An Exploration of the Red Army’s Rapid Marching Techniques on Mountain Roads at Night

During the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, faced with the fundamental reality of a vast disparity in strength between the enemy and itself, the Red Army was compelled to frequently march on mountain roads at night to maneuver against the Nationalist forces. In such night marches on mountain roads, to turn passivity into initiative and disadvantage into advantage, the application of technique became especially important. Regarding the Red Army’s techniques for marching on mountain roads at night, there has as yet been no detailed and meticulous academic inquiry. How did the Red Army march rapidly on mountain roads at night, and how was its formidable marching capability forged? This article, drawing on relevant historical materials, will focus on analyzing these questions from a technical perspective.

土地革命战争时期，面对敌我实力悬殊这个最大实际，红军不得不频繁在山地夜路行军与国民党军周旋。山地夜路行军中要想变被动为主动，化劣势为优势，技术的运用就变得尤为重要。有关红军山地夜路行军技术，目前尚未有翔实细致的学术探究。红军是如何在山地夜路中快速行军的，其强大的行军能力又是如何炼就的？本文拟依据相关史料，围绕这些问题重点从技术层面进行分析。

I. Techniques of Mountain Marching

一、山地行军的技术

From a historical background, the Red Army’s mountain marching and combat operations are linked to the CPC’s exploration, after the failure of the Great Revolution, of the revolutionary path of encircling the cities from the countryside and seizing state power by armed force, and are particularly closely related to the strategic shift of “going up into the mountains” proposed by Mao Zedong. “Going up into the mountains” was because “it was impossible to stay below”; the revolutionary banner was not allowed to be “planted in the cities” and could only be “planted on the mountaintops.” After going up into the mountains, how to face the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression” and how to maneuver flexibly among the mountains and seize the initiative in warfare became crucial concrete issues. Under the historical conditions and objective environment of the time, from the perspective of marching technique, the Red Army had to “be tempered a thousand times, and be able to walk.”

从历史背景看，红军山地行军作战，与大革命失败后中共对农村包围城市、武装夺取政权的革命道路的探索有关，特别是和毛泽东提出的“上山”的战略转变密切相关。“上山”是因为“下面住不得”，革命大旗不准“在城里插”，只能到“山顶上去插”。上山之后，如何面对敌人的“围剿”，如何在山地之间灵活行军、掌握战争主动权就是至关重要的具体问题。在当时的历史条件和客观环境中，从行军技术上看，红军必须“要千锤百炼，要能走路”。

(1) Tactical Training for Mountain Marching

（一）山地行军的战术训练

To march rapidly in the mountains, tactical training was indispensable. From the very day of its birth, the Red Army, in its practical drills and exercises, eliminated “those pretentious and cumbersome formalities of little use in combat” and emphasized “drill and discipline that invigorate the spirit.” Mountain climbing training was the main training subject for the Red Army’s mountain marching. After the CPC “went up into the mountains,” living with mountains as companions was the basic state of wartime existence. To defeat the enemy, the Red Army placed considerable emphasis on mountain climbing training. Mountain climbing not only built physical fitness but also enhanced combat effectiveness, making it an essential skill for marching and fighting. Therefore, the Red Army frequently practiced mountain climbing to build speed and endurance, improving combat skills through running, climbing, jumping over obstacles, and other such training.

要想在山地快速行军，战术训练必不可少。红军自诞生之日起，就在实训演练中除掉“那些摆架子的于作战无大关系的繁冗虚文”，注重“振作精神之制式教练”。爬山训练是红军山地行军的主要训练科目。中共自“上山”以后，与山为伍是基本的战争生活状态。红军为克敌制胜，较为注重爬山训练。爬山不仅健身，而且提高战斗力，是行军打仗的必备技能。因此，红军经常爬山练速度、练耐力，通过跑步、爬山、跳越障碍等训练提高战斗技能。

Beyond mountain climbing training, the Red Army also placed special emphasis on physical fitness training, stressing that only with “a strong physique could one run over a hundred li in a day, seize more than ten hilltops, and fight several fierce battles.” On this basis, the Red Army command made “exercising the body and increasing physical strength” the “first priority in the Red Army’s military training,” requiring that every one to two months “a physical fitness competition be convened among all columns and army-level direct units,” regarding this as “the sole essential condition for enhancing the Red Army’s combat effectiveness.” Consequently, Red Army units actively organized and carried out various physical exercises and competitive activities, actively organizing training and competitions in long jump, high jump, racing, wall-climbing, rope-climbing, and other areas. Because many Red Army soldiers were quick and agile in their movements, they even earned the nickname “ape-men.” At the same time, the Red Army also held athletic meets of varying scales during major festivals to increase the competitive nature of physical exercise, using demonstrations and competitions in cross-country ability and marching techniques to enhance the troops’ emphasis on mountain marching capability, and in this process further tempering the military quality of unity and cooperation. Through physical exercise and long-term military practice, the Red Army’s mountain marching capability was rapidly enhanced, becoming an important tactical asset for flexible maneuvering against the enemy.

爬山训练之外，红军还特别注重体力训练，强调只有“强健的体力才能一天奔跑百多里路，抢十多个山头，作几场恶战”。基于此，红军司令部将“锻炼身体增进体力”作为“红军军事训练中的第一要着”，要求每一个月至两个月“召集一次各纵队及军直属队的体力比赛”，将其看作“增进红军战斗力的唯一要件”。于是，红军各部队积极组织开展各种体育锻炼和竞赛活动，在跳远、跳高、赛跑、翻墙、爬绳等方面积极组织训练和竞赛活动。由于许多红军战士动作迅速敏捷，还获得“人猿”的诨名。同时，红军还在各种重大节日期间举办规模不等的运动会，提高体育锻炼的竞技性，通过展示比拼越野能力和行军技术增强部队对山地行军能力的重视，并在此过程中进一步锤炼团结协作的军事品质。经过体育锻炼和长期军事实践，红军山地行军能力得到迅速提升，成为与敌军灵活周旋的重要战术资本。

(2) Technical Essentials in Mountain Marching

（二）山地行军中的技术要诀

The Red Army’s mountain marching and combat operations required commanders and fighters to possess knowledge of military geography. To address this issue, the CPC specifically organized military geography and terrain training classes for Red Army commanders and fighters, offering courses in military geography, topography, engineering techniques, and other subjects. To comprehensively study military geography and understand the specific terrain of the operational areas, “all assignments in the training classes were to be carried out on maps of those provinces where the Red Army and guerrilla forces were currently waging armed struggle.”

红军在山地行军作战，要求指战员具备军事地理知识。为解决这一问题，中共专门针对红军指战员举办军事地理和地形培训班，开设军事地理、地形学、工程技术等课程。为了全面学习军事地理和了解作战区域所特有的地形，培训班的“全部作业都要在现阶段红军和游击队开展武装斗争的那些省份的地图上进行”。

For the Red Army marching in the mountains, familiarity with the terrain and environment was a basic condition. Mountain marching was not like marching on the plains; getting lost or taking the wrong path was the norm. To solve this problem, the Red Army had its natural advantages. Most Red Army soldiers were of peasant origin, and most were natives of the locality. In the First Front Army of the Red Army, “the percentage of locals was even higher, averaging three-quarters of the total.” Marching through the intricate and rugged mountain terrain “was like adding wings to a tiger for these native-born Red Army officers and soldiers.” When the Red Army moved into unfamiliar environments for operations, it would replenish its troop strength by recruiting locally. During the Long March, when the Red Army entered Tibetan areas, it specifically established a Tibetan Independent Division, whose “soldiers were mostly locals, familiar with local conditions.”

