Attention to the Wartime Civil-Military Relations in the Theater of Operations during the War of Resistance

In recent years, as research on the history of the War of Resistance against Japan has deepened, the “wartime military” has gradually become a key object of investigation for researchers. The eight-volume *History of the War of Resistance against China* devotes a separate volume to a focused discussion of the Nationalist troops and the Communist armed forces during the war, covering basic issues such as the organizational structure, officer and soldier personnel, weaponry and equipment, military logistics, and political work and Party affairs of the wartime military. This can be regarded as a positive guide to this hot topic. However, limited by space and the scope of researchers’ perspectives, some other important issues concerning the wartime military have not yet been fully discussed. The civil-military relations in the theater of operations during the War of Resistance is one such issue that requires attention.

近年来，随着抗日战争史研究的持续深入，“战时军队”逐渐成为研究者重点考察的对象。八卷本《中国抗日战争史》单辟一卷专论战时国民党部队和中共武装，涉及战时军队的组织架构、官兵人事、武器装备、军需后勤、政工党务等基本问题，可以视作对这个热点的积极引领。不过，限于篇幅和研究者的视野，关于战时军队的另外一些重要问题尚未得到充分的讨论，抗战时期的战地军政关系便是需要关注的问题之一。

The so-called civil-military relations in the theater of operations refers specifically to the relationship between the stationed troops in the combat zone and the local government, and does not include the civil-military relations at the central level of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. On the frontal battlefield of the War of Resistance, each war zone, army group, and army (division) interacted constantly with the provincial, administrative inspectorate, and county-level governments in which they were located. Meanwhile, on the enemy’s rear battlefield during the same period, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, local armed forces, and the administrative organs of the base areas’ anti-Japanese democratic governments also maintained close ties. These interactions and ties have very rich content, which can help the academic community further understand the military, the government, and their mutual relations during the War of Resistance.

所谓战地军政关系，专指交战地域驻军与地方政府的关系，不包括国共两党中央一级的军政关系。在抗日战争的正面战场，各战区、集团军、军（师）与所在的省、行政督察区、县几级政府时刻进行着互动；而在同一时期的敌后战场，八路军、新四军、地方武装和根据地抗日民主政权的行政机关也保持着紧密联系。这些互动和联系有着非常丰富的内容，有助于学界进一步理解抗战时期的军队、政府及其相互关系。

At the theoretical level, the relationship between the military and the government, that is, civil-military relations in political power, is a topic that has never waned in heat within Western academia since World War II, and many scholars have discussed it. Within the discipline of Chinese history, the field of ancient history has always attached importance to the relationship between civil officials and military generals in successive dynasties, and the field of modern history is not lacking in discussions on civil literati and warlords during the Beiyang period, as well as Party affairs and military affairs during the Great Revolution. At present, there is already considerable research belonging to the category of civil-military relations in the theater of operations during the War of Resistance, but more issues related to civil-military relations in the theater of operations have yet to be well resolved, warranting further reflection by the academic community.

上升到学理层面，军队与政府的关系亦即政治权力中的文武关系（civil-military relations），是二战后西方学界热度始终不减的论题，许多学者对此均有论述。而在中国史学科内部，古代史学界历来重视历代文官与武将的关系，近代史学界也不乏关于北洋时期文人与军阀、大革命期间党务与军事的讨论。目前，属于抗战时期战地军政关系范畴的研究已有不少，但更多与战地军政关系相关的问题尚未得到很好的解决，值得学界进一步思索。

I. The Position of Military Power in the Power Structure of the Theater of Operations

一、军权在战地权力格局中的地位

After the July 7th Incident, the flames of the War of Resistance quickly spread across the country, and defeating the Japanese invaders gradually evolved into a long process. To cope with a comprehensive and protracted war, both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party made adjustments not only militarily but also in politics, economy, culture, and other aspects. In the vast combat zones, the original power structure was either no longer well-suited to the needs of the war or gradually disintegrated under the impact of the Japanese army. In response to the objective reality that the power structure in the theater of operations urgently needed reorganization or reconstruction, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party chose completely different paths, but the plans adopted by both sides were permeated with the idea of using military force and relying on military commanders to consolidate or establish political power. In the new power structure, the status of the military and soldiers was significantly elevated.

七七事变之后，抗日烽火很快延烧至全国各地，而战胜日本侵略者也渐渐演变成一个漫长的过程。为了应对全面而持久的战争，国共两党不仅在军事上进行调整，还在政治、经济、文化等多个方面作出相应的变阵。在广大的交战地域，原有的权力格局或已不太适应战争需要，或在日军的冲击下逐步瓦解。针对战地权力格局亟待重组或再造的客观实际，国民党和中共选择了完全不同的路径，但双方所采取的方案都渗透着运用军事力量、倚重军事将领巩固或建立政权的思路。在新的权力格局中，军队和军人的地位得到了显著抬升。

Researchers have already noted the tendency toward militarization of the central-level power organs of the Nationalist government during the war. Whether it was the short-lived Grand Headquarters, which attempted to integrate Party, government, and military into one, or the subsequent Supreme National Defense Council, which coordinated the various Party, government, and military departments, both reflected the rise of military power under wartime conditions. This change may be related to Chiang Kai-shek’s governing philosophy of “valuing the military over the Party.” Based on a similar logic, regarding the power structure at the local level, Chiang Kai-shek attempted to promote the deepening and expansion of military power within it. The most typical change is the phenomenon of wartime military provincial governors, which has not yet been fully discussed.

