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Motives, Practices, and Lessons: A Three-Dimensional Exploration of the Chinese Communist Party’s Political Mobilization during the War of Resistance Against Japan

李现总、唐迪:动因·实践·镜鉴:抗战时期中国共产党政治动员的三维探赜

· · CPC History & Party Building · School of Marxism, Changzhou University · Journal of Red Culture, 2025, no. 2 · 28 min read

The War of Resistance Against Japan was a critical battle for the survival or extinction of the Chinese nation, and also an important historical field in which the Chinese Communist Party achieved a breakthrough in its capacity for political mobilization amid national crisis. Under the special historical circumstances of national peril and drastic changes in the domestic political landscape, the Chinese Communist Party, through institutional innovation and strategic renovation, activated the anti-war kinetic energy of all social strata and constructed an anti-Japanese national united front that crossed classes and regions. Surveying the research achievements of the academic community in recent years, some scholars have taken *Xinhua Daily* as the object of investigation, analyzing the methods and significance of using the Party newspaper to carry out political mobilization; some have taken the 359th Brigade’s Southern Advance Detachment as an example, analyzing the entire process of political mobilization by the Southern Advance Detachment in the later period of the War of Resistance; some have taken women’s groups as the research object, analyzing the establishment of the Jiangxi Women’s Guidance Office and its political mobilization of women. There are abundant research results on the Chinese Communist Party’s political mobilization from different perspectives such as media, groups, periods, and localities, but systematic summarization and organization of political mobilization during the War of Resistance period are still insufficient. In view of this, studying the historical motives, historical practices, and experiential lessons of the Chinese Communist Party’s political mobilization during the War of Resistance period not only helps to restore the full picture of the Chinese Communist Party’s political mobilization during that period but also provides a historical reference for social mobilization in national governance in the New Era.

抗日战争是中华民族生死存亡的关键一战,也是中国共产党在民族危难中实现政治动员能力突破的重要历史场域。在民族危亡与国内政治格局剧变的特殊历史情境下,中国共产党通过制度创新与策略革新,激活了社会各阶层的抗战动能,构建起跨阶级、跨地域的抗日民族统一战线。纵观学界近年来的研究成果,学者们有以《新华日报》为考察对象,分析运用党报开展政治动员的方式和意义;有以三五九旅南下支队为例,分析抗战后期南下支队在政治动员中的全过程;有以妇女群体为研究对象,对江西妇女指导处的成立及其对妇女政治动员进行剖析。从不同媒介、群体、时期、地方等角度对中国共产党政治动员的研究成果颇丰,但是对抗日战争时期政治动员的总结和系统性梳理还不够。鉴于此,通过对抗战时期中国共产党政治动员的历史动因、历史实践、经验镜鉴进行研究,不仅有助于还原抗战时期中国共产党政治动员的全景,更能为新时代国家治理中的社会动员提供历史参照。

I. Historical Motives for the Chinese Communist Party’s Political Mobilization during the War of Resistance Against Japan

一、抗战时期中国共产党政治动员的历史动因

On the historical coordinate system of national survival or extinction, the Chinese Communist Party’s political mobilization was like a torch in the dark night, illuminating the spiritual landscape of the全民抗战 [1]1 全民抗战 (quánmín kàngzhàn): “total resistance by the entire people,” a slogan and policy emphasizing the mobilization of all social strata, not just the military, in the war effort.. When the invader’s iron heel trampled across China, half of the rivers and mountains stained with blood; when the central government’s will to resist wavered on the path between war and peace, the leading core gradually losing its unifying power; when the common people had not yet awakened to the greater cause of the nation, the consensus for national salvation still like viewing flowers through a mist — this triple fracture of external aggression, central authority, and popular morale precisely highlighted the strategic value of political mobilization. The Chinese Communist Party, taking the cultural gene of “everyone is responsible for the rise and fall of the world” [2]2 “天下兴亡,匹夫有责” (tiānxià xīngwáng, pǐfū yǒu zé): a classical Chinese saying meaning “every individual is responsible for the rise and fall of the nation,” often attributed to the Ming-Qing scholar Gu Yanwu. as its bond, reshaped the backbone of the national spirit through ideological enlightenment, reconstructed the channels of social mobilization by relying on organizational networks, and forged a community of shared destiny in the War of Resistance through interest adjustment, ultimately transforming dispersed historical potential energy into a historical resultant force for overcoming the enemy and achieving victory.

在民族存亡绝续的历史坐标系上,中国共产党的政治动员犹如暗夜火炬,照亮了全民抗战的精神版图。 当侵略者的铁蹄纵横华夏,半壁河山尽染血色;当中枢抗战意志趑趄于战和歧途,领导核心渐失统摄之力;当草野未苏家国大义,救亡共识仍如雾里观花——这种外患、中枢、民气三重断裂的危局,恰恰凸显出政治动员的战略价值。 中国共产党以“天下兴亡,匹夫有责”的文化基因为纽带,通过意识形态启蒙重塑民族精神脊梁,凭借组织网络重构社会动员经络,依托利益调整熔铸抗战命运共同体,最终将分散的历史势能转化为克敌制胜的历史合力。

(1) The Multidimensional Crisis of National Survival Made the Chinese Communist Party’s Political Mobilization Urgent

(一)多维危机的民族生存困境使中国共产党政治动员具备迫切性

After the September 18th Incident in 1931 [3]3 September 18th Incident (九一八事变): the Japanese Kwantung Army’s staged destruction of a railway near Mukden (Shenyang) on September 18, 1931, used as a pretext to invade and occupy Northeast China., because “Japan is a relatively small country, lacking in manpower, military strength, financial resources, and material resources” [4]4 Quotation from Mao Zedong’s *On Protracted War* (1938)., it was forced to implement a policy of “sustaining the war through war” [5]5 “以战养战” (yǐ zhàn yǎng zhàn): “sustaining the war through war,” a Japanese policy of extracting resources from occupied territories to fuel further military operations., plundering strategic resources such as coal and iron ore from the Northeast and North China to maintain its war machine, and forcibly promoting Japanese-language education to undermine national cultural identity. After the full-scale war of aggression against China broke out in 1937, the Japanese army implemented the “burn all, kill all, loot all” policy [6]6 “三光政策” (sān guāng zhèngcè): “burn all, kill all, loot all” policy, a brutal counterinsurgency tactic systematically employed by the Japanese army in China from 1940 onward., forming a violent mechanism of terrorist rule. At the international political level, the Western powers, based on considerations of the Far Eastern balance of power, constructed a substantive system of appeasement. Britain, to maintain its interests in China and the Far East, adopted a series of policies of appeasement and connivance toward Japanese expansion, sacrificing the rights and interests of other countries. The United States, by enacting the Neutrality Acts [7]7 Neutrality Acts: a series of U.S. laws passed in the 1930s (1935, 1936, 1937) that prohibited arms sales and loans to belligerent nations, which in practice disadvantaged China against Japan., while professing “neutrality,” in fact restricted China’s access to military aid, and did not “awaken to the fact that its true responsibility in the Pacific was to struggle against Japanese imperialism, which directly threatened American ideals and interests” [8]8 Quotation from an unspecified source, likely a CCP analysis of U.S. foreign policy.. When Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in 1933, that organization lost its capacity to impose constraints due to the great powers’ evasion of responsibility, leading China into strategic isolation. Under this dual oppression, China fell into strategic isolation, and the crisis of national survival, as a “catalyst for social integration” [9]9 “社会整合的催化剂” (shèhuì zhěnghé de cuīhuàjì): “catalyst for social integration,” a sociological concept applied here to describe how external threat can unify a society., forced the Chinese nation to turn inward for mobilization,凝聚 [10]10 凝聚 (níngjù): “to condense, to gather together,” a common CCP term for mobilizing and uniting popular forces. the strength of the entire people for the War of Resistance, laying the foundation for a protracted war.

自1931 年九一八事变后,由于“日本国度比较地小,其人力、军力、财力、物力均感缺乏”,迫使其推行“以战养战”政策,通过掠夺东北、华北的煤矿铁矿等战略资源维系战争机器,并强制推行日语教育以瓦解民族文化认同。 1937 年全面侵华战争爆发,日军实施“烧光、杀光、抢光”的三光政策,形成恐怖统治的暴力机制。 国际政治层面,西方列强基于远东均势考量构建起实质性的绥靖体系。 英国为维护在华及远东利益,对日本扩张采取一系列姑息迁就的政策,牺牲他国权益。美国通过确定《中立法案》,虽标榜“中立”,实则限制中国获取军援,没有“觉悟到它在太平洋的真正责任是同直接威胁美国理想和利益的日本帝国主义作斗争”。 当1933 年日本退出国际联盟时,该组织因大国推诿丧失制约能力,导致中国陷入战略孤立。 在此双重压迫下,中国陷入战略孤立,民族存亡危机作为“社会整合的催化剂”,迫使中华民族转向内部动员,凝聚全民抗战力量,为持久抗战奠定基础。

(2) The Popular Enthusiasm for Resisting Japan Made the Chinese Communist Party’s Political Mobilization Possible

