“Entering the Cities” and “Going to the Countryside”: The CCP’s Practice of Currency Unification around the Founding of New China

In the history of the Chinese Communist Party’s financial and economic work, the practice of currency unification completed around the founding of New China constitutes a significant chapter, holding great importance for “the development of the national economy,” “the convenience of military areas in transit,” and “the opening of a path for unified finance.” Regarding the CCP’s practice of currency unification, which spanned the two historical periods before and after the founding of New China, current scholarship tends toward static and regional research results, with insufficient study of its dynamic development process. Based on this, this article intends to take the launch of the national unified currency — the renminbi — as its starting point, and carefully examine the process of the renminbi’s promotion, in order to restore the entire process by which currency, under the leadership of the CCP, moved from plurality toward unity, until it fully occupied the market.

在中国共产党财经工作史上，新中国成立前后完成的货币统一实践是浓墨重彩的一笔，对于“国民经济的发展”“军队转移地区的便利”“财政统一道路的开拓”等均具有重要意义。对于中共这一跨越新中国成立前后两个历史时期的货币统一实践，目前学界偏向静态和区域性的研究成果较多，对其动态的发展过程研究不足。基于此，本文拟以全国性统一货币——人民币的推出为起点，细致考察人民币的推广进程，以期还原货币在中共的领导下从多元迈向统一，直至完全占领市场的全过程。

I. “Birth”: The Launch of a National Unified Currency

一、“诞生”：全国性统一货币的推出

During the period of the All-Out War of Resistance against Japan, under the leadership of the CCP, the currencies of the various base areas assumed a pluralistic form. There were two main reasons for this. First, Japan carried out “economic aggression to sustain the war by means of war” [n1] against China, not only vigorously dumping puppet currency in the occupied areas but also continuously intensifying the penetration of puppet currency into the base areas. This severely suffocated the economic development of the base areas. In order to “struggle in a planned way against the enemy’s policy of issuing puppet currency and undermining the fabi,” [n2] the CCP vigorously carried out “puppet-currency prohibition” currency struggles, making the decision to “permit the establishment of local banks and the issuance of local banknotes in areas cut off from each other.” [n3] The various base areas actively responded to the call, successively establishing their own banks and issuing their own currencies. Second, the Nationalist government vigorously promoted a “controlled economy,” stipulating the fabi as the only legal circulating currency nationwide while also “restricting and prohibiting the issuance and circulation of base area currencies.” [n4] Initially, to serve the overall situation of the War of Resistance, the currencies issued by the various base areas basically existed as subsidiary currency to the fabi. After the outbreak of the Southern Anhui Incident [n5] and especially after the Nationalist government stopped paying the salaries of the Eighth Route Army, the CCP decided to cease using the fabi, in order to “promote the economic self-sufficiency of the border regions” and “establish a正规的 [regular] border region financial system.” [n6] In the course of carrying out currency struggles such as “puppet-currency prohibition” and “fabi expulsion,” the CCP, guided by the monetary policy of “decentralized issuance, circulation by zones,” led the various base areas in establishing independent currency markets, forming a situation where multiple currencies coexisted.

全民族抗战时期，在中共的领导下，各根据地的货币呈现出多元的形态。其主要原因有两个。一是日本对华实施“以战养战的经济侵略”，不仅在沦陷区大力倾销伪钞，还不断加大伪钞向根据地渗透的力度。这严重窒息了根据地的经济发展。为“有计划的与敌人发行伪币及破坏法币的政策作斗争”，中共大力开展“禁伪”的货币斗争，作出“允许被隔断区域设立地方银行，发行地方纸币”的决定。各根据地积极响应号召，先后自设银行并自发货币。二是国民党政府极力推行“统制经济”，在规定法币为全国唯一合法的流通货币的同时还“限制、禁止根据地货币的发行和流通”。起初，为服务抗战大局，各根据地所发行的货币基本上作为法币之辅币而存在。皖南事变爆发特别是国民党政府停发八路军军饷后，中共决定停用法币，以“促进边区经济自给”和“建立正规的边区金融制度”。在开展“禁伪”和“排法”等货币斗争的进程中，中共以“分散发行、分区流通”的货币政策为主导，领导各根据地建立起独立的货币市场，形成了多元货币共存的局面。

After the victory of the War of Resistance against Japan, the base areas led by the CCP gradually transitioned into liberated areas. At this time, the situation where some liberated areas were divided and blockaded improved somewhat, and the demand for economic exchange correspondingly increased. Some base areas then took the lead in carrying out currency unification work within their own regions. There were two methods: first, unifying currencies that had previously been issued by zones — for example, the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region Bank [n7] removed the words “Jizhong Branch,” “Jixi Branch,” and “Ji-Re-Liao Branch” printed on banknotes, allowing the unified circulation of Jin-Cha-Ji border region currency; second, establishing new banks and issuing unified new currencies — for example, the Central China Bureau of the CCP Central Committee merged local banks such as the Huainan Bank, the Jianghuai Bank, and the Yanfu Bank into the Central China Bank, and established a unified currency market based on the Central China Bank note as the standard. Just as the various liberated areas were beginning to further unify their currencies, Chiang Kai-shek violated the ceasefire agreement and brazenly launched an all-out offensive against the liberated areas. The currency unification work of the liberated areas was forced to be shelved, and the situation of multiple coexisting currencies remained unchanged.

抗日战争胜利后，中共领导的各根据地逐步向解放区过渡。这时，部分解放区被分割和封锁的情况有所改善，经济交往的需求随之增加，一些根据地便先行在本区范围内开展货币统一工作。其方式有二：一是将过去分区发行的货币进行统一，如晋察冀边区银行取消了加印在票面上的“冀中分行”“冀西分行”“冀热辽分行”字样，统一流通晋察冀边币；二是成立新银行并发行统一的新货币，如中共中央华中局将淮南银行、江淮银行和盐阜银行等地方银行合并，组成华中银行，并建立起以华中银行币为本位的统一货币市场。正当各解放区着手进一步统一货币时，蒋介石破坏停战协定，悍然向解放区发动全面进攻，解放区的货币统一工作被迫搁置，多元货币并存的局面未能改变。

As the War of Liberation advanced, the work of unifying the currencies of the various liberated areas was soon placed on the agenda again. During this period, the CCP frequently conducted large-scale, cross-regional mobile warfare with large army groups. However, because the currency systems of the various regions were not uniform, the dispatch and supply of military materials were considerably affected, making it difficult to guarantee military needs. At the same time, as the various liberated areas gradually became connected into one contiguous territory, the exchange of goods and trade between them became increasingly frequent. The variety of currencies was also complex, making it difficult to meet civilian needs. How to achieve currency unification on a larger scale became a problem the CCP urgently needed to explore and solve.

随着解放战争向前推进，统一各解放区货币的工作很快再次被提上议程。这一时期，中共时常开展大规模、跨地区的大兵团运动战。但由于各区币制不一，军事物资的调度和供应颇受影响，军需难以保障。与此同时，随着各解放区逐步连成一片，彼此间的物资交流和贸易往来愈加频繁。货币种类繁杂，亦难以满足民需。如何在更大范围内实现货币的统一，就成为中共亟须探索解决的问题。

On December 30, 1946, the Jin-Cha-Ji Central Bureau of the CCP suggested to the CCP Central Committee “convening a North China Economic Conference” to change the situation where “currency is not unified, and problems are numerous.” The CCP Central Committee pointed out that “convening such a conference is very necessary,” emphasizing that the conference agenda “should be to exchange experiences in financial and economic work among the regions, discuss the exchange of goods, currency, taxation, and mutual assistance in resources among the regions, and carry out unified financial and economic struggles against the Kuomintang, and other such items, and may have each region send people to establish a permanent North China financial and economic intelligence and guidance organ.” [n8] From March 10 to May 11, 1947, the North China Economic Conference, through both preparatory and formal sessions, discussed the above issues in detail. However, at this time, there were slight differences in understanding between the central and local levels regarding whether and when to unify the currency. The participants responsible for financial and economic work from the various liberated areas “unanimously suggested establishing a unified bank and issuing a unified currency in 1947,” but the central authorities believed that “the conditions were not yet mature.” [n9] Dong Biwu, then a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Work Committee of the CCP and Director of the North China Financial and Economic Office, pointed out: “Unified issuance of banknotes is an important link in financial unification, and is closely related to the revenues, expenditures, banks, trade, and markets of each region. To extract the issue of banknote issuance alone cannot solve the problem.” [n10] Based on this, the conference ultimately decided not to issue unified banknotes at the end of the year, but instead to take “mutual support and convenient exchange” as the goal for the currency work of each region.

