Tactical Evolution and Strategic Application of the CPC’s Tunnel Warfare in Central Hebei during the War of Resistance Against Japan

The Central Hebei Plain refers mainly to the area bounded by the Beijing–Hankou, Tianjin–Pukou, and Beijing–Shenyang railways and the Cangzhou–Shijiazhuang highway; geographically it forms part of the North China Plain. Bordering on Beijing and Tianjin, the Central Hebei Plain includes more than fifty counties and cities such as Shijiazhuang, Baoding, Langfang, Hengshui and Cangzhou, and is a strategically vital area for controlling the North China Plain. After the Japanese army launched its full-scale war of aggression against China, its mechanized forces advanced rapidly across the Central Hebei Plain, relying on their mobility together with superior troop strength to carry out large-scale “mopping-up” operations, which posed a severe test for the Central Hebei base area. Guided by Mao Zedong’s theory of independent guerrilla warfare and protracted war, the military and civilian population of Central Hebei, acting on the geographical features of the plain, actively transformed the natural environment and gradually developed a new type of plain guerrilla tactic — tunnel warfare. Tunnel warfare in Central Hebei was an innovation in plain guerrilla tactics under the guidance of the protracted-war concept; its tactical evolution and strategic application greatly enriched the combat logic and practice of the CPC’s plain guerrilla warfare, and are of major significance for studying the survival strategies of the Eighth Route Army behind enemy lines in North China. This article takes the overall development and evolution of tunnel warfare in Central Hebei as its thread, exploring the process by which tunnel tactics were perfected and the conditions for their application, with the aim of deepening understanding of the CPC’s plain guerrilla warfare and the struggle strategies behind it.

冀中平原主要是指以平汉、津浦、北宁铁路及沧石公路为边界的中间区域，地理上属于华北平原的一部分。冀中平原临近平津，包括石家庄、保定、廊坊、衡水、沧州等 50余市县，是控制华北平原的战略要地。日军发动全面侵华战争后，其机械化部队在冀中平原上快速推进，依托其机动性配合优势兵力展开大规模“扫荡”，给冀中根据地带来严峻考验。在毛泽东独立自主的游击战和持久战理论指导下，冀中军民依据平原地区的地理特征，能动地改造自然环境，逐渐发展出了新型的平原游击战术——地道战。冀中地道战，是持久战思想指导下平原游击战术的一次创新，其战术演进与策略运用，极大丰富了中共平原游击战的战斗逻辑与实践，对研究八路军在华北敌后的生存策略有重要意义。本文拟以冀中地道战的整体发展演变为线索，探究地道战术的完善过程及其适用条件，以期深化对中共平原游击战及背后斗争策略的认识。

I. The Emergence of Tunnel Fortifications: An Inevitable Product of Coping with the Japanese “Cage Policy”

一、地道工事的出现：应对日军“囚笼政策”的必然产物

In the long course of war practice, people had long recognized the importance of underground combat, but historically the use of tunnels was mostly an isolated instance or an unconventional means of warfare. During the War of Resistance, the CPC combined tunnel warfare with people’s war, making it an important form of plain guerrilla warfare and raising it to a new level in tactical terms.

在长期的战争实践中，人们早就意识到地下战斗的重要性，但历史上对地道的使用多为孤例或非常规的作战手段。中共在抗战时期将地道战与人民战争相结合，使其成为平原游击战的重要形式，在战术层面发展到新高度。

In October 1937, Lü Zhengcao, then commander of the People’s Self-Defense Army, led his troops north into the Central Hebei Plain. The following year the force was reorganized as the 3rd Column of the Eighth Route Army and the Central Hebei Military Region was established, opening up the Central Hebei Anti-Japanese Base Area. In January 1939, He Long led the main force of the 120th Division across the Taihang Mountains to Central Hebei; after the forces were integrated, the Central Hebei base area had 100,000 troops, controlled 42 counties, and governed a population of about 7 million. Relying on plain guerrilla tactics worked out in frequent combat, the Central Hebei base area dealt effective blows to the enemy and gradually came to be regarded by the Japanese army as a new threat to its “public order pacification” policy. In March 1940, Hirata Masakazu, deputy chief of staff of the Japanese North China Area Army, judged that “the focus of future punitive pacification must be directed at the Communist forces.” However, the Japanese army’s purely military operations in the early period achieved little; faced with flexible and mobile guerrilla tactics, traditional “mopping-up” could not pose a substantial threat to the CPC’s forces.

1937年 10月，时任人民自卫军司令员吕正操率部北上冀中平原，次年部队改编为八路军第 3纵队并成立冀中军区，开辟出了冀中抗日根据地。1939年 1月，贺龙率 120师主力穿越太行山开赴冀中，部队整合后冀中根据地拥有部队 10万人，控制 42个县，所辖人口约 700万人。冀中根据地凭借在频繁战斗中摸索出的平原游击战术予敌以有力打击，逐渐被日军视为其“治安肃正”政策的新威胁。1940年 3月，日军华北方面军参谋副长平田正判认为：“今后讨伐肃正的重点必须指向共军。”不过日军初期单纯的军事行动收效甚微，面对灵活机动的游击战术，传统“扫荡”无法给中共军队造成实质性的威胁。

In 1941, Okamura Yasuji succeeded to the post of commander of the Japanese North China Area Army. In order to effectively counter the Eighth Route Army’s guerrilla tactics and reverse the unfavorable military situation, Okamura began to further promote the “Public Order Strengthening Campaign,” focusing militarily on strengthening the blockhouse tactics and “cage policy” that had previously been insufficiently emphasized. According to statistics, in November 1940 the Japanese had only 540 strongpoints in Central Hebei; by the end of February 1942, the number of blockhouses in Central Hebei had grown to 1,300, and by the end of 1942 the number of completed strongpoints and blockhouses had reached 1,753, more than three times the 1940 figure.

1941年，冈村宁次接任日军华北方面军司令官。为了有效克制八路军的游击战术，扭转军事上的不利局面，冈村宁次开始进一步推动“治安强化运动”，在军事方面重点强化此前用力不足的碉堡战术与“囚笼政策”。据统计，1940年 11月，日军在冀中仅有 540个据点，到 1942年 2月末，冀中的碉堡数量增长至 1300个，而到 1942年末，已建成的据点和碉堡数量更是达到了 1753个，是 1940年的 3倍多。

After large-scale construction and terrain modification, on the Central Hebei Plain there was on average one blockhouse or strongpoint for every 4.5 villages. These blockhouses and strongpoints were linked to each other, dividing the entire Central Hebei Plain into fine small pieces; the “cage” targeting the Eighth Route Army’s guerrilla tactics was formally formed. The core of the Japanese “cage policy” was to invest large amounts of manpower and material resources in a specific area, using obstacles such as ditches and walls to weaken the Eighth Route Army’s mobility and block the flow of its personnel and supplies, while at the same time using strongpoints and road networks to increase the Japanese army’s early-warning and mobility capabilities, so that each point could give timely warning, respond, and at any time encircle and cut off the target.

