How Did the Central Committee of the CPC Establish a Foothold in Shanghai after the Failure of the Great Revolution?

After the failure of the Great Revolution in 1927, the Central Committee of the CPC moved its organs from Wuhan back to Shanghai and was forced into a secret existence. How to safely establish and effectively cover underground organs under conditions of White Terror became a pressing problem to be solved. This article attempts to focus on the CPC Central Committee organs stationed in Shanghai from 1927 to 1933, discussing the selection and changes in the methods of establishing organs and providing cover, thereby revealing the survival skills, organizational resilience, and struggle tactics of the CPC in assessing the situation under harsh circumstances.

1927 年大革命失败后，中共中央机关从武汉迁回上海，并被迫转入秘密状态。如何在白色恐怖环境下安全设置并有效掩护地下机关，成为亟待解决的课题。本文试图以1927—1933年中共中央驻沪机关为研究重点，讨论机关设置、掩护方法的选择及变化，从而揭示中共在严峻环境中审时度势的生存技巧、组织韧性与斗争策略。

I. The Early Practice of “Using the Family to Cover the Party” and “Using Commerce to Cover the Party” and the Return of the CPC Central Committee Organs to Shanghai after the Failure of the Great Revolution

一、“以家掩党”“以商掩党”的早期做法与大革命失败后中共中央机关迁回上海

After the founding of the CPC, it was closely monitored by the Beiyang government and foreign powers in China. The Beiyang government formulated the “Special Provisions for Punishing Extremists,” ordering provincial military and police forces to “conduct rigorous surveillance” and “strictly investigate and prosecute.” [1]1 White Terror: A term used to describe the violent suppression and massacres of communists and leftists by the Kuomintang (KMT) regime, especially following the KMT-CCP split in 1927. Against this backdrop, the CPC needed to “extremely carefully, extremely attentively, extremely cautiously, and extremely skillfully” utilize all “cracks” among the enemy to develop and strengthen its organization. [2]2 Soviet Areas: Rural base areas established by the Chinese Communist Party, most famously the Jiangxi-Fujian Soviet, before the Long March. The urban structure of modern Shanghai, characterized by “three administrations and four jurisdictions” and “the intermingling of Chinese and foreigners,” objectively provided favorable conditions for the early survival and struggle of the CPC. [3]3 All-Out War of Resistance (1937-1945): The Chinese term for the Second Sino-Japanese War. War of Liberation (1945-1949): The Chinese Civil War between the CPC and the KMT. The early CPC’s establishment and cover of organs in Shanghai generally proceeded along two lines of thought.

中国共产党成立后，即受到北洋政府和列强在华势力的严密盯防。北洋政府曾制定《惩治过激党人专条》，饬令各省军警“严密侦察”“从严查办”。在此背景下，中国共产党需要“极仔细、极留心、极谨慎、极巧妙地”利用敌人之间的一切“裂痕”来发展和壮大组织。近代上海“三治四界”“华洋杂处”的城市格局，在客观上为早期中共的生存和斗争提供了有利条件。早期中共在上海设立和掩护机关，大体沿两条思路展开。

The first was the high degree of integration between residences and organs, “using the family to cover the Party.” In the early period of the CPC’s founding, organs were mostly set up in Party members’ residences, concentrated in the new district of the French Concession. For example, Chen Duxiu’s residence (No. 2, Laoyuyangli) also served as the editorial office of *New Youth* and the activity site of the Shanghai Communist Group. [4]4 "Red-White trade" (chibai maoyi 赤白贸易) refers to the clandestine trade conducted between the Communist-controlled Soviet Areas (Red) and the KMT-controlled areas (White). The concession areas, due to their convenient location, low rent, and strong concealment, facilitated early theoretical propaganda and organizational development.

一是寓所与机关高度合一，“以家掩党”。中国共产党成立初期，机关设置多以党员寓所为主，集中于法租界新城区。比如，陈独秀的住所（老渔阳里2号）曾兼作《新青年》编辑部和上海共产党组织活动场所。租界地区因为区位便利、租金低廉、隐蔽性强，便于早期开展理论宣传与推动组织发展。