1946年 12月 30日，中共晋察冀中央局向中共中央“建议召开华北经济会议”，以改变“货币不统一，问题甚多”的现状。中共中央指出，“召集这种会议甚为必要”，强调会议议程“应为交换各区财经工作经验，讨论各区货物交流及货币、税收、资源互相帮助、对国民党进行统一的财经斗争等项，并可由各区派人成立永久华北财经情报和指导机关”。从 1947年3月 10日至 5月 11日，华北财经会议通过预备会议和正式会议两个环节，对上述问题进行详细探讨。但此时中央和地方对于货币是否统一和何时统一的认识略有差异。各解放区负责财经工作的参会人员“一致建议在 1947年成立统一的银行，发行统一的货币”，但中央认为“条件还不成熟”。时任中共中央工作委员会常委、华北财经办事处主任董必武指出：“统一发行票币是财政统一中一个重要的环节，与各区收入、支出、银行、贸易、市场有密切关系，单独抽出发行票币问题来，是不能得到解决的。”基于此，会议最终决定不在年底发行统一票币，而是将“互相支持，便利兑换”作为各区货币工作目标。

In accordance with the spirit of the North China Economic Conference, the North China Financial and Economic Office actively adjusted the currency relations among the various liberated areas. Among these, an important monetary policy was to designate mixed currency markets and establish currency exchange offices at the junctions of the liberated areas. In July 1947, the North China Financial and Economic Office issued the “Measures for Adjusting Current Financial and Economic Relations in the North China Liberated Areas,” which clearly stipulated: “To facilitate trade between merchants and people of the two regions, neighboring areas may designate certain markets (by mutual agreement) to use the currency of this region as the main standard for pricing and means of payment, while simultaneously permitting friendly regions to bring and use their currency.” [n11] Concurrently, the Southern Hebei Bank [n12] and others successively agreed to designate mixed currency circulation markets in the border zones between regions, formulating the principle of “four freedoms” — use, exchange, carrying, and preservation — for their respective issued currencies in the mixed zones. The formulation and implementation of the “mixed circulation” policy established currency links between the various liberated areas, making necessary preparations for the further unification of currencies that followed.

按照华北财经会议精神，华北财经办事处积极调整各解放区的货币关系。其中，一个重要的货币政策就是在解放区结合处划定货币混合市场及建立货币兑换所。1947年 7月，华北财经办事处颁发《华北解放区目前财经关系调整办法》，明确规定：“为便利两区商民交易，接邻地区得指定若干市场（互相协议）以本区货币为主，作为计价标准与支付手段，同时准许友区携带使用。”与此同步，冀南银行等先后商定在区际接壤地带划定货币混合流通市场，制定各自发行的货币在混合地带有行使、兑换、携带、保存“四大自由”的原则。“混合流通”政策的制定和实施，建立起各解放区区际间的货币联系，为后续货币的进一步统一作了必要的准备。

At the same time, the North China Financial and Economic Office also began preparations for establishing a unified bank for the liberated areas. On August 1, 1947, Dong Biwu reported to the Central Committee on the “Organizational Regulations of the North China Financial and Economic Office,” pointing out that one of its tasks was “to prepare for the establishment of a central finance and bank.” [n13] There was considerable local demand for establishing a bank. For example, on September 14, 1947, Zhang Dingcheng and Deng Zihui, secretaries of the Working Committee of the East China Central Bureau of the CCP, telegraphed the North China Financial and Economic Office, proposing to “quickly unify finances, immediately issue a unified currency,” and “immediately establish a joint bank or a liberation bank.” [n14] On October 2, Dong Biwu requested instructions from the CCP Central Committee regarding the establishment of a central bank. A few days later, the CCP Central Committee replied, agreeing to use “People’s Bank of China” as the name of the unified bank, stating that “carrying out preparatory work is necessary,” but at the same time, based on actual conditions, raising the doubt “whether establishing a unified bank now is a bit premature.” [n15] The North China Financial and Economic Office carefully considered the issues raised by the Central Committee, proceeded from the actual situation, and after careful investigation and analysis concluded that “the conditions for establishing a unified bank for the entire liberated areas and issuing a unified currency are not yet present,” and decided to establish a “Preparatory Office for the People’s Bank of China” to further carry out preparatory work such as the design of renminbi banknote plates and the raising of funds.

与此同时，华北财经办事处还着手筹建解放区统一的银行。1947年 8月 1日，董必武就《华北财经办事处组织规程》向中央报告，指出其任务之一是“筹建中央财政及银行”。对于筹建银行，地方的呼声颇高。如 1947年 9月 14日，中共华东中央局工委书记张鼎丞、邓子恢致电华北财经办事处，提议“财政赶快统一，立即发行统币”，“立即成立联合银行或解放银行”。10月 2日，董必武就组建中央银行的相关事宜向中共中央请示。几日后中共中央复电，赞同以“中国人民银行”作为统一银行的名称，认为“进行准备工作是必要的”，但同时基于现实条件提出“目前建立统一银行是否过早一点”的疑虑。华北财经办事处认真思考中央提出的问题，从实际情况出发，在仔细调研分析后得出“目前建立全解放区统一的银行和发行统一货币的条件还不具备”的认识，并决定成立“中国人民银行筹备处”，进一步开展人民币的票版设计、基金的筹集等准备工作。

At this time, the situation in the War of Liberation had undergone a major shift: the People’s Liberation Army had moved from interior-line operations to exterior-line operations, from strategic defense to strategic offense. In particular, the liberation of Shijiazhuang on November 12, 1947, marked the joining of the two large liberated areas of Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei and Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan. Under the circumstances that “the various liberated areas were increasingly stable and economic exchanges were growing closer,” it was necessary that “financial and trade relations adapt to the new situation, gradually establish unified command and joint action, and realize the transition from dispersion to unification.” On this basis, Dong Biwu concretized the work of currency unification, pointing out that it would need to go through five steps from start to finish, and reported to the Party Central Committee that “it is proposed to convene a financial and trade conference for the various areas of North China in February or March of next year to discuss in detail the establishment of a bank and the question of unified issuance.” Xue Muqiao, then deputy director of the North China Financial and Economic Office and head of its economic group, drafted in January 1948 two documents, “Opinions on Rectifying Currency” and “Supplementary Opinions on Several Points for Rectifying Currency,” which further explained the purpose, plan, and concrete steps of currency unification from the level of policy design. Driven by the war situation and the North China Financial and Economic Office, the Central Committee Work Commission of the CPC [16]16 The Central Committee Work Commission (中央工委) was a temporary body established by the CPC Central Committee in March 1947, after the evacuation of Yan’an, to handle routine work in the liberated areas while the central leadership was on the move. It was based in Xibaipo, Hebei Province, and was dissolved in May 1948 when the Central Committee reunited there. gained a deeper understanding of the timing for currency unification, stating that “if currency is not unified, the internal economy of the liberated areas cannot circulate.” It proposed first unifying the currencies of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei and Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan areas, but “this bullet of the new banknotes of the People’s Bank should be held in reserve for the time being, to be fired only when necessary.”

此时，解放战争的形势已有较大转变，解放军由内线作战转入外线作战，由战略防御转向战略进攻。特别是 1947年 11月 12日石家庄的解放，标志着晋察冀和晋冀鲁豫两大解放区连成一片。在“各解放区日趋稳定，经济往来日渐密切”的情况下，“金融贸易关系必须适应新的情况，逐步建立统一指挥，联合行动，实现从分散走向统一”。基于此，董必武将货币统一工作具体化，指出其由开始到完成需经历五个步骤，并向中共中央报告“拟在明年二三月间召集华北各区金融贸易会议，具体讨论建立银行和统一发行问题”。时任华北财经办事处副主任兼经济组组长的薛暮桥于 1948年 1月起草《对于整理货币的意见》和《关于整理货币的几点补充意见》两份文件，进一步从政策设计层面阐释了统一货币的目的、方案及具体步骤。在战争形势和华北财办的推动下，中共中央工作委员会（简称“中央工委”）对统一货币的时机有进一步认识，表示“货币不统一，解放区内部经济即不能流通”，拟先统一晋察冀和晋冀鲁豫两区的货币，但“人民银行新钞这一颗子弹暂时保留，到必要时才发出”。

In March 1948, the Central Committee Work Commission and the North China Financial and Economic Office convened the North China Financial and Trade Conference in Shijiazhuang as scheduled. One of the core topics of the conference was how to solve the problem of “gradually unifying the currencies of the various regions.” After repeated discussion, the participants reached a consensus that currency unification should not be rushed but should proceed by region in accordance with the progress of the war. The conference also adopted a resolution, “On the Question of Unifying the Currency of New China,” which clearly stated: “The general principle is first to unify the currencies of each region (Northeast, North China, Northwest, Central Plains, West China, South China), then proceed from north to south, first the Northeast and North China, next the Northwest and Central Plains, then West China and South China, and finally, with the issuance of the standard currency of the People’s Bank of China, achieve nationwide unification.” After the conference, two shifts occurred in the work of currency unification. In terms of circulation, the situation in which “the currencies of the various regions only achieved mutual support but not free circulation” was reversed: for the currencies of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region, the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Region, the Shandong Liberated Area, and the Central China Liberated Area, a “fixed exchange rate” was implemented, permitting mutual circulation. In terms of institutions, Zhou Enlai’s instruction that “we can no longer engage in a coalition government [referring to the North China Financial and Economic Joint Office]; we must establish a unified economy” was heeded: the North China Financial and Economic Office was abolished, and the Central Committee’s Ministry of Finance and Economy was established in its place.