经过大规模的建设和地形改造，在冀中平原之上，平均每 4.5个村庄就有一个碉堡或据点。这些碉堡据点互相连接，把整个冀中平原分割成细密的小块，针对八路军游击战术的“囚笼”正式形成。日军“囚笼政策”的核心，就是在特定区域内投放大量的人力物力，通过建设沟墙等障碍削弱八路军的机动性、封锁其物资人员流动，同时以据点、道路网增加日军的示警和机动能力，以使各点之间能够及时预警、响应并随时分割包围目标。

The “cage policy” greatly restricted the Eighth Route Army’s guerrilla tactics. Lü Zhengcao summarized the strategy and tactics of plain guerrilla warfare as forms such as “circling around and dodging behind a screen” and “transportation warfare,” the core of which all required the troops to have the mobility to “move as freely as one pleases.” But under the Japanese blockade, the activities of both the CPC’s regular forces and the militia could not proceed normally; the plain guerrilla tactics previously employed, such as rapid maneuvering and disrupting transportation, could no longer function effectively. In December 1941, the Japanese army attacked the Tenth Sub-Region of Central Hebei; after the local Party, government and people’s organizations suffered heavy losses, the original positions of the Tenth Sub-Region were basically lost, and all the CPC’s main forces withdrew.

“囚笼政策”极大地限制了八路军的游击战术。吕正操将平原游击战的战略战术总结为“兜圈子绕影壁”“交通战争”等形式，其核心皆要求部队具有“施传如意”的机动性。但在日军封锁之下，中共正规军和民兵的活动都难以正常开展，以往所采用的快速机动、破坏交通等平原游击战术，无法继续有效发挥作用。1941年 12月，日军进攻冀中十分区，在地方党政民组织遭受严重损失之下，十分区原有阵地基本丢失，中共主力部队全部退出。

In order to completely annihilate the Eighth Route Army’s main forces in Central Hebei, from May 1 to June 20, 1942, the Japanese army launched the large-scale “May 1 Mopping-Up.” According to relevant statistics, the precise number of Japanese troops deployed in this battle was about 17,000, while the main forces of the Central Hebei Military Region numbered about 14,000. Although the numbers of troops on the two sides were not far apart, under the siege of the “cage” the Eighth Route Army’s activities were restricted while the Japanese army’s mobility was further enhanced; combined with the Japanese army’s superiority in military equipment and combat power, this large-scale “mopping-up” dealt a heavy blow to the Central Hebei base area. Only a small number of troops could be left in very small areas by the various sub-regions and county and district guerrilla units. Shimabori Takeji, the Japanese North China Area Army’s senior staff officer for operations, claimed that this operation “can be said, in political-strategic terms, to be the most perfected operation… it destroyed the Central Hebei Military Region.”

为了彻底消灭冀中的八路军主力，1942年 5月 1日至 6月 20日，日军开展了声势浩大的“五一大扫荡”。据相关统计，此战中日军出动的准确兵力在 1.7万人左右，冀中军区主力军则在 1.4万人左右。尽管敌我双方军队在数量上相差不大，但在“囚笼”围困之下，八路军活动受限，日军机动能力则进一步提高，加之日军在军事装备和战力上的优势，此次大规模“扫荡”给冀中根据地造成巨大打击，各军分区和县、区游击队仅能在很小几块地区留下少量部队。日军华北方面军作战主任参谋岛贯武治声称，这次“在政治战略上可以说是改进的最完善的作战……摧毁了冀中军区”。

The situation in Central Hebei during this period was extremely tense; the original guerrilla tactics were almost unsustainable. Militiamen from Dingxian and Tangxian counties in Central Hebei recalled that the Japanese blockade network was not only dense but also that the surveillance along the railway lines was being strengthened. Especially after the strongpoints and blockhouses were built in early 1942, “the broad masses had no place to move; because the enemy’s mopping-up left no choice but to go underground, there was no other road to take.” In June 1942, the losses from the large “mopping-up” led Mao Zedong to judge that the struggle in North China was extremely brutal and that “to survive these two years will require enormous sacrifice.” If the CPC wanted to preserve its strength and wait for an opportunity, it had to find new tactics capable of breaking the enemy’s “cage policy.”

这一时期的冀中形势极为紧张，原来的游击战术几乎无以为继。冀中定唐县民兵回忆称，日军的封锁网不仅密集且铁路沿线看守也在加强。特别是 1942年初，据点碉堡建成之后，“广大群众再无活动之处，因敌人扫荡只有转入地下，再没有第二条路可走”。1942年 6月，大“扫荡”的损失使得毛泽东作出了华北斗争极其残酷，“要熬过今明两年须费极大牺牲”的判断。中共欲保存实力、等待时机，就必须寻找能够打破敌“囚笼政策”的新战术。

As early as when the Japanese “cage policy” was first being rolled out, the Central Hebei leadership had sensed the gradually worsening situation and attempted to respond. In the practical struggle to break the Japanese blockade, the military and civilian population of Central Hebei began to dig tunnels according to local conditions, using their concealment characteristics to preserve themselves and defend against the enemy. As early as 1941, when the Japanese army surrounded Qingyuan County, they discovered that CPC armed forces had dug tunnels in some villages and were using them to construct defensive positions. In the autumn of 1941, Cheng Zihua, political commissar of the Central Hebei Military Region, inspected Lixian County and other places; in a report to the district Party committee he affirmed the effectiveness of the tunnels. In early 1942, the Central Hebei District Party Committee, when discussing militia training, pointed out that tunnels could be “used by the militia in brutal areas for offense and defense, and as a route for the masses to evade sudden enemy encirclement.” During the “May 1 Mopping-Up,” the Central Hebei Military Region further recognized the role of tunnels in preserving effective strength, instructing all areas to “seize every gap to dig tunnels, and areas may develop cave hideouts,” and to use them “in coordination with explosives to oppose the enemy’s captures.” After the “May 1 Mopping-Up,” many cadres relied on tunnel cover to avoid danger, so cadres often said: “If there had been no cave hideout, I would have been sacrificed several times over.” During this period, tunnels, as an underground fortification spontaneously created by the military and civilian population for coping with Japanese “mopping-up,” initially showed their effectiveness in protection, defense and concealment, but they were still at an early stage, and their functions and roles were not yet perfected.

早在日军“囚笼政策”铺开之初，冀中领导人便察觉到了逐渐严峻的形势并尝试作出应对。在打破日军封锁的斗争实践中，冀中军民开始因地制宜地挖掘地道，利用其隐蔽性特点以保存自己、防御敌人。早在 1941年，日军在包围清苑县时就发现中共武装在一些村庄内挖了地道，并依托其构筑起防御阵地。1941年秋，冀中军区政治委员程子华到蠡县等地视察，在向区党委所作的汇报中肯定了地道的效力。1942年初，冀中区党委在谈及民兵训练时指出，地道可以被“残酷地区利用为民兵进攻与防御，及群众进行逃避敌已突然包围的道路”。“五一大扫荡”期间，冀中军区进一步意识到地道在保存有生力量上的作用，指示各地应“抓紧一切空隙将地道挖成，地区可发展地洞”，并以此“配合爆炸反对敌人抓捕”。在“五一大扫荡”之后，很多干部依靠地道掩护躲避危险，因此时常有干部说：“假如没有地洞，我也牺牲几个过了。”这一时期，地道作为一种军民自发创造的用于应对日军“扫荡”的地下工事，在保护、防御、隐藏方面的效果初步显现，但它尚处于初期阶段，功能和作用尚不完善。

II. The Initial Reality of Tunnel Warfare: Functions Not Yet Perfected under the Constraints of Subjective and Objective Conditions

二、地道战的初期实际：在主客观条件限制下功能尚未完善

Relying on the “cage” encirclement and the deployment of large numbers of troops, the Japanese army carried out a fine-grained “combing-out” of the Central Hebei Plain. The newly born tunnel tactics, when faced with large-scale “mopping-up,” gradually revealed their shortcomings.

