From Domestic Confrontation to International Debut: The CPC and the Question of Representation at the San Francisco Conference

As World War II drew to a close in 1945, the post-war peace order became a focus of the international community, led by the four major powers of the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and China, and the United Nations was thus born. Prior to this, research on the Kuomintang government’s active efforts to establish the United Nations has been quite extensive. Academic discussions centered on the CPC, however, have mainly focused on the composition of the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco Conference (also known as the United Nations Conference on International Organization), the CPC’s struggle to secure participation, the significance of Dong Biwu’s attendance, and his activities in the United States. Yet, compared with diplomatic analyses of the CPC sending representatives to the San Francisco Conference, there is currently little research in academia linking the CPC’s domestic and international political objectives to explore changes in its propaganda strategy. In particular, insufficient attention has been paid to issues such as the interactive relationship between the Kuomintang-CPC “coalition government” negotiations and the composition of the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco Conference, as well as the CPC’s propaganda strategy regarding Dong Biwu’s visit. In fact, the issue of the Chinese delegation members to the San Francisco Conference witnessed the CPC’s transformation from a party lacking international experience into a mature political party with both international and domestic perspectives. This article intends to combine relevant archival documents to restore, to the greatest extent possible, the complex internal and external situation the CPC faced before and after the San Francisco Conference, thereby exploring the CPC’s early view of the international community on the eve of the United Nations’ establishment and the corresponding changes in its propaganda strategy.

在1945年第二次世界大战行将结束之际，战后世界的和平秩序成了以美、苏、英、中四大国为首的国际社会关注的重点，联合国由此应运而生。此前，有关国民党政府积极筹建联合国的相关研究业已相当丰富。而学界以中共为中心的讨论，则主要聚焦旧金山会议（也称联合国制宪会议）中国代表团的组成和中共争取参会的斗争、董必武的参会意义与其在美的活动轨迹等。不过，相较于中共派代表参加旧金山会议的外交分析，目前学界联系中共的国内外政治目标来探讨其宣传策略变化的研究尚不多，特别是有关国共“联合政府”谈判与旧金山会议中国代表团组成问题的互动关系、中共对董必武出访的宣传策略等问题关注不足。实际上，旧金山会议中国代表团成员问题见证了中共由国际经验不足成长为兼具国际与国内视野的成熟政党。本文拟结合相关档案文献，以最大程度还原中共在旧金山会议前后面临的错综复杂的内外局面，由此探讨中共在联合国建立前夕的早期国际社会观与相应的宣传策略变化。

I. “Coalition Government”: The Historical Background of the CPC’s Struggle for a Seat at the San Francisco Conference

一、“联合政府”：中共争取旧金山会议代表席位的历史背景

The determination of the core principles of the “United Nations” began with the Atlantic Charter, reached by the heads of the United States and Britain in 1941, and the Declaration by United Nations, signed by 22 countries including the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and China on New Year’s Day 1942 after the outbreak of the Pacific War. After the war situation gradually turned in favor of the Allies, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt began planning for the establishment of a post-war peace organization. Following the Moscow “Four-Power Declaration” and the Tehran Conference at the end of 1943, which twice confirmed the idea of the four major powers as the center of the new international organization, in the autumn of 1944, representatives of the United States and Britain successively met with Soviet and Chinese representatives at Dumbarton Oaks, finalizing the “Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization,” which became the prototype of the later United Nations Charter. Throughout this process, the government of the Republic of China actively participated. The CPC, on the other hand, mainly used newspapers as a platform to voice public opinion and actively supported the relevant conferences, but in reality, it lacked fair opportunities to participate in the various negotiations. Taking the Dumbarton Oaks Conference from August to October 1944 as an example, although the CPC’s two major party newspapers (Jiefang Daily and Xinhua Daily) actively reprinted the “Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization,” due to various bans and restrictions imposed by the Kuomintang, the CPC lacked channels to fully understand the specific process of the negotiations.

“联合国”核心原则的确定，肇始于1941年美英首脑达成的《大西洋宪章》和太平洋战争爆发后1942年元旦由美、苏、英、中等22国签署的《联合国家宣言》。而在二战局势逐渐有利于盟国后，美国总统罗斯福开始筹谋战后和平组织实体的建立。在1943年底莫斯科“四国宣言”和德黑兰会议两次确定了四大国为新兴国际组织重心的设想后，1944年秋，美英代表先后于敦巴顿橡树园会见了苏联和中国代表，确定了“国际组织建议案”，这也成为了日后《联合国宪章》的雏形。在整个过程中，中华民国政府积极参与。中共方面则主要以报纸作为舆论发声场积极拥护相关会议，实则未能获得参与各个谈判的公平机会。以1944年8月至10月的敦巴顿橡树园会议为例，中共的两大党报（《解放日报》与《新华日报》）虽然积极转载“国际组织建议案”，但实际上由于国民党的种种禁令和约束，中共缺少充分了解谈判具体过程的渠道。

Nevertheless, the CPC closely followed the international situation and, especially from 1944 onward, actively carried out external work. An important background to this change was the Kuomintang army’s ineffective resistance against Japan on the main battlefield. As Kuomintang rule became increasingly corrupt, it suffered a major defeat in the Henan-Hunan-Guangxi campaign in response to the Japanese “Operation Ichigo.” Meanwhile, the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines led by the CPC, after a long period of arduous resistance, began to gradually reverse their difficult situation from 1943 onward, launching offensive operations against Japanese and puppet forces in some areas. One was retreating, the other was advancing—the two formed a stark contrast. Against this backdrop, the U.S. government increasingly valued the strategic importance of the CPC’s anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines. In July and August 1944, the U.S. Army Command in the China-Burma-India Theater dispatched the U.S. Army Observer Group in two batches, with 18 members entering Yan’an. CPC leaders attached great importance to this and held multiple talks with them, aiming to establish communication between the CPC and the outside world and to more widely publicize the Party’s propositions. To assess subsequent diplomatic activities, the CPC Central Committee’s Southern Bureau, which had rich experience in external exchanges, suggested to the Central Committee on August 16: “We should constantly pay attention to studying international activities (such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the international aid movement to China, post-war peace plans, etc.), and prepare and put forward our own opinions.” The “post-war peace plans” referred mainly to the “United Nations” then being conceived. On August 18, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Directive on Diplomatic Work,” regarding the visits of foreign journalists and the U.S. Army Observer Group to the border region as the “development of the international united front” and “the beginning of our diplomatic work.” Furthermore, the Central Committee proposed that the international united front, centered on “joint resistance against Japan and democratic cooperation,” was “not only necessary during the War of Resistance but also possible after the war.” This demonstrated the CPC’s natural support and endorsement of the future United Nations entity.