红军在山地行军，熟悉地形环境是基础条件。山地行军不比平原，迷路或走错路是常态。破解这一问题，红军有其天然优势。红军大多是农民出身，且多为本地籍。在红一方面军中，“当地人的百分率还更高，平均占总数的3/4”。在错综复杂的崎岖山地行军，“对于这些土生土长的红军将士而言则是如虎添翼”。当红军流动进入陌生环境作战，又会在当地扩红补充兵源。长征时期红军进入藏区，就专门成立藏民独立师，“独立师战士多系本地人，熟悉当地情况”。

However, when entering unfamiliar territory, guides played a pivotal role. After the Second and Sixth Army Groups of the Red Army arrived in Guizhou, a region of high mountains, deep valleys, and narrow roads, the biggest problem they faced was “unfamiliarity with the terrain” and “having no military maps, relying entirely on finding guides to ask the way.” Therefore, when marching in the mountains, the Red Army often sought local people as guides. Regarding how to select competent guides, the Red Army also had clear regulations. Generally, guides were required to be young and strong, able to run on level ground and climb mountains, and, more importantly, “familiar with the route, clearly knowing the paths for advancing, retreating, and the left and right flanks.” The Red Army required that guides be treated warmly, that they be “given preferential treatment in material life and politically propagandized, so that they would guide the way with peace of mind and loyalty.”

不过，如果进入陌生地域，向导就起着举足轻重的作用。红二、六军团到达山高谷深、道路窄小的贵州后，面临最大的问题就是“地形不熟悉”，“没有军用地图，全靠找向导问路”。因此红军在山地行军，常找当地群众作向导。关于如何选择能够胜任的向导，红军也有明确规定。一般要求年轻力壮，能跑平路能爬山，更重要的是“路线熟悉，前进后退、左右两翼的路途都很清楚”。红军要求对待向导要热情，要“从物质生活上优待他，从政治上宣传他，使他安心而忠实地引路”。

In the terrain of southern China, mountains and rivers often coexisted, so opening roads through mountains and building bridges across rivers were inevitable problems encountered in mountain marching. The southern regions where the Red Army was initially active were themselves characterized by a well-developed water system. Even among the numerous mountain ranges and their offshoots in southern Jiangxi alone, over a thousand tributaries were densely distributed, converging radially toward the center, forming nine major tributaries: the Shangyou River, Zhangshui, Meijiang, Qinjiang, Xiangjiang, Lianjiang, Jinjiang, Pingjiang, and Taojiang. The water system of western Fujian was even more characterized by a grid-like pattern, with the highest density of river networks in East China. During the Long March period, according to incomplete statistics, the Red Army crossed 24 major rivers, including famous ones such as the Wujiang River, the Xiangjiang River, the Jinsha River, and the Dadu River. How to cross rivers became a problem that the Red Army had to solve during its marches.

在南方的地形中，山地与河流时常相伴而生，因此逢山开路遇水架桥，是山地行军中必然遇到的问题。红军早期所在的南方地域，本身就水系发达。仅在赣南众多山脉及其余脉之间，就密布着千余条支流，以辐射状向中心汇集，形成上犹江、章水、梅江、琴江、湘江、濂江、锦江、平江、桃江9条大支流。福建闽西水系更是以格状为特征，居华东河网密度之冠。长征时期，据不完全统计，红军渡过的主要大江大河有24条，其中包括乌江、湘江、金沙江、大渡河等著名河流。如何渡河成为红军行军过程中必须解决的难题。

Regarding river-crossing techniques, due to the lack of technical equipment for constructing military bridges, the Red Army’s bridge-building work mostly relied on traditional methods. Generally, several strands of iron wire were twisted into an iron cable, then the two ends of the iron cable were fixed on opposite banks of the river, and wooden planks were laid horizontally across the iron cable to form a simple pontoon bridge. The materials for bridge construction were also based on simplicity and practicality. For example, in late November 1934, the engineer company of the 22nd Division of the 9th Army Corps was ordered to build a bridge across the Xiangjiang River near Jieshou in Guangxi. Under conditions of time pressure and difficulty in collecting bridge-building materials, the engineer soldiers carried doors and bamboo rafts on their shoulders to erect a simple bridge, ensuring the Red Army’s breakthrough across the Xiangjiang River. From January 3 to 6, 1935, the river-crossing company of the Engineer Battalion of the Central Military Commission, the engineer company of the Cadre Regiment, and the engineer company of the 2nd Division used yellow bamboo and mountain timber to build a pontoon bridge 300 meters long and 5 meters wide at Jiangjiehe, ensuring that the Military Commission column crossed the Wujiang River and advanced directly on Zunyi. When the Red Army forced the crossing of the Wujiang River, it also used local materials, tying bamboo and wood from the riverbank into rafts, and fastening the rafts to tree trunks, wooden stakes, or rocks on the bank with thick ropes, creating a simple pontoon bridge to facilitate the Red Army’s passage.

就渡河技术来讲，由于缺少架设军用桥梁的技术装备，红军的架桥工作多依传统方法。一般是将几股铁丝拧成铁索，然后将铁索两端分别固定在江两岸，于铁索之上横铺木板成一简易浮桥。架桥材料也以简便实用为主。如1934年11月下旬，红九军团第22师工兵连奉命在广西界首附近的湘江上架桥，在时间紧迫难以搜集架桥材料的条件下，工兵战士肩扛门板、竹筏，搭起一座简易桥，保障了红军突破湘江。1935年1月3日至6日，中革军委工兵营渡河连、干部团工兵连、红2师工兵连在江界河用黄竹和山木架设了长300米宽5米的浮桥，保障军委纵队跨过乌江，直下遵义。红军强渡乌江时，也是就地取材，将乌江岸边之竹木扎成竹筏，以粗绳将筏系于岸上树干、木桩或岩石上，造成简易浮桥便利红军通过。

Communication and liaison are “the eyes and ears of the army, and are of great importance to victory or defeat in battle,” and this is even more true during mountain marches. From the very beginning of its founding, the Red Army placed special emphasis on communication and liaison to facilitate mountain marching, requiring soldiers to be able to scout enemy sentries and observe targets, and at complex terrain and crossroads near the enemy “to post sentries,” and when changing sentries “to brief them on the enemy’s movements.” Flag signals, bugle calls, and relayed verbal commands were commonly used means of communication for the Red Army during mountain marches. After the founding of the Chinese Soviet Republic, the Chinese Communist Party established the Red Army Communication School in Ruijin, setting up eight brigades including bugle, telephone, flag signal, and radio, among which six to seven hundred studied bugle calls, over one hundred studied flag signals, and several dozen studied radio in each session. Flag signals were a means of transmitting commands by waving flags of different patterns and making gestures from high points in the mountains. Bugle calls, because they were unaffected by mountain terrain and weather and could be sounded from concealed positions, were frequently used during mountain marches. Every Red Army company had buglers who used different notes of the brass bugle to transmit commands such as “advance,” “retreat,” and “rest.” The Central Military and Political School of the Chinese Soviet Republic specifically published materials such as *The Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army Military Bugle Call Manual* and *Red Army Whistle Signals, Lamp Signals, and Flag Signal Communications*, which were applied in actual marching and combat. Relayed verbal commands were a method by which the Red Army, during marches, quickly transmitted the intent of an action down to every soldier through soldiers passing short orders back and forth.