1948年 3月，中央工委和华北财办如期在石家庄召开华北金融贸易会议，会议的核心议题之一就是解决“如何逐渐统一各地区的货币”的问题。经反复探讨，与会人员形成货币统一不宜操之过急，而应根据战争进展分区进行的共识。会议还作出《统一新中国货币问题》的决议，明确指出：“总的原则是先统一本区之货币（东北、华北、西北、中原、华西、华南），然后再由北而南，先是东北和华北，其次是西北和中原，然后是华西和华南，最后以中国人民银行之本位货币之发行实现全国之大统一。”会后，货币统一工作出现两个转向。在流通方面，扭转了“各区货币只做到了相互支持，而未做到自由流通”的局面，对晋察冀边区、晋冀鲁豫边区、山东解放区、华中解放区的货币实行“固定比价”，准许互相流通；在机构方面，听取了周恩来“不能再搞联合政府了（指华北财经联合办事处），要搞统一经济”的指示，将华北财经办事处撤销，转而成立中共中央财政经济部。

Shortly after the conclusion of the North China Financial and Trade Conference, regional currency unification work rapidly unfolded. Starting from April 15, 1948, the six major liberated areas—the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region, the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Region, the Shanxi-Suiyuan Border Region, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, Shandong, and Central China—successively determined exchange rates and achieved free circulation. During this period, on September 8, the Party Central Committee convened its first enlarged Politburo meeting after evacuating Yan’an (the “September Meeting”) at Xibaipo, once again emphasizing that currency issuance “must first be unified.” On October 2, Dong Biwu, following instructions from the Party Central Committee, presided over the first meeting of the Ministry of Finance and Economy, deciding to fix the exchange rates of the currencies of the three major liberated areas of North China, East China, and the Northwest, in order to achieve unified circulation on a larger scale. The next day, the Party Central Committee issued the instruction “On the Question of Printing New Currency,” stipulating the exchange rate and printing details for the new currency of the People’s Bank of China. With this, all preparatory work was basically completed, and the “new banknotes of the People’s Bank of China” were poised for release.

华北金融贸易会议结束后不久，区域性的货币统一工作迅速铺开。从 1948年 4月 15日开始，晋察冀边区、晋冀鲁豫边区、晋绥边区、陕甘宁边区、山东、华中六大解放区相继确定兑换比价，实现自由流通。在此期间，中共中央于 9月 8日在西柏坡召开撤离延安后的第一次政治局扩大会议（即“九月会议”），再次强调货币发行“必须先统一”。10月 2日，董必武遵照中共中央指示，主持召开财政经济部第一次会议，决定将华北、华东、西北三大解放区的货币固定比价，以在更大范围内实现统一流通。次日，中共中央又发出《关于印制新币问题》的指示，规定中国人民银行新币的兑换比价和印制细节。由此，各项准备工作基本完成，“人民银行新钞”蓄势待发。

The Party Central Committee originally planned to establish the People’s Bank of China and issue the renminbi on January 1, 1949, but with “entering the cities” imminent, this matter needed to be brought forward. After the liberation of the entire Northeast in November 1948, the Northeast Field Army moved south through the Shanhai Pass, and the liberation of Beiping and Tianjin was imminent. The liberation situation at this time was, as Mao Zedong put it, “already entering a new turning point, that is, the balance of forces between the two sides in the war has undergone a fundamental change. The People’s Liberation Army already holds an advantage not only in quality but also in quantity. This is a sign that the victory of the Chinese revolution and the realization of peace in China are imminent.” Looking at the currency situation, “there are now four kinds of banknotes circulating in North China. Although this is more convenient than when they did not circulate with each other, the variety of currencies and the inconsistency of exchange rates still cause inconvenience for the people. If we take over Beiping and Tianjin, and they border the Northeast, the types of currency flowing into the market will be even greater.” To avoid this situation, “issuing a unified currency has become a matter of utmost urgency.”

中共中央原定于 1949年 1月 1日成立中国人民银行及发行人民币，但“进城”在即，该事项有提前之必要。1948年 11月东北全境解放后，东北野战军挥师入关，平津解放在即。此时的解放形势，正如毛泽东所言：“已进入一个新的转折点，即战争双方力量对比已经发生了根本的变化。人民解放军不但在质量上早已占有优势，而且在数量上现在也已经占有优势。这是中国革命的成功和中国和平的实现已经迫近的标志。”反观货币状况，“现在华北已有四种钞票流通，虽比互不流通时较方便，但货币种类多，比价不一，人民使用仍感不便。若接管平津，与东北接壤，流入市场的货币种类将更多”。为避免这种情况发生，“发行统一货币已是刻不容缓之事”。

After consultations among all parties, it was decided that the North China People’s Government would formally announce the currency unification. On December 1, 1948, the North China People’s Government posted its Fourth Proclamation in gold characters, announcing the merger of the Bank of North China, the Beihai Bank, and the Northwest Peasants’ Bank into the “People’s Bank of China,” and that from that day forward, banknotes of the People’s Bank of China would be issued, “designated as the standard currency for the three regions of North China, East China, and the Northwest, to circulate uniformly.” With this, the nationwide unified financial institution, the “People’s Bank of China,” was formally established, and the nationwide unified currency, the “renminbi,” was formally issued.

经由各方磋商，确定由华北人民政府正式宣布货币的统一。1948年 12月 1日，华北人民政府贴出金字第四号布告，宣告将华北银行、北海银行、西北农民银行合并为“中国人民银行”，且从即日起发行中国人民银行钞票，“定为华北、华东、西北三区的本位货币，统一流通”。至此，全国统一的金融机构“中国人民银行”正式成立，全国统一的货币“人民币”正式发行。

II. “Entering the Cities”: The Promotion of the Renminbi in Urban Areas

二、“进城”：人民币在城市的推广

The introduction of a nationwide unified currency was not the endpoint of the CPC’s practice of currency unification, but the beginning. Because “the circulation of the people’s currency must proceed in step with military operations,” as the War of Liberation advanced southward, the market that the renminbi needed to occupy also extended southward in tandem. It should be noted that at this time, the CPC was about to transition from partial governance to national governance, and the focus of its work had begun to shift from the countryside to the cities. Correspondingly, the path of advance of the War of Liberation and the order of promotion of the renminbi also changed. Before crossing the Yangtze River, under the liberation path of “countryside first, then cities,” the renminbi first “took root in the countryside,” and then was able to rapidly occupy the urban market, with relatively little resistance to its promotion. But after crossing the Yangtze River, the liberation path changed to “cities first, then countryside.” At this point, the renminbi had to first “enter the cities” and occupy the urban currency market. However, at the beginning of the liberation of the new areas, the renminbi in fact faced the predicament of “being unable to enter the cities.”

全国性统一货币的推出，不是中共货币统一实践的终点，而是开端。因“一定要让人民券流通与军事行动同步”，故随着解放战争往南推进，人民币所要占领的市场亦同步向南延伸。需要注意的是，此时中共即将从局部执政走向全国执政，工作重心开始从乡村转移到城市。与之相适应，解放战争的推进路径与人民币的推广顺序也有所变化。渡江以前，在“先乡村后城市”的解放路径下，人民币率先在“乡村生了根”，随后得以迅速占领城市市场，推广阻力较小。但渡江以后，解放路径变更为“先城市后乡村”，这时人民币则应先“进城”，占领城市的货币市场。然而新区解放伊始，人民币实际上面临着“进不了城”的困境。

First, the currency system in the newly liberated cities had not yet been unified, and the currency market was extremely mixed. The reasons for this were mainly the following three. First, the local currencies issued by the various liberated areas were still circulating in the market. Although after the renminbi was issued, “the various local currencies immediately ceased issuance and were to be gradually withdrawn in a planned and step-by-step manner,” “before they were withdrawn, the local currencies and the new currency were to circulate as before at a fixed exchange rate.” Under these circumstances, by the end of May 1949, there were two major categories of local currency in the liberated areas: “the people’s notes within the passes [17]17 “Within the passes” (关内) refers to areas of China proper east of the Shanhai Pass, i.e., the traditional heartland of China, as distinct from the Northeast (Manchuria), which is “outside the passes” (关外). (including the Hebei-Shandong-Henan notes, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border notes, the Beihai notes, the Central China notes, the Northwest Peasants’ notes, and the Central Plains notes) and the Northeast notes outside the passes (including the Great Wall notes and the Rehe notes).” Second, remnants of the old currency system of the Kuomintang government remained after its collapse. In August 1948, the Kuomintang government, in order to plunder the people’s wealth and support the war, decided to issue the gold yuan certificate to replace the fabi. In just nine months, the issuance of gold yuan certificates surged to 679,458 billion yuan, an increase of 124,900 times over the amount at initial issuance. In July 1949, the Kuomintang government repeated the same trick, issuing silver yuan certificates in Guangzhou, Chongqing, and Guilin. The excessive issuance of both not only brought heavy losses to the broad masses of the people but also hindered the promotion of the renminbi. Third, some foreign currencies still flooded China’s currency market. Because the currency credit of the Kuomintang government was precarious, U.S. dollars and Hong Kong dollars once became the main means of pricing in the circulation sphere. Among them, U.S. dollars mainly circulated in cities such as Beiping, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Wuhan; the issuance of Hong Kong dollars by August 1949 had exceeded 1.3 billion, with domestic circulation accounting for about 700 million, of which “East China and North China accounted for 12%, and South China accounted for 88%.”