尽管如此，中共仍密切关注国际形势，尤其是从1944年起，积极开展对外工作。这一变化的一个重要背景就是国民党军队在正面战场的抗日不力。由于国民党统治日显腐败，其在应对日军“一号作战”时发生豫湘桂大溃退。而中共领导的敌后战场经过长期艰苦抗战，从1943年起开始逐步扭转困难局面，在一些地区开始了对日、伪军的攻势作战。一个是后退，一个是前进，两者形成鲜明的对照。在此背景下，美国政府越来越重视中共敌后抗日根据地的战略价值。1944年七八月间，中缅印战区美军司令部分两批派遣美军观察组18人进入延安。中共领导人高度重视，多次与他们会谈，以期沟通中国共产党与外部世界的联系，更广泛地宣传党的主张。为了研判后续的外交活动，富有对外交往经验的中共中央南方局于8月16日建议中央：“要随时注意研究国际间的活动（如战后救济总署、国际援华运动、战后和平计划等），准备与提出自己的意见。”其中的“战后和平计划”，即主要指正在酝酿中的“联合国”。8月18日，中共中央发出《关于外交工作的指示》，将外国记者和美军观察组到访边区视作中共“国际间统一战线的开展”和“我们外交工作的开始”。此外，中央还提出，以“共同抗日与民主合作”为中心内容的国际统一战线“不仅在抗战中有此需要，即在战后也有此可能”。这呈现出中共对日后联合国实体机构的天然支持与拥护。

From September 1944, the Kuomintang-CPC negotiations entered a new phase. At that time, on the eve of the third session of the third People’s Political Council, the CPC Central Committee believed that “the time is ripe for our Party to propose to the Kuomintang and at home and abroad a plan to reorganize the government.” On September 15, CPC representative Lin Boqu publicly proposed for the first time at the People’s Political Council: “We hope the Kuomintang will immediately end the situation of one-party rule,” convene a national affairs conference, and “organize a coalition government of all anti-Japanese parties.” On September 27, Mao Zedong, in a letter drafted for Lin Boqu in reply to Kuomintang representatives Wang Shijie and Zhang Zhizhong, reiterated this proposal. This letter was delivered on October 13 but never received a positive response from the Kuomintang side.

从1944年9月起，国共谈判进入一个新的阶段。当时，正处在三届三次国民参政会召开的前夕，中共中央认为，“目前我党向国民党及国内外提出改组政府主张时机已经成熟”。9月15日，中共代表林伯渠在国民参政会上首次公开提出：“希望国民党立即结束一党统治的局面”，召开国是会议，“组织各抗日党派联合政府”。9月27日，毛泽东为林伯渠起草的复国民党代表王世杰、张治中的信中重申了这一主张。这封信于10月13日送达，但始终没有得到国民党方面的积极反响。

Internationally, the U.S. government was particularly concerned about China’s domestic political situation. As victory in the war approached, the U.S. government hoped to “unify China’s military forces under Chiang Kai-shek, make some reforms, and establish a government in China that could effectively serve the interests of the U.S. ruling class.” [1]1 This sentence reflects the U.S. government’s strategic objective of maintaining a stable, pro-American China under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership after the war, as part of its broader post-war geopolitical planning. In this context, Roosevelt sent former U.S. Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley to China as his personal envoy. In the early stages of Hurley’s mission to China, U.S. policy was to prevent the collapse of the Kuomintang regime and to have Hurley mediate Kuomintang-CPC relations.

国际上，美国政府对中国国内政局特别关心。随着战争接近胜利，美国政府希望“由蒋介石来统一中国的军事力量，并作出一些改革，在中国建立起一个能有效地适应美国统治阶级利益的政府”。在这种情况下，罗斯福派美国前陆军部部长赫尔利作为总统特使来到中国。赫尔利来华初期，美国政府的政策是防止国民党政权的崩溃，并让赫尔利居中调处国共关系。

In November 1944, Hurley flew to Yan’an, expressing agreement with the CPC’s proposal to abolish the Kuomintang’s one-party dictatorship and establish a coalition government. After three days of negotiations, Hurley and CPC leaders jointly drafted the “Draft Agreement between the National Government of China, the Chinese Kuomintang, and the Chinese Communist Party.” However, Chiang Kai-shek believed that the democratic reforms stipulated in this agreement would threaten Kuomintang rule and refused to accept it. Hurley also reneged on his support for establishing a democratic coalition government, which he had agreed to in Yan’an, and openly sided with Chiang Kai-shek. The negotiations could not proceed smoothly. Nevertheless, the CPC Central Committee still believed that, for the time being, “the negotiations have yielded no results, but the door to negotiations has not been closed.” On January 7, 1945, Hurley wrote to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, proposing a Kuomintang-CPC meeting in Yan’an with his participation. On January 11, Mao replied, stating that “such a meeting is unlikely to produce any results,” and the CPC proposed “convening a preparatory meeting for the national affairs conference in Chongqing. This preparatory meeting should include representatives from the Kuomintang, the Communist Party, and the China Democratic League, and it should be guaranteed that the meeting will be held publicly, with equal status and freedom of movement for representatives of all parties.”

1944 年11月，赫尔利飞抵延安，表示赞同中共关于废除国民党一党专政、成立联合政府的主张。经过三天谈判，赫尔利和中共领导人共同拟定了《中国国民政府、中国国民党与中国共产党协定（草案）》。然而，蒋介石认为这个协定所规定的民主改革会威胁国民党的统治，拒绝接受。赫尔利也背弃他在延安赞同建立民主联合政府的主张，公开站到蒋介石一边。谈判难以继续进行下去。不过中共中央仍认为，目前“谈判无结果，但未关闭谈判之门”。1945年1月7日，赫尔利致信毛泽东和周恩来，提议在延安举行有他参加的国共两党会议。11日，毛泽东复函说：“恐此项会议得不到何种结果”，中共提议“在重庆召开国是会议之预备会议，这种预备会议应该有国民党、共产党、民主政团同盟三方代表参加，并保证会议公开举行，各党派代表有平等地位和往返自由”。

Although the CPC’s proposal to first convene a party conference and then form a “coalition government” did not receive support from the Kuomintang side or the United States in late January 1945, by the end of January, Wang Shijie and Zhang Zhizhong changed their stance during the negotiations, “orally acknowledging that one-party rule should be ended” and “tending to convene a party conference.” On February 1, Wang Shijie also strongly urged Chiang Kai-shek on the necessity of seeking a “political solution” to the CPC issue. On February 2, after negotiations between Zhou Enlai and Wang Shijie, both sides felt their views were drawing closer. That evening, Zhou reported to Yan’an that “Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Shijie may accept a party conference.” On the same day, Wang Shijie noted in his diary, “Regarding the convening of a meeting for consultation involving some personnel outside the Kuomintang and non-party individuals, there is already general agreement between the two sides.”

尽管中共先召开党派会议再组建“联合政府”的方案在1945年1月下旬并未得到国民党方面和美方的支持，但1月底，王世杰、张治中在谈判期间转变态度，“口头承认应结束一党统治”，并“倾向于召集党派会议”。2月1日，王世杰也向蒋介石力陈寻求中共问题“政治解决”的必要性。2月2日，周恩来与王世杰谈判后双方均感觉意见有所接近。周恩来当晚汇报延安，“蒋介石、王世杰有可能接受党派会议”。而同日王世杰在日记中也提到，“对于召集若干国民党以外人员及无党无派人员，开会协商一事，彼此已大体同意”。