The second was “disguising as” or “borrowing” shops, “using commerce to cover the Party.” The concessions had a strong commercial atmosphere, and the CPC actively integrated into and utilized this. “Disguising as” meant putting up a signboard without actually operating a business. For instance, in June 1923, the CPC Central Committee set up a secret office at No. 3, Sanzengli, in the French Concession in Shanghai, outwardly posing as a “customs brokerage firm” that handled customs declaration services for imported and exported goods. [5]5 The April 12 Counter-Revolutionary Coup (四一二反革命政变, April 12, 1927) was a massacre of Communists and left-wing KMT members in Shanghai ordered by Chiang Kai-shek, marking a major split in the First United Front. “Borrowing” involved working through existing commercial firms, thereby quickly obtaining ready-made cover premises and genuine occupational identities, saving the trouble of building them from scratch. For example, from the end of 1921 to 1926, the CPC Central Committee borrowed the Commercial Press Compilation Department to set up a secret liaison point, where the then-editor Shen Yanbing (Mao Dun) relayed correspondence from Party organizations in various places. [6]6 The Fuxing Society (复兴社, "Renaissance Society") was a secretive, right-wing KMT organization founded in 1932, heavily involved in intelligence and political policing. The advantage of these practices lay in their low cost and high flexibility, reflecting the CPC’s wisdom in adapting to the environment and mobilizing resources.

二是“假扮”或“借用”商铺，“以商掩党”。租界商业氛围浓厚，中共主动融入并加以利用。“假扮”即只挂牌而不实营，比如1923年6月，中共中央在上海法租界三曾里3号设立秘密办事机关，对外扮作从海关进出口货物进行报关服务的“关捐行”。“借用”则是通过既有商号开展工作，借此快速获得现成的掩护场所和真实的职业身份，省去自建之劳。比如1921年底至1926年，中共中央曾借商务印书馆编译所设立秘密联络点，由时任编辑沈雁冰（茅盾）转接各地党组织的信函。上述做法的优点在于成本较低、灵活性强，体现出中共对适应环境与调动资源的智慧。

The two main lines of cover, “using the family to cover the Party” and “using commerce to cover the Party,” not only reflected the flexible strategies of early Party members in complex environments but also indicated that the CPC’s activities already possessed a considerable social foundation.

“以家掩党”“以商掩党”两条掩护主线，既反映出早期党员在复杂环境下的灵活策略，也说明中共活动已具备相当社会基础。

As the center of the revolution moved to Wuhan, the CPC Central Committee organs relocated from Shanghai to Wuhan in early April 1927. However, during this period, the Kuomintang implemented the so-called “Party Purification,” represented by the April 12 Counter-Revolutionary Coup in Shanghai. [7]7 The April 12 Counter-Revolutionary Coup was a massacre of Communists and left-wing KMT members in Shanghai ordered by Chiang Kai-shek. Kuomintang secret agents and the concession authorities jointly encircled and arrested Communists. The revolutionary situation changed abruptly, and the CPC’s losses were extremely severe. Wang Shouhua, Xiao Chunü, Chen Yannian, and other famous activists and leaders of the Party were sacrificed. [8]8 Wang Shouhua (1901–1927), Xiao Chunü (1893–1927), and Chen Yannian (1898–1927) were prominent Communist leaders executed by the KMT. Many Party organizations were destroyed, and the Party organizations could only completely go underground. The CPC Central Committee further recognized the necessity of establishing professional intelligence and security work, and adopting new forms of struggle was imperative.

随着革命的中心移至武汉，中共中央机关于1927年4月初从上海迁至武汉。但在这一时期，国民党实施所谓“清党”，以上海的四一二反革命政变为代表，国民党特务和租界当局对共产党人展开联合围捕，革命形势骤然变化，中共的损失十分惨重。汪寿华、萧楚女、陈延年等党的著名活动家和领导人牺牲，许多党的组织遭到破坏，党的组织只能全部转入秘密状态。中共中央进一步认识到建立专业情报保卫工作的必要性，采取新的斗争形式势在必行。

In May 1927, Zhou Enlai, then head of the Central Military Department, established the Special Affairs Office of the Central Military Commission in Hankou, with the main functions of protecting the security of CPC Central Committee organs, ensuring the personal safety of leading comrades, and gathering intelligence. [9]9 Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) was a key leader of the CPC and later the first Premier of the People’s Republic of China. Although this organization existed for a short time, it accumulated valuable experience for the subsequent establishment and operation of the Central Special Section. [10]10 The Central Special Section was the CPC’s first specialized intelligence and security agency, established in Shanghai. After several relocations, the CPC Central Committee organs finally moved back from Wuhan to Shanghai in early October 1927. Relying on the special status of the concessions, a deep revolutionary foundation, and a vast civil society, Shanghai became the optimal choice for the CPC to rebuild its organization under high pressure.