(二)民众抗日热情为中国共产党政治动员催生可能性

Mao Zedong profoundly pointed out in *On Protracted War*: “The deepest roots of the great power of war lie in the masses of the people.” [11]11 Quotation from Mao Zedong, *On Protracted War* (1938). This thesis was particularly vividly demonstrated in the early period of the War of Resistance: the Shanghai National Salvation Association formulated a plan for a complete economic boycott of Japan to strike at Japanese arrogance; the Northeast Volunteer Army constructed a spontaneous guerrilla front; students in Beiping [12]12 Beiping (北平): the name for Beijing from 1928 to 1949, when it was not the national capital. raised the “December 9th” [13]13 December 9th Movement (一二·九运动): a large-scale student protest in Beiping on December 9, 1935, demanding that the Nationalist government resist Japanese aggression. tide of national salvation. The Chinese Communist Party, with keen political insight, seized the historical opportunity, issuing the “Declaration on the Violent Occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces by Japanese Imperialism” [14]14 “Declaration on the Violent Occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces by Japanese Imperialism”: issued by the CCP Central Committee on September 20, 1931, two days after the Mukden Incident. immediately after the September 18th Incident. In 1932, it issued a “Declaration of War Against Japan” [15]15 “Declaration of War Against Japan”: issued by the Chinese Soviet Republic on April 15, 1932., calling on the workers, peasants, soldiers, and all laboring masses of the whole country to rise up together and actively participate in and carry out revolutionary war. In the same year, the “January 28th” [16]16 January 28th Incident (一二八事变): a Japanese attack on Shanghai on January 28, 1932, met with fierce resistance by the Nationalist 19th Route Army and local volunteers. Battle of Shanghai [17]17 Battle of Shanghai: the 1937 battle (also known as the Battle of Songhu) was a major three-month campaign that marked the start of full-scale war in China. gathered the strength of all the people of Shanghai; “the people provided spiritual strength, the people provided clothing, food, guns, ammunition, and shells, and the people fought shoulder to shoulder with them” [18]18 Quotation from an unspecified source, likely a CCP historical account.. In 1937, the Chinese Communist Party put forward the line of “total resistance” [19]19 “全面抗战” (quánmiàn kàngzhàn): “total resistance,” the CCP’s line advocating for mass mobilization, as opposed to the Nationalist government’s “片面抗战” (one-sided resistance) relying only on regular armies., and through the “Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation” [20]20 “Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation”: a CCP program issued in August 1937 outlining policies for mobilizing the people, including democratic reforms and improving people’s livelihoods., combined national interests with class liberation, so that “the entire Chinese people are mobilized and armed to participate in the War of Resistance” [21]21 Quotation from an unspecified CCP document, likely the Ten-Point Program., forming a broad united front.

毛泽东在《论持久战》中深刻指出:“战争的伟力之最深厚的根源,存在于民众之中。”这一论断在抗战初期展现得尤为鲜明:上海抗日救国会制定彻底对日经济绝交的计划打击日本气焰,东北义勇军构筑起自发的游击战线,北平学子掀起“一二·九”救亡浪潮等。中国共产党以敏锐的政治洞察力把握历史契机,在九一八事变后即发表《为日本帝国主义强暴占领东三省事件宣言》。1932 年发布“对日战争宣言”,号召全国工农兵及一切劳苦群众,一致起来积极地参加和进行革命战争。同年的“一二·八”淞沪抗战集结了全部上海人民的力量,“人民给予了精神力量,人民给予衣、食、枪炮弹药,人民还与之并肩作战”。1937 年,中国共产党提出“全面抗战”路线,通过《抗日救国十大纲领》将民族利益与阶级解放结合,让“全中国人民动员起来武装起来,参加抗战”,形成广泛的统一战线。

(3) The Mobilization Capacity Accumulated from Historical Experience Injected Agency into the Chinese Communist Party’s Political Mobilization

(三)历史经验累积的动员能力为中国共产党政治动员注入能动性

The mobilization capacity forged by the Chinese Communist Party in revolutionary practice was the core kinetic energy for凝聚 [10]10 凝聚 (níngjù): “to condense, to gather together,” a common CCP term for mobilizing and uniting popular forces. the strength of the entire nation during the War of Resistance. During the Great Revolution period [22]22 Great Revolution period (大革命时期): the period of the First United Front between the CCP and the Nationalist Party (KMT), roughly 1924–1927., the Party initially constructed a mobilization framework in the workers’ movement and the construction of peasant associations, carrying out political mobilization through the establishment of night schools, newspaper propaganda, and the formation of peasant associations, transforming Marxist theory into practical slogans such as “overthrow the contract labor system” and “increase wages and reduce working hours,” directly linking abstract revolutionary goals with the interests of the people. This mobilization strategy of integrating political demands with economic demands was deepened and developed during the Agrarian Revolutionary War period [23]23 Agrarian Revolutionary War period (土地革命战争时期): the period from the Nanchang Uprising (1927) to the outbreak of full-scale war with Japan (1937), characterized by CCP-led land reform and the establishment of rural Soviet bases.. The Central Soviet Area [24]24 Central Soviet Area (中央苏区): the largest and most important CCP-controlled base area in the early 1930s, centered on the Jiangxi-Fujian border, with Ruijin as its capital., through projects such as land redistribution, the establishment of Soviet political power, and the promotion of cultural literacy, stimulated the masses’ enthusiasm for participation, forming a mobilization model with grassroots Party organizations at the core and the Red Guards [25]25 Red Guards (赤卫队): local militia units in the Soviet areas, distinct from the later Red Guards of the Cultural Revolution. and Young Pioneers [26]26 Young Pioneers (少先队): a mass youth organization in the Soviet areas, forerunner of the post-1949 Young Pioneers. as extensions. When the flames of the War of Resistance ignited, these experiences were rapidly transformed into mobilization resources for national salvation: class discourse was sublimated into the greater cause of the nation; the “speaking bitterness meetings” [27]27 “Speaking bitterness meetings” (诉苦大会): a mass mobilization technique used in land reform, where peasants publicly recounted their grievances against landlords. of the Agrarian Revolution were transformed into mass assemblies denouncing the atrocities of the Japanese army; the propaganda and reporting on the revolutionary situation in publications such as *New Youth* [28]28 *New Youth* (《新青年》): a influential magazine founded by Chen Duxiu in 1915, a key vehicle for the New Culture Movement and later for Marxist propaganda. evolved into propaganda on the dynamics of the anti-Japanese situation in *Liberation Daily* [29]29 *Liberation Daily* (《解放日报》): the official newspaper of the CCP Central Committee, first published in Yan’an in 1941.. Most importantly, while maintaining its traditional advantage in mobilizing peasants, the Party also absorbed social elites through the “Three-Thirds System” [30]30 “Three-Thirds System” (三三制): a policy in the base areas during the War of Resistance, where one-third of positions in representative bodies and governments were held by CCP members, one-third by non-Party leftists, and one-third by centrists. and alleviated class contradictions through the policy of reducing rent and interest [31]31 Policy of reducing rent and interest (减租减息): a wartime policy in CCP-controlled areas that lowered land rents and loan interest rates to alleviate peasant burdens while maintaining the cooperation of patriotic landlords.. This creative transformation of historical experience was reflected not only in flexible changes at the strategic level but also in the construction of a mobilization system with national liberation as the value consensus, the mass line as the organizational bond, and interest adjustment as the practical foundation, injecting inexhaustible impetus into the protracted War of Resistance.

中国共产党在革命实践中锻造的动员能力,是抗战时期凝聚全民族力量的核心动能。 大革命时期,党在工人运动与农民协会建设中初步构建起动员框架,通过创办夜校、报刊宣传、建立农会等形式开展政治动员,将马克思主义理论转化为“推翻包工制”“加薪减时”的实践口号,使抽象的革命目标与民众利益直接关联。这种将政治诉求融合经济诉求的动员策略,在土地革命时期得到深化发展。中央苏区通过土地再分配、建立苏维埃政权、推行文化扫盲等工程,激发群众的参与热情,形成以基层党组织为核心、赤卫队与少先队为延伸的动员模式。当抗战烽火燃起,这些经验迅速转化为民族救亡的动员资源:阶级话语升华为民族大义,土地革命的“诉苦大会”转型为控诉日军暴行的群众集会,《新青年》等报刊对革命形势的宣传报道演化为《解放日报》等对抗日时局动态的宣传。尤为重要的是,党在保持农民动员传统优势的同时,还通过“三三制”政权吸纳社会精英,借助减租减息政策缓和阶级矛盾。 这种历史经验的创造性转化,不仅体现在策略层面的灵活变动,更在于构建起以民族解放为价值共识、以群众路线为组织纽带、以利益调整为现实基础的动员体系,为持久抗战注入了不竭动力。

II. Historical Practices of the Chinese Communist Party’s Political Mobilization during the War of Resistance Against Japan

二、抗战时期中国共产党政治动员的历史实践

The Chinese Communist Party deeply recognized that to achieve final victory in the War of Resistance, it was necessary to fully mobilize the masses and凝聚 [10]10 凝聚 (níngjù): “to condense, to gather together,” a common CCP term for mobilizing and uniting popular forces. the strength of the entire nation. To this end, the Party carried out a series of highly targeted and effective political mobilization efforts. From consolidating the ideological foundation for the全民抗战 [1]1 全民抗战 (quánmín kàngzhàn): “total resistance by the entire people,” a slogan and policy emphasizing the mobilization of all social strata, not just the military, in the war effort., to perfecting the implementation system for mobilization in the War of Resistance, to strengthening social consensus through interest linkages, every measure closely revolved around the overall situation of the War of Resistance, aiming to unite the entire people under the banner of resisting Japan and to fight valiantly for national liberation.

中国共产党深刻认识到,要想取得抗战的最终胜利,必须充分发动群众,凝聚全民族的力量。为此,党开展了一系列极具针对性和实效性的政治动员工作。 从筑牢全民抗战意识形态基础,到完善抗战动员执行体系,再到利益联结强化社会共识,每一项举措都紧密围绕抗战大局,旨在将全国人民团结在抗日的旗帜下,为实现民族解放而奋勇拼搏。

(1) Consolidating the Ideological Foundation for the全民抗战 [1]1 全民抗战 (quánmín kàngzhàn): “total resistance by the entire people,” a slogan and policy emphasizing the mobilization of all social strata, not just the military, in the war effort. through Systematic, Multi-Dimensional Propaganda and Education

(一)通过系统化、多维度的宣传教育筑牢全民抗战意识形态基础

In the grand project of political mobilization, the Chinese Communist Party not only achieved broad coverage of social mobilization through popularized cultural propaganda but also strengthened the deep penetration of ideological enlightenment by taking literacy education as a starting point. When the people in the base areas understood the fate of the nation and family in the smell of ink from literacy textbooks, strategic communication in the international public opinion field was also unfolding simultaneously. This internal-external linked propaganda and education system formed a cognitive progression from cultural infection to knowledge popularization within the base areas, while also building a three-dimensional communication network within the world anti-fascist front, ultimately constructing an ideological united front spanning domestic and international spheres and connecting the intellectual stratum with the grassroots masses.