Mao Zedong closely followed the progress of the negotiations and maintained a high degree of vigilance regarding the shift in the Kuomintang’s attitude. On 3 February 1945, after analyzing multiple reports from Zhou Enlai, Mao sent two telegrams in reply. In the first telegram, he sharply analyzed the reasons for the Kuomintang’s major concessions to the CPC in light of the world situation. Mao believed that, on the one hand, the results of the Yalta Conference were about to be made public—“Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin are already meeting, and the results will be seen in a few days”; on the other hand, the European theater was about to end—“the possibility of Soviet involvement in Eastern affairs is growing.” Consequently, “the United States and Chiang Kai-shek are both anxious to reach a political compromise with us.” On this basis, Mao decisively instructed Zhou Enlai in the second telegram that, in addition to insisting on the abolition of one-party rule, he should focus on four points: eliminating the secret police, granting genuine freedom to the people, releasing political prisoners, and lifting the blockade of the border regions. He was to directly inform Hurley, Song Ziwen, Wang Shijie, and Zhang Zhizhong that “if these four points are not implemented first, it cannot be proven that abolishing one-party rule and practicing democracy are not a deception, and we will find it extremely difficult to join the government.” This shows that, at a time when the international situation was unclear in early February, Mao decided to hold firm to the negotiating conditions. On 13 February, Zhou Enlai, accompanied by Hurley, met with Chiang Kai-shek, who refused to accept the proposal for a coalition government, declaring that “organizing a coalition government is tantamount to overthrowing the government, and a party conference is equivalent to a conference for dividing the spoils.” Under these circumstances, the KMT-CPC negotiations could not continue.

毛泽东密切关注着谈判的进展，对于国民党方面态度的转变，他保持着高度警觉。1945年2月3日，毛泽东在分析了周恩来的多份汇报后，连发两封电报回复。在第一封电报中，他结合世界局势犀利分析了国民党对中共大幅妥协的原因。毛泽东认为，一方面，雅尔塔会议结果即将公开，“罗斯福、丘吉尔、斯大林已在开会，数日后即可见结果”；另一方面，欧洲战场即将结束，“苏联参与东方事件可能性增长”。因而，“美、蒋均急于和我们求得政治妥协”。基于此，毛泽东在第二封电报中果断指示周恩来，除坚持废除党治外，请着重取缔特务、给人民真正的自由、释放政治犯、撤销对边区的包围四条，请直告赫尔利、宋子文、王世杰、张治中，“如这四条不先办到，不能证明废党治、行民主不是骗局，我们万难加入政府”。这说明，在2月初国际形势不明之时，毛泽东决定坚持谈判条件。2月13日，周恩来在赫尔利陪同下会见蒋介石，蒋介石拒绝接受建立联合政府的主张，宣称“组织联合政府无异于推翻政府，党派会议等于分赃会议”。在此情况下，国共谈判无法继续。

II. The Confrontation Between the KMT and the CPC over the Composition of the Chinese Delegation to the San Francisco Conference

二、国共围绕旧金山会议中国代表团组成问题的交锋

The KMT-CPC negotiations and the issue of the composition of the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco Conference intersected precisely in mid-February 1945. In response to Wang Shijie’s statement at a foreign press conference on 14 February distorting the truth of the KMT-CPC negotiations, Zhou Enlai issued a statement on behalf of the CPC Central Committee the following day on the issue of the KMT-CPC negotiations, explaining that the negotiations had yielded no results because the KMT government insisted on the CPC handing over its army, persisted in not ending one-party dictatorship, and opposed a democratic coalition government. This statement was published in the *Liberation Daily* on 17 February. On the same page of the same issue, the newspaper published a special editorial highly praising the Crimea Conference (i.e., the Yalta Conference) for having “resolved the major differences over the voting procedure of the Security Council in the international peace and security organization, making the rapid convening of the United Nations Conference possible.” The editorial also focused on the Yalta Conference’s announcement “that the United Nations Conference would be convened in San Francisco on 25 April this year, and that our country was invited to participate in the joint convening of the conference.” The CPC, which had previously had no opportunity to participate in any meetings of the United Nations’ preparatory process, put forward a completely new demand: “At the San Francisco International Conference opening on 25 April, the Kuomintang dictatorial government should be allowed to send at most one-third of the delegates; the other two-thirds of the delegates should be sent by the Chinese Communist Party, the China Democratic League, and prominent non-partisan figures to represent the vast numbers of people in China’s liberated areas, occupied areas, and the rear areas.”

国共谈判与旧金山会议中国代表团组成两个问题正是在1945年2月中旬发生交汇。针对王世杰2月14日在外国记者招待会上发表歪曲国共谈判真相的声明，周恩来于次日代表中共中央就国共谈判问题发表声明，说明由于国民党政府在谈判中坚持要中共交出军队，坚持不结束一党专政，反对民主的联合政府，所以使谈判毫无结果。该声明发表在2月17日的《解放日报》上。同一日的同一版面，该报发表专题社论，盛赞克里米亚会议（即雅尔塔会议）“解决了关于国际和平安全机构中安全理事会的表决程序问题上的重要分歧，使联合国会议的迅速召开成为可能”。该社论还重点关注雅尔塔会议“宣布于今年四月廿五日在旧金山召开联合国会议，并邀请我国参加共同召集会议”的消息。此前未有机会参与联合国筹建过程任何会议的中共，提出了一个全新的要求：“四月二十五日开会的旧金山国际大会，至多准许国民党独裁政府派出三分之一的代表，其他三分之二的代表，应由中国共产党、中国民主同盟及著名无党派人士代表中国解放区、中国沦陷区及中国大后方广大人民派出自己的代表。”

In light of the near-breakdown of the KMT-CPC negotiations over the proposals for a “party conference” and a “coalition government,” the CPC’s demand regarding the proportion of delegates in the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco Conference highlighted its hope to push the “coalition government” thesis onto the international stage, thereby exposing the KMT’s dictatorial reality and winning over international public opinion.

结合此时国共谈判因“党派会议”与“联合政府”主张濒临破裂的局面，中共对于旧金山会议中国代表团人员比例的要求凸显其希望将“联合政府”论推向国际社会，从而揭露国民党独裁事实，争取国际舆论支持。

On 17 February, the Yan’an English-language broadcast even more explicitly linked the joint statement of the Yalta Conference with the two issues of the “coalition government” and the “one-party dictatorial (KMT) fascists.” The broadcast stated: “The joint statement of the leaders of the three major powers strengthens our confidence in democracy and promotes the formation of a coalition government. This is a heavy blow to those fascist believers who are addicted to one-party dictatorship.” The CPC linked the domestic KMT-CPC negotiations with the international San Francisco Conference, achieving a combined propaganda effect linking the domestic and international situations. This broadcast immediately attracted the attention of the United States; the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in China, Atcheson, immediately reported the text of the broadcast to Secretary of State Stettinius.

2 月17日，延安英文广播更是明确地将雅尔塔会议的联合声明与“联合政府”“一党专政的（国民党）法西斯”两个问题相联系。广播指出：“三大国领导人的联合声明加强了我们对民主的信心，并推动联合政府的形成。这对那些沉迷于一党专政的法西斯信徒来说，是一次沉重的打击。”中共将国内的国共谈判与国际的旧金山会议相联系，实现了国内外局势的联动宣传效果。这一广播当即引发了美国的关注，美国驻华临时代办艾其森立刻将该广播文稿报告国务卿斯退丁纽斯。

Also on 17 February, the *Xinhua Daily* reported statements by China Democratic League leaders Zuo Shunsheng, Shen Junru, and Zhang Bojun, emphasizing that the democratic principles of the Yalta Treaty also “apply to the Far East” and calling for “China to achieve success at the San Francisco Conference and gain its due status; it must appear before the world as a democratic and unified China, and the issues of party unity and a democratic coalition government must be quickly resolved.” That same day, the newspaper’s editorial also stressed: “The decisions of the Crimea Conference show that the world democratic tide is irresistible, and China’s internal unity issue must also be resolved fairly and reasonably through democratic means.”

