The Military Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party during the Period of the New Democratic Revolution

Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. The Nanchang Uprising on 1 August 1927 opened the curtain on the Chinese Communist Party’s independent leadership of revolutionary war, the creation of a people’s army, and the seizure of political power by armed force. Surveying the Party’s glorious history of army building, the people’s army moved from surviving with difficulty amid the encirclement and pursuit of reactionary forces at the time of its initial founding, to raising the storm of the agrarian revolution, to becoming the main pillar of the entire nation’s War of Resistance against Japan, to annihilating the Kuomintang reactionaries and liberating all of China, and then to confronting head-on the US-led “UN forces,” curbing the imperialist ambition to invade, and winning the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. The conditions under which the people’s army was founded were so harsh, the enemies it faced so powerful, the results it achieved so abundant, and the mission it shouldered so great that they are rarely seen in the world. Under the Party’s leadership, the Chinese people, who had been sunk in humiliation for nearly a century, stood up. From being the “sick man of East Asia” wantonly bullied by the great powers, to having the strength to repel powerful enemies at the national gate, break the myth of the US military’s invincibility, uphold international justice, and maintain world peace — all this took less than 30 years. Behind such a dramatic transformation, how was the Chinese Communist Party’s military leadership forged and continuously strengthened?

枪杆子里面出政权。1927年8月1日南昌起义爆发，开启了中国共产党独立领导革命战争、创建人民军队和武装夺取政权的序幕。纵观我党光辉的建军史，人民军队从创设初期在反动势力的围追堵截中艰难生存，到掀起土地革命的风暴，到成为全民族抗战的中流砥柱，到消灭国民党反动派解放全中国，再到与美国为首的“联合国军”正面对抗，遏制了帝国主义侵略野心，取得了抗美援朝战争的胜利。人民军队的创立条件之艰难、面对敌人之强大、取得成果之丰硕、承担使命之伟大，世所罕见。在党的领导下，已沉沦近百年、受尽屈辱的中国人站了起来，从当年被列强肆意欺凌的“东亚病夫”，到有实力御强敌于国门之外，打破美军不败神话，伸张国际正义，维护世界和平，其间仅用了不到30年时间。如此剧变的背后，中国共产党的军事领导力是如何被锻造出来并不断增强的？

I. Introduction

一、引言

That the strong defeat the weak is an eternal truth. The victory of the Chinese revolution was not a gift from the reactionary forces, still less did it rely on chance or external factors. Rather, it was a great struggle in which the Chinese Communist Party led the people of all ethnic groups across the country in arduous effort, step by step turning from weak to strong, effectively enhancing its strength, and ultimately winning national independence and the liberation of the people. War is an overall contest between systems; what decides victory or defeat is the superiority or inferiority of the systems and the strength or weakness of the forces. Mao Zedong pointed out: “War is a contest of strength, but strength changes its original form in the course of war.” The Chinese Communists objectively and comprehensively recognized the comparative strength of the forces of both sides — enemy and ourselves — and the inherent contradictions and characteristics of the two systems. They continuously enhanced the Party’s military leadership, vigorously developed revolutionary strength, and steadily weakened the reactionary forces, thereby creating the necessary subjective and objective conditions for promoting the transformation of the relative strength of enemy and ourselves. After analyzing all the basic factors and trends of change in the comparison between enemy and ourselves, Mao Zedong held that the advantage of the reactionary army lay in its higher starting point — it was stronger in weaponry, military strength, and economic power — while the revolutionary army’s advantage lay in its progressiveness, political character, organizational capacity, spiritual strength, fighting on home territory, and mass support. Through protracted struggle and by fully utilizing and developing its own advantageous conditions, the revolutionary army could prove stronger than the reactionary army in the outcome of the war.

强战胜弱，是亘古不变的真理。中国革命的胜利，不是反动势力的施舍，更不是依靠偶然和外界因素，而是中国共产党带领全国各族人民进行艰苦奋斗，一步步由弱变强，切实提升实力，最终赢得了民族独立和人民解放的伟大斗争。战争是系统与系统间的整体较量，决定胜负的是系统优劣和力量强弱。毛泽东指出：“战争是力量的竞赛，但力量在战争过程中变化其原来的形态。”中国共产党人客观全面地认识到敌我双方综合力量的强弱对比和双方系统中固有的矛盾和特性，不断提升党的军事领导力，大力发展革命力量，不断削弱反动力量，为促成敌我的强弱转化创造了必要的主客观条件。毛泽东对敌我对比的全部基本因素和变化趋势进行分析后认为，反动军队的优势在于起点较高，强在武器装备、军力和经济力，而革命军队的优势在于进步性、政治性、组织力、精神力、本土作战和群众支持，通过长期奋斗，充分利用和发展自身优势条件，革命军队可在战争结果上强于反动军队。

Throughout the entire process of revolutionary forces turning from weak to strong, the Party’s military leadership played an extremely important role. Mao Zedong pointed out: “Those who direct war cannot exceed the limits of the objective conditions and hope for victory, but they can and must, within the limits of the objective conditions, actively strive for victory.” Military personnel are the subjects of the practical activity of war; from the formulation of strategy and tactics to the concrete implementation of combat, the command ability and execution ability of military personnel at all levels are indispensable. However, the possibility of subjective conditions playing a role is limited by the actual boundaries of objective conditions. The full display of the quality and skill of military personnel must take the Party’s military leadership as its prerequisite. This article explores the forging of the Chinese Communist Party’s outstanding military leadership during the period of the New Democratic Revolution from three aspects: the Party commanding the gun, unity between officers and soldiers, and the people’s war. The Party commanding the gun laid the organizational foundation for building the army politically, ensuring that the people’s army could maintain unity and obey the Party’s command in harsh circumstances, avoiding disintegration or degenerating into a warlord’s private army. Implementing a democratic system of unity between officers and soldiers and carrying out effective ideological and political work among army members was the key to evolving from an old-style army into a communist army, comprehensively raising the ideological, political, and military quality of army members, and strengthening the army’s cohesion and combat effectiveness. In the vast rural revolutionary base areas, maintaining close ties with the masses and waging a people’s war, carrying out an unprecedented large-scale guerrilla war, discovering, awakening, and liberating the majestic forces that had lain dormant for a thousand years on Chinese soil — this was a genius creation that adapted to China’s national conditions and the battlefield situation and mobilized revolutionary forces to the greatest extent. These core principles constituted the cornerstone of the Party’s military leadership, helping our Party and our army achieve the transformation from weak to strong, ultimately overthrowing the “three great mountains”[1]1 The “three great mountains” (三座大山) is a standard Chinese Communist metaphor for imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism, which the Party held to be the main oppressors of the Chinese people before 1949. and winning the victory of the Chinese revolution.