在政治动员的宏大工程中,中国共产党不仅通过大众化文化宣传实现了社会动员的广度覆盖,更以扫盲教育为抓手强化了思想启蒙的深度渗透。当根据地民众在识字课本的油墨气息中理解家国命运时,国际舆论场域的战略传播也在同步展开。这种内外联动的宣传教育体系,既在根据地内部形成从文化感染到知识普及的认知进阶,又在世界反法西斯阵线中搭建起立体传播网络,最终构建起横跨国内国际、贯通知识阶层与基层群众的意识形态统一战线。

First, popularized cultural propaganda. As the most penetrating mobilization strategy during the War of Resistance, popularized cultural propaganda constructed a spiritual totem for the whole nation’s resistance through multi-dimensional literary and artistic carriers. Mao Zedong, in *On Protracted War*, pointed out that mobilization must rely on “oral speech, on leaflets and bulletins, on newspapers and books, on plays and films, on schools, on mass organizations, and on cadres.” [32]32 Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War,” *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 481. [33] “Directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Propaganda Work in the War Zones,” 1938. [34] *Put Down Your Whip* was a popular street play during the War of Resistance, depicting the suffering of refugees and calling for resistance. [35] *Qu Yuan* is a historical play by Guo Moruo, written in 1942, using the story of the ancient poet Qu Yuan to criticize the Kuomintang’s passivity and inspire patriotic resistance. [36] The Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region was one of the earliest and most important anti-Japanese base areas, established in 1937 in the border area of Shanxi, Chahar, and Hebei provinces. [37] *Liberation Daily* was the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, published in Yan’an from 1941 to 1947. [38] “New script” refers to the Latinized New Writing (Latinxua Sin Wenz) promoted in the 1930s and 1940s as a simplified phonetic script for literacy among the masses. [39] The Jiangsu-Anhui Border Region was an anti-Japanese base area established in 1940 along the borders of Jiangsu and Anhui provinces. [40] Liao Chengzhi (1908–1983) and Pan Hannian (1906–1977) were senior Chinese Communist Party officials and intelligence operatives. [41] Wu Yuzhang (1878–1966) was a senior Chinese Communist Party member and educator, later president of Renmin University of China. *National Salvation News* was a Chinese-language newspaper published in Paris from 1935 to 1938. [42] *Overseas Chinese Times* was a Chinese-language newspaper published in the United States, supporting the Chinese Communist Party. *Liberation* was a weekly journal published in Yan’an. [43] Edgar Snow (1905–1972) was an American journalist whose book *Red Star Over China* (1937) introduced the Chinese Communist Party to the Western world. [44] “Resolution on Massively Developing Party Members,” March 15, 1938. [45] “Decision on Consolidating the Party,” 1939. Guided by this thinking, the Chinese Communist Party innovatively built a three-dimensional literary and artistic mobilization project. First, slogans and catchphrases, as core mobilization tools, struck people’s hearts with concise rhythms. In 1938, the Party Central Committee demanded that “in the war zones, write more, paste more, and issue large numbers of slogans and catchphrases, with Japanese annotations.” [33]33 Central Archives, ed., *Selected Documents of the Hebei-Henan-Shanxi Base Area*, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1985), p. 76. Localities adapted slogans to local conditions in innovative forms—some were printed on paper, couplets, or leaflets for wide distribution; others were written with paint or ink on walls and rocks using locally available materials; and, more innovatively, a Chinese-Japanese bilingual comparison model was adopted, with slogans such as “the state above all, the nation above all” achieving wide dissemination. Second, drama and theater served as wartime awakening classrooms, becoming one of the main forms for mobilizing the masses. For example, the Shandong Anti-Japanese Base Area set a record of performing *Put Down Your Whip* 13 times in a single day. [34]34 *Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi*, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1981), p. 278. Traditional opera was tempered and reborn in the crucible of the War of Resistance; for instance, the adapted opera *Jianghan Fishermen’s Song* incorporated themes of resistance, and in the Southwest region, plays such as *Qu Yuan* sparked a cultural resistance climax. [35]35 The Red Spear Society was a traditional Chinese folk armed self-defense organization, often with religious and superstitious elements, prevalent in rural areas of northern China in the early 20th century. Third, poetry, songs, and ballads also formed a powerful appeal. For example, the *Yellow River Cantata*, created by the Yan’an Lu Xun Academy of Arts, awakened national consciousness with its majestic momentum, and when toured in the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, it drew an audience of 100,000. [36]36 *Selected Military Writings of Zhu De* (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1997), p. 187. Additionally, newspapers and periodicals served as the main front for ideological mobilization. Mao Zedong emphasized using the propaganda methods of newspapers to mobilize the masses. For instance, *Liberation Daily* built an ideological front through news, commentary, and propaganda posters, transforming the Chinese Communist Party’s propositions into action programs perceptible to the people. [37]37 Hu Hua, ed., *A Course in the History of the Chinese Revolution* (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 1979), p. 345. This multi-dimensional cultural propaganda, by artistically presenting the wartime crisis, deepened the cognition of the national community through emotional resonance, propelled the masses of all strata to complete an ideological leap from spontaneous struggle to conscious adherence to the revolutionary path, and achieved a deep integration of ideological mobilization and political awakening.

第一,大众化文化宣传。作为抗战时期最具穿透力的动员策略,大众化文化宣传通过多维度的文艺载体构建起全民抗战的精神图腾。 毛泽东在《论持久战》中指出,动员要“靠口说,靠传单布告,靠报纸书册,靠戏剧电影,靠学校,靠民众团体,靠干部人员”。在这一思想指引下,中国共产党开创性地构建起立体化的文艺动员工程。 首先,标语口号作为核心动员手段,以简明韵律直击人心。1938 年,中共中央要求“在战地多写、多贴、大发标语口号并标注日文”。各地因地制宜创新标语呈现形式——或印刷于纸张、对联、传单广泛散发,或就地取材以颜料墨汁书写于墙壁岩石,更开创性地采用中日双语对照模式,“国家至上、民族至上”等口号得到广泛传播。 其次,戏剧文化作战时觉醒课堂,成为发动群众的主要形式之一。例如山东抗日根据地创下单日连演13 场《放下你的鞭子》的纪录。传统戏曲在抗战熔炉中淬炼新生,如改编戏曲《江汉渔歌》等融入抗战主题,西南地区通过《屈原》等剧目掀起文化抗战高潮。 再次,诗词歌谣同样形成了强大的号召力。例如延安鲁迅艺术学院创作的《黄河大合唱》以磅礴气势唤醒民族意识,在晋察冀边区巡演时观众达10 万人次。此外,报刊传媒作为思想动员的主阵地,毛泽东强调利用报纸舆论的宣传方式来动员群众。如《解放日报》通过新闻、评论和宣传画的形式构建舆论阵地,将中国共产党的主张转化为民众可感知的行动纲领。这种多维文化宣传通过艺术化呈现时局危机,在情感共鸣中深化民族共同体认知,推动各阶层群众完成从自发抗争到自觉追随革命道路的思想跃迁,实现了意识形态动员与政治觉醒的深度融合。

Second, literacy education. In the early stages of the War of Resistance, the problem of illiteracy not only caused difficulties in production and daily life but also affected the security of the base areas. Militiamen, unable to read, could not distinguish genuine from fake “road passes,” giving traitors opportunities to exploit the situation. On one hand, in response to the reality of high illiteracy rates in rural areas, the Chinese Communist Party launched educational programs such as “literacy classes” and “night schools” in the base areas, combining cultural learning with resistance propaganda, so that the most basic and easiest-to-learn new script could be popularized in the shortest time among male and female illiterates who had never participated in written life. [38]38 “The military and the people are as close as fish and water” is a classic CCP slogan expressing the ideal of harmonious military-civilian relations, originating from the Yan’an period. In 1940, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region issued the *Notice on Eliminating Illiteracy within the Party*, which supervised and inspected literacy work across Party localities, pointing out that the main reason for the lack of depth in political transmission was the problem of illiteracy among cadres. On the other hand, local practice exhibited innovative characteristics tailored to local conditions. After Xiwen County in Guizhou Province opened literacy night schools, current affairs classes were added on top of basic literacy and simple arithmetic courses. Instructors transformed Mao Zedong’s military theories, such as *On Protracted War*, into easy-to-understand teaching cases, organically integrating cultural acquisition with patriotic education. At the same time, the winter study movement was also a flexible teaching format for literacy among peasants in winter. For example, in 1944, the Jiangsu-Anhui Border Region actively carried out the winter study movement, integrating practical issues such as enlistment mobilization and production construction into cultural courses, transforming what was originally a simple literacy classroom into a mobilization field for the whole nation’s resistance. After the winter study concluded that year, the enlistment rate among youth in the border region increased by 37% compared to previous years, vividly illustrating the superimposed effect of knowledge dissemination and social mobilization. [39]39 The Great Production Movement was a large-scale economic self-sufficiency campaign launched by the CCP in the base areas from 1939 onwards, aimed at overcoming the severe material shortages caused by the Japanese blockade.

