The Historical Status of the Chinese Communist Party’s Independent Mountain Guerrilla Warfare during the Anti-Japanese War

During the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the Chinese Communist Party explored a revolutionary path of encircling the cities from the countryside and seizing state power by armed force, and guerrilla warfare had already become an important form of combat for the Red Army. The Party led the Red Army in “surprise attacks” on the enemy, mobilized the masses through guerrilla warfare, advanced the agrarian revolution and established rural revolutionary base areas, effectively striking the enemy while preserving itself. The full-scale outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War demanded that all forces unite against Japanese aggression. In this context, the Chinese Communist Party faced the strategic question of how to maintain its own independence while establishing the broadest possible Anti-Japanese National United Front — a question bearing on the overall situation of the war and the Party’s own development. During the Anti-Japanese War, the Party “proposed and implemented the general strategic policy of protracted war and a complete set of people’s war tactics and strategies,” becoming the mainstay of the nationwide war of resistance, and united and led the entire Party, the entire army, and the people of all ethnic groups across the country to “win the final victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression.” During this period, the Party broke free from the constraints of the Communist International, the Kuomintang’s scheme of “incorporating the Communists without tolerating them,” and erroneous ideas within the Party, proposing and carrying out independent mountain guerrilla warfare. Independent mountain guerrilla warfare endowed guerrilla tactics with overall strategic characteristics and was elevated to the Party’s strategic policy. Its proposal, grounded in the Sinicization of Marxist military theory as its theoretical foundation and ideological prerequisite, represented a major strategic shift in armed struggle, undertaken by the Party to establish the broadest Anti-Japanese National United Front, to arm and mobilize the masses for people’s war, and to adapt to the overall changes in the situation of the national war. The conduct of independent mountain guerrilla warfare held significant strategic importance for coordinating the enemy’s rear areas with the front-line battlefield, opening up anti-Japanese base areas and developing mass forces, and forging the Party into a major party that marched at the forefront of the times and steered the nation’s liberation.

土地革命战争时期，中国共产党探索出一条农村包围城市、武装夺取政权的革命道路，游击战已成为红军的重要作战形式。党领导红军“奇袭”敌人，在游击战争中发动群众，推进土地革命和建立农村革命根据地，有效地打击了敌人、保存了自己。抗日战争的全面爆发要求各方力量一致对外反抗日本侵略，中国共产党为此面临着在建立最广泛的抗日民族统一战线的同时，如何保持自身独立性这一事关抗战全局和自身发展的战略问题。抗日战争时期，党“提出和实施持久战的战略总方针和一整套人民战争的战略战术”，成为全民族抗战的中流砥柱，团结带领全党全军全国各族人民“取得中国人民抗日战争最后胜利”。这一时期，党摆脱共产国际的制约、国民党“编共而不容共”的图谋和党内的错误思想，提出并开展了独立自主的山地游击战。独立自主的山地游击战赋予游击战术以全局性战略特征，并被提升为党的战略方针。它的提出，以中国化马克思主义军事理论为理论基础和思想前提，是党为了建立最为广泛的抗日民族统一战线、武装动员群众开展人民战争，以适应民族战争形势全局性变化，在武装斗争上的重大战略转变。独立自主的山地游击战的开展，对以敌后战场配合正面战场、开辟抗日根据地并发展群众力量，以及将党锻造成为走在时代前列、领航民族解放的大党，都具有重要战略意义。

I. Conducting Independent Mountain Guerrilla Warfare Was a Major Theoretical Innovation in the Party’s Armed Struggle

一、开展独立自主的山地游击战是党武装斗争的重大理论创新

During the Anti-Japanese War, the contradiction between China and Japan gradually rose to become the principal contradiction. It was urgent for the Chinese Communist Party to break free from the constraints of the Communist International and the restrictions of the Kuomintang, and to correct the erroneous ideas of some within the Party regarding the war against Japan. Guided by the proposition of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times and by Mao Zedong and other Party leaders, the thinking on independent mountain guerrilla warfare gradually took shape and was implemented — this was a major theoretical innovation in the Party’s armed struggle.

抗战时期，中日民族矛盾逐步上升为主要矛盾。中国共产党摆脱共产国际的制约和国民党的限制、纠正党内部分人对日作战的错误思想迫在眉睫。在马克思主义中国化命题和毛泽东等党的领导人的引领下，独立自主的山地游击战思想逐渐形成并实施，这是党武装斗争的重大理论创新。

(I) The Background to the Proposal of Independent Mountain Guerrilla Warfare

（一）独立自主的山地游击战的提出背景

From the period of the Great Revolution onward, the Communist International’s entanglement with the Chinese Communist Party, the Kuomintang’s containment of the Communist Party, and the erroneous ideas of Wang Ming and others within the Party had fettered the Party’s independent development. Only by resolving these three problems could the Party truly adhere to the principle of independence and apply it in the military field, striving to win victory in the Chinese revolution.

自大革命时期开始，共产国际对中国共产党的牵掣、国民党对共产党的遏制，以及党内王明等人的错误思想，束缚了我们党独立自主的发展。只有解决这三个问题，党才能真正坚持独立自主原则并将其应用于军事战争领域，为夺取中国革命胜利而斗争。

While receiving assistance from the Communist International, the Chinese Communist Party was inevitably subject to its constraints, and there were also some differences between the two sides in their understanding and grasp of the concrete realities of the Chinese revolution. There is no doubt that the Communist International provided guidance and support for the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, and the Great Revolution once developed rapidly under the correct guidance of the Communist International. However, as Mao Zedong said, the Communist International was “good at both ends but poor in the middle,” and the Party’s three “Left” errors “were all related to the Communist International, especially the Wang Ming line.” [1]1 “Good at both ends but poor in the middle” is Mao Zedong’s assessment of the Communist International’s role in the Chinese revolution, meaning its early and late periods were relatively positive, but its middle period (roughly the late 1920s to mid-1930s) was problematic. The “three ‘Left’ errors” refer to the putschist line of November 1927, the Li Lisan line of 1930, and the Wang Ming line of 1931–1934, all of which the Party later criticized as adventurist or dogmatic. The “Wang Ming line” refers to the political line associated with Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu), a leading figure who, under Comintern influence, advocated urban insurrection and subordination to the Kuomintang during the Anti-Japanese War. With the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War, the Chinese revolution faced a new situation and new problems. The Communist International’s understanding and grasp of the concrete realities of the Chinese revolution were insufficiently comprehensive and deep, making it difficult to provide specific guidance for the Party’s struggle for leadership. Only by correctly handling its relationship with the Communist International on the basis of independence could the Party truly solve the problems of the Chinese revolution and grasp its own development.

中国共产党在接受共产国际帮助的同时难免受其制约，双方在对中国革命具体实际认识和理解层面亦有一些分歧。共产国际对中国共产党建党提供的引导和支持毋庸置疑，大革命也曾经在共产国际的正确指导之下取得迅速发展。然而，正如毛泽东所说，共产国际是“两头好，中间差”，党的三次“左”倾错误“都跟共产国际有关系，特别是王明路线”。伴随抗日战争的爆发，中国革命面临新的形势、产生了新的问题。共产国际对中国革命具体实际的了解和掌握不够全面、深入，难以对党争取领导权作出具体指导。党只有在独立自主的基础上正确处理与共产国际的关系，才能真正解决中国革命问题、把握自身发展。

From the period of the Great Revolution to the period of the nationwide Anti-Japanese War, the Kuomintang’s military containment and economic blockade of the Communist Party hindered the expansion of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the normal development of the Communist Party. Since the period of partial resistance, relations between the two parties had fluctuated between tension and negotiation. In January 1936, Deng Wenyi, in a conversation with Wang Ming, mentioned that Chiang Kai-shek said the Nanjing government “could provide the Red Army with a certain amount of weapons and grain.” [2]2 Deng Wenyi was a Kuomintang official who served as a liaison with the Chinese Communist Party in the mid-1930s. From February to July 1937, the Kuomintang allocated approximately 300,000 yuan per month to the Red Army. Nevertheless, the path to united resistance against Japan between the two parties remained extremely difficult. This was mainly due to the Kuomintang’s plan to “eradicate the Red scourge,” and its use of informal military funding as a lever to exert indirect control over the Communist Party, stipulating that the latter “could not make further demands,” thereby damaging the forces of resistance and delaying the opportunity to counter the aggression. During the period of the nationwide Anti-Japanese War, the military funds that the Kuomintang was supposed to disburse to the Communist Party were repeatedly cut, greatly undermining the Anti-Japanese National United Front. The development of the Chinese Communist Party was severely constrained by the Kuomintang, making it imperative to open a new situation through independent armed struggle.

大革命时期至全国抗战时期，国民党对共产党的军事遏制和经济封锁，阻滞了抗日民族统一战线的扩大和共产党的正常发展。局部抗战以来，两党关系在剑拔弩张和谈判交涉间翻覆。1936年1月，邓文仪在与王明谈话时提到，蒋介石称南京政府“可以给红军提供一定数量的武器和粮食”。1937年2月至7月，国民党每月向红军拨款约30万元。尽管如此，两党的一致抗日之路却仍然艰涩异常。这主要归因于国民党谋划“根绝赤祸”，还以非正式军费发放为杠杆对共产党施加间接控制，规定后者“不能再另要求”，以致损害抗战力量、贻误反侵略战机。全国抗战时期，国民党应向共产党发放的抗战军饷屡遭克扣，极大破坏了抗日民族统一战线。中国共产党的发展在国民党的束缚下举步维艰，以独立自主的武装斗争打开新局面刻不容缓。

Wang Ming and others mechanically copied the directives of the Communist International, grafting the Soviet experience onto the Chinese revolution, and compromised with the Kuomintang on key issues such as leadership, harming the progress of the Chinese revolution and the Party’s own development. On the one hand, Wang Ming and others “still pursued the line of the Fourth Plenary Session when they went to the Communist International,” [3]3 The “Fourth Plenary Session” refers to the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, held in January 1931, at which Wang Ming, with Comintern backing, gained leadership and promoted a dogmatic line. holding the one-sided view, put forward by the Communist International, that China’s victory in the Anti-Japanese War depended on the Kuomintang. On the other hand, Wang Ming and others failed to clearly understand the dialectical relationship between the Party’s independence and the united front, pinning their hopes for uniting the forces of resistance on measures such as “abandoning the slogan of Sovietizing China and turning the Soviet areas into border regions of the Republic of China,” while simultaneously demanding, on the united front issue, “unified command, unified discipline, unified supply, unified armament, and a unified military plan for operations against the enemy,” [4]4 These demands were put forward by Wang Ming in his 1937 article “The Key to Saving the Current Situation” and other writings, advocating subordination of the Communist-led forces to Kuomintang command. confining the thinking and actions of the Party and the people’s army within the limits permitted by the Kuomintang. The erroneous ideas of Wang Ming and others misled some comrades within the Party and were detrimental to the implementation of the Party’s line of total resistance against Japan.

王明等人照搬共产国际指示，以苏联经验嫁接中国革命，在领导权等关键问题上对国民党妥协，妨害了中国革命的推进和党的自身发展。一方面，王明等人“到共产国际搞的还是四中全会那一套”，持有共产国际提出的中国赢得抗日战争胜利需依仗国民党的片面认识。另一方面，王明等人对党的独立自主和统一战线之间的辩证关系认识不清，将团结抗战力量的希望寄托于“放弃苏维埃化中国的口号并将苏区改为中华民国的边区”等措施，同时在统一战线问题上要求“有统一指挥、统一纪律、统一供给、统一武装，以及对敌作战有统一军事计划”，把党和人民军队的思想和行动限制在国民党允许的范围内。王明等人的错误思想误导了党内部分同志，不利于党全面抗战路线的贯彻执行。

(II) The Ideological Foundation of Independent Mountain Guerrilla Warfare

（二）独立自主的山地游击战的思想基础

To break free from the constraints of the Communist International, the Kuomintang’s scheme of “incorporating the Communists without tolerating them,” and the erroneous ideas within the Party, the Party took adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times as its ideological guide, adhered to independence, and, in the process of establishing and consolidating Mao Zedong’s leading position in the Party Central Committee and the military, took his scientific analysis of the situation and his correct understanding of independence as the ideological compass, gradually forming a strategic consensus and ideological agreement on independent mountain guerrilla warfare.