1927 年5月，时任中央军事部部长的周恩来在汉口创立了中央军委特务工作处，以保卫中共中央机关安全、保障领导同志人身安全、搜集情报等工作为主要职能。尽管这一机构存在时间不长，但为之后中央特科的建立和运行积累了宝贵经验。而中共中央机关也几经辗转，最终于1927年10月上旬从武汉迁回上海。上海凭借租界的特殊地位、深厚的革命基础以及庞大的市民社会，成为高压环境下中国共产党重建组织的最优选择。

Regarding the issue of site selection for organs, the CPC Central Committee continued to leverage its flexible strategic advantages. Considering the special governance structure of the concessions and areas where enemy rule was weak, it combined organ site selection with concealment work. The CPC Central Committee organs, Jiangsu Provincial Committee organs, and the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League were scattered across different areas such as the Central Shanghai District, Zhabei, and the French Concession. Different organs were not even located in the same alleyway at the same time. Li Weihan recalled: “After the Party Central Committee moved to Shanghai in October 1927, quite a number of central organs were set up near Avenue Edward VII.” [11]11 Li Weihan (1896–1984) was a senior CPC leader. Avenue Edward VII was a major road in the International Settlement. This area, located in the western part of the International Settlement and adjacent to the French Concession, was objectively conducive to concealing forces, dispersing risks, and maintaining liaison. At that time, the political environment had undergone drastic changes. The breakdown of the KMT-CPC cooperation meant the CPC could no longer establish organs through administrative resources and could only rely on renting private houses. However, the concession authorities usually required tenants to have a clear occupation, a stable family relationship, and a reliable “shop guarantee” (a guarantee from a local merchant required for renting a house). They were particularly vigilant against single individuals without a fixed occupation or family ties. How to safely establish organs and ensure the survival and development of the CPC Central Committee in Shanghai became an urgent problem to be solved.

在机关选址的问题上，中共中央继续发挥灵活策略优势，考虑到租界的特殊治理格局与敌人统治薄弱区域，将机关选址同隐蔽工作相结合。中共中央机关、江苏省委机关、团中央机关分散布局于沪中、闸北、法租界等不同区域，各机关甚至不同时在一个弄堂里办公。李维汉回忆：“一九二七年十月，党中央迁到上海以后，相当多的中央机关设在爱多亚路附近。”这里位于公共租界西区、邻近法租界，客观上有利于隐蔽力量、分散风险、维持联络。当时，政治环境已发生剧烈变化，国共合作破裂使中共无法再通过行政资源设立机关，只能借助租赁民房。然而，租界当局通常要求租户有明确的职业、稳定的家庭关系以及可靠的“铺保”（租赁房屋所需本地商户担保），对无固定职业、无家庭关系的单身人员尤为警惕。如何安全设置机关，保障中共中央在沪的生存与发展，成为亟待解决的问题。

II. The Exploration of “Making Organs Familial” and “Making Organs Social” and the Establishment of a Foothold for the CPC Central Committee in Shanghai

二、“机关家庭化”“机关社会化”的探索与中共中央机关在上海的立足

After the failure of the Great Revolution, the August 7 Meeting clearly designated “creating solid and capable secret organs” as an urgent task for organizational construction. [12]12 The August 7 Meeting was an emergency meeting of the CPC Central Committee in 1927 that ended Chen Duxiu’s leadership and called for armed resistance. In November 1927, the Central Special Section was established in Shanghai, with a General Affairs Section specifically responsible for the site selection, arrangement, and security of the central organs’ premises. [13]13 The General Affairs Section was one of the four sections of the Central Special Section, responsible for logistics and security. At the same time, the operational methods of the organs were also adjusted, implementing “making organs familial” to cope with the severe political struggle situation through more rigorous forms of concealment.

大革命失败后，八七会议明确将“造成坚固的能奋斗的秘密机关”定为组织建设的当务之急。1927年11月，中央特科在沪成立，下设总务科，专门负责中央机关驻地的选址、布置与保卫工作。与此同时，机关活动方式也有所调整，实行“机关家庭化”，以更为严密的隐蔽形式应对严酷的政治斗争形势。