同样是2月17日，《新华日报》也报道了民盟领导人左舜生、沈钧儒、章伯钧的谈话，强调雅尔塔条约的民主原则也“适用于远东”，呼吁“中国要在旧金山会议中获得成就，获得应有地位，就必须以民主统一的中国出现于世界人士之前，党派团结问题，民主联合政府问题就必须迅速解决”。当日，该报社论也强调：“克里米亚会议的决定显示世界民主潮流是不可抗拒的，中国内部统一问题，也必须循民主途径才能得到公平合理解决。”

On 18 February, Zhou Enlai sent a telegram to Hurley, formally presenting to the U.S. side the CPC’s demands regarding the composition of the Chinese delegation. However, Hurley refused and insisted that only the Republic of China could “represent China.” He also emphasized that “the San Francisco Conference is an international conference, not a conference of the domestic political parties of various countries.” In view of this, on 25 February, the CPC Central Committee instructed Wang Ruofei, Secretary of the Southern Bureau Working Committee: “The San Francisco Conference can only help promote the domestic democratic movement; it cannot yet be said that Chiang will necessarily make some concessions before this conference. The conditions that can truly force Chiang to make concessions are not yet fully mature.” “Now that all parties are advocating that the list of representatives should include all抗日 democratic forces, we hope that, in line with our Party’s position, we can launch a movement to prove that the Kuomintang cannot represent the public will of the entire nation.” This clearly shows that, when objective conditions were limited, the CPC actively changed its strategy, preparing to use the issue of representation as a pretext to initiate a domestic public opinion movement against KMT dictatorship.

2 月18日，周恩来致电赫尔利，正式向美方提出了在中国代表团组成问题上的要求。然而，赫尔利拒绝并坚称只有中华民国才能“代表中国”。他还强调，“旧金山会议是一场国际会议，而非各国国内政党的会议”。鉴于此，25日，中共中央指示南方局工委书记王若飞：“旧金山会议只能有利于国内民主运动的推动，还不能说蒋在此会议前必有若干让步，真正能逼蒋让步的条件，还没完全成熟”，“现在各方既均主张代表人选应包括各抗日民主力量，望即本党之主张，发动运动，以证明国民党不能代表全国人民公意”。这清晰说明，在客观条件受限时，中共积极转变策略，准备以代表席位为由，主动发起国内反国民党独裁的舆论运动。

At this time, Chiang Kai-shek was also facing pressure from within and outside the KMT. On 20 February 1945, Chiang recorded: “After the declaration of the Black Sea Three-Power Conference (i.e., the Yalta Conference), the Communist bandits used the word ‘democracy’ in it for fierce propaganda, and used the condition of securing their representation at the San Francisco Conference to threaten to weaken our government’s international status. Almost everyone inside and outside the Party was intimidated by this, feeling that our government was about to face another great disaster.” That same day, KMT elder Zou Lu also strongly urged Chiang Kai-shek, “If a compromise cannot be reached with the CPC before the San Francisco Conference, our international status will not be preserved.” The following day, Chiang received advice from Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union Fu Bingchang, relaying the suggestion of U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Harriman: “(Harriman believes) that our government’s accommodation and reorganization of the Communist Party should also be realized as soon as possible, preferably before the end of the European war.”

此时，蒋介石也正面临着国民党内外的压力。1945年2月20日，蒋介石曾记录：“黑海三国会议（即雅尔塔会议）宣言后，共匪借其中‘民主’语句作猛烈之宣传，并以争取其出席旧金山会议代表为条件，以减弱我政府国际地位相威胁，党内外几乎皆被其吓倒，以为我政府大祸又将临头之感。”当日，国民党元老邹鲁也力劝蒋介石，“旧金山会议以前，对中共如不能妥协，则我国际地位将不能保全”。次日，蒋介石又收到了中国驻苏大使傅秉常转述的美国驻苏大使哈里曼的建议，“（哈使以为）我政府之容共改组，亦宜早日实现，宜于欧战结束前为之”。

Under these circumstances, Chiang Kai-shek remained tough. On 1 March 1945, Chiang delivered a speech, reiterating that the government could only return political power to the “National Assembly” and not to a “party conference of various parties and factions or its coalition government,” and he unilaterally set a timetable for convening the so-called “National Assembly.” This action by Chiang Kai-shek undoubtedly proved that he had abandoned further peace talks. On 2 March, Zhou Enlai drafted a telegram on behalf of the CPC Central Committee to Wang Ruofei, in which he mentioned that Chiang’s speech proved that Wang Shijie’s statements about accepting a party conference, “the possibility of discussing the end of one-party rule,” and “the possibility of reorganizing the government” were “all deceptions.”

在此情况下，蒋介石仍保持强硬。1945年3月1日，蒋介石发表演说，重申政府只能还政于“国民大会”而非“各党各派的党派会议或其联合政府”，而且自行制定了召集所谓“国民大会”的时间。蒋介石此举无疑证明其放弃继续和谈。3月2日，周恩来为中共中央起草致王若飞电，其中提到：蒋介石的演说证明王世杰所说接受党派会议、“结束党治可以讨论”、“可以改组政府”等等，“都是哄骗”。

Just as the KMT-CPC peace talks were on the verge of breaking down, in a telegram sent to Mao Zedong on 6 March 1945, Wang Ruofei mentioned that there were rumors that Chiang Kai-shek might appoint CPC members as delegates to the San Francisco Conference. This new information from Wang Ruofei led the CPC to reconsider the possibility and candidates for sending delegates. On 7 March, Mao Zedong instructed: “Propose our side’s candidates to Wang Shijie, to prevent Chiang from making arbitrary appointments.” That same day, Zhou Enlai wrote to Wang Shijie, reiterating the demand for the proportion of delegates in the delegation and specifying the CPC’s preliminary list: “CPC Central Committee members Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu, and Qin Bangxian.” In addition, Zhou Enlai cited the inclusiveness of the U.S. and British delegations towards delegates from different political parties, sternly pointing out that if the KMT sought to “monopolize” the delegation list, it would be “not only unfair and unreasonable, but also indicative of a divisive stance.” On 9 March, Zhou Enlai notified Hurley, who had already returned to the United States, of the content of this letter, asking him to convey it to Roosevelt.

在国共和谈即将宣告破裂之时，王若飞1945年3月6日发给毛泽东的电报中，提到有消息传出蒋介石可能指派中共方面参加旧金山会议代表。王若飞的新情报让中共重新考虑派出代表的可能及人选。3月7日，毛泽东批示：“向王世杰提出我方出席人选，免蒋随意委派。”当天，周恩来致函王世杰，除继续强调代表团比例，还指定了中共的预备名单：“中央委员周恩来、董必武、秦邦宪三人”。此外，周恩来还援引美英代表团对不同政党代表的包容性，严正指出国民党在代表团名单上如欲“一手垄断”，“不但不公平、不合理，而且表示了分裂的立场”。3月9日，周恩来将这封信的内容通知已回美国的赫尔利，要他转达罗斯福。

In this situation, the CPC still did not relax its leadership over the domestic democratic movement. On March 8, 1945, Zhou Enlai drafted a telegram for the Party Central Committee, instructing Wang Ruofei to focus on persuading the China Democratic League to cooperate with us in launching a sharp counterattack, and to secretly print and distribute the *Liberation Daily* article criticizing Chiang Kai-shek’s speech. He also reiterated the need to combine the “political parties conference” and “coalition government” proposals with the propaganda campaign for the “San Francisco Conference”: “After Chiang’s speech is published, we must everywhere insist on a series of proposals—the political parties conference, ending one-party rule, a coalition government, and post-war unrestricted National Assembly elections—in order to dampen Chiang’s arrogance. Even if the San Francisco Conference refuses to include representatives from both the Communist Party and the Democratic League, we should still raise this as a foreshadowing.”