依托“囚笼”围困和大量投放兵力，日军对冀中平原展开了细密的“剔抉”。刚刚诞生的地道战术在面对大规模“扫荡”时，不足之处逐渐暴露出来。

Beituan Village in Ding County was a model village that relied on tunnels to wage struggle against the enemy. After the Japanese “mopping-up” campaign began, Zhao Tiefu, secretary of the Ding County CPC County Committee, Zhao Shuguang, political commissar of the county guerrilla brigade, and Fan Dongshen, brigade commander, personally led the masses in this area to dig tunnels and build fortifications in preparation for combat. Beituan Village had main and branch tunnel lines connecting the village and its outskirts, and the village was equipped with bunker works coordinated with the tunnels. The garrison troops had made meticulous preparations for conducting tunnel warfare. Yet even so, during the “May Day Mopping-Up Campaign,” the “Beituan Massacre,” which shocked China and the world, occurred here. When the Japanese army surrounded Beituan Village, they released poison gas, slaughtering more than 800 people. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region Command and the *Jin-Cha-Ji Daily* both issued telegrams condemning the Japanese atrocities. Examining this battle may provide a deeper understanding of the shortcomings of tunnel warfare in its early stage when confronting large-scale Japanese “mopping-up” campaigns.

定县的北疃村是依托地道展开对敌斗争的模范村庄。日军“扫荡”开始后，中共定县县委书记赵铁夫、县游击大队政委赵树光、大队长范栋申亲自在这一带领导群众挖地道、修工事，进行备战工作。北疃村建有连接全村及村外的地道干线、支线，并且村庄配合地道设有掩体工事。守备部队对于开展地道战进行了精心准备。但即便如此，“五一大扫荡”期间此处却发生了震惊中外的“北疃惨案”。日军在包围北疃村时施放毒气，残杀百姓 800余人。晋察冀军区司令部、《晋察冀日报》纷纷发电谴责日军暴行。检视这场战斗，或可对地道战在发展初期面对日军大规模“扫荡”时的不足有更深入的认识。

After the “May Day Mopping-Up Campaign” began, Uesaka Masaru, commander of the Japanese Army’s 163rd Infantry Regiment, responsible for mopping-up operations in the Ding County and Shahe River area, received orders from his superiors instructing his unit to test the effectiveness of poison gas canisters in tunnels during combat.

“五一大扫荡”开始之后，负责在定县、沙河一带“扫荡”的日军步兵第 163联队联队长上坂胜接到上级命令，指示其所部在作战时试验毒气筒在地道中的使用效果。

In May 1942, Japanese mopping-up operations in the Shahe River area grew increasingly frequent, and people from more than ten nearby villages fled to Beituan Village for refuge. On the 27th, the 1st Battalion of the 163rd Regiment received intelligence that Communist troops were building tunnels near Beituan Village. Battalion Commander Oe Yoshitaka thus led 319 men from various garrisons, advancing off-road and by mobile means, surrounding Beituan Village before dawn and launching an attack at daybreak. Lieutenant Odaira Sadayoshi’s 11th Company of the Japanese Army’s 110th Infantry Regiment, which was mopping up nearby, heard the intense gunfire and joined the battle shortly thereafter.

1942年 5月，日军在沙河一带“扫荡”日渐频繁，附近十余个村的百姓纷纷逃往北疃村避难。27日，第 163联队第 1大队接到情报，称有共军正在北疃村附近修筑地道。大队长大江芳若于是率所部 319人从各驻点出发，采取离开道路、机动前进的方法，在拂晓以前包围了北疃村并于天亮时发动进攻。正在附近“扫荡”的日军步兵第 110联队第 11中队小田贞良部听到此处激烈枪响，也在随后加入战斗。

The soldiers and civilians defending Beituan Village put up stubborn resistance relying on the village’s earthen walls and loopholes in the rooftops, effectively slowing the Japanese advance. But outnumbered, after gradually losing ground, the guerrillas and militia withdrew into the tunnels to continue fighting. Oe Yoshitaka recalled: after entering the village, the “enemy soldiers” who had been fighting persistently suddenly vanished, but his own side still came under attack from hand grenades and landmines; only after searching did they discover the tunnel entrances. Oe Yoshitaka then immediately sent men to search for tunnels outside the village and tunnel entrances inside the village, and cut off the tunnel leading to Xicheng Village. Every time they found a tunnel entrance, the Japanese followed the same procedure, releasing poison gas. According to survivors, at the time “the common people in the tunnels were choked and crying out in agony, their eyes streaming tears and noses bleeding.” Because the tunnels were narrow, those who could not bear it could only crawl out over the dead bodies; those who narrowly escaped the gas were bayoneted or captured by the Japanese, then killed by cruel means such as shooting or burning. On the morning of the 28th, the Japanese again “mopped up” inside the tunnels, not assembling to return to Ding County until 4:00 p.m. Oe Yoshitaka recalled: “The village tunnels and cellars were filled with stubbornly resisting enemy soldiers, so annihilating them all took great effort, and we captured considerable booty.” In reality, the so-called “enemy soldiers” were mostly refugees from various villages. Moreover, on the way back, the Japanese made more than 60 captured villagers change into military uniforms, disguising them as captured Eighth Route Army soldiers and escorting them to Ding County prison. In 1956, the New China Special Military Tribunal investigated the case; the Japanese army killed more than 800 residents in this battle, including raping 35 women, capturing 62 people, and burning down 36 houses. In Beituan Village alone, 23 families were completely wiped out. Such heavy casualties brought bloody lessons for guerrilla warfare and tunnel struggle in the Central Hebei region at that time.

