The Enemy’s Own Records – The Anti-Japanese Resistance Behind Enemy Lines Led by the CPC as Seen in Japanese Civilian Materials

In recent years, as research on the War of Resistance against Japan has deepened, war materials held in Japanese civilian collections and displayed in databases such as domestic wartime literature data platforms—including unit histories such as regimental and battalion histories, memoirs of Japanese veterans, and wartime interviews—have attracted increasing academic attention. The diverse forms of these historical records reflect the features of the era, presenting richer historical details for the study of the War of Resistance and offering new perspectives for examining important historical issues, including the anti-Japanese resistance behind enemy lines led by the Communist Party of China (CPC).

近年来，随着抗日战争研究的日益深入，日本民间所藏与国内的抗战文献数据平台等数据库所展示的战争资料，包括联队史、大队史等部队史著作，日本老兵的回忆、战争访谈等，受到学术界越来越多的关注。这些形式多样的历史记录反映的时代面相，为抗战史研究展现了更丰富的历史细节，也为研究包括中国共产党领导的敌后抗战等重要历史问题提供了新的角度。

The fundamental driving force behind the protracted war lay in the nation’s persistent resistance, while the Japanese military underestimated the Chinese people’s will to resist. Matsumura Tomokatsu, former deputy chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, recalled that the basic premise of the Japanese military’s full-scale invasion of China was its contempt for the Chinese people’s will to resist; Japanese officers generally believed that “the Han Chinese nation has no concept of the state and is a heap of loose sand” and “did not believe that China possessed national consciousness.” Inamoto Isao, a staff officer of the Imperial General Headquarters Operations Bureau, recalled that at the time almost the entire Japanese Army thought that “China is a divided weak nation that cannot be unified under any circumstances” and that military force would “one hundred percent” bring it to submission; they “never dreamed that they would sink into the quagmire of a full-scale war with China.” Research on Chinese national character conducted by the War Ministry and the Kwantung Army regarded traits such as “following the crowd,” “serving the powerful,” and “lacking a sense of state and responsibility” as inherent to the Chinese people, and held that China was unsuited to protracted war. Even after the full-scale outbreak of the War of Resistance, when the Imperial General Headquarters Operations Bureau analyzed China’s capacity for protracted war, it still believed that because China lacked a modern organizational system, the people could not sustain their will to resist, and that the Nationalist government’s strategy of trading space for time and waging a war of attrition would degenerate into a one-sided policy of retreat.

持久抗战的根本动力在于民族的坚持抗争，而日军低估了中国人民的抵抗意志。曾任关东军参谋副长的松村知胜回忆，日军发动全面侵华战争的基本立足点，是轻视中国人的抵抗意志，日本军官群体普遍认为“汉民族没有国家思想，是一盘散沙的民族”，“不相信中国有民族意识”。参谋本部作战参谋井本熊男回忆，当时日本陆军几乎都认为“中国是分裂的弱国，无论如何都无法统一”，以武力打击“百分百”能使之屈服，“做梦都没想到会陷入对华全面战争的泥沼”。而陆军省与关东军对中国民族性的研究，将普遍“随大流”“事大”“缺乏国家观念和责任义务意识”等视为中国人的民族性，且认为中国不擅持久战。即便在全面抗战爆发后，日军参谋本部分析中国的持久战能力，仍认为由于中国缺乏近代化的组织体系，民众无法坚持抗日意志，国民政府以空间换时间的持久战、消耗战战略，将演变为一心后退的逃跑方针。

In breaking the Japanese military’s strategic expectations, the anti-Japanese resistance behind enemy lines led by the CPC played a major role and changed the overall direction of the war. A secret wartime Japanese military document, *Operations of the Chinese Army*, summarized: “Mao Zedong of the Chinese Communist Party divided the War of Resistance against Japan into three stages,” including the first stage of drawing the Japanese forces deep into the interior and forcing them into a war of attrition; the second stage of confronting the puppet regime installed by Japan while consolidating the national defense posture; and the third stage of seizing the opportunity presented by future international changes to launch a full-scale counteroffensive. “The development of the China Incident has proceeded exactly as the Chinese Communist Party predicted, moving entirely in the direction the enemy intended”; China integrated various domestic forces during the war and sought opportunities to turn to the counteroffensive; the Japanese military, meanwhile, found itself bogged down in the China theater, and the territories it had occupied through frontal offensives, under the resistance of the people, “became the base areas of the Communist Party.”