研究者已经注意到战时国民党政府中央一级权力机构军事化的倾向。无论是昙花一现的试图融党政军为一体的大本营还是之后协调党政军各部门的国防最高委员会，都反映了战争环境下军权的上升。这样的变化或许和蒋介石“重军轻党”的统治理念有关。基于相似的逻辑，对于地方一级的权力架构，蒋介石尝试推动军权在其中的深入和扩展。最典型的变化，便是尚未得到充分讨论的战时军人省主席现象。

The so-called military provincial governors have two types: one is where active-duty commanders of Nationalist troops, such as war zone commanders and army group commanders-in-chief, concurrently serve as provincial governors; the other is where active-duty commanders of Nationalist troops leave their military posts to be transferred to the position of provincial governor. A rough analysis of the appointments of provincial governors in various provinces during the period of the All-Nation War of Resistance reveals that the above two types of military provincial governors accounted for a considerable proportion. During the war, there were 28 provinces in China, and a total of 67 people served as provincial governors. Among them, only 15 were pure civil officials, accounting for 22.4% of the total; 13 were military commanders transferred to the post of provincial governor, accounting for 19.4% of the total; the remaining 39 were all active-duty commanders of Nationalist troops, accounting for 58.2% of the total. Adding the latter two figures together, provincial governors with a military background accounted for as high as 77.6% of the total. If the appointments of the 30 provincial governors in the 14 provinces located in the combat zones are counted separately, the data does not change much. In the combat zone provinces, civil official provincial governors accounted for 30%, while military provincial governors accounted for as high as 70%.

所谓军人省主席有两种类型，一种是国民党部队中的战区长官、集团军总司令等现职将领兼理省政，一种是国民党部队现职将领脱离军职转任省主席。粗略分析全民族抗战期间各省省主席任职情况，不难发现上述两类军人省主席占据了相当大的比重。战时中国28个省份，先后担任省主席的共有67人。其中纯文官只有15人，占总数的22.4%；转任省主席的军事将领有13人，占总数的19.4%；剩余39人均是国民党部队的现职将领，占总数的58.2%。将后两者数字相加，军人出身的省主席在总人数中占比高达77.6%。如果单独统计位于交战地区的14个省30位省主席的任职情况，数据没有太大的变化。战地省份文官省主席占比30%，而军人省主席占比则高达70%。

These data raise many interesting questions—what considerations led Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government to entrust local government affairs to the military and soldiers? What process of change did the phenomenon of military provincial governors undergo? What exactly is the difference between concurrently serving as provincial governor and being transferred to the post of provincial governor? The above issues involve factors such as power division, power struggles, and factional strife in wartime provincial-level political power, and require reflection on their mechanisms and logic.

这些数据引出了很多有趣的问题——蒋介石和国民党政府将地方政务交给军队和军人是出于怎样的考虑？军人出任省主席的现象经历了怎样的变化过程？兼理省政和转任省主席的差别究竟在哪里？上述问题涉及战时省级政权权力划分、权力博弈、派系斗争等因素，需要对其机制和逻辑展开思考。

Commentators say that the Kuomintang “placed the great power of Party, government, and military in the combat zone provinces in the hands of military commanders,” while the Communist Party differed from this but also had commonalities. As a political party where “the Party commands the gun,” the Communist Party could never at any time allow military power to overstep its bounds, but the classic logic of the Chinese revolution that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” was repeatedly proven true in the context of the All-Nation War of Resistance. In the Communist Party’s anti-Japanese base areas, military forces and military cadres played a key role, and the importance of armed force was mainly manifested in the role of the military in establishing political power and the status of military leaders in the base areas.

论者谓国民党是“战区各省党政军大权操诸军事将领之手”，而中共与之存在区别但也有共通之处。作为一个“党指挥枪”的政党，中共在任何时间都不可能容许军权有所僭越，但中国革命“枪杆子里面出政权”的经典逻辑在全民族抗战背景下依然反复被证明其真理性。在中共抗日根据地，军事力量和军队干部扮演着关键的角色，武装的重要性主要表现为军队在建立政权中的作用和军事负责人在根据地的地位。

For the military’s role in establishing most levels of political power in the anti-Japanese base areas, a considerable number of researchers may consider it a matter of course. However, if this process is re-examined with a perspective of “defamiliarization,” it will be found to be a highly distinctive scene in the history of the people’s army and even in the history of the Chinese revolution. Some scholars have emphasized the role of the military in establishing political power in the Communist Party’s anti-Japanese base areas. First, the military’s responsibility for establishing political power came from the top-level design of leaders such as Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai. Second, such practice achieved good results from the very beginning: “The intervention of the military ensured that the Party and political power could quickly take root locally,” maximizing the efficiency of political power establishment. Finally, military cadres were quite welcome in local political power, and a large number of company- and platoon-level cadres were dispatched to local areas, gradually creating a situation where supply could not meet demand. However, the specific operational procedures, key success factors, and existing shortcomings of “using the military to establish political power” still await more refined research.