首先，新解放的城市币制尚未统一，货币市场十分混杂。其原因，主要有以下三个方面。一是各解放区发行的地方货币仍在市场上流通。尽管人民币发行之后，“各种地方货币即停止发行，并有计划有步骤的逐渐收回”，但“在未收回之前，地方货币与新币固定比价，照旧流通”。在此情形下，至 1949年 5月底，解放区存有两大类地方货币，即“关内的人民票（包括冀南币、晋察冀边币、北海币、华中币、西农币、中州票）和关外的东北券（包括长城券、热河券）”。二是国民党政府旧货币体系崩溃后仍有遗留。1948年 8月，国民党政府为搜刮民财、支持战争，决定发行金圆券以取代法币。仅 9个月，金圆券的发行量便猛增至 679458亿元，比初发行时增加了 124900倍。1949年7月，国民党政府故技重施，在广州、重庆以及桂林等地发行银元券。二者的过量发行，不仅给广大人民群众带来了重大损失，而且阻碍着人民币的推广。三是一些外币仍充斥于中国的货币市场。因国民党政府的货币信用岌岌可危，故美钞、港币等一度成为流通领域的主要计价手段。其中，美钞主要在北平、天津、上海和武汉等城市流通；港币发行额至 1949年 8月已超过 13亿，国内流通约占 7亿，而“华东、华北占12%，华南占 88%”。

Second, the newly liberated cities showed little acceptance of the renminbi, and speculative activities were rampant. On the one hand, because the Nationalist government had pursued a policy of vicious inflation, causing repeated devaluations and cancellations of paper currency, the broad masses of the people had suffered greatly and gradually lost trust in paper money. Under these conditions, hard currencies such as gold and silver flooded the circulation sphere. Silver dollars in particular, having circulated widely before and being abundant in private hoards, became the main currency for pricing and circulation in the market. The Central China region once reported in a document that the people were deeply wary of “paper money,” and that “the currency market in Central China has long been occupied by the silver dollar.” For example, in Wuhan, “the market takes the silver dollar as the main currency,” while the renminbi “is like clear oil floating on the surface of water; although it appears to function as currency, it comes out in the morning and returns at night, unable to gain a foothold in the market.” Similarly, in Shanghai, “the renminbi is merely subsidiary currency to the silver dollar,” so “the total amount of renminbi circulating in the market does not exceed two billion” and “it floats entirely on the surface.” This in fact made it difficult for the renminbi to establish itself in the cities. On the other hand, lawless elements took advantage of the renminbi’s unstable foothold to exploit the “silver dollar advantage” and engage in rampant speculation. They not only depreciated the renminbi’s credit, declaring that “the renminbi is a miscellaneous currency” and boasting that “the People’s Liberation Army can enter Shanghai, but the renminbi cannot enter Shanghai,” but also used hoarding and other tactics to drive black market rates wildly upward and push prices ever higher. In Shanghai, the exchange ratio between the silver dollar and the renminbi rose more than fivefold within just over ten days, driving the wholesale price index up by 275 percent.

其次，新解放的城市对人民币接受度不高，投机活动十分猖獗。一方面，由于国民党政府实行恶性通货膨胀政策，造成纸币数次贬值作废，广大人民群众深受其害，逐渐对纸币失去信任。在此前提下，金银等硬通货充溢于流通领域。特别是银元，因之前流通较为广泛、民间贮藏较为丰富，成为市场上计价流通的主要货币。华中区就曾在报告中指出，人民对“纸币”深具戒心，且“华中货币市场，早已为银元盘踞”。如在武汉，“市场以银元为主币”，而人民币“则宛如清油之浮泛水面，外观虽亦能起了通货作用，但早出晚归，不能在市场上站住”。无独有偶，在上海，“人民币只是银元的辅币”，故“市上流通的人民币，总额不会超过二十亿”且“完全浮在市上”。这实际上使得人民币难以在城市中立足。另一方面，有不法分子乘人民币立足未稳之机，利用“银元优势”大肆开展投机活动。他们不仅贬低人民币信用，宣称“人民币为杂币”，扬言“解放军进得了上海，人民币进不了上海”，还通过囤积居奇等手段，使黑市疯狂畸涨、物价日益高昂。在上海，银元与人民币的比价在 10余日内上涨 5倍之多，并带动市场批发物价指数上升275%。

In response to these difficulties, the CPC launched a campaign to promote the renminbi in the newly liberated cities, explicitly stating that “the renminbi issued by the People’s Bank of China is the legal currency for unified circulation throughout the country,” and making the cleanup of the market and the unification of currency core tasks. As the takeover of the cities proceeded, the military control committees in various localities issued proclamations without delay, establishing the renminbi as the standard currency while emphasizing that all public and private accounts must use the renminbi as the unit of calculation.

针对上述困境，中共在新解放城市开展了一场人民币推广运动，明确“中国人民银行所发行之人民币，为全国统一流通之合法货币”，将清理市场、统一货币作为核心任务。随着城市接管工作的开展，各地军事管制委员会第一时间发布布告，在确立人民币本位币地位的同时，强调不论公私款项均须以人民币为计算单位。

At the same time, the CPC took measures to further squeeze non-renminbi media of exchange out of the currency market.

与此同时，中共采取措施进一步将非人民币交易媒介排挤至货币市场外。

The first was to handle the local currencies issued in the various liberated areas in stages. The first stage was “fixed exchange ratios, mixed circulation.” Because the economic conditions of the different liberated areas varied, the value represented by their currencies also differed. To enable currency holders to maintain their original purchasing power, the various liberated areas successively established fixed exchange ratios with the renminbi based on their own price levels. However, out of consideration for adapting to wartime conditions and stabilizing the market, the people’s government adopted a method of mixed circulation in the short term. For example, upon first entering Beiping, the Jinnanbi [n18] and the Northeast currency were temporarily permitted to circulate on the market as subsidiary currency to the renminbi. The second stage was “gradual withdrawal, responsibility to the end.” As major cities were liberated one after another, the conditions for unifying local currencies under the renminbi gradually matured. The people’s government therefore used methods such as banking operations, fiscal collection, and trade recovery to gradually withdraw the local currencies issued in the liberated areas within the passes. During this period, there were cases where “some people, after the issuance of the new currency, misunderstood and suspected whether the various existing local currencies would, like the Nationalist government’s ‘fabi’ [n19], be suspended and invalidated.” The people’s government explicitly stated that it would “take responsibility not only for the new renminbi notes of the People’s Bank, but also for all local currencies previously issued by the banks of the liberated areas,” until “the very last note has been exchanged.” This laid a solid foundation of credit for the promotion of the renminbi.