在革命力量由弱变强的整个过程中，党的军事领导力发挥了至关重要的作用。毛泽东指出：“指导战争的人们不能超越客观条件许可的限度期求战争的胜利，然而可以而且必须在客观条件的限度之内，能动地争取战争的胜利。”军事人才是战争实践活动的主体，从战略战术的制定到战斗的具体实施，都离不开各级军事人才的指挥能力和执行能力。然而主观条件发挥作用的可能性受限于客观条件的现实边界，军事人才素养和技能的充分发挥，要以党的军事领导力作为前提。本文从党指挥枪、官兵一致、人民战争等三方面，探析新民主主义革命时期中国共产党卓越军事领导力的锻造之路：党指挥枪奠定了政治建军的组织基础，确保人民军队能在残酷的环境中保持团结、听党指挥，避免解体或沦为军阀私人武装。实行官兵一致的民主制并对军队成员开展有效的思想政治工作，是从旧式军队向共产主义军队进化的关键，整体提升了军队成员的思想政治素质和军事素质，强化了军队的凝聚力和战斗力。在广大农村革命根据地密切联系群众打人民战争，进行史无前例的超大规模游击战争，发现、唤醒并解放了中华大地沉睡千年的雄伟力量，是适应我国国情和战场局势，最大程度动员革命力量的天才创造。这些核心原则构成了党的军事领导力的基石，帮助我党我军实现由弱变强的转变，最终推翻“三座大山”，赢得中国革命的胜利。

II. The Party Commanding the Gun: Ensuring the Party’s Absolute Leadership over the Army

二、党指挥枪：确保党对军队的绝对领导

The *Book of Han: Biography of Jia Yi* uses the phrase “like the body directing the arm, like the arm directing the finger” to describe the absolute leadership of superiors over subordinates — an ideal state that many organizations throughout history have dreamed of. Our Party’s absolute leadership over the army is the best illustration of this phrase. The Chinese Communists, with Mao Zedong as their representative, established the fundamental principle of army building of the Party’s absolute leadership over the army. They embedded Party organizations deep in the army’s grassroots: Party committees were set up at the regimental and brigade levels and above, Party branches at the company level, and Party groups at the platoon and squad levels. All major issues at every level of the army were to be discussed and decided collectively by the Party organization. This ensured, organizationally, that the army was firmly placed under the Party’s absolute leadership, completing the fundamental transformation from military power being held by individuals to being held by an advanced political party, and laying the organizational foundation for the thorough remolding of the people’s army.

《汉书·贾谊传》用“如身使臂，如臂使指”描述上级对下级的绝对领导，这是历史上众多组织梦寐以求的理想状态。我党对军队的绝对领导，便是对这句话最好的诠释。以毛泽东为代表的中国共产党人确立了党对军队绝对领导的根本建军原则，将党组织深入部队基层，营、团以上设立党委，连设立党支部，班、排设立党小组，军队各级一切重大问题顺经党组织集体讨论决定，从组织建设上确保军队牢牢置于党的绝对领导之下，完成了由个人掌握军权向先进政党掌握军权的根本转变，为人民军队的脱胎换骨奠定了组织基础。

After the failure of the Great Revolution in 1927, the Chinese Communists deeply recognized, from the bloody lessons, the extreme importance of the principle that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Without a revolutionary armed force, it was impossible to defeat the armed counter-revolution. The Chinese Communist Party began actively exploring the independent building of an army and the leadership of armed struggle. The repeated defeats of the uprisings in the early period of the people’s army’s founding were certainly due to objective factors such as the vast disparity in strength between enemy and ourselves, and subjective factors such as the lack of a correct line of struggle, guidance from military thought, and combat experience. But they also exposed prominent problems in the army’s own construction: the management system and personnel composition of the early Red Army were still inherited from the old-style armies, carrying many remnants and habits of the old forces. For example, there was a large gap in treatment between officers and soldiers; officers arbitrarily beat and physically punished soldiers; relations between officers and soldiers were tense; many soldiers did not know what revolution was, merely regarding soldiering as a means of livelihood, joining the army for pay, and having a low level of ideological consciousness. When combat was dangerous, pay was insufficient, or the revolutionary situation temporarily encountered difficulties, morale easily sank, soldiers could not withstand tests, and unauthorized desertion was serious. By the end of the “three major uprisings”[2]2 The “three major uprisings” (三大起义) refers to the Nanchang Uprising (1 August 1927), the Autumn Harvest Uprising (September 1927), and the Guangzhou Uprising (December 1927), the first three major armed insurrections led by the CPC after the Kuomintang’s split with the Communists., the number of troops remaining in each was less than a thousand (the Nanchang Uprising had a total strength of about 23,000, with about 800 preserved; the Autumn Harvest Uprising had a total strength of about 5,000, with about 700 preserved; the Guangzhou Uprising had a total strength of about 6,000, with about 1,000 preserved). Some officers had impure revolutionary motives, harboring ideas of gaining official rank and wealth, regarding the troops under their command as private property, and displaying speculative psychology. In some cases, when political lines diverged, when their ambition to use troops for personal power swelled, or when they were subjected to inducements and threats from reactionary forces, they even betrayed the revolution. These problems were common maladies of the old mercenary army system and were also an important reason why China’s armies, from modern times onward, repeatedly suffered defeat when confronting Western powers that employed conscription and possessed advanced weaponry. A force riddled with internal contradictions, confused in personnel thinking, and disobedient to command could hardly survive, let alone shoulder the task of completing the Chinese revolution, amid intense military confrontation and brutal struggle. At this critical juncture, how to create a new type of people’s army that obeyed the Party’s command became a major issue of life and death for the revolution.

1927年大革命失败后，中国共产党人在血的教训中深刻认识到“枪杆子里面出政权”的极端重要性。没有革命的武装就无法战胜武装的反革命，中国共产党开始进行独立建军和领导武装斗争的积极探索。人民军队创立初期多次起义的失利，固然有客观上敌我实力悬殊、主观上缺乏正确的斗争路线、军事思想指导和作战经验等原因，同时也暴露了自身建设方面存在的突出问题：早期红军部队的管理体制和人员构成，仍从旧式军队沿袭而来，带有许多旧式军队的残余和习气。如军官和士兵待遇差距大，军官随意打骂体罚士兵，官兵关系紧张；许多士兵不知革命为何物，只是把当兵作为谋生手段，为军饷参军，思想觉悟不高。当战斗危险、军饷不足和革命形势暂时出现困难时，容易士气低下，经不起考验，擅自脱队情况严重。“三大起义”结束时，部队人数均剩下不足千人（南昌起义总兵力约23000人，保存约800人；秋收起义总兵力约5000人，保存约700人；广州起义总兵力约6000人，保存约1000人）；部分军官革命动机不纯粹，有升官发财思想，视所辖部队为私人财产，存在投机心理，甚至在政治路线分歧、挟兵自重野心膨胀和反动势力威逼利诱等情况下背叛革命。这些问题是旧式雇佣制军队的通病，也是近代以来中国军队与采用义务兵役制且武器装备先进的西方列强交手而屡遭失败的重要原因。一支内部矛盾重重、人员思想混乱、不听指挥的部队，在激烈的军事对抗和残酷的斗争中连自身生存都难，更无法承担完成中国革命的重任。值此危急关头，如何创立一支听党指挥的新型人民军队，成为革命生死攸关的重大问题。

Mao Zedong recognized that the first task was to resolve the question of leadership over the revolutionary army; otherwise, no matter how many senior and junior military personnel were recruited, the nature of the army would not undergo any essential change, and the failures of the past would be repeated. It was necessary to ensure the Party’s absolute leadership over the army: “Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party.” [1]1 The “three great mountains” (三座大山) is a standard Chinese Communist metaphor for imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism, which the Party held to be the main oppressors of the Chinese people before 1949. During the intervals of battle in the transfer to the Jinggang Mountains, Mao Zedong investigated the conditions of the troops and discovered two sharply contrasting situations within the army: the ideological and political work among the rank-and-file soldiers was extremely inadequate; they did not know for whom they were fighting, let alone what the lofty ideal of communism meant. The connection between officers and ordinary soldiers was weak; they did not live together, and there was a lack of understanding and concern for the soldiers’ lives, thoughts, and needs. Simple propaganda slogans and abstruse theoretical doctrines could not make the soldiers feel personally involved, so the effect of conducting ideological and political work was very limited. In contrast, Party members who had received education in communist ideology and had been tested through brutal struggle played a vanguard and exemplary role in the army, becoming the soul that united the troops. Any company that had a certain number of Party members performed relatively well in combat. In particular, the company whose Party representative was He Tingying [2]2 The “three major uprisings” (三大起义) refers to the Nanchang Uprising (1 August 1927), the Autumn Harvest Uprising (September 1927), and the Guangzhou Uprising (December 1927), the first three major armed insurrections led by the CPC after the Kuomintang’s split with the Communists. had almost no deserters throughout the arduous battles following the Autumn Harvest Uprising and preserved the most complete organizational structure.