驻守北疃村的军民依靠村子周围的土墙和屋顶的枪眼进行了顽强抵抗，有效迟滞了日军进攻。但由于敌众我寡，在逐渐不敌之后，游击队和民兵退入地道继续战斗。大江芳若回忆称：攻入村中之后，一直坚持战斗的“敌兵”突然不见踪影，但己方仍会受到手榴弹和地雷的袭击，经过探查之后才发现了地道入口。随后大江芳若立即派人搜索村外的地道和村内地道口，并切断了通向西城村的地道。每找到一个地道口，日军都如法炮制，施放毒气。据幸存者称，当时“老百姓在洞内被熏的大哭大叫，眼睛流泪、鼻子流血”。而由于地道狭窄，无法忍受的人只能从死人身上爬出地道，侥幸逃过毒气的人也被日军刺死或俘虏，以扫射、火烧等残忍手段杀死。28日清晨，日军再次对地道内部进行“扫荡”，直到下午 4点方才集结返回定县。大江芳若回忆称：“村内地道及地下室内充满了顽强抵抗的敌兵，因而将其全部歼灭费了很大力气，缴获颇多。”实际情况却是，其所谓“敌兵”大部分都是各村避难的百姓。此外，返途时日军还让被抓的 60多个村民换上军装，将其乔装成八路军俘虏押送定县监狱。1956年，新中国特别军事法庭对该案进行调查，日军在此战中杀害居民 800余人，其中强奸妇女 35人、抓捕 62人、烧毁民房 36间，仅北疃一村就有23户人家被杀绝户。如此惨重的伤亡，给当时冀中地区的游击战争和地道斗争带来了血的教训。

From an objective standpoint, the vast disparity in military strength between China and Japan was the main cause of this massacre. In the Beituan battle, the Japanese deployed nearly 400 troops, while the Communist forces defending Beituan consisted of only two county guerrilla companies, three district platoons, and some militia, numbering about 200. This small armed force, besides fighting, also had to cover nearly a thousand ordinary civilians who kept pouring in from the surrounding areas. Moreover, in the Beituan battle, the Japanese began their attack at dawn on the 27th and did not withdraw until the afternoon of the 28th, occupying and fighting for two full days. The ample troop strength and time allowed the Japanese to calmly encircle and blockade the tunnel resistance, search out each tunnel entrance one by one, and destroy the tunnels without sparing time or effort. Furthermore, the Japanese released poison gas into the tunnels during this battle, making it impossible for those inside to hide safely, resulting in heavy losses.

从客观条件上看，中日双方的军事实力差距过大，是此次惨案发生的主要原因。北疃战斗中日军出动兵力近 400人，而驻守北疃的中共武装只有两个县游击中队，三个区小队和部分民兵，人数在 200左右。这点武装力量，除了战斗外还要掩护周边不断涌来的近千名普通民众。而且，北疃战斗中日军自 27日凌晨开始进攻，直到 28日下午方才撤离，战斗及占领时间长达两天。兵力和时间的充足使得日军在面对地道抵抗时可以从容地包围和封锁，逐一寻找地道口并不惜耗时耗力地破坏地道。况且日军在此战中向地道中施放毒气，更使地道中的人无法安然躲藏，损失惨重。

From the perspective of tunnel tactics, at this stage the tunnels emphasized hiding and evacuation, lacking combat functions, which was also an important reason for the heavy losses among soldiers and civilians. Because the functions were incomplete, the soldiers and civilians in the tunnels could only passively hide and could not conduct effective combat. When the Japanese used poison gas and prolonged siege, those hiding in the tunnels could only passively take the beating, with almost no ability to fight back. The CPC side immediately analyzed this after the battle. The *Jin-Cha-Ji Daily* identified three important causes of the Beituan Massacre. Apart from lack of organization, the other two points both centered on the inadequacy of tunnel facilities: first, the lack of armed protection at tunnel entrances and other points; second, the tunnels had no anti-gas equipment. Cheng Zihua, then political commissar of the Central Hebei Military Region, in his November 1942 article “Militia Struggle on the Central Hebei Plain,” further pointed out the problem that tunnel digging in surrounding villages was not widespread enough. On the one hand, this led to overcrowding in one place for villagers from the surrounding area; on the other hand, once the village was surrounded, it could neither receive assistance nor rely on the tunnels to evacuate. When Beituan Village became the target of a concentrated Japanese attack, not only could it not get help from the surrounding area, but the tunnels’ own functions of hiding and evacuation were also severely limited.

从地道战术角度看，此时的地道侧重于躲藏和转移，战斗功能缺失，也是造成军民损失惨重的重要原因。由于功能不完善，军民在地道中仅能被动躲藏，无法开展有效战斗，当日军使用毒气和进行长时间围困时，躲藏在地道里的军民只能被动挨打，几无还手之力。对于这一点，中共方面在战后也立即进行了分析。《晋察冀日报》认为造成北疃惨案的重要原因有三。除缺乏组织性外，另外两点都集中在地道设施的不完善上：一是洞口等处缺乏武装保护，二是地道没有防毒设备。时任冀中军区政委程子华在 1942年 11月撰写的《冀中平原上的民兵斗争》中，进一步指出周边村庄地道挖掘不够普遍的问题。这一方面导致周边村民拥挤一处，另一方面造成村庄被包围之后既得不到援助也无法依托地道转移的局面。北疃村在成为日军重点进攻目标情况下，不仅无法得到周边的援助，地道本身的躲避、转移功能也极大受限。

These defects in the early development of tunnel warfare were mainly because tunnel digging at that time was still an occasional, small-scale activity by the soldiers and civilians in the base areas, with incomplete functions, lack of unified organization, no interconnection between tunnels, and no timely sharing of experience. However, the development of tunnel warfare cannot be separated from specific historical conditions; the reason it did not develop rapidly in its early stage was mainly due to many limiting factors.

地道战发展初期存在的这些缺陷，主要是因为此时的地道挖掘还是根据地军民偶发的小范围的行为，功能不够完善，又缺乏统一组织，互相不能连通，经验也无法及时共享。然而，地道战的发展不能脱离具体的历史条件，其在初期之所以未能快速发展主要是因为存在着许多限制条件。

Subjectively, although the CPC had already taken note of the form of tunnel warfare as a new path of underground struggle, at that time insufficient importance was attached to it, and understanding of the role and function of tunnels was not yet comprehensive. Some cadres even regarded tunnels as escapism and advocated filling them in and confronting the enemy head-on. In March 1942, the Central Hebei Administrative Office, the Military Region Command, and the Armed Forces Committee jointly issued a directive letter calling for the development of tunnel struggle. Although the directive’s content included very specific and detailed introductions to the experience of tunnel construction, tunnel warfare did not develop rapidly thereafter. Cheng Zihua, in summarizing the causes of the Beituan Massacre, repeatedly emphasized that tunnel warfare was not being carried out widely enough.

从主观上看，作为一条新的地下斗争道路，地道战的形式虽然已经被中共注意到，但其时重视程度不足，对地道的作用和功能认识尚不全面，甚至有干部认为地道是逃跑主义，主张将其回填和敌人硬碰硬。1942年 3月，冀中行署、军区司令部、武委会曾联合发布指示信，要求开展地道斗争。虽然从指示内容看，其中对地道建设的经验介绍非常具体且详细，但地道战并未在此后快速发展起来，程子华在总结北疃惨案的发生原因时还多次强调地道战开展得不够普遍。

Objectively, the struggle environment in the early stage of tunnel warfare and the enormous cost of tunnel digging itself were the main factors limiting its development. As mentioned earlier, tunnel warfare emerged during the Japanese “cage policy” [n] and large-scale “mopping-up” campaigns. At that time, the soldiers and civilians in the base areas, under severe circumstances and spatial isolation by the “cage,” simply had no time or energy to organize large-scale digging operations. Thus, tunnels were only scattered in a spotty and fragmented manner in a few villages. Moreover, tunnel digging was a major project requiring massive human, material, and financial resources. Although relevant historical materials from the early period are scarce, the enormous cost of digging can be inferred from later-period materials. For example, in 1944, “the completed tunnels in Central Hebei may have reached 25,000 li [n]; the labor involved can be seen from this. Furthermore, digging tunnels required many tools, such as baskets, hoes, picks, and especially lamp oil, with each village spending tens of thousands of yuan.” According to calculations, in Quyang County, Baoding, in 1945, newly dug tunnels totaled 262,800 zhang [n]; the value of human labor, lamp oil, firewood, and other resources was 20 million yuan, and each meter of tunnel consumed 230 yuan worth of materials. The enormous expense of tunnel digging meant that in the early stage it could only be a small-scale, spontaneous action. Without unified government leadership and economic support, it was difficult for various localities to build structurally complete tunnels on their own.

