The Historical Significance and Enlightenment of "Leading the Troops to Jinggangshan" and the "Channel Troop Redirection"

As early as March 2013, General Secretary Xi Jinping demanded that leading cadres at all levels "understand the context of our Party and state's affairs, draw on the historical experience of our Party and state, and correctly understand the major events and important figures in the history of our Party and state. This is essential for correctly understanding the Party's and the nation's conditions, and also essential for creating the future." [1]1 The “Channel” (通道) refers to the area around Tongdao County in present-day Hunan Province, where the emergency meeting of the Party Central Committee was held on December 12, 1934. "Leading the Troops to Jinggangshan" and the "Channel Troop Redirection" are important historical events of great strategic turning significance in the history of our Party, playing a crucial role in the victory of the Chinese revolution. "Leading the Troops to Jinggangshan" was the key decision of the Communist Party of China to shift the focus of the revolution to the countryside after the setback of the Autumn Harvest Uprising, marking the beginning of a new path for the Chinese revolution. The "Channel Troop Redirection" laid the foundation for the successful convening of the Liping Conference and the Zunyi Conference, and for our Party to achieve a great strategic turn. Although these two "troop redirections" are far removed from us in time, the principles contained within them still enable us to deeply understand major questions such as "Why the Communist Party of China 'can', why Marxism 'works', and why socialism with Chinese characteristics 'is good'."

早在2013年3月，习近平总书记就要求各级领导干部，“要了解我们党和国家事业的来龙去脉，汲取我们党和国家的历史经验，正确了解党和国家历史上的重大事件和重要人物。这对正确认识党情、国情十分必要，对开创未来也十分必要”。“引兵井冈”和“通道转兵”是我们党的历史上具有伟大战略转折意义的重要历史事件，对中国革命走向胜利产生了重要作用。“引兵井冈”是中国共产党在秋收起义受挫后，将革命重心转向农村的关键决策，标志着中国革命新道路的开端。“通道转兵”为黎平会议、遵义会议的胜利召开，为我们党实现伟大战略转折奠定了基础。这两次“转兵”虽然离我们已经久远，但其中蕴含的道理仍能够让我们深刻理解“中国共产党为什么‘能’、马克思主义为什么‘行’、中国特色社会主义为什么‘好’等重大问题”。

In 1927, Mao Zedong led the troops of the Autumn Harvest Uprising to Jinggangshan, established a rural revolutionary base, and opened the prelude to the classic work of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context, causing the Party's revolutionary cause, like a single spark, to gradually start a prairie fire. In December 1934, the Central Red Army, during the Long March, passed through Tongdao, Hunan, and convened the Tongdao Conference, deciding to advance into Guizhou, which gave new life to the Party and the Red Army at a critical moment of life and death, laying an important foundation for the successful convening of the Zunyi Conference and the realization of the great turning point of the Long March. From "Leading the Troops to Jinggangshan" to the "Channel Troop Redirection," what is demonstrated is the historical process in which the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as the main representative, combined with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, arduously explored the Chinese-characteristic revolutionary path and revolutionary laws. It also demonstrates the difficult journey of the Chinese Communists gradually moving towards maturity and their confidence in the path, confidence in the theory, confidence in the system, and confidence in the culture. [2]2 Luo Fu is the pseudonym of Zhang Wentian, a senior leader of the Chinese Communist Party who later served as General Secretary.

1927 年，毛泽东率秋收起义部队辗转上井冈山，建立农村革命根据地，开启马克思主义中国化经典之作的序曲，使党的革命事业如星星之火逐渐形成燎原之势。1934年12月，中央红军长征途经湖南通道，召开通道会议，决定进军贵州，使党和红军在生死存亡之际获得新生，为遵义会议胜利召开、实现长征伟大转折奠定了重要基础。从“引兵井冈”到“通道转兵”，彰显的是以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人，结合中国革命具体实践筚路蓝缕探索中国特色革命道路和革命规律的历史过程，彰显的是中国共产党人初步走向成熟的艰难历程和道路自信、理论自信、制度自信、文化自信。

Marx believed that historical events possess similarity, and this similarity is "created under conditions directly encountered, given, and inherited from the past." [3]3 A jun is an ancient Chinese unit of weight, equivalent to 30 jin (approximately 15 kilograms). The phrase “a boat weighing a thousand jun” is a classical Chinese idiom meaning a heavy or crucial responsibility. It is not a simple repetition, but is manifested through the dynamic evolution of the relationship between perceptual activity and objects. Similarity or difference is not only an inherent attribute of the development of human history itself but also the object of comparative historical research. Therefore, similarity or difference is indispensable for history itself and for comparative historical research. In the more than one hundred years of glorious history of our Party, many historical events possess a certain degree of similarity, which is the unity of historical necessity and contingency. The same is true of "Leading the Troops to Jinggangshan" during the Agrarian Revolutionary War period and the "Channel Troop Redirection." By analyzing and expounding the historical significance of the two "troop redirections" from the perspective of similarities in profound historical causes, main leaders, etc., we can "gain inspiration and find steadfastness from history." [4]4 This is a paraphrase of a common CPC expression about learning from history.

马克思认为历史事件存在相似性，这种相似性是“在直接碰到的、既定的、从过去继承下来的条件下创造”。它并非简单的重复，而是通过感性活动与对象关系的动态演变体现的。相似或相异既是人类历史发展本身固有的属性，也是历史比较研究的对象。因此，相似或相异对历史本身和历史比较研究来说都是不可或缺的。在我们党百余年的辉煌历史中，其中许多历史事件具有一定程度的相似性，是历史必然性与偶然性的统一。土地革命战争时期的“引兵井冈”与“通道转兵”亦如此。从深厚历史原因、主要领导者等方面的相似性来分析阐述两次“转兵”的历史意义，我们可以“从历史中得到启迪、得到定力”。

I. The Profound Historical Causes of the Two "Troop Redirections" — The Unity of Historical Necessity and Contingency

一、两次“转兵”的深厚历史原因——历史必然性和偶然性的统一

Historical development and its direction are the unity of necessity and contingency. "In the development of history, contingency plays its role, and in dialectical thinking, just as in the development of the embryo, it is included in necessity." [5]5 This is a paraphrase of Engels's discussion of necessity and contingency in dialectics. Both "Leading the Troops to Jinggangshan" and the "Channel Troop Redirection" have profound historical causes and are the unity of historical necessity and contingency.

历史发展及其走向是必然性和偶然性的统一。“在历史的发展中，偶然性起着自己的作用，而它在辩证的思维中，就像在胚胎的发展中一样包括在必然性中。”“引兵井冈”和“通道转兵”，都具有深厚的历史原因，是历史必然性和偶然性的统一。

(I) The Historical Necessity of the Two "Troop Redirections" — "Left" Errors Led to Huge Losses for the Revolution, and the Revolution Achieved a Major Turning Point Amidst Setbacks

（一）两次“转兵”的历史必然性——“左”倾错误导致革命遭受巨大损失，革命在挫折中实现重大转折

The Communist Party of China was established and continuously grew stronger with the support of the Communist International. From the founding of the Party to the Party leading a series of revolutionary movements, from the formation of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to the establishment of the Chinese Soviet regime, every step of progress in the Party's growth received varying degrees of support and assistance from the Communist International and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Joining the Communist International meant that the Communist Party of China was part of the international communist movement and had to accept the leadership of the Communist International. According to the "Conditions for Admission to the Communist International," joining the Communist International required recognizing the leading position of the Communist International in the relationship between the two parties and implementing the instructions of the Communist International. Under these various strict regulations, the Party lacked autonomy, and coupled with its own weakness, it could only follow the instructions of the Communist International. However, the Communist International did not fully understand the actual situation in China, and its guidance of the Chinese revolution inevitably led to mistakes. During the Great Revolution period, the Communist International misjudged the revolutionary situation in China, restricted the Communist Party's armed construction, and made one-sided concessions to the Kuomintang, ultimately leading to the failure of the Great Revolution. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War period, the leading organs of our Party once experienced errors such as Qu Qiubai's "Left" putschism, Li Lisan's "Left" adventurism, and Wang Ming's "Left" dogmatism. [6]6 Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan, and Wang Ming were successive leaders of the CPC who promoted "Left" lines during the late 1920s and early 1930s, leading to severe setbacks for the revolution. These erroneous "Left" ideas caused serious losses to the Party's cause. The Communist International and our Party attempted to take measures to remedy these errors, but ultimately, the Chinese revolution still suffered major setbacks.