通讯联络是“军中的耳目，于战斗胜败上，关系很重”，在山地行军中更是如此。红军初创时期就特别重视通讯联络以利山地行军，要求战士会摸敌哨、看目标，在地形复杂、接近敌人的岔路口“要派人站哨”，换哨时“要交代敌人的动向”。旗语、司号与列队传令是红军山地行军常用的联络手段。中华苏维埃共和国成立后，中共在瑞金建立红军通信学校，设置司号、电话、旗语、无线电等8个大队，其中学习司号的六七百人，学习旗语的100多人，学习无线电的每期几十人。旗语是红军以不同式样的旗子及动作在山中高点挥舞指挥传递信号的手段。司号因不受山中地形及天气影响，且可在隐蔽地点发送号音，因而在山地行军中经常使用。红军各连队都有司号员，他们利用铜号的不同音节变换吹奏，传递“前进”“撤退”“休息”等指令。中华苏维埃共和国中央军事政治学校专门出版《中国工农红军军用号谱》《红军哨音、灯号、旗语通讯》等材料，在实际行军作战中加以运用。列队传令是红军在行军时通过战士前后相传较短口令的方式，把行动意图迅速下达到每个战士。

(III) Technical Characteristics of Mountain Marching

（三）山地行军的技术特点

Mountain marching emphasizes secrecy and stealth; the basic requirement is to move swiftly and elusively, appearing and disappearing unpredictably. Therefore, equipment must be simple and must not exceed the prescribed quantity. Red Army commanders and fighters had to know in advance the direction, route, and destination of the march, and strict military discipline had to be maintained during the march, all aimed at achieving swift and agile mountain marching, using a fast and decisive style to achieve surprise and victory. This marching style was employed from the very beginning of the Red Army’s founding. For example, the term “circling” (打圈), which frequently appeared in the Red Army’s early mountain marches, meant leading the enemy in circles, waiting until the enemy was exhausted, and then swiftly striking them. In the first four counter-encirclement campaigns, the Red Army also used this tactic, applying the tactical principle of “using terrain and cover, unleashing firepower, annihilating the enemy, and preserving oneself” to military training and specific combat operations through their extremely high level of mountain marching skill.

山地行军重在诡秘，行动飘忽敏捷、出没无常是基本要求。故而装备必须简单，不能超过规定数目。红军指战员要提前知晓行军方向、道路、目的地等情况，行军途中要严守军纪，旨在迅敏快捷地在山地行军，以快速、果断的作风实现出奇制胜的目的。这种行军风格，从红军初创时期即在运用。比如红军初期在山地行军中经常出现的“打圈”一词，就是带着敌人兜圈子，等待敌人疲劳时，迅疾予以打击。在前四次反“围剿”中，红军同样利用这一战术，以极高的山地行军本领，将“利用地形地物，发扬火力，消灭敌人，保存自己”的战术方针贯彻到军事训练和具体作战中。

How to choose a route for a mountain march is key to whether the march and combat can be won. In the first four counter-encirclement campaigns, the Red Army used circuitous routes or the “circling” tactic to bypass the enemy’s spearhead, even going so far as to march a thousand li to maneuver and engage the enemy. However, during the fifth counter-encirclement campaign and for a period during the Long March, the Red Army adopted a straight-line marching method, “as if always advancing in a straight line along a route drawn on paper with a pencil, heading in one direction.” This was an erroneous tactic under the mistaken military guidance of Li De and Bo Gu, causing the Red Army to lose its advantage of flexibility and mobility, leading to successive defeats. On the contrary, the enemy, having learned from previous lessons in the fifth encirclement campaign, adopted a “curved-line method” for marching and combat, making it impossible for the Red Army to predict their route. With the Nationalist army implementing this new tactic, the Red Army found that “there was no opportunity to be found for mobile warfare,” which became a major tactical lesson from the counter-encirclement campaign.

山地行军如何选择路线，是关乎行军作战能否取胜的关键。红军在前四次反“围剿”中，均以迂回路线或“打圈”战术，绕过敌军锋芒，甚至不惜千里转战与敌周旋。但是在第五次反“围剿”以及长征时期的一段时间内，红军一度采用直线行军方式，“仿佛总是沿着一条用铅笔在纸上画好的路线，朝着一个方向直线前进”。这是在李德、博古错误军事指导方针下的错误战术，导致红军丧失了灵活机动的优势，接连失败。反倒是敌军在第五次“围剿”中吸取之前的教训，采用“曲线法”行军作战，从而使红军无法预测其行军路线。国民党军实施此新的战法，红军遂“于运动战无机可觅”，成为反“围剿”在战术上的重大教训。

After the Zunyi Conference [1]1 The Great Revolution (1924–1927) refers to the first Kuomintang-CPC united front and the Northern Expedition against the warlords., the Red Army adopted a more mobile marching method, spending most of its time in a state of high-speed movement, boldly making circuitous advances and穿插 (穿插

遵义会议后，红军实行更为机动的行军方式，大部分时间皆处于高速流动状态，大胆迂回穿插。如此行军路线，“部队自然要多走一点路，疲劳一点。可是敌人却对我们捉摸不透，便于我们隐蔽企图，使我军由被动变为主动”。这一战术和行军技术在四渡赤水战役中得到集中运用和体现，把红军灵活机动的优势充分发挥出来。在当时的条件下，红军执行此战术需要克服很多困难。由于云贵地区山高林密、河流众多，山地之间城镇人烟稀少，红军长时间高速行军，补给困难，经常陷入粮食缺乏的境地，“战士们吃不饱，经常饿着肚子”，但仍“每天要行军，至少行军八十里”。为了战胜敌人，红军以坚强的意志和过硬的军事素养克服了这些困难，成功实现了战略转移，跳出了敌人的重重包围。尽管当时李德等人曾批评四渡赤水是“一个月疲惫不堪和毫无益处的徘徊”，但事实证明，迂回穿插、灵活机动的行军方式是最适合红军的战术。

II. Techniques of Night Marching

二、夜路行军的技术

Facing the objective situation of the enemy being strong and ourselves being weak, the Red Army had to avoid engaging the enemy in frontal combat under unfavorable conditions and instead adopt the tactic of marching on mountain roads, while also fully exploiting the advantages of night marching and night combat to surprise and strike the enemy. With the cover of darkness, the Red Army could conceal its movements and evade enemy reconnaissance. During the Long March period, the Red Army often found that “because there were too many enemy aircraft, it was very difficult to march during the day.” Under these circumstances, in order to “conceal operational intentions and objectives, and to prevent enemy aerial reconnaissance and bombing, the Red Army adopted the method of resting by day and marching by night.” Night marching thus became an important means for the Red Army to conceal itself and strike the enemy.