在这一情况下，中共仍没有放松对国内民主运动的领导。1945年3月8日，周恩来为中共中央起草电报，命王若飞重点说服民盟同我配合痛击，秘密印发《解放日报》评蒋介石演说的文章。他还重申，要将“党派会议”“联合政府”主张与“旧金山会议”的宣传运动结合起来：“在蒋演说发表后，更要到处坚持党派会议，结束党治，联合政府及战后无拘束的国大选举一系列主张，以杀蒋之气焰。旧金山会议即使拒绝共、民两方人物出席，但我们仍应提出以作伏笔。”

The so-called “foreshadowing” meant that the CPC would use Chiang Kai-shek’s refusal to include CPC and China Democratic League representatives in the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco Conference as a new weapon to “dampen Chiang’s arrogance.” In other words, the CPC shaped the issue of the composition of the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco Conference into a new focal point of public opinion for attacking Chiang Kai-shek’s dictatorial rule domestically.

所谓“作伏笔”，就是指中共要以蒋介石拒绝旧金山会议中国代表团包含中共、民盟的代表作为新的“杀蒋之气焰”的武器。换言之，中共将旧金山会议中国代表团组成问题塑造为国内抨击蒋介石独裁统治的舆论新焦点。

To this end, the CPC launched a large-scale propaganda campaign. In the 20 days before the Kuomintang government officially announced the delegation list at the end of March 1945, the *Liberation Daily* continuously reported that the military, government, and people of all anti-Japanese base areas actively responded to the proposal put forward in the newspaper’s earlier editorial—that the proportion of CPC and China Democratic League representatives should account for two-thirds of the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco Conference. The reports, as always, linked “the participation of CPC and China Democratic League representatives in the San Francisco Conference” with “the establishment of a coalition government,” in order to promote the domestic democratic movement. On March 21, Zuo Shunsheng, Secretary-General of the China Democratic League, wrote to Chiang Kai-shek, urging him to include CPC representatives in the Chinese delegation. This shows that the democratic movement initiated by the CPC not only created domestic public pressure but also influenced the delegation list through its impact on leaders of democratic parties. This was one of the important reasons why Chiang Kai-shek ultimately agreed to accept CPC representatives in the Chinese delegation.

为此，中共开展了大规模的宣传报道。在1945年3月底国民党政府正式公布代表团名单之前的20天里，《解放日报》持续报道各抗日根据地军、政、民积极响应该报此前社论中所提的中共与民盟代表的比例应占旧金山会议中国代表团的三分之二的主张。报道时一如既往注重将“中共及民盟等派代表参加旧金山会议”与“成立联合政府”相联系，以推动国内民主运动。3月21日，民盟秘书长左舜生致信蒋介石，力劝其容纳中共代表为中国代表团成员。这说明，中共发起的民主运动既制造了国内舆论压力，也通过影响民主党派领导人从而对代表名单产生了影响，这正是蒋介石最终同意接纳中共派代表参加中国代表团的重要原因之一。

In addition, the American factor was also a variable that contributed to the CPC obtaining representation. On March 15, 1945, Roosevelt cabled Chiang Kai-shek, following Zhou Enlai’s line of thinking that the British and American delegations included multiple political parties in the San Francisco Conference, and tactfully suggested that the Chinese delegation “include the Communist Party or other political combinations or parties.” However, this cable did not arrive at the U.S. Embassy in China until March 22. On March 23, after detailed discussions with Wellington Koo, Chiang Kai-shek “decided to send one Communist Party member to participate in the San Francisco Conference delegation.” On March 26, Chiang Kai-shek, at a National Defense Council meeting, “decided to send Dong Biwu to participate” in the delegation. That same day, Chiang Kai-shek replied to Roosevelt, introducing the party affiliations of the Chinese delegation list: “The Chinese government has today appointed ten delegates, six of whom are members of the People’s Political Council, including one each from the Communist Party and two other opposition parties outside the Kuomintang, plus three non-partisans, and the publisher of the *Ta Kung Pao* is also among them.” On March 27, the Executive Yuan of the Kuomintang government officially announced the delegation list.

此外，美国因素也是促成中共获得代表资格的变量。1945年3月15日，罗斯福致电蒋介石，按周恩来的美英代表团容纳多政党参与旧金山会议的思路，婉转建议中国代表团“容纳共产党或其他政治结合或政党”。不过，该电22日才抵达美国驻华大使馆。23日，蒋介石在与顾维钧详细商谈后，“决派中共一人参加旧金山会议代表团”。26日，蒋介石在国防会议上“决定派董必武参加”代表团。当日，蒋介石回复罗斯福，介绍了中国代表团名单所属的党派：“中国政府今日已派定代表十人，其中六人为国民参政员，即国民党以外之共产党及其他两反对党各一人，暨无党派者三人，大公报社长亦在其内。”27日，国民党政府行政院正式公开代表团名单。

Although the number of representatives did not meet the CPC’s initial demands, considering the importance of the post-war peace conference and the expectations of domestic and international people for peace, the Party Central Committee accepted it in the overall interest. On March 27, Zhou Enlai drafted a telegram for the Party Central Committee to Wang Ruofei: “Since the list of delegates to the San Francisco Conference has been announced, for the sake of making concessions to achieve the larger goal, we agree to Comrade Dong’s participation, but we must convey to Wang Shijie and Shao Lizi our dissatisfaction with the CPC being given only one representative.” Dong Biwu later also stated, “The Party Central Committee was extremely dissatisfied with the decision on the representatives to the San Francisco Conference. Because, given the role of the CPC and the anti-Japanese base areas in China’s politics and the War of Resistance Against Japan today,” “it should not have been limited to only one out of ten delegate seats. The reason we attended was entirely to demonstrate our love of peace, our spirit of seeking democratic unity through making concessions to achieve the larger goal, and to strive for international peace.”

尽管代表人数不符合中共的初始要求，但考虑到战后和平会议的重要性和国内外人民对和平的期待，中共中央还是顾全大局地接受了。3月27日，周恩来为中共中央起草致王若飞电：“出席旧金山会议代表团名单既已宣布，为委曲求全我们同意董老参加，但须转告王世杰、邵力子，对只给中共一名代表表示不满。”董必武后来也申明，“对这次旧金山会议代表的决定，我党中央是极不满意的。因为按照中共及敌后解放区在今天中国政治上及中国抗日战争中所起的作用”，“是不应该在十个代表名额中只占一个的。而我们之所以出席，则全为表现吾人之爱好和平，力求民主团结的委曲求全精神，并为国际和平而奋斗”。

Regarding Dong Biwu’s selection as a delegate, the United States had the following suspicions about Chiang Kai-shek’s intentions: “By appointing Dong Biwu, the central government actually places the Communist Party in a position where they must agree to this appointment, or else they will face international criticism for being unwilling to cooperate with the government in any field.” In other words, the United States believed that Chiang Kai-shek’s appointment, while appearing to be a concession to the CPC, was actually “retreating in order to advance.” Specifically, Chiang Kai-shek hoped that this move would both deprive the CPC of opportunities for external propaganda and force it, for the sake of democratic unity, to “have no choice but to agree to this appointment.”