中国共产党是在共产国际的支持下成立并不断发展壮大的，从党的建立到党领导一系列的革命运动，从中国工农红军的组建到中华苏维埃政权的建立，党在成长过程中的每一次进步，都得到了共产国际与联共（布）不同程度的支持和帮助。加入共产国际，这就意味着中国共产党是国际共产主义运动中的一部分，必须接受共产国际的领导。根据《共产国际的加入条件》，加入共产国际就必须承认共产国际在双方的关系上处于领导地位，必须执行共产国际的指示。在各种严格的规定下，党缺少自主权，再加上自身力量弱小，只能听从共产国际的指示，而共产国际对中国的实际情况并不完全了解，对中国革命的指导就不可避免出现失误。大革命时期，共产国际错误估计中国革命形势、限制共产党的武装建设、对国民党一味退让等，最终导致大革命失败。土地革命战争时期，我们党的领导机关一度出现了瞿秋白“左”倾盲动主义、李立三“左”倾冒险主义、王明“左”倾教条主义等错误。这些“左”的错误思想，给党的事业造成严重损失。共产国际和我们党曾试图对这些错误采取措施进行弥补，但最终仍使中国革命遭受重大挫折。

Under the guidance of erroneous "Left" putschist ideas, the Chinese revolution adhered to the "urban center theory." [7]7 The "urban center theory" refers to the orthodox Marxist-Leninist strategy of launching proletarian uprisings in cities to seize state power, which the CPC initially attempted but abandoned after repeated failures. At a time when the Kuomintang reactionaries possessed strong armed forces, our Party intended to achieve a one-time final victory of the revolution by attacking large cities. The final result was predictable. In early 1928, the Communist Party of China successively led and launched nearly a hundred armed uprisings, but the vast majority quickly ended in failure. The troops of the Autumn Harvest Uprising suffered heavy losses even before attacking Changsha and were forced to make a strategic retreat. The troops of the Nanchang Uprising, after more than four hours of fierce fighting, temporarily captured Nanchang city but held it for only three days. Under the heavy siege of Kuomintang troops, they had to move south to Guangdong and finally suffered heavy losses in the Chaoshan area. [8]8 The Nanchang Uprising (August 1, 1927) was the CPC's first armed resistance against the Kuomintang; the Chaoshan area refers to the Shantou-Chaozhou region in Guangdong where the uprising forces were finally defeated. Objective factors such as the timing of the revolution and the vast disparity in strength between the enemy and ourselves inevitably led the focus of the Chinese revolution's development to shift to the vast countryside and carry out the agrarian revolution. However, Qu Qiubai still insisted that "the situation of the Chinese revolutionary struggle is undoubtedly on the rise." [9]9 This is a quotation from Qu Qiubai's writings during the "Left" putschist period. Mao Zedong, based on the actual situation of the Chinese revolution at that time, decisively, promptly, and voluntarily abandoned the original plan to attack Changsha, led the uprising troops to explore and advance along the Hunan-Jiangxi border, sought a new foothold, and finally "led the troops to Jinggangshan," established rural bases, extensively mobilized the masses, and carried out the agrarian revolution. According to the opinion of the Comintern representative Besso Lominadze, the Provisional Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee punished the leaders of the Nanchang Uprising and the Autumn Harvest Uprising. [10]10 Besso Lominadze was a Comintern representative in China during the late 1920s who advocated for the "Left" line and For a time, the style of punishment within the Party prevailed. Comrade Mao Zedong was removed from his position as alternate member of the Provisional Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, and was even mistakenly rumored to have been "expelled from the Party."

在“左”倾盲动主义错误思想指导下，中国革命坚持“城市中心论”，在国民党反动派拥有强大武装力量的情况下，我们党意欲通过攻打大城市就达到一次性取得革命最后胜利，其最终结果可想而知。1928年初，中国共产党先后领导发动了近百次武装起义，但绝大部分很快都以失败告终。秋收起义部队还在进攻长沙途中就遭到重创，被迫进行战略退却。南昌起义部队经过4个多小时激烈奋战，虽暂时攻占南昌城，但也只坚守了3天，在国民党军队的重兵围攻下不得不南下广东，最后在潮汕遭受重大损失。革命的时机、敌我力量过于悬殊等客观因素的存在，必然导致中国革命的发展重心走向广大农村，开展土地革命。但瞿秋白仍坚持认为，“中国革命斗争形势毫无疑问的是在高涨”。毛泽东则根据当时中国革命的实际情形，果断、及时、主动地放弃原攻打长沙的计划，率领起义部队沿湘赣边界一路探索前进，寻找新的落脚点，最后“引兵井冈”，建立农村根据地，广泛发动群众，开展土地革命。按照共产国际代表罗明纳兹的意见，中共中央临时政治局对南昌起义与秋收起义的领导人予以处分。一时间，党内惩办主义之风盛行，毛泽东同志被开除中央临时政治局候补委员的职务，甚至还被误传为“开除党籍”。

By the time of the Central Soviet Area period, Wang Ming pushed "Left" ideas to the extreme, ultimately leading to the failure of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign. [11]11 Jinggangshan: A mountain range on the border of Jiangxi and Hunan provinces, where Mao Zedong established the first rural revolutionary base area in 1927. The Party was again dealt a heavy blow, rural revolutionary bases were almost completely lost, the number of Party members plummeted, and the number of Red Army soldiers dwindled. The Central Red Army was forced to evacuate the Soviet Area in October 1934 and begin the arduous Long March. At that time, the main responsible persons of the Central Committee still adhered to "Left" errors during the retreat, committing the error of flightism. The Battle of the Xiangjiang River alone caused the loss of over 30,000 of the main Central Red Army troops, resulting in heavy losses for the Central Red Army. [12]12 Sanwan Reorganization: A military reorganization carried out by Mao Zedong in Sanwan Village, Jiangxi, in September 1927, which established Party leadership over the army at the company level. This series of problems aroused widespread dissatisfaction among Party members and Red Army soldiers with the "Left" errors. Various negative sentiments began to spread and grow. Doubts arose about the military command and the line, and the sentiment for replacing the leaders grew increasingly strong. These subjective wills greatly facilitated the smooth realization of the "Channel Troop Redirection."

到了中央苏区时期，王明更是将“左”的思想推到了极致，最终导致第五次反“围剿”失败，党再次遭到沉重打击，农村革命根据地几乎丧失，党员人数骤降，红军人数所剩不多。中央红军被迫在1934年10月撤离苏区，开始漫漫长征。而当时中央主要负责人在撤退中仍坚持“左”倾错误，犯了逃跑主义错误，仅湘江战役就使中央主力红军损失3万多，致使中央红军遭受重大损失。这一系列的问题，引发广大党员和红军将士对“左”倾错误的不满，各种不良情绪开始滋生蔓延，对军事指挥及路线产生怀疑，要求更换领导人的情绪越来越强烈，这些主观意愿极大地促成了“通道转兵”的顺利实现。

When the Central Red Army advanced toward Channel (Tongdao), Chiang Kai-shek, based on relevant intelligence, had already discerned the Central Red Army’s strategic intention to head north to western Hunan. He mobilized five to six times the Central Red Army’s strength, deploying a “large pocket” in Jingzhou, Huitong, Hongjiang, Suining, and other areas along the route to western Hunan, waiting for the Central Red Army to walk into it. Faced with such a perilous situation, on December 12, 1934, the Party Central held an emergency meeting within Channel County (present-day Tongdao Dong Autonomous County). At the meeting, leaders constrained by “Left” dogmatic thinking still insisted on continuing northward to join forces with the Second and Sixth Army Groups. In the end, the Central Military Commission heeded Mao Zedong’s suggestion, deciding to urgently adjust the direction of advance, evade the Kuomintang’s heavy encirclement, and achieve a major strategic shift, historically known as the “Channel Troop Redirection.”

中央红军挺进通道时，蒋介石根据相关情报已判明中央红军北上湘西的战略意图，调集五六倍于中央红军的兵力，在去往湘西途中的靖州、会同、洪江和绥宁等地布置了一个“大口袋”，等着中央红军去钻。面对如此险境，1934年12月12日，中央在通道县（今通道侗族自治县）境内召开紧急会议。会上，受“左”倾思想禁锢的领导者仍坚持继续北上，与红二、六军团会合。最后，中央军委听取了毛泽东的建议，决定紧急调整进军方向，避开国民党的重兵包围，实现了重大战略转移，史称“通道转兵”。

(II) The Contingency of the Two “Troop Redirections”—Chinese Realizing a Major Turn in “Favorable Geographical Position and Support of the People”

（二）两次“转兵”的偶然性——中国革命在“地利人和”中实现重大转折

1. The Advantage of “Favorable Geographical Position”

1.“地利”之便

After the Autumn Harvest Uprising forces led by Mao Zedong suffered defeat in the attack on Changsha, they moved from place to place. The reason they ultimately chose to settle in Jinggangshan was its advantage of “favorable geographical position.” Leading the Autumn Harvest Uprising forces south to southern Hunan, during the struggle along the Hunan-Jiangxi border, Mao Zedong gained a deeper understanding of the geographical conditions and economic situations of places he passed through, such as Lianhua, Yongxin, Ninggang, and Ling County. Through analysis and comparison, he felt that the middle section of the Luoxiao Mountain range, Jinggangshan, was the best place to establish a base area. It was far from the provincial capitals of Jiangxi and Hunan, had complex terrain and a strategically advantageous and defensible position, making it easy to defend and difficult to attack. It was a gray zone where Kuomintang rule was relatively weak, an excellent place for military separatist rule. The surrounding counties had a self-sufficient agricultural economy, large areas of forest, and were rich in rice, oil-tea camellia, tea, timber, bamboo, and various medicinal herbs, which could provide a good economic foundation for establishing a base area. As Mao Zedong later pointed out in *The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains*, the “existence and development of the armed independent regime of the workers and peasants” possessed “terrain favorable for operations.”