面对敌强我弱的客观形势，红军既要避免在不利条件下和敌人正面作战而采取山地行军的战术，又要充分发挥夜间行军和作战的优势，出其不意地袭扰和打击敌人。借助夜色的掩护，红军能够隐藏行踪，躲避敌人的侦察。在长征时期，红军往往因“敌机过多，白天很难行军”。在此情形之下，红军为了“隐蔽行动企图和目标，防止敌机侦察和轰炸，采用白天休息、夜间行军的办法移动”。夜路行军便成为红军隐蔽自己、打击敌人的重要方式。

(1) Tactical Training for Night Marching

（一）夜路行军的战术训练

In 1928, when Mao Zedong established the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army Training Detachment on the Hunan-Jiangxi border, he particularly emphasized the need to “strengthen night training” and to learn the skill of “walking night roads.” Liu Bocheng, who was long engaged in Red Army military teaching work, also repeatedly stressed: “Night movement is a good habit of our troops, and what the enemy fears.” The Red Army must “on the one hand prepare bayonets and practice thrusting skillfully, and

1928 年毛泽东在湘赣边界创建工农革命军教导队时，就特别强调要“加强夜间训练”，学会“走夜路”的本领。长期从事红军军事教学工作的刘伯承也反复强调：“夜间运动是我们部队良好的习惯，敌人所怕的事”。红军要“一面准备刺刀熟练刺杀，一面加紧夜间的前进队形、冲击队形、标定方向、通信联络、侦察警戒乃至守备阵地的训练”。

The technical and tactical training of the Red Army for night marching had a distinct practical orientation. Xu Xiangqian once pointed out: night marching and night fighting “are precisely for the purpose of using speed to defeat the enemy and achieving a quick decision. At night, the enemy hunkers down in their positions, their eyes and ears are not sharp, which facilitates our concentration of forces, swift movement, and secret approach to the enemy; at night, the enemy is often lax in vigilance and sleeps soundly, which facilitates our taking the enemy by surprise and launching a sudden assault and breakthrough; at night, the enemy’s field of vision is limited, and their superior firepower is difficult to bring to bear, which facilitates our giving full play to the advantages of close combat and quickly concluding the battle; at night, it is not easy for the enemy to ascertain the Red Army’s troop strength, and once gunfire erupts, every bush and tree looks like a soldier to them, which also facilitates our achieving the effect of defeating a larger force with a smaller one.”[n7] It was precisely because night marching could effectively weaken the enemy’s advantages in equipment, troop strength, and other aspects that it became a key subject in the Red Army’s military training.

红军夜间行军的技战术训练有着鲜明的实用指向。徐向前就曾指出：夜行夜战“就是为了以快制敌，速战速决。夜间敌人龟缩于驻地，耳目不灵，便于我集中兵力，神速运动，秘密接近敌人；夜间敌人往往疏于戒备，高枕而眠，便于我出敌不意，奇袭突破；夜间敌人视野有限，优势火器火力难以发扬，便于我发挥近战特长，迅速解决战斗；夜间敌人不易弄清红军的兵力，枪声一响，草木皆兵，也便于我收以少胜多之效”。正是由于夜行军能有效削弱敌人在装备、兵力等方面的优势，因此成为红军军事训练的关键科目。

The Red Army’s training for night marching and night fighting started from the basics, including nighttime emergency assembly and quickly donning equipment and preparing for battle in a short time. Night marching and night fighting placed particular emphasis on vision and hearing; therefore, the Red Army’s daily training focused on skills such as how to quickly determine the enemy’s position, how to accurately distinguish friend from foe in the chaotic situation of a dark night, and how to smoothly pass through obstacles during night marches and swiftly reach the destination. To enhance night vision, the Red Army, in the concrete process of training, often simulated night marching and combat scenarios, carrying out actions according to actual combat requirements once night fell. Nighttime military technical training was also an important part, specifically including nighttime shooting, grenade throwing, bayonet drill, and so on, all of which had to be continuously improved and strengthened through concrete training. At the same time, carrying out actual tactics such as attack, defense, night raids, and night reconnaissance in night marching and night fighting was also an important part of the Red Army’s daily training.

红军夜行夜战训练从基础入手，包括夜间紧急集合、短时间内迅速着装备战等。夜行夜战尤其注重视力和听力，因此红军日常训练中注重训练包括如何迅速判断敌军方位、如何在暗夜混乱局面中准确识别敌我、如何在夜行军中顺利通过障碍迅捷地到达目的地等技能。为了加强夜行视力，红军在具体训练过程中，经常模拟夜间行军作战场景，到夜间后就按照实战要求实施行动。夜间军事技术训练也是重要一环，具体包括夜间射击、投弹、劈刺等，都要在具体训练中不断提升加强。同时，在夜行夜战中展开进攻、防守、夜袭夜摸等实际战术，也是红军日常训练的重要内容。

In the actual-combat training for night marching, Red Army commanders and fighters also had to train fully equipped at designated locations, especially training the ability to move silently at night. In the concrete process of training, by frequently changing postures and jumping vigorously, they trained the ability to move without making a sound. If any noise was made during training, they had to re-dress and continue drilling until even vigorous jumping produced not the slightest sound. Through continuous training, the Red Army’s night marching and night fighting capabilities were greatly enhanced. When the 265th Red Regiment marched at night, it was like a “leopard cat moving at night,”[n8] silent and soundless; when passing through villages, it “could keep dogs from barking and chickens from crowing,” and “during battle, it could move freely through enemy positions without being discovered,” and moreover, “in situations of severe melee, it could maintain command structure and communications,” thereby earning the title “Night Tiger.”[n9]

在夜行军实战训练中，红军指战员也要全副装备在指定地点训练，尤其是训练夜间肃静行动的本领。在具体训练过程中，通过变换姿势频繁猛跳，锻炼肃静无声的能力。在训练中如果发出动静响声，就要重新着装继续演练，直至迅猛跳动也听不到丝毫声响为止。经过持续不断的训练，红军夜行夜战能力得到极大提升。红265团夜行军时，犹如“狸猫夜行”无声无息，路过村庄“能使鸡犬不惊不叫，战斗中能在敌阵中穿行自如而不被发现”，而且“遇到严重混战情况能保持指挥建制和通讯联络”，由此获得“夜老虎”的称号。

(2) Technical Essentials for Marching on Night Roads

（二）夜路行军的技术要诀

During night marches, the Red Army generally transmitted information by bugle calls or whistle signals. In mountainous areas with dense bamboo groves, the Red Army often used local materials to make a “bamboo-tube signal.” This involved taking a section of bamboo, cutting one end open with a knife, and inserting a burning thick incense stick into the middle to release a signal. To identify approaching persons at night, the Red Army used bamboo to make a contact whistle. This bamboo whistle was shrill and piercing, audible even amid the roar of artillery fire. Due to prolonged night marching, the Red Army also became highly skilled in making torches. Some bored holes into bamboo tubes and filled them with kerosene; others directly used pine branches and resin from the mountains for ignition and illumination; still others gathered relatively thin dry bamboo, tied it into bundles, and set them alight—such torches were both bright and long-lasting. Although torches could illuminate night travel, they also easily exposed the marchers. Therefore, the Red Army had clear regulations on the number of torches to be used during night marches. For example, before the start of the Long March, the Central Military Commission explicitly ordered that during night marches, each mess unit was permitted to light three torches, and each group of six porters one torch. [10]10 The Central Military Commission (中央军委) was the supreme military leadership organ of the Chinese Communist Party and the Red Army during this period. If the night march involved enemy contact, or if the troops entered plains or areas near White [i.e., Nationalist-controlled] territory and entered a combat state, torches were no longer to be raised. When implementing concealment from aircraft, all items that could reveal targets had to be hidden, especially easily identifiable white objects. During night marches, all combat troops dyed their red or white clothing and caps gray or green, and even “white horses were to be painted black or green uniformly.” During the Third Counter-Encirclement Campaign, the Red Army, in its night marches, “treated all items that could emit sound or light with soundless and lightless measures, even painting white horses black.” [11]11 The Third Counter-Encirclement Campaign (第三次反“围剿”) was a military campaign from July to September 1931 in which the Red Army in the Central Soviet Area repelled a large-scale Nationalist offensive. To avoid leaking information, “when encountering forks in the road during marches, no road signs were set up; instead, guides [literally ‘markers’] were used as substitutes.” During night marches without enemy contact, in the absence of torchlight, white objects were easily visible while black or dark ones were hard to distinguish; thus, white objects became the Red Army’s “guiding lights.” During marches, each Red Army soldier was issued a white towel, which they draped over their shoulders or tied around their arms, so that those behind could fix their eyes on the white spot ahead and grope their way forward in the darkness. Zhao Rong of the Ninth Army Corps recorded a scene from a night march during the Four Crossings of the Chishui River in his diary: “It was a night of continuous drizzle, pitch black so that you couldn’t see your hand in front of your face, causing great difficulty for our march. We had to wrap white towels around our necks, and those behind followed the white shadows ahead.” [12]12 The Four Crossings of the Chishui River (四渡赤水) were a series of highly mobile maneuvers by the Red Army during the Long March from January to March 1935, aimed at breaking out of Nationalist encirclement in Guizhou province. Zhao Rong (赵镕, 1899–1992) was a Red Army logistics officer whose diary is a historical source.

