The Chinese Communist Party’s Understanding of and Policy toward Britain under the Background of the Second KMT–CPC United Front, and Their Impact (1937–1940)

In June 1940, Mao Zedong pointed out in an internal Party reference document that, from the signing of the Soviet–German agreement in August 1939 to the signing of the Soviet–Finnish peace treaty in March 1940, an anti-Soviet upsurge had swept the world. Instigated and influenced by Britain, the United States and France, the Guomindang government on the one hand launched anti-Soviet propaganda and on the other hand launched an anti-Communist upsurge. “‘Where does friction come from?’ Many people do not understand a vertical line of descent running from Chamberlain to He Shaonan.” [1]1 He Shaonan (何绍南) was a Guomindang official notorious for his anti-Communist activities in northern Shaanxi during the War of Resistance; the term “friction” (磨擦) was used by the CPC to describe KMT-instigated military and political clashes within the united front. Linking the British Prime Minister Chamberlain with the Guomindang “friction expert” He Shaonan, two figures who appear to have nothing to do with each other, and interpreting KMT–CPC relations against the complex international situation, is a thread that seems peculiar but in fact has a traceable logic.

1940年6月，毛泽东在一份党内参考材料中指出，从1939年8月苏、德签订协定起至1940年3月苏、芬签订和约止，世界范围内掀起反苏高潮。在英、美、法的策动和影响下，国民党政府一方面发动了反苏宣传，一方面发动了反共高潮。“‘磨擦从何而来’呢？许多人不明白从张伯伦到何绍南这样一条垂直的线索。”把英国首相张伯伦与国民党“磨擦专家”何绍南两个貌似毫不相关的人物联系在一起，将国共关系置于纷繁复杂的国际局势下加以解读，这是一个看似奇特，其实有迹可循的脉络。

Japan’s invasion of China shattered the original pattern of the Far East and drew the attention of major powers such as Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. Among them, Britain, as the de facto leader of the League of Nations and one of the largest holders of vested interests in China, attracted particularly notable attention. Yet for a considerable period, Britain’s policy toward Japan vacillated, and the Central Committee of the CPC maintained close attention to this throughout. The CPC’s understanding of and policy toward Britain were grounded in changes in the domestic and international political situation, especially in KMT–CPC relations, and in turn influenced to a certain extent the CPC’s handling of KMT–CPC relations.

日本对中国的侵略打破了原有的远东格局，引起英、美、苏等大国关注。其中，作为国联的实际主导者、在华既得利益的最大拥有者之一，英国的反应尤为引人瞩目。但在相当长一段时间里，英国的对日策略摇摆不定，中共中央则始终对此给予密切关注。中共对英国的认识和政策立足于国内外政治形势尤其是国共关系的变化，反过来又在一定程度上影响了中共对国共关系的处理。

When discussing the relationship between the CPC and Britain during the War of Resistance, the academic community has mostly focused on the period after the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, examining how the CPC sought British aid and conducted international cooperation. There is still a lack of specialized research on the earlier period. This article selects the historical stage from the outbreak of the all-out War of Resistance in 1937 to the formation of the German–Italian–Japanese alliance in September 1940, and, taking the CPC’s observation of British diplomacy as its main thread, discusses how the CPC understood and responded to the international situation and to KMT–CPC relations, in the hope of providing a new perspective for understanding China’s international and domestic situation during the War of Resistance.

学界在讨论抗战时期中共与英国的关系时，重点多放在1941年太平洋战争爆发后如何争取英国援助、开展国际合作上，对此前的情况尚缺专题研究。本文选取1937年全民族抗战爆发至1940年9月德、意、日三国结盟这一历史阶段，以中共对英国外交的观察为主线，讨论中共如何认识、应对国际时局及国共关系等问题，以期为理解抗战时期中国的国际国内局势提供新视角。

I. The United Front Strategy and the Struggle to Win over Britain for Joint Resistance against Japan

一、统一战线策略与争取联英抗日

As a political party founded amid the tide of world revolution, the CPC’s major policies and decisions often had a broad global vision. In its early days, the CPC accepted Lenin’s theory on the national and colonial question and was influenced by the instructions of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International on the anti-imperialist united front. Until the mid-1930s, while persisting in opposing Japan and the Guomindang, the CPC’s national liberation struggle always targeted Anglo-American imperialism.

作为一个在世界革命浪潮中成立的政党，中共的重大方针和决策往往有着宽广的世界眼光。中共在成立初期接受列宁关于民族和殖民地问题的理论，并受到共产国际四大有关反帝统一战线指示的影响。直到20世纪30年代中期，中共在坚持反日、反国民党的同时，民族解放斗争的矛头始终指向英美帝国主义。

The CPC’s adjustment of its line in this regard was closely related to the Soviet Union and the Communist International. Around 1934, the Soviet government began actively seeking cooperation with Western powers such as Britain and France to resist the threat of aggression from Germany and Japan. Influenced by this, the Communist International demanded that communist parties in various countries adjust their policies in a timely manner. At the Seventh Congress of the Communist International held in 1935, General Secretary Georgi Dimitrov sharply criticized the fascist dictatorships of Germany, Italy and other countries, reclassified Britain, France and the United States as democratic countries, and argued that the most critical task for communist parties at that time was “to establish a broad anti-fascist people’s front.” Specifically for semi-colonial China, it was necessary “to establish a very broad united front against Japanese imperialism and its Chinese agents.” The CPC’s subsequent “August First Declaration” proposed “uniting with all nations and countries that sympathize with China’s national liberation movement, and establishing friendly relations with all nations and countries that maintain a benevolent neutrality toward the Chinese people’s anti-Japanese war of liberation,” and expressed willingness “to immediately negotiate with all parties and groups in China willing to participate in the cause of national salvation and resistance against Japan … on the question of jointly establishing a national defense government.”

中共在这方面的路线调整与苏联和共产国际密切相关。1934年前后，苏联政府开始积极寻求与英、法等西方大国合作，抵御德、日两国的侵略威胁。受此影响，共产国际要求各国共产党及时调整政策。在1935年召开的共产国际七大上，总书记季米特洛夫尖锐批判德、意等国法西斯独裁政权，改称英、法、美为民主国家，认为各国共产党目前最关键的任务是“建立广泛的反法西斯人民战线”。具体到半殖民地的中国，要“建立一个反对日本帝国主义及其中国代理人的非常广泛的统一战线”。中共随后发表的《八一宣言》提出，“联合一切同情中国民族解放运动的民族和国家，对一切对中国民众反日解放战争守善意中立的民族和国家建立友谊关系”，并表示“愿意立刻与中国一切愿意参加抗日救国事业的各党派、各团体……进行谈判共同成立国防政府问题”。

After the resolutions of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International reached northern Shaanxi, the Central Committee of the CPC began to formulate the strategy of the anti-Japanese national united front. Zhang Wentian reassessed the overall situation, arguing that the drawing together of the three aggressor nations—Germany, Italy and Japan—had “caused great changes within the imperialist camp” and that contradictions with Britain, France and the United States would further escalate. The CPC’s goal was to establish a united front, “with opposing Japanese imperialism as the center,” and “to use a national revolutionary war to oppose imperialist aggression.” Mao Zedong expressed agreement and pointed out that contradictions existed between Japan, which was invading China, and the British and French great powers, so it was no longer appropriate to lump them together. China “should, according to possibility, establish relations with those imperialist countries that are now willing to maintain peace and oppose new wars of aggression, for the common opposition to Japanese imperialist aggression.” In short, before the outbreak of the all-out War of Resistance, the Central Committee of the CPC changed its policy of opposing Britain and began to seek support from Western countries for the common struggle against Japanese imperialist aggression. Liu Shaoqi pointed out: “Britain, France and the United States are giving considerable support to China’s resistance against Japan. The outcome of the struggle between the international peace front and the aggression front has become one of the decisive factors in the victory or defeat of China’s War of Resistance.” Under the major premise of establishing a world anti-fascist united front and an anti-Japanese national united front, the CPC’s understanding of and policy toward Britain underwent a clear adjustment.

共产国际七大决议传到陕北后，中共中央开始制定抗日民族统一战线策略。张闻天对整个形势进行了重估，认为德、意、日三个侵略国家的靠拢“使帝国主义内部发生了很大的变动”，与英、法、美的矛盾将会进一步升级。中共的目标是建立统一战线，“反对日本帝国主义尤其是中心”，“要以民族革命战争反对帝国主义的侵略”。毛泽东表示认可，并指出：侵华的日本与英法列强存在矛盾，不宜再将两者混为一谈，中国“应当按照可能，和那些在现时愿意保持和平而反对新的侵略战争的帝国主义国家建立共同反对日本帝国主义的关系”。简言之，在全民族抗战爆发前，中共中央改变了反英政策，开始寻求西方国家支持，共同反对日本帝国主义的侵略。刘少奇指出：“英美法相当赞助中国抗日。国际和平阵线与侵略阵线斗争的胜负，已经成为中国抗日战争胜负的决定因素之一。”在建立世界反法西斯统一战线和抗日民族统一战线的大前提下，中共对英国的认识和政策有了明显调整。

First, China’s War of Resistance against Japan did not exist in isolation but was highly connected to the situation in the Pacific and even the world situation, and Britain was an important ally of China. On the eve of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Mao Zedong solemnly explained to foreign journalists: “The question of peace and war in the East is a world question.” The Japanese army’s target of attack was not only China but also aimed at “occupying the Philippines, Siam, Vietnam, the Malay Peninsula and the Dutch East Indies.” Hoping to curb Japanese aggression by making China yield was “nothing but an illusion.” “China, Britain, the United States, France and the Soviet Union should quickly unite, otherwise there is a danger of being defeated one by one by the enemy.” Furthermore, according to the CPC’s understanding, Germany’s expansion in Europe and Japan’s aggression in the Far East were two sides of the same coin. “Germany is precisely the accomplice of the Japanese bandits in invading China, so striking at the Western aggressor is also striking at the Eastern bandit.” The aggressive actions of Germany and Japan “are in direct conflict with the vital interests of countries such as Britain, France and the United States.” Britain could by no means stand aloof and should cooperate with China, the Soviet Union and other countries to jointly confront the German and Japanese aggressive forces on the Eurasian continent.