为摆脱共产国际的制约、国民党“编共而不容共”的图谋和党内的错误思想，党以马克思主义中国化为思想引领，坚持独立自主，在确立和巩固毛泽东在党中央和军队领导地位的过程中，以其对时局的科学分析、对独立自主的正确认识为思想指针，逐步形成了对独立自主的山地游击战的战略认同和思想共识。

The proposal and enrichment of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times laid the ideological foundation for the Party to adjust and innovate its strategies and tactics according to the concrete realities of the Chinese revolution, thereby turning the tide of the Anti-Japanese War. In October 1938, Mao Zedong explicitly put forward the proposition of “adapting Marxism to the Chinese context” at the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, and later elaborated it as making Marxism “in every one of its manifestations possess the necessary Chinese characteristics, that is, applying it in accordance with China’s characteristics.” [5]5 This quotation is from Mao Zedong’s report “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War” at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee (October 1938). Correspondingly, the Sinicization of Marxist military theory, as an important component of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context, was developed. The Marxist methodology of concrete analysis of concrete conditions was concretized in the field of war as “studying the laws of China’s revolutionary war, which are even more specific.” [6]6 This quotation is from Mao Zedong’s 1936 work “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War.” That is, organically combining the generality of Marxist military theory with the particularity of the concrete realities of China’s revolutionary war, scientifically formulating and flexibly adjusting operational plans based on a realistic grasp of the war situation, and achieving the dialectical unity of effective strategy and tactics with their efficient implementation. This further consolidated the theoretical foundation of the thinking on independent mountain guerrilla warfare.

马克思主义中国化的提出和丰富，为党根据中国革命具体实际调整和创新战略战术以扭转抗战形势奠定了思想基础。1938年10月，毛泽东在党的扩大的六届六中全会上明确提出“马克思主义中国化”的命题，而后将其具体阐释为使马克思主义“在其每一表现中带着必须有的中国的特性，即是说，按照中国的特点去应用它”。相应地，作为马克思主义中国化重要组成部分的马克思主义军事理论中国化得以开拓。马克思主义具体问题具体分析的方法论在战争领域具象化为“研究更加特殊的中国革命战争的规律”。即把马克思主义军事理论的一般性，同中国革命战争具体实际的特殊性有机结合，根据对战争形势的现实把握，科学制定和灵活调整作战计划，实现战略战术行之有方与行之有效的辩证统一。这进一步巩固了独立自主的山地游击战思想的理论基础。

The CPC’s endowment of independence provided the internal driving force for it to gradually shake off the influence of the Comintern and intra-Party dogmatism, and especially the restrictions of the Kuomintang. The Marxism-Leninism brought to China by the October Revolution was the ideological foundation for the founding of the CPC, but the Party-building practice of the CPC was fundamentally driven by the early Communists’ mission of independently saving the nation from subjugation and building a new world. In the early period of the Party’s founding, the positive role of Comintern assistance is beyond doubt, but as the CPC matured, the Party’s ideological endowment of independence was fully stimulated in the process of gradually breaking free from Comintern constraints and especially resisting Kuomintang suppression. Recalling Party history before the Zunyi Conference [7]7 The Zunyi Conference (January 1935) was a pivotal meeting of the CPC during the Long March where Mao Zedong established his leadership role, correcting the military errors of the previous leadership and marking a turning point in the Party’s history., Mao Zedong said: “From the Party’s founding in 1921 to 1934, we suffered from the teacher’s [8]8 “The teacher” here refers to the Comintern and its dogmatic application of Marxist theory to China, which Mao criticized as leading to failures. mistakes,” and that “thinking for ourselves” was the irrefutable truth. The CPC’s distinctive trait of independence, resonating with the Party leaders’ far-sighted advocacy of taking our own road, blazed a path for independently solving problems within the Party and in the Chinese revolution.

中国共产党独立自主的禀赋，为其逐渐摆脱共产国际和党内教条主义的影响，特别是国民党的限制提供了内驱力量。十月革命给中国送来的马克思列宁主义是中国共产党建立的思想基础，但中国共产党的建党实践根本上还是以早期共产党人独立自主地救亡图存、建立一个新世界的使命为内驱。建党初期，共产国际援助的积极作用毋庸置疑，但伴随中国共产党的日益成熟，党在逐步摆脱共产国际制约、特别是反抗国民党压制的过程中，独立自主的思想禀赋被充分激发。毛泽东在回顾遵义会议之前的党史时说：“从一九二一年党成立到一九三四年，我们就是吃了先生的亏”，而要“自己想问题”才是颠扑不破的真理。中国共产党独立自主的鲜明特质，与党的领导人高瞻远瞩、倡导走自己的路的强大引领，二者同频共振，开创出一条独立自主解决党内和中国革命具体问题的道路。

As the core leader of the Party and the military, Mao Zedong’s foresight provided ideological and theoretical guidance for the Party to maintain political clarity at all times and to conduct independent mountain guerrilla warfare. Mao Zedong believed that the “inferior weapons of guerrilla forces” determined that we could not adopt ordinary combat methods, and that “dispersing to do mass work” was the only way to strike the enemy and assist friendly forces. At the same time, while affirming the correctness of Chiang Kai-shek’s “defending the territory and resisting Japan” and “establishing guerrilla warfare as one aspect of strategic tasks,” Mao also profoundly exposed the Kuomintang’s bourgeois nature of “innate vacillation and incompleteness,” its capitulationist tendencies, and its autocratic and dictatorial essence, indirectly demonstrating the necessity of conducting independent mountain guerrilla warfare. The Kuomintang’s hard-line suppression of “still ‘encircling and suppressing’ guerrillas,” its hidden control through economic means such as restricting military funds to weaken the CPC’s independence, and “the Kuomintang’s seduction of CPC cadres with promotions, wealth, wine, and pleasure” were mutually reinforcing, reflecting the Kuomintang’s attempt to “incorporate the CPC without tolerating it.” Mao’s above-mentioned dialectical analysis clarified the ideological guideline that the Party must abandon illusions of deep cooperation with the Kuomintang or peaceful compromise with the Japanese army, and must form and consolidate its own strength within the united front.

作为党和军队的领导核心，毛泽东的远见卓识为党时刻保持政治清醒、开展独立自主的山地游击战提供思想理论指引。毛泽东认为，“游击队劣势的武器”决定了我们不能采取一般的战斗方法，“分散做群众工作”是打击敌人、援助友军的唯一办法。同时，毛泽东在肯定蒋介石“守土抗战”的正确性，“确定游击战争担负战略任务的一个方面”的同时，也深刻揭露了国民党“先天的动摇性和不彻底性”的资产阶级底色、投降主义倾向和专制独裁本质，侧面说明了开展独立自主的山地游击战的必要性。国民党“对游击队仍‘围剿’”的硬性镇压、以军费限制等经济手段削弱共产党独立性的隐性控制，以及“国民党对共产党干部所施行的升官发财酒色逸乐的引诱”互为表里，体现了国民党“编共而不容共”的企图。毛泽东上述一分为二的分析，明确了党必须放弃同国民党达成深度合作、对日军和平苟安的幻想，在统一战线中形成并夯实自己力量的思想指针。

(3) Theoretical Innovation of Independent Mountain Guerrilla Warfare

（三）独立自主的山地游击战的理论创新

The Party’s understanding and grasp of the principle of independence, and its deepening recognition of the important status of guerrilla warfare, promoted the formation and development of the thought of independent mountain guerrilla warfare. This marked a phased achievement in adapting Marxist military theory to the Chinese context, and also signaled the Party’s increasingly strengthened theoretical innovation in focusing on the direction of the Chinese revolution and the question of leadership, and in advancing the strategy and tactics of armed struggle with the times.

党对独立自主原则的理解和把握、对游击战重要地位认识的深化，推动了独立自主的山地游击战思想的形成和发展。这标志着马克思主义军事理论中国化取得了阶段性成果，也昭示着党聚焦中国革命发展方向和领导权问题、推动武装斗争战略战术与时俱进的理论创新日益强化。

The thought of independent mountain guerrilla warfare was a phased intellectual achievement in adapting Marxist military theory to the Chinese context. Mao Zedong pointed out: “There is no abstract Marxism, only concrete Marxism.” The Party’s study and absorption of Marxist military theory must be concretized in light of China’s actual conditions into strategies and tactics applicable to revolutionary warfare. As early as the Jinggangshan period [9]9 The Jinggangshan period (1927–1930) refers to the early revolutionary base area established by Mao Zedong in the Jinggang Mountains, where the CPC first experimented with guerrilla warfare and land reform., Mao Zedong summarized the twelve-character guerrilla tactical principle of “when the enemy comes, we withdraw; when the enemy camps, we harass; when the enemy retreats, we pursue,” later expanding it into the sixteen-character formula: “when the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy camps, we harass; when the enemy tires, we strike; when the enemy retreats, we pursue,” combined with other guerrilla tactics such as “dividing forces to mobilize the masses, concentrating forces to deal with the enemy.” This was a creative development of the Marxist view that violent revolution is the basic form of proletarian revolution, taking a key step in adapting Marxist military theory to the Chinese context.

独立自主的山地游击战思想是马克思主义军事理论中国化的阶段性思想成果。毛泽东指出：“没有抽象的马克思主义，只有具体的马克思主义。”中国共产党对马克思主义军事理论的学习和吸收，必须结合中国实际具体化为可应用于革命战争的战略战术。早在井冈山时期，毛泽东就概括了“敌来我走，敌驻我扰，敌退我追”的十二字诀游击战术原则，后又将其扩充为“敌进我退，敌驻我扰，敌疲我打，敌退我追”的十六字诀，并配合“分兵以发动群众，集中以应付敌人”等其他游击战术，成为党拓展革命根据地范围和放手发动群众的战术。这是对马克思主义将暴力革命作为无产阶级革命基本形式观点的创造性发展，迈出了马克思主义军事理论中国化的关键一步。

The thought of independent mountain guerrilla warfare embodied the Party’s dual grasp of “time” and “situation,” reflecting the Party’s continuously deepening understanding and recognition of the Chinese revolution. The integration of independence and guerrilla warfare deepened our Party’s understanding of the relationship between the two parties and its impact on the course of the Chinese revolution, and consolidated the Party’s ideological identification with independent mountain guerrilla warfare. In the face of national contradictions, the Party recognized that the relationship between the Kuomintang and the CPC was a decisive factor affecting the direction of the Chinese revolution, and that “the question of leadership responsibility in the Chinese revolution” was the key to winning the Chinese revolution. The Party’s advocacy for establishing the Anti-Japanese National United Front “formed a new period in the Chinese revolution.” In this new period, the Party gradually realized that only by strengthening the leadership of the proletariat and its party, and continuing the fine tradition of close coordination between guerrillas and the Red Army that defeated the enemy during the Agrarian Revolutionary War, could a nationwide military mobilization be formed. From this perspective, in the process of breaking through restrictions on independently leading the military and thereby exerting military wisdom, the Party’s theoretical and scientific understanding of the nature and path of the Chinese revolution became increasingly prominent.