对于军队缔造大多数抗日根据地各级政权，相当一部分研究者或许认为理所当然，但如果以“去熟悉化”的眼光重新认识这一过程，便会发现这个过程堪称人民军队历史乃至中国革命史中极具特色的一幕。有学者强调了军队在中共抗日根据地政权建立中的作用。首先，军队负责建政来自毛泽东、彭德怀等领导人的顶层设计；其次，这样的实践一开始即收到了很好的效果，“军队的介入，保证了党和政权可以快速在地方就位”，实现了建政效率的最大化；最后，军队干部在地方政权中颇受欢迎，大量连排级干部派驻地方，渐有供不应求之感。不过，“以军建政”的具体运作流程、成功要诀以及存在的不足，还有待更加精细化的研究。

Not only did the military establish political power, but the existence of the military was also the guarantee for the continued existence of the anti-Japanese democratic political power in the base areas. “With the regular army as a support, in the harsh struggle, a political system that would otherwise easily collapse naturally became more powerful.” [1]1 The author is quoting from a source; the original Chinese text is provided. The influence of the military in the war zones can be imagined, and the actual status of military leaders in the base areas is a topic that can be further explored in depth. Currently, academic circles have conducted considerable research on the leadership mechanisms in the base areas after the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC issued the “Decision on Unifying the Leadership of the Party in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas and Adjusting Relations among Various Organizations” on September 1, 1942, but there is little understanding of the situation before the emergence of the unified leadership system. [2]2 The “Decision on Unifying the Leadership of the Party in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas and Adjusting Relations among Various Organizations” (1942) established the principle of unified Party leadership over all Party, government, military, and civilian organizations in the base areas, a key step in consolidating CPC control. In fact, “in the early period of the War of Resistance, during the establishment and expansion of base areas behind enemy lines, there had emerged a situation of ‘three powers standing in tripartite equilibrium’ among the Party, government, and military in the base areas, with each not subordinate to the others.” [3]3 “Three powers standing in tripartite equilibrium” (三权鼎立) refers to a situation where Party, government, and military organs operated independently without clear subordination, a problem the CPC sought to correct. To resolve this problem, after 1938, various base areas successively established military-political committees composed of the military and local Party and government organs. In March 1938, the Southern Taihang Military-Political Committee was established, followed by the successive establishment of military-political committees in more than ten base areas, including Southern Hebei, Hebei-Shandong Border, Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu, Central Hebei, Hebei-Rehe-Chahar, Western Shandong, and Northern Taihang. Although the name of the military-political committee changed after February 1941, its nature as “the supreme leading organ for the unified leadership of all Party, government, military, and civilian work in the anti-Japanese base areas” did not change, and moreover, “the person in charge of the main force that opened up the anti-Japanese base area was mostly the main person in charge when the military-political committee of that area was established.” [4]4 The author is quoting from a source; the original Chinese text is provided. That is to say, from 1938 to 1942, the military leaders of the troops stationed in most CPC anti-Japanese base areas concurrently served as the chairmen of the military-political committees of their respective territories. “The secretary [chairman] of the military-political committee was generally held by a military commander, and important issues within the region were studied and resolved through the military-political committee (which had the nature of a joint Party-government-military conference).” [5]5 The author is quoting from a source; the original Chinese text is provided. The reasons for the formation of this pattern of “the military leading the government,” and its connection with the CPC’s long-standing institutional design of power and its actual operation, may be questions that need to be answered.

军队不仅建立了政权，军队的存在也是根据地抗日民主政权得以存续的保障。“有了正规军作支撑，在严酷的斗争中，原本容易垮台的政权体系自然更加有力”。军队在战地的影响力可想而知，而军事负责人在根据地的实际地位是可以继续深入讨论的话题。目前学界对于1942年9月1日中共中央政治局作出《关于统一抗日根据地党的领导及调整各组织间关系的决定》之后根据地的领导机制已有不少研究，但对于一元化体制出现之前的状况却了解不多。事实上，“抗战初期在敌后根据地的建立和扩大中，曾出现过根据地的党政军‘三权鼎立’、互不隶属的情况”。为解决这个问题，1938年之后各个根据地陆续成立军队与地方党政合组的军政委员会。1938年3月，太南军政委员会成立，随后冀南、冀鲁边、豫皖苏、冀中、冀热察、鲁西、太北等10多个根据地的军政委员会相继成立。虽然军政委员会的名称在1941年2月后曾有过改变，但其“统一领导抗日根据地党政军民全面工作的最高领导机构”的性质并没有变化，而且“开辟抗日根据地主力部队的负责人，大多是这一地区军政委员会成立时的主要负责人”。也就是说，1938年至1942年多数中共抗日根据地所驻军队的军事负责人，同时担任属地军政委员会的主任。“军政委员会的书记〔主任〕一般由军队首长担任，地区内的重要问题通过军政委员会（党政军联席会议性质）来研究解决”。这种“以军领政”格局的形成原因、其与中共长期以来的权力制度设计和实际运行的联系，或是需要得到解答的问题。

II. Military Commanders and Local Government Affairs

二、军事将领与地方政务

Some viewpoints hold that highly professionalized military personnel are not suited to the governance tasks at which civilian officials excel. However, the role of military personnel in modernization practices in a considerable number of late-developing countries in the 20th century suggests that this viewpoint may be more of a value judgment. During the War of Resistance, whether it was the military governors of provinces under the Guomindang government or the senior military cadres actually in charge in the CPC anti-Japanese base areas, they all undertook a large amount of local governance work, and their handling of local government affairs also displayed distinct characteristics.

有观点认为，高度职业化的军人并不适合从事文官所擅长的治国理政。但20世纪相当数量后发国家的军人在现代化实践中的作用，说明此种观点可能更多是一种价值判断。抗战时期，无论是国民党政府的军人省主席还是中共抗日根据地实际负责的军队高级干部，都承担了大量地方治理工作，而他们对地方政务的处理也具有鲜明的特点。

In recent years, researchers of Republican-era history have shown considerable interest in the phenomenon of military personnel entering politics in various provinces during the war. The military governors of provinces who have been studied more extensively include Chen Cheng of Hubei Province, Li Zongren and Liao Lei of Anhui Province, Zhang Zhizhong and Xue Yue of Hunan Province, Chen Yi of Fujian Province, Xiong Shihui of Jiangxi Province, Liu Wenhui of Xikang Province, and Chiang Kai-shek of Sichuan Province. [6]6 Chen Cheng, Li Zongren, Liao Lei, Zhang Zhizhong, Xue Yue, Chen Yi, Xiong Shihui, Liu Wenhui, and Chiang Kai-shek were prominent military and political figures in the Republic of China period, many of whom served as provincial governors during the war.