从客观上看，地道战初期所处的斗争环境以及地道挖掘本身耗费甚大等是限制其发展的主要原因。如前所述，地道战是在日军施行“囚笼政策”进行大“扫荡”期间产生的，当时的根据地军民在严峻形势和“囚笼”的空间隔绝下，根本没有时间和精力组织大范围的挖掘行动，因而地道只是点状和零散地分布在少数村庄。此外，地道挖掘是个大工程，需要大量的人力物力财力作支撑。尽管初期相关史料缺乏，但挖掘耗费巨大可以从后期史料推知。比如，1944年冀中“完成后之地道，可能已达二万五千里，其劳力之大从此可见。此外挖地道时还要很多的家具，如筐子、锄、镐，特别是点灯油，每村均在数万元款的开支”。据计算，保定曲阳县 1945年新挖地道 26280丈，人力、灯油、木柴等资源价值 2000万元，每 1米地道就需要消耗 230元的物资。地道挖掘花费之巨，导致其在初期只能是小范围的自发行动。在没有政府统一领导、经济支持的情况下，各地很难自行建成结构完善的地道。

Overall, in its early stage of formation, tunnel warfare, owing to numerous subjective and objective constraints, did not shed its characteristics of spontaneity and isolation. Facing the enemy’s formidable “May Day Mop-Up” [10]10 The “May Day Mop-Up” (五一大扫荡) was a large-scale, brutal campaign launched by the Japanese North China Area Army against the CPC’s Central Hebei base area starting on May 1, 1942, aimed at annihilating the main forces of the Eighth Route Army and the base area leadership., the early tunnel fortifications were not only barely adequate in defensive capability but also clearly insufficient in their capacity to take the initiative in fighting the enemy. Where tunnels had not been widely adopted, single or small numbers of villages were in fact unable to conduct effective combat. After the “May Day Mop-Up,” following a period of arduous struggle, the war situation and the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves underwent changes, and tunnel warfare, as an important means for the CPC to persist in resistance behind enemy lines, entered a phase of rapid development.

总的来看，地道战在形成初期由于主客观方面的诸多限制，没有摆脱自发性和孤立性的特点。面对敌人声势浩大的“五一大扫荡”，初期的地道工事不仅在防御能力上捉襟见肘，而且主动对敌的战斗能力也明显不足。在地道没有普及的情况下，单一或少量的村庄实际上是无法开展有效战斗的。“五一大扫荡”之后，经过一段时间的艰苦斗争，战争形势和敌我力量发生变化，地道战作为中共坚持敌后斗争的重要手段，进入了快速发展阶段。

III. The Perfection and Elevation of Tunnel Warfare: Tactical Gaming under Changing Circumstances and Shifting Forces

三、地道战的完善与提升：形势变化与力量消长之下的战术博弈

Mao Zedong pointed out in *On Protracted War* that, in the strategic stalemate phase, “the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves will undergo enormous opposite changes; China will gradually rise, while Japan will gradually decline… first reaching a position of equilibrium, then a position of superiority and inferiority reversed.” [11]11 Mao Zedong, *On Protracted War* (May 1938), *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II. The passage is a paraphrase of the original text. Tunnel warfare was a plainland guerrilla tactic born in the strategic stalemate phase, and its development was closely related to the war situation and changes in the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves.

毛泽东在《论持久战》中指出，在战略相持阶段，“敌我力量对比将发生巨大的相反的变化，中国将逐渐上升，日本则逐渐下降……先走到平衡的地位，再走到优劣相反的地位”。地道战是诞生于战略相持阶段的平原游击战术，它的发展与战争形势以及敌我力量的变化密切相关。

From the Japanese side. On the one hand, the implementation of the “cage policy” [12]12 The “cage policy” (囚笼政策) was a Japanese strategy in North China from 1941 onward, using blockhouses, fortified strongpoints, and封锁沟 (blockade ditches) to restrict the mobility of the Eighth Route Army and cut off base areas from each other. was extremely dependent on the quantity and quality of Japanese troops, and after entering 1943, the advantages of the world anti-fascist camp gradually became apparent, with the Japanese army suffering continuous defeats in the Pacific theater, forcing the Imperial General Headquarters and the Army General Staff to decide on a strategic contraction; on the other hand, the implementation and maintenance of the “cage policy” caused its troops and equipment to be constantly dispersed, and this prolonged dispersed deployment also led to a tendency among Japanese troops for “superior officers to be unable to fully supervise and guide, resulting in a slackening of punitive campaigns and a relaxation of vigilance.” As troop numbers became stretched, the Japanese army had to abandon some strongpoints to concentrate forces. In the autumn of 1944, Senior Staff Officer of the North China Area Army, Kankawa Yoshitō, when recalling the “public order” situation of that period, stated bluntly: among the 400 counties the Japanese army occupied in central Hebei, there were 139 counties where basically no troops were deployed and the CPC was left to its own activities. To restrain the Eighth Route Army’s guerrilla tactics, the Japanese army needed to invest large numbers of troops and deploy them dispersedly to form tight control over central Hebei, but as the Japanese army’s decline gradually became evident, neither troop strength nor personnel quality could continue to meet the requirements of the “cage policy,” which objectively provided favorable conditions for the CPC to vigorously develop tunnel warfare.

从日军方面看。一方面，“囚笼政策”的开展极度依赖日方的军队数量和质量，而自进入 1943年后，世界反法西斯阵营优势渐显，日军在太平洋战场不断失利，日本大本营和参谋本部不得不作出了战略收缩的决定；另一方面，“囚笼政策”的开展和维持，致使其兵力和装备不断分散，而长期的分散部署，也使日军“上级指导官不能充分监督指导，形成怠于讨伐和放松警备的倾向”。随着兵员数量捉襟见肘，日军不得不放弃部分据点以便集中兵力。1944年秋，华北方面军高级参谋寒川吉溢在回忆这一时间的“治安”状况时直言：日军在冀中占领的 400个县里，基本未配备兵力、听任中共活动的就有 139个县。想要克制八路军的游击战术，日军需要投入大量兵力并分散部署以形成对冀中的严密控制，但随着日军颓势的逐渐显露，无论是部队兵力还是人员素质都无法继续满足“囚笼政策”要求，这在客观上为中共大力发展地道战提供了有利条件。