独立自主的山地游击战思想蕴含着党对“时”与“势”的双重把握，体现了党对中国革命认识和理解的不断深化。独立自主与游击战争融为一体，深化了我们党对两党关系及其对中国革命进程影响的认知，巩固了党内对独立自主的山地游击战的思想认同。在民族矛盾面前，党认识到国共两党关系是影响中国革命走向的决定性因素，“中国革命领导责任的问题”又是夺取中国革命胜利的关键所在。党倡导建立抗日民族统一战线“形成了中国革命的一个新时期”。在这个新时期，党逐渐认识到，只有强化无产阶级及其政党的领导，赓续党在土地革命战争时期游击队与红军密切配合击溃敌人的优良传统，才能形成全国军事总动员。由此看来，党在突破独立自主领导军队的限制，进而发挥军事智慧的过程中，对中国革命性质和道路认识的理论性和科学性不断凸显。

The thought of independent mountain guerrilla warfare was a scientific answer to the strategic and tactical issues of the War of Resistance Against Japan, crystallizing the CPC’s theoretical innovation achievements concerning the content and form of armed struggle. To win the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japan—a war characterized by protractedness, brutality, and justice—how should armed struggle be conducted? The proposal of the thought of independent mountain guerrilla warfare epitomized the Party’s theoretical exploration of this question. The protractedness of the war and the persistence of sustained armed struggle were mutually causal; the brutality of the war made “fortress against fortress” armed struggle extremely difficult, while conducting “exchanging space for time” guerrilla warfare suited the above war situation. At the same time, regarding how to develop the Anti-Japanese National United Front well and provide a force guarantee for guerrilla warfare, the Party underwent an ideological transformation from “the two parties are undoubtedly the leading components of this great united front” to our Party’s “relative independence” within the united front. From the accumulation of understanding of armed struggle beginning in the Agrarian Revolutionary War period, to the gradual formation during the National War of Resistance period of the empirical summary that the united front, armed struggle, and Party building were the Party’s “three main magic weapons” for defeating the enemy, the Party’s understanding of the necessity, importance, and specific content and form of armed struggle as the main form of the Chinese revolution gradually became systematic.

独立自主的山地游击战思想，是对抗日战争战略战术问题的科学回答，凝结着中国共产党关于武装斗争内容与形式的理论创新成果。赢得中国人民抗日战争这场具有长期性、残酷性和正义性的战争，应如何开展武装斗争？独立自主的山地游击战思想的提出，集中体现了党对这一问题的理论探索。战争的长期性与坚持持久的武装斗争互为因果，战争的残酷性又决定了“以堡垒对堡垒”的武装斗争困难重重，开展“以空间换时间”的游击战争则适应了上述战争形势。同时，对于如何发展好抗日民族统一战线、为游击战争提供力量保障，党又经历了一个由“两个党无疑是这个伟大统一战线的领导成分”到在统一战线下我们党“是相对的独立自主”的思想转变过程。从土地革命战争时期开始积累对武装斗争的认识，到全国抗战时期逐渐形成统一战线、武装斗争和党的建设是党克敌制胜“三个主要的法宝”的经验总结，党对武装斗争作为中国革命主要形式之必要性、重要性及其具体内容形式的认识渐成体系。

2. Conducting Independent Mountain Guerrilla Warfare Was a Major Strategic Shift in the Party’s Armed Struggle

二、开展独立自主的山地游击战是党武装斗争的重大战略转变

The War of Resistance Against Japan was protracted and brutal, giving rise to a series of questions about why and how guerrilla warfare should be conducted. The demand to “examine the issue of guerrilla warfare from a strategic perspective” emerged accordingly. The combination of the principle of independence with guerrilla tactics was elevated into the strategy of independent mountain guerrilla warfare, achieving the elevation of guerrilla warfare under the Party’s leadership from tactics to strategy. This provided strategic guidance for the Party to promote the establishment of the broadest Anti-Japanese National United Front, independently lead armed struggle, and thereby advance from partial victory to nationwide victory.

抗日战争具有长期性与残酷性，由此产生了一系列有关游击战争为何、如何开展的问题，“把游击战争的问题放在战略的观点上加以考察”的要求应运而生。独立自主原则与游击战术的结合，升华为独立自主的山地游击战战略，实现了党领导的游击战由战术向战略的提升，为党推动建立最广泛的抗日民族统一战线、独立领导武装斗争进而从局部胜利走向全国胜利提供了战略指导。

(1) The United Front and the Strategic Decision to Persist in Independent Mountain Guerrilla Warfare

（一）统一战线与坚持独立自主的山地游击战的战略决策

Every link in the strategic system affects the whole. The elevation of independent mountain guerrilla warfare from tactics to strategy, as a key component of the overall strategic system of the Chinese revolutionary war, had important strategic significance for mobilizing, uniting, and organizing all revolutionary forces to form the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and for exerting the CPC’s leadership role in the united front and enhancing its leadership capacity.

战略体系各环节牵一发而动全身。独立自主的山地游击战由战术上升为战略，作为中国革命战争总的战略体系中的关键组成部分，对于发动、团结和组织所有革命力量形成抗日民族统一战线，对于发挥中国共产党在统一战线中的领导作用、提升其领导能力，均有重要战略意义。

Independent mountain guerrilla warfare, within the strategic system of the national revolutionary war, subordinated and served the overall strategic policy of “active defense” in the Chinese revolutionary war. One who fails to plan for the whole situation is inadequate to plan for a single area; the task of strategic studies is “to investigate the laws governing war situations that have a bearing on the whole.” [10]10 Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War” (December 1936), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1, p. 175. The phrase “one who fails to plan for the whole situation is inadequate to plan for a single area” is a classical Chinese saying from the Qing dynasty text *Anecdotes of the Qing Court*. “The whole situation” can refer macroscopically to a country or even the entire world, or microscopically to “an independent guerrilla zone or a large independent operational direction.” [11]11 Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” p. 175. Therefore, strategy is a system in which the whole and the parts, the system and its elements, are highly unified. Within the strategic system, levels should be distinct and lines clear; strategies at lower levels that are more focused subordinate and serve strategies at higher levels that encompass the whole situation. The strategic policy of independent mountain guerrilla warfare was an important component of the overall strategic system of the Chinese revolutionary war. It played a role in each independent guerrilla zone and independent operational direction, thereby accumulating small-scale, localized, and regional guerrilla war victories and transitioning them into nationwide victories, cooperating in the completion of the overall “active defense” strategic policy.

独立自主的山地游击战，在民族革命战争战略体系中服从和服务于中国革命战争“积极防御”总的战略方针。不谋全局者，不足谋一域，战略学的任务就是“研究带全局性的战争指导规律”。“全局”在宏观上可指一个国家乃至整个世界，微观上也可指“一个独立的游击区、一个大的独立的作战方面”。因此，战略是整体与部分、系统与要素高度统一的体系。战略体系内部应层次分明、条理清晰，层级较低、更为聚焦的战略服从和服务于层级较高、囊括全局的战略。独立自主的山地游击战的战略方针，是中国革命战争总的战略体系的重要组成部分，在各独立游击区和独立作战方面发挥作用，进而以小规模、局部化和地方性的游击战争胜利积累并过渡为全国性的胜利，配合“积极防御”总的战略方针的完成。

Independent mountain guerrilla warfare had strategic mobilizational significance for establishing the broadest possible anti-Japanese national united front of “one heart and one mind, united in arms.” [12]12 The phrase “one heart and one mind, united in arms” is a classical allusion from the *Book of Documents* (*Shangshu*), referring to unity of purpose in military struggle. Before the Wayaobu Conference [13]13 The Wayaobu Conference was a meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee held in Wayaobu, northern Shaanxi, in December 1935, which formally adopted the policy of forming an anti-Japanese national united front. decided to establish the broadest anti-Japanese national united front, the Central Committee of the CPC had already been “educating and leading the masses to arm themselves, organizing guerrilla units, and mobilizing them to join the Red Army” to strengthen forces opposing Japanese imperialist aggression and countering the Kuomintang’s counter-revolutionary forces. [14]14 “Resolution on Military Issues” (December 1935), in *Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China*, Vol. 10, p. 602. The reason independent mountain guerrilla warfare could broadly mobilize the masses and unite all national and anti-Japanese forces across the country lay in its independent guiding principle and its dispersed, flexible operational forms. The application of the independent principle to the military operational sphere broke through the Kuomintang’s restrictions in economic, political, and military areas, developed armed forces, and expanded base areas, thereby “independently mobilizing the masses on these base areas.” [15]15 Mao Zedong, “The Tasks of the Anti-Japanese United Front in the Current Situation and the Question of Strategy in the National War” (November 1938), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 394. At the same time, compared to concentrated mobile warfare, the dispersed operational form was also better suited to the spatial and temporal conditions for mobilizing the masses for total war against Japan.

独立自主的山地游击战，对于建立“同心同德一戎衣”的最广泛的抗日民族统一战线具有战略动员意义。在瓦窑堡会议确定建立最广泛的抗日民族统一战线前，中共中央就已通过“教育与领导群众武装起来组织游击队，发动他们加入红军”来壮大反对日本帝国主义侵略和应对国民党反革命势力的力量。独立自主的山地游击战之所以能够广泛发动群众、团结全国全民族一切抗日力量，得益于其独立自主的指导原则和分散灵活的作战形式。独立自主原则应用于军事作战领域，突破了国民党在经济、政治、军事等方面的限制，发展了武装力量和扩大了根据地，进而“在这种根据地上独立自主地发动群众”。同时，分散的作战形式相较于集中的运动战而言，也更具备动员群众全面抗战的时空条件。

Independent mountain guerrilla warfare provided strategic support for the CPC to play the role of the mainstay in the nationwide War of Resistance Against Japan and to hold the leadership within the united front. The War of Resistance Against Japan had two battlefields and two lines of resistance. At the organizational and leadership level, the Kuomintang mainly organized the frontal battlefield. Beyond the Japanese advance line, the CPC established 19 concentrated, contiguous large-scale liberated areas, forming a situation of coexistence with Kuomintang-controlled areas. [16]16 The “19 liberated areas” refers to the major base areas established by the CPC behind enemy lines during the War of Resistance, such as the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, and others. Compared with the Kuomintang’s one-sided line of resistance, mistaken strategic tactics, and passive attitude toward resistance, the CPC’s consistently upheld line of total resistance best represented and highlighted the national character of the War of Resistance; it was a matter of course for the CPC to bear the political leadership responsibility for the war. [17]17 The “two lines of resistance” refers to the Kuomintang’s “one-sided line of resistance” (relying solely on the government and regular army) versus the CPC’s “line of total resistance” (mobilizing the entire populace). By waging independent mountain guerrilla warfare in the enemy’s rear areas, the CPC effectively safeguarded the anti-Japanese national united front, which was decisive for winning the War of Resistance, and thereby established strategic fulcrums for the Party to advance its organizational, political, and military leadership to a broader scope and deeper level.