近年来，民国史研究者对于战时各省军人从政的现象表现出较大兴趣，被研究较多的军人省主席，有湖北省主席陈诚、安徽省主席李宗仁和廖磊、湖南省主席张治中和薛岳、福建省主席陈仪、江西省主席熊式辉、西康省主席刘文辉、四川省主席蒋介石等。

Scholars have already had a clear conceptual awareness when conducting their research. While restoring in detail the process by which these military governors administered and governed their provinces, they have also sought to excavate the military characteristics of these figures. Research has found that military governors of provinces indeed had outstanding achievements in implementing various important policies related to military affairs, such as conscription, grain levies, and public security. At the same time, they also performed well in areas of people’s livelihood. From reforms of provincial administrative systems to increases in industrial and agricultural output, and even urban construction, the actions of military governors can be seen. However, some interesting questions have still not been fully explored. For example, during the period when Xue Yue, the commander-in-chief of the 9th War Zone, concurrently managed Hunan’s provincial affairs, he rectified officialdom with thunderous methods, and the severity of his measures shocked even Chiang Kai-shek. Questions such as the gains and losses of this administrative style of military governors using “martial law” to cultivate “civil governance,” and how it compares with that of governors from a civilian official background, still require more scholarly attention. Furthermore, a systematic and complete study of wartime military governors of provinces has yet to be published.

学者开展研究时已有明确的概念自觉，在详细复原这些省主席治省理政过程的同时，力图挖掘他们身上的军人特色。研究发现，军人省主席在推行与军事相关各项要政，如征兵、征粮、保安等方面确有突出之处。同时，他们在民生方面也表现不错，从各省的行政系统改革、工农业增产乃至城市建设中，都能看到军人省主席的作为，但一些有意思的问题仍未得到充分探讨。例如，第9战区司令长官薛岳兼理湘政期间，就以霹雳手段整顿吏治，其严苛程度连蒋介石都感到震惊。军人省主席以“军法”修“文治”，此种行政风格的得失以及与文官出身的省主席相比孰高孰低等问题，还需要得到学者的更多关注。此外，关于战时军人省主席系统而完整的研究，至今也仍未问世。

In the vast CPC anti-Japanese base areas, after border region governments at various levels were established with the help of the military, they began to undertake the daily government affairs of the base areas. However, the military, especially military leaders, did not completely withdraw, and their active figures could be seen in many important tasks such as the construction and development of the base areas. As mentioned earlier, the chairmen (secretaries) of the military-political committees in most base areas were held by the military leaders of the stationed troops. These military leaders often adopted a model of shouldering both military and political responsibilities, deeply participating in the local governance of the base areas.

在广大的中共抗日根据地，各级边区政府在军队帮助下建立之后就开始承担根据地的日常政务。但是，军队尤其是军事负责人并未完全退场，在根据地建设和发展等诸多重要工作中都可以看到他们活跃的身影。如前所述，多数根据地军政委员会的主任（书记），由驻军的军事负责人担任。这些军事负责人往往采取军政一肩挑的模式，深度参与根据地的地方治理。

A group of military-political committee leaders, including Nie Rongzhen, Luo Ronghuan, He Long, Huang Kecheng, Peng Xuefeng, Tan Zhenlin, Liu Ruilong, Xiao Ke, and Xiao Hua, displayed astonishing governance talents in the construction of various base areas. Xiao Ke, recalling Nie Rongzhen’s contributions to the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, said: “Someone once said that Nie Rongzhen could not only command troops but also govern the country. The Jin-Cha-Ji base area had a notable characteristic: not only did the troops fight well at the front, but rear-area construction was also done well and was very orderly… Nie Rongzhen had studied chemistry at the Charleroi Labor University in Belgium in his early years, and could provide guidance to the military industry department in technology and management. Other work, such as finance, grain, and militia, was all done outstandingly.” [7]7 The Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region was one of the earliest and most important CPC anti-Japanese base areas, established in 1937 in the border area of Shanxi, Chahar, and Hebei provinces. Nie Rongzhen was its principal military and political leader. Academic circles have already paid attention to the above-mentioned commanders who excelled in both military and political affairs, but there is likewise a lack of systematic discussion. Moreover, those enthusiastic about local government affairs may not have been limited to these leaders of military-political committees. Liu Bocheng, who is generally perceived as being less involved in local work, was in fact also deeply engaged in the various constructions of the Taihang base area. The governance practices of these commanders also need to be restored.