第一，中国的抗日战争并非孤立存在，而是与太平洋局势乃至世界局势高度关联，其中英国是中国的重要盟友。在卢沟桥事变前夕，毛泽东对外国记者郑重说明：“东方的和平与战争问题是一个世界性问题。”日军的进攻目标不仅是中国，也志在“占领菲律宾、暹罗、越南、马来半岛和荷属东印度”。希望通过中国作出让步来遏制日本侵略，“只是一种幻想”。“中、英、美、法、苏五国应该赶快地联合一致，否则有被敌人各个击破之虞。”此外，按照中共的理解，德国在欧洲的扩张与日本在远东的侵略实为一体两面。“德国正是日寇侵略中国的帮凶，所以打击西方侵略者亦就是打击东方强盗。”德、日的侵略行动“与英、法、美等国的切身利益是直接冲突的”。英国绝不可能独善其身，理应与中、苏等国合作，在欧亚大陆一致对抗德、日侵略势力。

Second, Britain played a pivotal role in the world structure, but whether it would vigorously aid China in resisting Japan remained to be seen. Within the world anti-fascist united front, the strength of each country and the size of its interests in China varied, and the CPC’s assessment of them also differed. In the summer of 1937, Mao Zedong told foreign journalists: “What is most important for China is the policy of Britain and the United States. These two countries are particularly in danger of fascist aggression from both East and West.” At that time, Britain’s political and diplomatic influence still slightly surpassed that of the United States, and the latter, having long pursued the Monroe Doctrine, often followed Britain’s lead in international affairs. Therefore, regarding sanctions against Japan, “the pace of the United States still depends on Britain’s attitude; without Britain’s consent, the United States is still unwilling to act alone.” The CPC leaders were very clear about Britain’s influence on the international stage. For example, Zhang Wentian stated at the Luochuan Conference [2]2 The Luochuan Conference (洛川会议) was an enlarged meeting of the CPC Central Committee held in Luochuan, Shaanxi, in August 1937, which formally adopted the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the strategy of independent guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. that whether Britain was tough or not in the Far East profoundly affected the direction of the situation. In a word, “Britain’s attitude has a decisive effect on Japan.” Conversely, once Britain and Japan compromised, the resulting shock would inevitably be considerable. Zhou Enlai pointed out: “Partial compromise is something to be concerned about. If Britain is willing, France will follow, and Portugal and the Netherlands will be even worse.” In short, Britain was an important factor determining the direction of the situation in Asia and even the world. Similar views also existed among the upper echelons of the Guomindang. For example, Chiang Kai-shek believed: “If the Sino-Japanese war has the potential to affect the situation in Europe, the key to controlling it lies entirely with Britain.” On this point, there was basically no fundamental disagreement between the leaders of the two parties, the KMT and the CPC, on the policy of uniting Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union to jointly oppose Japan.

第二，英国在世界格局中的作用举足轻重，但其能否大力援华抗日尚待观察。在世界反法西斯统一战线中，各国实力与在华利益大小不一，中共对其评判也存在差异。1937年夏，毛泽东对外国记者说：“对于中国最重要的是英美二国的政策。这两个国家，是特别有受到东西两面法西斯侵略的危险。”彼时英国的政治、外交影响力仍略胜于美国，且后者长期奉行门罗主义，在国际事务上常唯英国马首是瞻，所以在对日制裁上，“美国的进度仍须视英国的态度而定，没有英国的赞同，美国还是不愿单独发动的”。中共领导人非常清楚英国在国际舞台上的影响力。例如，张闻天在洛川会议中谈到，英国在远东的强硬与否，深刻影响着局势走向。一句话概括，“英国态度对日本有着决定作用”。反过来看，一旦英、日妥协，所引发的震荡必然不小。周恩来指出：“局部的妥协是可顾虑的。英国如愿，法国必跟着，葡、荷是会更坏的。”总之，英国是决定亚洲乃至世界局势走向的重要因素。类似观点在国民党高层中同样存在。例如，蒋介石认为：“中日战事苟有影响欧洲大局之可能，则操其枢纽者全在英国。”就此而论，国共两党领导人在联合英、法、美、苏共同对日的方针上是基本一致的，并无根本性分歧。

However, after the Japanese army launched its full-scale war of aggression against China in 1937, Britain never made up its mind to take a hard line against Japan, which caused the Chinese Communist Party’s negative understanding of Britain to rise gradually. For example, after the Battle of Shanghai broke out, Britain and the United States took no obvious action to aid China. Mao Zedong, at a meeting of Party activists, criticized Britain for being “limited to verbal sympathy, with no assistance of any real strength.” [3]3 Mao Zedong, “The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War after the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan” (November 12, 1937), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 2. At the Nine-Power Treaty Conference convened in November of the same year, Britain was still unwilling to take the initiative to sanction Japan, prompting the Chinese Communist Party’s doubts to increase steadily and it criticized the British attitude at the conference as unsteady and unwilling to “carry out further effective sanctions.” [4]4 “Telegram from the Chinese Communist Party Delegation to the Kuomintang and the Yangtze Bureau of the Central Committee to the Central Committee” (November 1937), in *Selected Documents of the Central Archives: The Chinese Communist Party’s Anti-Japanese National United Front Policy*, vol. 2. In early 1938, Peng Dehuai, in an interview with foreign journalists, also expressed dissatisfaction with the passive and wavering attitude of Britain, the United States and other countries toward China’s War of Resistance. [5]5 “Interview with Peng Dehuai” (January 1938), in *Selected Documents of the Central Archives: The Chinese Communist Party’s Anti-Japanese National United Front Policy*, vol. 2. Looking at the Chinese Communist Party leaders’ views of Britain during this period, it can be said that while retaining some expectations, they also offered criticism, repeatedly pointing out that “Britain’s vacillation affects the peace front.” [6]6 “Telegram from the Chinese Communist Party Delegation to the Kuomintang and the Yangtze Bureau of the Central Committee to the Central Committee” (November 1937), in *Selected Documents of the Central Archives: The Chinese Communist Party’s Anti-Japanese National United Front Policy*, vol. 2. On this basis, synthesizing the domestic and international situation, Mao Zedong stressed that the decisive factors in China’s anti-Japanese national revolutionary war were, “within China, the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party and, on the basis of this cooperation, the transformation of Kuomintang policy, and the strength of the workers and peasants; outside China, the aid of the Soviet Union.” [7]7 Mao Zedong, “The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War after the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan” (November 12, 1937), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 2. The Chinese Communist Party adopted a cautious attitude toward whether Britain would vigorously aid China in resisting Japan.

不过，1937年日军发起全面侵华战争后，英国始终未下定决心对日强硬，这使得中共对英国的负面认识逐步上升。例如，在淞沪会战爆发后，英、美没有明显的援华动作，毛泽东在党的活动分子会议上批评英国“限于口头上的同情，而没有什么实力的援助”。在同年11月召开的九国公约会议上，英国仍不愿主动出面制裁日本，促使中共疑虑渐增，批评与会的英国态度不坚定，不愿意“进行进一步的有效制裁”。1938年初，彭德怀在接受外国记者采访时也对英、美等国对中国抗战的消极游移态度表达了不满。纵观这一时期中共领导人的对英观感，可以说是在留有期待的同时给予了批评，多次点出“英之动摇影响于和平阵线”。在此基础上，综合国内外形势，毛泽东强调，中国抗日民族革命战争“决定的因素，在中国内部是国共两党的合作和在这一合作的基础上的国民党政策的转变，是工农群众的力量；在中国外部是苏联的援助”。对于英国能否大力援华抗日，中共持谨慎态度。

Third, Britain’s moves were linked to the ups and downs of the overall situation of China’s War of Resistance at home, and while actively striving for British support, one should also be on guard. On the eve of the all-nation War of Resistance, while the Chinese Communist Party was changing its strategy toward the European and American great powers, it was also seeking cooperation with the Kuomintang and actively promoting the establishment of a domestic anti-Japanese national united front. In Zhou Enlai’s words, during this period “the Communist International’s effort to build an anti-fascist united front coincided with China’s effort to build an anti-Japanese national united front.” [8]8 Zhou Enlai, “Speech at the Symposium on the History of the Party” (July 10–11, 1944), in *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, vol. 1. After establishing the strategy of the two united fronts, the Chinese Communist Party remained highly vigilant against compromise among Britain, Chiang Kai-shek and Japan, and was especially worried that the Kuomintang government’s domestic and foreign policies would be influenced by the British attitude. As Zhou Enlai wrote in a report to the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, the overall line of the Kuomintang government’s diplomacy was “Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and France,” but in practice toward the Soviet Union it was “half believing, half doubting,” and “its diplomacy toward the Soviet Union was often influenced by the diplomacy of Britain and the United States, especially Britain.” [9]9 Zhou Enlai, “Report on the Current Situation of the Kuomintang Government’s Diplomacy” (January 1938), in *Selected Documents of the Central Archives: The Chinese Communist Party’s Anti-Japanese National United Front Policy*, vol. 2. This judgment was related not only to the lack of a foundation of political trust with Britain and the Kuomintang, but also to the fact that after the outbreak of the all-nation War of Resistance, while Britain was indecisive toward Japan, many people in the upper echelons of the Kuomintang government sought to have an international force step in to “mediate.” For example, during the Nine-Power Treaty Conference, Ye Jianying observed that the atmosphere among the pro-British and pro-American faction within the Kuomintang was thick with advocacy for compromise, and they intended to “take more losses” at the conference. [10]10 Ye Jianying, “Report on the Current Situation of the War of Resistance” (November 1937), in *Selected Documents of the Central Archives: The Chinese Communist Party’s Anti-Japanese National United Front Policy*, vol. 2. After the fall of Taiyuan, Zhou Enlai also pointed out that capitulationism was growing at home, with “people advocating relying on Britain and the United States to negotiate terms, lacking confidence in self-reliance.” [11]11 Zhou Enlai, “Report on the Current Situation of the War of Resistance” (November 1937), in *Selected Documents of the Central Archives: The Chinese Communist Party’s Anti-Japanese National United Front Policy*, vol. 2. Added to this were many differences in KMT–CPC cooperation, leading the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to believe that the Chiang Kai-shek government had a tendency toward secret compromise with Britain and Japan. After the fall of Beiping and Tianjin, Zhang Wentian pointed out that although the Kuomintang had made progress, “it has not yet broken free from its past passive state in foreign affairs. Its dependence on Britain is still quite large. The tradition of wavering and vainly hoping for ease through compromise has not yet been completely overcome.” [12]12 Zhang Wentian, “On the Current Situation of the War of Resistance and the Kuomintang’s Anti-Communist Activities” (November 1937), in *Selected Documents of the Central Archives: The Chinese Communist Party’s Anti-Japanese National United Front Policy*, vol. 2. The Chinese Communist Party Central Committee stated in a report to the Communist International: “Britain’s surrender to the aggressors, and Japan’s invitation to Britain to mediate when it faces difficulties in the war, could cause certain unfavorable changes in the Chinese government.” [13]13 “Report of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to the Communist International” (November 1937), in *Selected Documents of the Central Archives: The Chinese Communist Party’s Anti-Japanese National United Front Policy*, vol. 2.