“Making organs familial” meant that Party members lived together under the guise of a “family,” facilitating the handling of rental scrutiny. According to scale, it could be divided into “large families” and “small families.” “Large families” were usually used to accommodate a larger number of personnel or organs with specific functions, where members had to play the roles of “head of household,” “children,” “relatives,” and even “servants.” For example, between 1927 and 1928, No. 700, Baide Li, on Tongfu Road was an important liaison point for the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Peng Shuzhi and his wife Chen Bilan, along with Yang Qinglan, Wang Genying, and others, were stationed there for cover, acting as landlord and tenants. [14]14 Peng Shuzhi (1896–1983) was a senior CPC leader who later became a Trotskyist. “Large families” were also often used as cover for organizing large meetings. To prepare for the preparatory meeting of the National Conference of Soviet Representatives, Li Yimeng rented a large mansion, temporarily forming a “large family.” He played the role of the master, Zhao Yimin and Zhao Yiman played his younger brother and sister, and there was also a wife and two children. [15]15 Li Yimeng (1903–1990) was a senior CPC member. Zhao Yimin (1904–2002) and Zhao Yiman (1905–1936) were Communist revolutionaries. The Central Special Section also equipped them with a car, kitchen utensils, furniture, etc. During the meeting, they played a gramophone, played mahjong, and had children frolic downstairs to cover the meeting upstairs. However, members of “large families” often came from all over the country, with different accents and dialects, making it difficult for them to resemble a real family, which could easily arouse suspicion.

“机关家庭化”即党员以“家庭”名义共同居住，便于应对租房审查，按照规模大小可分为“大家庭”“小家庭”两种。“大家庭”通常用于容纳较多人员或承担特定功能的机关，成员需扮演“家长”“子女”“亲戚”乃至“仆人”。比如，1927年至1928年间，同孚路柏德里700号是中共中央政治局的重要联络点，由彭述之、陈碧兰夫妇以及杨庆兰、王根英等人以房东、房客身份驻守掩护。“大家庭”还常作为组织大型会议的掩护。为组织召开全国苏区代表会议预备会，李一氓租下一处大户宅邸，临时组成“大家庭”，自己扮主人，赵毅敏、赵一曼扮作其弟妹，另有夫人及两个小孩，中央特科还为其配备汽车、厨具、家具等，开会时通过楼下播放留声机、打麻将、小孩嬉闹以掩护楼上会议。不过，“大家庭”成员往往来自五湖四海，口音不同，南腔北调，很难像真正一家人，容易引起怀疑。

In comparison, a “small family” composed of one man and one woman was the most natural and feasible. According to the 1930 statistical table of Party cadres in Shanghai, young cadres under the age of 30 accounted for as high as 81%. Therefore, “revolutionary couples” became the most commonly adopted cover method for organs stationed in Shanghai at this time. “Small families” were further divided into two types. One type was genuine couples who were already married, such as the residence of Zhou Enlai and Deng Yingchao, which was actually the site of a CPC Central Committee organ. [16]16 Deng Yingchao (1904–1992) was a senior CPC leader and Zhou Enlai’s wife. This type of combination, due to close personal relationships, had advantages in work coordination, lifestyle habit alignment, and identity cover. It could also solve the problem of Party members living apart from their spouses. Generally, both parties had high willingness and the results were good. The other type was fake couples temporarily arranged by the organization due to work needs. For example, in 1928, the Central Special Section rented a foreign-style house on Route Père Robert in the French Concession. Hong Yangsheng and a female comrade posed as a couple and were stationed on the third floor as a secret meeting point. [17]17 Hong Yangsheng (1902–1992) was a member of the Central Special Section. Route Père Robert was a street in the French Concession. The advantage of fake couples lay in flexible selection, allowing matching according to work needs. However, problems such as the shortage of female Party members, the need to transfer them from various places, high requirements for disguise skills, and the difficulty in drawing the line between public and private spheres posed higher demands on concealment work.

相较之下，由一男一女组成的“小家庭”最为自然且容易可行。根据1930年上海党员干部统计表，30岁以下年轻干部占比高达81%。因此，“革命夫妻”成为此时驻沪机关普遍采用的掩护方式。“小家庭”又分两类，一类是本身具有婚姻关系的真夫妻，如周恩来、邓颖超夫妇的住所实为中共中央机关驻地。这类组合因私人关系紧密，在工作配合、生活习惯协调及身份掩护上均具优势，还能解决党员两地分居问题，通常来说双方意愿高且效果好。一类则是因工作需要由组织临时安排的假夫妻。比如，1928年中央特科在法租界金神父路租用洋房，由洪扬生与女同志假扮夫妻驻守三楼作为秘密接头处。假夫妻的优势在于选择灵活，可以根据工作需要匹配，但受限于女性党员紧缺，需从各地调动，伪装技巧要求高、公私界限难把握等问题，则对隐蔽工作提出较高要求。