独立自主的山地游击战，为中国共产党在全民族抗战中发挥中流砥柱作用、在统一战线中掌握领导权提供战略支撑。抗日战争存在着两个战场和两条抗战路线。在组织领导层面，国民党主要组织了正面战场。在日军推进线外，中国共产党建立了19个集中成片的大块解放区，形成了与国民党辖区同期并存的局面。相较于国民党片面的抗战路线、失误的战略战术、消极的抗战态度，中国共产党始终坚持的全面抗战路线最能代表和凸显抗日战争的民族性质，由中国共产党肩负抗战政治领导责任是题中应有之义。中国共产党在敌后战场开展独立自主的山地游击战，有力维护了对于夺取抗战胜利具有决定性意义的抗日民族统一战线，进而为党向更广范围、更深层次推进其组织领导、政治领导和军事领导建立了战略支点。

(II) Armed Struggle and the Strategic Decision to Persist in Independent Mountain Guerrilla Warfare

（二）武装斗争与坚持独立自主的山地游击战的战略决策

Mao Zedong, citing Stalin’s exposition, pointed out that armed struggle “is one of the characteristics of the Chinese revolution, and also one of its advantages.” [18]18 Mao Zedong, “Introducing *The Communist*” (October 1939), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 604. The “three magic weapons” are the united front, armed struggle, and Party building. The proposal and conduct of independent mountain guerrilla warfare not only reconfirmed the importance of armed struggle as one of the three magic weapons of the Chinese revolution, but also transformed the Party’s “small battlefield” of leading military operations into a “great stage” for people’s war, enriching the strategy and tactics of armed struggle and helping the anti-Japanese forces gain the initiative in the war. [19]19 The “three magic weapons” (*san da fabao*) is a standard CPC term for the three key elements of revolutionary success identified by Mao Zedong.

毛泽东曾援引斯大林的论述，指出武装斗争“是中国革命的特点之一，也是中国革命的优点之一”。独立自主的山地游击战的提出和开展，不仅是对作为中国革命三大法宝之一的武装斗争重要性的再次确证，更是将党领导军队作战的“小战场”转变为人民战争的“大舞台”，充实了武装斗争的战略战术，帮助抗日力量赢得了战争的主动权。

Independent mountain guerrilla warfare further emphasized the necessity of using armed revolution to oppose armed counter-revolution in semi-colonial and semi-feudal China. Armed struggle was the only path to victory in the Chinese revolution; its conduct could not be without rules or leadership. Therefore, the Party had to strive for “the Party’s military power,” “the people’s military power,” and “the nation’s military power,” exercising absolute leadership over all links and battlefields of armed struggle. The reason why the strategic policy of independent mountain guerrilla warfare was established and flourished lay in the Party’s need to maintain absolute leadership over the people’s army. The inevitability and importance of armed struggle determined that the Party must, in light of the concrete realities of the enemy’s rear areas, scientifically formulate and apply the strategic policy of independent mountain guerrilla warfare; in exploring the theory and practice of independent mountain guerrilla warfare, the Party also enhanced its awareness, capability, and level of firmly grasping absolute leadership over the people’s army, deepening its ideological understanding of the important position of armed struggle.

独立自主的山地游击战，进一步强调了以武装的革命反对武装的反革命在半殖民地半封建中国的必要性。武装斗争是夺取中国革命胜利的唯一道路，其开展不能毫无章法、群龙无首，因此党要争取“党的兵权”“人民的兵权”“民族的兵权”，绝对领导武装斗争各环节各战场。独立自主的山地游击战战略方针因何建立、为何而兴，其奥义均在于党要掌握对人民军队的绝对领导权。武装斗争的必然性和重要性，决定了党必须结合敌后战场具体实际，科学制定并运用独立自主的山地游击战战略方针；党在探索独立自主的山地游击战的理论和实践中，也提升了牢牢把握人民军队绝对领导权的意识、能力和水平，深化了对武装斗争重要地位的思想认识。

As a people’s war with the core of “for the people and relying on the people,” independent mountain guerrilla warfare enriched the forms of armed struggle in the Chinese revolution. Armed struggle in a broad sense includes not only wars that assemble and employ armed forces to achieve political and economic objectives, but also armed conflicts beyond the form of war. The uniqueness of the Chinese revolutionary path and the concrete conditions of the Chinese revolution determined that the Party must maximize the gathering of the wisdom and strength of the masses, “organizing the residents near the battlefield around itself to fight the enemy together.” [20]20 Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War” (May 1938), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 511. Waging independent mountain guerrilla warfare was the best choice at that time for leveraging the advantages of the military and mobilizing the people’s strength. At the very beginning of the nationwide War of Resistance, Mao Zedong, based on Marx and Engels’ theory of people’s war, analyzed the issues of fighting a protracted war to achieve complete victory and concluded with “the soldiers and the people are the foundation of victory,” emphasizing that people’s war was the basic form of the War of Resistance Against Japan—the largest-scale and longest-duration armed struggle of the Chinese people against foreign invasion—and that close and orderly cooperation between the Party-led army and the populace in guerrilla warfare was the necessary path to final victory. [21]21 “The soldiers and the people are the foundation of victory” is from Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War,” p. 511.

作为以“为了人民、依靠人民”为内核的人民战争，独立自主的山地游击战丰富了中国革命的武装斗争形式。广义的武装斗争，不仅包含为达成政治、经济目标而集合并采用武装力量进行的战争，也涵盖除战争形式外的武装冲突。中国革命道路之唯一性以及中国革命的具体形势，决定了党要最大限度凝聚人民群众的智慧和力量，“把战地附近的居民组织在他自己的周围，一道儿去抗击敌人”。开展独立自主的山地游击战，是当时发挥军队优势、调动人民力量的最佳选择。全国抗战时期伊始，毛泽东即以马克思、恩格斯的人民战争理论为基础，在分析打好持久战进而夺取完全胜利的相关问题后，以“兵民是胜利之本”作结，强调人民战争是抗日战争这一中国人民反抗外敌入侵规模最大、持续时间最长的武装斗争的基本形式，党领导下的军队与民众在游击战争中密切有序配合是赢得这一战争最终胜利的必经之路。

Independent mountain guerrilla warfare achieved a dual transcendence of guerrilla tactics, enriching the strategic and tactical arsenal of the CPC-led people’s independent armed struggle. Mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare, as basic forms of armed struggle applied in different scenarios, showed distinct stage-based differences in the practice of the Chinese revolutionary war. Until December 1935, the Party Central Committee’s resolution on military strategic issues still clearly stated that “mobile warfare is the basic principle.” [22]22 “Resolution on Military Issues” (December 1935), in *Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China*, Vol. 10, p. 603. During the nationwide War of Resistance, Mao Zedong expounded the basic principles of mountain guerrilla warfare to realize the transition to anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare. The shift from mobile warfare to guerrilla warfare constituted the “first transcendence” in the Party’s tactical field of armed struggle. The introduction of “independence” then realized a value enhancement from traditional guerrilla warfare to independent mountain guerrilla warfare. When Mao Zedong elaborated the four basic principles of independent mountain guerrilla warfare, three of them emphasized “freedom” and “independence,” while the last one, “relying on mountains and avoiding hard battles,” was actually aimed at winning more independent space for the Party, the army, and the people. [23]23 The four basic principles of independent mountain guerrilla warfare were: (1) using initiative, flexibility, and planning in conducting offensives within the defensive; (2) coordinating with the masses; (3) establishing base areas; and (4) relying on mountains and avoiding hard battles. See Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan” (May 1938), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, pp. 79-80. From guerrilla warfare to independent mountain guerrilla warfare, the Party refined and innovated concrete tactics into strategy, achieving the “second transcendence.”

独立自主的山地游击战完成了对游击战术的双重超越，丰富了中国共产党领导人民进行独立武装斗争的战略战术宝库。运动战和游击战作为应用场景不同的武装斗争的基本形式，在中国革命战争实践中展现出鲜明的阶段性差异。直至1935年12月，党中央在围绕军事战略问题作出的决议中仍明确指出“运动战是基本原则”；全国抗战时期，毛泽东阐释了山地游击战的基本原则，以实现向抗日游击战争的过渡。从运动战到游击战，是党在武装斗争战术领域的“第一重超越”。“独立自主”的引入则实现了由传统游击战到独立自主的山地游击战的价值提升。毛泽东在阐述独立自主的山地游击战的四项基本原则时，有三项都在突出“自由”“自主”，而最末项的“依傍山地与不打硬仗”实际上也是为党、军队和人民争取更多独立自主的施展空间。从游击战到独立自主的山地游击战，党将具体战术提炼和创新为战略，实现了“第二重超越”。

(III) Independent Mountain Guerrilla Warfare Responded to the War Situation and Strategic Needs

（三）独立自主的山地游击战因应了战争形势和战略需要

The level of a political party’s strategy depends on its ability to understand and grasp the domestic and international situation at the time. Only by “seeing, when the tip of the mast first appears, that it is going to develop into a large and widespread thing, and being able to grasp it” can strategic initiative be won. [24]24 Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War,” p. 514. The natural geographical environment of the enemy’s rear areas and the basic characteristics of the War of Resistance Against Japan, after being analyzed, grasped, and utilized by the Chinese Communists represented mainly by Comrade Mao Zedong, constituted the realistic basis for formulating the strategic policy of independent mountain guerrilla warfare.

政党战略水平的高低取决于对国内外时局的认知和把握程度。只有“当桅杆顶刚刚露出的时候，就能看出这是要发展成为大量的普遍的东西，并能掌握住它”，才能赢得战略主动。敌后战场的自然地理环境和抗日战争的基本特点，经以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人的分析、把握和利用，构成了制定独立自主的山地游击战战略方针的现实基础。

The natural conditions of the enemy’s rear battlefield during the War of Resistance Against Japan were the natural foundation and objective prerequisite for waging independent mountain guerrilla warfare. Those who direct a war “can and must, within the limits of objective conditions, strive actively to win victory.” [25]25 Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War” (1938). Specifically regarding mountainous terrain, “mountains are the most suitable for relatively static resistance,” and small units daring to resist “have advantages over larger units in the mountains.” [26]26 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Book Six, Chapter 16, “Defense of Mountains.” This precisely coincided with the general policy of strategic defense in the War of Resistance and the design of the strategic policy of independent mountain guerrilla warfare. The anti-Japanese base areas were mostly surrounded by mountains. By adapting to local conditions and utilizing this terrain, “going to all mountainous areas behind enemy lines to develop guerrilla warfare and establish base areas” [27]27 Mao Zedong, “The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance Against Japan” (1937). created objective conditions for the people’s army led by the Party to wear down the enemy when it was fatigued, preserve its own strength when the enemy was active, and carry out strategic retreats at critical moments.

抗日战争中敌后战场的自然条件，是开展独立自主的山地游击战的自然基础和客观前提。指导战争的人们“可以而且必须在客观条件的限度之内，能动地争取战争的胜利”。具体到山地地形，“对相对抵抗来说，山地最为适宜”，且敢于抵抗的小股部队“在山地要比大部队有优越性”。这正与抗日战争战略防御的总方针、独立自主的山地游击战战略方针的设计相吻合。抗日根据地四周多山地，因地制宜利用上述地形，“到一切处于敌后的山岳地带去发展游击战争，并建立起根据地来”，能够为党领导的人民军队在敌军倦怠时对其适时消耗、在敌人活跃时保存自身实力，以及在紧要关头实行战略撤退营造了客观条件。

The balance of forces among the Chinese Communist Party, the Kuomintang, and Japanese imperialism was the realistic basis for formulating the strategic policy of independent mountain guerrilla warfare. The relationship between enemy and ourselves is the main factor determining victory or defeat in war. China was relatively backward in material, military, and financial resources, but still possessed manpower that could be broadly mobilized—the people’s army led by the Party and the broad masses of the people. Japan, though equipped with a modern army and superior weaponry, had “extended battle lines and a vacant rear,” was “not very familiar with mountain warfare, and generally lax in flank and rear警戒,” [28]28 Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan” (1938). and had long borne the condemnation and pressure of waging an unjust war. At the same time, the relationship between one’s own side and allied forces was also a key factor affecting the outcome of the war. The Kuomintang, as an ally, though possessing advanced weapons, had shortsighted strategic vision and a passive attitude toward resistance. These conditions together determined that for the Party to lead the people to victory in the anti-aggression war, it had to take a long-term view, avoid direct fierce confrontations as much as possible, and leverage the advantages of the people’s army led by the Party to wage independent mountain guerrilla warfare.