第三，英国的动向与中国国内抗战大局起伏存在关联，在积极争取英国支持之余亦应有所防备。全民族抗战前夕，中共在转变对欧美列强策略的同时，也在寻求与国民党合作，积极推动国内抗日民族统一战线的建立。用周恩来的话来说，这一时期“共产国际搞反法西斯统一战线，和中国搞抗日民族统一战线相合”。确立两条统一战线的策略后，中共仍高度警惕英、蒋、日之间妥协，尤其担心国民党政府的内外政策受到英国态度影响。一如周恩来在写给中共中央的报告中所言，国民党政府的外交，“总的路线是英美苏法”，但实际上对苏“是将信将疑”，“对苏外交常常受着英美尤其是英国外交的影响”。这种判断既与对英国和国民党缺乏政治信任基础有关，也是因为全民族抗战爆发后，在英国对日举棋不定的情况下，国民党政府高层中，不少人有意寻求国际力量出面“调停”。比如，在九国公约会议期间，叶剑英观察到，国民党内英美派主张妥协的空气浓厚，拟在会议中“多吃点亏”。太原沦陷后，周恩来也指出，国内投降主义正在生长，“主张依靠英、美谈判条件，没有自力更生的信心”。加之国共合作中仍有很多分歧，中共中央认为，蒋介石政府存在与英、日暗中妥协的倾向。张闻天在平津沦陷后指出，国民党虽有进步，但“在外交上尚未脱离过去的消极状态。对英国的依赖性，还相当大。徘徊不定、妄想偷安的妥协传统，尚未完全克服”。中共中央在给共产国际的报告中表示：“英国向着侵略主义者的投降，日本在战争困难时邀请英国出面调解，这可使中国政府产生某种不利的变化。”

Although worried that the situation of China’s War of Resistance might suffer setbacks due to Britain’s policy of appeasement, the Chinese Communist Party adopted a strategy of striving to win over both Britain and the Kuomintang government. In its external propaganda, Chinese Communist Party leaders actively spoke out, supporting the Chinese government’s diplomacy of allying with Britain and affirming Britain’s contributions to aiding China’s War of Resistance; even when occasional criticism was offered, it was more often used as an opportunity to urge Britain to take a hard line against Japan and increase its aid to China. The Chinese Communist Party also attempted to establish direct contact with Britain, frequently meeting with British journalists and British diplomatic officials stationed in China to express to the British side the intention of mutual assistance and to seek the establishment of a world anti-fascist united front. At the same time, in the early period of the all-nation War of Resistance, the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party shared common ground both in domestic affairs—cooperating to resist Japan—and in foreign affairs—allying with Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union—so relations between the two parties were relatively harmonious. After the Battle of Wuhan, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee believed that the overall situation of China’s War of Resistance was improving and was committed to maintaining stable KMT–CPC relations. For example, Mao Zedong pointed out in November 1938 at the Second Congress of the Northwest Youth National Salvation Federation: “Chiang Kai-shek and the majority of the Kuomintang will not make peace with Japan. The Kuomintang has made progress. Friction is a local phenomenon and can be changed. We must see the overall situation.” [14]14 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Second Congress of the Northwest Youth National Salvation Federation” (November 1938), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 2. When Zhou Enlai met with Chiang Kai-shek in January 1939, he also proactively signaled goodwill for cooperation, hoping to resolve the existing friction between the two parties.

尽管担心中国的抗战局势会因英国绥靖政策发生波折，但中共对英国和国民党政府均采取了努力争取的策略。在对外宣传上，中共领导人积极发声，支持中国政府的联英外交，肯定英国援华抗战的贡献；即使偶有批评，更多的也是借机敦促英国对日强硬、加大援华力度。中共还尝试建立与英国的直接联系，通过频繁接触英国记者、英国驻华外交官员，向英方表达互助之意，谋求建立世界反法西斯统一战线。同时，全民族抗战初期，国共双方无论在内政上合作抗日，还是在外交上联合英、法、美、苏，都有共通之处，两党关系相对融洽。武汉会战后，中共中央认为中国抗日大局是整体向好的，并致力于保持国共关系稳定。例如，毛泽东1938年11月在西北青年救国联合会第二次代表大会上指出：“蒋介石和国民党的大多数不会同日本讲和，国民党是有进步的，磨擦是局部现象，是可以改变的，我们必须看到全局。”周恩来在1939年1月与蒋介石见面时也主动释放合作善意，希望化解两党已有磨擦。

Overall, from the Marco Polo Bridge Incident to the spring of 1939, under the influence of the Communist International, the Chinese Communist Party established two united fronts: the world anti-fascist united front uniting Britain, France, the United States and other Western great powers, and the anti-Japanese national united front centered on KMT–CPC cooperation. Affected by multiple factors, the Chinese Communist Party remained vigilant toward Britain and the Kuomintang government, but its analysis of the situation was generally optimistic: internationally, “China’s War of Resistance can obtain more foreign aid than during the era of the Great Revolution”; [15]15 Mao Zedong, “On the New Stage” (October 12–14, 1938), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 2. although Britain was wary of aiding China in resisting Japan, “British capital will not sacrifice immediate interests for long-term prospects”; [16]16 Mao Zedong, “On the New Stage” (October 12–14, 1938), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 2. domestically, the Kuomintang was “on the one hand anti-Japanese—this is fundamental—and on the other hand anti-Communist.” [17]17 Mao Zedong, “On the New Stage” (October 12–14, 1938), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 2. Therefore, the Chinese Communist Party actively promoted cooperation with the British government and the Kuomintang government, attempting to advance hand in hand with them.

总体来看，从七七事变至1939年春，中共在共产国际影响下确立了两条统一战线，即联合英、法、美等西方大国的世界反法西斯统一战线和以国共合作为中心的抗日民族统一战线。受多重因素影响，中共对英国和国民党政府仍有所警惕，但对时局的分析大体上是乐观的：就国际而言，“中国的抗战能够得到比上次大革命时代更多的外援”，英国虽然对援华抗日抱有戒心，“但英资并不会因远景而牺牲眼前利益”；就国内而言，国民党“一方面为抗日的，这是基本的，另一方面是防共的”。因此，中共积极推进与英国政府、国民党政府的合作，试图与之携手共进。

II. The Deterioration of Anglo-Soviet Relations and Guarding against the Confluence of Chiang, Britain and Japan

二、英苏交恶与对蒋、英、日合流的防范

As the situation evolved, the Chinese Communist Party’s views gradually adjusted. At the end of September 1938, Britain and France, excluding the Soviet Union, convened the Munich Conference and decided to sacrifice Czechoslovak territory to satisfy Germany. Mao Zedong and others noted Britain’s compromise in Europe, criticized Britain for excluding the Soviet Union and intending to divert the danger eastward, and for a time worried that Britain’s policy of compromise would encourage Japan’s aggression against China. [18]18 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee” (November 1938), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 2. In the spring of 1939, Britain stood by while Japan occupied Hainan Island and Germany annexed Czechoslovakia by force, without taking any substantive sanctions. As to how the international situation would evolve next and whether Britain would continue its appeasement, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee believed the matter awaited observation.

随着时局演变，中共的看法渐有调整。1938年9月底，英、法撇开苏联召开慕尼黑会议，决定牺牲捷克斯洛伐克领土以满足德国。毛泽东等人注意到英国在欧洲的妥协，批评英国排斥苏联，意图祸水东引，并一度担心英国的妥协政策会鼓舞日本对华侵略。1939年春，英国先后坐视日军侵占海南岛、德国出兵吞并捷克斯洛伐克，未有实质性制裁动作。对于下一步国际局势如何演变、英国是否继续绥靖，中共中央认为尚待观察。

Besides the sudden and unpredictable shifts in the international situation, the domestic situation also gradually stirred up waves, with KMT–CPC conflicts intensifying. At the Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifth Kuomintang Central Executive Committee convened in early 1939, Chiang Kai-shek dominated the formulation of a policy of “dissolving the Communists,” “preventing the Communists” and “restricting the Communists”; although he declared that the War of Resistance would continue, he did not mention recovering the Northeast. [19]19 The Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifth Kuomintang Central Executive Committee (January 1939) marked a shift in KMT policy toward greater emphasis on “preventing the Communists” alongside the War of Resistance, adopting secret measures to restrict CPC activities. A series of changes forced the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to assess the connection between the domestic political situation and the deterioration of the international situation. For example, Mao Zedong pointed out at a meeting of the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in mid-February: “Japan’s current aim is politically to win over the Kuomintang and establish a puppet government, and militarily to cut off international communications. What Chiang Kai-shek calls ‘resisting to the end’ only means restoring the situation before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which in fact means recognizing the cession of the Northeast. Internationally, the peace front has not yet been formed; the democratic countries are compromising with the fascists—this is a very major change in the international situation.” [20]20 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Meeting of the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee” (February 15, 1939), in *Selected Documents of the Central Archives: The Chinese Communist Party’s Anti-Japanese National United Front Policy*, vol. 2. To this end, when reporting on domestic work to the Communist International in mid-May, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee hoped to receive the latest information on Soviet-Japanese developments and the international situation, as well as instructions on these matters.

除了国际形势倏忽不定外，国内时局也渐起波澜，国共冲突愈演愈烈。在1939年初召开的国民党五届五中全会上，蒋介石主导制定了“溶共”“防共”“限共”的方针；他虽声言继续抗战，却未提及收复东北。一系列变动让中共中央不得不评估国内政治局面与国际形势恶化之间的关联。例如，毛泽东在2月中旬的中共中央书记处会上指出：“现在日本的企图是在政治上拉拢国民党，建立傀儡政府，在军事上截断国际交通。蒋介石所谓抗战到底是只要恢复七七事变以前状态，这实际上是承认割让东北。现在国际上和平阵线尚未形成，民主国家与法西斯谋妥协，这是很大的国际形势变动。”为此，在5月中旬向共产国际报告国内工作时，中共中央希望获得最新的苏、日动态以及国际形势等方面的指示。

In fact, Mao Zedong’s judgment coincided with that of the Soviet side. Since the Munich Conference, the Soviet Union had also heightened its vigilance against Britain. At the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) convened in mid-March 1939, Stalin singled out for attack the so-called neutral policy of Britain, France and other countries, calling its essence a political conspiracy to profit from others’ conflicts, and no longer regarded them as democratic states that needed to be united. The views of the top Soviet leadership could hardly avoid influencing the Comintern; moreover, as the Comintern gradually learned in the spring of 1939 of the increasingly frequent frictions between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, Georgi Dimitrov grew suspicious of the Kuomintang government’s determination to resist Japan, believing that the Kuomintang’s suppression and persecution of the Chinese Communist Party “should be seen as part of a plan to surrender.” [21]21 The reference is to the possibility that the Kuomintang might surrender to Japan and end the War of Resistance. Therefore, in his telegram of reply to the CCP Central Committee on 21 May, Dimitrov, citing Stalin’s March report, directly pointed out that the situation in China was about to deteriorate, and that “the greatest danger is that the Kuomintang may surrender.” The CCP “should concentrate all its fire on opposing the capitulationist clique around Chiang Kai-shek, inside and outside the Kuomintang, and in the military … To undermine the national united front is to prepare for surrender. The Communist Party should be prepared and should prepare the masses to deliver a timely and resolute counterblow to any conspiracy or act of betrayal in this regard.” With Britain and France coercing Czechoslovakia into making concessions to Germany, the Comintern feared that Britain would repeat the same trick in the Far East and warned the CCP that “a new Munich may emerge.”