聂荣臻、罗荣桓、贺龙、黄克诚、彭雪枫、谭震林、刘瑞龙、萧克、萧华等一批军政委员会负责人，在各个根据地的建设中表现出惊人的治理长才。萧克回忆聂荣臻在晋察冀边区的贡献时说：“有人曾说过，聂荣臻不仅能治军，还能治国。晋察冀根据地有一个显著的特点，不仅部队在前方打得好，后方建设也搞得好，很有秩序……聂荣臻早年在比利时沙洛瓦劳动大学学过化学，能在技术上和经营上给军工部门以指导。其他如财政、粮食、民兵等工作都搞得很出色”。学界对于上述军政兼优的将领已有关注，但同样缺乏系统的讨论。而且，对地方政务充满热情的或许还不止这些军政委员会的负责人，一般人印象中较少介入地方工作的刘伯承，实际上也投身到了太行根据地的各项建设中。这些将领们的治政实践，亦需要复原。

Behind the management of local government affairs by military leaders in the war zones of both the Guomindang and the CPC lies a theoretical question—that “Lord Guan reading the Spring and Autumn Annals by lamplight” may not be merely a figment of people’s imagination, but to a considerable extent could also be a reality. [8]8 “Lord Guan reading the Spring and Autumn Annals by lamplight” (关公夜读春秋) is a Chinese idiom referring to the legendary figure Guan Yu, a military general from the Three Kingdoms period, who was said to study the Confucian classic *Spring and Autumn Annals* at night, symbolizing a military man’s cultivation of civilian learning. Questions such as how military commanders understood participation in politics and government, the ideological resources relied upon by military personnel in governance, and the knowledge reserves of the military personnel involved in local governance, also await explanation in future related research.

国共双方战地军事负责人对于地方政务的经营，背后隐藏着一个理论问题——“关公夜读春秋”未必仅仅是人们的想象，在相当程度上也可能是现实。军事将领如何理解从政参政、军人治政所凭恃的思想资源、参与地方治理的军人们的知识储备等问题，亦留待将来的相关研究进行阐释。

III. Military-Political Contradictions in the War Zones

三、战地的军政矛盾

The military and military personnel occupying a dominant position in the power structure of the war zones, and military commanders playing an important role in local government affairs, are the basic themes of military-political relations in the war zones during the War of Resistance. However, another theme should not be overlooked: the friction and conflict that arose when troops were stationed in one place for a long time with the local government (including the populace), as well as the conceptual differences that emerged when military personnel entered the political arena and came into contact with the broad ranks of civilian officials, constituted the military-political contradictions in the war zones. Such contradictions manifested in both the Guomindang’s various war zones and army group garrisons and the CPC anti-Japanese base areas, but their specific expressions differed.

军队和军人在战地的权力结构中占据主导地位，军事将领在地方政务中发挥重要作用，是抗战时期战地军政关系的基本主题。但另一个主题也不应被忽视，即军队长驻一地，与当地政府（包括民众）出现磨擦、冲突，以及军人涉足政坛后与广大文官产生观念上的分歧，构成了战地的军政矛盾。此种矛盾在国民党各战区、集团军驻地与中共抗日根据地均有显现，但具体表现各不相同。

The focus of contradictions between Guomindang troops and the governments of their garrison areas was often related to the local administrative system. Incidents of military interference in local personnel arrangements and encroachment on local administrative resources occurred repeatedly. The most typical of these was the “Eastern Hubei Incident” around 1941 involving Li Zongren’s 5th War Zone and the Hubei Provincial Government. At that time, the 5th War Zone attempted to directly control the government affairs of Eastern Hubei, frequently pressuring the Hubei Provincial Government, and ultimately forcing the provincial government to adjust the personnel in Eastern Hubei according to the war zone’s wishes. The situation in Guangdong was similar. Issues such as local personnel appointments and removals, the command of local armed forces, and the ownership of local financial powers twice became the causes of continuous friction between the military commander Yu Hanmou and the Guangdong Provincial Government. There are many other cases of military-political confrontation arising from local administrative issues, such as the entanglements between the 3rd War Zone and the Zhejiang Provincial Government, the Lu-Su War Zone and the Shandong Provincial Government, and the 34th Army Group and the Shaanxi Provincial Government, which still await excavation and restoration.

国民党部队与驻地政府的矛盾焦点往往与地方行政系统有关。军方干涉地方人事安排、侵占地方行政资源的事件迭有发生，其中最为典型的就是1941年前后李宗仁所在的第5战区与湖北省政府发生的“鄂东事件”。彼时第5战区企图直接控制鄂东政务，频频向湖北省政府施压，最终迫使省政府按照战区意愿调整鄂东人事。广东的情况与之类似，地方人事任免、地方武装的统辖、地方财政权的归属等问题，两度成为军方余汉谋和广东省政府持续磨擦的肇因。因地方行政问题而出现的军政对立，如第3战区与浙江省政府、鲁苏战区与山东省政府、第34集团军与陕西省政府之间的纠葛，还有许多个案有待发掘、复原。

The issue of military grain was another powder keg for conflicts between the army and local governments. As the grain crisis surfaced in 1940, it became common for Nationalist garrisons in various localities to pressure local governments into forcibly requisitioning grain beyond what the populace could bear, and even to plunder grain from the people. The aforementioned contradiction between the 5th War Zone and the Hubei provincial government was also reflected in their conflict over military grain collection in northern Hubei. Military grain was also one of the cruxes of military–government disputes in Guangdong Province. The military not only demanded more grain but also “used grain as a weapon in political struggles,” attacking provincial chairman Li Hanhun. The military–government discord in Henan Province caused by military grain is well known. Whether the 1st War Zone forced the provincial government to deliver its full quota of military grain, and how Tang Enbo’s group army “collected” military grain on its own—if these historical events can be precisely reconstructed, the connotation of military–government relations in the war zones can be expected to be further enriched. In addition, the enormous burden that Nationalist military grain collection imposed on the people, and the harassment of the populace by the army’s deteriorating discipline, were also factors affecting military–government relations in the war zones, and have received some scholarly attention in recent years.