中国共产党、国民党和日本帝国主义的力量对比关系，是制定独立自主的山地游击战战略方针的现实基础。敌我关系是决定战争胜负的主要因素。中国在物力、军力和财力方面相对落后，但尚且拥有可供广泛发动的人力——党领导的人民军队和广大人民群众；日本虽有新式军队、精良装备等条件，却“战线延长，后方空虚”“不十分熟习山地战，侧后警戒一般”，且历来背负着挑起非正义战争的谴责和压力。同时，己方与友军的关系也是影响战争成败的关键因素。国民党作为友军，虽握有先进武器，但其战略眼光短视、抗日态度消极。上述情况共同决定了，党领导人民赢得反侵略战争胜利必须着眼长线，尽量避免正面激烈冲突，发挥党领导人民军队的优势开展独立自主的山地游击战。

The scientific assessment of the characteristics of the War of Resistance Against Japan by the Chinese Communists, mainly represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, was the direct factor in launching independent mountain guerrilla warfare. *On Protracted War* pointed out that there were four basic contradictory characteristics between China and Japan: the enemy is strong while we are weak, the enemy is regressive while we are progressive, the enemy is small while we are large, and the enemy receives little help while we receive much help. The characteristics of the enemy being strong while we are weak, and the enemy being small while we are large, determined that the Party and the people’s army it led could not pin their hopes for victory on the Kuomintang, which was engaged in fierce but difficult resistance on the frontal battlefield; instead, they had to compensate for their weaknesses by waging independent and flexible mountain guerrilla warfare. The characteristics of the enemy being regressive while we are progressive, and the enemy receiving little help while we receive much help, determined that final and complete victory in the War of Resistance would surely belong to China. Therefore, waging independent mountain guerrilla warfare as an important part of protracted war required both perseverance and patience to see it through, as well as confidence and determination to win. These scientific predictions made by the Party based on dialectical thinking shone with the truth of Marxism and became the theoretical basis and practical guide for waging independent mountain guerrilla warfare.

以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人对抗日战争特点的科学研判，是开展独立自主的山地游击战的直接因素。《论持久战》指出，中日双方存在着相互矛盾的4个基本特点，即敌强我弱、敌退步我进步、敌小我大、敌寡助我多助。敌强我弱、敌小我大的特点，决定了党及其领导的人民军队不得将取胜的希望寄托于在正面战场激烈却艰难抵抗的国民党身上，而必须通过开展独立且灵活的山地游击战取长补短。敌退步我进步、敌寡助我多助的特点，则决定了抗日战争的最后完全胜利必将属于中国。因此，开展独立自主的山地游击战作为持久战的重要环节，既要有坚持到底的恒心和耐心，也要有必胜的信心和决心。党基于辩证思维作出的上述科学预判，闪耀着马克思主义的真理光芒，成为开展独立自主的山地游击战的理论依据和实践遵循。

III. The Development of Independent Mountain Guerrilla Warfare Made Important Contributions to Achieving the Great Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan

三、独立自主的山地游击战的发展为夺取抗日战争的伟大胜利作出了重要贡献

“Things of a global nature cannot be separated from the parts and exist independently.” [29]29 Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War” (1936). Only when a strategy is applied on the battlefield and tested in practice can it be flexibly adjusted and keep pace with the times amid the “lack of constancy in military operations.” [30]30 A phrase from Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War*, meaning there are no fixed patterns in warfare. In actual combat, the strategic policy of independent mountain guerrilla warfare became more focused in content, clearer in principle, and its scope of application expanded to other areas, including the plains, making important contributions to winning the final victory in the War of Resistance and strengthening the Party’s own forces.

“全局性的东西，不能脱离局部而独立”。战略唯有应用于战场、经过实践的检验，才能在“兵无常势”中灵活调整、与时俱进。独立自主的山地游击战战略方针在实战中内涵更为聚焦、原则愈加明确，应用范围拓展至以平原为代表的其他地区，为夺取抗日战争最后胜利、壮大党的自身力量作出了重要贡献。

(1) The Specific Application and Development of Independent Mountain Guerrilla Warfare

（一）独立自主的山地游击战的具体运用与展开

The Luochuan Conference [31]31 The Luochuan Conference (August 1937) was a key meeting of the CPC Central Committee in Luochuan, Shaanxi, that set the strategic policy for the War of Resistance. clearly designated independent mountain guerrilla warfare as the Red Army’s strategic policy. However, how to adapt this strategy to the actual changes in the war, to “make the best use of the terrain” and “make the best use of everything,” required continuously summing up experience during implementation and expanding and deepening it while upholding the Party’s absolute leadership over the military.

洛川会议明确将独立自主的山地游击战作为红军的战略方针。但如何结合战争实际变化，让这一战略“地尽其利”“物尽其用”，还需要在贯彻执行的过程中不断总结经验，在坚持党对军队绝对领导的前提下拓展深化。

The Party fully implemented the strategy of independent mountain guerrilla warfare, promptly summed up both positive and negative experiences, and promoted guerrilla warfare in the enemy’s rear to become the main form of anti-Japanese combat operations. After the Luochuan Conference, Mao Zedong continued to adhere to the policy of mountain guerrilla warfare, pointing out the objective fact that concentrated operations and mass work could not be given equal weight, and affirming Peng Dehuai’s implementation of the mountain guerrilla warfare policy. [32]32 Peng Dehuai (1898–1974) was a senior military commander of the CPC and later Marshal of the People’s Republic of China. Subsequently, Mao Zedong made the overall deployment that “the entire work in North China should take guerrilla warfare as the sole direction,” and that all work, including mass movements and the united front, “should revolve around guerrilla warfare.” [33]33 Mao Zedong, telegram to the North China Bureau, September 1937. The strategy of independent mountain guerrilla warfare was thus widely applied on the North China battlefield. After the fall of Taiyuan, Mao Zedong again emphasized the importance of waging independent mountain guerrilla warfare, stating, “What remains is only guerrilla warfare, with the Red Army as the main force.” [34]34 Mao Zedong, “The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan” (1937). Facts speak louder than words. Waging independent guerrilla warfare in North China was not only a historical task for the people’s army but also conducive to opening up a new situation in the War of Resistance through phased and partial victories.

党全面贯彻独立自主的山地游击战战略，及时总结正反两方面经验，推动敌后游击战争上升为主要抗日作战方式。洛川会议后，毛泽东继续坚持山地游击战方针，指出集中作战和群众工作不能并重的客观事实，肯定彭德怀对山地游击战方针的贯彻。随后，毛泽东作出“整个华北工作，应以游击战争为唯一方向”，民运、统一战线等一切工作，皆“应环绕于游击战争”的总体部署，独立自主的山地游击战战略在华北战场得以广泛应用。太原沦陷后，毛泽东再次强调了实行独立自主的山地游击战的重要性，“剩下的只是红军为主的游击战争了”。事实胜于雄辩，在华北地区独立自主地开展游击战争，不仅是人民军队肩负的历史任务，更有利于以阶段性、局部性胜利打开抗日战争新局面。

The strategy of independent mountain guerrilla warfare, in combat practice, centered on highlighting the Chinese Communist Party’s absolute leadership over the military. If the Party suffered from “infantile disorder” [35]35 A reference to Lenin’s *“Left-Wing” Communism: An Infantile Disorder* (1920), used here to criticize dogmatic or simplistic approaches to Party leadership. on the issue of leadership over the military, Party members would find it difficult to shoulder the responsibility and mission of “becoming the most conscious leader of this war.” [36]36 Mao Zedong, “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War” (1938). In September 1937, Mao Zedong systematically explained the basic principles of independent mountain guerrilla warfare, the vast majority of which concerned the Party’s absolute leadership over the military. First, there was freedom to use forces according to circumstances; second, the Red Army had the freedom to mobilize the masses, create base areas, and organize volunteer armies, and local political power and neighboring allied forces could not interfere; third, Nanjing [37]37 “Nanjing” refers to the Nationalist government of the Kuomintang, then based in Nanjing. would only provide strategic direction, and the Red Army had full freedom to execute this strategy. This elevated the Party’s and the Red Army’s thinking, which had been anchored to tactical effectiveness and victory or defeat in war, to the level of striving for and maintaining the Party’s absolute leadership over the military. Guided by these principles, the Party gradually restored the system of political commissars and political work organs in the military, combining the establishment of “political offices in brigades to lead the brigade’s political work” with “temporarily dispatching battalion Party representatives” [38]38 Internal Party directive on restoring political work in the Red Army, 1937. to adapt to the objectives, tasks, and combat methods of independent mountain guerrilla warfare, thereby strengthening the Party’s absolute leadership over the military through robust political work.

独立自主的山地游击战战略在作战实践中以突出中国共产党对军队的绝对领导权为核心。如果在党对军队的领导权问题上患“幼稚病”，共产党员就难以肩负起“成为这个战争的最自觉的领导者”的责任使命。1937年9月，毛泽东对独立自主的山地游击战的基本原则进行了系统阐释，其中的绝大部分内容涉及党对军队的绝对领导权问题。其一是依照情况使用兵力的自由；其二是红军有发动群众、创造根据地、组织义勇军之自由，地方政权与邻近友军不得干涉；其三是南京只作战略规定，红军有执行此战略之一切自由。这就将党和红军锚定战术效用、战争胜负的思维提升至争取并保持党对军队绝对领导权的高度。在上述原则的指导下，党逐步恢复了军队政治委员制度和政治工作机关，将“旅应设政治处，负责全旅政治工作之领导”与“临时派遣营党代表”相结合，以适应独立自主的山地游击战的目标任务和作战方式，通过强有力的政治工作强化了党对军队的绝对领导。

The strategy and tactics of independent mountain guerrilla warfare were flexibly applied and richly developed in actual combat. Mao Zedong made “relying on mountains and avoiding hard battles” the fourth principle for waging independent mountain guerrilla warfare. “Relying on mountains” pointed to the application scenario and unique advantage of independent mountain guerrilla warfare: using the complex terrain of mountains to wage guerrilla warfare, waiting for the shift in the balance of offense and defense, and using mountain base areas to expand the people’s army’s operational space and provide concealment. “Avoiding hard battles” was not escapism, but “minimizing unnecessary sacrifices” [39]39 Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War” (1938). to preserve one’s own strength. Subsequently, in *Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War*, Mao Zedong raised six specific strategic issues, covering tactics, combat readiness, command, and other aspects. In particular, the emphasis on the dialectical unity of offensive warfare within defensive warfare, quick-decision warfare within protracted warfare, and exterior-line operations within interior-line operations, as well as the emphasis on the “advance” of war and the “stability” of opportunely establishing and developing base areas, promoted the further integration of theory and practice at the level of strategic and tactical innovation. Guided by this, the anti-Japanese armed forces led by the Party waged flexible and effective independent mountain guerrilla warfare in North China. The anti-Japanese base areas of Jin-Cha-Ji, Jin-Sui, Jin-Ji-Yu, Ji-Lu-Yu, and Shandong [40]40 These are the names of major anti-Japanese base areas: Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei), Jin-Sui (Shanxi-Suiyuan), Jin-Ji-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Henan), Ji-Lu-Yu (Hebei-Shandong-Henan), and Shandong. were also continuously developed, effectively coordinating with the frontal battlefield’s offensives, persistently wearing down the Japanese forces, while preserving the Party’s own strength.