第二,扫盲教育。抗战初期,文盲问题不仅导致生产生活困难,还影响根据地安全,民兵因不识字无法辨别真假“路条”,给汉奸可乘之机。 一方面,针对农村文盲率高的现实,中国共产党在根据地开展“识字班”“夜校”等教育项目,将文化学习与抗战宣传相结合,让最基本最易学的新文字在最短时间内普及到从未参加过文字生活的男女文盲。1940 年,陕甘宁边区发布《关于消灭党内文盲问题的通知》,对党内各地的扫盲识字工作监督检查,指出政治传达不深入的主因在于干部文盲问题。另一方面,地方实践呈现出因地制宜的创新特征。贵州修文县开办扫盲夜校后,在基础识字、简易算数课程的基础上又增添时事课,教员将毛泽东《论持久战》等军事理论转化为通俗易懂的教学案例,使文化习得与爱国主义教育形成有机融合。 同时,冬学运动也是冬季农民进行扫盲的一种灵活的教学形式。 例如,在1944 年,苏皖边区积极开展冬学运动,将参军动员、生产建设等现实议题融入文化课程,原本单纯的扫盲课堂转化为全民抗战的动员场域。 该年度冬学结束后,边区青年参军率较往年提升37%,生动诠释了知识传播与社会动员的叠加效应。

Third, international propaganda. In response to the weakness of international communication in the early stages of the War of Resistance, the Party Central Committee focused on breaking through international cognitive barriers, exposing the atrocities of the Japanese army to the world, and reshaping the Chinese Communist Party’s image in the resistance. First, international propaganda institutions were established. The Chinese Communist Party organized the creation of the Xinhua News Agency to serve the Party’s external propaganda work. In 1938, the Chinese Communist Party decided to designate Hong Kong as the center for overseas Chinese activities and international propaganda. Zhou Enlai indicated that the heroic achievements of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army had won the admiration of overseas Chinese, and there was an urgent need to establish an institution in Hong Kong to receive donations from overseas Chinese. Accordingly, Liao Chengzhi and Pan Hannian were tasked with establishing the Eighth Route Army Hong Kong Office. This institution, by organizing overseas Chinese support, compiling and distributing multilingual resistance information, and coordinating international aid supplies, became an important communication hub in the Far East. [40]40 The “Support the Government and Cherish the People” and “Support the Army and Give Preferential Treatment to Families of Servicemen and Martyrs” movements were twin campaigns initiated in the base areas in 1943 to strengthen unity between the military and civilians and between the government and the people. Second, a media matrix was built. The Party Central Committee focused on constructing autonomous and controllable overseas communication platforms. After the Paris-based *National Salvation News* ceased publication in 1935, Wu Yuzhang founded the *National Salvation Times*, which systematically published strategic documents such as *On Protracted War*. [41]41 The “25% reduction in rent” refers to reducing the original land rent by 25%, a specific policy measure of the CCP’s wartime land policy. Because its statements represented the demands of a broad readership, its circulation jumped from 5,000 to 20,000 copies in its first year of publication, covering 43 countries, forming a cross-lingual resistance communication network together with publications such as *Overseas Chinese Times* and *Liberation*. [42]42 *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991), p. 766. Finally, international friends were invited to visit. Through systematic planning and diplomatic coordination, the Chinese Communist Party successfully facilitated visits by groups of foreign journalists with international influence. Through in-depth investigations such as battlefield inspections and military-civilian discussions, these journalist groups keenly captured the deep transformations in the anti-Japanese base areas. Journalists such as Edgar Snow, using internationally renowned media like the *New York Times*, disseminated the actual conditions of the base areas’ resistance to all parts of the world. This not only broke the Kuomintang’s information blockade but also attracted more international figures to visit China for investigation, forming a virtuous cycle of international communication. [43]43 *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 768.

第三,国际宣传。针对抗战初期国际传播薄弱问题,中共中央着力突破国际认知壁垒,向世界揭露日军暴行并重塑中国共产党的抗战形象。首先,创立国际宣传机构。中国共产党组织创立新华通讯社,服务于党的对外宣传工作。 1938 年,中国共产党决定将香港确定为华侨运动及国际宣传的中心地区,周恩来表示八路军、新四军英勇战绩深得海外侨胞钦仰,亟须在港设立机构接收侨胞捐献物资。据此,廖承志、潘汉年受命组建八路军驻香港办事处,该机构通过组织华侨支援、编发多语种抗战资讯、协调国际援华物资,成为远东地区的重要传播枢纽。其次,打造媒体矩阵。 中共中央注重构建自主可控的海外传播平台,吴玉章1935 年在巴黎《救国报》停刊后创办《救国时报》,系统刊载《论持久战》等战略文献。因其言论代表了广大读者的要求,发行量在创刊首年即从五千份跃升至两万份,覆盖四十三国,与《华侨时报》《解放》等刊物共同构成跨语种抗战传播网络。最后,邀请国际友人来访。中国共产党通过系统策划与外交协调,成功促成了一批具有国际影响力的外国记者团访华事宜。记者团通过组织战地考察、军民座谈等深度调研,敏锐捕捉到抗日根据地的深层变革,斯诺等记者借助《纽约时报》等国际知名媒体,将根据地的抗战实情传播到世界各地,不仅打破国民党舆论封锁,而且吸引更多国际人士来华考察,形成国际传播的良性循环。

(B) Perfecting the execution system for the whole nation’s resistance mobilization through hierarchical and grid-based organizational construction

(二)通过层级化、网格化的组织建设完善全民抗战动员执行体系

Transforming the whole nation’s enthusiasm for resistance into concrete action required constructing an efficient execution system for resistance political mobilization. To this end, the Chinese Communist Party coordinated efforts from three aspects—developing grassroots Party organizations, organizationally mobilizing mass groups, and strengthening military construction—to jointly build a tight organizational network, ensuring that resistance political mobilization could be precisely and efficiently implemented in every corner.

将全民族的抗战热情转化为实际行动,构建一套高效的抗战政治动员执行体系至关重要。为此,中国共产党从发展基层党组织、组织化动员群众团体、强化军队建设三方面协同发力,共同构建起一张严密的组织网络,确保抗战政治动员能够精准、高效地落实到每一个角落。

First, developing grassroots Party organizations. Under the influence of the Communist International, the Chinese Communist Party established a vast organizational system with the Party at its core. Through the systematic construction and creative practice of grassroots Party organizations, it built a political mobilization system that combined organizational effectiveness with mass identification, becoming the core hub for consolidating the whole nation’s resistance forces. In the early stages of the War of Resistance, the Chinese Communist Party rapidly constructed a five-level Party organization network of “Central Bureau—Sub-Bureau—Region—County—Township” in the enemy’s rear base areas, absorbing advanced elements to join the Party. On March 15, 1938, the Chinese Communist Party issued the *Resolution on Massively Developing Party Members*, making the expansion of organizational scale the Party’s most urgent task and demanding that the entire Party “massively develop Party members by tenfold and a hundredfold.” [44]44 The “November 1 Directive” refers to the directive issued by the CCP Central Committee on November 1, 1942, urging the thorough implementation of the land policy in the base areas. According to the resolution’s directive, the number of Chinese Communist Party members grew from 40,000 in the early stages of the War of Resistance to over 1.2 million, achieving a magnitude leap in organizational strength. It is worth noting that this scale expansion was always accompanied by strict quality control. In 1939, the Party Central Committee issued the *Decision on Consolidating the Party*, pointing out that “every effort must be made to consolidate the Party’s organization, tighten the Party’s ranks, and unite the Party like one person, so that the Party can be prepared to overcome current difficulties, oppose the danger of domestic capitulation and splitting, unite the entire Chinese people, and lead the War of Resistance to final and complete victory.” [45]45 *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 892.

第一,发展基层党组织。在共产国际的影响下,中国共产党建立了一个以党为核心的庞大的组织体系,通过基层党组织的系统化建设与创造性实践,构建起兼具组织效能与群众认同的政治动员体系,成为凝聚全民抗战力量的核心枢纽。在抗战初期,中国共产党在敌后根据地迅速构建起“中央局—分局—区—县—乡”五级党组织网络,吸纳先进分子加入党组织。1938 年3月15日,中国共产党作出《关于大量发展党员的决议》,把扩大组织规模作为党最迫切的任务,要求全党“大量的十百倍的发展党员”。根据决议指示,中国共产党党员人数从抗战初期的4万人增长到120多万人,组织力量实现量级跨越。值得关注的是,这种规模扩张始终伴随着严格的质量管控。1939年,中共中央发布《关于巩固党的决定》,指出要“尽一切的努力来巩固党的组织,严密党的队伍,把党团结得像一个人一样,才能使党有所准备来克服目前困难,反对国内投降分裂的危险,团结全中国人民,引导抗战到最后的彻底的胜利”。

Second, the organizational mobilization of mass organizations. In the social mobilization system of the anti-Japanese base areas, the organizational construction of mass organizations occupied a core position. As a foundational project for the construction of base area political power, the Chinese Communist Party consistently regarded the formation of mass organizations as a key pathway for consolidating the forces of the War of Resistance. At the organizational level, in 1938, the CCP’s Hebei-Henan-Shanxi Provincial Party Committee stated in its directive letter that it was necessary to unify the mass movement and organization on a broader scale, “establishing various unified mass organizations, such as district peasant salvation associations, district self-defense corps headquarters and political departments, district workers’ salvation associations, youth salvation associations, women’s salvation associations, and even children’s national salvation associations, all to be fully and practically completed by the end of the year.” [33]33 Central Archives, ed., *Selected Documents of the Hebei-Henan-Shanxi Base Area*, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1985), p. 76. Liu Shaoqi also emphasized the need to “do a good job of the mass movement, do a good job of organizing the workers, peasants, women, and youth,” and to “respect mass organizations.” [34]34 *Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi*, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1981), p. 278. In practice, many areas skillfully relied on groups such as “peasant associations” and “women’s salvation associations” to incorporate originally scattered individuals into a solid framework of collective action. Taking the Shandong base area as an example, the Party organization skillfully transformed folk armed groups like the “Red Spear Society,” [35]35 The Red Spear Society was a traditional Chinese folk armed self-defense organization, often with religious and superstitious elements, prevalent in rural areas of northern China in the early 20th century. absorbing 50,000 members into the ranks of the War of Resistance within a short period. These groups were not merely units of production cooperation; their essence was as vehicles for political education, prompting political mobilization to deeply integrate into the daily lives of the people in a normalized, routine manner. Furthermore, Zhu De affirmed youth organizations such as the “Youth Anti-Japanese Vanguards” and anti-Japanese youth teams, clearly stating that “as long as there are anti-Japanese armed forces locally, the youth play an enormous role within them.” [36]36 *Selected Military Writings of Zhu De* (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1997), p. 187. This evaluation was both an affirmation of the youth’s contribution to the War of Resistance and a reflection of the Party’s successful practice of intergenerational mobilization through organizational construction.