From the CPC side. In October 1942, Liu Shaoqi, on his way back to Yan’an by order, rested temporarily at the Eighth Route Army headquarters in Matian County. Upon learning of this, Huang Jing, Secretary of the Central Hebei District Party Committee, and Lü Zhengcao, Commander of the Military District, rushed from central Hebei to southeastern Shanxi to report to Liu Shaoqi on their work and sought his instructions on the issue of tunnel warfare. After understanding the situation, Liu Shaoqi affirmed the prospects for developing tunnel warfare in central Hebei and proposed that tunnel warfare should be elevated to the level of guerrilla warfare, that is, “gradually transform from a defensive form into a form capable of both defense and offense,” and through elusive tunnel warfare “force the enemy entering the base areas into a passive position where every bush and tree looks like a soldier.” [13]13 “Every bush and tree looks like a soldier” (草木皆兵) is a Chinese idiom from the *Jin Shu* (Book of Jin), describing extreme fear and paranoia, where the enemy sees soldiers everywhere. Liu Shaoqi also gave instructions on the direction of tunnel warfare’s development, such as combining tunnel warfare with mass mobilization and political struggle, combining underground struggle with above-ground struggle, and strengthening the concealment of tunnels. Liu Shaoqi’s instructions not only strengthened the confidence of the central Hebei Party organization in developing tunnel warfare but also pointed out the direction of tunnel warfare’s development from the heights of strategy and tactics, playing a crucial role in the rapid development of tunnel warfare.

从中共方面看。1942年 10月，刘少奇奉命返回延安的途中在八路军总部麻田县暂时休整。冀中区党委书记黄敬、军区司令员吕正操得知后便从冀中赶赴晋东南向刘少奇汇报工作，并请示了关于地道战的问题。刘少奇了解情况后，肯定了地道战在冀中的发展前景，并提出应该把地道战提高到游击战争的高度，即“由防御的形式逐步转为既能防御又能进攻的形式”，通过神出鬼没的地道战“迫使进入根据地的敌人，陷于草木皆兵的被动地位”。刘少奇对地道战的发展方向也作出指示，诸如将地道战和群众动员与政治斗争相结合、地下斗争和地上斗争相结合、强化地道的隐蔽性等。刘少奇的指示，不仅坚定了冀中党组织对发展地道战的信心，而且进一步从战略和战术的高度指明了地道战的发展方向，对于地道战的快速发展起到了至关重要的作用。

After the “May Day Mop-Up,” the objective battlefield environment on the central Hebei plain was no longer suitable for large-scale army operations. The activities of large units and cadres in the base areas became extremely difficult, constrained everywhere by ditch-walls, blockhouses, and the Japanese army’s transportation network. Under these circumstances, the troops could only reduce the scale of the army and the struggle. The resistance situation in central Hebei at this time was characterized mainly by small-unit activities, and the advantages of tunnel warfare in small-scale combat gradually became apparent. This change in the situation and the transformation of the form of struggle provided the necessary objective conditions for the development of tunnel warfare. After Liu Shaoqi approved and indicated the direction for tunnel warfare’s development, in November 1942, the interim Central Hebei District Party Committee stated that “tunnel struggle can be widely developed in the future,” and further required Party committees at all levels to dig large numbers of tunnels and connect them appropriately in preparation.

“五一大扫荡”之后，冀中平原上客观的战场环境不再适合大规模军队作战。根据地大股部队和干部的活动变得极为困难，处处受到沟墙、碉堡以及日军交通网的限制。在这种局势之下，部队只能减小军队和斗争的规模。冀中的抗战形势此时呈现出以小部队活动为主的特点，地道战在小规模战斗方面的优势逐渐显露，这种形势的变化和斗争形式的转变为地道战的发展提供了必要的客观条件。在刘少奇认可并指示地道战的发展方向后，1942年 11月，冀中区临时区党委表示“将来可广泛开展地道斗争”，进而要求各级党委大量挖掘地道，并将其适当连接以作准备。

Following Liu Shaoqi’s instructions, the central Hebei base area combined tunnel warfare with political mobilization, turning paper appeals into a broad mass movement. Institutions at all levels in central Hebei, from top to bottom, issued documents introducing experiences on tunnel digging, manpower allocation, and the like. In the winter of 1942, Yi County established county-, district-, and village-level tunnel committees composed of Party, government, military, and civilian departments to guide and disseminate experience. In 1943, the Central Hebei Military District proposed the tactic of “creating village guerrilla warfare and village chain defense warfare,” emphasizing mobilizing the masses to open up underground, above-ground, and rooftop lines within villages to conduct guerrilla warfare. After 1944, tunnel digging was directly planned, organized, and led by the base area government, with the expenses and materials consumed also provided by the government. Under the organization and leadership of organs at all levels, tunnel digging began to be widely carried out within the central Hebei base area.

按照刘少奇的指示，冀中根据地将地道战和政治动员相结合，将纸面的号召落实成了广泛的群众运动。冀中自上而下各机构，纷纷发布有关地道挖掘、人力分配等经验介绍的文件。1942年冬季，易县由党政军民各部门成立县区村地道委员会，以指导和介绍经验。1943年冀中军区提出“创造村落游击战、村落连环防卫战”的战术，强调发动群众打通村中地下、地上、屋顶的线路开展游击战。1944年之后，地道挖掘更是由根据地政府直接计划并组织领导，所消耗的经费和物资也都由政府提供。地道挖掘在各级机关的组织领导下开始在冀中根据地内广泛开展。

The digging of tunnels not only increased the space for CPC troops to operate, improving the resistance situation in central Hebei, but also, through small-scale combat conducted on a village-by-village basis, enabled the CPC armed forces to continuously accumulate experience and train militia during this process, rapidly increasing the number of villages with a certain combat capability. At the end of 1944, Lieutenant General Nosho Shōtoku, commander of the Japanese 63rd Division responsible for the Baoding area’s security, faced with the activity of guerrilla warfare in that area, wrote in his year-end reflections: “The anti-communist war has turned into tunnel warfare.” Taking Dingnan County near Baoding as an example, by 1945, among the county’s 314 villages, approximately 160 had reported digging tunnels. There were 19 villages with tunnels over 1,000 *zhang* [14]14 A *zhang* (丈) is a traditional Chinese unit of length, approximately 3.33 meters. in length, approximately 95 villages with tunnels between 200 and 1,000 *zhang*, and 46 villages with tunnels under 200 *zhang*. Through promotion and development, by this time the tunnels on the central Hebei plain had developed into an underground network connecting every household, as dense as a spider’s web, “recreating an underground layer of anti-Japanese base areas.”

