek a balance between these two aspects. In fact, integrating knowledge on CPC Party building from the four disciplines mentioned above can form a three-level logical framework of “discourse – institution – practice.” “Discourse” refers to what Party leaders have said and what requirements they have raised; “institution” refers to the institutional designs carried out after these requirements are raised; and “practice” refers to the actual operation of these institutional designs. For understanding the Communist Party of China and its building, all three are indispensable. Therefore, through interdisciplinary knowledge integration and methodological complementarity, CPC Party building research can better construct the three-level logical framework of “discourse – institution – practice,” more comprehensively grasp and promote the sustained development and innovation of CPC Party building research, and thereby advance the in-depth development of Party building work.

上述交流互动机制缺乏的原因在于，一些研究可能过于侧重对领导人的讲话进行整理和解释，在学术深度上可能有所欠缺。此外，也有意见指出，某些研究可能过分强调学术性，从而忽视了中共党建研究本身所具有的政治性。因此，近年来，学术界提出了“用学术讲政治”的理念，旨在寻求这两方面的平衡。实际上，将上述四个学科关于中共党建的知识融合起来，就能形成“话语－制度－实践”三层次的逻辑框架。“话语”指党的领导人说了什么，提了什么要求，“制度”指提出要求之后又进行了哪些制度设计，“实践”则是指制度设计的实际运行。对理解中国共产党及其建设来说，三者缺一不可。因此，通过跨学科的知识融合和方法论的互补，中共党建研究才能够更好地构建“话语－制度－实践”的三层次逻辑框架，更全面地把握和促进中共党建研究的持续发展和创新，从而推动党建工作的深入发展。

Source: Journal of East China Normal University, Issue 1, 2025

文章来源：《华东师范大学学报》2025年第1期

Online Editor: Jing Mu

网络编辑：静穆