毛泽东领导的秋收起义部队在攻打长沙遭受失利后，一路辗转，最后之所以选择落脚井冈山，因为它有“地利”之便。毛泽东率秋收起义部队南下湘南，在湘赣边界开展斗争的途中，对途经的莲花、永新、宁冈、酃县等地的地理位置和经济状况等有了较深的了解，并通过分析、比较，觉得罗霄山脉中段的井冈山是建立根据地最好的地方。它离江西、湖南等省的省会都比较远，地形复杂且地势险要，易守难攻。它是国民党统治力量比较薄弱的灰色地带，是军事割据的好地方。周围各县有自给自足的农业经济，有大面积森林，盛产稻谷、油茶、茶叶、木材、楠竹和各种药材，可以为建立根据地提供良好的经济基础。正如后来毛泽东在《井冈山的斗争》中指出的，“工农武装割据的存在和发展”具备了“有便于作战的地势”。

After the Central Red Army forcibly crossed the Xiang River, on December 4, 1934, Commander-in-Chief Zhu De issued a telegram ordering a westward advance to Channel, requiring the Central Red Army to continue westward to the area south of Channel and to Boyangsuo and Changbao Fort. The telegram clearly indicated that the Central Red Army’s westward destination was Channel. However, after the Central Red Army entered Channel, the headquarters of Kuomintang “pursuit and suppression” force commander Liu Jianxu had already moved to Jing County to “supervise the suppression.” His subordinate, Chen Guangzhong’s Division, attacked the Yanmenpu area of Channel; Tao Guang’s Division approached the Jingwuzhou area of Channel; Zhang Liangji’s Division struck directly at Linkou and Xiaxiang areas; Wang Dongyuan’s and He Ping’s Divisions deployed to Jing County to provide support. Kuomintang Xue Yue’s subordinate divisions, Ou Zhen’s and Han Han’s, successively stationed in Hongjiang awaiting orders for “attack and suppression.” To the south, Guangxi forces under Liao Lei and Xia Wei had advanced to the Sanjiang and Linxi line; to the west, there were five regiments of Guizhou warlord Wang Jialie. The Central Red Army, numbering over 30,000, was tightly squeezed by several hundred thousand Kuomintang troops into a narrow area northwest of Channel. The road for the Central Red Army to head north to western Hunan and join the Second and Sixth Army Groups was completely blocked by heavy Kuomintang forces. Under these circumstances, realizing the original plan was impossible, and a troop redirection was imperative. At the same time, judging from the Kuomintang’s military strength and deployment, the enemy’s “strength” lay to the north of Channel; the enemy’s “weakness” lay in Guizhou, which had weak defensive forces, only Wang Jialie’s five regiments. Channel, located on the southwestern border of Hunan, at the junction of three provinces (Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou) and six counties, was truly a “channel.” Since ancient times, Channel has held an important strategic position. During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, it was the “remote service area of the southwestern corner of Lizhou”; when Qin Shi Huang conquered the Baiyue, he took the route through Channel, “one army blocked the Xiancheng Ridge,” bringing Lingnan into submission; Zhuge Liang’s southern campaign also passed through Channel, leaving behind a “Marquis Wu’s Campaign Drum”; Shi Dakai led 400,000 Taiping Army troops in their campaign to Guizhou, also passing from Guangxi through Channel. This was the “favorable geographical position” advantage of the “Channel Troop Redirection.”

中央红军强渡湘江以后，1934年12月4日，朱德总司令发出西进通道的电令，要求中央红军以继续西进至通道以南及播阳所、长安堡地域之目的。电报明确指示，中央红军西进目的地就是通道。但在中央红军进入通道后，国民党“追剿”军刘建绪指挥部已移营至靖县“督剿”，其部陈光中师进击通道岩门铺地域，陶广师逼近通道菁芜州地域，章亮基师直击临口、下乡地域，王东原、何平师则开赴靖县策应。国民党薛岳部欧震、韩汉英诸师相继进驻洪江待命“攻剿”。南面桂军廖、夏所部已进抵三江、林溪一线；西面，有贵州军阀王家烈的5个团。中央红军3万多人已被国民党几十万军队紧紧挤压在通道西北一段狭窄地域内，中央红军北上湘西与红二、六军团汇合的道路完全被国民党重兵封死。此种情形下，要想实现原定计划已无可能，转兵势在必行。同时，从国民党军的军事实力及部署来看，敌人的“实”在通道北面；敌人的“虚”，在防御力量薄弱的贵州，只有王家烈的5个团。而通道在湖南西南边陲，地处湘、桂、黔三省六县交界处，是名副其实的“通道”。自古以来，通道就具有重要的战略地位。在春秋战国时即为“莉州西南隅要服之地”；秦始皇南征百越取道通道，“一军塞镡成岭”，使岭南归服；诸葛亮南征亦经过通道，留下“武侯行军鼓”一面；石达开率40万太平军转战贵州，也是从广西经过通道。这是“通道转兵”的“地利”之便。

2. The Advantage of “Support of the People”

2.“人和”之利

In Lianhua County, Jiangxi, Mao Zedong learned from a secret letter delivered by Song Renqiong: “Ninggang County has our Party’s armed forces, with several dozen guns.” For the Autumn Harvest Uprising forces, who were desperately seeking a place to settle down, this was truly timely help. After Mao Zedong led his forces to capture Lianhua County town, he immediately convened a meeting of the Front Committee, deciding to “lead the troops to Jinggangshan” and advance toward Ninggang. On September 27, 1927, Mao Zedong led his forces out of Lianhua, officially marching toward Jinggangshan. At the same time, because there was also a local armed force under the control of the Chinese Communist Party in Jinggangshan, this laid an important foundation for Mao Zedong’s successful “leading the troops to Jinggangshan.” On October 6, 1927, Mao Zedong and Yuan Wencai met for the first time at Dacang in Ninggang. Yuan Wencai dispelled his doubts, immediately expressed his willingness to accept and support the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army settling in Jinggangshan, and donated 1,000 silver dollars to the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army. On October 7, 1927, Mao Zedong led over 700 members of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army into Maoping, officially settling in Jinggangshan. According to General Zhang Guohua’s recollection: “The Red Army led by Comrades Mao Zedong and Zhu De was able to gain a foothold in Jinggangshan. Apart from the role of Party organizations in the surrounding counties, it was inseparable from Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo accepting the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. If they had continued their bandit life, it would have been difficult for the Red Army to gain a foothold in Jinggangshan, because they both had a certain social foundation.”

在江西莲花县，毛泽东在宋任穷送来的一封密信中得知：“宁冈县有我们党的武装，有几十支枪”。这对正在苦寻落脚安家处的秋收起义部队来说，无疑是雪中送炭。毛泽东在率部攻克莲花县城后，立即主持召开前敌委员会会议，决定“引兵井冈”，向宁冈进发。1927年9月27日，毛泽东率部离开莲花，正式进军井冈山。同时，因为井冈山还有一支中国共产党掌握的地方武装，这为毛泽东成功“引兵井冈”奠定了重要基础。1927年10月6日，毛泽东和袁文才在宁冈大仓第一次见面，袁文才消除了疑虑，当即表示愿意接纳和支持工农革命军安家井冈山，并赠送工农革命军1000银元。1927年10月7日，毛泽东率工农革命军700余人进驻茅坪，正式安家井冈山。据张国华将军回忆：“毛泽东、朱德同志领导的红军，能够在井冈山站住脚，除附近各县党组织的作用外，与袁文才、王佐接受共产党的领导分不开，如果他们继续其绿林生活，红军要在那井冈山站住脚是困难的，因为他们都有一定的社会基础”。

Before the Central Red Army’s Long March, due to secrecy reasons, the issue of the troops’ transfer was only known to a few senior leaders. The broad masses of Red Army soldiers, having not received extensive and in-depth ideological mobilization, lacked sufficient ideological understanding and preparation. Consequently, the troops were unstable, and there was some ideological confusion. From the failure of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement and Suppression Campaign [1]1 The “Channel” (通道) refers to the area around Tongdao County in present-day Hunan Province, where the emergency meeting of the Party Central Committee was held on December 12, 1934., to the forced Long March, and especially the heavy losses in the Xiang River Campaign, from Lin Biao, Commander of the First Red Army Corps, and Nie Rongzhen, its Political Commissar, to Peng Dehuai, Commander of the Third Red Army Corps, and even Red Army Commander-in-Chief Zhu De and Zhou Enlai, all harbored doubts about the erroneous military command and line of Bo Gu and Li De. Zhou Enlai clearly stated: “From the border area of Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou, Chairman Mao, Wang Jiaxiang, and Luo Fu [2]2 Luo Fu is the pseudonym of Zhang Wentian, a senior leader of the Chinese Communist Party who later served as General Secretary. criticized the military line, arguing and debating all the way. From Laoshanjie to Liping, the debate was especially intense at Liping. At this time, Li De advocated turning into eastern Guizhou, which was also very erroneous and would have fallen into Chiang Kai-shek’s trap. Chairman Mao advocated establishing a Sichuan-Guizhou border base area. I decided to adopt Chairman Mao’s opinion, following the original route of the Second Front Army westward to cross the Wu River and head north. Li De was furious after losing the argument. After this, my relationship with Li De gradually became estranged.” At the same time, the broad masses of Red Army soldiers began to doubt the established policy of going to western Hunan to join the Second and Sixth Army Groups. Especially when the Central Red Army was about to reach Channel, facing a several-fold superior enemy force, Bo Gu and Li De still insisted on having the exhausted 30,000-strong army head north to western Hunan to join the Second and Sixth Army Groups. This disregard for reality caused the broad masses of Red Army soldiers to lose confidence in the command of Bo Gu and Li De. Faced with bitter defeat and a bleak future, the sentiment among the Party and Red Army soldiers demanding a change in leadership grew increasingly strong. They once again focused their attention on Mao Zedong, who had previously led them to successfully establish the Jinggangshan base area and win many battles. Zhou Enlai, Wang Jiaxiang, Zhang Wentian, and the broad masses of Red Army commanders all fervently hoped that Mao Zedong could once again command the Red Army and save the Party and the Red Army. Furthermore, before the Central Red Army reached Channel, two other Red Army units had already passed through, their red flags fluttering over Channel. In the four years from December 1930 to December 1934, the Seventh Red Army led by Deng Xiaoping and Zhang Yunyi, and the Sixth Red Army Corps led by Ren Bishi, Xiao Ke, and Wang Zhen, successively passed through Channel, sowing revolutionary seeds and strengthening the revolutionary ranks there. These were all the “support of the people” advantages of the “Channel Troop Redirection.”