毛泽东认识到，首先必须解决革命军队的领导问题，否则无论招募多少高级和基层军事人才，军队的性质也不会发生本质改变，过去的失败还会反复上演。必须确保党对军队的绝对领导，“我们的原则是党指挥枪，而不容许枪指挥党”。在向井冈山转移的战斗间隙，毛泽东对部队情况进行调研后发现，部队中存在差异显著的两种现状：基层士兵的思想政治工作很不到位，他们不知为谁而战，更不知何谓共产主义远大理想，军官与基层士兵的联系较为薄弱，生活不在一起，对士兵的生活、思想和需求缺少了解和关心，简单的宣传口号和高深的理论学说并不能让士兵感同身受，进行思想政治工作的效果非常有限；而接受过共产主义思想教育并通过残酷斗争考验的党员，在军队中发挥了先锋模范作用，成为凝聚军队的灵魂。凡是拥有一定数量党员的连队，其战斗表现就较为优秀，尤其是何挺颖任党代表的连队，在秋收起义后一路的艰苦战斗中几乎没有逃兵，保存的建制最为完整。

Mao Zedong believed that building the army politically was the foundation of military strength: “Political work is the lifeline of the revolutionary army.” The army must, and could only, rely on Party members with firm revolutionary will; the first step was to change the organizational structure of the Party within the army. At that time, the Red Army still followed the old system of the Northern Expedition and had not formed a sound Party organizational network within the insurgent troops. Party members were mostly scattered among middle- and high-ranking officers at the battalion and regimental levels and above, while Party organizations had not yet been established at the company level, which severely impaired the Party’s leadership role. After careful deliberation, Mao Zedong carried out reorganization and consolidation of the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops at Sanwan Village in Yongxin County, Jiangxi: Party committees were established at the battalion, regimental, and higher levels; Party branches were set up at the company level; and Party groups were formed at the platoon and squad levels. This enabled the Party organization to penetrate deep into the grassroots of the army, ensuring that the Party commands the gun. The establishment of Party branches at the company level was later proven to be a great invention. It completed the politicization of grassroots military organizations, and through the lifeline of political work, it integrated the army from top to bottom into a single whole, thereby realizing the Party’s absolute leadership over the army. In the daily practice of revolutionary military life, Mao Zedong discovered that setting up Party branches at the company level could achieve a unity of function and efficiency. Modern psychology and brain science have already proven that the upper limit of the number of people with whom an ordinary person in a traditional society can engage in social interaction is about 150, which is close to the size of a company (an infantry company at full strength has about 120 people). The upper limit of the number of people with whom an ordinary person can engage in precise, in-depth, and sustained social interaction over a period of time is about 20, which can cover the size of a squad (an infantry squad at full strength has 12 people). Once the group size becomes too large, it exceeds the leader’s ability to effectively manage the team members, and indirect management through a bureaucratic organization becomes necessary. With Party groups in squads and Party branches in companies, Party members can provide direct and effective leadership over an organization of this scale. From the perspective of the laws of military operations, the company is the most basic combat unit in the army, often operating independently in areas far from the regimental and battalion headquarters for garrison and combat missions. The company is also the most basic living unit in the army; the army generally organizes meals, sleeping, and marches by company. Therefore, the company is a small acquaintance society where everyone knows and understands each other. For the Party’s leadership to take root in people’s hearts, it must be concretely implemented down to every ordinary soldier at the grassroots level. A battalion commander directly commands company commanders and may not know the soldiers, but the company commander and company political instructor can know and command all the soldiers. Therefore, under the old system of setting up Party committees at the regimental and battalion levels and Party representatives at the company level, the Party organization could not penetrate the front line of the army and had a limited understanding of the vast number of grassroots soldiers. Only by establishing Party branches at the company level could Party organizational life be fully carried out, the ideological trends and living needs of every person in the company be understood, grassroots conditions be reported upward, and close ties be formed with the soldiers downward, enabling effective ideological and political work.

毛泽东认为，政治建军是立军之本，“政治工作是革命军队的生命线”，军队必须也只能依靠革命意志坚定的党员，首先要从军队的党组织结构入手进行改变。彼时红军沿用北伐旧制，并未在起义部队中形成健全的党组织体系，党员多数散布在营、团以上的中高层军官中，基层连队尚未设立党组织，严重影响了党的领导作用发挥。毛泽东经过深思熟虑后，在江西永新三湾村对秋收起义部队进行了改编和整顿：在营、团及以上级别均设党委，连级设立党支部，班、排设立党小组，使党组织深入部队基层，确保党指挥枪。支部建在连上，日后被证明是一个伟大的发明，完成了基层军事组织的政治化改造，通过政治工作这条生命线，将军队从上到下贯穿为一个整体，从而实现了党组织对军队的绝对领导。毛泽东在革命军事生活的日常实践中发现，在连级设立党支部，能实现功能与效率的统一。现代心理学和脑科学已经证明，传统社会中普通人参与社会交往的人数上限，约为150人，与连级人数相近（步兵连满编约120人）；普通人在一段时间内进行精确、深度、跟踪社交的人数上限，约为20人，可以覆盖班的人数（步兵班满编12人）。一旦群体人数过多，会超出领导对团队成员进行有效管理的能力，此时必须借助科层制组织进行间接管理。班有党小组，连有党支部，则党员正好能对该规模的组织进行直接有效的领导。从军事活动规律来看，连级是军队中最基本的作战单位，经常作为独立单位在远离团部、营部的地区驻防和参与作战任务。连级同时也是军队最基本的生活单位，军队一般以连为单位组织伙食、睡觉和行军，因此连是一个小型熟人社会，连里的每个人互相都是了解和熟悉的。党的领导要深入人心，要具体落实到每个基层普通士兵身上。营长直接指挥连长，可能不认识士兵，但连长和连指导员却能认识并指挥所有士兵。因此，按过去在团级和营级设立党支部、连级设立党代表的制度，党组织无法深入部队一线，对广大基层士兵的了解程度有限。只有将党支部建立在连上，才能充分开展党组织生活，了解连内每一个人的思想动态和生活所需，向上汇报基层状态，向下跟士兵打成一片，进行有效的思想政治工作。

The establishment of Party branches at the company level ensured that company-level units had a sufficient number of Party members, which was conducive to improving the troops’ organizational capacity, combat effectiveness, and morale. In terms of organizational capacity, in the chaos of the battlefield, troops often faced situations where their overall organizational structure was broken up. In the middle and later stages of the “Three Major Uprisings,” [3]3 The “Three Major Uprisings” refers to the Nanchang Uprising (August 1, 1927), the Autumn Harvest Uprising (September 1927), and the Guangzhou Uprising (December 1927), which were the first armed uprisings led by the Chinese Communist Party against the Kuomintang regime. companies with an insufficient number of Party members would most likely disintegrate and dissolve. Companies with a larger number of Party members, when encountering such a breakup, had a stronger regenerative capacity; Party members could spontaneously seek out other Party members, actively gather soldiers, and reorganize the unit. In terms of combat effectiveness, in the past, Party members in the army were mostly concentrated at the regimental level and were mostly officers. As the revolutionary situation changed and the troops were dispersed to fight in the vast rural and mountainous areas, front-line units needed to independently carry out complex tasks and required the direct leadership of the Party organization and Party members even more than the high command. Because Party members had stronger ideological and political qualities, combat skills, and combat experience, companies with more Party members had more high-quality combat personnel and their combat effectiveness was stronger than that of ordinary units. In terms of morale, a larger number of Party members in a company could enhance and improve the collective psychological state of the grassroots unit during combat. On the one hand, the proactive combat spirit of Party members taking the lead and sacrificing themselves in battle would inspire ordinary soldiers. On the other hand, in daily life, ordinary soldiers could feel the tangible care of the Party organization and a sense of security provided by organizational guarantees, thus raising the overall morale of the troops.