独立自主的山地游击战的战略战术在实战过程中实现了灵活运用和丰富发展。毛泽东将“坚持依傍山地与不打硬仗”作为开展独立自主的山地游击战的第四项原则。“依傍山地”道出了独立自主的山地游击战的运用场景和独特优势，即依托山地的复杂地形开展游击战、等待攻守易势，并以山地根据地为人民军队拓展作战空间和提供隐蔽场所。“不打硬仗”不是逃跑主义，而是“尽量地减少那些不必要的牺牲”，以保存自身实力。随后，毛泽东在《抗日游击战争的战略问题》中又提出了六项具体战略问题，涵盖战术、战备、指挥等方面。特别是对防御战中的进攻战、持久战中的速决战和内线作战中的外线作战辩证统一的强调，对战争的“进”与相机建立和发展根据地的“稳”的强调，推动了战略战术创新层面理论与实践的进一步结合。以此为指导，党领导的抗日武装在华北地区独立自主地开展灵活且有效的山地游击战，晋察冀、晋绥、晋冀豫、冀鲁豫和山东抗日根据地也得以不断发展，在有力配合正面战场进攻、持久消耗日军的同时保存了党的自身实力。

(2) The Transition and Transformation from Mountain Guerrilla Warfare to Plain Guerrilla Warfare

（二）从山地游击战到平原游击战的过渡和转变

In the early stage of the strategic stalemate, the Party mainly waged extensive independent mountain guerrilla warfare in Shanxi and surrounding areas, accumulating valuable combat experience. As the war situation changed, based on the new circumstances of a temporary gap in Japanese troop deployments and the fundamental requirement that guerrilla warfare always revolve around the people, the Chinese Communist Party continued to follow its own path, taking steps to plan and launch plain guerrilla warfare.

战略相持阶段初期，党主要在山西及周边地区广泛开展独立自主的山地游击战，积累了宝贵的作战经验。伴随战况变化，基于日军兵力部署短暂出现缺口的新形势，以及游击战争始终围绕人民推进的根本要求，中国共产党继续走自己的路，迈出了规划和开展平原游击战的步伐。

The proposal and deployment of plain guerrilla warfare constituted a supplement and expansion of independent mountain guerrilla warfare at both the strategic and tactical levels. During the period of partial resistance, guerrilla warfare could still “not break out of widespread activity beyond mountainous, marshy, forested, and other such areas.” The proposal at the Luochuan Conference to “annihilate enemy army groups under favorable conditions and develop guerrilla warfare on the plains” indicated the possibility of launching plain guerrilla warfare, while also emphasizing “but with a focus on the mountains,” showing that this was not yet the optimal time to unfold plain guerrilla warfare on a broad scale. In April 1938, Mao Zedong and others further clarified that the Party and the Eighth Route Army in the plain areas of Hebei, Shandong, and elsewhere “should resolutely adopt the policy of developing guerrilla warfare as extensively as possible,” with military independence and material self-reliance mutually reinforcing each other. Plain guerrilla warfare expanded the scope of traditional guerrilla warfare from narrow mountainous areas to vast plains, while retaining the characteristics of traditional guerrilla warfare, with guerrilla units as the main force and flexible strikes and harassing attacks as the primary modes of operation. This was a creative application of guerrilla warfare as a tactic on a broader scale and at a higher level. At the same time, relying on independent mountain guerrilla warfare as a strategic foundation and upholding the spirit of historical initiative, the Party led the army from deep within the mountains to more complex and open terrain, marking that the Party’s overall perspective and strategic thinking had reached a new height.

平原游击战的提出和部署，是对独立自主的山地游击战在战略和战术两个层面的补充和拓展。局部抗战时期，游击战争还“不能突破山泽湖沼森林等地区以外广泛的活动”。洛川会议提出的“有利条件下消灭敌人兵团与在平原发展游击战争”，显示出开展平原游击战的可能性，同时强调“但着重于山地”，表明是时还不是铺开平原游击战的最佳时机。1938年4月，毛泽东等进一步明确，党和八路军在河北、山东等地的平原地区“应坚决采取尽量广大发展游击战争的方针”，以军事上的独立自主与物质上的自力更生互哺。平原游击战将传统游击战的范围从狭小山地拓展至广袤平原，同时保留以游击队为主力、以灵活打击和扰袭进攻为主要作战方式的传统游击战之特点，这是游击战作为战术在更广范围、更高层次的创造性应用。同时，党以独立自主的山地游击战为战略依托，秉持历史主动精神，带领军队从大山深处走向情况更为错综复杂的开阔地带，也标志着党此时的全局视野和战略思维已达到崭新的高度。

Changes in the situation of the War of Resistance against Japan were the direct factor enabling the Party, building on its accumulated experience in independent mountain guerrilla warfare, to explore the new possibilities of plain guerrilla warfare. Only by being able to see changes “when they are still small and not widespread” could strategic initiative be seized. In early 1938, the Japanese army attempted to use the Tianjin-Pukou Railway as an axis to link the northern and central China battlefields, launching a pincer attack on Xuzhou, a strategic stronghold, from north and south. They dispatched main forces of the North China Japanese army southward as reinforcements, reducing the number of Japanese troops stationed on the vast plains of Shandong, Hebei, and elsewhere, thereby opening a gap in the North China Plain. Subsequently, constrained by geography and provisions, and hit by Chinese forces’ destruction of transportation lines, the Japanese army’s southward advance encountered “difficulties of advance that words cannot describe.” Based on prior experience in mountain guerrilla warfare, and given that the Party Central Committee had already developed a certain understanding of the strategic shift from mountain to plain guerrilla warfare, the subjective and objective conditions for the Eighth Route Army to conduct guerrilla operations on the plains were largely in place. This made the trend “turning the vast areas of Hebei and Shanxi provinces into mobile zones for the army’s large-scale advances and long-distance retreats” unstoppable.

抗日战争形势的变化，是党在积累独立自主的山地游击战经验基础上，探索平原游击战全新可能性的直接因素。只有在战争形势变化“还是小量的不普遍的时候，就能看见”，才能抢占战略先机。1938年初，日军试图以津浦铁路为轴贯通华北和华中战场，对作为战略要塞的徐州作南北对进式的进攻，遂派华北日军主力南下增援，山东、河北等地广阔平原的驻扎日军数量有所减少，恰好将华北平原豁开了一个口子。随后，受地缘和粮草限制，加上中国军队破坏交通线的打击，日军南下之计“进击之困难，实非言语所可形容”。基于先前山地游击战的经验，加之党中央已经对山地游击战向平原游击战的战略转变有了一定认识，八路军向平原地区进行游击作战的主客观条件均较为齐备，这就“使冀晋两省的广大地区，均成为作战军队大踏步前进、长距离后退的机动区”的趋势不可阻挡。

Consistently and firmly relying on the people was the root cause of the Party’s promotion of the development from independent mountain guerrilla warfare to plain guerrilla warfare. Mao Zedong pointed out: “Guerrilla warfare cannot be separated from the masses for a single moment; this is the most basic principle.” Plain guerrilla warfare could “preserve most of the manpower and material resources from being used by the enemy”; from this perspective, plain guerrilla warfare was of even greater significance than mountain guerrilla warfare. In the process of understanding and practicing plain guerrilla warfare, the Party consistently adhered to the principle of everything for the people and relying on the people. Only with the support and endorsement of the masses could the Party’s plain base areas develop, the interests of the broad masses be protected, and “ensuring the minimum living standards of the masses” be achieved even under extremely difficult conditions. At the same time, guerrilla warfare, as the best organizational form and highest expression of people’s war, could not advance without the help of the masses. The masses not only “helped the troops raise provisions” but also, leveraging their familiarity with the terrain and local conditions, played an important role in reconnaissance, medical care, transportation, and other tasks.

始终紧紧依靠人民，是党推动独立自主的山地游击战向平原游击战发展的根源所在。毛泽东指出：“游击战争不能一刻离开民众，这是最基本的原则。”而平原游击战能够“保持大部份的人力物力，不为敌人所利用”，从这一角度来看，平原游击战较山地游击战意义更为重大。在认识、实践平原游击战的过程中，党始终坚持一切为了人民、一切依靠人民。只有得到人民群众的支持和拥护，党的平原根据地才能有所发展，广大民众的利益才能得到保护，才能实现在极端困苦条件下依然“保证群众最低限度的生活要求”。同时，游击战争作为人民战争的最好组织形式和最高表现形式，其推进也离不开群众的帮助。人民群众不仅“帮助部队筹措给养”，更凭借其熟悉地形、民情的优势，在侦查、救护、运输等工作中发挥了重要作用。

(III) Independent Mountain Guerrilla Warfare and the Growth of Revolutionary Forces

（三）独立自主的山地游击战与革命力量的壮大

The elevation of independent mountain guerrilla warfare to Party strategy effectively struck at the Japanese army and promoted the development and expansion of anti-Japanese base areas. In this process, the Party also fused its own development with the national revolution, enhancing its ideological awareness and honing its capable skills.

独立自主的山地游击战上升为党的战略，有力地打击了日军，推动了抗日根据地的发展和壮大。党也在这一过程中将自身发展与民族革命熔铸为一体，提高了思想觉悟、练就了过硬本领。

The independent mountain guerrilla warfare led by the Communist Party of China dealt a heavy blow to the Japanese aggressors. In the ambush battle at Pingxingguan in September 1937, the Eighth Route Army, relying on the steep terrain at the boundary between Datong and Xinzhou cities in Shanxi Province, eliminated over 1,000 enemy troops, achieving the first victory for Chinese forces since the start of the nationwide War of Resistance. In the ambush battle at Shentouling in March of the following year, our army killed over 800 enemy troops. The Japanese army noted that “the tendency of Kuomintang guerrilla forces to surrender is significant,” while “the Communist guerrilla tactics are skillful,” and “their method of retreating when facing a strong enemy and striking when facing a weak one makes them extremely difficult to eradicate.” The guerrilla actions of the Eighth Route Army and others amplified the mismatch between the areas occupied by the Japanese army and its own troop strength, making it impossible for the Japanese army “to garrison all areas.” In particular, the guerrilla warfare conducted by the forces led by the Communist Party of China in Hebei dealt a “fatal blow to the Japanese plan to foster and establish a new central regime.” Building on partial victories, independent mountain guerrilla warfare was carried out more extensively and deeply in North China, pushing the enemy’s rear battlefield to gradually become the main battlefield during the strategic stalemate phase. “These many scattered small victories” could accumulate into “an important major victory.” Mao Zedong pointed out that anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare and its strategic program “are the necessary path to preserving and developing oneself, annihilating and expelling the enemy, coordinating with regular warfare, and striving for final victory,” highly affirming the key role of the Party’s independently conducted guerrilla warfare in securing the ultimate victory of the War of Resistance.