实际上，毛泽东的判断与苏联方面不谋而合。自慕尼黑会议后，苏联也对英国加强戒备。斯大林在1939年3月中旬召开的苏共十八大上点名抨击英、法诸国所谓的中立政策，称其实质是坐收渔翁之利的政治阴谋，不再视它们为需要联合的民主国家。苏共高层的观点难免会对共产国际产生影响，加之共产国际在1939年春陆续了解到愈加频繁的国共磨擦情况，季米特洛夫对国民党政府的抗日决心产生了怀疑，认为国民党对中共的打压、迫害“要作为投降计划的组成部分来看待”。因此，在5月21日给中共中央的回电中，季米特洛夫援引斯大林3月的报告，直接点明中国时局将有恶化的趋势，“最大的危险是国民党可能投降”。中共“应该把全部火力集中于反对在蒋介石周围、国民党内外和军队中的投降派……破坏民族统一战线就是准备投降。共产党应该有所准备并使群众准备好给予这方面的任何阴谋和背叛行为以及时的和坚决的回击”。在英、法胁迫捷克斯洛伐克对德让步的情况下，共产国际担心英国会在远东故技重施，提醒中共“可能出现新的慕尼黑”。

After receiving the Comintern’s telegram, the sense of crisis within the CCP further intensified. When discussing the situation at a meeting of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee held at the end of May, Zhang Wentian proposed that immediate attention be paid to “the danger of a new Munich agreement and the Kuomintang’s main danger of opposing the Communist Party and surrendering.” Mao Zedong took an even firmer stance, believing that the British-instigated “Far Eastern Munich” conspiracy “was approaching a critical juncture,” exerting pressure on the Chinese government on the one hand while conniving at Japan’s expansion in China on the other, with the intention of breaking up the anti-Japanese front. Against this background, “the possibility of the Kuomintang’s surrender has already become the greatest danger, and its anti-Communist activities are the steps to prepare for surrender.”

收到共产国际回电后，中共党内的危机意识进一步提升。张闻天在5月底召开的中共中央书记处会议上讨论形势问题时，提出要即刻注意“新的慕尼黑协定及国民党反共投降的主要危险”。毛泽东态度更为坚决，认为英国策动“远东慕尼黑”阴谋“接近了一个紧要时节”，一边施加压力于中国政府，一边纵容日本在华扩张，意图瓦解抗战阵线。在此背景下，“国民党投降的可能已经成为最大的危险，而其反共活动则是准备投降的步骤”。

Judging from CCP internal documents after June, a sense of anxiety linking the collusion of Britain and Japan with the Kuomintang’s anti-Communist stance and its quest for peace had initially taken shape. For example, in July, under Japanese threats, Britain signed the Arita-Craigie Agreement with Japan, which in effect recognized the “established facts” created by Japan’s invasion of China. The CCP Central Committee issued a special directive on this, clearly stating: “Britain has made major concessions in principle to Japan. Such concessions create a possible serious situation of a Far Eastern Munich.” The Chiang Kai-shek regime “still harbors great illusions about Britain; in particular, because of its financial dependence on Britain, Britain still has great power to control Chiang,” and therefore it is necessary to “resolutely oppose any wavering in the resistance to Japan by anyone inside China’s War of Resistance caused by Chamberlain’s surrender to Japan.”

从6月以后的中共党内文件来看，将英、日合流与国民党反共、求和相挂钩的忧患意识初步形成。例如7月，英国在日本威逼下，与之签订《有田—克莱琪协定》，变相承认日本侵华造成的“既定事实”。中共中央专门为此发出指示，明确指出：“英国对日已有了重大的原则的让步。这种让步造成东方慕尼黑的可能严重局势。”蒋介石政权“对英国仍抱有极大的幻想；特别由于金融上对英国的依赖，使英国对蒋仍有很大的支配力量”，因此必须“坚决反对中国抗战内部任何人因张伯伦的对日投降而对抗战表示动摇”。

A more direct factor in the change in the CCP’s attitude toward Britain was the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact on 23 August. Against the backdrop of a sharp deterioration in Anglo-Soviet relations, the CCP’s assessment of the international situation changed accordingly. In Mao Zedong’s view, the Soviet-German treaty not only helped the Soviet Union to “smash the Anglo-French conspiracy to provoke a Soviet-German war” and break the diplomatic encirclement by Germany and Japan, but also had multiple effects on China’s War of Resistance: on the positive side, the Soviet Union’s diplomatic victory could deter the Japanese aggressors in the East; on the negative side, Britain “would use the joint partition of China and financial and economic assistance to Japan as conditions” to win over Japan and pressure China into surrender, so as to achieve the goal of “suppressing China’s national liberation movement and tying down the Soviet Union.” At the same time, “Japan would launch a Far Eastern Munich, using some relatively large concessions as bait” to induce China to cease hostilities. After the full-scale outbreak of war in Europe, Mao further developed this view, arguing that because of the war in Europe Britain “had no time to look east” and might reach “some kind of compromise and concession” with Japan, “creating a possible serious crisis of a Far Eastern Munich.” Mao’s logic was clear: what was favorable to the Soviet Union was favorable to China’s War of Resistance, and therefore unfavorable to Britain and Japan, and vice versa.

中共对英国态度转变更直接的影响因素是8月23日《苏德互不侵犯条约》的签订。在英苏关系急剧恶化的背景下，中共对于国际时局的研判相应有所改变。在毛泽东看来，苏、德缔约不仅有利于苏联瓦解英、法“挑动苏德战争的阴谋”，打破德、日的外交包围，也对中国抗战具有多重效应：积极地看，苏联的外交胜利可以在东方震慑日本侵略势力；从消极一面讲，英国“将以共同瓜分中国和在财政上经济上帮助日本为条件”，拉拢日本、压迫中国投降，以实现“镇压中国的民族解放运动，牵制苏联”的目的。同时，“日本将发起东方慕尼黑，以某种较大的让步为钓饵”，诱使中国停战。二战在欧洲全面爆发后，毛泽东进一步发展上述观点，认为英国因欧战“无暇东顾”，可能与日本达成“某种的让步妥协”，“造成东方慕尼黑可能的严重危机”。毛泽东的思考逻辑是清晰的：对苏有利，即对中国抗战有利，也就是对英、日不利，反之亦然。

Another reason why the CCP Central Committee’s understanding of Britain turned negative after the Soviet-German treaty was that Britain had never responded forcefully to Germany and Japan. For instance, after declaring war on Germany, Britain and France undertook no large-scale military operations on the Western Front. The CCP Central Committee judged for a time that Britain’s main objective was still to deal with the Soviet Union, that it “would not threaten Germany too much,” but rather intended to steer the war elsewhere, profit from the conflict, and consolidate its position as the world’s colonial hegemon. Another example was the period of probing between Britain and Japan in the Far East. The Japanese government, greatly shocked by the Soviet-German treaty, urgently needed to find new allies and adjust its foreign policy. After the pro-British and pro-American Nobuyuki Abe reorganized the cabinet, he actively courted Britain in order to further cut off China’s international aid and hasten the “resolution” of the war of aggression against China. The Japanese cabinet announced that it would not intervene in the European war and would focus on “resolving the China Incident,” and used this to blackmail Britain into “respecting Japan’s interests and actions in China” and withdrawing British armed forces from China. Influenced by this, British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax indicated that, with Britain and Germany locked in conflict, Britain should make the most of the opportunity presented by Japan’s easing of its attitude toward Britain to seek agreement between the two countries on China policy. The CCP had some insight into these diplomatic probes between Britain and Japan. For example, after the new Japanese cabinet was formed, the Xinhua Daily, citing commentary in Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun, pointed out that “the military coloration of the new cabinet is much lighter than before,” indicating an attempt to improve Anglo-Japanese relations. In November 1939, the CCP Central Committee learned that Britain had decided to withdraw its troops from North China, regarding this as “a major concession to Japan.” The overt and covert contacts between Britain and Japan showed that Britain was planning to sacrifice China, while Japan was “using the compromise of Britain and France … to achieve its conspiracy of a quick peace and a quick settlement.” In short, Britain’s ambiguous response to German and Japanese aggression further confirmed the CCP’s judgment that Britain was plotting an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist conspiracy in the Far East and even worldwide: “The British, French and American imperialists hope to use China’s resources for the European war, to attract Japan to the Anglo-French bloc at the price of partially recognizing Japan’s occupation zones in China, and to turn both Japan and China against the Soviet Union.” Therefore, whether out of ideological differences or practical considerations of persisting in the War of Resistance, the CCP regarded Britain as a potential target of struggle.

苏、德缔约后，中共中央之所以对英国的认识趋于负面，亦与其始终未能对德、日作出强势回应有关。比如，英、法对德宣战后，在西线未有大规模军事行动。中共中央一度判断英国的主要目标仍是对付苏联，“不会威胁德国过甚”，而是有意引战火于他处，坐收渔利，巩固世界殖民霸主地位。又如，英、日两国在远东有过一段试探期。日本政府在苏、德缔约后大受刺激，亟须寻求新盟友，调整对外路线。亲英美的阿部信行重组内阁后，积极拉拢英国，以此进一步切断中国国际援助，加快侵华战争的“解决”。日本内阁宣布不介入欧洲战事、专注“解决中国事变”，并借此要挟英国“尊重日方在华利益及其行动”，撤出英国在华武装部队。受此影响，英国外交大臣哈利法克斯表示，在英、德对垒之际，英国应尽量利用日本对英态度缓和的契机，寻求两国在对华政策上的一致。对于英、日两国在外交上的试探，中共有所洞悉。例如，日本新内阁成立后，《新华日报》援引日本《读卖新闻》的评论指出，“新内阁的军部色彩较此前更为淡薄”，意在设法改善英日关系。1939年11月，中共中央已获悉英国决定撤退华北驻军，认为此举是其“对日的一大让步”。英、日之间或明或暗的接触表明，英国正在谋划牺牲中国，而日本则“利用英法的妥协”，“以达其速和速结的阴谋”。简言之，英国对德、日侵略行动的暧昧反应进一步坐实了中共关于英国在远东乃至全世界筹划反苏反共阴谋的判断：“英法美帝国主义者希望把中国的资源用于欧战，以部分承认日本在中国的占领区为代价把它吸引到英法集团方面，并使日本和中国都转向反对苏联。”因此，无论出于意识形态的差异，还是坚持抗战的实际考量，中共都将英国视为潜在的斗争对象。

The CCP’s judgment that Britain and Japan would compromise was not an eccentric view; similar remarks were common among various parties and people from all walks of life. Zhu Xizu, a professor in the History Department of National Central University, analyzed that Japan might “make peace with Britain and the United States and seek peace with China,” specifically to deal with the Soviet Union. “Although China is unwilling to make peace with Japan … China’s economic lifeline is entirely in British hands, and it is possible that the British, stopping at the right point, will force China to cease hostilities—this is one way out for Japan.” The writer Xiao Jun, then in Chongqing, similarly believed: “In order to take revenge on the Soviet Union and to secure China’s interests and colonial stability, Britain can cooperate with Japan.” Even high-ranking Kuomintang figures who were relatively partial to Britain had similar concerns. For example, H. H. Kung and Weng Wenhao privately speculated that with the outbreak of war in Europe, “the world situation is now divided into two blocs,” with the Soviet Union and Britain in different camps and almost in opposition, and “the Far Eastern question will inevitably be affected … Whether Britain, because of European relations, will once again fawn on Japan and sacrifice our country—this is a matter worthy of close attention.” Others believed that, against the backdrop of deteriorating Anglo-Soviet relations, both countries might try to win over Japan, which was more powerful than China. At that time, “the Soviet Union and Britain and France would make concessions to Japan and sacrifice China.” In fact, the Soviet Union was indeed secretly communicating with Japan and Germany during this period. But unlike the Kuomintang, the CCP was more inclined to see the collusion of Britain and Japan, rather than a Soviet-Japanese compromise, as the main danger.