第二,群众团体的组织化动员。在抗日根据地的社会动员体系中,群众团体的组织化建设居于核心地位。 作为根据地政权建设的基础性工程,中国共产党始终将群众组织的建构视为凝聚抗战力量的关键路径。 在组织层面,1938 年,中共冀豫晋省委在指示信中要求在更大范围内统一群众运动和组织,“建立各种统一的群众组织,如区农救会,区自卫队队部及政治部,区工救会、青救会、妇救会以至儿童救国会等,于年终前全部切实完成”。刘少奇也强调,要“把群众运动搞好,把工、农、妇女、青年组织搞好”,要“尊重群众团体”。在实践层面,许多地区巧妙依托“农会”“妇救会”等团体,将原本分散的个体纳入集体行动的坚实框架之中。 以山东根据地为例,党组织巧妙改造“红枪会”等民间武装,短短时间内就吸纳了5万成员加入抗战序列。这类团体并非单纯的生产协作单位,其实质是政治教育载体,促使政治动员以常态化、日常化的方式深度融入民众生活。此外,朱德对“青抗先”、抗日青年队等青年组织表示肯定,明确“只要当地有抗日武装,青年就在里面起了极大的作用”。这种评价既是对青年抗战贡献的肯定,也折射出党通过组织建设实现代际动员的成功实践。

Third, strengthening military construction. The development and expansion of the people’s army led by the Chinese Communist Party in the enemy rear base areas, along with its disciplinary construction, was both a strategic choice in response to national peril and an innovative achievement combining Marxist military theory with the practice of the Chinese revolution. To achieve victory in the War of Resistance, strengthening the construction of the people’s army was urgent. On the one hand, there was the expansion of the scale of armed forces. The Chinese Communist Party profoundly understood the necessity of transforming the worker and peasant masses into revolutionary armed forces. The CCP’s “liberated areas were spread across 19 provinces and regions, and the people’s army grew from over 50,000 at the start of the war to over 1.2 million, with the militia reaching over 2.6 million.” [37]37 Hu Hua, ed., *A Course in the History of the Chinese Revolution* (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 1979), p. 345. From this perspective, the Chinese Communist Party was always the strong core consolidating the forces of the War of Resistance throughout the entire process of the national War of Resistance, demonstrating outstanding mass mobilization and organizational capacity. On the other hand, there was the strengthening of military-civilian integration. The key to strengthening the political construction of the military lay in handling military-civilian relations, deepening the new type of officer-soldier relations, implementing the interactive model of “the military and the people are as close as fish and water,” [38]38 “The military and the people are as close as fish and water” is a classic CCP slogan expressing the ideal of harmonious military-civilian relations, originating from the Yan’an period. and integrating the principle of equality into the political practice of the “Party commands the gun” principle. During the stage of strategic stalemate, while carrying out military strikes, the Japanese army also deprived the base areas of survival resources, causing the destruction of residential buildings, the severance of food supplies, and the destruction of production capacity. In response, the Chinese Communist Party launched the “Great Production Movement,” [39]39 The Great Production Movement was a large-scale economic self-sufficiency campaign launched by the CCP in the base areas from 1939 onwards, aimed at overcoming the severe material shortages caused by the Japanese blockade. thereby raising the economic living standards of the masses, while actively organizing the “Support the Government and Cherish the People” and “Support the Army and Give Preferential Treatment to Families of Servicemen and Martyrs” movements, [40]40 The “Support the Government and Cherish the People” and “Support the Army and Give Preferential Treatment to Families of Servicemen and Martyrs” movements were twin campaigns initiated in the base areas in 1943 to strengthen unity between the military and civilians and between the government and the people. enhancing the unity of the Party, government, military, and people, and consolidating the combined forces of the War of Resistance.

第三,加强军队建设。 中国共产党领导的人民军队在敌后根据地的发展壮大与纪律建设,既是应对民族危亡的战略抉择,也是马克思主义军事理论与中国革命实践相结合的创新成果。要实现抗战胜利,加强人民军队的建设刻不容缓。一方面,武装力量规模扩张。中国共产党深刻体会到将工农群众转化为革命武装力量的必然性。中国共产党的“解放区遍布19 个省、区,人民军队则由战争开始时的5 万余人发展到120 余万人,民兵达260 余万人”。由是观之,中国共产党在全民族抗战进程中始终是凝聚抗战力量的坚强核心,彰显出卓越的群众动员与组织能力。另一方面,加强军民融合。加强军队政治建设,关键在于处理军民关系、深化新型官兵关系,落实“军民鱼水情”互动模式,将平等理念融入“党指挥枪”原则的政治实践。 战略相持阶段,日军在实施军事打击的同时剥夺根据地生存资源,造成民居损毁、粮食断绝,并摧毁生产机能。为此,中国共产党开展“大生产运动”,以此提升群众经济生活水平,同时积极组织“拥政爱民”和“拥军优属”运动,增进党政军民团结,凝聚抗战合力。

(III) Constructing differentiated and precise interest linkage bonds to strengthen social consensus

(三)构建差异化、精准化的利益联结纽带强化社会共识

To successfully mobilize the broad masses to participate in the War of Resistance, the key lay in integrating the interests of all parties, enabling the people to genuinely feel that their own interests were closely linked to the cause of the War of Resistance. To this end, the Chinese Communist Party exerted efforts from multiple key areas: by promoting adjustments to land policy, enabling peasants to obtain tangible economic benefits; by launching the Great Production Movement, improving the supply of materials in the base areas and raising the people’s living standards; and by implementing democratic politics, granting the people political rights, and enhancing their sense of participation and belonging. This series of measures intertwined and advanced synergistically, comprehensively consolidating the mass foundation for mobilization in the War of Resistance.

要成功动员广大群众投身抗战,关键在于整合各方利益,让民众切实感受到自身利益与抗战事业紧密相连。 为此,中国共产党从多个关键领域发力,通过推动土地政策调整,使农民获得切实的经济利益;开展大生产运动,改善根据地物资供应,提升民众生活水平;实行民主政治,赋予民众政治权利,增强民众的参与感与归属感。这一系列举措相互交织、协同推进,全方位夯实了抗战动员的群众基础。

First, promoting land policy. Facing the reality of imbalanced land distribution in the border areas during the early stages of the War of Resistance, the Chinese Communist Party creatively implemented a land policy system centered on reducing rent and interest. First, policy formulation and local refinement. The CCP Central Committee stopped confiscating landlords’ land, returned land ownership to the landlords, and formally implemented the land policy of rent reduction in 1937, requiring the principle of a 25% reduction in rent, stipulating on the one hand that landlords reduce rent, and on the other hand that peasants pay rent. [41]41 The “25% reduction in rent” refers to reducing the original land rent by 25%, a specific policy measure of the CCP’s wartime land policy. In the specific implementation process, each base area actively responded to the call of the Party Central Committee and acted swiftly. Detailed regulations such as the “Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region Government Single Regulations on Rent and Interest Reduction” and the “Southern Hebei Administrative Office Stipulated Measures for Rent and Interest Reduction” were successively promulgated, and the land rent reduction movement in various regions thus arose. Second, policy deepening and supervision mechanisms. In 1942, the Politburo of the Central Committee passed the “Decision on Land Policy in Anti-Japanese Base Areas” and the “Directive on the Strategy for Implementing the Land Policy Decision,” emphasizing that “uniting with landlords to resist Japan is our Party’s strategic policy,” [42]42 *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991), p. 766. further clarifying this policy. Guided by the policy, various regions, combining their own actual conditions, once again perfected more targeted policies. In the actual process of policy implementation, the CCP Central Committee supervised and inspected the actual implementation in the base areas. Mao Zedong emphasized in his directives that each base area must establish an autumn harvest inspection system; if rent had not been reduced in the current year, it must be reduced; if the reduction was incomplete, the rent must be thoroughly reduced. [43]43 *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 768. Following the Central Committee’s “November 1 Directive,” [44]44 The “November 1 Directive” refers to the directive issued by the CCP Central Committee on November 1, 1942, urging the thorough implementation of the land policy in the base areas. each base area put forward clear requirements for the vast number of Party members and cadres, urging them to go deep into the grassroots level to promote the implementation of the policy.