一是分阶段处理各解放区发行的地方货币。第一阶段为“固定比价，混合流通”。由于各解放区经济状况不同，其货币所代表的价值量亦不同。为使持币者能保持原有的购买力，各解放区先后根据自身物价水平确立了与人民币的固定兑换比价。但出于适应战时和稳定市场的考虑，人民政府在短期内采取了混合流通的办法。如刚进入北平时，暂准冀南币及东北币作为人民币的辅币在市面上流通。第二阶段为“逐步收回，负责到底”。随着各大城市次第解放，以人民币统一地方货币的条件逐渐成熟。人民政府遂通过银行业务、财政征收、贸易回笼等方式，陆续收回关内各解放区发行的地方货币。在此期间，曾出现“有些人在新币发行后发生误会，怀疑原有的各种地方货币，是否会像国民党政府的‘法币’一样停兑作废”的状况，人民政府明确表示“不但对人民银行新币负责，而且对一切解放区银行过去发行的地方货币都要负责”，直至“兑到最后一张为止”。这为人民币的推广奠定了良好的信用基础。

The second was to systematically eliminate the Nationalist government’s gold yuan notes and silver yuan notes. First, regarding the gold yuan notes, because they were deeply entangled with the masses, the people’s government adopted a method of “exchange as the main approach, expulsion as supplementary” in carrying out this work. “Exchange as the main approach” meant that as soon as a city was liberated, the currency issued by the Nationalist government was declared illegal, but to protect the people’s interests, it was decided to exchange gold yuan notes for renminbi at posted rates, “temporarily permitting circulation on the market, with use strictly prohibited after the deadline.” Specifically, regarding the exchange ratio, the people’s government flexibly adjusted it based on market conditions and the depreciation of the gold yuan note, with the People’s Bank of China posting changes in the renminbi-to-gold-yuan-note ratio at any time; regarding the exchange method, collective exchange and over-the-counter exchange were combined, so that different groups could exchange the gold yuan notes they held on time and at designated locations. This approach, which balanced market stability and the people’s interests, allowed the work of exchanging gold yuan notes to proceed smoothly. For example, Beiping completed the exchange task within 18 days, exchanging over 800 million yuan in gold yuan notes; Shanghai completed the exchange in just 7 days, exchanging 36 trillion yuan in gold yuan notes, accounting for 53 percent of the total issuance of gold yuan notes by the Nationalist government. “Expulsion as supplementary” meant that the people’s government organized forces to expel gold yuan notes from the liberated areas into the Nationalist-controlled areas, mainly applied in the early stage of the gold yuan note exchange. Taking Tianjin as an example, the people’s government stipulated that “anyone holding counterfeit gold yuan notes in an amount of 100,000 yuan or more may register with the Customs (or the Bureau of Industry and Commerce) and carry them out of the territory to exchange for goods,” and that “anyone holding counterfeit gold yuan notes in an amount of less than 100,000 yuan may apply to the designated exchange offices of the People’s Bank of China, Tianjin Branch, for a certificate to carry enemy currency out of the territory to exchange for goods.” This measure was conducive both to clarifying the domestic currency market and to obtaining some goods from the Nationalist-controlled areas to supply the liberated areas. As for the silver yuan notes, because their credit foundation was poor and they had become virtually worthless with the collapse of the Nationalist government, the people’s government directly declared that all silver yuan notes in the newly liberated areas were void and called on the masses to unite and refuse to use them. By the eve of the founding of New China, the gold yuan notes and silver yuan notes issued by the Nationalist government had been basically eliminated.

二是分重点肃清国民党政府发行的金圆券、银元券。先是金圆券，因其与人民群众牵扯较深，故人民政府在开展这项工作时采取了“兑换为主、排挤为辅”的方法。“兑换为主”是指城市一经解放，便宣告国民党政府发行的货币为非法货币，但为保护人民利益，决定以人民币按牌价收兑金圆券，“暂准在市面流通，过期即严禁使用”。具体言之，在兑换比价上，人民政府根据市场情况和金圆券贬值情况灵活调整，并由中国人民银行随时挂牌公布人民币对金圆券比价的变动；在兑换方法上，将集体兑换和门市兑换相结合，使不同群体均能把手中持有的金圆券按时按点兑换出去。此类兼顾稳定市场和人民利益的做法，让收兑金圆券的工作顺利推进。如北平在 18天内完成收兑任务，共兑进金圆券 8亿多元；上海仅用 7天即完成收兑工作，兑进金圆券 36万亿元，占国民党政府金圆券发行总量的 53%。“排挤为辅”则是指人民政府组织力量将金圆券从解放区排挤至国统区，主要应用于前期的金圆券收兑。以天津为例，人民政府规定，“凡持伪金圆券金额在十万元以上者，准向海关（或工商局）办理登记手续，携运出境换回物资”，“凡持有伪金圆券金额在十万元以下者，准向本市中国人民银行天津分行各中心兑换所申请登记，开给敌币携带证携运出境，换回物资”。这一举措既有利于澄清本币市场，又能从国统区获得部分物资以充实解放区。至于银元券，因其信用基础较差，且随着国民党政府的垮台几成废纸，故人民政府直接宣告在新解放区银元券一律作废，并号召人民群众团结一致，拒用银元券。至新中国成立前夕，国民党政府发行的金圆券和银元券基本被肃清。

The third was to strengthen the management of foreign currencies step by step. In response to the situation where foreign currencies circulated freely on the market and affected the legal status of the renminbi, various cities, after liberation, promulgated foreign exchange management regulations with similar content. The first step was to explicitly abolish the privilege of foreign banks to issue currency and control exchange in China, and instead unify foreign exchange management, placing all foreign exchange business under the People’s Bank of China and its designated institutions. The second step was to explicitly prohibit the circulation, trading, and pricing in foreign currencies on the Chinese market, stipulating that anyone holding foreign currency must exchange it for renminbi at posted rates at the People’s Bank of China or its designated institutions within a certain period, or deposit it in foreign currency form. The third step was to resolutely crack down on black market trading in foreign currencies, encourage the masses to deposit foreign currencies in banks, form foreign exchange reserve funds, and thereby transform forces that disrupted the market into constructive forces beneficial to the national economy. The implementation of these steps effectively stopped the circulation of foreign currencies. Taking Shanghai as an example, after rectification, “foreign banks declined from deposits and loans each accounting for 20 percent and 25 percent in 1949 to each accounting for 2.44 percent and 3.72 percent at the end of 1949.” The “Basic Summary of Two Years of International Exchange and Settlement Work” issued by the People’s Bank of China on March 21, 1951, also showed that “black market trading in foreign currencies was limited to sporadic individual activities” and that “the amount of foreign currency remaining in private hands was already small.”

三是分步骤加强对外币的管理工作。针对外币在市场上自由流通而影响人民币法定地位的状况，各城市在解放后，颁布了内容相似的外汇管理办法。第一步，明确取缔外国银行在中国发行货币、把持汇兑的特权，转而统一外汇管理，将一切外汇业务交由中国人民银行及其指定机构办理。第二步，明令严禁外币在中国市场上流通、买卖和计价结算，规定凡持有外币者，必须在一定时期内按牌价到中国人民银行及其指定机构兑换人民币，或以外币存款形式储存。第三步，坚决打击外币黑市交易，鼓励人民群众将外币存入银行，形成外汇准备基金，进而将扰乱市场的破坏力量转化为有利于国民经济的建设力量。这些步骤的实施，有效地制止了外币的流通。以上海为例，经过整顿，“外商银行从一九四九年存款放款各占20%和25%，衰退至一九四九年底的各占 2.44%和 3.72%”。中国人民银行 1951年 3月 21日发布的《两年来国际汇兑清算工作基本总结》也显示，“外币黑市仅限于个别零星活动”，且“外币留存民间者已为数不多”。

Fourth, they waged a struggle against the silver dollar, the “most stubborn enemy.” To this end, the newly taken-over cities, led by Shanghai, carried out an anti-silver-dollar struggle through a two-pronged approach of “treating the symptoms” and “treating the root causes.” On the one hand, administrative means were used to ban silver-dollar trading and crack down on silver-dollar speculation, so as to achieve the effect of “treating the symptoms.” Regarding the silver dollar itself, the East China Financial and Economic Committee adopted a “strict and thorough policy of striking hard” on June 4, 1949, and stipulated that “the circulation of silver dollars be completely banned in all large, medium, and small cities in the Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou-Wuhu area.” The next day, the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee also announced “a ban on the circulation of silver dollars in the market.” Regarding silver-dollar speculators, the Shanghai Military Control Commission first used “persuasion and education,” conveying its determination to crack down on silver-dollar speculation through newspapers or forums. For example, it published an editorial in the *Liberation Daily* hoping that “speculators who disrupt finance and manipulate silver dollars would quickly come to their senses”; if they remained obstinate, it would resort to “severe sanctions.” On June 10, the Shanghai Military Control Commission sealed off the stronghold of silver-dollar speculation—the Securities Building—detaining hundreds of speculators and confiscating tens of thousands of silver dollars, severely striking at silver-dollar speculation. On the other hand, comprehensive measures were adopted to dispel the public’s doubts about the renminbi, so as to achieve the effect of “treating the root causes.” Among these, inflation-adjusted savings deposits were an innovative practice. Specifically, the renminbi was linked to physical goods: deposits were made at the inflation-adjusted unit price, and withdrawals were paid at the inflation-adjusted unit price at the time of withdrawal, protecting depositors’ savings from the impact of price increases to the greatest extent possible, thereby enhancing the renminbi’s credit. On this basis, “ordinary citizens no longer needed to preserve value by purchasing silver dollars,” fundamentally eliminating the basis for silver-dollar trading. At the same time, implementing inflation-adjusted savings deposits after cracking down on silver-dollar speculation effectively absorbed idle funds, accelerated the withdrawal of the renminbi from circulation, and stabilized prices. According to a summary by the People’s Bank of China Shanghai Branch, by the end of 1949, inflation-adjusted savings deposits had “absorbed 31.4 billion yuan of market funds, which was an important force in stabilizing the financial and commodity markets.” In addition, the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee widely publicized the nature of the renminbi and actively launched mass movements in the anti-silver-dollar struggle, serving as a “powerful backing for the people’s government.” In step with Shanghai, other newly liberated cities also “launched fierce attacks on the black market for silver dollars with uniform steps.” In the end, the anti-silver-dollar struggle was victorious, and “the scope of circulation of the renminbi gradually expanded, and the people’s confidence in the renminbi grew increasingly solid.”