董必武被选为代表，美国对蒋介石的意图有如下怀疑：“通过任命董必武，中央政府实际将中共置于一个不得不同意此任命的位置，否则他们将面临国际社会对其不愿与政府在任何领域合作的批评。”换言之，美国认为，蒋介石的任命看似向中共让步，实则是“以退为进”。具体而言，蒋介石此举希望让中共既损失对外舆论宣传的机会，又使其为了民主团结“不得不同意此任命”。

Although Dong Biwu was one of ten delegates in the Chinese delegation, he represented the Chinese Communist Party and the vast regions and people under its leadership—19 liberated areas, 100 million people, 970,000 regular troops, and 2.2 million militia. Representing the Chinese people for the first time at an international conference of such great significance, and solemnly signing the United Nations Charter, was unprecedented in Chinese history. The Party Central Committee actively seized the favorable opportunity of Dong Biwu’s participation in the San Francisco Conference as a CPC representative, strengthened propaganda, and reaffirmed its full support for the United Nations. Mao Zedong, in *On Coalition Government*, specifically stated: “The Chinese Communist Party fully agrees with the recommendations made at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and the decisions on this issue made at the Crimea Conference regarding the establishment of an institution for the maintenance of post-war international peace and security. The Chinese Communist Party welcomes the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. The Chinese Communist Party has already sent its own representative to join the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco Conference, in order to express the will of the Chinese people.”

董必武虽是中国代表团十个代表之一，但他却代表了中国共产党及其领导下的19个解放区、1亿人民和97万正规军、220万民兵的广大地区和人民。代表中国人民第一次出席具有如此重大意义的国际会议，并庄重地在联合国宪章上签字，这在中国历史上是空前的。中共中央积极把握董必武以中共代表身份参加旧金山会议的有利时机，加强宣传，并重申对于联合国的完全拥护。毛泽东在《论联合政府》中特别提出：“中国共产党对于保障战后国际和平安全的机构之建立，完全同意敦巴顿橡树林会议所作的建议和克里米亚会议对这个问题所作的决定。中国共产党欢迎旧金山联合国代表大会。中国共产党已经派遣自己的代表加入中国代表团出席旧金山会议，借以表达中国人民的意志。”

III. Dong Biwu’s Trip to San Francisco: Actively Seizing Opportunities for External Propaganda

三、董必武的旧金山之行：积极把握外宣机会

Shortly after the CPC decided to agree to send Dong Biwu to San Francisco, the Party Central Committee formulated corresponding domestic and international propaganda strategies. On April 1, 1945, a meeting of the Presidium of the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC decided that Dong Biwu’s main tasks in the United States were to “win over foreign friends, raise our Party’s international status, and strive to remain in the United States for work as much as possible, in order to expand the Chinese Communist Party’s international influence.” This meant that in the arena of participating in the San Francisco Conference, the CPC’s main target of propaganda shifted from domestic to international—that is, the focus shifted from promoting the domestic democratic movement to enhancing the CPC’s international influence. John S. Service, Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in China, once reported to the State Department that “Yan’an expects that the Chinese government delegation will prevent Dong Biwu from expressing his own views at the conference or in public. Therefore, the Communist Party’s efforts in San Francisco will mainly focus on informal contacts with the press and other delegations.”

早在中共决定同意派董必武前往旧金山后不久，中共中央就制定了相应的国内外宣传策略。1945年4月1日，中共六届七中全会主席团会议决定，董必武赴美的任务主要是“争取外国朋友，提高我党的国际地位，并尽量争取留驻美国工作，以扩大中国共产党在国际上的影响”。这意味着在参加旧金山会议这一场域，中共主要宣传对象从对内转为对外，即重心从推动国内民主运动转变为增强中共的国际影响力。美国驻华使馆二等秘书谢伟思就曾报告国务院称，“延安预计中国政府代表团会阻止董必武在会议或公众场合发表自己的意见。因此，共产党在旧金山的努力将主要集中于与新闻界和其他代表团的非正式接触”。

On the way to San Francisco, Dong Biwu and his entourage actively sought opportunities to spread the “coalition government” proposal and the actual situation in the liberated areas to the outside world. After flying from Yan’an to Chongqing, Dong Biwu attended a farewell party held by the China Democratic League, where he actively promoted the “coalition government” proposal. He pointed out: “Only with a democratic coalition government can the people’s various freedoms and rights be realized, can the Chinese people demonstrate their own strength and role in the War of Resistance, can they meet the demands of the entire nation internally and international expectations externally; otherwise, when the War of Resistance is about to be won or has not yet been won, there will be the danger of civil war.” The women’s circles in Chongqing also held a tea party to bid farewell to Dong Biwu. At the meeting, Dong Biwu introduced the latest military, political, and economic conditions in the liberated areas and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. It is noteworthy that, according to a decision of the Central Committee, one of Dong Biwu’s attendants was Zhang Hanfu, Editor-in-Chief of the *Xinhua Daily*, so this newspaper also undertook the main reporting tasks during Dong Biwu’s participation in the conference. The choice of the *Xinhua Daily*, headquartered in Chongqing, as the medium for propaganda also reflected, from one side, that the Party Central Committee set the domestic propaganda focus of Dong Biwu’s visit as the Kuomintang-controlled areas, thereby showing the democratic parties and leftist masses sympathetic to the CPC the attitude and performance of the CPC representative within the Chinese delegation in San Francisco.

董必武一行前往旧金山途中，主动寻找机会，致力于把“联合政府”主张和解放区的实际情况向外传播。从延安飞抵重庆后，董必武参加了中国民主同盟举行的欢送会，在会上积极宣传“联合政府”主张，他指出：“有了民主的联合政府，人民的各种自由权利才能实现，中国人民才能在抗战中表现其本身的力量与作用，才能内合全民要求，外符国际期望，否则在抗战将胜利或未胜利的时候，即有内战的危险。”重庆妇女界也举行茶话会欢送董必武。在会上，董必武介绍了解放区和陕甘宁边区最近在军事、政治、经济等方面的情况。值得注意的是，根据中央决定，董必武的随员之一是《新华日报》总编辑章汉夫，因而该报也承担了董必武参会期间的主要报道任务。选择驻地在重庆的《新华日报》作为宣传的媒介，也从侧面反映出中共中央将董必武出访的国内宣传重心定为国统区，从而向民主党派与同情中共的左翼群众展现出中共代表在旧金山中国代表团中的态度和表现。

After arriving in San Francisco, the public opinion environment faced by Dong Biwu and his delegation was even more complex. The Kuomintang’s systematic blockade of public opinion greatly compressed the operational space for the CPC’s external propaganda. As early as the delegation formation stage, Wang Shijie, the Kuomintang government’s Minister of Propaganda, was tasked with formulating the “Three Measures for Propaganda Regarding the San Francisco Conference,” which specifically mentioned the need to prevent the CPC from “using the San Francisco Conference to attempt to undermine the government’s prestige and to issue declarations opposing the government delegation.” [19]19 Wang Shijie (1891–1981) was a senior Kuomintang official who served as Minister of Propaganda and later as Foreign Minister. On Wang Shijie’s suggestion, Chiang Kai-shek even secretly ordered the responsible personnel of embassies and consulates abroad to take necessary measures to ensure that overseas compatriots and overseas Chinese newspapers “support the Central Government and see through the CPC’s treacherous schemes,” and “prevent them from making any expressions of support for the Communist Party before and after the conference.” [20]20 Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) was the leader of the Kuomintang and the Republic of China government during this period. Zhang Hanfu also recalled that the Kuomintang government “secretly assigned特务 [special agents] to disrupt and sabotage Dong Biwu’s activities outside the conference.” [21]21 Zhang Hanfu (1906–1972) was a senior CPC diplomat and intellectual.