第一,推广土地政策。面对抗战初期边区土地分配失衡的现状,中国共产党创造性实施以减租减息为核心的土地政策体系。其一,制定政策与地方细化。 中共中央停止没收地主土地,将土地所有权归还地主,并在1937 年正式实行减租的土地政策,要求以二五减租为原则,一方面规定地主减租,另一方面规定农民交租。在具体执行过程中,各根据地积极响应党中央号召,迅速行动起来,《晋察冀边区政府减租减息单行条例》《冀南行政公署规定减租减息办法》等细则相继颁布,各地区土地减租运动就此兴起。 其二,政策深化与督导机制。1942 年中央政治局通过《关于抗日根据地土地政策的决定》和《关于执行土地政策决定的策略的指示》,强调“联合地主抗日是我党的战略方针”,进一步明确这一政策。在政策的指引下,各地结合自身实际情况,再次完善更具针对性的政策。 在政策真正落实的过程中,中共中央对根据地的实际落实情况进行督促检查,毛泽东在指示中强调,各根据地须建立秋收检查制度,未减者当年必减,减不彻底者彻底减租。各根据地遵照中央下达的“十一指示”,对广大党员干部提出明确要求,敦促其深入基层一线推进政策落地。

Second, launching the Great Production Movement. During the stage of strategic stalemate, the base areas were extremely short of materials and faced financial difficulties. The military and civilians in Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei, Taihang, and other places suffered from extreme food shortages, subsisting on wild vegetables and tree bark. “Financial difficulties can only be resolved through practical and effective economic development.” [45]45 *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 892. At the institutional level, in February 1939, the Party Central Committee convened a production mobilization conference in Yan’an, putting forward the policy of “rely on our own efforts, overcome difficulties, develop production, and ensure supply,” [46]46 *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991), p. 1016. and first in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and subsequently in all liberated areas, resolutely launched and led the Great Production Movement, promoting economic self-sufficiency. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government organized peasants to carry out mutual aid and cooperative movements, establishing mutual aid organizations such as exchange-work teams and labor-hiring teams. [47]47 Exchange-work teams and labor-hiring teams were forms of mutual aid in agricultural production organized by the CCP in the base areas, where peasants pooled their labor and tools. At the technical level, the border region dispatched batches of professional agricultural technicians deep into the countryside, actively promoting agricultural techniques such as seed selection and fertilization, and improving farm tools to enhance farming efficiency. Between 1942 and 1944, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region added over two million mu of cultivated land, [48]48 One mu is approximately 0.0667 hectares. basically achieving the phased economic goal of “tillers have their food, fighters have their grain.” Such measures combined the people’s survival with the goals of the War of Resistance, not only resolving the wartime survival crisis but also creating an institutional example of sustained resistance supported by “millet plus rifles,” [49]49 “Millet plus rifles” is a famous phrase used by Mao Zedong to symbolize the CCP’s reliance on simple resources and popular support to sustain the protracted war against Japan. forming a community of interests for “defending the home and the country.”

第二,开展大生产运动。战略相持阶段,根据地物资极度匮乏,财政困难,晋察冀、太行等地的军民粮食极度短缺,以野菜、树皮充饥。“财政困难,只有从切切实实的有效的经济发展上才能解决。”在制度层面,1939 年2 月党中央在延安召开了生产动员大会,提出了“自己动手,克服困难,发展生产,保障供给”的方针,并且首先在陕甘宁边区,继而在各个解放区毅然发动和领导大生产运动,推动经济自给自足。 陕甘宁边区政府组织农民开展互助合作运动,建立变工队、扎工队等互助组织。 在技术层面,边区派遣了一批批专业的农业技术人员深入农村,积极推广选种、施肥等农业技术,改良农具提高耕作效率。 1942—1944 年间,陕甘宁边区新增耕地二百多万亩,基本实现“耕者有其食,战者有其粮”的阶段性经济目标。此类措施将民众生存与抗战目标结合,不仅破解了战时生存危机,更创造了“小米加步枪”支撑持久抗战的制度范例,形成“保家卫国”的利益共同体。

Third, realizing democratic politics. Realizing democratic politics was both the key to conforming to history and winning popular support, and a guarantee for victory in the War of Resistance. To this end, the Chinese Communist Party carried out a series of democratic political construction practices in the anti-Japanese base areas. From the perspective of institutional innovation, the Chinese Communist Party creatively proposed and established the “Three-Thirds System” political power. [50]50 The “Three-Thirds System” was a policy for the composition of anti-Japanese democratic political power, stipulating that CCP members, non-Party leftist progressives, and centrists (including middle-of-the-roaders and members of other parties) each occupied one-third of the positions. In 1941, during the second democratic elections in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, through universal, direct, and equal elections, a large number of non-Party personnel entered the organs of political power, broadly absorbing representatives from all social strata, giving the base area political power broader representativeness. As Mao Zedong pointed out: “This kind of political power is the political power of all those who approve of resistance to Japan and approve of democracy; it is the democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes united against traitors and reactionaries.” [51]51 *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 750. From the perspective of practical breakthroughs, democratic elections are the cornerstone of democratic politics. The Chinese Communist Party implemented a broad system of democratic elections in the anti-Japanese base areas. The “Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region Election Regulations” clearly stipulated: “All people within the border region, regardless of gender, occupation, ethnicity, class, party affiliation, belief, educational level, or length of residence, who have reached the age of eighteen, after being registered by the election committee, have the right to vote and to stand for election.” [52]52 *Selected Documents of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region*, Vol. 1 (Beijing: Party History Materials Publishing House, 1988), p. 120. To implement universal suffrage, for rural areas with low literacy rates, indigenous methods such as the “bean voting method” and the “circle drawing method” were innovatively adopted. For example, in some villages in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border region, votes were counted by the number of beans in a bowl. [53]53 The “bean voting method” was a practical method used in areas with high illiteracy rates, where voters cast their votes by dropping a bean into a bowl designated for a specific candidate. This practical innovation broke through the cultural barriers of traditional rural society and reconstructed the path for realizing “grassroots democracy.”

第三,实现民主政治。实现民主政治既是顺应历史、争取民心的关键,也是抗战胜利的保障。为此,中国共产党在抗日根据地开展了一系列民主政治建设实践。 从制度创新看,中国共产党创造性地提出并建立了“三三制”政权。 1941 年陕甘宁边区在第二次民主选举中,通过普遍、直接、平等的选举,一大批党外人士进入政权机关,广泛吸纳了各阶层的代表,使根据地政权具有更广泛的代表性。正如毛泽东指出:“这种政权,是一切赞成抗日又赞成民主的人们的政权,是几个革命阶级联合起来对于汉奸和反动派的民主专政。”从实践突破看,民主选举是民主政治的基石。中国共产党在抗日根据地推行了广泛的民主选举制度。《晋察冀边区选举条例》明确规定,“凡在边区境内之人民,不分性别、职业、民族、阶级、党派、信仰、文化程度、居住年限,年满十八岁者,经选举委员会登记后,均有选举权与被选举权”。为落实普选权,对于识字率低的农村地区,创新采用“豆选法”“画圈法”等本土方式,例如晋察冀边区的一些村庄以碗中豆数计票。这种实践创新突破了传统乡村社会的文化屏障,重构了“草根民主”的实现路径。

III. The Experience and Mirror of the Chinese Communist Party’s Political Mobilization during the War of Resistance Against Japan

三、抗战时期中国共产党政治动员的经验镜鉴

In the historical scroll of the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership of the War of Resistance, the practical wisdom of political mobilization is like a red thread running through the whole, tightly interweaving the contemporary radiance of Marxist theory with the real needs of the revolutionary struggle. The ideological leadership at the theoretical level is not a suspended theoretical blueprint, but rather tempers organizational power through the practical crucible of the mass line. This process of transformation from theoretical consciousness to practical consciousness both manifests the practical character of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and provides space for methodological innovation in political mobilization under different historical circumstances. The organic unity of the three levels constitutes a three-dimensional coordinate for understanding the success code of political mobilization during the War of Resistance, where each dimension contains the possibility of dialogue between historical experience and contemporary inspiration.

在中国共产党领导抗战的历史画卷中,政治动员的实践智慧犹如一条贯穿始终的红线,将马克思主义理论的时代光芒与革命斗争的现实需求紧密交织。理论层面的思想引领并非悬置空中的理论图景,而是通过群众路线的实践熔炉淬炼出组织伟力,这种从理论自觉到实践自觉的转化过程,既彰显马克思主义中国化的实践品格,又为不同历史情境下的政治动员提供了方法论层面的创新空间。 三个层面的有机统一,构成了理解抗战时期政治动员成功密码的三维坐标,其中每个维度都蕴含着历史经验与当代启示的对话可能。

(1) Adhering to the Two Integrations is the “Golden Key” for Carrying Out Political Mobilization

(一)坚持“两个结合”是开展政治动员的“金钥匙”

The guiding role of scientific theory over practice profoundly interprets the internal mechanism by which a Marxist political party leads the transformation of the times. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, Chinese Communists represented by Mao Zedong, based on the practice of revolutionary struggle, deeply perceived the scientific and truthful connotations of the Marxist theoretical system, laying an important foundation for adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times. General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: “We must deeply comprehend the truth of Marxism and its innovative theories adapted to the Chinese context, and enhance our firmness in consciously implementing the Party’s innovative theories.” Political mobilization must fully recognize that Marxism is the Party’s fundamental guiding principle and spiritual pillar, playing a key role in revolution, construction, and reform, and providing powerful guidance for the cause of the Party and the state.

科学理论对实践的先导性作用深刻诠释了马克思主义政党引领时代变革的内在机理。 抗日战争时期,以毛泽东为代表的中国共产党人基于革命斗争实践,深刻洞察马克思主义理论体系的科学性与真理性内涵,为马克思主义中国化时代化奠定重要基础。 习近平总书记指出:“要深刻领悟马克思主义及其中国化创新理论的真理性,增强自觉贯彻落实党的创新理论的坚定性。”政治动员要充分认识马克思主义是党的根本指导原则和精神支柱,对革命、建设和改革起到关键作用,为党和国家事业提供强大指引。

Entering the New Era, it is necessary to take the latest achievements of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times as the fundamental guiding ideology and as a comprehensive, systematic action guide for the development of the cause of the Party and the state in all aspects. Since the New Era, this theoretical character has been manifested in the battle against poverty as the “targeted poverty alleviation” methodology surpassing traditional relief models, and transformed in epidemic prevention and control into the governance wisdom combining “dynamic zero-COVID” with scientific prevention and treatment, fully demonstrating the leading role of theoretical innovation over practical innovation. The dual judgment in the report of the 20th National Congress of the CPC regarding “Marxism works” and “Marxism adapted to the Chinese context and the needs of the times works” essentially constructs a dialectical picture of the spiral ascent of theoretical innovation. The latest achievements of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times have formed a theoretical matrix covering multiple dimensions, including the new development concept, the modernization of national governance, and a community with a shared future for mankind. Particularly in the dimension of productive forces, the theoretical construction of new quality productive forces both inherits Marx’s classic thesis that “science and technology are productive forces” and creatively proposes contemporary propositions such as the innovative allocation of production factors and the deep transformation and upgrading of industries, providing a new cognitive framework for high-quality development. It precisely responds to the issues of the times, covering economy, politics, culture, society, ecological civilization, and other aspects. Only by taking it as the fundamental guiding ideology and integrating it into all aspects and the entire process of the work of the Party and the state can we ensure that the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a New Era advances steadily along the correct direction.