四是与银元这个“最顽强的敌人”展开斗争。为此，以上海为首的新接管城市通过“治标”与“治本”双管齐下的方式，大力开展反银元斗争。一方面，运用行政手段取缔银元交易、打击银元投机，以达到“治标”之效果。针对银元本身，华东财委于 1949年 6月 4日采取“严格的彻底打击的方针”，且规定“京沪杭芜各大中小城市全面禁止银元流通”。次日，中共上海市委也宣布“禁止银元在市场流通”。针对银元投机者，上海军管会先“劝导说服”，以报刊或座谈会的形式向其传达打击银元投机的决心。如在《解放日报》上发表社论，希冀“扰乱金融操纵银元的投机者赶快觉悟”，若其仍执迷不悟，则转用“严厉手段制裁”。6月 10日，上海军管会一举查封银元投机的大本营——证券大楼，拘捕投机者数百名，收缴银元数万枚，严厉打击了银元投机行为。另一方面，采用综合措施解除市民对人民币的疑虑，以达到“治本”之效果。其中，折实储蓄存款是一个创新的做法。具体来说，就是将人民币与实物挂钩，存款时按折实单位牌价存入，支取时按取款时的折实单位牌价支付，在最大程度上保障了储户存款不受或少受物价上涨的影响，进而提升了人民币的信用。基于此，“一般市民不必再用购买银元的方法来保存币值”，从根本上消除了银元买卖的基础。同时，在打击银元投机后实行折实储蓄存款，能有效吸收游资，加速人民币的回笼，使物价趋于平稳。据中国人民银行上海分行总结，至 1949年底，折实储蓄存款“吸住市场的资金有三百一十四亿元之多，对于金融物价市场的稳定，是一个重要的力量”。此外，中共上海市委还广泛宣传人民币的本质，积极开展反银元斗争的群众运动，作为“人民政府的有力后盾”。与上海同步，其他新解放城市也用“齐一的步骤，对银元黑市展开猛烈的攻击”。最终，反银元之战取得胜利，“人民币的流通范围，日渐广扩，人民对人民币的信心，日见巩固”。

III. “Going to the Countryside”: The Spread of the Renminbi in Rural Areas

三、“下乡”：人民币在乡村的普及

As the renminbi “entered the city” and gained a foothold, the importance of its “going to the countryside” became increasingly prominent. On the one hand, whether it could spread in rural areas was an important indicator of whether the renminbi had fully occupied the market. Only when the renminbi achieved widespread circulation in both cities and rural areas could its unification truly be “completed.” Therefore, after completing the task of “entering the city,” promoting the renminbi’s “going to the countryside” became an inherent part of the CPC’s practice of monetary unification. On the other hand, the renminbi’s “going to the countryside” could expand its scope of circulation and stabilize urban and rural prices, serving as an important measure and breakthrough for restoring and developing urban and rural production.

随着人民币“进城”并站稳脚跟，其“下乡”的重要性日渐凸显。一方面，能否在乡村普及，是人民币完全占领市场与否的重要标志。只有人民币在城市和乡村均实现广泛流通，其统一工作才能真正“收官”。因此，完成“进城”任务后，推动人民币“下乡”成为中共领导货币统一实践的题中应有之义。另一方面，人民币“下乡”可以扩大流通范围、平稳城乡物价，是恢复和发展城乡生产的重要举措和突破口。

The CPC Central Committee attached great importance to the work of the renminbi “going to the countryside.” As early as September 1949, Chen Yun and Bo Yibo sent a telegram to the CPC Central Committee explaining the problem that “rural monetary credit in the newly liberated areas has not yet been established,” and suggested “smoothing the exchange of urban and rural goods and strengthening rural propaganda to enable the currency to go to the countryside.” In May of the following year, Chen Yun again pointed out the importance of “promoting the currency’s going to the countryside” in preventing price fluctuations. Subsequently, the CPC Central Committee formally proposed to “coordinate with the People’s Bank to promote the work of the currency going to the countryside.” Institutionally, the renminbi’s “going to the countryside” was carried out in coordination with the “going to the countryside” of financial institutions. To open up currency positions in rural areas, banking institutions had to be established. To this end, the People’s Bank of China began to extend its institutions from cities downward to rural areas. For example, the First National Rural Financial Conference held in May 1951 clearly stated that “state banks must go deep into the countryside, pushing their institutions down one level from the county branch to the district or market town level.” Organizationally, financial work teams were formed to carry out the renminbi’s “going to the countryside.” Because military advances were rapid and large areas of newly liberated areas were constantly emerging, banking institutions could not keep up immediately. Therefore, various localities first sent a small number of leading cadres to the grassroots level, who formed financial work teams with local young students or staff to publicize the renminbi, crack down on silver-dollar speculation, and prepare for the establishment of banks. In addition, after the CPC Central Committee implemented the unification of finance and economics in March 1950, price fluctuations also improved considerably. In sum, the renminbi’s “going to the countryside” gradually accumulated favorable conditions in terms of policy, institutions, organization, and the economy. From 1949 to 1952, all provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions across the country, in accordance with the guiding principles of the CPC Central Committee and their own specific conditions, successively launched campaigns for the renminbi to “go to the countryside.”

中共中央高度重视人民币“下乡”工作。早在 1949年 9月，陈云、薄一波便给中共中央发电报说明“新区农村货币信用尚未建立”的问题，建议“畅通城乡物资交流及加强农村宣传，使货币下乡”。次年 5月，陈云再次点明“推行货币下乡”之于防止物价波动的重要性。随后，中共中央正式提出要“与人民银行配合，推展货币下乡工作”。在机构上，人民币“下乡”是同金融机构“下乡”配合开展的。要在乡村中开辟货币阵地，必须配备银行机构。为此，中国人民银行着手将机构由城市向下延伸至乡村。如 1951年 5月召开的第一届全国农村金融会议就明确指出，“国家银行必须深入到农村去，把机构由县支行推下一层，推到区或集镇一级”。在组织上，组建金融工作队进行人民币“下乡”工作。因军事进展迅速，大片解放区不断出现，银行机构一时难以跟进，所以各地率先派少量领导骨干深入基层，并与当地青年学生或职员结成金融工作队，开展宣传人民币、打击银元投机、准备建立银行等工作。此外，1950年 3月中共中央实施统一财经后，物价波动情况也有了较大的改善。综此，人民币“下乡”逐步积累了政策、机构、组织以及经济等利好条件。从 1949年到 1952年，全国各省市区根据中共中央的指示精神以及自身的不同状况，先后开展了人民币“下乡”运动。

However, the renminbi also generally encountered resistance at the beginning of its “going to the countryside,” facing two major difficulties: “not being able to go down” and “not being able to stay.” “Not being able to go down” was because the traditional psychology of “valuing goods over currency” was widespread in rural areas. Under the dominance of this psychology, rural transactions were mostly barter exchanges. For example, “in Ankang, under the jurisdiction of southern Shaanxi, salt was used as the pricing standard for various goods,” and in Hanshou County, Hunan Province, “all goods were priced in rice.” The medium of exchange was mostly silver dollars, and in some areas, copper coins or even local merchants’ private notes were also in circulation. “Not being able to stay” was because the renminbi’s credit had not yet been established in rural areas. Constrained by conditions such as poor urban-rural communication, incomplete related organizations, insufficient supplies, and inconvenient transportation, the renminbi’s acceptance in rural areas was not high at that time. According to reports from the Central China region, rural masses “were unfamiliar with our banknotes and unwilling to accept them,” and due to a lack of material support, “the banknotes went down for a few days and then came back.” Hunan had a similar problem: because the renminbi “had not gone deep into the countryside to establish solid credit,” when prices fluctuated, it “flowed back from the countryside to the cities in large quantities.” How to promote the renminbi’s “going to the countryside” and its “settling in the countryside” became an important issue that urgently required the consideration and resolution of relevant departments such as finance and economics.