军粮问题是军队与地方政府爆发冲突的另一个火药桶。随着1940年粮食危机浮出水面，各地国民党驻军压迫地方政府强征超出民间负荷的粮食、甚至搜刮百姓粮食的现象屡见不鲜。前述第5战区与湖北省政府之间的矛盾，还体现在双方在鄂北围绕军粮征集的冲突。军粮也是广东省军政纠纷的症结之一，军方不仅苛求更多的粮食，还“以粮食为政争的利器”，攻击省主席李汉魂。河南省因军粮导致的军政不和已为人们所熟知，第1战区是否逼迫省政府缴足军粮、汤恩伯集团军如何自行“征集”军粮，这些史事如能得以精密复原，战地军政关系的内涵可望更加丰富。此外，国民党军粮征集带给民众的巨大负担、军队风纪败坏对于百姓的滋扰，也是影响战地军政关系的因素，近年来已得到部分学者的关注。

In February 1942, in his speech at the opening ceremony of the Central Party School, Mao Zedong specifically criticized the lack of unity between military cadres and local cadres, indicating that by this time some discord had already emerged between the military and the government within the Communist-led base areas. Mao said: “In places where military cadres in fact occupy a leading position, under ordinary circumstances, if relations with local cadres are not good, then the main responsibility should be placed on the military cadres.” This passage reveals that within the base areas, the army and military personnel were likely relatively dominant, and most military–government discord stemmed from the military’s insufficient respect for and cooperation with the local governments under their jurisdiction.

1942年2月，毛泽东在中央党校开学典礼的讲演中专门批评了军队干部和地方干部的不团结，这说明此时中共抗日根据地内部的军政之间已经出现一些不谐之音。毛泽东说：“在军队干部事实上居于领导地位的地方，在一般的情形之下，如果和地方干部的关系弄不好，那末，主要的责任应该放在军队干部的身上。”这段文字透露，根据地内军队和军人可能相对强势，多数军政不和缘于军方对属地政府尊重不够、配合不足。

Some materials indicate that individual units of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army were not sufficiently friendly toward local governments, cadres, and even the populace, and engaged in acts that violated local policies or made things difficult for local cadres. He Long pointed out that within the troops in the Shaanxi–Gansu–Ningxia Border Region, “there were individuals who only said they supported the Party Central Committee but did not say they supported the Border Region government,” and there was “an overbearing attitude among certain military cadres toward local staff.” He criticized these erroneous words and deeds as the result of the idea that “military power is above everything else.” Xu Xiangqian, citing examples of cadres in the troops who undermined financial policies and berated government staff, lamented that “the political power we ourselves won through bloody struggle, we are now destroying it with our own hands.”

有材料表明，八路军、新四军的个别部队对于属地政府、干部乃至民众的态度不够友善，出现过违反地方政策、为难地方干部的行为。贺龙指出，在陕甘宁边区的部队中，“有个别的只说拥护党中央，不说拥护边区政府”，“军队某些干部对地方工作人员的蛮横态度”，他批评这些错误言行是“军权高于一切”思想作祟。徐向前以部队里有干部破坏金融政策、责骂政府工作人员为例，痛陈这是“我们自己辛辛苦苦经过流血斗争得到的政权，自己又来破坏它”。

Academia has already taken note of this. Some scholars have specifically examined the roots and manifestations of the lack of unity between the military and government in the Shaanxi–Gansu–Ningxia Border Region during the Anti-Japanese War. The economic difficulties in the base areas, especially the natural disasters of 1941 and 1942, were factors that triggered tensions between the military and the government and between the army and the people. The burden on the populace was already heavy, and the army’s supplies were inadequate; disagreements arose over water use, land occupation, and hiring laborers, which in turn sparked disputes between the army and the government. These phenomena likely existed earlier, and similar situations probably occurred to varying degrees in base areas other than the Shaanxi–Gansu–Ningxia Border Region. The state of military–government relations in different base areas at different times may be corroborated by more new case studies.

学界对此已有关注，有学者专门考察了抗战时期陕甘宁边区军政之间不够团结的根源和表现。根据地的经济困难，特别是1941年、1942年的天灾，是诱发军政、军民关系紧张的原因；民众负担本身沉重，军队的供应不佳，双方在用水、占地、雇夫等方面发生不快，继而引发军队和政府之间的争执。这些现象恐怕早已有之，而且除陕甘宁边区之外的根据地或多或少也存在类似情况。不同时期各个根据地军政关系的情况，或许更多新的个案研究能够予以佐证。

IV. Efforts by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party to Coordinate Military–Government Relations

四、国共双方各自协调军政关系的努力

Faced with the problems that emerged between the military and government in the war zones, both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party attached great importance to them. To mediate contradictions and mend military–government relations, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party adopted different measures, yielding different results.

面对战地军政之间出现的问题，国共双方都非常重视。为了调解矛盾、弥合军政关系。国民党和中共采取了不同的措施，呈现了不同的结果。

As noted earlier, “valuing the military over the Party” was Chiang Kai-shek’s governing philosophy. As Chiang gradually ascended to the pinnacle of power, the rules of the power game shifted from “governing the country through the Party” to “military power dominating everything,” establishing a “personal dictatorship on the basis of military power.” The military naturally enjoyed a greater voice in his regime. Consequently, when disputes arose between the army and local governments, although the Kuomintang high command, including Chiang Kai-shek, tried to balance the two sides, the final resolution usually favored the military. Local governments were forced to make concessions to temporarily ease the contradiction, but military–government relations were not improved.