在打破日军战略预期方面，中国共产党领导的敌后抗战发挥重大作用，改变了战争全局走向。战时日军内部秘密资料《中国军队的作战》总结道：“中国共产党的毛泽东将抗日战争分为三个阶段”，包括第一阶段将日军引入内地，使之陷入消耗战；第二阶段将与日本扶植的伪政权相对峙，整顿国防态势；第三阶段则结合未来的国际变局，寻求转入全面反攻。“中国事变的发展，完全如中国共产党所言，完全向敌方企图的方向发展”；中国在抗战中整合了国内各种力量，寻求着转入反攻的机会；而日军则在侵华战场陷入僵局，其正面进攻所占领的土地，在民众的反抗下“成为共产党的地盘”。

The fundamental reason why the war situation developed in the direction predicted by the CPC rather than by the Japanese military was that the CPC actively exerted its subjective initiative to mobilize the masses. Mao Zedong pointed out, “The soldiers and the people are the foundation of victory” and “Mobilizing the common people throughout the country creates an immense sea in which to drown the enemy, creates the conditions that make up for our deficiencies in arms and other things, and creates the prerequisites for overcoming all difficulties in the war.” In the course of war, the Japanese military gradually came to realize that “the source of the Communist Party’s strength” lay in its “connection with the people.” The Japanese North China Area Army believed that the integrated wartime organization of Party, government, military, and people created by the CPC was the essential foundation for the existence of the enemy’s rear battlefield; “at least 500,000 completely unarmed popular organizations provide direct and indirect support to the Communist Army’s military operations, disrupting our pacification work. One cannot ignore this fact when evaluating the Communist Army’s combat effectiveness.” Inamoto Isao, the staff officer, lamented, “The Chinese people risked their lives to assist the Chinese Communist forces in battle; even women and children stepped forward amid the flames of war to transport ammunition and supply food. It is extremely difficult for our forces to prevent the penetration of Communist influence.”

战争形势之所以向中国共产党而非日军预言的方向发展，根本原因在于中国共产党积极发挥主观能动性动员人民群众。毛泽东指出，“兵民是胜利之本”，“动员了全国的老百姓，就造成了陷敌于灭顶之灾的汪洋大海，造成了弥补武器等缺陷的补救条件，造成了克服一切战争困难的前提”。在战争实践中，日军也逐渐意识到“共产党的力量的源泉”，在于“与民众的联系”。日军华北方面军认为，中国共产党缔造的党、政、军、民有机结合的抗战组织，是敌后战场存在的重要基础，“至少有五十万完全没有武器的民众团体对共产军的军事行动提供直接、间接支持，搅乱我方治安工作，要评价共产军的战力，不能忽视这一事实”；日军作战参谋井本熊男感慨，“中国民众拼死协助中共军队战斗，连女性与儿童都在战火中挺身而出，从事弹药运送和粮食补给工作，我军要防止中共势力渗透是很难的”。

To effectively control the occupied areas, after the Battle of Wuhan the Japanese military focused on preventing “a sharp deterioration of public order within the occupied areas, especially the full-scale infiltration by the Chinese Communist Party and its army.” The Imperial General Headquarters prioritized “deploying sufficient forces” to the enemy’s rear battlefield; on the frontal battlefield, “in accordance with the enemy-our situation, the forces deployed were limited to the minimum necessary,” stationing only the 11th Army and the 21st Army around Wuhan and Guangzhou respectively, with deployed forces amounting to only half of those on the enemy’s rear battlefield. The commander of the 11th Army, Okamura Yasuji, submitted a memorial opposing this policy, arguing that “the center of the enemy’s anti-Japanese forces does not lie in China’s 400 million people, nor in the will of government leaders, nor in the two million troops mixed with numerous miscellaneous units, but solely in the Central Army centered on young officers of the Whampoa Military Academy clique with Chiang Kai-shek at its core.”

为切实控制占领区，日军在武汉会战后着重防范“占领区内部的治安剧烈恶化，特别是中共党军将全力进行渗透”的情况。参谋本部向敌后战场优先“配置充足的兵力”；而在正面战场“根据敌我形势，将配置的兵力限制在所必需的最小限度”，仅分别在武汉和广州周边部署第11军与第21军，部署兵力仅为敌后战场的半数。第11军司令官冈村宁次上书反对这一方针，主张“敌军抗日势力之中枢，不在于中国四亿民众，不在于政府要人之意志，也不在于混杂有大量杂牌军的二百万部队，而仅在于以蒋介石为核心的黄埔军校系青年军官为主体的中央军”。

Tokuzu Junichi, a veteran of the 11th Army, presented a completely different view in his memoirs. He believed that although this unit was mainly engaged in frontal operations, compared with the Nationalist army, which “surrounded the Japanese forces on all sides but never attempted to recapture occupied areas,” it was “the Communist Party’s New Fourth Army” that truly caused the Japanese forces to “exhaust their combat strength in endless rushing about” and thus fall into a “war of attrition.” “They continuously employed ingenious guerrilla tactics, actively infiltrated Japanese-occupied areas, and provoked battles. Such a strategy was indeed outstanding.” Tokuzu Junichi lamented that the flexibility of the Communist forces relative to the Japanese military stemmed from popular support: “If the people are water, the Communist Party and its army are fish swimming in an endless sea of water. This kind of fish-water relationship is precisely the foundation of the people’s front.” One Japanese regimental history stated that the reason why they could not gain the upper hand in battles with the Eighth Route Army was that the Chinese people would immediately report Japanese troop movements to the Eighth Route Army, while reports of Eighth Route Army intelligence to the Japanese forces were almost “completely absent.”