在中央红军长征之前，因保密原因，对部队的转移问题，只限于上层少数领导了解，广大红军将士因没有得到广泛深入的思想动员，思想上还没有充分的认识和准备，因而部队人心不稳，思想有所混乱。从第五次反“围剿”失败，到被迫长征，特别是湘江战役遭受重大损失，从红一军团军团长林彪、政委聂荣臻，到红三军团军团长彭德怀，乃至红军总司令朱德及周恩来等，都对博古和李德的错误军事指挥及路线产生怀疑。周恩来明确讲道：“从湘桂黔交界处，毛主席、王稼祥、洛甫即批评军事路线，一路开会争论。从老山界到黎平，在黎平争论尤为激烈。这时李德主张折入黔东，这也是非常错误的，是要陷入蒋介石的罗网。毛主席主张到川黔边建立川黔根据地。我决定采取毛主席的意见，循二方面军原路西进渡乌江北上。李德因争论失败大怒。此后我与李德的关系也逐渐疏远。”同时，广大红军将士对到湘西与红二、六军团会合的既定方针产生怀疑，特别是当中央红军快行进至通道时，面对数倍于己的重兵，博古、李德依然坚持让3万疲惫之师北上湘西，与红二、六军团会合。此种不顾实际的做法，使广大红军将士对博古和李德的指挥失去信心。面对惨痛失败和渺茫前程，党和红军将士要求改变领导人的情绪愈发强烈，再次把目光聚焦到曾率领他们胜利开创井冈山根据地和打过许多胜仗的毛泽东身上。周恩来、王稼祥、张闻天及广大红军将领，都热切希望毛泽东能够重新指挥红军，挽救党和红军。此外，在中央红军到达通道之前，已有两支红军经过，红旗漫卷通道。1930年12月到1934年12月4年，先后有邓小平、张云逸率领的红七军，以及任弼时、萧克、王震率领的红六军团经过通道，并在这里播撒革命火种，壮大革命队伍。这些都是“通道转兵”的“人和”之利。

II. The Main Leader of the Two “Troop Redirections”—Mao Zedong Turning the Tide at Critical Moments of the Revolution

二、两次“转兵”的主要领导者——毛泽东在革命危急关头力挽狂澜

Among myriad towering mountains, there must be a main peak; a boat weighing a thousand jun [3]3 A jun is an ancient Chinese unit of weight, equivalent to 30 jin (approximately 15 kilograms). The phrase “a boat weighing a thousand jun” is a classical Chinese idiom meaning a heavy or crucial responsibility. requires a single helmsman. Great historical events are inseparable from the full exertion of the historical initiative of important historical figures and authoritative figures. The two important “troop redirections,” “leading the troops to Jinggangshan” and the “Channel Troop Redirection,” are both inseparable from Mao Zedong’s strategic wisdom. At critical moments of crisis, the revolution turned from a dead end to a bright future.

万山磅礴，必有主峰；船重千钧，掌舵一人。伟大历史事件，必定与重要历史人物、权威人物充分发挥的历史主动精神分不开。“引兵井冈”和“通道转兵”这两次重要“转兵”，都离不开毛泽东的战略智慧，革命在危急关头由柳暗转向花明。

(I) Judging the Situation and “Leading the Troops to Jinggangshan,” Igniting the Spark of the Chinese Revolution

（一）审时度势“引兵井冈”，点燃中国革命的星星之火

1. The “Wenjiashi Troop Redirection,” the Key Step in “Leading the Troops to Jinggangshan”

1.“文家市转兵”，“引兵井冈”的关键一步

After suffering setbacks in the Autumn Harvest Uprising’s attack on Changsha, Mao Zedong, based on the grim situation at the time of the enemy being strong and our forces weak, decisively changed the original plan and decided to temporarily withdraw the remaining forces of the uprising to Wenjiashi in Liuyang. Subsequently, Mao Zedong convened a meeting of the former committee in Wenjiashi to discuss the direction of the subsequent actions of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army. Division Commander Yu Sadu insisted that without attacking Changsha, the revolution would have no way out, and that the original plan to “take Liuyang and directly attack Changsha” must be followed. Mao Zedong firmly opposed another attack on Changsha to avoid further heavy losses, and strongly advocated moving the remaining forces to mountainous areas and rural regions where enemy forces were weaker to build up strength. He persuaded the troops, saying: “Everyone very much wants to enter Changsha. But for now, places like Changsha are not where we should be. We need to find a place where the enemy’s strength is weak, gain a firm foothold, conserve our strength, and carry on the fight against the enemy…” However, some people firmly opposed Mao Zedong’s proposal, insisting that going to the mountains to make revolution was essentially becoming “mountain kings.” Mao Zedong patiently educated and persuaded everyone, pointing out: “This mountain king of ours is a special mountain king, a mountain king led by the Communist Party, with principles, policies, and methods, a worker-peasant armed force representing the interests of the people.” With the boldness of a proletarian revolutionary, Mao Zedong overruled dissenting opinions and made the major decision to shift from attacking big cities to marching into the countryside, taking the crucial first step from Wenjiashi in “leading the troops to Jinggangshan” [11]11 Jinggangshan: A mountain range on the border of Jiangxi and Hunan provinces, where Mao Zedong established the first rural revolutionary base area in 1927. toward the success of the Chinese revolution.

毛泽东在率领秋收起义部队进攻长沙受挫后，依据当时敌强我弱的严峻形势，果断改变原计划，决定把起义军余部暂撤到浏阳文家市。之后，毛泽东在文家市主持召开前委会会议，讨论工农革命军后续行动方向问题。师长余洒度却坚持认为，不打长沙，革命就没有出路，必须按原计划“取浏阳直攻长沙”。毛泽东坚决反对再次攻打长沙，以免再次遭受巨大损失，极力主张将余部转至敌人力量较弱的山区及农村积蓄力量。他劝导部队说：“大家都很想进长沙。只是目前长沙那样的城市，还不是我们蹲的地方。我们要找个敌人力量薄弱的地方，站住脚跟，养精蓄锐，和敌人干下去……”但有一些人坚决反对毛泽东的主张，他们坚持认为，到山上搞革命，实际上就是去“做山大王”。毛泽东又耐心地教育说服大家，并指出：“我们这个山大王，是特殊的山大王，是共产党领导的、有主义、有政策、有办法的山大王，是代表人民利益的工农武装。”毛泽东以无产阶级革命家的胆略，力排众议，作出从进攻大城市转向进军农村的重大决定，为部队从文家市“引兵井冈”迈出了中国革命走向成功的至关重要的第一步。

At the same time, to smoothly achieve the “Wenjiashi turnaround” and lead the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army into the countryside to establish base areas, Mao Zedong also gave a mobilization speech to the uprising officers and soldiers to strengthen the troops’ faith and will to march into the countryside. Mao Zedong said: “Victory and defeat are common in military affairs; don’t be complacent after a victory, and don’t lose heart after a defeat.” “We are like a small stone, and Chiang Kai-shek is like a big water vat. The small stone will smash that big water vat; there will always be a day for us to turn things around.”