而在抵达旧金山后，董必武一行面临的舆论场域更为复杂。国民党的系统性舆论封堵极大压缩了中共对外宣传的操作空间。早在代表团组建阶段，国民党政府宣传部部长王世杰就受命制定了“旧金山会议之宣传办法三项”，特别提到要防范中共“利用旧金山会议企图破坏政府威信，并发表反对政府代表团之宣言”。在王世杰的建议下，蒋介石更是密令驻外使领馆负责人员采取必要措置，务使侨胞及侨报“拥护中央，洞烛中共奸计”，并“防止彼等在会议前后发生响应共党之表示”。章汉夫也曾回忆，国民党政府“暗地里指派特务对董必武会外的活动进行捣乱和破坏”。

Although Dong Biwu’s initial international debut faced numerous obstacles, he broke through the Kuomintang’s tight defenses and made full use of every available opportunity to publicize the Chinese Communist Party to the international community. Following instructions from the Party Central Committee, Dong Biwu proceeded from the overall situation and adhered to the consensus reached within the delegation, namely, that going abroad represented China, regardless of party affiliation. Gu Weijun, a member of the delegation, recalled that he and Dong Biwu and other representatives had reached an internal “understanding on the code of conduct for the delegation,” and that “Dong Biwu indeed adhered to it consistently.” [22]22 Gu Weijun (1888–1985), also known as V. K. Wellington Koo, was a prominent Chinese diplomat who served as a member of the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco Conference. Dong Biwu also assured journalists during an interview that “within the Chinese delegation, regarding matters of the United Nations International Organization Conference, there is harmony and unity, and discussions and decisions are conducted in accordance with democratic methods.” This fully demonstrates the sense of responsibility and vision of the Chinese Communists, represented by Dong Biwu, who prioritized the interests of the nation.

尽管董必武在国际视野的初次亮相受到了重重阻碍，但他还是突破国民党的严防死守，充分利用可资利用的机会，向国际社会宣传中国共产党。董必武按照中央指示从大局出发，遵从代表团内部达成的共识，即出国代表中国、不论党派。代表团成员之一的顾维钧曾回忆，他与董必武等代表内部达成了“关于代表团行动准则的谅解”，“董必武确是恪守如一”。董必武还曾在接见记者时保证，“中国代表团内部关于联合国国际组织会议事情，和谐一致，并依循民主方法进行讨论及作决定”。这足见以董必武为代表的中国共产党人以民族大义为重的担当与格局。

The primary target audience for Dong Biwu’s delegation’s propaganda was the English-language public opinion sphere and political circles, mainly in the United States. Shortly after arriving in the United States in late April 1945, Dong Biwu unequivocally stated to a reporter from the New York *Daily Worker* that the CPC had four reasons for sending representatives to the San Francisco Conference: “First, to assist in the democratic international organization drafted at the Tehran Conference; second, to deliver the final blow to Nazism; third, to further isolate Japan; and fourth, to strike a blow against fascism worldwide.” [23]23 The *Daily Worker* was the newspaper of the Communist Party of the United States of America. He also specifically explained the issue of “establishing a coalition government in China.” He stated: “To mobilize the entire Chinese people and all their strength to expel the Japanese aggressors, we must establish a democratic coalition government. Only by mobilizing the strength of the entire nation can we expel the Japanese aggressors.” When asked whether “Chinese Communists are Chinese first and Communists second,” Dong Biwu publicly replied, “This is not a question of first or second. The main purpose of the Chinese Communist Party is how to save China in the war and how to revitalize China from its economic backwardness.” [24]24 The Tehran Conference was a 1943 meeting between Allied leaders Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin. By linking the “coalition government” proposal with the War of Resistance against Japan, Dong Biwu aimed to show the European and American public opinion circles the CPC’s stance of persisting in the War of Resistance and opposing fascism, thereby shaping an international image of the CPC as enlightened, resilient, and committed to peace and development.

董必武一行的宣传受众首先是以美国为主的英语舆论界和政界。1945年4月底抵达美国之初，董必武就旗帜鲜明地向纽约《工人日报》记者表示，中共派代表参加旧金山会议有四大理由：“一，协助特黑兰会议（即德黑兰会议）拟定之民主国家组织；二，予纳粹以最后之打击；三，更加孤立日本；四，予全世界法西斯以打击。”他还具体解释了“成立中国联合政府”的问题。他表示：“为动员中国全体人民及力量以驱逐日寇，我们必须成立一个民主联合政府。只有动员全国力量，我们方能逐出日寇。”而当被问及“中国共产党人是否先中国人而次共产党”时，董必武也公开答复，“此不是何先何次之问题，中国共产党之主要目的，是如何于战争中救中国，及从经济落后中振兴中国”。董必武将“联合政府”主张与抗日联系起来，意在向欧美舆论界展示中共坚持抗日和反法西斯的态度，从而在国际上塑造中共开明、坚韧、追求和平与发展的政党形象。

Regarding specific issues of Kuomintang-CPC relations, Dong Biwu’s delegation also repeatedly and proactively expressed the CPC’s position. For example, staff member Chen Jiakang explained to journalists why Zhou Enlai had rejected the Chongqing proposal to “establish a reorganization committee composed of one member each from the Kuomintang, the Communist Party, and the United States to reorganize the CPC army” and to “appoint an American officer as commander-in-chief of the CPC army”: “It is precisely because it only aims to reorganize the CPC army, and the American commander of the CPC army would be under Chiang’s command.” [25]25 Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) was a top leader of the CPC and its chief negotiator with the Kuomintang. Regarding the so-called “National Assembly,” Dong Biwu also clearly stated, “Not only the CPC, but also all factions of the Democratic League oppose the November National Assembly. If the National Assembly is convened according to the Kuomintang’s plan, it will legalize one-party dictatorship under the guise of a constitution. Therefore, its convening is not for achieving unity, but for splitting China.” [26]26 The “National Assembly” was a constitutional body the Kuomintang planned to convene to formalize its one-party rule. This shows that the CPC actively pushed the issue of Kuomintang-CPC negotiations and the “coalition government” dispute onto the international stage, seeking understanding and support from European and American societies.