地道的挖掘不仅增加了中共部队的活动空间，使冀中的抗战形势得以好转，同时以村为单位开展的小规模战斗，使中共武装在此过程中能够不断积累经验、培养民兵，具有一定战斗能力的村庄数量迅速增加。1944年末，侵华日军负责保定地区警戒的第 63师团师团长野副昌德中将面对该地区游击战的活跃，在其年终述感中写道：“剿共战已变成地道战”。以保定附近的定南县为例，到 1945年，全县 314个村庄中仅上报的挖有地道的村庄就有约 160个。地道长度在 1000丈以上的村庄 19个、200到 1000丈的村庄约 95个、200丈以下的村庄46个。经过推广发展，此时冀中平原的地道已经发展成家家互通、密如蛛网的地下网络，“重新创造了一层地下的抗日根据地”。

The development of tunnel warfare practice also drove the gradual perfection of the CPC’s tunnel construction experience and tactical thinking. Following Liu Shaoqi’s tactical conception of “capable of both defense and offense,” the central Hebei military and civilian population drew on past experience, and on the basis of utilizing tunnels, fully coordinated with traditional above-ground forms of struggle such as mine warfare and sparrow warfare [15]15 “Sparrow warfare” (麻雀战) is a guerrilla tactic named after the sparrow’s habit of pecking and fleeing; it involves small, highly mobile groups harassing the enemy with hit-and-run attacks from multiple directions., developing a village tunnel tactic that combined tunnel digging with the transformation of villages. Its core was the full utilization and transformation of the above-ground and underground space of villages: not only building walls around the villages, sealing main roads while leaving small paths, and relying on the villages to construct fortifications layer by layer, but also using sturdy tall houses within the villages to construct combat watchtowers, building sky bridges between other houses, breaking through walls to connect courtyards, and linking all tunnels together to form a crossfire system of three layers—horizontal and vertical—along the village perimeter, streets, courtyards, rooftops, ground level, and underground. Then, using field tunnels as a link, villages, tunnels, and the open countryside were combined into a “three-dimensional” combat position. This joint defense transformation of above-ground and underground, inside and outside the village, made full use of the geographical features of the North China landscape—soil, crops, villages, civilian houses—turning the villages into combat fortresses capable of offense and defense, advance and retreat, organically integrating the preservation of oneself with the annihilation of the enemy. The vast plain of central Hebei was transformed into a three-dimensional, diverse, vertically and horizontally interconnected, and offensively and defensively capable combat system.

地道战斗争实践的发展也推动着中共地道建造经验和战术思想的日益完善。按照刘少奇“既能防御又能进攻”的战术设想，冀中军民吸取以往经验，在利用地道的基础上，充分配合传统的地雷战、麻雀战等地面斗争形式，发展出了把挖掘地道与改造村落相结合的村落地道战术。其核心就是对村庄地上、地下空间进行充分利用与改造，不仅在村庄的四周筑起围墙，封大路留小路，依托村庄层层构筑工事，而且在村内将坚固的高房用来构筑战斗岗楼，其余各房之间则搭架天桥，各家之间掏墙连院，各地道之间互相打通，构成村沿、街内、院内和房顶、地面、地道横纵各三层的交叉火力系统。然后，以野外地道为纽带，把村庄、地道、野外组成一个“立体”的作战阵地。这种地上地下、村里村外的联防改造，充分利用了华北地貌、土壤、作物、村落、民房等地理特征，把村落建设成为可攻可守、可进可退的战斗堡垒，将保存自身和消灭敌人有机结合起来。冀中广袤的平原，被改造成了立体多样、纵横贯通、攻防兼备的战斗系统。

In addition to transforming villages to enhance combat capability, the idea of strengthening the concealment of tunnels also received great attention from the military and civilians in central Hebei. The core of tunnel warfare tactics lies in achieving surprise; once a tunnel entrance, firing port, or ventilation hole is detected by the enemy, not only is the effect greatly diminished, but the military and civilians inside the tunnel also fall into danger. Therefore, during this period, the development of tunnels paid particular attention to the concealment and armament of various internal facilities. In 1944, the Japanese army’s *Guide to Bandit Suppression* [16]16 The Japanese term “剿共指南” (Guide to Bandit Suppression) refers to a manual issued by the Japanese military during the war, using the derogatory term “bandit” for the CPC and its forces. mentioned that the CPC would reward the planting of tall-stemmed crops and prohibit their harvesting in order to conceal the traces of tunnels. For CPC troops, once they were unable to hold their own in combat, they needed to retreat into the tunnels, so the camouflage of tunnel entrances was also particularly important. These entrances were often coordinated with various village facilities, such as livestock troughs, kang mats, [17]17 A kang is a traditional Chinese heated brick bed used as a sleeping platform, common in northern China. and stove tops. In addition, to prevent the enemy from digging open the tunnel after discovering the entrance, the Chinese side would lay pull-fuse landmines near the entrance and dig a parallel tunnel nearby with gun ports. If the enemy dug open the tunnel, the landmines could be detonated to collapse and bury the entrance; if they entered, the militia could use the firing ports to attack, then withdraw through other entrances.

除了对村庄进行改造以增加战斗能力之外，加强地道隐蔽性的思想也备受冀中军民重视。地道战术的核心即在于出其不意，而一旦地道口、射击孔或通气孔被敌人探知，不仅效果会大打折扣，地道中的军民也会陷入危险之中。因此，这一时期地道的发展就特别注意内部各种设施的隐蔽性和武装性。1944年，日军的《剿共指南》中提到，中共会通过奖励种植高秆植物并禁止割取，以掩护地道的行踪。对中共部队来讲，一旦在作战中战力不支就需要退回到地道之中，因此地道口的伪装也显得格外重要。其往往是配合村内的各种设施，如牲口槽、炕席、锅台等处。此外，为了防止敌人发现洞口后掘开地道，中方会在洞口附近埋上拉发地雷，旁边另挖一条平行地道并设置枪眼。敌人如果掘开地道则可引爆地雷将洞口炸塌掩埋，进入则民兵可以利用射击口攻击，之后从其他洞口撤离。

Under the CPC’s organized leadership and transformation, the tunnel fortifications in central Hebei were increasingly perfected and soon demonstrated great power in the struggle against the enemy. In December 1944, a combined force of Japanese and puppet troops [18]18 “Puppet troops” (伪军) refers to Chinese collaborationist forces fighting for the Japanese occupation regime. of three battalions launched a converging attack on Shijing Village. As soon as they reached the village entrance, they triggered pre-planted landmines, suffering heavy casualties. Subsequently, 32 militiamen in the village met the enemy in four groups. In the northeast of the village, the militia relied on courtyard fortifications to resist three enemy charges before entering the tunnel; the other groups, after covering the evacuation of civilians, also assembled inside the tunnel. After the Japanese and puppet troops entered the village, they dispersed everywhere, looting grain and livestock. The militia continuously shifted positions throughout the village via the tunnels, using gate towers and tall houses to intermittently open fire, breaking up enemy concentrations and inflicting casualties. A squad of enemies discovered a tunnel entrance in a certain courtyard; just as they were about to destroy it, the militia detonated a landmine, killing and wounding them. Enemy troops in other places also suffered intermittent harassment fire from the militia. The battle lasted from midnight until dusk the next day, forcing the Japanese and puppet troops to withdraw. In this battle, 13 engagements occurred; the militia expended 300 rounds of ammunition, 30 hand grenades, and 9 landmines, suffering no casualties themselves. It can be regarded as a classic application of village tunnel warfare tactics.