同时，为顺利实现“文家市转兵”，率工农革命军到农村开辟根据地，毛泽东还对起义官兵作动员讲话，以坚定部队向农村进军的信念和意志。毛泽东说：“胜败是兵家常事，打了胜仗别大意，打了败仗也别泄气。”“我们好比一块小石头，蒋介石好比一个大水缸，小石头要打烂那个大水缸，将来总有翻身之日。”

2. The “Sanwan Reorganization” [12]12 Sanwan Reorganization: A military reorganization carried out by Mao Zedong in Sanwan Village, Jiangxi, in September 1927, which established Party leadership over the army at the company level., Laying the Foundation for a New Type of People’s Army

2.“三湾改编”，为新型人民军队奠基

When Mao Zedong led the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops from Wenjiashi and arrived at Sanwan Village in Yongxin County, Jiangxi, the troops numbered fewer than a thousand and morale was extremely low. At that time, betraying the revolution and deserting had become an open secret within the troops. Some opportunists were even asking each other, “Are you leaving?” “Where are you going?” Facing serious problems such as severe troop attrition, sharply reduced combat effectiveness, more officers than soldiers, and more guns than people, Mao Zedong deeply realized that if the troops were not reorganized in time, even if they did not degenerate into roving bandits, they would be unable to shoulder the historical mission of the Chinese revolution. On the evening of September 29, 1927, Mao Zedong convened a meeting of the former enemy committee in Sanwan Village and made the major decision to reorganize the troops. First, the troops were downsized, with the original First Army, First Division of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army being reduced to one regiment. Second, Party branches were established at the company level, a political commissar system was set up, and the principle of “the Party commands the gun” was established. Third, soldier committees were formed, allowing soldiers to directly participate in the democratic management of the army and establishing a new type of relationship between officers and soldiers. After the “Sanwan Reorganization,” the troops took on an entirely new look. The soldiers truly understood for whom they carried guns and for whom they fought, strengthening their confidence and determination to march into Jinggangshan. In 1957, Marshal Luo Ronghuan wrote in “The Autumn Harvest Uprising and the Early Days of Our Army’s Founding”: “The Sanwan Reorganization was in fact the rebirth of our army. It was from this point that the Party’s leadership over the army was established. At that time, if Comrade Mao Zedong had not wisely solved this fundamental problem, then this army would not have had a political soul, would not have had a clear program of action, and the habits of the old-style army and the free and undisciplined style of the peasants could not have been reformed. As a result, even if it had not been wiped out by the powerful enemy, it would have degenerated into roving bandits.” After the “Sanwan Reorganization,” the troops happened to encounter seasonal infectious diseases, and life in the army was also very hard, but the officers and soldiers did not complain or grumble. Although a very small number of people later left the Party or betrayed the revolution, this army not only did not collapse but gradually developed and grew stronger, establishing the Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area and igniting the spark that would eventually set the Chinese revolution ablaze.

当毛泽东率秋收起义部队从文家市出发，到达江西永新县三湾村时，部队已不足千人且士气十分低落。那时，背叛革命、逃跑已成为部队公开的秘密。一些投机分子竟然互相询问，“你走不走”“你要往哪去”。面对部队减员严重、战斗力锐减，官多兵少、枪多人少等严重问题，毛泽东深刻意识到若不及时改编部队，这支部队即便不沦为流寇，亦无法担负中国革命之历史重任。1927年9月29日晚，毛泽东在三湾村主持召开前敌委员会会议，并作出改编部队的重大决定。一是部队缩编，把原工农革命军第一军第一师缩编为一个团；二是将党支部建在连上，设立党代表制度，确立“党指挥枪”原则；三是成立士兵委员会，让士兵直接参与军队民主管理，建立新型官兵关系。经过“三湾改编”，部队面貌焕然一新，战士们从此真正明白了为谁扛枪、为谁打仗的问题，坚定了进军井冈山的信心和决心。1957年，罗荣桓元帅在《秋收起义与我军初创时期》中写道：“三湾改编，实际上是我军的新生，正是从这时开始，确立了党对军队的领导。当时，如果不是毛泽东同志英明地解决了这个根本性的问题，那么，这支部队就不会有政治灵魂，不会有明确的行动纲领，旧式军队的习气，农民的自由散漫作风，都不可能得到改造，其结果即使不被强大的敌人消灭，也只能变成流寇。”“三湾改编”后，恰好遇到季节性传染病，同时部队生活也十分艰苦，但将士们没有叫苦，也没有发牢骚。尽管有极少数人先后脱党和叛变革命，但这支部队不仅没有垮，反而逐渐发展和壮大了，建立了井冈山革命根据地，点燃了中国革命走向胜利的星星之火。

(II) Arguing on Principle to Facilitate the “Channel Turnaround” [13]13 Channel Turnaround: The decision made at the Channel Conference in December 1934 to change the Red Army’s route from heading to western Hunan to entering Guizhou, avoiding a potential trap., Opening a New Path for the Party and the Red Army

（二）据理力争促成“通道转兵”，为党和红军另辟生路

1. Doing Ideological Work for the “Turnaround” During the Long March

1. 长征途中做“转兵”思想工作

After the Long March began, Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang often discussed major matters concerning the Party and the Red Army together on stretchers, turning the stretchers into a political stage for discussing the fate of the Party and the Red Army. The discussions focused on the main reasons for the failure of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign [14]14 Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign: The CCP’s military campaign from 1933 to 1934 against the Kuomintang’s fifth encirclement, which ended in failure due to erroneous military command, leading to the start of the Long March.. Zhang Wentian talked about his various disputes with Bo Gu and his dissatisfaction with the erroneous command of Li De and Bo Gu. Mao Zedong compared the process of the failure of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign with the victories of the previous counter-encirclement campaigns, analyzing in detail the errors of Li De and Bo Gu’s purely defensive military command and their negation of mobile warfare. Before crossing the Xiang River, Mao Zedong also suggested to the Central Committee that they should not force a crossing of the Xiang River but should instead go to southern Hunan, which was not the defensive focus of the Kuomintang army, had relatively fewer deployed troops, and had not yet had time to build fortifications. Moreover, our Communist Party had greater influence among the masses there, with a good mass base, which would facilitate the Red Army’s flexible and mobile operations. At the same time, taking advantage of the fact that various Kuomintang units were still on the move and the two central army groups had not yet fully converged, the Red Army could concentrate superior forces to seek an opportunity to annihilate a part of the Kuomintang army, thereby turning the tide of battle and shifting from passivity to initiative. However, Bo Gu and Li De rejected Mao Zedong’s suggestion, still insisting on forcing a crossing of the Xiang River and, following the instructions of the Communist International, joining forces with the Second and Sixth Army Corps in western Hunan. This resulted in the Central Red Army suffering severe losses in the Xiang River Campaign [15]15 Xiang River Campaign: A major battle during the Long March in November-December 1934, where the Red Army suffered heavy casualties while crossing the Xiang River..

长征开始后，毛泽东、张闻天和王稼祥三人经常在担架上一起讨论党和红军的大事，把担架变成讨论党和红军命运的政治舞台，讨论话题聚焦第五次反“围剿”失败的主要原因。张闻天谈自己同博古的各种争论，以及对李德、博古错误指挥的不满。毛泽东则将第五次反“围剿”的失败过程同前几次反“围剿”的胜利加以比较，详细分析李德、博古军事指挥上的单纯防御，否定运动战等错误。在过湘江之前，毛泽东还向中央建议，不要强渡湘江，而是要到湘南去，那里不是国民党军的防守重点，部署的兵力相对较少，也还没有来得及构筑堡垒。而我们共产党在群众中的影响力较大，群众基础好，便于我们红军机动灵活地作战。同时可乘国民党各路部队正在调动、中央军两部还没有完全靠拢之时，红军可集中优势兵力伺机寻歼国民党军一部，以扭转战局，化被动为主动。但博古、李德拒绝了毛泽东的建议，仍然坚持强渡湘江，按共产国际的指示到湘西与红二、六军团会合，结果导致中央红军在湘江战役中遭受严重损失。

To change this predicament, Mao Zedong continuously did ideological work among central leaders and Red Army commanders during the Long March. According to Wu Xiuquan’s memoirs: “Comrade Mao Zedong used every possible opportunity to conduct persuasion and education work among relevant cadres and Red Army commanders and fighters, using facts to awaken the comrades’ consciousness and enable everyone to distinguish what was correct from what was wrong.” Mao Zedong first worked on Wang Jiaxiang and Zhang Wentian, and later on Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and other Red Army commanders. Through in-depth analysis and conversation along the way, Zhang Wentian’s thoughts and views gradually aligned with Mao Zedong’s, and he deeply realized that the failure of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign was mainly due to strategic and tactical errors in military leadership. However, these discussions and persuasion efforts provoked dissatisfaction from Li De, but Mao Zedong, disregarding personal得失, still prioritized the overall situation and sought a way out for the Red Army. As early as at Laoshanjie [16]16 Laoshanjie: A mountain pass in Guangxi, where the Red Army camped during the Long March and where internal criticism of military leadership intensified., Zhang Wentian, together with Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang, openly criticized within the Central Political Bureau that the major failures since the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign were mainly caused by strategic and tactical errors in military leadership.