如前所述，“重军轻党”是蒋介石的统治理念。随着蒋介石逐渐登上权力巅峰，权力游戏规则由“以党治国”变成了“军权支配一切”，在“军权上建立个人独裁体制”，军方在其政权中自然享有较大话语权。因此，当军队与当地政府发生纠纷时，尽管包括蒋介石在内的国民党高层尽力平衡，但最终处置多是偏袒军方，以地方政府被迫让步暂时缓和矛盾，但军政关系并未得到改善。

Existing research has found that whether in the “Eastern Hubei Incident” or the “Northern Hubei Problem,” the Hubei provincial government, under Chiang Kai-shek’s mediation, “displayed the spirit of collegial cooperation to enhance mutual feelings” and acceded to various military demands. Similar situations occurred in Zhejiang, Shandong, Shaanxi, and other places. In 1941, when Shaoxing fell, the commander of the 3rd War Zone, Gu Zhutong, attributed more of the responsibility to the government side, specifically Xing Zhennan’s dereliction of duty. Zhejiang provincial chairman Huang Shaohong threatened to resign but still could not save Xing Zhennan’s life. The commander-in-chief of the Lu–Su War Zone, Yu Xuezhong, and Shandong provincial chairman Shen Honglie developed friction over defense zones, funding, and local militia. After the conflict escalated, Chiang Kai-shek had to transfer Shen Honglie away and let Mou Zhongheng, whom Yu Xuezhong favored, succeed him as provincial chairman. In Shaanxi Province, Hu Zongnan constantly interfered in local personnel matters, sending trainees from his War Cadre Training Corps to various counties, and, despite the opposition of provincial chairman Xiong Bin, directed the War Cadre Training Corps to absorb the provincial training corps run by Xiong Bin. How the mediation of military–government friction in other areas was handled, and whether the outcomes were similar to those in the provinces mentioned above, are questions that can be selected for discussion.

既有研究发现，无论“鄂东事件”还是“鄂北问题”，湖北省政府都是在蒋介石的劝解下“发挥同寅协恭之精神增进彼此情感”，答应了军方的各种要求。类似情况也发生在浙江、山东、陕西等地。1941年绍兴沦陷，第3战区司令长官顾祝同将责任更多归结为政府方面的邢震南玩忽职守，而浙江省主席黄绍竑以辞职相威胁，亦未能保住邢震南的性命。鲁苏战区总司令于学忠与山东省主席沈鸿烈因防区、经费、地方团队等问题出现芥蒂，矛盾激化后蒋介石不得不将沈鸿烈调离，让于学忠属意的牟中珩接任省主席。胡宗南在陕西省不断插手地方人事，向各县派出自己培养的战干团学员，并不顾省主席熊斌的反对，指使战干团吞并熊斌主办的省训练团。另外一些地区军政磨擦的调处情况如何，其结局与上述几省是否相似，是可以选择讨论的问题。

The organizational advantages of the Communist Party played a huge role in coordinating military–government relations. Unlike the Kuomintang regime’s characteristic of “military dominance over civilian affairs,” the authority of the Communist Party transcended the traditional distinction between civil and military. Starting in September 1942, the Communist Party implemented unified leadership [9]9 Unified leadership (一元化领导): A system implemented by the CPC from 1942 onward, whereby Party committees at each level of a base area assumed unified authority over all military, government, and mass organizations, replacing the previous system of separate military–political committees. throughout the Party and in all base areas. Compared with the Kuomintang, this more effectively resolved the problem of insufficient unity between the military and government in the base areas. At the same time, the Communist Party further strengthened the connection between the military and government through various movements such as rectification [10]10 Rectification (整风): The Yan’an Rectification Movement (1942–1944), a Party-wide campaign to study Marxist texts, criticize subjectivist and sectarian tendencies, and establish Mao Zedong Thought as the guiding ideology. and streamlining administration and troops [11]11 Streamlining administration and troops (精兵简政): A policy adopted in 1941–1942 to reduce the size of government and military organs in the base areas, aimed at alleviating the economic burden on the populace and improving efficiency.. In terms of coordinating military–government relations in the war zones, the Communist Party was far more successful than the Kuomintang.

中共的组织优势在协调军政关系中发挥了巨大作用。与国民党政权“武主文从”的特征不同，中共党的权威超越了传统的文武之别。自1942年9月起，中共在全党和各个根据地推行一元化领导，相较于国民党，更加妥善地化解了根据地军政之间不够团结的问题。同时，中共还通过开展整风、精兵简政等各种运动，进一步加强了军政之间的联系。就协调战地军政关系而言，中共较国民党要成功得多。

The process of the Communist Party’s implementation of unified leadership has been described in many works. The general course was as follows: In September and December 1942, the Central Committee of the Communist Party successively issued the “Decision on Unifying the Leadership of the Party in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas and Adjusting Relations among Various Organizations” and the “Directive on Strengthening Unified Leadership and Streamlining Administration and Troops,” establishing the Party’s authority in each base area. The Jin–Cha–Ji, Shandong, and other base areas successively completed the adjustment to unified leadership. In October 1943, the Central Committee even elevated “unified leadership” to one of the “Ten Major Policies” [12]12 Ten Major Policies (十大政策): A set of policies announced by the CPC Central Committee in October 1943, including unified leadership, rectification, streamlining, production campaigns, and others, intended to consolidate the base areas during the war. of the Communist Party during the Anti-Japanese War. Classic texts indicate that the implementation of unified leadership was aimed at such undesirable phenomena as “the military’s insufficient spirit of respect for local Party and local government organs.” In each base area, the Party committee replaced the previous military–political committee, and the Party secretary became the pivot for harmonizing relations between the two sides.