中共对英、日妥协的判断并非标新立异，类似言论在各党派、各界人士中比比皆是。在中央大学历史系任教的朱希祖分析认为，日本有可能“与英美联好，与中国讲和”，专以对付苏联。“中国虽不愿与日本和……然中国经济命脉全握于英国之手，英人适可而止，强制中国停战，亦属可能，此则日本一生路也”。在渝作家萧军同样认为：“为报复苏联以及获得中国利益、殖民地安定，英国是可以和日本合作的。”即使相对袒护英国的国民党高层也有类似担心。如孔祥熙、翁文灏等人私下推测，欧洲爆发大战，“世界大局现分二集团”，苏联与英国分属不同阵营，几乎形成对立，“远东问题亦必连带影响……英国是否以欧洲关系重新献媚与日，牺牲我国，此层至堪注目”。还有人认为，在英、苏交恶背景下，两国均有可能拉拢比中国更具实力的日本。届时，“苏俄和英法对日让步，牺牲中国”。实际上，苏联这一时期确实在与日、德两国暗通款曲。但与国民党不同的是，相较于苏、日妥协，中共则更倾向于认为英、日合流才是主要危险。

At the same time, a series of domestic and foreign moves by the Nationalist government in the second half of 1939 heightened the CCP’s vigilance that it was tilting toward the British and Japanese camps to jointly oppose the Soviet Union and the Communist Party. In the latter half of that year, multiple anti-Communist friction incidents occurred, of which the December Western Shanxi Incident [22]22 “Far Eastern Munich” (远东慕尼黑): A term used by the CPC to describe a feared conspiracy by Britain, the United States, and other Western powers to appease Japan at China’s expense, analogous to the 1938 Munich Agreement that ceded the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. was the most representative. The Party Central Committee at one point regarded this as “the surface manifestation of capitulation to Japan, an act of betrayal of the War of Resistance.” The Nationalist government’s vacillating words and deeds in international diplomacy, especially its indecision among Britain, Japan, and the Soviet Union, reinforced the CCP’s view. For example, after World War II broke out in full in Europe, Britain and France, for their own interests, privately sounded out Chinese officials about the possibility of Sino-Japanese “peace talks.” Some key Nationalist government figures, fearing that the great powers would be too preoccupied with the European war to attend to the East, wavered in their confidence in the War of Resistance. Wang Chonghui, H. H. Kung, and others repeatedly told foreign media that a third country could “mediate the Sino-Japanese war.” Although Chiang Kai-shek stopped this, it still drew the CCP’s close attention, and the Party became wary that the Nationalist government’s diplomatic strategy of approaching Europe and America was preparation for merging with the Japanese puppet regime. In addition, the CCP gathered considerable intelligence about Sino-Japanese compromise through its underground Party in the rear areas. For instance, the Sichuan provincial Party organization reported to Bo Gu and others that a British representative had come to Chongqing to “mediate” the Sino-Japanese war. At the League of Nations meeting at the end of 1939, when the Soviet Union was expelled for invading Finland, the Nationalist government looked on coldly by abstaining. This made the CCP pay even more attention to anti-Soviet tendencies within the Nationalist Party. The accumulation of various factors led the CCP to begin guarding against a major shift in the Nationalist government’s domestic and foreign policy, even to the point of suing for peace with Japan. The Nationalist Party was also aware of this. For example, Chiang Kai-shek’s confidant Chen Bulei observed that the CCP “on many occasions emphasized our Party’s [the KMT’s] compromising nature, slandering our Party as having the possibility of surrendering to the enemy. For instance, under the guise of a traitor-elimination campaign, they insinuated against our Party, proclaiming that ‘opposing the Communist Party means surrender.’”

与此同时，1939年下半年国民党政府的一系列内外举动加重了中共对其倒向英、日阵营，共同反苏反共的警惕。当年下半年发生多起国民党反共磨擦事件，其中以12月的晋西事变最具代表性，中共中央一度认为这是“投降日寇的表面化，其性质是对抗日的叛变”。国民党政府在国际外交上的一系列摇摆言行，特别是在英、日、苏之间举棋不定，强化了中共的看法。例如，二战在欧洲全面展开后，为自身利益计，英、法曾向中方官员私下试探中、日“和谈”的可能性。部分国民党政府要员担心列强因欧战无暇东顾，致使抗战信心动摇。王宠惠、孔祥熙等人多次对外媒表示，可由第三国“调停中日战事”。此事虽被蒋介石制止，还是引起中共高度关注，进而警惕国民党政府接近欧美的外交策略是在准备与日伪合流。此外，中共通过大后方地下党搜集到不少关于中日妥协的情报，比如四川省党组织曾向博古等人汇报过英国代表来渝“调解”中日战事的消息。在1939年底的国联会议上，对于苏联被英、法借侵略芬兰领土一事开除会籍，国民党政府以弃权的方式冷眼旁观。这使中共更加重视国民党内部的反苏意向。种种因素的叠加使得中共开始防备国民党政府在内政外交上发生重大转变，乃至向日本求和。国民党对此亦有察觉。例如，蒋介石的亲信陈布雷观察到，中共在多个场合“强调本党的妥协性，污蔑本党有降敌人的可能。如假借锄奸运动，以影射本党，声言‘反共即是投降’。”

A series of domestic and international changes after the Soviet–German Pact prompted the entire CCP to focus on preventing the Nationalist government from compromising with Britain and Japan and then turning fully anti-Communist. At a Politburo meeting on August 31, 1939, Wang Jiaxiang discussed the situation, saying, “The Soviet Union previously regarded Britain and France as unreliable friends. The Anglo-Japanese alliance is mainly aimed at the Soviet Union, not Germany. The danger of the Anglo-Japanese alliance is very great; the Chinese government’s reliance on Britain is very great, so the danger of Chinese compromise and surrender still exists. Britain will participate in carving up China… Our Party must emphasize the danger of compromise.” Peng Dehuai expressed a similar view: “The bourgeoisie has the dual wavering of dependence on imperialism and fear of the proletariat; some have already leaned toward a pro-British, anti-Communist, anti-Communist containment policy, such as holding military-political cadre meetings in Xi’an to discuss anti-Communist issues and strengthening the military’s anti-Communist national salvation; the current political situation has already moved from political anti-Communism to military anti-Communism… Such behavior by the bourgeoisie is no different from the actions of Wang Jingwei’s traitorous clique and requires vigilance.” Among senior cadres of the New Fourth Army, there was a circulating rumor that “Britain and France have a theory of negotiating compromise with Japan.” There was no shortage of ordinary cadres holding such views. In December 1939, Chen Jia, working in Guangdong, analyzed the situation in a way that well reflected the linkage between the understanding of Britain and KMT–CCP relations. He wrote: “Because of the brewing of an anti-Soviet front, two factions have formed, and the Chinese central government wavers between them. One is to unite with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party to resist Japan; the other is to be pro-British, anti-Communist, and capitulate to Japan. This creates the current serious crisis. Its concrete manifestation is the friction between the two parties. The Nationalist Party, in response to the international anti-Soviet front, does not hesitate to reenact the tragedy of the April 12 Incident [23]23 “The most reactionary country in the world” (世界上最反动的国家): A phrase Mao Zedong used in his speech at the Yan’an cadre conference on September 14, 1939, reflecting the CPC’s sharp turn against Britain after the outbreak of the European war. of 1927, ignoring the great enemy at the gate.”

苏、德缔约后一系列国内外变局促使中共全党上下着力防范国民党政府与英、日妥协，进而全面反共。王稼祥在1939年8月31日召开的中共中央政治局会议上就时局问题谈到，“苏联过去认为英法是不可靠的朋友。英日同盟，主要是对付苏联，不会对付德国。英日同盟的危险性很大，中国政府对英国的依靠性很大，因此中国妥协投降的危险仍然存在。英国将参加瓜分中国……我党要强调妥协的危险性”。彭德怀也表达过类似观点：“资产阶级具有依赖帝国主义及惧怕无产阶级之双重动摇性；部分人已倾向亲英反共防共政策，如西安举行军事政治干部会议，讨论防共问题，并加强军队防共救国；目前的政治形势，已由政治防共进而为军事防共……资产阶级此种行为无异于汪派汉奸的行动，需要警惕。”新四军高级干部中一度流传“英法有与日妥协谈判之说”。持有这种认识的普通干部同样不乏其人。1939年12月，在广东工作的陈嘉对局势的分析，很好地反映出对英国的认识与国共关系之间的联动关系。他写道：“由于反苏阵线的酝酿，就形成了两派，中国中央政府是动摇于此两者之间的。一是联苏联共抗日，一是亲英反共降日，于是做成目前时局的严重危机。这具体表现就是两党的摩擦，国民党为响应国际反苏阵线，不惜重演1927年‘四·一二’的惨剧，置大敌当前而不顾。”

In the early period after the Soviet–German Pact, various documents within the CCP contained much content opposing Britain and imperialism, opposing friction, and opposing surrender. Leaders, including Mao Zedong, also tended to deeply link the Nationalist Party’s anti-Communist friction with British–Japanese compromise. Of course, the possibility of propaganda and mobilization considerations cannot be ruled out. In light of subsequent historical development, the possibility of comprehensive British–Japanese compromise in the Far East was actually not great, and Chiang Kai-shek also had a certain determination to resist Japan and diplomatic autonomy. Returning to the historical context, when internal conflict and external changes occurred simultaneously, the CCP, as the relatively weaker side, had to comprehensively consider various potential risks, and its precautions against the convergence of Chiang, Britain, and Japan had their rationality.