为改变这种困局，毛泽东在长征途中一直在做中央领导人和红军将领的思想工作。据伍修权回忆：“毛泽东同志利用一切尽可能的机会，向有关干部和红军指战员进行说服教育工作，用事实启发同志们的觉悟，使大家分清楚什么是正确的，什么是错误的。”毛泽东首先是做王稼祥和张闻天的工作，后来又做周恩来、朱德及其他红军将领的工作。经过一路深入分析交谈，张闻天的思想和观点同毛泽东逐步统一，并深刻认识到第五次反“围剿”失败的原因，主要是军事领导上的战略战术错误。但这些讨论和劝说工作，引发了李德的不满，而毛泽东不计较个人得失，仍以大局为重，努力寻求红军的出路。还在老山界时，张闻天就同毛泽东、王稼祥一起，在中央政治局内公开批评指出第五次反“围剿”以来的重大失败，主要是军事领导上的战略战术错误造成的。

2. Arguing on Principle at the Channel Conference

2. 通道会议据理力争

In less than two months, the Central Red Army was reduced from 86,000 men at the start of the Long March to just over 30,000 after the bloody Battle of the Xiang River. Where was the Red Army’s way out? Where was the way out for the Chinese revolution? These major questions, bearing on the fate of the Party and the Red Army, weighed on the minds of every Red Army officer and soldier. At this critical moment of life and death, Mao Zedong, who had already been “pushed aside,” did not stand by as a mere onlooker despite being sidelined. Instead, he exerted a historical initiative, threw himself into the situation, and worked hard to think through and explore a way out for the Red Army. “At that time, Comrade Mao Zedong, though in an adverse situation, was still constantly concerned about the safety of the Party Central Committee and the Red Army.” On the long march, Mao “‘stayed for a while in one army corps, and for a while in another,’ continuously discussing the current military line and the direction of advance with everyone, thereby gradually forming the correct opinion of changing course to Guizhou.” At the same time, based on intercepted Nationalist military telegrams and the balance of military forces between the enemy and ourselves, Mao strongly advised that the Central Committee should promptly abandon the original plan and not go north to join forces with the Second and Sixth Red Army Corps. However, the military commanders who adhered to the “Left” deviationist thinking, such as Bo Gu and Li De, stubbornly insisted on proceeding north according to the original plan, completely disregarding the safety of the Red Army. Thanks to the active efforts of Mao and others, on December 12, 1934, the Central Committee hastily convened an emergency meeting in the Channel area [1]1 The “Channel” (通道) refers to the area around Tongdao County in present-day Hunan Province, where the emergency meeting of the Party Central Committee was held on December 12, 1934., primarily to discuss the direction of the Red Army’s next strategic shift. At the meeting, Li De naively insisted: “Should we let the enemy troops pursuing us on parallel lines or rushing to strategic points in the west overtake us, while we ourselves turn north behind their backs to establish contact with the Second Army Corps? Relying on the base area of the Second Army Corps, plus the troops of He Long and Xiao Ke, we can attack the enemy in a broad area and create a large Soviet area in the triangular border zone of Hunan, Guizhou, and Sichuan.” Mao Zedong resolutely opposed this and argued forcefully that advancing west into Guizhou would, first, avoid engaging superior enemy forces. Pitting an exhausted force of 30,000 against an enemy five or six times its size, well-prepared and well-equipped, would be extremely unfavorable for the Red Army. Second, it would allow them to avoid the strong and strike at the weak to seize the initiative. In terms of the balance of forces among the various Nationalist armies, the Guizhou Army had poor weapons, lax discipline, and the weakest combat effectiveness; moreover, the Guizhou Army was riven by complex factional struggles, and the Red Army could exploit these contradictions to defeat them one by one and seize the initiative. Third, it would disrupt the Nationalist plan to encircle and annihilate the Red Army, and would enable the Central Red Army, the Fourth Front Red Army, and the Second and Sixth Red Army Corps to form a tripod configuration, favorable for future strategic development. Mao’s position won the approval and support of the majority of comrades, including Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang. In the end, the meeting agreed to and adopted Mao’s correct proposal, voluntarily abandoned the original plan to go north, and decided to reorient the troops and advance west into Guizhou. At 7:30 p.m. on December 12, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued an “extremely urgent” telegram to the commanders of all army corps and columns ordering the advance west into Guizhou. On December 13, the Central Red Army split into two routes in the Channel area and turned west, evading the heavy encirclement of Nationalist forces and avoiding the mortal danger that would have awaited them had they gone north to western Hunan, thereby opening a new path to survival for the Party and the Red Army. Liu Bocheng later wrote in “Recalling the Long March”: “It was at this critical juncture that Chairman Mao saved the Red Army. … At that time, if Chairman Mao had not resolutely advocated changing the policy, the only future for the remaining 30,000 Red Army soldiers would have been destruction.”

中央红军在不到两个月的时间里，由长征出发时的8.6万人，经过血战湘江锐减至3万余人。红军的出路在哪里？中国革命的出路在哪里？这些关乎党和红军命运的重大问题，都时刻牵动着每一位红军将士的心。在这生死存亡关头，当时已“靠边站”的毛泽东并没有因为被排挤而坐视不管成为看客，而是发挥历史主动精神，把自己摆进去，努力思考和探索红军的出路。“那时毛泽东同志虽身处逆境，但仍时刻关注着党中央和红军的安全。”毛泽东在漫漫行军途中，“‘一会儿呆在这个军团，一会儿呆在那个军团’，不断和大家商讨当时的军事路线和进军的方向问题，从而逐渐形成了改道贵州的正确意见。”同时，毛泽东又根据截获的国民党军的军事电报，以及敌我双方的军事力量对比，极力建议中央应及时放弃原计划，不能北上与红二、六军团会合。但博古、李德等“左”倾思想的军事指挥领导者，竟丝毫不顾红军安危，固执坚持按原计划北上。在毛泽东等的积极努力下，1934年12月12日，中央在通道境内临时决定召开紧急会议，主要讨论下一步红军战略转移的前进方向问题。会上，李德天真地坚持认为：“是否让那些在平行线上追击我们的或向西面战略要地急赶的敌军超过我们，我们自己在他们背后转向北方，与二军团建立联系，我们依靠二军团的根据地，再加上贺龙和萧克的部队，就可以在广阔的区域向敌人进攻，并在湘黔川三省交界的三角地带创建一大片苏区。”对此，毛泽东予以坚决反对，据理力争，认为西进贵州，一是可避免同优势敌军交战。以3万疲惫之师与五六倍于己的，且准备充足、装备优良的敌军决战，于红军十分不利。二是可避强击弱以争取主动。从各路国民党军的力量对比来看，黔军武器较差且部队纪律涣散，战斗力最弱；同时，黔军内部派系斗争复杂，红军可用其矛盾实现各个击破，争取主动。三是可趁此打乱国民党军围歼红军的计划，而且可使中央红军与红四方面军，以及红二、六军团形成鼎足之势，有利于以后的战略发展。毛泽东的主张，得到周恩来、张闻天、王稼祥等多数同志的赞成和支持。最后，会议同意并采纳毛泽东的正确主张，主动放弃原定北上计划，决定转兵，西进贵州。12月12日晚七点半，中革军委向各军团、纵队首长发出西进贵州的“万万火急”电令。12月13日，中央红军在通道境内分两路转兵西进，避开国民党军重兵包围圈，避免了北上湘西可能遭受的灭顶之灾，为党和红军另辟生路。刘伯承后来在《回顾长征》中这样写道：“正是在这危急关头，毛主席挽救了红军。……当时，如果不是毛主席坚决主张改变方针，所剩三万多红军的前途只有毁灭。”

III. The Contemporary Enlightenment of the Two “Troop Reorientations”

三、两次“转兵”的时代启示

General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out: “History is the best textbook. For us Communists, the history of the Chinese revolution is the best nutrient.” Mao Zedong’s shift of the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops “from attacking big cities to marching into the countryside was a decisive new starting point for the Chinese revolution.” Mao Zedong’s strenuous efforts to bring about the Channel Troop Reorientation took the correct first step in changing the Red Army’s strategic direction of advance, enabling the Red Army to move from defeat to victory. Reviewing, analyzing, and summarizing these great histories of the Party still provides important enlightenment for our work today.

习近平总书记指出：“历史是最好的教科书。对我们共产党人来说，中国革命历史是最好的营养剂。”毛泽东率秋收起义部队“从进攻大城市转为向农村进军，是中国革命具有决定意义的新起点。”毛泽东极力促成通道转兵，为改变红军进军战略方向迈出了正确的第一步，使红军从失败走向胜利。回顾分析总结党的这些伟大历史，对我们做好当下的工作仍有重要启示。

(I) We Must Always Adhere to Seeking Truth from Facts

（一）必须始终坚持实事求是

General Secretary Xi Jinping has profoundly pointed out: “Seeking truth from facts is the fundamental viewpoint of Marxism, the fundamental requirement for Chinese Communists to understand and transform the world, and the basic method of our Party’s thinking, work, and leadership. No matter in the past, present, or future, we must always proceed from reality in everything, integrate theory with practice, and test and develop truth in practice.” The setbacks suffered by the troops during the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the early stages of the Long March were mainly because our Party was influenced by “Left” deviationist thinking at the time and did not deal with or solve the practical problems of the Chinese revolution in a manner of seeking truth from facts.