进入新时代,需要把马克思主义中国化时代化最新成果作为根本指导思想,作为党和国家事业发展全方位、系统性的行动指南。 新时代以来,这一理论品格在脱贫攻坚战役中展现为“精准扶贫”方法论对传统救济模式的超越,在疫情防控中转化为“动态清零”与科学防治相结合的治理智慧,充分彰显理论创新对实践创新的引领作用。 党的二十大报告关于“马克思主义行”与“中国化时代化的马克思主义行”的双重判断,实质上构建了理论创新螺旋式上升的辩证图景。当前马克思主义中国化时代化的最新成果,已形成涵盖新发展理念、国家治理现代化、人类命运共同体等多维度的理论矩阵。特别是在生产力维度,新质生产力的理论构建既继承马克思“科学技术是生产力”的经典论断,又创造性提出生产要素创新性配置、产业深度转型升级等当代命题,为高质量发展提供全新认知框架。它精准回应时代课题,涵盖经济、政治、文化、社会、生态文明等各个方面。只有将其作为根本指导思想,融入党和国家工作的各方面全过程,才能确保新时代中国特色社会主义事业沿着正确方向稳步前行。

(2) Adhering to the Mass Line is the Institutional Advantage of Political Mobilization and Organizing the Masses

(二)坚持群众路线是政治动员和组织群众的制度优势

The theoretical construction and practical evolution of the mass line profoundly reflect the Chinese Communist Party’s localized innovation of Marxist epistemology and methodology. In 1929, Mao Zedong first used the concept of the “mass line” in the “Resolution of the Gutian Congress,” [54]54 The rectification (整风) movement was a Party-wide ideological education campaign launched by the CPC in Yan’an in 1942–1944, aimed at correcting deviations in Party style, study style, and writing style, and establishing Mao Zedong Thought as the guiding ideology. founding the theory of the mass line; in the article “Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership,” he comprehensively elaborated on the mass line, and the Party’s mass line matured. Mao Zedong pointed out in “On Protracted War” that “the soldiers and the people are the foundation of victory,” emphasizing the importance of the masses in the War of Resistance. At the critical stage of national salvation from subjugation and survival, the Chinese Communist Party held high the banner of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, constructing a cross-class, cross-party, cross-industry community with a shared future through strategic political integration. The Chinese Communists represented by Comrade Mao Zedong achieved a creative transformation of Marxist epistemology and traditional Chinese people-oriented thought, constructing the methodology of “from the masses, to the masses,” and developed the mass line in practice and exploration. History profoundly shows that the mass line not only shaped the Chinese Communist Party’s value coordinate of “everything for the people,” but also tempered a significant political character distinguishing it from other political parties.

群众路线的理论建构与实践演进,深刻体现了中国共产党对马克思主义认识论与方法论的本土化创新。1929 年,毛泽东在《古田会议决议》中首次使用“群众路线”这个概念,创立群众路线理论;在《关于领导方法的若干问题》一文中就群众路线作了全面的阐述,党的群众路线走向成熟。 毛泽东在《论持久战》中指出“兵民是胜利之本”,强调了群众在抗战中的重要性。在民族救亡图存的关键阶段,中国共产党高擎抗日民族统一战线旗帜,以战略性政治整合构建起跨阶级、跨党派、跨行业的命运共同体。以毛泽东同志为代表的中国共产党人实现了马克思主义认识论与中国传统民本思想的创造性转化,构建了“从群众中来,到群众中去”的方法论,在实践和探索中发展了群众路线。历史深刻昭示,群众路线不仅塑造了中国共产党“一切为了人民”的价值坐标,更淬炼出区别于其他政党的显著政治品格。

Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core has made practicing the mass line a work priority, running through the entire process of Party and state governance, and has repeatedly emphasized the status and role of the masses on multiple occasions. At the same time, the Party always safeguards the rights and interests of the masses

党的十八大以来,以习近平同志为核心的党中央将践行群众路线作为工作重点,贯穿于党和国家治理的全过程,并在多个场合反复强调人民群众的地位和作用。与此同时,党始终维护人民群众的权益,习近平总书记在党的群众路线教育实践活动工作会议上指出,要在全党范围内深入开展以“为民务实清廉”为主要内容的党的群众路线教育实践活动,以保持党的先进性和纯洁性。要求每个党员干部弄明白“为了谁”“怎么做”“怎么样”的问题,在践行群众路线的过程中,需秉持严督实导的态度,高度聚焦每一处细节。站在新的历史起点,面对新的机遇与挑战,更应坚定不移地传承和弘扬群众路线这一优良传统,将人民的意愿作为制定政策的出发点与落脚点,让群众路线在新时代绽放光芒。

(3) Formulating practical and adaptive strategies that fit the actual situation is the fundamental path to enhancing the effectiveness of political mobilization

(三)制定契合实际的适配性策略是提升政治动员效能的根本路径

Facing the crisis of national survival, the Chinese Communist Party used strategic thinking to reconstruct the political coordinate system, realizing a strategic transformation from “opposing Chiang Kai-shek and resisting Japan” to “forcing Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan.” This shift was not only based on a profound insight into and adherence to the great cause of the nation but also contained a deep grasp of the need to make timely adjustments to national policies in accordance with changes in the principal contradiction. In order to fully promote the establishment and consolidation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, the Party actively carried out multifaceted political mobilization work. Ideological construction, as the core project of political mobilization, was elevated to an unprecedented strategic height during the War of Resistance period.

面对民族存亡的危局,中国共产党以战略思维重构政治坐标系,实现从“反蒋抗日”向“逼蒋抗日”的策略转型。 这一转变不仅基于对民族大义的深刻洞察与坚守,更蕴含着对国家政策根据主要矛盾的变化而作出适时调整的深刻把握。为了全力促成抗日民族统一战线的建立与巩固,党积极开展了多方面的政治动员工作。 思想建设作为政治动员的核心工程,在抗战时期被提升至前所未有的战略高度。

In 1943, at the rectification [54]54 The rectification (整风) movement was a Party-wide ideological education campaign launched by the CPC in Yan’an in 1942–1944, aimed at correcting deviations in Party style, study style, and writing style, and establishing Mao Zedong Thought as the guiding ideology. mobilization meeting of the Party School of the Northern Bureau, Deng Xiaoping clearly put forward the practical path of “building the Party ideologically and strengthening the Party theoretically,” requiring that through the ideological transformation of “curing the illness to save the patient,” [55]55 “Curing the illness to save the patient” (治病救人) is a Party slogan from the Yan’an rectification movement, advocating for criticism and self-criticism with the goal of correcting errors and uniting comrades, rather than punishing individuals. the Party’s high degree of unity under the banner of Mao Zedong Thought be achieved. These theoretical innovations constructed a political mobilization ideological system with Chinese characteristics, transforming the Party’s propositions into the conscious actions of the masses. During this period, the propaganda and inculcation of ideology and consciousness became a powerful weapon for the Party to smoothly carry out political mobilization, occupying a prominent position in the Party’s political mobilization work. At that time, the War of Resistance led by the Chinese Communist Party was mainly concentrated in the extensive enemy rear areas. In the special environment of the enemy rear areas, the Chinese Communist Party created unique mobilization strategies. For example, through stone carvings and door-plank slogans, it conveyed information about the War of Resistance to the masses in an intuitive and eye-catching manner; it carried out “kang-head meetings” [56]56 “Kang-head meetings” (炕头会) refers to informal gatherings held on the heated brick bed (kang) common in northern Chinese rural homes, used by CPC cadres to conduct propaganda and mobilize peasants in a familiar, intimate setting. and “field-ridge discussions,” shortening the distance with the masses and propagating the ideas of the War of Resistance in a relaxed atmosphere. This practical wisdom of “life as mobilization” enabled political work to penetrate into the capillaries of the masses’ daily lives. While deeply cultivating domestic mobilization, the Chinese Communist Party also displayed a broad international vision, namely mobilizing peace-loving people around the world to form an international united front against fascism and jointly fight for the protection of the freedom and equality of all countries. This move not only demonstrated the Chinese Communist Party’s international vision and sense of responsibility but also contributed to the ultimate victory of the World Anti-Fascist War. Historical practice has proven that through correct and appropriate political mobilization strategies, the Chinese Communist Party created a rare example of mass mobilization in world war history, laying a solid mass foundation for the victory of the War of Resistance.