但人民币在“下乡”之初也普遍遇到阻力，面临着“下不去”和“留不住”两大难题。“下不去”是因为“重物轻币”的传统心理在乡村广泛存在。在这种心理的主导下，乡村的交易方式多为物物交换，如“陕南管辖的安康，以食盐为各种物品的计价标准”，湖南省汉寿等地“一切货物都以大米标价”；交易媒介则多为银元，部分地区还流通着铜元甚至是商人的土票。“留不住”是因为人民币的信用尚未在乡村建立起来。囿于城乡往来不通畅、相关组织不健全、物资不充裕、交通不便利等条件，当时人民币在乡村中的接受度并不高。据华中区反映，乡村群众出现“对我票子不熟悉，不愿接”的现象，且因物资支持力量缺乏，导致“票子下去几天又转回来”。湖南也存在类似的问题，即由于人民币“未深入农村建立巩固的信用”，因此在物价波动时“乃从农村大量流回城市”。如何推动人民币“下乡”且“积淀在乡”，成为亟需财经等相关部门思考和解决的重要议题。

The key to the renminbi’s “going to the countryside” lay in enabling farmers to understand and accept the renminbi. To this end, relevant departments adopted many measures. First, they vigorously launched a “reject silver, support renminbi” movement. Upon entering the countryside, “the government issued proclamations establishing the renminbi as the standard currency,” stipulating that all market transactions must use the renminbi as the unit of account and banning barter. On this basis, they organized movements to reject silver dollars and support the renminbi, exchanging gold and silver at the state-set price and resolutely cracking down on speculative activities. In some villages, forums were held with representatives from government organs, the military, schools, and industry and commerce, at which the importance of monetary unification and the harm of silver-dollar speculation to the people’s economic life were explained, and then the representatives conducted in-depth explanations among the broad masses. As the “reject silver, support renminbi” movement developed into a mass movement, the traditional psychology of “valuing goods over currency” among farmers improved, and their acceptance of the renminbi also increased. Second, they stepped up propaganda for the renminbi. Various localities used slogans, blackboard newspapers, cartoons, and radio as propaganda vehicles, and through propaganda subjects such as financial work teams, militiamen, and women’s federation members, they explained to the broad masses of farmers the close relationship between the circulation of the renminbi and production and daily life, guiding them to form a correct understanding of the renminbi and thus voluntarily support it.

人民币“下乡”的关键在于使农民了解、接受人民币。为此，相关部门采取了许多措施。一是大力开展“拒银拥币”运动。进入乡村之初，“由政府出布告，确立以人民币为本位”，规定市场交易一律以人民币为计算单位，禁止以物易物。在此基础上，组织开展拒绝银元、拥护人民币的运动，按国家牌价收兑金银，坚决打击投机活动。部分乡村召开机关、部队、学校、工商等各界代表座谈会，于会上讲清货币统一的重要性以及银元投机对人民经济生活的危害性，再通过代表在广大群众中进行深入的阐释。随着“拒银拥币”发展成为群众性运动，农民“重物轻币”的传统心理有所改善，对人民币的接受度亦有所提升。二是加大人民币的宣传力度。各地先后以标语、黑板报、漫画和广播等为宣传载体，通过金融工作队、民兵、妇联成员等宣传主体，向广大农民群体阐释人民币流通与生产生活的密切关系，引导他们形成对于人民币的正确认识，进而自觉自愿地支持人民币。

The key to the renminbi “staying in the countryside” lay in promoting farmers’ use and storage of the renminbi. “China’s rural areas are vast and scattered,” and “how to make the renminbi circulate in every corner of the countryside is a long-term task.” If administrative means were primarily used to promote the renminbi’s rooting in the countryside, not only would implementation costs be high, but it would also easily harm farmers’ interests. Therefore, the CPC comprehensively used various economic means such as fiscal, financial, and trade measures to firmly establish the renminbi’s credit in the countryside.

人民币“留乡”的关键则在于推动农民使用、贮存人民币。“中国的农村辽阔而分散”，且“如何使农村的每一个角落，都流通人民币，是一件长期的工作”，若以行政手段为主来推进人民币在乡村扎根，不仅实施成本高，而且容易损害农民利益。因此，中共综合运用财政、金融、贸易等各类经济手段，牢固树立人民币在乡村中的信用。

The first was fiscal measures. The specific method was that when collecting taxes and a certain proportion of grain substitutes in the countryside, local authorities required payment only in renminbi. On July 5, 1949, the Central China Bureau, in order to “raise the credit of the people’s currency and enable it to circulate in the countryside,” decided that “when collecting the summer grain substitute” and “when collecting the autumn grain substitute,” “only the people’s currency shall be accepted.” On March 1, 1950, the Southwest Military and Political Commission issued the “Notice on Taxpaying Households Being Allowed to Pay Grain Tax with Renminbi,” stating: “Those who pay grain tax with renminbi shall be given appropriate consideration.” The countryside under the jurisdiction of the Central-South Bureau likewise “implemented the provincial people’s government’s directive during the 1950 summer grain collection, collecting 30% to 10% of the grain substitute in renminbi converted at the county town listed price.” Thus, renminbi acquired the function of completing government tax payments, and the demand for its use in the countryside increased.

首先是财政手段。具体方法是，各地在乡村征收税费以及一定比例的公粮代金时要求只收人民币。1949年 7月 5日，华中局为“提高人民券信用，使人民券能在乡间流通”，决定在“收清夏季公粮代金”和“征收秋季公粮代金”时“概收人民券”。1950年3月1日，西南军政委员会颁发《关于纳粮民户可以人民币抵交公粮的通告》，提出：“凡以人民币抵交公粮者，均给以适当的照顾。”中南局所辖的乡村同样“在 1950年夏季公粮征收中，贯彻了省人民政府的指示，征收 30%～ 10%的公粮代金，按县城牌价折收人民币”。由此，人民币具备了完纳政府税收的效能，在乡村中的使用需求有所增长。

The second was financial measures. The specific content was that, with the People’s Bank as the main force, renminbi was injected into the rural market through issuing agricultural loans and smoothing remittance channels. In response to the shortage of renminbi in rural areas, the People’s Bank issued monetary agricultural loans according to actual conditions, so that “farmers could first obtain currency” for developing production, thereby reversing the situation of barter. At the same time, the People’s Bank vigorously carried out remittance work, taking the lead in “establishing remittance links with large and medium-sized cities that had close economic ties with the county, connecting large and medium-sized cities with the vast rural towns,” also enabling “the currency held by merchants and farmers not only to buy things locally but also to conveniently purchase goods elsewhere.” This helped consolidate the credit of renminbi and facilitated the exchange of local products and materials between regions. Thus, the circulation volume of renminbi in the countryside increased.

其次是金融手段。具体内容是，以人民银行为主力，通过发放农贷和畅通汇兑的方式，向乡村市场投放人民币。针对农村中人民币缺乏的状况，人民银行根据实际情况发放货币农贷，以使“农民们首先取得货币”，用于发展生产，进而扭转以物易物的局面。与此同时，人民银行大力开展汇兑工作，率先“与本县经济往来密切的大、中城市通汇，使大、中城市和广大农村城市联系起来”，亦使“商人和农民保存的货币，不但在本地可买到东西，到别处买货也能方便”。这有助于巩固人民币的信用，方便各地交流土产和物资。由此，人民币在乡村中的流通数量有所增加。

The third was trade measures. The specific operation was to follow the guiding principle of “what to take from the people, what to give to the people” and carry out urban-rural material exchange. “What to take from the people” referred to purchasing agricultural products from farmers, i.e., regularly and in large quantities buying rural produce such as silk, tea, hemp, tobacco leaves, tung oil, and other handicraft products; “what to give to the people” referred to selling industrial products to farmers, i.e., transporting to the countryside and selling necessities such as grain, fertilizer, farm tools, cloth, and other daily necessities, with payment designated only in renminbi and not exchangeable for other currency or goods. In this process, to enable renminbi to “go to the countryside” and gain a firm foothold, it was also necessary to let state-owned trade “go to the countryside” and organize private merchants to “go to the countryside” in tandem. The “Report of the Central Committee of the CPC’s Finance and Economics Commission Approving and Forwarding the Central Ministry of Trade’s Work Policy for the Second Half of the Year,” issued on July 5, 1950, clearly stated: on the one hand, organize private merchants to go to the countryside as much as possible to activate urban-rural exchange and expand the currency sphere; on the other hand, state-owned trade organs should also organize some forces to go to the countryside to supplement the insufficiency of private merchants’ forces, and establish some state-owned trade outposts in important towns in the countryside, so as to grasp the normal price differentials between urban and rural materials and prevent possible local price fluctuations in the countryside caused by the entry of currency. Through urban-rural material exchange, farmers stored up more or less renminbi. Thus, renminbi’s market share in the countryside expanded.