红军夜间行军，一般以号声或哨音传递信息。山区竹林茂密，红军经常就地取材，利用竹子制造一种“竹筒讯号”。即取竹子一节，用刀把一头切开，然后在中间插上一根燃着的粗香释放信号。夜间为辨认对方来人，红军就利用竹子制作一种联络哨。这种竹哨尖细刺耳，即便炮火震天也能听到。由于长期夜行军，红军对火把的制作也非常精熟。有的是把竹筒钻空后灌入洋油，有的直接利用山间松枝松香点燃照明，有的直接找较细的干竹，将其捆起来点烧，这样的火把不仅亮度大而且也耐烧。火把虽可照明夜行，但夜行军时火把也容易暴露自己。因此，红军对夜间行军时火把的数目有明确规定。比如，长征出发前中央军委就明令红军夜行军时，每一伙食单位准点三把，伕子六担一把。如遇有敌情的夜行军，或部队进入平原、临近白区进入作战状态，便不可再举火把。当实施对空隐蔽时，一切会暴露目标的物品均需隐藏，特别是易辨认的白色物体。红军夜间行军时，所有战斗部队所穿的红色或白色衣帽等一律染成灰色或绿色，乃至“白马应一律涂染成黑或绿色”。在第三次反“围剿”期间，红军在夜行军中就“对一切能发声、发光的物品都进行了无声无光处理，连白马都涂成了黑的”。为了不泄露消息，“行军中遇到岔路，一律不设路标，由标兵代替”。无敌情的夜行军，在无火把照明的情况下，因色白易见，色黑或色暗则难以辨清，于是白色物体便会成为红军的“指路明灯”。红军行军时，每人发一条白毛巾，把白色毛巾搭在肩头或系在胳膊上，后面的人就可盯着前面的白点，于黑暗中摸索前进。红九军团的赵镕在日记中记载了四渡赤水时夜行军中的一幕：“彻夜阴雨连绵，天黑得伸手不见五指，给我们行军造成了很大的困难，只好用白毛巾围在脖子上，后面的人看着前面白影子跟进。”

(III) Technical Characteristics of Night Marching on Mountain Roads

（三）夜路行军的技术特点

Concealment and secrecy were the greatest characteristics of night marching on mountain roads. In July 1931, during the Third Counter-Encirclement Campaign, facing the menacing Nationalist forces, the Red Army, then still in Fujian, decided to avoid the enemy’s main force, make a thousand-li detour from western Fujian back to southern Jiangxi to concentrate its forces and seek an opportunity to fight. On the way back, the Red Army encountered Nationalist troops. The Third Army Corps decided to act at night to stealthily cross a 20-li-wide gap between the forces of Chen Cheng, Han Deqin, and Luo Zhuoying. [13]13 Chen Cheng (陈诚, 1898–1965), Han Deqin (韩德勤, 1892–1988), and Luo Zhuoying (罗卓英, 1896–1961) were senior Nationalist military commanders. This night march mission could be described as “a dance on the blade of a knife.” To ensure the plan was foolproof and not discovered by the enemy, the Red Army stipulated strict night march regulations before departure. These required that during the night march, “all reflective items carried, such as iron buckets and vegetable basins used by the cooks, be wrapped in dark cloth or paper; and that all personal equipment—rifles, ammunition, canteens, grain bags, and other articles—be subjected to meticulous inspection and practice to ensure they made no sound during the night march.” On the night of the operation, “there was no moonlight; the soldiers followed one after another, none speaking, none coughing, only the rustling sound of hurried, light footsteps. Whenever crossing a bridge, a ditch, or other obstacles, squad and platoon leaders would automatically stop, stand to the side to call out and assist, and only rejoin the column after everyone had passed.” The troops set out at 10 p.m. and, after more than four hours of rapid, silent forced night march, successfully passed through the narrow mountain area sealed off by the Nationalist army by 2 a.m. the next morning, without being detected.

隐蔽绝密是夜路行军的最大特点。1931年7月第三次反“围剿”之时，面对来势汹汹的国民党部队，尚在福建的红军决定避其主力，绕道千里由闽西转回赣南集结兵力寻机作战。红军回师途中遭遇国民党部队，红三军团为偷越陈诚、韩德勤及罗卓英部之间20里宽的间隙，决定于夜间行动。此次夜行军任务，可谓是“刀尖上的舞蹈”。为保证计划万无一失，不被敌军发现，红军于出发前规定了严格的夜行军条例。要求夜行军时，“随身携带一切反光的东西，如炊事所用之铁桶、菜盆等皆用深色的布或纸包好；对个人所携带之枪枝、弹药、水壶、粮袋等器物进行不厌其烦的检查和演练，保证在夜行过程中不发出声响”。执行任务当晚，“没有月光，战士们一个跟着一个，谁也不说话，不咳嗽，只有急促轻微的脚步声沙沙作响。每当过桥越沟或通过其它障碍时，班、排长便自动停下来，站在一旁招呼、搀扶，等大家通过后再随队伍前进”。部队于当晚10点出发，经过4个多小时快速、静肃的夜间急行军，于次晨2点顺利通过国民党军封锁的狭窄山地，竟未被发现。

Agile tactical responsiveness was an essential quality for night marching on mountain roads. During night marches, encountering unexpected situations and enemy contacts required flexible adaptation based on actual circumstances. In September 1935, the Red Army’s Long March entered Gansu territory, and the Left Route Army halted for rest at Gongyipu and its surrounding areas. Quite alarmingly, at 10 p.m., a large enemy force was suddenly discovered 15 li from the bivouac. The troops then decided to shake off the enemy by marching at night. During the march, “lighting kerosene lamps or torches was forbidden, as were bugle calls, smoking, shouting, and coughing.” Finally, they avoided the enemy in silence.

灵敏的战术反应能力是夜路行军的必备素质。夜间行军，遇到预料之外的突发情况和敌情，必须根据实际情况灵活应变。1935年9月，红军长征进入甘肃地界，左路军行至公益铺及其周边扎营休整。颇为惊险的是，夜里10时忽然发现驻地15里处有大批敌人出现。部队遂决定趁夜行军摆脱敌人，行军过程中“禁止点马灯、火把，不准吹号、抽烟，不准呼叫和咳嗽”，最后于无声中避开了敌人。

Precisely because night marching had many advantages, the Red Army often implemented it in major operations. For instance, when the Red Army began the Long March, the Central Military Commission explicitly stated: “To conceal movements and avoid aerial reconnaissance and bombing, night marches should be used. Assemble before dusk, move after dusk, and halt at dawn.” During the Long March, the Red Army also mostly marched at night. Chen Yun once said that during the first eight months of the Red Army’s Long March, from October 1935 to June 1936, the troops’ marches “were often night marches.” [14]14 Chen Yun (陈云, 1905–1995) was a senior Chinese Communist Party leader who participated in the Long March and later wrote about it. During the Long March, the Nationalist army, relying on its control of air superiority, conducted frequent reconnaissance and bombing of the Red Army, and night marches could quite effectively avoid such dangers. In the process of pursuing and blocking the Red Army, Nationalist troops also discovered that the Red Army’s “movements were mostly at night, each man carrying a torch made of a bamboo tube with burning incense inside. They climbed mountains and crossed ridges, avoiding roads.”