中国共产党领导开展的独立自主的山地游击战，对日本侵略者造成了沉重打击。在1937年9月的平型关伏击战中，八路军依托山西省大同市与忻州市分界地带的险峻地形作战，消灭敌人1000多人，创造了全民族抗战以来中国军队的首次胜利。在次年3月神头岭伏击战中，我军又击毙敌人800余人。日军称，“国民党游击队的投降倾向显著”，而“共军的游击战术巧妙”，“遇强则退、逢弱便打的战法，剿灭极为困难”。八路军等的游击行动，放大了日军占领地区与自身兵力之间的不匹配性，使日军“不能守备全部地区”。特别是中国共产党领导的军队在河北开展的游击战，给日军“扶植、建立新中央政权，带来致命的打击”。以局部胜利为基础，独立自主的山地游击战在华北地区更为广泛且深入地开展，推动敌后战场在战略相持阶段逐步过渡为主战场，“这许多零碎的小胜利”可以累积成“一个重要的大胜利”。毛泽东指出，抗日游击战争及其战略纲领“是达到保存和发展自己，消灭和驱逐敌人，配合正规战争，争取最后胜利的必要途径”，高度肯定了党独立自主开展的游击战对于夺取抗战最终胜利的关键作用。

The conduct of independent mountain guerrilla warfare developed and expanded a number of anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy’s rear led by the Party, laying the material and mass foundations for the establishment of New China. The base areas established by the Party in the enemy’s rear battlefield served as strategic bases and fighting fortresses, upon which “the execution of all strategic tasks and the realization of war objectives” relied. The conduct of independent mountain guerrilla warfare benefited from the stability of the base areas, while the partial and phased victories achieved by the former also became conditions for the development of the latter. Starting in August 1937, the Red Army launched flanking attacks on the westward- and southward-advancing Japanese army in the border region of Hebei, Chahar, Shanxi, and Suiyuan provinces. Mass organizations such as anti-Japanese national salvation associations, spontaneously formed by the people in various parts of the base areas, were also active, effectively consolidating the Jin-Cha-Ji base area, which was surrounded by the enemy. Subsequently, taking advantage of the mountain guerrilla warfare conducted in the Lüliang Mountains, the Party successively opened up anti-Japanese base areas in southwestern Shanxi, northwestern Shanxi, northeastern Shanxi, and southeastern Shanxi, “encircling Taiyuan from four corners” and shattering the Japanese plan to quickly take Shanxi and quickly subjugate China. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, described as “a miracle never seen before in Chinese history,” also provided an “unconquerable material foundation” for the War of Resistance against Japan and the establishment of New China.

独立自主的山地游击战的开展，发展壮大了一批党领导的敌后抗日根据地，为新中国的建立奠定了物质基础和群众基础。党在敌后战场领导建立的根据地发挥着战略基地和战斗堡垒作用，“一切战略任务的执行和战争目的的实现”都以此为依托。开展独立自主的山地游击战得益于根据地的稳固，前者取得的局部性、阶段性胜利也成为后者发展的条件。自1937年8月始，红军在冀察晋绥四省交界地区对西进和南进的日军开展侧面袭击，根据地各处民众自发组成的抗日救国会等群众团体也活动频繁，有力地巩固了深处敌人之围的晋察冀根据地。随后，以在吕梁山区开展的山地游击战为契机，党相继开辟晋西南、晋西北、晋东北和晋东南抗日根据地，“四角合围”太原城，击碎了日军速取山西、速亡中国的设想。作为“中国历史上从来未有的奇迹”的陕甘宁边区，也为抗日战争以及新中国的建立提供了“不可征服的物质基础”。

In the process of conducting independent mountain guerrilla warfare, the Party’s understanding of the united front, armed struggle, and the issue of leadership over the military became more mature. A strong leading core, a mature leading collective, and a more advanced Party membership gradually took shape. Using the conduct of independent mountain guerrilla warfare as a link, Communists with strategic vision, primarily represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, emerged within the Party. Mao Zedong creatively combined the principle of independence with mountain guerrilla tactics, developing them into a strategy that then guided the enemy’s rear battlefield and even the overall situation of the War of Resistance. His leading core position in the Party Central Committee and the military was effectively established and continuously consolidated. In this process, the Party also forged a united, resilient, proactive, and flexible contingent. This contingent, centered on the people’s army led by the Party—an army that obeyed all commands, consistently maintained the rigidity and seriousness of discipline, possessed tenacious willpower and outstanding combat effectiveness, and always remained “dispersed in form but not in spirit” during scattered guerrilla operations—took the common goal of winning the final victory of the War of Resistance against Japan and establishing an independent, free, democratic, unified, and prosperous New China. Demonstrating the ability and power to correctly grasp the situation and an invincible spirit and strength, it became the most reliable pillar of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation.

在开展独立自主的山地游击战的过程中，党对统一战线、武装斗争和军队领导权问题的认识更加成熟，坚强的领导核心、成熟的领导集体、更加先进的党员队伍逐步形成。以开展独立自主的山地游击战为纽带，党内涌现出了以毛泽东同志为主要代表的有战略眼光的共产党人。毛泽东创造性地将独立自主原则与山地游击战战术相结合发展为战略，进而指导敌后战场乃至抗战全局，其在党中央和军队的领导核心地位事实上得以确立并不断巩固。党也在这一过程中锻造了一支团结一致、迎难而上、主动作为、灵活机动的队伍。这支队伍，以党领导的，一切行动听指挥、始终维护纪律的刚性和严肃性、具有坚韧意志力和卓绝战斗力、在分散游击作战时始终“形散而神不散”的人民军队为核心，以夺取抗日战争最后胜利，建立一个独立、自由、民主、统一、富强的新中国为共同奋斗目标，展现出正确把握时局的定力和能力以及不可战胜的精神和力量，成为中国人民和中华民族最为可靠的主心骨。

IV. Examining the Historical Status of Independent Mountain Guerrilla Warfare from the Perspective of a Grand View of Party History

四、从大党史观角度考察独立自主的山地游击战的历史地位

General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out: “Establish a grand historical perspective

习近平总书记指出：“树立大历史观，从历史长河、时代大潮、全球风云中分析演变机理、探究历史规律，提出因应的战略策略，增强工作的系统性、预见性、创造性。”大党史观是大历史观在党史研究中的具体应用。独立自主的山地游击战，是新民主主义革命时期党从初创走向成熟在军事战略层面的具体体现，从大党史观角度对其历史地位进行考察必要且重要。

(I) From the Objective Dimension: The Historical Inevitability of Independent Mountain Guerrilla Warfare Emerging in Response to the Times

（一）从客观之维看独立自主的山地游击战应际而生的历史必然

The development of human society is a natural historical process not subject to subjective will; the same holds true when reviewing Party history. Grasping changes in the situation and clarifying the historical orientation is a valuable experience of the Party in leading revolution, construction, and reform. Examined from the objective dimension of a grand perspective on Party history, independent mountain guerrilla warfare is a concrete manifestation of the Party clarifying its historical orientation and devising strategic tactics for the Chinese revolution.

人类社会发展是不以主观意志为转移的自然历史过程，回观党史亦如是。把脉形势变化、明确历史方位，是党领导革命、建设和改革的宝贵经验。从大党史观的客观之维来考察，独立自主的山地游击战是党明确历史方位、谋定中国革命战略战术的具体呈现。

The proposal of the strategy of independent mountain guerrilla warfare embodies the Party’s accurate grasp of its own historical orientation during the War of Resistance. Historical orientation is objective reality; it both marks the coordinates of the era and contains developmental trends. “The history of the CPC is a history of constantly adapting to the development and changes in the situation and tasks, and promptly calibrating its historical orientation.” The strategy of independent mountain guerrilla warfare was precisely proposed by the Party based on its historical orientation during the War of Resistance. From its inception, the Party shouldered the responsibility of leading the Chinese revolution, which laid the general tone of the Party’s historical orientation. In the early stage of the All-Out War of Resistance,[44]44 The All-Out War of Resistance (全民族抗战) refers to the period following the July 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident, when the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang formed the Second United Front to resist Japanese invasion. the people’s army led by the Party was in a relatively disadvantaged position in the war, but this was not immutable, and “weaknesses can sometimes become conditions for seizing the initiative.” Independent mountain guerrilla warfare was precisely the Party’s strategic plan to avoid direct confrontation with the enemy and wait for opportunities to seize the initiative.

独立自主的山地游击战战略的提出，蕴含着党对抗战中自身所处历史方位的准确把握。历史方位即客观现实，既标定时代坐标又内蕴发展趋势。“一部中国共产党的历史就是不断适应形势任务的发展变化及时标定历史方位的历史。”独立自主的山地游击战战略，正是党基于自身在抗战时期的历史方位提出的。党在初创时就肩负起领导中国革命的责任，这奠定了党历史方位的总基调。全民族抗战初期，党领导的人民军队处于相对弱势的战争地位，但这并非一成不变，且“弱点有时正成为争取主动地位的条件”。独立自主的山地游击战正是党避免与敌人产生正面冲突、等待机会争取主动的战略谋划。

Carrying out independent mountain guerrilla warfare reflects the Party’s practice of seeking truth from facts and acting only after careful deliberation. Exercising subjective initiative while respecting objective laws is the philosophical foundation for formulating the strategy of independent mountain guerrilla warfare. With the extensive and flexible application of combat forms such as mobile warfare, positional warfare, and guerrilla warfare, the Party’s understanding that guerrilla forces “cannot solve strategic tasks militarily but play a supplementary role” became clearer. However, the Party did not thereby belittle guerrilla warfare or weaken its independent leadership over it. The irregularity of guerrilla warfare lies in the scale of forces and the form of command, not in its effectiveness; in fact, the Japanese army “especially feared the guerrilla movement’s efforts to disintegrate the Japanese and Manchukuo armies.”[45]45 Manchukuo (满洲国) was a Japanese puppet state established in Northeast China in 1932, nominally ruled by the last Qing emperor Puyi. From this perspective, carrying out independent mountain guerrilla warfare was precisely the result of the Party’s seeking truth from facts and comprehensive analysis.

开展独立自主的山地游击战，是党实事求是、谋定而后动的体现。在尊重客观规律的同时发挥主观能动性，是制定独立自主的山地游击战战略的哲学基础。随着运动战、阵地战、游击战等作战形式的广泛灵活运用，党对游击队“在军事上不能解决战略任务而是起一种辅助的作用”的认识更加清晰。但是党也并未因此轻视游击战、弱化对游击战的独立自主的领导。游击战的非正规性在于兵力规模和指挥形式，而不是实施效果，实际上日军也“特别害怕游击队做瓦解日本满蒙军队的运动”。由此来看，开展独立自主的山地游击战正是党实事求是、综合分析的结果。

The exploration of independent mountain guerrilla warfare contains the practical logic of the Party’s military approach of seeking truth from facts, leveraging strengths and avoiding weaknesses, and defeating the enemy. As the war situation developed, “the issues of base areas and the development toward mobile warfare” emerged in the process of carrying out independent mountain guerrilla warfare, meaning the Party had to advance into the core war zones with more plains. Therefore, Mao Zedong proposed, “We must not conceal certain shortcomings of the Red Army that should not be concealed, such as being only capable of guerrilla warfare, not positional warfare; only capable of mountain warfare, not plain warfare,” but rather, by learning from each other’s strengths, “conduct independent command under the overall strategy” to further develop independent mountain guerrilla warfare. Thus, independent mountain guerrilla warfare embodies the Party’s methodology of consistently and comprehensively analyzing problems from both positive and negative aspects.

对独立自主的山地游击战的探索，包含着军事上党实事求是、扬长避短、克敌制胜的现实逻辑。随着战争形势的发展，“根据地的问题、向运动战发展的问题”在开展独立自主的山地游击战的过程中涌现出来，这意味着党必须向多平原的战争核心地带进军。因此，毛泽东提出，“不可隐瞒红军若干不应该隐瞒的缺点，例如只会打游击战，不会打阵地战，只会打山地战，不会打平原战”，而是要取长补短地“在总的战略下进行独立自主的指挥”，进一步发展独立自主的山地游击战。可见，独立自主的山地游击战蕴含着党始终坚持从正反两方面全面客观分析问题的方法论。

(II) From the Dialectical Dimension: The Internal Logic of Unity of Opposites in Independent Mountain Guerrilla Warfare

（二）从辩证之维看独立自主的山地游击战对立统一的内在逻辑

Historical development is a process of the interaction of various contradictions. Examining independent mountain guerrilla warfare from the dialectical dimension of a grand perspective on Party history is the necessary path to transcend its military tactical nature and, from a strategic and overall height, grasp the dialectical laws of the unity of opposites, the mutual transformation of quantity and quality, and the negation of the negation inherent within it.