第11军老兵德津准一在回忆录中提出完全不同的说法。他认为该部虽主要进行正面作战，但相较于“四面包围日军却完全不尝试夺回被占地区”的国民党军队，真正让日军“在疲于奔命中削减战力”，从而陷入“消耗战”的是“共产党的新四军”，“他们不断利用巧妙的游击战战法，主动渗透日军占领区并挑起战斗，这样的战略说来确实卓越”；德津准一感慨，共产党军队相对于日军的灵活性源自民众的支持：“如果说人民是水，共产党及其军队就是鱼，在无穷无尽的水中游动的鱼。像这样的鱼水关系，正是人民战线的根本”。有日军联队史称，之所以在与八路军的作战中不能占得先手，因为中国民众会把日军动向随时报告给八路军，而向日军报告八路军情报的几乎“完全没有”。

In practice, the Japanese military gradually recognized that the contest for popular support was the decisive factor in the outcome of the war. Prince Mikasa, younger brother of Emperor Hirohito, led research on the question of why Japan’s invasion of China had fallen into passivity and delivered a lecture titled “Self-Reflection on the China Incident as a Japanese,” identifying the development of the Chinese Communist Party as a major reason for Japan’s defeat: “After Japan swept away the Chinese political and administrative organs in North China, creating

日军在实践中逐渐认识到，民心的争夺是决定战争胜负的关键。裕仁天皇之弟三笠宫亲王牵头调研日本侵华为何陷入被动的课题，发表《作为日本人对中国事变的内省》讲演，将中国共产党的发展视为日军失败的重要原因：“日本一扫华北中国政治行政机构，形成真空状态后”，却迎来“中共的猖獗”，归根结底在于“日本式政治”不得人心；“中共对男女关系极端严格，绝无强奸等事；对民众的军纪极其严正，日军完全无法相比”；中国共产党干部与士兵都拿着低收入，军民关系平等，饮食也极为简陋，“在接待时绝无烟酒”；而在民众被日军掠夺，只能“靠野果与草维持生存时”，日军上层却普遍纵情酒色，上下差距云泥之别；三笠宫感慨，“如果这种情况下中共还不猖獗，真可谓世界七大奇迹之首了”。

The historical details in Japanese-language materials are sufficient to provide a glimpse into the inevitable reasons for the Japanese army’s defeat. An internal Japanese army report stated that when representatives from various counties in eastern Hebei were asked, “Do the people of eastern Hebei actually prefer the Eighth Route Army or the Japanese army?” most dared not answer. “One person, speaking on behalf of all, said: ‘When the Eighth Route Army comes to a village to camp, they sleep in the courtyards and corridors at night, and in the morning they clean up before departing. Now look at the Japanese and the Chinese they bring with them; even if there are Eighth Route Army workers in the village, they have no time to care about that, busy as they are ransacking the homes of the wealthy for valuables and abducting women.’” “The Chinese people will stubbornly resist and stubbornly seek revenge against oppressors who rely solely on force and disregard justice… This has been repeatedly confirmed by experience since the Manchurian Incident [1]1 The Manchurian Incident (1931), also known as the Mukden Incident, was a staged event used by the Japanese Kwantung Army as a pretext to invade and occupy Northeast China..” After the Japanese army surrendered, an officer of the North China Area Army concluded that the key reason for their complete defeat in the struggle against the Chinese Communist Party was that the Party had won the people’s hearts; its strength lay precisely in this, and the people of North China had almost “unanimously” chosen to firmly support the Communist Party.

日文资料中的历史细节，足以管窥日军失败的必然原因。日军内部报告提出，向冀东各县代表询问“冀东民众实际上喜欢八路军还是日军”时，多数人不敢回答，“有一人代表大家说：‘八路军来村里宿营，晚上就睡在院子和走廊上，早上还要打扫干净才出发。再看看日本人和他们带的中国人，就算村里有八路军的工作员，他们也无暇以顾，忙着在富豪的家里搜取财物，掠夺女人’”。“中国民众对只凭力量不顾道义的压迫者……会进行执拗的反抗、执拗的复仇，这是满洲事变以来的经验屡屡所证实的”。日军投降后，华北方面军有军官总结，之所以在与中国共产党的斗争中彻底失败，关键在于共产党争取到了民心，其强大之处正在于此，华北民众几乎“清一色”地选择了坚定支持共产党。

The historical details contained in Japanese civilian materials vividly depict the magnificent journey of the Chinese Communist Party leading the resistance behind enemy lines to forge a flesh-and-blood Great Wall [2]2 “Flesh-and-blood Great Wall” (血肉长城) is a common Chinese metaphor for the united resistance of the Chinese people against foreign invasion, emphasizing sacrifice and solidarity..

日文民间资料中蕴藏的历史细节，生动展现了中国共产党领导敌后抗战铸就血肉长城的壮丽征程。

(The author is an associate professor at the College of History, Nankai University)

（作者系南开大学历史学院副教授）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心