正是因为夜行具有诸多优势，所以红军往往在重大行动中实施夜间行军。比如，红军开始长征时中央军委便明确指出：“为隐蔽行动，避免飞机侦炸，应用夜行军。黄昏前集合，黄昏后移动，拂晓时停止。”长征途中，红军也多是夜间行军。陈云曾说，1935年10月至1936年6月红军长征的前8个月，部队行军“往往还是夜行军”。长征期间，国民党军凭借对制空权的掌握，对红军的侦察与轰炸十分频繁，而夜行军则可以颇为有效地规避此类险情。国民党部队在追堵红军的过程中也发现红军“行动多在黑夜，每人执行筒一把，内装燃香。爬山越岭，避开道路”。

Of course, although night marches could surprise and inflict heavy losses on the enemy, or achieve high concealment to shake off a powerful foe, there were also many uncontrollable accidental factors. The most common problem was taking the wrong road or going on a detour. In February 1930, the Longzhou Uprising troops marched at night into a range of high mountains and ridges with unfamiliar terrain. After marching all night, they discovered they were still in the same place. It was finally learned that, due to the darkness making it hard to find an exit, the troops had been going around in circles on a “labyrinth road” all night. [15]15 The Longzhou Uprising (龙州起义) was a Communist-led uprising in February 1930 in Longzhou, Guangxi, which established a short-lived soviet base. When encountering obstacles like mountains and rivers, under the same terrain conditions, crossing mountains and rivers at night was naturally more difficult than during the day. During night marches on the Long March, whenever the Red Army “encountered a narrow pass, an uphill or downhill slope, or a bridge or water crossing,” the vanguard would be blocked, often causing the entire column to “take three steps and stop ten,” greatly slowing the overall march. In addition, unpredictable severe weather was another major test often faced by the Red Army during night marches. If the weather suddenly changed during a night march, with a sudden gale and torrential rain soaking men and horses, the march might cover only a few kilometers in an entire night. Unpredictable road conditions during night marches could also cause delays. In March 1934, during a night assault by the Fifth Army Corps, “due to the darkness and slippery roads, the movement was slow; shortly after the attack began, dawn broke, and the enemy dispatched troops in separate columns to counterattack,” causing our side to miss the opportunity and achieve little result.

当然，夜行军虽可出其不意予敌重创，或高度隐蔽摆脱强敌，但不可控的意外因素也有很多，最容易出现的就是走错路，或走冤枉路。1930年2月，龙州起义部队夜行军至一片地形不熟的崇山峻岭，行军一夜后发现竟然还在原地，最后才得知部队由于天黑难以找到出口，一整晚都在“盘陀路”上打转转。遇山水阻隔，在同等的地形条件下，夜间行军跨山过河自然比白天更为困难。长征期间的夜行军，红军“一遇着隘路或上山下坡，或过桥过水”，前锋受阻，常致整个队伍“走三步停十步”，整体行军被大大拖慢。此外，难以预料的恶劣天气也是红军夜行军常面临的重大考验。夜行军时如遇天气突变，一时间狂风暴雨，人马衣服尽湿，往往一夜行军不过数公里。夜行军中难以预料的路况亦会使行军迟滞。1934年3月，红5军在一次夜间突击中，就“因天黑路滑，以致动作迟缓，攻击不久，天即拂晓，敌即分兵出击”，我方因此错失战机而无甚战果。

III. Techniques of Rapid Marching

三、快速行军的技术

Although the Red Army was simply equipped, it “forged in the practice of war two sets of skills: marching and fighting.” The application of both sets of skills “was inseparable from the word ‘speed.’” The Red Army’s outstanding marching speed was demonstrated in many campaigns, and the ability to march rapidly was, in turn, a manifestation of the Red Army’s solid organizational discipline and political work.

红军虽然装备简单，但“在战争实践中练就了走和打的两套本领”，这两套本领的施展，“都离不开一个‘快’字”。红军卓越的行军速度在多次战役中都得到了体现，而能够快速行军又是红军坚实的组织纪律和政治工作的体现。

(I) The Red Army’s Marching Speed

（一）红军的行军速度

In the early days of the Red Army’s founding, its daily marching speed could already reach over 100 li. For example, when the Fifth Army Corps marched back from Ruijin to the Jinggang Mountains, the troops covered 80 to 90 li per day, sometimes even over 100 li. During the Longzhou Uprising, when the Eighth Army Corps opened a link between Longzhou and Baise, in one night march it covered 120 li in a single night. During the Jinggangshan period, the Red Army’s marching speed further increased. Based on the requirements of guerrilla tactics, Zhu De repeatedly emphasized the importance of “fast running, fast fighting, fast ending, fast shifting,” and focused on training rapid-reaction troops, flying to strike at the enemy’s weak points by surprise to achieve tactical surprise. [16]16 Zhu De (朱德, 1886–1976) was the commander-in-chief of the Red Army and a key military leader of the Chinese Communist Party. Even under the difficult conditions of marching and bivouacking, with the enemy pursuing in relays, the Red Army could still average over 90 li per day in forced marches. In September 1929, the Fifth Column of the Fifth Army Corps traversed the Mufu Mountain region. To maintain concealed mobility, it mostly marched at night and bivouacked at dawn, covering 120 to 140 li each night on mountain roads.

红军初创时期日行军速度即可达百里以上。如红5军从瑞金回师井冈山，部队每天行军八九十里，甚至可达百里以上。龙州起义时，红8军打通龙州与百色之间的联系，在一次夜行军中，一夜就走了120里。井冈山时期，红军的行军速度进一步提高。朱德基于游击战术的要求，多次强调“快跑、快打、快结束、快转移”的重要性，着力训练快速部队，飞兵奔袭乘虚而入，达到出其不意的战术效果。即便在行军、宿营非常困难，敌人轮班穷追的艰难环境下，红军仍能每日平均急行90里以上。1929年9月，红5军第5纵队穿越幕阜山区，为保持隐蔽机动，多于夜间行军，破晓宿营，山地夜行每夜可走120至140里。

During the counter-“encirclement and suppression” campaigns, the Red Army’s marching speed was further tempered. In the second counter-“encirclement and suppression” campaign, the Red Army achieved the brilliant feat of sweeping 700 li in half a month. [n17] In the third counter-“encirclement and suppression” campaign, it used continuous forced marches and night marches to make a thousand-li detour, smashing the Kuomintang’s “encirclement and suppression.” In October 1932, the Red Army seized the opportunity while the Kuomintang’s deployment for “encirclement and suppression” of the Central Soviet Area was still incomplete, racing to gain the initiative. Luo Binghui led his troops in a forced march of over 140 li, capturing two county towns in a single day, and was hailed by Zhu De as “cavalry on two feet.” [n18] In the words of foreign journalist Nym Wales, Luo Binghui’s unit was “a special mobile force, specializing in attacking the enemy, dispersing the enemy, and preventing them from concentrating their attack on the main Red Army forces,” and was thus called the “Divine Speedster,” while the troops he led were known as the “Divine Marching Army.”