历史发展是各矛盾相互作用的过程。从大党史观的辩证之维考察独立自主的山地游击战，是超越其军事战术性质，而从战略和全局高度，把握其内蕴的对立统一、质量互变和否定之否定辩证法规律的必由之径。

Carrying out independent mountain guerrilla warfare embodies the dialectical unity of historical continuity and discontinuity. Focusing on key events in Party history is not about severing the thread of Party history, but about examining them with a unity of stages and continuity based on grasping the important nodes of the historical chain. The proposal of independent mountain guerrilla warfare connects the preceding issue of the Party’s army suffering heavy losses by trying to fight positional warfare with the subsequent trend of how to fight guerrilla warfare well and develop it into mobile warfare, linking the history of the War of Resistance with the evolution of the Party’s strategic tactics. Viewed from the entire process of the War of Resistance, guerrilla warfare was a discontinuous event interspersed within mobile warfare and positional warfare, playing a role at critical moments and driving the linear historical development of China’s victory in the War of Resistance, reflecting the gradual accumulation and breakthrough changes at the level of the Party’s strategic and tactical development history.

开展独立自主的山地游击战体现了历史连续性与非连续性的辩证统一。重点探究党史上的关键事件，不是割裂党史脉络，而是在把握历史链条重要节点基础上，对其作阶段性和连续性相统一的考察。独立自主的山地游击战的提出，上承党面临的军队尽力作阵地战却牺牲较大的问题，下继如何打好游击战并向运动战发展的趋势，串联起抗日战争史与党的战略战术的演变过程。从抗战全过程来看，游击战是穿插于运动战和阵地战中的非连续性事件，在非常时刻发挥作用，推动着中国赢得抗战胜利的历史线性发展，体现了党的战略战术发展史层面的渐进式积累和突破性变革。

Carrying out independent mountain guerrilla warfare embodies the historical dialectic that contradictory parties can transform into each other under certain conditions. Historical dialectics does not mean disorderly movement toward opposites, but rather the result of historical subjects seizing historical opportunities and exercising their initiative. The situation of the enemy being strong and ourselves being weak in the early stage of the All-Out War of Resistance, under the combined effect of subjective and objective factors such as China’s vast territory and abundant resources, correct resistance strategies, and the successful advancement of guerrilla warfare by the people’s army, continuously transformed into its opposite, ultimately leading to China’s complete victory in the anti-aggression war. From the perspective of summarizing strategic tactics, Mao Zedong expressed the first basic principle of anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare as “offensive warfare within defensive warfare, quick-decision warfare within protracted warfare, and exterior-line warfare within interior-line warfare.” The character “within” (中) in this formulation is a profound reflection of the relationship where “you have me, and I have you” between contradictory parties and the trend of their mutual transformation.

开展独立自主的山地游击战，体现了矛盾双方在一定条件下可相互转化之历史辩证法。历史辩证法并非无序地走向对立面，而是历史主体把握历史机遇发挥主动精神的结果。全国抗战初期的敌强我弱之势，在中国地大物博的支撑、抗战策略的正确、人民军队游击战争的成功推进等主客观因素的共同作用下，不断向其对立面转化，最终导向中国夺取反侵略战争的完全胜利。从战略战术概括的角度来看，毛泽东将抗日游击战争的首要基本原则，表述为“防御战中的进攻战，持久战中的速决战和内线作战中的外线作战”，其中的“中”字，便是对矛盾双方“你中有我，我中有你”关系和相互转化趋势的深刻反映。

Independent mountain guerrilla warfare contains the Party’s temporary understanding and developmental recognition of China’s revolutionary strategic tactics. Materialist dialectics examines the existence and extinction of things through a combination of dynamic and static perspectives, holding that the established forms of things under specific temporal and spatial conditions are temporary. Independent mountain guerrilla warfare embodies the Party’s temporary understanding of strategic tactics, meaning that various forms of guerrilla warfare played an irreplaceable role in all stages of the War of Resistance. However, in the long term, the strategic coverage of guerrilla warfare was expanding day by day, while in form it gradually transitioned to mobile warfare. Independent mountain guerrilla warfare also contains the Party’s developmental recognition of strategic tactics, namely that the protracted and brutal nature of the War of Resistance prompted the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare, especially as the Party’s understanding of base areas as the “strategic base” of guerrilla warfare deepened and its actions became more conscious.

独立自主的山地游击战包含着党对中国革命战略战术的暂时性理解和发展性认识。唯物辩证法对事物存在与灭亡进行动态与静态相结合的考察，认为特定时空条件下事物的既定形式具有暂时性。独立自主的山地游击战，体现着党对战略战术的暂时性理解，即多种形式的游击战争在抗日战争各阶段均发挥了无可替代的作用。但从长期来看，游击战的战略覆盖面在日益扩大，在形式上却逐渐过渡为运动战。独立自主的山地游击战也包含着党对战略战术的发展性认识，即抗战的长期性和残酷性促使游击战向运动战发展，特别是党将根据地作为游击战“战略基地”的认识日益深化、行动更加自觉。

(III) From the Subject Dimension: The Party’s Historical Initiative in Carrying Out Independent Mountain Guerrilla Warfare

（三）从主体之维看党开展独立自主的山地游击战的历史主动

Party history balances objective facts and subjective narrative through dialectical materialism and historical materialism. Examining independent mountain guerrilla warfare from the perspective of a grand view of Party history focusing on the nature of the Party’s subjective narrative reveals the inherent unity of Party spirit and people-centeredness, of Party history and the people’s creation of history, as well as the historical initiative spirit of the Party as the advanced element among the people.

党史以辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义平衡客观史实和主体叙事。基于大党史观聚焦党的主体叙事的性质考察独立自主的山地游击战，可见党性与人民性、党史与人民群众创造历史的内在统一性，以及党作为人民中的先进分子的历史主动精神。

Carrying out independent mountain guerrilla warfare embodies the Party’s adherence to the high degree of unity between Party spirit and people-centeredness. The high degree of unity between Party spirit and people-centeredness is the Party’s principled stance and also a bridge connecting historical materialism and the grand perspective on Party history. Carrying out independent mountain guerrilla warfare, “apart from military deployment, the most important thing is to rely closely on the broad masses of the people in the countryside,” which is a combination of independence in leadership and command with trusting and relying on the masses in the process of advancement. At the same time, the grand perspective on Party history presents the original historical features of the Chinese nation in economic, political, cultural, and social aspects since the founding of the Party and even modern times, which is actually a display in the field of Party history research of the view that the people are the creators of history. Mao Zedong’s “Sixteen-Character Formula”[46]46 The “Sixteen-Character Formula” (十六字诀) is Mao Zedong’s classic summary of guerrilla tactics: “The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue” (敌进我退，敌驻我扰，敌疲我打，敌退我追). for guerrilla warfare, with its essence of serving the masses and mobilizing the masses, is a concrete representation of the Party taking the people’s interests as its fundamental interests, and the Party’s consistent representation of the fundamental interests of the broadest masses of the people is precisely the logical backbone that supports the subjective narrative of the grand perspective on Party history without losing objectivity.

开展独立自主的山地游击战，是党坚持党性与人民性高度统一的体现。党性与人民性的高度统一是党的立场原则，也是贯通唯物史观和大党史观的桥梁。开展独立自主的山地游击战，“除军事部署以外，最主要的是紧密依靠乡村广大人民群众”，是领导指挥上独立自主与推进过程中相信群众和依靠群众的结合。同时，大党史观以线立骨地呈现建党以来乃至近代以来，中华民族在经济、政治、文化、社会等方面的历史原貌，这实际上是人民群众是历史创造者的观点在党史研究领域的展示。毛泽东的游击战争“十六字诀”，以为了群众、发动群众为精髓，是党把人民利益作为根本利益的具象呈现，而党始终代表最广大人民的根本利益恰恰是支撑大党史观进行主体叙事却不失客观的逻辑主干。

Carrying out independent mountain guerrilla warfare was a manifestation of the Party’s historical confidence and historical consciousness in opening up the bright prospects for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The reason independent mountain guerrilla warfare could develop into a broad popular guerrilla war lay in the endogenous driving force of the Party’s strong national confidence and national consciousness, and through this, it awakened the national consciousness of the broad masses of the people. In the early period of the National Anti-Japanese War, the Communist Party of China smoothly achieved the transition from regular troops and mobile warfare to guerrilla forces and guerrilla warfare, unlike the Kuomintang, which in that transition “suffered many losses it should not have suffered” [47]47 Mao Zedong, “The Question of Independence and Initiative within the United Front” (November 12, 1938), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2. The original text reads: “The Kuomintang, on the other hand, suffered many losses it should not have suffered in this transition.”; only then was there “the persistence, development and victory of the entire Anti-Japanese War,” and thereby “the bright prospects for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation were opened up.” Independent mountain guerrilla warfare was a strategic factor in the Party’s uniting and leading the people to win the great victory of the Anti-Japanese War, and it was also a powerful proof of the Party’s bearing the mission of national rejuvenation.

开展独立自主的山地游击战，是党开辟中华民族伟大复兴光明前景历史自信和历史自觉的彰显。独立自主的山地游击战之所以能发展成为广泛的民众游击战争，内生动力在于党有强烈的民族自信和民族自觉，并以此唤醒广大人民群众的民族意识。全国抗战初期，中国共产党顺利实现了由正规军和运动战向游击军和游击战的转变，不像国民党在该转变上“遭受了很多不应有的损失”，方有“整个抗日战争的坚持、发展和胜利”，进而“开辟了中华民族伟大复兴的光明前景”。独立自主的山地游击战是党团结带领人民赢得抗日战争伟大胜利的战略因素，也是党胸怀民族复兴使命的有力证明。

Carrying out independent mountain guerrilla warfare embodied the dual logic of the Party’s history of over one hundred years as both a history of social revolution and a history of self-revolution. The Party’s history of over one hundred years is not only a “history of unremitting struggle” but also a “history of self-construction” in which the Party raised its ideological awareness and tempered its abilities and skills. Party history not only reflects the evolution of China’s social forms and social relations but also presents the process by which the Party, in order to better lead the national revolution, continuously built and developed itself. The strategy of independent mountain guerrilla warfare embodied the revolutionary path of “encircling the cities from the countryside and seizing state power by armed force” [48]48 This is the core strategic line of the Chinese Communist Party’s revolutionary path, formally articulated by Mao Zedong in the late 1920s and early 1930s, emphasizing the establishment of rural base areas and the use of armed force to seize political power, in contrast to the urban insurrection model of the Russian Revolution., and in practice it also drove the Party to continuously deepen its understanding of independence and self-reliance, and to implement this understanding in all areas of Party building—including political building, ideological building, organizational building, and work style building—beyond the issues of leadership and the military sphere. With political sobriety and firmness, the Party was built into a political party that was “the most conscious, the most far-sighted, and capable of seeing the future clearly.”

开展独立自主的山地游击战，体现了百余年党史作为社会革命史和自我革命史的双重逻辑。百余年党史不仅是党的“不懈奋斗史”，更是一部党提高思想觉悟、锤炼能力本领的“自身建设史”。党史不仅反映了中国社会形态和社会关系的演变，更呈现了党为了更好地领导民族革命，不断建设和发展自身的历程。独立自主的山地游击战战略，体现着“农村包围城市，武装夺取政权”的革命道路，也在实践中推动党不断深化了对独立自主的认识，并将其贯彻到了除领导权问题和军事领域之外的党的政治建设、思想建设、组织建设、作风建设等各领域，以政治上的清醒和坚定，把党建设成了“最有觉悟，最有预见，能够看清前途”的政党。

Online editor: Jing Mu

网络编辑：静穆