支部建在连上，使连级单位有足够数量的党员，有利于提升部队的组织度、战斗力和士气。组织度方面，在混乱的战场中，部队经常面临整体建制被打散的情况，在“三大起义”的中后期，党员数量不足的连队，大概率的结局是溃散解体。党员数量较多的连队遇到被打散的情况，其再生能力较强，党员能自发寻找其他党员，积极主动地收拢士兵和重组队伍；战斗力方面，过去部队的党员多集中在团级，同时大多是军官，随着革命形势的变化，部队分散在广大农村和山区作战，此时一线部队需要独立执行复杂的任务，比军队高层更需要党组织和党员的直接领导。由于党员的思想政治素养、战斗技能、作战经验较强，因此战斗中，党员较多的连队，其高素质作战人员更多，战斗力会比一般部队强；士气方面，连队的党员数量较多，能在战斗中提升和改善基层团队的集体心理状态。一方面，战斗时党员身先士卒、牺牲在前的主动作战精神会感染普通士兵；另一方面，生活中普通士兵能感受到党组织的切实关怀，以及有组织保障的安全感，因此部队的整体士气得到了提升。

After the Sanwan Reorganization, only 700 participants of the Autumn Harvest Uprising voluntarily remained in the army. The First Division of the First Army of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army was reduced to the First Regiment, with only seven companies. Although the number was small, these were the essence of the revolutionary armed forces. From then on, the relationship between the Party, the army, and the soldiers became closer. The establishment of Party branches at the company level ensured greater unity between the upper and lower levels of the army and ensured that the army would not change its nature. The Party achieved absolute leadership over the people’s army; all affairs of the army were decided by Party committees at all levels, not by individual military commanders. After the Gutian Congress, [4]4 The Gutian Congress (December 1929) was the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Red Army held in Gutian, Fujian Province. Its resolutions established the principle of the Party’s absolute leadership over the army and emphasized the primacy of political work. “Party branches at the company level” was formally codified in intra-Party regulations, and this new type of grassroots Party organization system rapidly spread among the Red Army units across the country. A single spark can start a prairie fire. Mao Zedong later summarized in “The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains”: “The Red Army has been able to carry on its arduous struggle and remain undefeated; ‘Party branches at the company level’ is an important reason.” [5]5 This quotation is from Mao Zedong’s report to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, written in November 1928 and later published as part of “The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains.”

经过三湾改编，自愿留在部队的秋收起义参与者仅余700人，工农革命军第一军第一师缩编为第一团，仅有7个连。人数虽少，但都是革命武装力量的精华。自此党和军队、士兵的关系更加紧密了。支部建在连上，保证了军队的上下级更团结，保证了军队不变色。党实现了对人民军队的绝对领导，军队的一切事务均由各级党委决定，而不由军事长官个人决定。古田会议后，“支部建在连上”正式在党内法规中加以定位，这种新型基层党组织制度迅速在全国各地的红军队伍中扩展开来，星星之火，呈现燎原之势。毛泽东日后在《井冈山的斗争》中总结道，“红军所以艰难奋斗而不溃散，‘支部建在连上’是一个重要原因。”

III. Unity between Officers and Men: Achieving a Leap in the Army’s Cohesion and Combat Effectiveness

三、官兵一致：实现军队凝聚力和战斗力的飞跃性提升

Leading an organization requires understanding people, mastering people, and cultivating people. The Party’s combat effectiveness comes from the organic integration of all individuals. It is far from sufficient to focus solely on transforming the organizational structure itself to enhance the top-down unidirectional management efficiency of the organization, or to rely on ready-made talent and newly recruited talent to support the organization’s operations. Forging excellent leadership requires not only effective management of team members but also the cultivation of talent needed by the organization and future organizational leaders who conform to the organization’s values, providing a continuous supply of talent for the consistent implementation of the organization’s mission and the ultimate realization of its vision. The Chinese Communist Party forged the Chinese People’s Liberation Army into an efficient empowering organization. By implementing a democratic system of unity between officers and men, giving play to the role of grassroots Party organizations as fighting fortresses, and conducting effective ideological and political work among the broad masses of soldiers, it aimed to cultivate all members of the army into communist fighters with ideals and consciousness, whose individual needs were aligned with the organization’s goals, thereby achieving a leap in the army’s cohesion and combat effectiveness.

领导一个组织，必须了解人、掌握人、培养人。党的战斗力来源于所有个体的有机结合，仅着眼于对组织结构本身进行改造，以提升组织自上而下的单向管理效能，或寄希望于依靠现成的人才和新招募的人才来支撑组织运行，都还远远不够。锻造优秀的领导力，既要对团队成员进行有效管理，还要培养组织需要的、符合组织价值观的人才和未来的组织领导者，为组织使命一以贯之和组织愿景的最终实现，提供源源不断的人才保障。中国共产党将中国人民解放军打造成高效的赋能型组织，通过实行官兵一致的民主制度，发挥基层党组织的战斗堡垒作用，对广大士兵开展有效的思想政治工作，旨在将军队中的所有成员都培养成个体需求与组织目标相一致的、有理想有觉悟的共产主义战士，从而实现军队凝聚力和战斗力的飞跃性提升。

Many difficulties in organizational leadership originate in the complexity of human nature. An abstract organization is composed of concrete individuals; leaders can never neglect the extreme importance of the human heart at any time. When members enter an organization, each has his own demands, and these change dynamically over time. Human nature determines that most ordinary people first consider individual demands, rather than organizational interests. Therefore, how to resolve the contradiction between individual needs and organizational goals, and achieve a win-win situation for both organizational and personal interests, is the core problem leaders must solve. How can one achieve unity of purpose from top to bottom, so that every member of the army regards the revolutionary cause as his own cause, and personal goals become consistent with organizational goals? In the final analysis, this requires cultivating the revolutionary character, initiative, and consciousness of people through ideological and political work. The point of application lies in giving full play to the combat-fortress function of grassroots Party organizations in the army — transmitting the Party’s policies, executing orders, and guiding soldiers — conducting ideological and political education among the broad masses of soldiers, ensuring that every soldier understands and identifies with the Party’s fighting goals and ideas, strengthening the soldiers’ class feeling and collective sense of belonging, and enabling them to combine personal interests with collective, class, and national interests.