在反“围剿”时期，红军的行军速度得到进一步锻炼。第二次反“围剿”期间，红军在半个月时间内创造了横扫700里的辉煌战绩。第三次反“围剿”，又以连续的急行军和夜行军千里迂回，粉碎了国民党的“围剿”。1932年10月，红军利用国民党“围剿”中央苏区部署尚未完成的时机，急速行军抢占先机。罗炳辉率所部急行军140多里，一天之内连克两座县城，被朱德誉为“两脚骑兵”。在外国记者尼姆·威尔斯的笔下，罗炳辉部“是一支特别的流动部队，专门袭击敌军，分散敌军，使不能集中攻击主力红军”，遂称其为“神行太保”，他所率领的军队则被称为“神行军”。

As for the Red Army’s marching speed during the Long March, the famous “Flying Capture of Luding Bridge” is already widely known. At the time of the Flying Capture of Luding Bridge, the Red Army completed a forced march of 240 li in one day and one night, arriving at Luding Bridge on schedule and routing the defending Kuomintang troops. In an area nearly 2,500 meters above sea level, the Red Army set the extreme marching record of “240 li in day and night” to capture Luding Bridge, shattering Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to make the Central Red Army a “second Shi Dakai.” [n19] Such extreme marching speed moved Edgar Snow to exclaim, wondering whether the Red Army was “men, madmen, or gods.” The marching speed of the Red Army during the Long March is also evident from the diary of Xiao Feng, director of the Political Work Inspection Team of the 1st Division, 1st Red Army Corps. Xiao Feng’s diary records about 200 days of marching, but fewer than 200 days have distance records. Based on the actual recorded days and distances, the average daily marching speed of the 1st Red Army Corps during the Long March could reach 80 li, and sometimes the daily marching speed could exceed 100 li. For example, when the 1st Red Army Corps was crossing the Jinsha River at Jiaopingdu, it was required to “march at least 130 to 140 li per day,” and “the time limit must not be delayed,” traveling day and night to reach Jiaopingdu and complete the river crossing. After the Long March reached Wuqi Town in northern Shaanxi, Mao Zedong discussed the Long March’s distance with Xiao Feng. According to Mao Zedong, not counting night marches, the Red Army marched for about 267 days, with the longest distance being 25,000 li. Calculated this way, the Red Army’s average daily speed could reach 93 li; if night marching distances were included, the Red Army’s daily marching speed was no less than 100 li. According to Dong Biwu, even under conditions of Kuomintang pursuit, interception, and extremely complex terrain, the Red Army could still march 60 to 80 li per day, and faster if they had straw sandals. Even when marching through grasslands, the average daily distance was about 35 to 40 li.

红军长征时期的行军速度，著名的“飞夺泸定桥”已是广为人知。飞夺泸定桥之时，红军一天一夜急行军走完240里行程，终于如期赶到泸定桥，并击溃布防的国民党军。红军在近2500米海拔的地区，创造了“昼夜兼程二百四”飞夺泸定桥的极限行军纪录，粉碎了蒋介石要使中央红军成为“石达开第二”的企图。如此极限的行军速度，让斯诺不禁感慨，红军究竟“是人，是疯子，还是神”。红军长征期间的行军速度，从红一军团1师政治部巡视团主任萧锋的日记中也可见一斑。萧锋日记所记行军约200多天，但是有行程记录的不足200天。按照实际记录天数和行程，红一军团在长征时期的日平均行军速度可达80里，有时日行军速度可达百里以上。如红一军团在抢渡皎平渡时，就要求“必须日行百三四十里以上”，“时限不能延误”，日夜兼程赶到皎平渡完成渡河任务。长征到达陕北吴起镇后，毛泽东曾与萧锋谈及红军长征行程。按照毛泽东的说法，长征时不计算夜行军，红军共行军约267天，最多的走了25000里。以此计算，红军的日平均速度可达93里，如计算夜行军里程，红军的日行军速度不下100里。据董必武说，红军在国民党围追堵截、行军地形极其复杂的条件下，一天也可行军60至80里，若有草鞋则可更快。即便在草地行军，每天平均也能走35至40里左右。

(II) Prerequisites and Guarantee Conditions for Rapid Marching

（二）快速行军的前提和保障条件

The reason the Red Army could defeat the strong with the weak and overcome the enemy relied on its rapid and flexible marching style. Behind the formation of this style lay firm faith, resolute will, and endurance beyond ordinary people. The cultivation of these outstanding qualities required meticulous political work and strict organizational discipline as guarantees.

红军之所以能以弱胜强、克敌制胜，有赖于快速、灵活的行军风格。这种风格的形成，背后是坚定的信仰、刚强的意志以及超越常人的耐力。这些卓越品质的养成，需要细致的政治工作和严格的组织纪律作保障。

Political work was the lifeline for cultivating the Red Army’s powerful marching capability. During long-term, high-intensity marching, physical and mental exhaustion was hard to avoid, and complaints could arise. Red Army political cadres constantly paid attention to changes and fluctuations in soldiers’ morale. Whenever there was a major battle or a long-distance march, they used political propaganda to create a favorable political atmosphere. Singing was a powerful tool for mobilization and propaganda. Whenever they walked through difficult places, “propaganda team members would sing a few popular songs to encourage the soldiers to advance and bravely kill the enemy.” During rest breaks, even if only for ten minutes, “comrades from the Soldiers’ Committee would also conduct motivational work, putting on a small performance or singing a folk song. In the valleys and forests, the atmosphere was filled with joy, and everyone forgot their fatigue and the heat.” The Red Army sang while marching, sang during rest, and sometimes even on the battlefield used singing to “restore the fighters’ courage.” For Red Army soldiers, singing a good song during a march or battle could be as effective as a political lesson.

政治工作是培塑红军强大行军能力的生命线。长期高强度的行军，身心疲惫实难避免，也会出现抱怨情绪。红军政治干部随时注意士兵情绪的变化与波动，每遇重大战斗或劳师远行后，都会通过政治宣传营造良好的政治氛围。唱歌是动员和宣传的有力武器。每到行走在艰难的地方，“宣传队的宣传员就唱上几段大家爱听的歌子，鼓动着战士们前进，勇敢杀敌”。休息时哪怕只有十几分钟，“士兵委员会的同志们也要进行鼓动工作，来个小演唱，唱段山歌。山谷里，树林里，到处充满欢乐的气氛，大家把疲劳和酷热都忘记了”。红军行军途中唱歌，休息时唱歌，即便在战场上有时也以唱歌“恢复战斗员的勇气”。对于红军战士而言，行军作战时唱一支好歌曲，可顶一堂政治课。

Strict organizational discipline was also an important guarantee for the Red Army’s rapid marching. The fundamental guarantee for the Red Army’s ability to create miracles of rapid marching lay in the Red Army’s “good political quality.” This was also the key reason why rapid marching became a unique advantage of the Red Army, something other armies could not learn or achieve. From the day of its birth, the Red Army placed exemplary adherence to organizational discipline in a prominent position; only a unit that strictly observed discipline could be called an iron Red Army. While marching, Red Army soldiers strictly observed discipline: “They could not speak, could not cough, and could not leave footprints. To eliminate traces, after passing, they had to straighten the grass that had been trampled. On rainy days, when walking, they would sometimes walk forward and then retreat, or simply walk in the stream bed, and they could not drop anything, because if something floated downstream, the enemy would discover it and follow the trail.” When encountering geographical bottlenecks that could delay marching speed, the Red Army strictly observed organizational discipline and could still move smoothly and orderly. The most typical example was river crossings. The most prominent feature of river crossings was the concentration of large forces at a single point; without strict organization and discipline, conflicts, crowding, and blockages would inevitably occur, seriously affecting marching speed. Yet the Red Army was able to successfully cross rivers many times under extremely tense and dangerous conditions, and the key lay in meticulous and detailed organizational management. For example, when the 1st Red Army Corps crossed the Gan River at Zhangshu Town, there were very detailed regulations on the crossing order, crossing security, dock routes, dock allocation, number of people per boat, crossing of horses and baggage, nighttime crossing lighting, and rest locations after crossing, covering almost all possible situations during the crossing. To ensure a smooth crossing, the Red Army set up a special River Crossing Command, and all units crossing the river were subject to its orders. After receiving orders, units had to obey crossing discipline and advance only at the sound of the bugle. Each boat had a number, the number of people per boat was specified, and seating order was marked; people could not board simultaneously but had to board in a single file. Even “when the corps commander or division commander crossed the river, they had to board in order and obey the River Crossing Command, without the slightest violation.”