苏、德缔约初期，中共党内各种文件里有不少反英反帝、反磨擦反投降的内容。包括毛泽东在内的领导人也多倾向于将国民党反共磨擦与英、日妥协进行深度关联。当然，其中不排除有宣传动员的考量。以此后的历史发展来看，英、日在远东全面妥协的可能性实际上并不大，蒋介石也具有一定的抗日决心和外交自主性。回归历史情景中，在内部冲突与外部变局同时出现之际，作为实力相对较弱的一方，中共势必要全面考虑各种潜在风险，对蒋、英、日合流的防范有其合理性。

III. Urging the Nationalist Government to Reject Britain and Ally with the Soviet Union, and to Make Peace with the CCP for the War of Resistance

三、力促国民党拒英联苏、和共抗战

From the Soviet–German Pact to the early period of the full outbreak of World War II in Europe, the division of international camps was unclear, and friction between the two domestic parties was frequent. The Party Central Committee’s assessment that Chiang, Britain, and Japan would form an anti-Soviet camp and that KMT–CCP relations would break down became increasingly serious. As Zhou Enlai said in a report at the end of 1939: “Now the international situation has changed. On the one hand, the victory and activism of the Soviet Union’s peace policy and the bankruptcy of the international anti-Communist pact can naturally give assistance to China’s united front,

从苏、德缔约至二战在欧洲全面爆发初期，国际阵营分化未明，国内两党磨擦频发，中共中央对于蒋、英、日三方结成反苏阵营和国共关系破裂的估计愈发严重。正如周恩来在1939年底的一份报告中所言：“现在国际形势变了，一方面苏联和平政策的胜利和积极，国际反共协定的破产，自更可给中国统一战线以助力，但国际反苏联的新结合，尤其是英法的挑拨，也不会不给中国以影响。因为这样，中国的统一战线，就更加处在矛盾的发展中了。”对此，中共作出一系列回应。

In the autumn and winter of 1939, when Anglo-Soviet relations were tense and Anglo-Japanese relations were unclear, the CPC was on high alert that the KMT government, “in a state of great vacillation,” would create large-scale military friction and compromise with Britain and Japan. Out of caution against the “Far Eastern Munich” conspiracy, the CPC played the “anti-British card” heavily in its foreign policy, and while countering KMT friction it stressed the need to maintain KMT–CPC relations. The CPC also abandoned the policy of building a world anti-fascist united front with Britain and France, replacing it with an anti-imperialist united front. On September 14, 1939, at a cadre conference in Yan’an, Mao Zedong resumed his attacks on British imperialism, denouncing Britain as “the most reactionary country in the world” and removing it from the cooperative front. He pointed out that China should not participate in the imperialist war. This shift was closely related to instructions from the Comintern. Just a few days earlier, the Comintern had sent a telegram expressing the same view. Japan, as an “onlooker,” also recognized this, believing that since the Soviet–German pact and the outbreak of the European war, the Soviet Union’s adjustment of its foreign policy had led to a shift in the line of the Comintern and the communist parties of various countries, with the former target of attack—fascism—being replaced by Anglo-French imperialism.

在英苏关系紧张、英日关系未明的1939年秋冬，中共高度戒备“处在极大的动摇中”的国民党政府制造大规模军事磨擦及与英、日妥协。出于预防“远东慕尼黑”阴谋的考虑，中共对外大打“反英牌”，并在回击国民党磨擦之际强调维护国共关系。中共还摒弃了与英、法共建世界反法西斯统一战线的方针，取而代之的是反帝统一战线。1939年9月14日，毛泽东在延安干部大会上恢复对英帝国主义的抨击，斥责英国为“世界上最反动的国家”，将其移出合作阵线之外。他指出，中方不应参与帝国主义战争。这一转变与共产国际的指示密切相关。此前几日，共产国际刚刚发来电报，表达了同样的看法。作为“旁观者”的日本也意识到了这一点，认为自苏、德缔约及欧洲战争爆发以来，因苏联调整外交政策，共产国际及各国共产党方针发生转变，一直作为攻击对象的法西斯主义被英法帝国主义所取代。

The CPC’s high-profile anti-British stance was certainly intended to coordinate with Comintern instructions, but its main purpose was to safeguard the anti-Japanese national united front. Mao Zedong stressed that, under circumstances where Anglo-Soviet cooperation was impossible and relations were nearly antagonistic, the KMT government must absolutely not “join the Anglo-French imperialist front”; instead, it should form a united front with the Soviet Union and the oppressed nations, staying out of the European war. Conversely, if the KMT government joined the British front, it would implicitly place itself in opposition to the Soviet Union, and KMT–CPC relations would likely be affected. Mao later summarized: “Domestic relations always shift with international relations; the first anti-communist upsurge occurred during the period of the German–Soviet pact, the Soviet–Finnish war, and the Anglo-American anti-Soviet campaign.” In other words, the reason the CPC worked so hard to influence the KMT government’s foreign policy choices, urging it to keep its distance from Britain and strengthen ties with the Soviet Union, was to sustain KMT–CPC cooperation.

中共高调反英固然有配合共产国际指示的意图，但主要目的是维护抗日民族统一战线。毛泽东强调，在英苏合作暂无可能、关系几近对立的情况下，国民党政府绝不能“参加英法帝国主义战线”，而是应该联合苏联和被压迫民族组成统一战线，置身欧洲战争之外。反之，若国民党政府加入英国阵线，无形中处在苏联对立面，国共关系恐将受到冲击。毛泽东后来总结道，“国内关系总是随国际关系为转移，第一次反共高潮发生于德苏协定、苏芬战争及英美反苏时期”。换言之，中共之所以努力影响国民党政府的外交抉择，促使其与英国保持距离、强化对苏联系，是为了维系国共合作。

To achieve the above objectives, Chinese Communist Party leaders repeatedly urged the Nationalist government not to draw close to Britain and made clear the necessity of the united front between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party for resisting Japan. For example, in November 1939, Wang Ming, Wu Yuzhang and others, while conversing with left-wing journalists and democratic personages in Chengdu, linked Britain’s actions to the political situation in China, pointing out: “That there is friction between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party is undeniable, but it has no great effect on the overall situation of the War of Resistance”; “The Nationalist government’s desire to eliminate the Eighth Route Army … is in fact impossible”; “At present Britain is putting pressure on us in many ways, wanting us to compromise with the enemy so as to contain the Soviet Union and Germany.” Subsequently, Peng Dehuai expressed a similar meaning when meeting with Kuomintang representatives: “The European war will spread across the whole world and drag on for a very long time”; “In our country’s current diplomacy, apart from the Soviet Union, other countries such as Britain, France and the United States are all unreliable, because we fear there may be a Far Eastern Munich agreement in the future, sacrificing China.” He stated bluntly, “If the central authorities attack the Communist Party with troops, the Communist Party will certainly fight back”; “If the central authorities attack the Communist Party first, the central authorities will certainly fail; if the Communist Party attacks the central authorities first, the Communist Party will fail.” Zhou Enlai said privately to Feng Yuxiang, “Britain and France always want the Sino-Japanese war to end so that China can send troops, as in the First World War,” while the Eighth Route Army “supports President Chiang and united resistance to Japan.” Besides direct persuasion, the Chinese Communist Party also repeatedly attacked the tendency within the Nationalist government to align with Britain, stressing that “cooperation with the Soviet Union makes one a government of resistance to Japan; if one links up with Britain and France, that is a traitorous organization.”

为实现上述目的，中共领导人在多个场合劝阻国民党政府与英国接近，并言明国共合作抗日的必要性。例如1939年11月，王明、吴玉章等在成都与左翼记者、民主党派人士交谈时，将英国的举动与中国政局联系起来，指出：“国共磨擦已无可讳言，惟于抗战大局无甚影响”，“国民政府欲消灭八路军……实不可能”，“目前英国对我多方压迫，欲吾人与敌妥协，以牵制苏德”。随后，彭德怀在与国民党代表会晤时表达了类似的意思：“欧战将蔓延全世界，且迁延为时甚久”，“我国当前外交除苏联外，其他如英法美诸国均不可靠，因恐将来有东方慕尼黑协定，以牺牲中国”。他直言，“如中央兵袭共党，共党必反”，“中央先讨共，中央必失败；共产党先反中央，共党失败”。周恩来私下对冯玉祥说，“英法总想中日战争结束，中国好出兵，如第一次的欧战”，而八路军“拥护蒋总裁及团结抗日”。除了正面规劝外，中共还多次抨击国民党政府内部的联英倾向，强调“与苏联合作乃为抗日政府，若与英法联络即系汉奸组织”。

Such frequent criticism of Britain naturally affected relations between the Chinese Communist Party and Britain. Chen Duxiu, living in seclusion in Sichuan and Chongqing, observed: “Since the great war began, Chongqing’s *Xinhua Daily* has loudly proclaimed, following Lenin’s theory from the last great war, denouncing the hypocrisy of bourgeois democratic states like Britain and France, opposing the war among imperialists, and claiming that both sides are aggressive bandits.” British and American diplomatic officials in China were dissatisfied

对英国频繁的批评自然会影响到中共与英国的关系。蛰居川渝的陈独秀观察到，“大战开始以来，重庆的《新华日报》大声疾呼根据列宁在上次大战的理论，指斥英法等资产阶级的民主国家之虚伪，反对帝国主义间的战争，声称两边都是侵略的强盗”。英、美在华外交官员对中共的舆论攻势多有不满，在报告中屡屡指出，自苏、德缔约后，“中国当地的共产主义报纸对英国越来越不友好”。在《新华日报》上，“英国经常被描述为在德国的袭击面前试图保留世界的霸权……在远东，英国对日本的政策被描述为以牺牲中国为代价安抚日本的政策，以挽救英国的远东利益”。他们还注意到毛泽东尖锐抨击了英国的远东政策。此外，中共在实际行动中注意与英方人士保持距离。任职于英国驻华大使馆的左翼人士林迈可称：“在德苏条约时期，由于英国和中国共产党的关系已经严重恶化，我没能和中共重庆办事处周恩来的联络官接触。在重庆的共产党报纸《新华日报》经常抨击同盟国。我经常受命就这些文章向国民党中央政府作官方的抗议。”对之前关系较为密切的外国记者，中共的态度也有所调整，批评“英美记者及各种人员系政治情报员……在报章杂志中发表挑拨国共关系和不利于我之言论”。

The Chinese Communist Party’s negative appraisal of Britain and the actions it took in response were not without influence on relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Objectively speaking, the Kuomintang high command headed by Chiang Kai-shek was equally dissatisfied with Britain’s vacillation and the Soviet Union’s self-preservation. But because of the difference in their respective roles, Chiang Kai-shek’s path to a solution was this: while stabilizing Sino-Soviet relations, he would first join the British camp, thereby blocking a British-Japanese compromise from the opposite direction, and in this way tie the Sino-Japanese question to the European war for a joint resolution. The Chinese Communist Party’s actions placed diplomatic pressure on the Kuomintang government, which responded with some harsh measures, such as ordering the suspension of the *Xinhua Daily* (新华日报), which had been critical of Britain. In this light, it was impossible for Chiang Kai-shek to respond to the Chinese Communist Party’s call, abandon the British-French front and lean entirely toward the Soviet Union; on the contrary, this deepened his misunderstanding of the Chinese Communist Party.