组织领导中存在诸多困难，其根源在于人性的复杂。抽象的组织是由具体的人构成的，领导者在任何时候都不能忽视人心的极端重要性。成员在进入一个组织时，都会有各自诉求，且随时间而发生动态变化。人性决定了大部分普通人首先考虑的是个体诉求，而非组织利益。因此，如何化解个体需求与组织目标间矛盾，实现组织利益与个人利益的双赢，是领导者要解决的核心问题。怎样才能做到上下同欲，使军队中每一位成员都将革命的事业当成自己的事业，达成个人目标与组织目标相一致呢？归根结底，需要通过思想政治工作培养人的革命性、主动性、自觉性。落脚点在于发挥基层党组织在军队中传递党的方针政策、执行命令和指导士兵的战斗堡垒功能，对广大士兵进行思想政治教育，确保每一位士兵都能了解并认同党的奋斗目标和理念，增强士兵的阶级感情和集体归属感，使他们能够将个人利益与集体、阶级和民族利益相结合。

There is an essential difference between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang in their views on human beings. The Chinese Communist Party adheres to Marxism and values the free and comprehensive development of the individual. The Kuomintang army followed a management philosophy of “the carrot and the stick,” relying mainly on monetary incentives, coercive power, and the co-opting of personal relationships to manage organizational members, while neglecting the social and emotional factors of human beings. People have not only low-level material needs but also needs for social interaction, the expectation of respect, and even the need to realize ideals and aspirations. The Kuomintang’s crude and brutal management methods had many drawbacks. When military funds were tight, the war situation was unfavorable, other forces were buying over members, personal relationships broke down, or members left the scope of the organization’s violent jurisdiction, organizational members were very likely to cease being led by it. Apart from a few elite divisions directly under the central command, the personnel composition of most Kuomintang troops consisted of a very small number of leaders and core骨干, plus a majority of ordinary soldiers hastily cobbled together. Although the Kuomintang had superior weapons, equipment, and ample material supplies, its congenital defects in Party organization and the absence of grassroots Party organizations greatly reduced its leadership effectiveness; its troops scattered as soon as they fought. The looseness of the Kuomintang army’s organizational structure, the chaos of its command chain, its low capacity to withstand pressure, and the speed of its collapse — the key lay in its failure to win people’s hearts; the organization was large but not strong. But class attributes and political positions determined that the Kuomintang reactionaries disdained, were incapable of, and dared not conduct cultivation and education of organizational members, and were doomed never to win the support and endorsement of the broadest masses of the people.

中国共产党和国民党在对待人的观点上存在本质区别。中国共产党坚持马克思主义，重视人的自由全面发展。国民党军队奉行“胡萝卜加大棒”的管理理念，主要依赖金钱激励、权力高压、人情关系拉拢等手段管理组织成员，忽视人的社会因素和情感因素。人不仅有低层的物质需求，还有社交需求、期待受尊重，乃至实现理想抱负的需求。国民党简单粗暴的管理方式存在很多弊端，当军费紧张、战局不利、其他势力收买、私人关系破裂、离开组织暴力管辖范围等情况发生，组织成员就很可能不再受其领导。国民党军队除少数嫡系王牌师，大多数部队的人员构成是，占人数极少部分的领导、核心骨干及大部分生硬拼凑起来的普通士兵。虽然国民党拥有优良的武器装备和充足的物资供应，但国民党先天的政党组织缺陷与基层党组织缺位，导致其领导效能大打折扣，部队一打就散。国民党军队的组织结构之松散，指挥链条之混乱，抗压能力之低，崩溃速度之快，关键在于没有获得人心，组织大而不强。但阶级属性和政治立场决定了，国民党反动派不屑于、不可能，也不敢对组织成员进行培养教育，注定无法得到最广大人民的支持和拥护。

Mao Zedong believed that an organization filled with selfish members would sooner or later head toward destruction; passive individuals and rigid organizations alike have no future. In old social relations, people were long oppressed and exploited, and free and comprehensive development was out of the question. Therefore, the prerequisite for effective ideological and political work among soldiers was to fundamentally change the feudal relations of production and social relations of the old-style army. Although the general environment of the old society could not be changed temporarily, it was possible to create a completely new type of social relations within the people’s army — to build, within the old world, a new world in which everyone could participate, have personal experience, and be willing to fight for, closely linking each individual’s personal life with the grand narrative. Under Mao Zedong’s leadership, the people’s army carried out a democratic reform of equality between officers and men: officers and soldiers were not only identical in material treatment such as clothing, food, and housing, but also implemented the “three democracies” — political, military, and economic. [6]6 The “three democracies” (三大民主) refer to the system of political, military, and economic democracy implemented in the People’s Liberation Army, under which soldiers participate in management and supervision. Soldiers’ committees were established; soldiers participated in management and supervised officers; members of the soldiers’ committees were elected. Only the revolutionary army led by the Chinese Communist Party could empower every ordinary soldier; no other army of any exploiting class could achieve this. The democratic system of equality between officers and men established a new type of relationship between officers and soldiers as class comrades, unprecedentedly enhancing the cohesion of grassroots Party organizations and creating conditions for carrying out effective ideological and political work.

毛泽东认为，一个充斥着自私自利成员的组织，迟早会走向灭亡，被动的人和僵化的组织都是没有前途的。在旧的社会关系中，人长期受到压迫和剥削，自由全面的发展无从谈起。因此对士兵进行有效思想政治工作的前提，乃是从根本上改变旧式军队的封建生产关系和社会关系。虽然旧社会的大环境暂时无法改变，但可以通过在人民军队中创造一种全新的社会关系，在旧世界中打造一个人人可以参与其中、有切身体会且愿意为之奋斗的新世界，将每个人的个人生活都与宏大叙事紧密结合起来。在毛泽东领导下，人民军队进行了官兵一致的民主改革：军官与士兵不仅衣食住行等物质待遇完全一致，还实行政治、军事、经济“三大民主”。设立士兵委员会，士兵参加管理，对军官进行监督，士兵委员会委员由选举产生。只有中国共产党领导的革命军队能赋能每一个普通士兵，其他一切剥削阶级的军队都无法做到这一点。官兵一致的民主制度确立了官兵同为阶级同志的新型关系，基层党组织的凝聚力空前提升，为开展卓有成效的思想政治工作创造了条件。

First, ordinary soldiers formed deep comradely feelings and a sense of belonging through Party organizational life and political study. This internal unity was the foundation of the army’s strong combat effectiveness. Through ideological and political work, grassroots Party organizations valued the spiritual life of every individual, cultivated everyone’s capacity for independent thought, and, by linking with the soldiers’ personal experience, enabled them to understand why they were poor and trapped in difficulty, by whom they were oppressed, and for whom they were now fighting by joining the army. Once educated, the soldiers understood who their real enemies were. With a collective sense of belonging, class feeling was born; they were transformed from ordinary people who were resigned to suffering, numb, indifferent, and self-regarding, into staunch communist fighters. It was not only revolutionary fighting will that was aroused; in the organizational life of “all for one, one for all,” public spirit and kindness were also greatly stimulated. People were no longer confined to narrow personal interests; they understood collective interests, class interests, and national interests, took these as their fighting goals, and expanded from seeking benefits for themselves and their families to seeking benefits for all the people under heaven, serving the people, and fighting for the liberation of all China. Under the care and education of grassroots Party organizations, ordinary soldiers were liberated in every respect, from the material to the spiritual; they loved and defended the Party from the bottom of their hearts, and were unafraid of sacrifice in order to defend the hard-won fruits of the revolution and even the communist ideal.