组织纪律严明同样是红军快速行军的重要保障。红军之所以能够创造快速行军的奇迹，根本保障就在于红军的“政治质量良好”。这也是为何快速行军能成为红军的优势特长，而其他军队学不来做不到的关键所在。红军自诞生之日起，就将模范遵守组织纪律放在突出位置，只有严格遵守纪律的部队才称得上是铁的红军。行军之时，红军战士们严格遵守纪律，“不能讲话，不能咳嗽，更不能留下脚印。为了消灭形迹，走过之后要把踩倒的草扶起来。落雨天走路，走走又退回来，或者干脆就在河沟里走，而且不能失落任何东西，否则东西顺流而下，敌人发现又要跟踪而至了”。行军途中如遇延宕行军速度的地理节点，红军严格遵守组织纪律，也能实现畅行有序，最典型的例证便是渡河。渡河最突出的特点就是大军汇集一点，如无严密的组织和纪律，必然造成冲突矛盾、拥挤堵塞，严重影响行军速度。然而红军却能多次在极度紧张险难的条件下顺利渡河，关键就在于严密细致的组织管理。如红一军团由樟树镇渡赣江时，有关渡河次序、渡河警戒、码头路线、码头分配、每船人数、渡河马匹行李问题以及夜间渡河照明、渡河后之休息地点等皆有十分详细的规定，几乎考虑到了渡河时的各种情况。为了顺利渡河，红军专设渡河司令部，一切渡河部队皆听渡河司令部指挥。部队接到命令后，须遵守渡河纪律，听号音前进。每船都有号码，船内规定所载人数，并标明座位次序，不得同时几个人上船，只能一路纵队上船。即便“军团长、师长渡河时，亦须按次上船，听命于渡河司令部，不稍违背”。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

An exploration of the Red Army’s marching issues from the micro-technical level shows that the purpose of the Red Army’s marching was to “achieve victory with certainty.” They “sometimes went east, sometimes west, sometimes took the main road, sometimes took the small path, sometimes took the old road, sometimes took the new road,” all to seek favorable opportunities and areas, “to achieve victory in battle under favorable conditions.” Therefore, the Red Army’s unique marching and combat methods were not simply about hiding and evading, but about disrupting the enemy in an unpredictable manner, seeking opportunities to fight, and annihilating the enemy with swift and decisive action. Objectively speaking, this unique marching method was necessitated by the reality of the enemy being strong and the Red Army being weak. Compared to a powerful enemy, for the Red Army to win, it had to rely not only on excellent strategic deployment but also on meticulous tactical creation. After the Autumn Harvest Uprising, most of the Chinese Communist Party’s armed forces withdrew to the Jinggang Mountains. Kuomintang general Chen Cheng immediately concluded that after a series of military setbacks, the Chinese Communist Party’s “remaining forces were few and could not attempt any major action. To prolong their desperate existence, they first took refuge in the Jinggang Mountains in western Jiangxi, which could only be a temporary expedient when they had no way out. So-called long-term plans for establishing base areas were probably out of the question at that time.” However, to the great surprise of their opponents, Red Army leaders represented by Mao Zedong and Zhu De actively adjusted their strategic thinking and changed the military struggle methods of regular warfare, quickly establishing a foothold and taking root in mountainous areas, and adjusted specific marching techniques according to the characteristics of mountain guerrilla warfare, ultimately turning a single spark into a prairie fire.

从微观技术层面对红军行军问题的探讨说明：红军行军的目的，为的是“有把握的求得胜利”，他们“有时向东，有时向西，有时走大路，有时走小路，有时走老路，有时走新路”，就是寻求有利的时机与地区，“在有利条件下，求得作战的胜利”。因此，红军独特的行军作战方式，并非简单地隐藏躲避，而是在飘忽无常中扰乱敌军、寻找战机，以迅捷果断的战斗消灭敌人。这种独特的行军方式，从客观上讲是敌强我弱的现实所需。相比于强大的敌人，红军要想取胜，既要靠卓越的战略排布，也要凭借精谨的战术创造。秋收起义后中共武装大部退往井冈山。国民党将领陈诚当即断定：在经历一系列的军事挫折后，中共“残余力量无几，更不能图大举。为苟延残喘，乃就近先在赣西井冈山上落草，只可能是走投无路的一时权宜之计。所谓建立根据地的远大计划，此时也许根本谈不到”。然而令对手十分意外的是，以毛泽东、朱德为代表的红军领导人，主动调整战略思维并改变正规作战的军事斗争方式，在山区地带迅速立足和扎根，并根据山地游击战特点调整具体行军技术，终将星星之火燃成燎原之势。

The Red Army’s outstanding technique of rapid night marching in mountainous terrain was an important feature at the tactical level of the Red Army. This practice of marching and fighting also basically established the military combat style of the armed forces of the Chinese Communist Party, and was passed down and developed through multiple subsequent historical periods. For example, an American veteran who participated in the Korean War mentioned in his memoirs: “No one has studied just how excellent and how swift the Chinese were at marching.” The U.S. commander “never imagined that the Chinese would launch an attack in such a way — not mainly through frontal assault, but by marching on foot at night to circle around to the enemy’s flank, seeking out the weakest link to strike.” Even in daylight, the Chinese, relying on their outstanding marching ability, could “disappear into the rugged mountains of Korea.” In fact, the Chinese “had already turned America’s greatest advantage — the need for good roads due to reliance on heavy weapons — into a weakness.” The Red Army’s tactical creativity in difficult circumstances, and the combat wisdom it embodied of creating initiative in adversity and seeking change in deadlock, is an important force that cannot be ignored in influencing the revolutionary practice and historical trajectory of the Chinese Communist Party.

红军卓越的山地夜路快速行军技术，是红军战术层面的重要特色。这种行军作战实践也基本奠定了中共武装力量的军事作战风格，并在其后的多个历史时期传承发展。如一名参加过朝鲜战争的美国老兵在其回忆录中就提到：“没有一个人研究过中国人的行军到底有多出色，多迅速。”美军指挥官“从未想到中国人会以这样的方式发起进攻——不以正面进攻为主，而是夜间步行绕到敌人的侧翼，寻找最薄弱的环节实施打击”。即便在白天，中国人也能凭借其优秀的行军能力“消失在朝鲜的崇山峻岭之中”。事实上，中国人“已经把美国最大的优势——因依赖重武器而需要良好的路况——转化为弱势”。红军在艰难环境中的战术创造及其背后所蕴藏的在逆境中创造主动、在困局中寻求机变的斗争智慧，是影响中共革命实践和历史走向不可忽视的重要力量。

Author’s bio: Niu Zelin, doctoral candidate, School of Government, Nanjing University.

作者简介：牛泽林，南京大学政府管理学院博士生。;