中共对英国的负面评价和相关行动对于国共关系不无影响。客观地看，以蒋介石为首的国民党高层对英国的摇摆和苏联的自保同样有所不满，但因角色定位不同，蒋介石的解决路径是：在稳定中苏关系的同时，通过率先加入英国阵营，反向阻隔英、日妥协，从而将中日问题与欧洲战事捆绑解决。中共的做法为国民党政府带来外交压力，后者采取了一些强硬手段，如勒令参与批评英国的《新华日报》停刊。就此而论，蒋介石不可能响应中共呼声，抛弃英法阵线、完全倒向苏联，反而加深了对中共的误解。

Beginning in 1940, as Anglo-Japanese contradictions deepened and the Soviet Union’s position rose, the Chinese Communist Party gradually revised its judgment of the international situation, including that concerning Britain. In January, Mao Zedong perceived that an Anglo-Japanese compromise had not yet been realized; he argued that the Japanese military faction (军部) advocating Japan’s exclusive domination of China “appears to hold the upper hand,” and that Japan had decided to prop up the Wang Jingwei puppet regime, “a matter that cannot but influence the Kuomintang’s attitude,” so that “the time for nationwide rain has not yet come” and “the possibility of a turn for the better in the Kuomintang may not yet have been cut off.” The evolution of the situation from March to April further confirmed the judgment of the Party Central Committee. The Soviet Union ended the Winter War in mid-March, signing a peace treaty with Finland. The Chinese Communist Party analyzed that the Soviet Union, having prevailed in Europe, “will adopt a tough stance toward the Far East,” boosting the prospects for improvement in China’s War of Resistance and causing “the anti-Soviet propaganda of the reactionaries throughout the world (including China)

1940年起，随着英日矛盾加深、苏联地位提升，中共逐步修正对包括英国在内的国际形势的判断。1月，毛泽东察觉到英日妥协尚未实现，主张日本独占中国的日方军部势力“似乎占优势”，而且日本决定扶植汪伪，“此事不能不影响国民党的态度”，因此“目前还不是全国下雨之时”，国民党“好转可能还未断绝”。3月至4月的局势演变进一步印证了中共中央的判断。苏联于3月中旬结束冬季战争，与芬兰签订和约。中共方面分析，在欧洲获胜的苏联“将对远东采取强硬态度”，助推中国抗战形势好转，并使“全世界（中国在内）反动派反苏宣传暂时收起，中国反共高潮也下降”。从4月开始，德国大举进攻北欧，威胁西欧荷兰、比利时等国，逼近西线英、法联军。中共据此判断，英、法在北欧建立反苏据点的可能性下降，日军将趁着欧洲战争在远东有所动作。中共的分析着眼于两点：一是苏联国际地位的提升势必影响国内国共关系走向，即“蒋介石是否决心打延安主要决定于蒋（其）对苏联态度”；二是英、法与德国大战在即，日本难以与深陷战争的英国合作。换言之，蒋、英、日妥协，结成反苏反共阵营的可能性降低。另一方面，蒋介石考虑到中方加入英、法阵营无果，且英、法面临战争威胁，希望强化中、苏在远东的合作，决定改派亲苏的邵力子为驻苏大使，并多次致电周恩来邀其会面。抓住有利国际时机改善国共关系，成为中共决策的着眼点。毛泽东指出：“蒋邀周去颇迫切。邵力子使苏，似尚有赖苏救急之意……蒋的文章并不好做。周去将给以团结抗战之助力。”随后，周恩来赴渝协商两党政治问题。

In the summer of 1940, on the international front, the Anglo-French forces were routed by Germany on the European continent and France surrendered; on the domestic front, the friction between the KMT and the CPC in North China had temporarily subsided, while the conflict in Central China had not yet escalated. The Party Central Committee believed that the course of the European war was closely linked to China’s War of Resistance: “France will withdraw from the Far East, Britain will be weakened in the Far East, and neither will be able to meddle in the Sino-Japanese War.” [25]25 “The Central Committee’s Guiding Principles for the Current Situation and the Party’s Tasks,” 7 July 1940, in *Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party*, vol. 12, p. 419. Stimulated by Germany’s great victory, Japan attempted to use radical methods to end its war of aggression, would take active action against Britain, the United States and France, and a direct compromise between Japan and Britain was difficult. “The European war has already affected China, and recently the KMT’s friction-making has also decreased.” “The danger of an Oriental Munich [26]26 “Oriental Munich” refers to the feared appeasement of Japan by Britain, the United States and France at China’s expense, analogous to the 1938 Munich Agreement that ceded the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. initiated by Britain, the United States and France no longer exists, or at least it can be said to have been greatly reduced.” In mid-July, a change occurred in Japanese politics: the belligerent and hardline Fumimaro Konoe formed a cabinet again, and the pro-British and pro-American Mitsumasa Yonai fell from power. The CPC side analyzed that Japan’s “status-quo faction” had been overthrown and the “young officer faction” [27]27 The “young officer faction” (少壮派) refers to radical, ultranationalist middle-ranking officers in the Imperial Japanese Army who advocated aggressive expansion and often resorted to assassination and coup attempts in the 1930s. of the military, representing the hardline and belligerent, had risen; “Konoe’s coming to power is a victory for Germany and Italy”; Japan intended to draw close to Germany and Italy and to exclude the presence of Britain and the United States in the Far East; besides attacking China more aggressively on the main front and dominating East Asia, the Japanese army was also preparing for new adventures in the Pacific. Chen Yun believed that the international situation would be restructured, and the possibility of a British-Japanese anti-Soviet alliance had sharply diminished, to be replaced by three major international blocs: “The first is the German-Italian-Japanese imperialist bloc, the second is the British-French-American imperialist bloc, and the third is the Soviet peace bloc.” [28]28 Chen Yun, “The Current Political Situation and the Party’s Tasks,” 10 July 1940, in *Selected Works of Chen Yun*, vol. 1, p. 224. The antagonism between Britain and Japan had markedly intensified, British strength had been greatly weakened, and the Soviet Union’s position had risen — all of which favored the CPC in urging the KMT to join the Soviet bloc, helping to improve KMT–CPC relations, and “winning over the main body of the KMT to prolong the period of cooperation.” As Zhou Enlai said in an intra-Party report that same summer, the domestic situation “still has a relatively large possibility of improvement.” [29]29 Zhou Enlai, “Report on the Current Situation,” 16 July 1940, in *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, vol. 1, p. 108. Based on this, the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong made the judgment: “After Konoe came to power, the pro-British and pro-American faction [within the KMT] was also forced to incline toward the views of the resistance faction”; “the three directions of the KMT (Chiang Kai-shek) — being pro-Soviet, cooperating with the CPC, and making preliminary political reforms — seem unavoidable; unified surrender and unified ‘bandit suppression’ [30]30 “Bandit suppression” (剿共) was the KMT’s official term for its military campaigns to destroy the CPC, used from the 1927 Shanghai Massacre through the civil war period. are already impossible, and we are working hard to bring about the realization of these three things.” [31]31 “Mao Zedong’s Telegram to Zhou Enlai and Others,” 13 July 1940, in *Selected Military Writings of Mao Zedong*, p. 542.

1940年夏，国际方面，英法联军在欧洲大陆被德国击溃，法国投降；国内方面，国共两党华北磨擦暂告一段落，华中冲突尚未升级。中共中央认为欧洲战场走向与中国抗战密切相关：“法国将退出远东，英国将在远东削弱，对中日战争将无法过问”。日本受德国大胜刺激，企图用急进方法来结束侵略战争，对英、美、法将采取积极行动，日、英难以直接妥协。“欧战已影响到中国，最近国民党搞磨擦也减少了。”“从英、美、法方面发动的东方慕尼黑危险，已经不存在了，或至少可以说很大地减少了。”7月中旬，日本政坛发生变动，好战强硬的近卫文麿再度组阁，亲英美派米内光政倒台。中共方面分析，日本“维持现状派”被推翻，代表强硬好战的军部“少壮派”抬头；“近卫登台是德、意胜利”，日方意欲接近德、意，排斥英、美在远东的存在；日军除了正面更加积极进攻中国、独霸东亚外，也准备在太平洋上作新的冒险。陈云认为，国际时局将发生重组，英、日结为反苏同盟的可能性锐减，取而代之的是三大国际阵营：“第一个是德、意、日帝国主义阵线，第二个是英、法、美帝国主义阵线，第三个是苏联和平阵线。”英、日对立明显加剧，英国实力大受削弱，苏联地位上升，这些都有利于中共促使国民党加入苏联阵线，助推国共关系好转，“争取国民党的主体延长合作时间”。一如周恩来同年夏在党内作报告时所言，国内时局“好转的可能还大一些”。基于此，中共中央、毛泽东作出决断：“近卫登台后英美派亦不得不被迫而倾向抗战派的主张”，“国民党（蒋介石）亲苏、和共及初步政治改良这三个方向，似已不可避免，统一投降与统一‘剿共’已不可能，我们正在力促这三件事的实现”。

In its foreign policy, the CPC adjusted its anti-British stance and more actively advocated allying with the Soviet Union. For example, from July to September 1940, leading members of the Southern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee jointly submitted written statements to the Nationalist government together with democratic personages such as Huang Yanpei, Shen Junru, Zuo Shunsheng, and Zhang Bojun, hoping to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union. In public opinion, the CPC seized on Britain’s military setbacks and the closure of the Burma Road to build momentum for allying with the Soviet Union in the areas under Nationalist rule, calling for “the closest diplomatic relations” between China and the Soviet Union. In internal consultations, the CPC repeatedly signaled goodwill to the Nationalists for cooperative resistance against Japan. For instance, when Zhou Enlai met with Chiang Kai-shek in June, he stressed that the CPC was mainly competing with Japan and Wang Jingwei for the support of the masses in enemy-occupied areas, not targeting the Nationalist government, and took the opportunity to raise demands such as defining the boundaries of the Shaanxi–Gansu–Ningxia Border Region and expanding the establishment of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. In military operations, the CPC intensified its offensive against Japan and its united front work toward Nationalist troops. “Because of changes in the international situation, our southwestern international transportation routes have been cut off, and domestic difficulties have increased”; in order to “disrupt the enemy’s plan to attack the northwest, achieve notable military successes, and influence the overall situation of the War of Resistance,” the Eighth Route Army launched the Hundred Regiments Offensive in North China in August. In addition, the CPC Central Committee demanded that all localities pay attention to the limits and intensity of counter-friction struggles, and not merely hold “a purely confrontational outlook.” Judging from the directives issued to various localities in July and August, “pushing the Nationalists to make progress” and “winning over two million friendly troops” became one of the key tasks of the CPC Central Committee during this phase.

在对外方针上，中共调整反英政策，更多地积极主张联苏。例如，1940年7月至9月，中共中央南方局负责人多次与黄炎培、沈钧儒、左舜生、章伯钧等民主党派人士联名上书国民党政府，希望加强对苏联系。在舆论上，中共借助英国作战失利、关停滇缅公路的契机，在国统区为联苏造势，呼吁中、苏“发生最密切的邦交”。在内部协商上，中共频频向国民党释放合作抗日善意。例如，周恩来在6月与蒋介石会面时，着重声明中共主要是在敌占区同日本和汪精卫争取群众，而非针对国民党政府，并顺势提出解决陕甘宁边区范围、扩充八路军和新四军编制等诉求。在军事行动上，中共强化了对日军事攻势和对国民党军队的统战工作。“由于国际形势的变动，我西南国际交通路被截断，国内困难增加”，为“破坏敌人进攻西北计划，创立显著的战绩，影响全国的抗战局势”，八路军于8月在华北发动百团大战。此外，中共中央还要求各地注意反磨擦的限度与力度，不能仅存“单纯斗争的观念”。从7月、8月给各地下达的指令来看，推动国民党进步、“争取二百万友军”成为这一阶段中共中央的重点工作之一。

The CPC’s “offensive of allying with the Soviet Union and seeking harmony with the Nationalists” achieved certain results. Especially against the backdrop of Britain’s major defeat by Germany and its closure of the southwestern international route under Japanese pressure, the Nationalist government found itself in an almost diplomatic deadlock; the Soviet Union’s status in its diplomatic vision rose markedly, and calls to abandon Britain and ally with the Soviet Union grew louder within the Nationalist Party. Moreover, the Hundred Regiments Offensive launched by the CPC alleviated to some extent the pressure on the Nationalist government in its war against Japan, and even won Chiang Kai-shek’s approval. Chiang, urgently in need of Soviet aid, tried under the CPC’s impetus to use the latter to draw closer to the Soviet Union. A typical example is that Chiang basically agreed to Zhou Enlai’s requests for delimiting the border region’s boundaries and expanding military establishments, and in late July 1940 authorized Zhou to “go to Moscow together with T. V. Soong.”