首先，基层士兵在党组织生活和政治学习中形成了深厚的同志情谊和归属感，这种内部的团结是军队强大战斗力的基础。基层党组织通过思想政治工作，重视每一个人的精神生活，培养所有人的独立思考能力，结合士兵的切身体会，使士兵明白自己为何贫穷和陷入困境，受到谁的压迫，现在参军是为谁而战斗。一经教育，士兵们就明白了，谁才是真正的敌人。有了集体归属感，阶级感情诞生了，从逆来顺受的、麻木不仁、事不关己高高挂起的老百姓，变成了坚定的共产主义战士。不光是革命的战斗意志，在人人为我、我为人人的组织生活中，公心和善心也得到了极大激发，大家不再局限于狭隘的个人利益，明白了集体利益、阶级利益、民族利益，以此作为奋斗目标，将为自己和家人谋利益，扩展到为天下百姓谋福利，为人民服务，为解放全中国而奋斗。在基层党组织的关心和教育下，普通士兵从物质到精神，全方位都得到了解放，发自内心地热爱和维护党，为了捍卫来之不易的革命成果乃至共产主义理想而不怕牺牲。

Second, ordinary soldiers were able to be masters of their own affairs, and their sense of responsibility and consciousness of being the masters was enhanced, raising the self-management capacity of basic-level combat units and the overall operational efficiency of the army. Within the Party’s ranks, the bullying and abuse of the old society were eliminated; everyone addressed each other as “comrade,” everyone was qualified to study and had the right to speak, and spiritual needs were greatly satisfied — a world of difference from life in the old-style army. Every individual felt himself an important member of the revolution; the soldiers’ revolutionary enthusiasm was aroused, and their mental state was completely renewed. As Mao Zedong said: “They felt that the Kuomintang army and our army were two different worlds. Although they felt that the Red Army’s material life was inferior to that of the White Army, their spirit was liberated. The same soldier who was not brave yesterday in the enemy army is very brave today in the Red Army — this is the effect of democracy.” [7]7 Mao Zedong, “The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains” (1928), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 1.

其次，基层士兵能够当家做主，责任感和主人翁意识得到了增强，提升了基层作战单位的自我管理能力和军队的整体运作效率。党的队伍里消除了旧社会的欺凌和辱骂，人人以同志相称，人人都有资格学习，有权利发言，精神需求得到了极大满足，与旧式军队中的生活截然不同。每个人都感觉自己是革命的重要成员，士兵们的革命热情被激发，精神状态焕然一新。正如毛泽东说的：“他们感觉国民党军队和我们军队是两个世界。他们虽然感觉红军的物质生活不如白军，但是精神得到了解放。同样一个兵，昨天在敌军不勇敢，今天在红军很勇敢，就是民主主义的影响。”

Under the education and cultivation of grassroots Party organizations, the military quality of ordinary soldiers was greatly enhanced. Every soldier fought for himself and for the people, possessing the initiative and proactiveness for combat. Mao Zedong pointed out: “Freedom of action is the lifeblood of an army; once this freedom is lost, the army is close to being defeated or annihilated.” [8]8 Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War” (1936), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 1. Free and flexible soldiers are the cells of the army; when each individual has initiative and can fight independently, the flexible employment of tactical units and the implementation of advanced tactics become possible. In contrast, in the Kuomintang army, soldiers were recruited with money or forcibly conscripted as able-bodied men; their fighting enthusiasm, will, and morale could not be compared with those of the People’s Liberation Army. Some high-level Kuomintang generals may not have been unaware of the army’s ills, but the Kuomintang’s low level of military leadership meant that even a clever housewife could not cook a meal without rice.

在基层党组织的教育和培养下，普通士兵的军事素养得到了极大提升，每一个士兵为自己和人民而战，具备作战的积极性和主动性。毛泽东指出：“行动自由是军队的命脉，失了这种自由,军队就接近于被打败或被消灭。”自由灵活的士兵是军队的细胞，每个人具有积极性，能独立作战，使得战术分队的灵活运用和先进战法的实施成为可能。反观国民党军队，士兵是用金钱招募而来，或是强征壮丁被迫加入，其战斗热情、意志、士气都不能同解放军相提并论。部分高水平国民党将领未必就不了解军队弊病，但国民党对军队的领导力之低下，令巧妇难为无米之炊。

IV. People’s War: Forging the Source of Revolutionary Power That Advances from Victory to Victory

四、人民战争：打造从胜利走向胜利的革命力量之源

On the basis of Party organizations taking root at the grassroots level, maintaining close ties with the masses, and fully winning the people’s hearts, the Chinese Communist Party built a three-tiered armed system combining main forces, local armed guerrilla units, and militia self-defense forces, achieving the perfect integration of elements such as “the Party, the government, the army, the people, and the locality.” [9]9 This phrase refers to the integrated mobilization of Party organizations, government organs, military forces, civilian populations, and local territorial administration in the base areas during the revolutionary war. Appearing and disappearing at will across the land of China, gathering and dispersing freely, it launched an unprecedented large-scale guerrilla war in the vast enemy-occupied areas, plunging the reactionary forces into the vast ocean of people’s war.

中国共产党在党组织扎根基层、密切联系群众、充分赢得民心的基础上，打造了由主力部队、地方武装游击队、民兵自卫队相结合的三级武装体系，实现了“党、政、军、民、地”等要素的完美结合，在中华大地上神出鬼没，聚散自如，在广大敌占区发动了史无前例的超大规模游击战争，使反动势力陷入人民战争的汪洋大海。

Marxist military thought emphasizes holism and political character, holding that military activity is part of social activity and that military organization is an extension of social organization. To achieve success in the military sphere, one cannot do without favorable objective social conditions and popular support. In the early revolutionary armed struggles, our Party copied the Russian experience and for a time implemented a strategy of directly attacking large cities with regular forces and positional warfare, but this ended in failure. In the course of long revolutionary practice, Mao Zedong discovered that the “three big mountains” [10]10 The “three big mountains” (三座大山) refers to imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism, which Mao Zedong identified as the three oppressors of the Chinese people before the revolution. were entrenched in the major central cities, that the reactionary forces had very strong power in the cities, that Party organizations in the cities were too weak and lacked a mass base, and that old China, being semi-colonial and semi-feudal, was a large agricultural country with a very small industrial scale and limited numbers and strength of urban industrial workers. Where, then, could one find the decisive force to support the Chinese revolution? Mao Zedong believed that although the reactionary forces were strong, their rule did not cover all areas; they were active mainly in the cities, relied on railways and highways for transportation, and on the vast Chinese land below the county level were the rural areas, which accounted for over 90 percent of the country’s total population. The reactionary forces were still confined to a “point–line” scope of activity along “large and medium-sized cities and transportation lines,” and their ability to control the “surface” of the vast rural areas was limited. Therefore, provided that the revolutionary situation continued to advance without stagnation and that the military and the people were united, the revolutionary armed forces had considerable room for survival. Mao Zedong gradually explored the revolutionary development path with Chinese characteristics of “encircling the cities from the countryside,” establishing revolutionary base areas in the vast countryside where the rule of the reactionary forces was weak, and from there recruiting and training the military members urgently needed by the Party.