而对于国共关系的具体问题，董必武一行也多次主动表达中共的立场。比如，随员陈家康向记者解释，周恩来之所以拒绝接受重庆“成立有国民党、共产党、美国各一人参加的整编委员会，整编中共军队”并“为中共军队设一美军官作总司令”的方案，“乃因其只为改编中共军队，而中共军之美军司令则在蒋之指挥下”。而对于所谓“国民大会”，董必武亦明确表示，“不仅中共，即民主同盟各党派亦均反对十一月之国民大会”，“如国民大会依据国民党计划召开，将是以宪法之掩盖而使一党专政合法化，故其召开非为达到团结，而实为分裂中国”。这说明，中共积极将国共谈判与“联合政府”之争推向国际，以寻求欧美社会对中共的理解与支持。

Notably, Dong Biwu’s delegation also compiled and distributed an English-language brochure titled *The Truth about the Liberated Areas of China*, printing a total of 5,000 copies. On May 18, 1945, Dong Biwu officially made the brochure public. Based on reliable charts and data, the brochure comprehensively and clearly introduced the CPC’s political, military, and other achievements in the Liberated Areas from seven aspects: overview, military achievements, democratic government, a fighting people’s economy, education, trade unions, and the program for realizing the people’s urgent demands.

值得注意的是，董必武一行还编写并印发了《中国解放区实录》的英文介绍册，共计印刷了5000册。1945年5月18日，董必武正式对外公开了该介绍册。介绍册根据切实可靠的图表、数据，从概况、军事成就、民主政府、战斗型人民经济、教育、工会和实现人民迫切诉求的纲领七个方面，全面、清晰地介绍了中共在解放区的政治、军事等各方面的成绩。

Furthermore, Dong Biwu’s delegation also paid attention to winning the support of overseas compatriots. On June 5, 1945, at a speech conference held in San Francisco by the overseas Chinese Constitutionalist Party and the Zhigong Party, Dong Biwu delivered a lengthy speech on “The Basic Policies of the Chinese Communist Party.” [27]27 The Zhigong Party was a Chinese political party with a base among overseas Chinese. He “comprehensively expounded the basic policies of the Chinese Communist Party of persisting in the War of Resistance, persisting in unity, and persisting in democracy and progress, introduced the tremendous achievements in the War of Resistance against Japan and in building the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines, and pointed out that all the various policies of the Chinese Communist Party were aimed at establishing an independent, democratic, free, united, strong, and prosperous new China.” Subsequently, this speech was “serialized in the *Overseas Chinese Daily* from the 16th to the 20th of that month.” [28]28 The *Overseas Chinese Daily* was a newspaper serving the Chinese diaspora in the United States. After Dong Biwu’s public speech, the response was enthusiastic, “enabling our overseas compatriots who care about the situation in the motherland to hear what they had never heard before.” [29]29 The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region was the main CPC base area, with its capital at Yan’an.

此外，董必武一行还注意争取海外侨胞的支持。1945年6月5日，董必武在旧金山由华侨宪政党、致公党举办的演讲大会上，作了关于《中国共产党的基本政策》的长篇讲演，“全面地阐述了中国共产党坚持抗战、坚持团结、坚持民主进步的基本政策，介绍了在抗日战争以及建设陕甘宁边区、敌后抗日根据地的巨大成就，指出中国共产党所有各项政策都是为了建立一个独立、民主、自由、团结、强大、繁荣的新中国”。随后，这篇讲演“连载于当月十六日至二十日的《华侨日报》上”。董必武公开演讲后反响热烈，“使我关心祖国情况之侨胞，得意闻所未闻”。

In summary, during his time in the United States, Dong Biwu publicized the heroic feats of the Chinese people in the War of Resistance against Japan and the propositions of the Communist Party to a broad audience of overseas compatriots and the American people, generating significant repercussions. Dong Biwu’s visit accomplished the primary goal set by the Party Central Committee: “to expand the international influence of the Chinese Communist Party.” Dong Biwu’s participation in the Chinese delegation on behalf of the people of the Liberated Areas introduced the Chinese Communist Party’s policies and the great achievements of the Liberated Areas under its leadership to the world for the first time, breaking the Kuomintang’s long-standing information blockade on the CPC’s achievements and military successes, and laying a good foundation for future contacts between New China and the United Nations.

总之，董必武在美国期间，向广大侨胞和美国人民宣传中国人民英勇抗日的事迹和共产党的主张，引起很大的反响。董必武的出访完成了中央部署的“扩大中国共产党在国际上的影响”这一首要目标。由董必武代表解放区人民参加中国代表团，第一次把中国共产党的方针政策及其领导下的解放区所取得的伟大成就介绍给全世界，打破了国民党多年对中共政绩、战绩的舆论封锁，为之后新中国与联合国的接触奠定了良好的基础。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

The political practice of the CPC in sending representatives to the San Francisco Conference reflects the CPC’s struggle for international forces and the evolutionary process of its understanding of international mechanisms on the eve of victory in the War of Resistance against Japan. Overall, the CPC’s practice exhibited clear stage-specific characteristics. From mid-February to late March 1945, the CPC treated the issue of the Chinese delegation list for the San Francisco Conference more as a tool for political bargaining, using it as new ammunition to criticize the Kuomintang’s dictatorial rule and to promote the domestic campaign for a “conference of all parties” and a “coalition government.” After the Kuomintang government publicly announced Dong Biwu as a member of the visiting delegation in late March 1945, the CPC instructed Dong Biwu’s delegation to actively conduct external propaganda to shape its own international image. This also marked the CPC’s growing recognition, through continuous interaction with the international community, of the significant strategic value of the United Nations.

中共在派代表出席旧金山会议的政治实践上，折射出抗战胜利前夕中共对国际力量的争取及对国际机制的认知演进过程。总体来看，中共的实践呈现出明显的阶段性特征。1945年2月中旬至3月下旬，中共更多将旧金山会议中国代表团名单问题视作政治博弈的工具，即将其作为批判国民党独裁统治的新论据，推动国内“党派会议”和“联合政府”宣传运动的开展。1945年3月下旬国民党政府公开董必武作为出访代表团成员之后，中共指示董必武一行积极外宣以塑造自身国际形象，更是标志着中共在与国际社会的不断交往中越来越认识到联合国的重大战略价值。

It can be said that during the golden window period for CPC diplomacy triggered by the Kuomintang army’s disastrous rout in the Henan-Hunan-Guangxi campaign and the stationing of the US Army Observer Group in Yan’an, the CPC, through Dong Biwu’s participation in the conference, not only completed its first international debut but also deepened its understanding of post-war international organizations. It also achieved a narrative shift from “exposing the Kuomintang” to “constructing the image of the Liberated Areas.” This transformation provided key experience for the CPC’s subsequent handling of international affairs. The “linkage between international and domestic issues” thinking embodied in its external propaganda strategy further provided valuable experience for the political struggle against the Kuomintang reactionaries during the War of Liberation.

可以说，在国民党军队豫湘桂大溃退与美军观察组进驻延安等引发的中共外交黄金窗口期，中共借助董必武参会，既完成了首次国际舞台亮相，又增进了对战后国际组织的认识，还实现了从“揭露国民党”到“建构解放区形象”的叙事转换。这种转变为此后中共处理国际事务提供了关键经验，其外宣策略中体现的“国际—国内议题联动”思维，更为解放战争时期与国民党反动派开展政治斗争提供了宝贵经验。

Author’s bio: Zhou Tianyu, Lecturer, College of Foreign Languages, National University of Defense Technology.

作者简介：周天羽，国防科技大学外国语学院讲师。