关于中共推行一元化领导的过程，不少论著已经述及。其经过大致为：1942年9月和12月，中共中央先后作出《关于统一抗日根据地党的领导及调整各组织间关系的决定》《关于加强统一领导与精兵简政工作的指示》，确立党在各个根据地的权威；晋察冀、山东以及其他根据地陆续完成了一元化的调整；1943年10月，中央更是将“统一领导”提高到抗战时期中共的“十大政策”之一。经典文本表明，实行一元化领导，针对的就是“军队尊重地方党、地方政权的精神不够”等不良现象。在各个根据地，党委取代过去的军政委员会，党的书记成为调和双方关系的枢纽。

However, there remains considerable research space between unified leadership and the harmonization of military–government relations. First, the specific process of adjusting unified leadership in each base area still needs careful sorting out. Unfortunately, apart from Shandong, no case studies of the implementation of unified leadership in other base areas have been seen. Most base areas’ “Party histories” and “base area histories” mention the process of unification but lack in-depth exploration. How the military–political committees in each base area were replaced by Party committees deserves particular attention. Second, besides unified leadership, the Communist Party’s methods for consolidating military–government unity also included the movement against warlordist tendencies and the “Double Support” movement (supporting the government and cherishing the people; supporting the army and giving preferential treatment to families of servicemen) [13]13 “Double Support” movement (双拥运动): A campaign launched in 1943 in the Shaanxi–Gansu–Ningxia Border Region, calling on the army to “support the government and cherish the people” and on the people to “support the army and give preferential treatment to families of servicemen,” aimed at improving military–civilian and military–government relations.. After the “Decision on Unifying the Leadership of the Party in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas and Adjusting Relations among Various Organizations” was issued, at the Northwest Bureau High-Level Cadres Conference held in the Shaanxi–Gansu–Ningxia Border Region, He Long, Chen Yun, Xu Xiangqian, Lin Boqu, Ren Bishi, Tan Zheng, and others each elaborated on how to adjust military–government relations. A considerable number of them, from the perspective of opposing warlordist tendencies, demanded that the army rectify its own work style and put an end to behavior that showed disrespect for local governments. How the movement against warlordist tendencies was actually carried out can still be further discussed. The “Double Support” movement is generally considered a product of the resolutions of the Northwest Bureau High-Level Cadres Conference. As an important measure to deepen military–government feelings after the establishment of unified leadership, it has already received some scholarly attention. Its specific implementation process could become a new focus of inquiry. How great a role the “Double Support” movement actually played in strengthening military–government ties is also a question that needs to be considered.

不过，一元化领导与调和军政关系之间，仍有不小的研究空间。首先，各个根据地一元化领导的具体调整过程，还需要仔细梳理。遗憾的是，除了山东，尚未见到其他根据地实行一元化领导的个案研究。多数根据地的“党史”和“根据地史”均提及其一元化的进程，但缺乏深入的探讨。各个根据地的军政委员会是如何被党委所替代的，尤其值得关注。其次，除了一元化领导，中共巩固军政团结的方法还包括反对军阀主义倾向运动和“双拥”运动（拥政爱民、拥军优属）。《关于统一抗日根据地党的领导及调整各组织间关系的决定》发布后，在陕甘宁边区召开的西北局高干会上，贺龙、陈云、徐向前、林伯渠、任弼时、谭政等纷纷就如何调整军政关系进行了阐述。相当一部分人从反对军阀主义倾向的角度出发，要求军队整顿自身作风，杜绝不尊重地方政府的行为。反对军阀主义倾向运动究竟如何开展，还可以继续讨论。“双拥”运动一般被认为是西北局高干会决议的产物，作为一元化领导建立后加深军政感情的重要措施，已得到一些学者的注意，其具体实施过程似可成为新的关注点。“双拥”运动在加强军政联系中究竟起到多大作用，也是需要思考的问题。

The four issues concerning the military–political relationship in the war zone during the War of Resistance discussed in this article all leave room for further debate to varying degrees. For example, when and in which regions did the power structure undergo significant changes? This awaits year-by-year, region-specific quantitative research. What specific unique methods did military commanders adopt to solve the various difficulties in the war zone—such as Chen Cheng’s implementation of rationing by mouth in Hubei and Luo Ronghuan’s promotion of sea-salt trade in Shandong—deserve in-depth investigation. After military–political conflicts became widespread in the war zone, some local armies and governments, facing the same pressures of finances, personnel, and grain, still coordinated with each other and shared the hardships of the times; the institutional, structural, and personnel reasons behind this remain to be explored. The different strategies adopted by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party to coordinate military–political relations produced vastly different outcomes; the impact of this on the subsequent development of the two parties and their armies requires further analysis in conjunction with relevant theories from political science and sociology.

本文所谈及抗战时期战地军政关系的4个问题，都不同程度地存在继续讨论的空间。例如，什么时候、哪些区域的权力格局发生了显著变化，有待于逐年、分区域的量化研究；军事将领具体采用哪些独到办法解决战地的种种困难，比如陈诚在湖北推行的计口授粮、罗荣桓在山东力促的海盐贸易，值得深入考察；军政矛盾在战地普遍出现后，面临同样的财力、人员、粮食压力，部分地区的军队和当地政府仍相互协调、共体时艰，其背后的体制、机制和人事原因，尚需探究；国共双方采取不同策略协调军政关系，结果大相径庭，这对于两党及其军队之后的发展所产生的影响，须结合政治学、社会学的相关理论进一步分析。

(Author: Chen Mo, Associate Professor, School of History and Culture, Sichuan University)

（作者：陈默，四川大学历史文化学院副教授）

Online Editor: Jing Mu

网络编辑：静穆