在中共有组织的领导和改造下，冀中地道工事日臻完善，很快就在对敌斗争中显现出巨大威力。1944年 12月，日伪军三个大队合击石井村，刚到村口就引爆了预埋好的地雷，死伤惨重。随后，村内 32名民兵分四路迎击。村东北处民兵依托院落工事，抗击敌人三次冲锋后才进入地道，其他组在掩护群众隐蔽后也于地道内会合。日伪军进村后分散各处，抢夺粮食牲畜。民兵通过地道在村庄各处不断转移，利用门楼、高房不时开枪打散敌人集结并造成杀伤。一队敌人在某处院内发现洞口，刚欲破坏就被民兵拉炸地雷炸死炸伤，其他各处的敌伪也不时遭到民兵的开枪袭扰。战斗由夜半打至次日黄昏，日伪军被迫撤离。此战，共发生战斗 13次，民兵消耗子弹 300发，手榴弹 30枚，地雷 9枚，自身无伤亡，堪称村落地道战术的经典运用。

The tactical essence of tunnel warfare lies in: relying on ground positions to resist step by step; once the Japanese troops enter the village, shifting underground, flexibly moving through the tunnels, and striking out in all directions; coordinating tunnels with the village to increase the militia’s range of action; and by extensively setting up firing ports, combined with various tactics such as landmine warfare and sparrow warfare, [19]19 “Sparrow warfare” (麻雀战) is a guerrilla tactic named after the sparrow’s darting movements, involving small groups harassing the enemy from multiple directions. ensuring that enemy troops who have entered the village, even if they have occupied it, constantly face the risk of being killed or wounded by uncertain bullets or landmines. Faced with the CPC’s tunnel warfare, the Japanese and puppet troops were under immense physical and mental pressure, and ultimately often had no choice but to withdraw. As Yang Chengwu, then commander of the Central Hebei Military District, said: “Tunnel warfare in central Hebei originated before ‘May Day,’ [20]20 “May Day” (五一) here refers to the massive Japanese “mopping-up” campaign (the May 1st Sweep) launched in the central Hebei plain in 1942. but was widely applied after ‘May Day.’”

地道战的战术精髓在于：依靠地面阵地节节抵抗，待日军进入村庄之后则转入地下，通过地道灵活转移，四处出击；把地道和村落相配合，增加民兵的活动范围；通过广设射击孔，配合地雷战、麻雀战等多种战术，使得进入村庄的敌军哪怕已经占领了村庄，也要时刻面临不确定的子弹或是地雷炸死炸伤的风险。面对中共的地道战，日伪军在身体和精神上都面临极大的压力，最终往往只能无奈撤退。正如时任冀中军区司令员的杨成武所言：“冀中地道创始于‘五一’前，而广泛应用是在‘五一’后。”

In the later period of the War of Resistance, with the gradual emergence of the Japanese army’s decline in China and the spread of tunnels throughout the central Hebei plain, the balance of power between China and Japan changed markedly, and the role of tunnel warfare tactics became increasingly prominent in response to this change. From combat records, village tunnel warfare was predominantly small-scale: the Japanese side rarely deployed forces of a thousand men, and most were puppet troops; the CPC side mostly involved small numbers of guerrillas and militia, generally limited to around twenty to thirty people. Therefore, the Chinese side’s tactics of relying on villages to conduct tunnel warfare and guerrilla warfare precisely suited the situation of the Japanese side’s dispersed troop deployment and reduced combat effectiveness in the later stages of the war. With this ebb and flow, China and Japan presented a brief and delicate balance on the central Hebei plain. However, this balance was soon broken. Tunnel warfare, combined with traditional guerrilla warfare to form village tunnel tactics, accumulated sufficient strength for the final victory of the War of Resistance. In the later period of the War of Resistance, the CPC continuously launched local counteroffensives, and the liberated areas rapidly expanded to cover most of central Hebei.

抗战后期，随着日军在华颓势的逐渐显现，以及地道在整个冀中平原的推广，中日双方力量消长变化明显，地道战术的作用也顺应这种变化愈发凸显。从战斗记录来看，村落地道战总体上以小规模战斗为主：日军方面很少出动千人的规模，且大多数是伪军；中共方面参战的也多是数量不大的游击队和民兵，一般限于二三十人左右。因此，中方依靠村庄开展地道战、游击战的战术，恰好与日方战争后期兵力的分散部署及战斗力降低的形势相适应。此消彼长之下，中日双方在冀中平原呈现出短暂且微妙的平衡状态。不过这一平衡很快就被打破。地道战配合传统游击战进而形成的村落地道战术，为抗战胜利的最后到来积蓄了充足的力量。抗战后期，中共不断展开局部反攻，解放区范围迅速扩展至冀中大部分地区。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

The emergence and development of tunnel warfare were the result of the military and civilians in central Hebei adapting to the struggle environment and persisting in the War of Resistance; it was an innovative practice of the CPC’s guerrilla warfare thought in the plain areas. The conduct of tunnel warfare shifted conventional ground guerrilla warfare underground, creatively expanding the tactical space of guerrilla warfare, opening up a new three-dimensional, multi-layered combat field in enemy-occupied areas, preserving one’s own strength while striking powerful blows against the enemy. The significance and value of this innovative practice were not limited to the tactical level but extended to the fields of strategy and war theory. The formation and development of tunnel warfare relied on unified leadership, effective organization, broad mobilization, and vigorous promotion; it was the result of the CPC’s persistence in the struggle against Japan, persistence in the mass line, persistence in independence and self-reliance, and persistence in innovation and creation. In the later period of the War of Resistance, under the CPC’s vigorous promotion, tunnel warfare was rapidly carried out not only in central Hebei but also in plain areas such as southern Hebei and eastern Hebei. With the widespread conduct of tunnel warfare, the Japanese army gradually sank into the vast ocean of the people’s war led by the CPC, and the offensive-defensive situation underwent a tremendous change. Moreover, the experience and tactical development of tunnel warfare did not cease after the victory of the War of Resistance; the tunnels spread across the central Hebei plain continued to play the role of “preserving oneself and striking the enemy” during the War of Liberation, [21]21 The War of Liberation (解放战争) refers to the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949) between the CPC and the Kuomintang. with far-reaching significance and value.

地道战的产生和发展是冀中军民适应斗争环境坚持抗战的结果，是中共游击战思想在平原地区的一次创新实践。地道战的开展，将常规的地面游击战转入地下，创造性地拓展了游击战的战术空间，在敌占区开辟了全新的立体化、多层次的战斗场域，在保存自身力量的同时予敌以有力打击。这一创新实践的意义和价值不仅限于战术层面，更延伸至战略和战争理论领域。地道战的形成和发展依赖于统一的领导、有效的组织、广泛的动员、有力的推广，是中共坚持对日斗争、坚持群众路线、坚持独立自主、坚持创新创造的结果。抗战后期，在中共的大力推广之下，地道战不仅在冀中，而且在冀南、冀东等平原地区得以迅速开展。随着地道战的广泛开展，日军逐渐深陷中共领导的人民战争的汪洋之中，攻守之势发生巨大变化。而且，地道战的经验和战术的发展并未在抗战胜利后中断，遍布冀中平原的地道在解放战争中仍然继续发挥着“保存自身，打击敌人”的作用，意义和价值影响深远。

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