马克思主义军事思想注重整体性和政治性，认为军事活动是社会活动的一部分，军事组织是社会组织的延伸，要想在军事领域取得成功，绝不能离开有利的客观社会条件和人民支持。我党在早期革命武装斗争中照搬俄国经验，一度实行以正规军和阵地战正面攻打大城市的战略，但遭失败。毛泽东在长期革命实践活动中发现，“三座大山”盘踞在各大中心城市，反动势力在城市有很强的实力，城市中党组织过于薄弱，缺乏群众基础，而且半殖民地半封建的旧中国是农业大国，工业规模很小，城市产业工人的数量和力量有限。那么去哪里才能找到支持中国革命的决定性力量呢？毛泽东认为，反动势力虽强，但其统治范围并未覆盖所有地区，主要在城市活动，交通依靠铁路公路，在县城以下的中国大地上，是占全国总人口数超过90%的农村。反动势力仍限于“大中城市—交通线”的“点—线”活动范围，对广大农村地区“面”的掌控力度有限，因此在革命形势继续向前发展不停滞和军民团结的前提下，革命武装存在很大的生存空间。毛泽东逐步探索出“农村包围城市”的中国特色革命发展道路，去反动势力统治薄弱的广大农村建立革命根据地，并从中招募和培养党亟需的军队成员。

Mao Zedong saw the great power of the people. By maintaining close ties with the masses and mobilizing them to wage a people’s war, it was possible to provide the necessary base, manpower, material resources, and financial support for the Party and the army. Summing up the lessons of the early revolutionary struggles, Mao Zedong noted that the “three major uprisings” [11]11 The “three major uprisings” (三大起义) refers to the Nanchang Uprising (August 1, 1927), the Autumn Harvest Uprising (September 1927), and the Guangzhou Uprising (December 1927), which were the CPC’s first armed attempts to seize power. failed precisely because they did not properly resolve the problem of integrating with the masses; during their transfers they could not obtain timely logistical supplies and fought isolated and on the move until they were defeated. This shows that a revolutionary army cannot do without the support of the masses; a force without roots cannot survive and develop. For this reason, it was necessary for Party organizations to establish base areas in the vast countryside, set up Party committees at the county and district levels in rural areas, build Party branches in villages, and have the Party lead the masses in waging a people’s war, thereby providing the necessary conditions for the survival and development of the people’s army.

毛泽东看到了人民的伟大力量，通过密切联系群众，发动群众进行人民战争，能够为党和军队提供必要的基地、人力、物力和财力支持。毛泽东总结早期革命斗争的经验教训，“三大起义”正是由于没有很好地解决与群众的结合问题，在转移过程中无法得到及时的后勤补给，孤军辗转奋战而遭失败。可见革命军队不能离开群众支持，没有根的部队无法生存和发展。为此，需要由党组织在广大农村建立根据地，在农村的县、区建立党委，村上建党支部，党领导群众进行人民战争，方能为人民军队的生存和发展提供必要条件。

Through the agrarian revolution, the Communist Party of China enabled the poor peasants to throw off oppression and obtain land that truly belonged to them. In this process, the Party propagated land policies in the countryside, organized the peasants to carry out land struggles, and dispatched troops to assist and protect them, ensuring the smooth progress of the agrarian revolution. The Party also promulgated the “Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention,” [12]12 The “Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention” (三大纪律八项注意) were a set of behavioral regulations for the Red Army, later adopted by the People’s Liberation Army, emphasizing respect for civilians and property. which improved the relationship between the military and the people and closely linked the Party and the army with the masses. By implementing this discipline in the army, the military not only protected the safety of the masses but also helped them with production labor and provided them with social services such as education and healthcare, winning widespread support and affection from the masses and greatly enhancing the prestige and influence of the Party and the army in the hearts of the people. The “fish-and-water relationship” between the military and the people was thus established. The broad masses developed class consciousness, their enthusiasm for joining the army was aroused, and they volunteered to become revolutionary soldiers to defend the hard-won fruits of the revolution. A three-tiered armed system under Party leadership, combining main forces, local armed guerrilla units, and militia self-defense corps, was formally established. A new type of revolutionary army, led by the proletariat and composed mainly of peasants, embarked on a path of regularized development, drawing soldiers from the peasants and sustaining them through the peasants, creating a sustainable model of development.

中国共产党通过土地革命，让贫苦农民摆脱压迫，得到真正属于自己的土地。在这一过程中，党在农村宣传土地政策，组织农民进行土地斗争，派出军队加以协助和保护，确保土地革命顺利进行。党又颁布了“三大纪律八项注意”，改善了军民关系，将党和军队与人民群众紧密联系在一起。党在军队中推行这一纪律，使军队不仅保护群众的安全，还帮助群众进行生产劳动，为群众提供教育和卫生等社会服务，得到了群众的广泛支持和爱戴，极大地增强了党和军队在人民心中的威信和影响力，军民之间的“鱼水关系”得以建立。广大群众有了阶级觉悟，参军的积极性被调动起来，自愿成为革命战士，捍卫来之不易的革命果实。党领导下的主力部队、地方武装游击队、民兵自卫队相结合的三级武装体系正式形成，一支由无产阶级领导、以农民为主体的新型革命军队走上了常态化的发展道路，取兵于农，养兵于农，建立了可持续发展的模式。

Thanks to the Party’s advantage of maintaining close ties with the masses, the people’s army was not only able to establish and develop rural revolutionary base areas behind enemy lines but also to organize large-scale, sustained military operations deep inside enemy-controlled areas. During the stalemate phase of the War of Resistance against Japan, in response to the brutal Japanese “mopping-up,” “nibbling,” and “clearing-out” operations, the Party Central Committee demanded that in the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines, scattered small-unit forms be used to wage widespread local and mass guerrilla warfare. When the Japanese invaders adopted “iron-wall encirclement” and “cage policy” [13]13 “Iron-wall encirclement” (铁壁合围) and “cage policy” (囚笼政策) were Japanese military tactics during the Second Sino-Japanese War: the former involved concentric encirclements to trap enemy forces, while the latter used blockhouses and fortified lines to restrict guerrilla movement. in an attempt to annihilate the anti-Japanese armed forces, our army could both blend into the vast countryside and mountainous areas to avoid their sharp edge and, at any time, concentrate forces to launch counterattacks where the enemy’s rule was weak, making the Japanese army impossible to guard against. As *The Art of War* by Sunzi says: “One skilled in defense hides in the deepest depths of the earth; one skilled in attack moves from the highest heights of heaven.” [14]14 This is a classical Chinese military maxim from Sunzi’s *The Art of War*, emphasizing the invisibility of defense and the suddenness of attack. Before this, in the history of human warfare, no large military force had ever been able to break up into smaller units as an organized whole and wage long-term, large-scale guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. The Kuomintang army, divorced from the masses and heavily dependent on regular supply channels, could only fight on interior lines and could hardly gain a foothold on exterior lines or behind enemy lines; once defeated, it had to withdraw completely from the entire combat zone. In the vast occupied areas of Northeast, North, East, Central, and South China, all regular Kuomintang Party, government, and military organizations withdrew, but in these areas a large number of regular CPC Party, government, and military organizations at all levels remained active, preventing most of China’s territory from being completely occupied by the enemy. At the most critical moment of the War of Resistance, the Communist Party of China shouldered the main burden, went deep behind enemy lines, and led the broad masses of soldiers and civilians in waging an unprecedentedly large-scale guerrilla war in human history, opening up the enemy’s rear battlefield in the War of Resistance against Japan.

得益于党密切联系群众的优势，人民军队不仅能在敌后建立和发展农村革命根据地，还能深入敌人控制的区域内组织大规模、持续性的军事行动。在抗战相持阶段，为应对日军残酷的“扫荡”“蚕食”“清乡”行动，党中央要求在敌后抗日根据地以分散的小部队形式，开展普遍的地方性、群众性的游击战争。当日寇采取“铁壁合围”和“囚笼政策”企图消灭抗日武装时，我军不仅可以融入广大农村和山区扎根以避其锋芒，又能随时集结兵力在其统治薄弱处发动反攻，令日军防不胜防。正如《孙子兵法》有言：“善守者藏于九地之下，善攻者动于九天之上。”在此之前，人类军事史上没有任何一支大型部队能做到成建制地化整为零，在敌后开展长期、大规模的游击战争。国民党军队脱离群众，严重依赖正规渠道补给，只能在内线作战，在外线和敌后几乎无法立足，一旦战败，就要从整个交战区域彻底退出。在东北、华北、华东、华中、华南的广大沦陷区，国民党的党政军正规组织全部都撤出了，但在这些地区还活跃着大量的中共各级党政军正规组织，使大部分中国土地不被敌人完全占领。在抗战最危急的时刻，中国共产党扛起了大梁，深入敌后，领导广大军民开展人类历史上史无前例的超大规模游击战，开辟了抗日战争的敌后战场。