1943 年,在北方局党校整风动员会上,邓小平明确提出“思想建党、理论强党”的实践路径,要求通过“治病救人”的思想改造,实现全党在毛泽东思想旗帜下的高度统一。这些理论创新构建起具有中国特色的政治动员思想体系,使党的主张转化为民众自觉行动。 这一时期,思想意识形态的宣传与灌输,成为党顺利开展政治动员的有力武器,在党的政治动员工作中占据突出地位。当时,中国共产党领导的抗战主要集中在广泛的敌后战场。在敌后战场的特殊环境中,中国共产党创造了独具特色的动员策略。 例如,通过石刻和门板标语,以直观醒目的方式向民众传递抗战信息;开展“炕头会”“田埂座谈”,拉近与群众的距离,在轻松氛围中宣传抗战理念。这种“生活即动员”的实践智慧,使政治工作渗透到群众生活的毛细血管。 中国共产党在深耕国内动员的同时,更展现出宏阔的国际视野,即动员世界爱好和平的民众,组成反抗法西斯的国际统一战线,共同为保护各国的自由与平等而斗争。这一举措不仅彰显了中国共产党的国际视野与担当,也为世界反法西斯战争的最终胜利贡献了力量。 历史实践证明,中国共产党通过正确适当的政治动员策略,创造了世界战争史上罕见的群众动员,为抗战胜利奠定了坚实的群众基础。

Online editor: Jing Mu

网络编辑:静穆

Notes

  1. 全民抗战 (quánmín kàngzhàn): “total resistance by the entire people,” a slogan and policy emphasizing the mobilization of all social strata, not just the military, in the war effort. ↩
  2. “天下兴亡,匹夫有责” (tiānxià xīngwáng, pǐfū yǒu zé): a classical Chinese saying meaning “every individual is responsible for the rise and fall of the nation,” often attributed to the Ming-Qing scholar Gu Yanwu. ↩
  3. September 18th Incident (九一八事变): the Japanese Kwantung Army’s staged destruction of a railway near Mukden (Shenyang) on September 18, 1931, used as a pretext to invade and occupy Northeast China. ↩
  4. Quotation from Mao Zedong’s *On Protracted War* (1938). ↩
  5. “以战养战” (yǐ zhàn yǎng zhàn): “sustaining the war through war,” a Japanese policy of extracting resources from occupied territories to fuel further military operations. ↩
  6. “三光政策” (sān guāng zhèngcè): “burn all, kill all, loot all” policy, a brutal counterinsurgency tactic systematically employed by the Japanese army in China from 1940 onward. ↩
  7. Neutrality Acts: a series of U.S. laws passed in the 1930s (1935, 1936, 1937) that prohibited arms sales and loans to belligerent nations, which in practice disadvantaged China against Japan. ↩
  8. Quotation from an unspecified source, likely a CCP analysis of U.S. foreign policy. ↩
  9. “社会整合的催化剂” (shèhuì zhěnghé de cuīhuàjì): “catalyst for social integration,” a sociological concept applied here to describe how external threat can unify a society. ↩
  10. 凝聚 (níngjù): “to condense, to gather together,” a common CCP term for mobilizing and uniting popular forces. ↩
  11. Quotation from Mao Zedong, *On Protracted War* (1938). ↩
  12. Beiping (北平): the name for Beijing from 1928 to 1949, when it was not the national capital. ↩
  13. December 9th Movement (一二·九运动): a large-scale student protest in Beiping on December 9, 1935, demanding that the Nationalist government resist Japanese aggression. ↩
  14. “Declaration on the Violent Occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces by Japanese Imperialism”: issued by the CCP Central Committee on September 20, 1931, two days after the Mukden Incident. ↩
  15. “Declaration of War Against Japan”: issued by the Chinese Soviet Republic on April 15, 1932. ↩
  16. January 28th Incident (一二八事变): a Japanese attack on Shanghai on January 28, 1932, met with fierce resistance by the Nationalist 19th Route Army and local volunteers. ↩
  17. Battle of Shanghai: the 1937 battle (also known as the Battle of Songhu) was a major three-month campaign that marked the start of full-scale war in China. ↩
  18. Quotation from an unspecified source, likely a CCP historical account. ↩
  19. “全面抗战” (quánmiàn kàngzhàn): “total resistance,” the CCP’s line advocating for mass mobilization, as opposed to the Nationalist government’s “片面抗战” (one-sided resistance) relying only on regular armies. ↩
  20. “Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation”: a CCP program issued in August 1937 outlining policies for mobilizing the people, including democratic reforms and improving people’s livelihoods. ↩
  21. Quotation from an unspecified CCP document, likely the Ten-Point Program. ↩
  22. Great Revolution period (大革命时期): the period of the First United Front between the CCP and the Nationalist Party (KMT), roughly 1924–1927. ↩
  23. Agrarian Revolutionary War period (土地革命战争时期): the period from the Nanchang Uprising (1927) to the outbreak of full-scale war with Japan (1937), characterized by CCP-led land reform and the establishment of rural Soviet bases. ↩
  24. Central Soviet Area (中央苏区): the largest and most important CCP-controlled base area in the early 1930s, centered on the Jiangxi-Fujian border, with Ruijin as its capital. ↩
  25. Red Guards (赤卫队): local militia units in the Soviet areas, distinct from the later Red Guards of the Cultural Revolution. ↩
  26. Young Pioneers (少先队): a mass youth organization in the Soviet areas, forerunner of the post-1949 Young Pioneers. ↩
  27. “Speaking bitterness meetings” (诉苦大会): a mass mobilization technique used in land reform, where peasants publicly recounted their grievances against landlords. ↩
  28. *New Youth* (《新青年》): a influential magazine founded by Chen Duxiu in 1915, a key vehicle for the New Culture Movement and later for Marxist propaganda. ↩
  29. *Liberation Daily* (《解放日报》): the official newspaper of the CCP Central Committee, first published in Yan’an in 1941. ↩
  30. “Three-Thirds System” (三三制): a policy in the base areas during the War of Resistance, where one-third of positions in representative bodies and governments were held by CCP members, one-third by non-Party leftists, and one-third by centrists. ↩
  31. Policy of reducing rent and interest (减租减息): a wartime policy in CCP-controlled areas that lowered land rents and loan interest rates to alleviate peasant burdens while maintaining the cooperation of patriotic landlords. ↩
  32. Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War,” *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 481. [33] “Directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Propaganda Work in the War Zones,” 1938. [34] *Put Down Your Whip* was a popular street play during the War of Resistance, depicting the suffering of refugees and calling for resistance. [35] *Qu Yuan* is a historical play by Guo Moruo, written in 1942, using the story of the ancient poet Qu Yuan to criticize the Kuomintang’s passivity and inspire patriotic resistance. [36] The Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region was one of the earliest and most important anti-Japanese base areas, established in 1937 in the border area of Shanxi, Chahar, and Hebei provinces. [37] *Liberation Daily* was the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, published in Yan’an from 1941 to 1947. [38] “New script” refers to the Latinized New Writing (Latinxua Sin Wenz) promoted in the 1930s and 1940s as a simplified phonetic script for literacy among the masses. [39] The Jiangsu-Anhui Border Region was an anti-Japanese base area established in 1940 along the borders of Jiangsu and Anhui provinces. [40] Liao Chengzhi (1908–1983) and Pan Hannian (1906–1977) were senior Chinese Communist Party officials and intelligence operatives. [41] Wu Yuzhang (1878–1966) was a senior Chinese Communist Party member and educator, later president of Renmin University of China. *National Salvation News* was a Chinese-language newspaper published in Paris from 1935 to 1938. [42] *Overseas Chinese Times* was a Chinese-language newspaper published in the United States, supporting the Chinese Communist Party. *Liberation* was a weekly journal published in Yan’an. [43] Edgar Snow (1905–1972) was an American journalist whose book *Red Star Over China* (1937) introduced the Chinese Communist Party to the Western world. [44] “Resolution on Massively Developing Party Members,” March 15, 1938. [45] “Decision on Consolidating the Party,” 1939. ↩
  33. Central Archives, ed., *Selected Documents of the Hebei-Henan-Shanxi Base Area*, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1985), p. 76. ↩
  34. *Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi*, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1981), p. 278. ↩
  35. The Red Spear Society was a traditional Chinese folk armed self-defense organization, often with religious and superstitious elements, prevalent in rural areas of northern China in the early 20th century. ↩
  36. *Selected Military Writings of Zhu De* (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1997), p. 187. ↩
  37. Hu Hua, ed., *A Course in the History of the Chinese Revolution* (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 1979), p. 345. ↩
  38. “The military and the people are as close as fish and water” is a classic CCP slogan expressing the ideal of harmonious military-civilian relations, originating from the Yan’an period. ↩
  39. The Great Production Movement was a large-scale economic self-sufficiency campaign launched by the CCP in the base areas from 1939 onwards, aimed at overcoming the severe material shortages caused by the Japanese blockade. ↩
  40. The “Support the Government and Cherish the People” and “Support the Army and Give Preferential Treatment to Families of Servicemen and Martyrs” movements were twin campaigns initiated in the base areas in 1943 to strengthen unity between the military and civilians and between the government and the people. ↩
  41. The “25% reduction in rent” refers to reducing the original land rent by 25%, a specific policy measure of the CCP’s wartime land policy. ↩
  42. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991), p. 766. ↩
  43. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 768. ↩
  44. The “November 1 Directive” refers to the directive issued by the CCP Central Committee on November 1, 1942, urging the thorough implementation of the land policy in the base areas. ↩
  45. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 892. ↩
  46. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991), p. 1016. ↩
  47. Exchange-work teams and labor-hiring teams were forms of mutual aid in agricultural production organized by the CCP in the base areas, where peasants pooled their labor and tools. ↩
  48. One mu is approximately 0.0667 hectares. ↩
  49. “Millet plus rifles” is a famous phrase used by Mao Zedong to symbolize the CCP’s reliance on simple resources and popular support to sustain the protracted war against Japan. ↩
  50. The “Three-Thirds System” was a policy for the composition of anti-Japanese democratic political power, stipulating that CCP members, non-Party leftist progressives, and centrists (including middle-of-the-roaders and members of other parties) each occupied one-third of the positions. ↩
  51. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 750. ↩
  52. *Selected Documents of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region*, Vol. 1 (Beijing: Party History Materials Publishing House, 1988), p. 120. ↩
  53. The “bean voting method” was a practical method used in areas with high illiteracy rates, where voters cast their votes by dropping a bean into a bowl designated for a specific candidate. ↩
  54. The rectification (整风) movement was a Party-wide ideological education campaign launched by the CPC in Yan’an in 1942–1944, aimed at correcting deviations in Party style, study style, and writing style, and establishing Mao Zedong Thought as the guiding ideology. ↩
  55. “Curing the illness to save the patient” (治病救人) is a Party slogan from the Yan’an rectification movement, advocating for criticism and self-criticism with the goal of correcting errors and uniting comrades, rather than punishing individuals. ↩
  56. “Kang-head meetings” (炕头会) refers to informal gatherings held on the heated brick bed (kang) common in northern Chinese rural homes, used by CPC cadres to conduct propaganda and mobilize peasants in a familiar, intimate setting. ↩