习近平总书记深刻指出：“实事求是，是马克思主义的根本观点，是中国共产党人认识世界、改造世界的根本要求，是我们党的基本思想方法、工作方法、领导方法。不论过去、现在和将来，我们都要坚持一切从实际出发，理论联系实际，在实践中检验真理和发展真理。”秋收起义和长征初期，部队遭受失利，主要因为当时我们党内一直受“左”倾思想的影响，没有实事求是地对待和处理中国革命的实际问题。

After the failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops’ attack on Changsha, Mao Zedong, based on the actual situation of the enemy and ourselves at the time, voluntarily abandoned the original plan to attack Changsha, reoriented the troops to Wenjiashi, and finally “led the troops to Jinggangshan,” establishing a rural revolutionary base area and creating a revolutionary path with Chinese characteristics—the Jinggangshan path. During the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign and the early stages of the Long March, the Central Red Army was passive and beaten everywhere, suffering heavy losses; but after the Channel Troop Reorientation, and especially after the Zunyi Conference, it was reborn and continuously moved from victory to greater victory. The main reason for this major change was that our Party adhered to proceeding from reality and adopted strategic policies proven effective in practice.

毛泽东在领导秋收起义部队进攻长沙失利后，根据当时敌我实际情况，主动放弃攻打长沙的原定计划，转兵文家市，最后“引兵井冈”，建立农村革命根据地，开创了中国特色的革命道路——井冈山道路。中央红军在第五次反“围剿”和长征初期处处被动、处处挨打，以致遭受重大损失；但在“通道转兵”特别是遵义会议后重获新生，不断从胜利走向更大胜利。这一重大变化的主要原因，就在于我们党坚持从实际出发，采取被实践证明行之有效的战略策略。

Throughout its glorious journey of more than one hundred years, the Party has always adhered to proceeding from China’s basic national conditions, exploring and forming, and continuously perfecting, a distinctive development path suited to China’s conditions. Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, under the strong leadership of the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, the entire Party and the people of all ethnic groups in the country have forged ahead with determination, comprehensively advancing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation through Chinese-path modernization. Chinese-path modernization is a broad road that adheres to seeking truth from facts, is firmly planted in the vast land of China, and conforms to China’s specific national conditions.

党的百余年辉煌征程，始终坚持从我国基本国情出发，探索形成并不断完善适合中国国情的特色发展道路。党的十八大以来，在以习近平同志为核心的党中央坚强领导下，全党全国各族人民砥砺奋进，以中国式现代化全面推进中华民族伟大复兴。中国式现代化，是坚持实事求是，脚踏广袤的中华大地，符合中国具体国情的康庄大道。

(II) We Must Adhere to the Integration of Theory and Practice

（二）必须坚持理论与实践相结合

Theory is the guide to action; without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary action. At the same time, “practice divorced from theory is blind practice; theory divorced from practice is empty theory.” Marxism is the fundamental guiding ideology of our Party, and Marxist theory is the guide to action for our Party in all historical periods—revolution, construction, and reform. It is not a dogma; it must keep pace with the times, be continuously enriched and perfected as practice develops, must be Sinicized to take root and sprout, must be localized to enter the homes of ordinary people and win their hearts, and must be adapted to the needs of the times to grasp the pulse of the era. Over more than one hundred years, the most crucial reason why the Party has smoothly accomplished the glorious and arduous historical tasks that other political forces could not and would not have accomplished is that it has always adhered to integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with China’s specific realities and with the fine traditional Chinese culture, and has continuously advanced the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times. Mao Zedong’s “leading the troops to Jinggangshan,” and from there beginning to establish rural revolutionary base areas; and his facilitation of the Central Committee’s emergency meeting in the Channel and the realization of the great troop reorientation—these represent the new path of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times, pioneered by the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, who resolutely broke free from the shackles of “book worship” and insisted on integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, forged in the lessons of blood and fire.

理论是行动的先导，没有革命的理论就没有革命的行动。同时，“离开理论的实践，是盲目的实践；离开实践的理论，是空洞的理论。”马克思主义是我们党的根本指导思想，马克思主义理论是我们革命、建设、改革各个历史时期的行动指南，而不是教条，必须与时俱进，随着实践发展而不断丰富完善，必须中国化才能生根发芽，必须本土化才能深入寻常百姓家赢得民心，必须时代化才能把握时代脉搏。一百多年来，党之所以顺利完成了其他各种政治力量难以完成也不可能完成的光荣而艰巨的历史重任，最关键的原因就在于，始终坚持把马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际相结合、同中华优秀传统文化相结合，并不断推进马克思主义中国化时代化。毛泽东“引兵井冈”，并由此开始建立农村革命根据地；在通道促成中央召开紧急会议，并实现伟大转兵，这是以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人坚决克服“本本主义”禁锢，坚持把马克思主义基本原理同中国革命具体实践相结合，在血与火的教训中开创的马克思主义中国化时代化的新路。

(III) There Must Be a Strong Leading Core

（三）必须有坚强的领导核心

For a country or a political party, the leading core is of paramount importance. Only when the Party Central Committee has a core and the entire Party has a core can the Party have strength. Engels pointed out: “Nothing can better illustrate the need for authority, and for the most dictatorial kind of authority, than a ship on the high seas. There, in moments of danger, the lives of all depend on the immediate and absolute obedience of everyone to the will of one person.” The stars shine brightly, and the Big Dipper guides the course. In the great strategic shifts such as “leading the troops to Jinggangshan” and the “Channel Troop Reorientation,” Mao Zedong historically became the lighthouse for the great ship sailing through stormy seas, playing a role as steady as a rock.

一个国家、一个政党，领导核心至关重要。党中央有核心、全党有核心，党才有力量。恩格斯指出：“能最清楚地说明需要权威，而且是需要专断的权威的，要算是在汪洋大海上航行的船了。那里，在危急关头，大家的生命能否得救，就要看所有的人能否立即绝对服从一个人的意志。”星汉灿烂，北斗指航。在“引兵井冈”和“通道转兵”等这些伟大战略转变过程中，毛泽东历史性地成为在惊涛骇浪中航行的巨轮的灯塔，发挥了定海神针般的作用。

After leading the Autumn Harvest Uprising, Mao Zedong, based on the actual revolutionary situation, promptly “led the troops to Jinggangshan” [17]17 “Leading the troops to Jinggangshan” (引兵井冈) refers to Mao Zedong’s decision in September 1927, after the failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprising, to abandon the plan to attack Changsha and instead lead the remaining troops to the Jinggangshan mountain range on the border of Jiangxi and Hunan provinces, establishing the Party’s first rural revolutionary base area. to preserve revolutionary forces, turning his attention to the vast rural areas where the Kuomintang’s ruling power was relatively weak, actively mobilizing and organizing peasants, extensively establishing base areas, and launching a vigorous land revolution. The great practical struggle initiated by Mao Zedong, along with his entirely new theoretical creations, caused many revolutionaries, whether abroad in foreign lands or struggling domestically, to focus their attention on the revolutionary struggle and practice he led. At that time, although Liu Bocheng was far away studying in Moscow, he constantly paid close attention to the domestic revolutionary situation. After reading Mao Zedong’s articles “Why Can China’s Red Political Power Exist?” and “The Struggle in Jinggangshan,” he was greatly encouraged and said with infinite emotion to his classmate Qu Wu: “The article ‘Why Can China’s Red Political Power Exist?’ has opened my horizons and strengthened my confidence. It seems that the future of the Chinese revolution is bright. And from the article ‘The Struggle in Jinggangshan,’ it can be seen that the domestic struggle is still very difficult. I really want to return to China now, go to Jinggangshan, and fight together with Mao Zedong and Zhu De!” After leading the Southern Hunan Uprising, Zhu De resolutely declared that he wanted to “go find Mao Zedong!” After leading the Pingjiang Uprising, Peng Dehuai also unswervingly led his troops to advance towards Jinggangshan, like a torrent merging into the sea. For a time, armed uprisings and revolutionary struggles in other places set off a wave of learning from, drawing on, and exploring Mao Zedong’s revolutionary method. Mao Zedong became the lighthouse at the tip of the mast of China’s giant revolutionary ship, illuminating the direction of the Chinese revolution. During the “Channel Transfer” [18]18 The “Channel Transfer” (通道转兵) refers to the decision made at the emergency Channel Conference held in Hunan province in December 1934 during the Long March. Overruling the original plan to join with other Red Army forces in northern Hunan, the conference decided to turn the Central Red Army westward into Guizhou, a move that avoided a potential trap set by the Kuomintang and marked the beginning of Mao Zedong’s return to military leadership., it was only under Mao Zedong’s vigorous persuasion and fierce argument that the Central Committee finally agreed to convene an emergency meeting to discuss the major issue of the Red Army’s direction of advance. At the meeting, central leaders began to resist the erroneous command of Bo Gu and Li De [19]19 Bo Gu (1907-1946) was a leading member of the Chinese Communist Party and a key political leader during the early phase of the Long March. Li De (1900-1974), born Otto Braun, was a German Communist and Comintern agent who served as the military advisor to the Chinese Communist Party. Their rigid, Soviet-style military command was widely blamed for the Red Army’s heavy losses during the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign and the early stages of the Long March., and ultimately decided to turn the troops westward into Guizhou, “turning what might have been a demoralized rout into a spirited victorious march.” This major change was inseparable from the important role played by Mao Zedong. It can be said that the Channel Transfer was the beginning of Mao Zedong’s march towards the core leadership of the Red Army and the Party Central Committee during the Long March. “A Collection of Important Meetings in the History of the Chinese Communist Party” (1982) mentions: “From the Channel Conference to the Houchang Conference, Mao Zedong’s military leadership actually began.” Shi Zhongquan, in his book “The Long March,” evaluated the Channel Conference as follows: “It laid the initial foundation for realizing the first great historical turn of the Party and establishing Mao Zedong’s actual core leadership position in the Central Committee.” From the Channel Conference to the Liping Conference, and then to the Zunyi Conference, Mao Zedong played an important leadership role. Zhang Wentian, later reviewing the Zunyi Conference, evaluated its historical significance, Mao Zedong’s achievements, and his own role as follows: “…the credit for this conference, of course, belongs to Comrade Mao Zedong; I was merely a supporting role.”