The people’s war under Party leadership dealt heavy blows to the Japanese army and played a pivotal role in the War of Resistance: First, it led and consolidated the Anti-Japanese National United Front, giving great confidence and encouragement to all ethnic groups, all parties, and all classes across the country, and showing them the hope of victory in a protracted war. Under our Party’s leadership, all anti-Japanese forces were able to persist in the struggle without giving up. Second, it seized the initiative on the battlefield and curbed the pace of the Japanese invasion. The Japanese army’s rear supply lines were constantly under threat from our forces, its freedom of movement was constrained, and it could not concentrate its forces to launch new campaigns. Third, it directly pinned down and eliminated large numbers of Japanese effective strength, weakening the Japanese army’s combat power. The Japanese army had to divert large numbers of troops to suppress our forces, exhausting itself in guerrilla warfare, suffering heavy losses in manpower and declining morale. Although our army also paid a huge price, because it was based in the base areas and among the people, its sources of soldiers could be continuously replenished, while the Japanese army, already short of manpower, could not replenish its high-quality human losses in the short term; its well-trained veterans were steadily depleted, the quality of new recruits was very poor, and the overall combat effectiveness of the army declined sharply. Fourth, it shattered the Japanese plan to sustain the war through plunder, preventing the Japanese army from obtaining the resources urgently needed to maintain its global war through the invasion of China and also causing the economic bankruptcy of the Japanese invading forces in China. The occupied areas covered China’s most fertile agricultural and industrial zones and had a population of about 100 million. The resistance behind enemy lines sabotaged important production facilities and railway transportation facilities occupied by the Japanese, seriously hindering their plundering activities and preventing them from obtaining resources at the desired target level in the occupied areas. Fifth, it caused the bankruptcy of the Japanese strategy of fostering local proxies. In the people’s war, the armed forces behind enemy lines were frequently active, and the Japanese army could not establish stable puppet regimes in the vast rural areas of the occupied zones; even the puppet regimes in the cities were sometimes shaken, and stable order in the occupied areas could not be established for a long time.

党领导下的人民战争，给予日军沉重打击，在抗战中起到中流砥柱的作用：第一，领导并巩固了抗日民族统一战线，给全国各族人民、各党派、各阶级以巨大的信心和鼓舞，看到了持久抗战的胜利希望。各种抗日力量在我党的领导之下，得以坚持斗争而不放弃。第二，夺取了战场主动权，遏制了日军侵略步伐。日军的后方补给线时刻处于被我军威胁状态，军队的自由行动受到钳制，不能放开手脚集中力量发动新的战役。第三，直接牵制并消灭了大批日军有生力量，削弱了日军战力。日军抽调大批兵力镇压我军，在游击战中疲于奔命，兵力损耗严重，军心动摇。虽然我军也付出了巨大牺牲，但由于立足根据地和人民，兵源能持续不断得到补充，而日军兵力原本就不足，高质量的人力消耗在短期内无法补充，训练有素的老兵持续损耗，新兵质量很差，军队整体战斗力严重下降。第四，粉碎了日军以战养战的图谋，不仅使日军无法通过对中国的侵略而获得其维持全球战争所急需的资源，还使侵华日军的经济破产。敌占区覆盖了中国最精华的农业区和工业区，并拥有约1亿人口，敌后抗战对日军占领的重要生产设施和铁路交通运输设施进行破坏，严重阻碍了日军的掠夺活动，使日军在占领区内不能获得理想目标水平的资源。第五，使日军扶持本地代理人的战略破产。在人民战争中，敌后武装力量频繁活动，日军无法在占领区的广大农村建立稳固的伪政权，城市伪政权也时有动摇，敌占区的稳固秩序因而迟迟无法建立。

V. Conclusion

五、结语

The Chinese Communists, represented by Mao Zedong, gave birth to the crystallization of collective wisdom in revolutionary practice and forged the Communist Party of China’s outstanding military leadership. First, by extending Party organizations deep into the army’s grassroots units, they ensured the Party’s absolute leadership over the military. Second, by implementing a military democratic system of equality between officers and soldiers, they trained all ordinary soldiers into communist fighters with ideals and consciousness, achieving the evolution of the army. Third, by perfectly integrating elements such as the Party, the government, the military, the people, and education, they obtained great war power in the people’s war.

以毛泽东为代表的中国共产党人，在革命实践活动中诞生了集体智慧的结晶，打造出中国共产党的卓越军事领导力。首先，通过将党组织深入部队基层，确保党对军队的绝对领导。其次，通过实施官兵一致的军事民主制，将所有普通士兵都培养成有理想有觉悟的共产主义战士，实现军队的进化。再次，通过将党政军民学等要素完美融合，在人民战争中获得了伟大的战争力量。

It is worth noting that the effective exercise of the core principles of the Party’s military leadership was invariably built upon the emphasis on and cultivation of people themselves. The Chinese Communist Party consistently implemented the Marxist humanist thought, regarding talent as the Party’s most precious asset; even the most ordinary members at the grassroots level could receive opportunities for cultivation. Among the 1,614 founding generals, [15]15 The “founding generals” (开国将领) refers to the military officers who were awarded the rank of general or higher in 1955, when the People’s Liberation Army first introduced a formal rank system. the vast majority, with the exception of a few early revolutionaries, came from poor peasant backgrounds. Former peasants, with their firm revolutionary will, joined the Red Army, received thorough cultivation under the Party’s leadership, became senior military personnel of the Party, and contributed to the revolution. Many “miscellaneous” units of the Kuomintang that were disregarded and passively beaten during the War of Resistance [16]16 The “War of Resistance” (抗战) refers to the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). joined our army during the War of Liberation, [17]17 The “War of Liberation” (解放战争) refers to the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949) between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang. were remade under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and the same group of people, who could not even defeat the Japanese army, became capable of defeating the American army during the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. [18]18 The “War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea” (抗美援朝) is the official Chinese name for the Korean War (1950–1953), in which Chinese forces intervened on the side of North Korea. Examples of such battles are too numerous to enumerate. The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party possesses the wondrous effect of turning stone into gold, capable of transforming the ordinary into the great and turning the rotten into the miraculous.

值得注意的是，党的军事领导力核心原则的有效发挥，无一不是建立在对人本身的重视和培养之上。中国共产党始终贯彻马克思主义人学思想，将人才视为党最宝贵的财富，即使是最基层的普通成员，也能获得培养机会。在1614位开国将领中，除少数早期革命家外，绝大多数是贫苦农民出身。昔日的农民以坚定的革命意志参加了红军，在党的领导下得到了充分培养，成为党的高级军事人才，为革命做出了贡献。许多支抗战时期不受重视、被动挨打的国民党“杂牌”部队，在解放战争中加入我军，在中国共产党的领导下回炉重造，同样一批人，就从连日军都打不赢，变成抗美援朝时能战胜美军，诸如此类的战例不胜枚举。中国共产党的领导具备点石成金的妙用，能变平凡为伟大，化腐朽为神奇。

(Authors: Ma Kangmei, former Deputy Party Secretary and Vice President of China University of Political Science and Law, Professor and Doctoral Supervisor at the School of Marxism, Vice President of the Chinese Talent Research Society; Yi Ming, Postdoctoral Fellow at China University of Political Science and Law)

（作者：马抗美，中国政法大学原党委副书记、副校长，马克思主义学院教授、博士生导师，中国人才研究会副会长；易明，中国政法大学博士后）

Online Editor: Jing Mu

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