再者是贸易手段。具体操作是，遵循“向老百姓要什么，给群众什么”的指导思想，开展城乡物资交流。“向老百姓要什么”指向农民购买农产品，即经常并大量收购农村物产如丝、茶、麻、烟叶、桐油和其他手工业产品等；“给群众什么”指向农民出售工业品，即运送农民所必需的物资如粮食、肥料、农具、布匹和其他日用品到乡村中出售，且货款指定只收人民币，不得以其他币物抵换。在此进程中，为使人民币“下乡”并站稳脚跟，还须让国营贸易“下乡”和组织私商“下乡”相辅而行。1950年 7月 5日发布的《中共中央财经委员会批转中央贸易部下半年的工作方针的报告》便明确指出：一方面尽量组织私商下乡以活跃城乡交流，开拓货币阵地；另一方面，国营贸易机关也组织一部分力量下乡，以补私商下乡力量之不足，并在乡村中重要城镇建立一部分国营贸易据点，以便掌握城乡物资之正常差价，防止因货币下乡而在乡村中可能引起的局部物价波动。在城乡的物资交流中，农民或多或少地贮存了人民币。由此，人民币在乡村中的市场占有率有所扩大。

Combining actual conditions, various localities comprehensively applied the above measures, successively carrying out work to promote renminbi “going to the countryside” and “staying in the countryside,” achieving certain results. According to reports, in Hunan “the scope of renminbi circulation is expanding day by day, and areas using barter are gradually decreasing”; in Chahar and Shanxi provinces, “the masses’ psychology of ‘valuing goods over currency’ has changed, and renminbi is already circulating in the vast countryside”; in Hebei, “a new situation different from the past has emerged in small and medium-sized county towns, market towns, and villages, with barter exchange gradually decreasing, and farmers changing from fearing banknotes to wanting banknotes and saving banknotes.” According to surveys, by the end of 1952, the amount of renminbi held by farmers had reached 14.2 trillion yuan, accounting for 51.6% of the total renminbi in circulation at that time. This indirectly reflected that farmers’ trust in renminbi had increased, and they no longer chose to convert currency into physical goods as during the previous period of violent price fluctuations. In addition, the degree of commercialization of agricultural products also increased year by year. According to statistics, the ratio of the total value of commercialized agricultural products to the total value of agricultural output rose from 30% in 1950 to 37% in 1953. This indicated that as renminbi penetrated the countryside, the economic ties between urban and rural areas became closer.

各地结合实际情况，综合运用上述举措，先后开展了推进人民币“下乡”和“留乡”的工作，取得了一定成效。据报道，湖南“人民币流通范围日渐扩大，以物易物的地区正逐步减少”；察晋两省“群众‘重货轻币’心理已有转变，广大农村已流通人民币”；河北“各中小县城和集镇及农村已出现了与过去不同的新局面，物物交换逐渐减少，农民由怕票子转为愿要票子与存票子”。据调查，至1952年底，农民持有的人民币量已达 14.2万亿元，占当时人民币流通总量的 51.6%。这从侧面反映出农民对于人民币的信任程度有所提升，不再像以往物价剧烈波动时期那样选择将货币换成实物。此外，农产品商品化的程度也逐年提高。据统计，农产品商品总值占农业生产总值的比例，1950年为30%，1953年则跃升至37%。这表明随着人民币深入农村，城乡之间的经济联系愈加紧密。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

The CCP’s currency unification practice around the founding of New China spanned two historical periods—the New Democratic Revolution and socialist revolution and construction—and followed the internal logic of historical development. Before the founding of New China, achieving preliminary currency unification was an important link in establishing the new political power. A unified national regime required a unified financial and economic system as support. As the CCP was about to seize national power, the long-term fragmentation of financial and economic work drew the attention of CCP leaders. When Mao Zedong was deliberating the establishment of the North China People’s Government, he emphasized the need to integrate the financial and economic work of the three regions of North China, East China, and Northwest China, “in order to support the front lines.” [24] Unifying financial and economic work involved a thousand threads, but “the focus was on unifying finance and currency.” After the founding of New China, achieving complete currency unification was an important lever for stabilizing the new regime. At that time, how to stabilize the country economically became a new task facing the CCP. Under these circumstances, the CCP still needed to take currency unification as the “ox nose” [25] to accelerate the pace of unifying finance and economics, thereby concentrating resources to the greatest extent to promote the recovery and development of the national economy.

中共于新中国成立前后开展的货币统一实践涉及新民主主义革命与社会主义革命和建设两个历史时期，遵循着历史发展的内在逻辑。新中国成立以前，实现货币的初步统一是建立新政权的重要一环。统一的全国政权需要有统一的财经体制作为支撑。在中共即将夺取全国政权之际，长期分割的财经工作引起中共领导人的注意。毛泽东在酝酿成立华北人民政府时即强调要整合华北、华东和西北三区的财经工作，“以利支援前线”。统一财经工作千头万绪，“重点是统一金融货币”。新中国成立以后，实现货币的完全统一是稳固新政权的重要抓手。彼时，如何在经济上安邦定国成为摆在中共面前的新课题。在此情况下，中共仍需以货币统一为“牛鼻子”，加速统一财经的步伐，进而在最大程度上集中资源以促进国民经济的恢复和发展。

To achieve the goal of currency unification, the CCP first launched a nationwide unified currency—renminbi—and then intensified the promotion of renminbi. As an important symbol of the new regime, the areas where renminbi was issued and circulated reflected the scope of the new regime’s control and influence. Therefore, an important task for the CCP in the process of taking over newly liberated areas was to ensure the widespread circulation of renminbi in both cities and countryside. However, constrained by the urban-rural separation caused by the wartime environment, this work initially faced the dilemma of “being unable to enter the city” and “being unable to go to the countryside.” Based on this, the CCP, on the one hand, cleared away non-renminbi transaction media and established renminbi credit to enable renminbi to smoothly “enter the city”; on the other hand, it comprehensively used administrative and economic means to enable renminbi to complete the dual tasks of “going to the countryside” and “staying in the countryside.” By the end of 1951, except for Tibet and the regions of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan,

为实现货币统一目标，中共先是推出全国性的统一货币——人民币，而后又加大人民币的推广力度。作为新政权的重要表征，人民币发行和流通的区域彰显着新政权控制和影响的范围。因此，中共在接管新解放区进程中的一项重要工作便是让人民币在城乡广泛流通。但囿于战时环境造成的城乡区隔，该工作在初期面临着“进不了城”和“下不了乡”的困境。基于此，中共一方面通过清除非人民币交易媒介、树立人民币信用等措施，使人民币顺利“进城”，另一方面综合运用行政手段和经济手段，使人民币完成“下乡”和“留乡”的双重任务。至 1951年底，除西藏和港澳台地区以外，全国初步建立起独立的、统一的人民币市场，中共领导的货币统一实践基本完成。

The CCP’s practice of currency unification around the founding of New China carried important historical significance. Contemporaries praised the establishment of the People’s Bank of China and the unified issuance of the renminbi as “a powerful lever for consolidating and developing China’s national economy,” greatly strengthening the people’s confidence in the new regime. At the same time, the people’s government’s regulation and control of economic operations resembled a long chain, and currency unification was precisely the primary link in this chain. Only by completing currency unification could the subsequent unified financial and economic situation be rapidly achieved, enabling the CCP to marshal the forces for economic construction to the greatest extent. Based on this logic, the orderly circulation of the renminbi in both cities and the countryside not only smoothed the exchange of industrial and agricultural products between urban and rural areas but also provided primitive accumulation for the subsequent development of industrialization. In sum, sorting out the CCP’s practical process of currency unification allows us to glimpse the implementation logic of the CCP’s economic policies around the founding of New China, and also provides an important perspective for understanding the consolidation of the people’s regime and the rapid recovery and development of the economy and society in the early years of New China.

新中国成立前后中共的货币统一实践，具有重要的历史意义。时人就曾称赞中国人民银行的成立以及人民币的统一发行是“巩固和发展中国国民经济之有力的杠杆”，极大地增强了国人对于新政权的信心。同时，人民政府对于经济运行的调控像一个长长的链条，而货币统一恰是这个链条中的首要环节。只有完成货币统一，后续的财经统一局面才得以迅速实现，中共才能在最大程度上汇聚开展经济建设的力量。基于这种逻辑，人民币在城乡中实现有序流转，不仅畅通了城乡工农业产品的交流，也为后续发展工业化提供了原始积累。综此，梳理中共关于货币统一的实践进程，既可窥见新中国成立前后中共经济政策的实施逻辑，也为我们理解新中国成立之初人民政权的巩固以及经济社会的快速恢复和发展提供了重要视角。

Web editor: Jing Mu

网络编辑：静穆