毛泽东在领导秋收起义后，根据革命实际情况，及时“引兵井冈”以保存革命力量，把目光转向国民党统治力量比较薄弱的广大农村地区，积极动员和组织农民，广泛建立根据地，开展轰轰烈烈的土地革命。毛泽东开创的伟大斗争实践，以及全新的理论创造，使许多无论是身在异国他乡，还是在国内奋斗的革命者，都纷纷把目光聚焦到他所领导的革命斗争和实践。当时，刘伯承虽然远在莫斯科学习，但时时刻刻都关注着国内的革命局势，他在读了毛泽东的《中国的红色政权为什么能够存在？》《井冈山的斗争》这两篇文章后备受鼓舞，无限感慨地对同学屈武说：“《中国的红色政权为什么能够存在？》这篇文章打开了我的眼界，增强了我的信心。看来，中国革命的前途是光明的。而从《井冈山的斗争》这篇文章中又可以看出，国内的斗争还是非常困难的。我真想现在就回国，上井冈山，和毛泽东、朱德一起去战斗！”朱德在领导湘南暴动后，毅然决然地说要“找毛泽东去！”彭德怀在领导平江起义后，也义无反顾地率领部队向井冈山挺进，激流归大海。一时间，其他各地的武装起义和革命斗争掀起学习借鉴探索毛泽东的这种革命方式的热潮，毛泽东成为中国这艘巨大革命航船桅杆尖头照亮中国革命前进方向的灯塔。“通道转兵”中，正是在毛泽东的极力劝说和激烈争辩下，中央才最终答应召开紧急会议，讨论红军前进方向的重大问题。会上，中央领导人开始抵制博古、李德的错误指挥，并最终决定转兵西进贵州，“把原来可能是军心涣散的溃退变成一场精神抖擞的胜利进军”。这一重大变化，与毛泽东发挥的重要作用是密不可分的。可以说，通道转兵是长征中毛泽东走向红军和党中央领导核心的开端。《中国共产党历次重要会议集》（1982）提到：“从通道会议到猴场会议，实际上开始了毛泽东在军事上的领导。”石仲泉在《长征行》一书中对通道会议作了这样的评价：“为实现党的历史第一次伟大转折，确立毛泽东在中央的实际核心领导地位奠定了最初的基础”。从通道会议到黎平会议，再到遵义会议，毛泽东都发挥了重要领导作用。张闻天后来在回顾遵义会议时，对遵义会议的历史意义、毛泽东的功绩及自己的作用曾作出这样的评价：“……这个会议的功绩，当然属于毛泽东同志，我不过是一个配角而已。”

Among myriad mountains, the main peak is the one to behold; on the vast ocean, the lighthouse guides the voyage. The Party’s establishment of Comrade Xi Jinping’s core position on the Party Central Committee and in the Party as a whole, and the establishment of the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, are major historical conclusions drawn from a profound summation of the Party’s century-long struggle and the great practice since the 18th National Congress of the CPC. The extraordinary journey of the New Era has also irrefutably proven that the Two Establishments are not only the winning code for achieving historic achievements and undergoing historic changes since the New Era, but also the fundamental guarantee for the Communist Party of China, the Chinese people, and the Chinese nation to continuously overcome various difficulties and obstacles on the new journey and march towards an even more glorious future.

万山磅礴看主峰，大海航行看灯塔。党确立习近平同志党中央的核心、全党的核心地位，确立习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想的指导地位，是深刻总结党的百年奋斗、党的十八大以来伟大实践得出的重大历史结论。新时代的非凡历程也雄辩地证明，“两个确立”，不仅是新时代以来取得历史性成就、发生历史性变革的制胜密码，更是中国共产党、中国人民、中华民族新征程上不断战胜各种艰难险阻，走向更加辉煌未来的根本保证。

(IV) The Spirit of Self-Revolution Must Be Carried Forward

（四）必须发扬自我革命精神

“The reason why the Party, after a century of vicissitudes, is still full of vitality lies in its consistent adherence to truth and correction of errors. The greatness of the Party lies not in never making mistakes, but in never concealing its illnesses for fear of treatment, actively engaging in criticism and self-criticism, daring to face problems directly, and having the courage to carry out self-revolution.” From Mao Zedong leading the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops to withdraw from Changsha, to “leading the troops to Jinggangshan,” and then to vigorously promoting the convening of the Central Committee’s Channel Conference to achieve the transfer of troops to Guizhou, these are all important manifestations of the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as the main representative, carrying forward the spirit of self-revolution and courageously correcting serious “Left” errors. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War period, the “Left” thinking that existed within our Party once caused significant losses to the Chinese revolution. Many uprisings focusing on attacking large cities failed one after another. The failure of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign forced the Long March, and the Central Red Army suffered heavy losses. The spirit of self-revolution is a powerful support for the Party to maintain its youthful vitality forever. Self-revolution not only profoundly reveals the fundamental reason why the Party was able to succeed in the past, but also scientifically points out the core code for how it can continue to succeed in the future. It is the second answer for the Party to break free from the historical cycle of rise and fall, survival and extinction. [20]20 The “first answer” to the historical cycle of rise and fall is generally considered to be the “mass line” and people’s supervision proposed by Mao Zedong during a conversation with Huang Yanpei in 1945. The “second answer” is the Party’s “self-revolution,” a concept strongly emphasized by Xi Jinping.

“党历经百年沧桑更加充满活力，其奥秘就在于始终坚持真理、修正错误。党的伟大不在于不犯错误，而在于从不讳疾忌医，积极开展批评和自我批评，敢于直面问题，勇于自我革命。”从毛泽东率秋收起义部队撤出长沙，到“引兵井冈”，再到极力促成中央召开通道会议实现转兵贵州，这些都是以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人发扬自我革命精神，勇于纠正“左”倾严重错误的重要体现。土地革命战争时期，我们党内存在的“左”倾思想，一度给中国革命造成了重大损失，以进攻大城市为重点的众多起义纷纷失败，第五次反“围剿”失败被迫长征，中央红军损失惨重。自我革命精神，是党永葆青春活力的强大支撑。自我革命，不仅深刻揭示了党为什么能在过去成功的根本原因，而且科学指明了未来如何能继续成功的核心密码，是党跳出兴衰存亡历史周期率的第二个答案。

(V) The Ability to Recognize, Respond to, and Seek Change Must Be Enhanced

（五）必须增强识变应变求变能力

“Change” is the essence of things. Facing changing things, we must enhance our ability to see the whole from a single clue, forge a “piercing gaze,” achieve insight into the first signs, and seek advantages while avoiding disadvantages. “Leading the troops to Jinggangshan” and the “Channel Transfer” were both instances where Mao Zedong, after accurately identifying major changes in the revolutionary situation, creatively opened up a new revolutionary situation in a crisis, turning darkness into light and correcting the course of the revolution. Currently, China’s development environment is facing profound and complex changes. The evolution of the international situation profoundly affects domestic development. The world is undergoing changes unseen in a century, accelerating its evolution, and the balance of international power is undergoing profound adjustment. Faced with these circumstances, every Party member and leading cadre must effectively enhance their ability to recognize, respond to, and seek change, proactively recognize, respond to, and seek change, accurately understand the general trend of world development, scientifically grasp the new historical juncture of China’s development, and be adept at fostering new opportunities amidst crises and opening up new horizons amidst changing circumstances. This is of great significance for coordinating the domestic and international situations and comprehensively advancing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation through Chinese-path modernization.

“变”是事物的本质。面对变化的事物，我们要提升见微知著的能力，炼就“火眼金睛”，做到洞察先机，趋利避害。“引兵井冈”和“通道转兵”，都是毛泽东在准确识别革命形势发生重大变化后，在危局中创造性地开创了革命新局面，实现了柳暗花明，拨正了革命航向。当前，我国发展环境面临深刻复杂变化，国际形势演变深刻影响国内发展，世界百年变局加速演进，国际力量对比深刻调整。面对这些情况，每一位党员干部都要切实增强识变应变求变能力，主动识变应变求变，准确认识世界发展大势，科学把握中国发展新的历史方位，善于在危机中育新机、于变局中开新局。这对统筹国内国际两个大局，以中国式现代化全面推进中华民族伟大复兴具有重要意义。

Author’s Brief Introduction: Zhang Youliang, Second-Level Researcher, Editorial Office of the College Journal, Department of Teaching and Research, China Executive Leadership Academy, Jinggangshan.

作者简介：张友良，中国井冈山干部学院教学科研部院刊编辑室二级调研员。