中共的“联苏、和共攻势”取得了一定成效。尤其是在英国大败于德国并在日本威逼下关闭西南国际通道的背景下，国民党政府几乎陷入外交僵局，苏联在其外交视野中的地位明显提升，弃英联苏呼声在国民党内有所高涨。除此之外，中共发起的百团大战一定程度上缓解了国民党政府对日作战压力，甚至得到蒋介石的认可。急需苏联援助的蒋介石在中共推动下，试图借助后者拉近与苏联方面的距离。一个典型例证是，蒋介石基本上同意了周恩来提出的划定边区范围及扩充军队编制请求，并于1940年7月下旬授意周恩来同宋子文“一起去莫斯科”。

Looking back at the period from the German–Soviet Pact to the formation of the German–Italian–Japanese alliance, the CPC faced a rapidly changing international environment, alternately raising the banners of opposing Britain and allying with the Soviet Union, and basically maintained a stance of responding to circumstances as they arose and keeping internal and external affairs distinct. In hindsight, the formation of the Tripartite Pact proved that Britain and Japan could not easily make a separate peace, and CPC leaders reflected on this. Mao Zedong said at a Politburo meeting of the CPC Central Committee in December 1940: “Japan’s policy is to recognize Wang Jingwei and overthrow Chiang’s regime… Looking back now, the view that after Konoe came to power the danger of British and American inducement to surrender had passed is correct. When the Nationalists advocated joining the Anglo-American bloc, our propaganda against joining the Anglo-American bloc was correct, but as a policy it was wrong; both Chongqing and Yan’an had shortcomings.” Zhang Wentian also engaged in self-criticism: “Our Party’s criticism of Britain and America this time was permissible, but opposing joining the Anglo-American bloc was a bit too vehement.” Whether or not the rhetoric was somewhat excessive, the CPC’s core purpose was consistent: to maintain the unity of the Nationalist–CPC anti-Japanese camp. As Mao Zedong put it: although the imperialist war had a great impact on the War of Resistance, “the most important thing is China’s own problems,” and it was necessary to “always adhere to the national policy of resisting Japan to the end, uphold internal unity, and especially the policy of Nationalist–CPC cooperation.” This is the key to understanding how the CPC handled various domestic and international relations.

纵观从苏、德缔约到德、意、日三国结盟这段时间，中共面临风云突变的国际环境，交替高举反英、联苏旗帜，基本保持了应时而动、内外分明。事后看来，三国同盟的成立证明英、日难以单独媾和，中共领导人对此有所反思。毛泽东在1940年12月的中共中央政治局会议上说：“日本方针是承认汪精卫，打倒蒋政权……现在回想起来，自近卫上台后英、美诱降危险已经过去这个观点是对的。在国民党主张加入英美集团时，我们不主张加入英美集团的宣传是对的，但作为政策是不对的，重庆、延安方面都有缺点。”张闻天也作出自我批评：“此次我党对英美批评是可以的，但反对加入英美集团太激烈了一些。”无论言论是否稍显激烈，中共的核心目的都是一贯的，即维持国共抗日阵营的团结。一如毛泽东所言：帝国主义战争对抗战影响虽大，但“最主要的，是中国本身的问题”，必须“始终坚持抗战到底国策，坚持内部团结，尤其是国共合作的方针”。这才是理解中共处理国内国际各种关系的密钥。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

The War of Resistance against Japan was a highly international war. Japan’s invasion of China shattered the established pattern in the Far East and drew the attention of all major powers. Before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the CPC, under the influence of the Comintern, included the Western powers—Britain, France, and the United States—and the Nationalist government within its horizon of cooperation. In the early period of the all-out War of Resistance, the CPC believed that the Soviet Union was resolutely opposed to Japan, while Britain and Chiang Kai-shek’s government were wavering, and the latter could easily tilt toward the Japanese camp as the situation changed. This understanding deepened progressively with the deterioration of Anglo-Soviet relations, especially the reversal of the international situation around the signing of the German–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Faced with the anti-communist high tide launched by the Nationalist diehards, the CPC linked the domestic situation to international developments, was highly vigilant against the formation of an anti-Soviet, anti-communist camp by Britain, Japan, and Chiang, and against local friction escalating into a full-scale anti-communist campaign; it once again raised the policy of opposing Britain and imperialism, guarding against a complete breakdown in Nationalist–CPC relations. Thus, to fully understand the CPC’s analysis and handling of Nationalist–CPC relations from 1937 to 1940, one must take into account the complex relationships among the four countries and five parties: Britain, the Soviet Union, Japan, the Nationalists, and the CPC. As Ren Bishi stated in a report in Moscow: “The deterioration of Nationalist–CPC relations depends not only on ourselves but also on the imperialist powers, on the Wang Jingwei clique, and on the activities of the Nationalist diehards.”

抗日战争是一场极具国际性的战争。日本侵华打破了远东固有格局，引发各个大国关注。七七事变前，中共在共产国际影响下将英、法、美等西方大国和国民党政府纳入合作视线。全民族抗战初期，中共认为苏联坚决反日，英国和蒋介石政府处在摇摆之中，后者极易因时局变化倒向日本阵营。这一认识随着英苏关系恶化尤其是《苏德互不侵犯条约》签订前后的国际时局逆转而逐步加深。面对国民党顽固派发动的反共高潮，中共将国内时局与国际动态关联起来，高度警惕英、日、蒋形成反苏反共阵营，局部磨擦上升为全面反共，一度重提反英反帝方针，防范国共关系全面失衡。由此可见，若要全面理解1937年至1940年中共对国共关系的分析和处理，需要综合考虑英、苏、日、国、共四国五方的复杂关系。正如任弼时在莫斯科作报告时所言：“国共关系的恶化，基本上不仅取决于我们自己，而且还取决于帝国主义列强，取决于汪精卫集团和国民党顽固派的活动。”

The War of Resistance against Japan was also a highly national and indigenous war. When faced with sharply divided international blocs, the CPC always prioritized maintaining the situation of national unity in resistance. In the early period after the full outbreak of World War II in Europe, compared with its resolute opposition to Britain, the CPC exercised due restraint toward the Nationalists. This was also what Mao Zedong repeatedly stressed: as long as the Nationalists “are still willing to unite in resisting Japan,” it was possible to “win them over to remain within the anti-Japanese united front, and the longer this period lasts, the better.” This point was even confirmed by Japan, the opposing side: “After the German–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and the outbreak of the European war, the internationalist outlook of communist parties in various countries was greatly impacted by the Comintern’s directives. Although the CPC accepted its views and adopted a single people’s front, excluding the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, it still followed the line of the Nationalist–CPC cooperative anti-Japanese national united front.” In the summer of 1940, as Britain’s conflicts with Germany and Japan escalated and the Soviet Union’s status rose, the CPC adjusted its strategy in a timely manner, replacing opposition to Britain with alliance with the Soviet Union, promoting cooperative resistance against Japan, and striving to improve the situation. It is worth noting that, unlike previous instances when it was influenced by the Soviet side, this adjustment was made independently by the CPC. The Comintern had not made a clear distinction among Britain, France, and the United States, but the CPC, proceeding from the overall situation of China’s War of Resistance, adopted a more moderate attitude toward the United States, which had not yet entered World War II and was relatively tough on Japan.

抗日战争也是一场极具民族性和本土性的战争。中共在面对分化剧烈的国际阵营时，始终把维护全民族团结抗战局面放在首要位置。二战在欧洲全面爆发初期，相较于坚决反英，中共对国民党保持了应有的克制。这也是毛泽东一直反复强调的：只要国民党“还愿团结抗日”，就有可能“争取他们留在抗日统一战线里面，这种时间越长久越好”。这一点甚至得到了作为对手方的日本的确认：“德苏互不侵犯协定、欧战爆发后，各国共产党的国际观念都因共产国际指示产生巨大冲击。中共虽然接受其意见，采用单一的人民战线，将大地主、大资产阶级排除在外，但依旧走着国共合作的抗日民族统一战线路线。”1940年夏，英国与德、日两国矛盾升级，苏联地位上升，中共及时调整策略，以联苏代替反英，助推合作抗日，力促时局好转。值得一提的是，与此前受到苏联方面影响不同，此次调整是中共独立自主作出的。共产国际未对英、法、美等大国作明确区分，中共则从中国抗战大局出发，对于暂未介入二战、对日较为强硬的美国采取了更为缓和的态度。

Because Britain suffered heavy losses in World War II and its strength was greatly diminished, like the setting sun in the western hills, its status in the CPC’s field of vision gradually declined and was replaced by the United States. In August 1940, the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee clearly pointed out: “The main leader of the front against Germany, Italy, and Japan is no longer Churchill, but Roosevelt.” Moreover, at that time the alignment and division of the major powers were still in flux, “the forms they manifested were very subtle, enough to make one dizzy; this is not only different from all wars in history, but also completely different from the First World War, which had the same purpose. In the First World War, as soon as the call was made, fighting began, and as soon as fighting began, it expanded. This war is neither a dense cloud without rain, nor a violent storm, but a phenomenon of scattered clouds and scattered rain.” It was precisely in this complex situation that the CPC continuously studied the movements of Britain and other major powers, analyzed the Nationalist government’s foreign strategy and domestic policies, and on this basis properly handled internal and external relations, maximizing the national interest.

由于英国在二战中遭受重创，实力大不如前，已似西山落日，其在中共视阈中的地位逐渐下降，为美国所取代。1940年8月，中共中央书记处明确指出：“对抗德、意、日阵线的主要领导者已经不是丘吉尔，而是罗斯福了。”此外，彼时各大国阵营分合仍处于游移之中，“所表现出来的形态是非常微妙的，足以令人头晕目眩，这不仅与历史上所有战争不同，就是与目的完全相同的第一次世界大战亦完全两样。第一次大战一喊就打，一打就扩大起来。此次大战既不是密云不雨，又不是疾风暴雨，而是片云片雨的现象”。正是在这种复杂局面下，中共持续研判英国及其他大国的动向，分析国民党政府的外交战略和国内政策，在此基础上妥善处理了内外关系，实现了民族利益的最大化。

Online editor: Jing Mu

网络编辑：静穆