The “familialization of organs” basically continued the earlier approach of “merging organs with residences,” but at this time it was a systematic practice after the failure of the Great Revolution and the CPC’s complete shift underground, on a larger scale and under a more severe external environment. As practice deepened, some problems gradually emerged. The approach of “merging organs with residences” relied heavily on cover from comrades and the masses, but under the background of the Kuomintang authorities implementing neighborhood joint guarantees and “heavy rewards” to encourage mutual denunciation, incidents of betrayal occurred frequently. For example, Luo Yinong, then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and director of the Central Organization Bureau, was arrested and killed on April 15, 1928; those who betrayed Luo Yinong were precisely the couple He Jiaxing and He Zhihua, who had provided cover for him. [18]18 Luo Yinong (1902–1928) was a senior leader of the CPC. He was arrested in Shanghai in April 1928 and executed by the Kuomintang. He Jiaxing and He Zhihua were CPC members who, after being arrested, betrayed Luo for a reward. In addition, there were also great financial difficulties. In the process of organizing underground work, renting houses and setting up organs all required large amounts of funds. However, channels for mass donations and supplies from the Soviet areas were repeatedly blocked, economic sources were increasingly exhausted, and the CPC Central Committee had to reiterate many times that “living expenses and organ expenses should be reduced to the minimum.” Luo Xiaohong, a former cadre of the Central Propaganda Department, recalled that at that time, members of the organs had no social occupations, relied entirely on organizational subsidies, and lived a very hard life.

“机关家庭化”基本延续了早期“机关寓所合一”的思路，但此时属于大革命失败、中共全面转入地下之后的系统化实践，规模更大，外部环境更加严峻。伴随着实践的深入，一些问题慢慢暴露出来。“机关寓所合一”的做法高度依赖同志和群众掩护，但在国民党当局推行邻里联保、“重金悬赏”鼓动互相举报的背景下，告密事件频发。比如，时任中共中央政治局常委、中央组织局主任罗亦农于1928年4月15日被捕杀害，出卖罗亦农之人，正是为其掩护的何家兴、贺稚华夫妇。此外，资金上也面临极大困难。在组织地下工作的过程中，租赁房屋、布置机关均需大量资金。然而，群众募捐与苏区输送渠道屡遭阻断，经济来源日趋枯竭，中共中央不得不多次重申“生活费及机关费应减少至极小限度”。曾任中央宣传部干部的罗晓红回忆，当时机关成员都没有社会职业，完全依靠组织津贴，生活十分艰苦。

Under these circumstances, the CPC Central Committee gradually regarded “socialization of organs” and “professionalization of Party members” as the direction for breaking the deadlock. On May 1, 1928, Zhou Enlai, in the “Resolution on the Work Plan for Hubei” drafted for the CPC Central Committee, proposed that the reconstruction of organs should adhere to the principle of absolute secrecy, and “the socialization of organs and the professionalization of responsible comrades are also very important issues.” In November of the same year, the Party Central Committee clearly stated that only by realizing “professionalization of Party members” could “socialization of Party organizations” be promoted. At the same time, on the basis of absorbing the lessons of the previous stage of “familialization of organs,” the Party Central Committee demanded that uniting the workers and peasants and the Party’s secret work must be closely combined. In May 1928, the “Central Circular No. 47 — On the Rectification, Development, and Secret Work of Party Organizations under the White Terror” pointed out: “The Party’s secret work is meaningful only when it can enable the Party to lead the struggle of the broad masses.” The enlarged Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party in 1930 established going deep among the masses and opposing bureaucratism as the foundation of secret work, pointing out the practical direction for the Party’s subsequent secret work.

在此形势下，中共中央逐渐把“机关社会化”“党员职业化”视为破局的方向。1928年5月1日，周恩来在为中共中央起草的《湖北工作方针决议案》中提出，机关重建要坚持绝对秘密原则，“机关的群众化、负责同志的职业化亦是很重要的问题”。同年11月，党中央明确提出，唯有实现“党员职业化”，方能推动“党的组织社会化”。同时，在吸收上一阶段“机关家庭化”经验教训的基础上，党中央要求必须把团结工农群众和党的秘密工作紧密结合起来。1928年5月，《中央通告第四十七号——关于在白色恐怖下党组织的整顿、发展和秘密工作》指出：“党的秘密工作只有能使党领导广大群众斗争时才有意义”。1930年党的扩大的六届三中全会将深入群众和反对机关主义确立为秘密工作的基础，为接下来的党的秘密工作指明了实践方向。

Under the leadership of the Party, the secret work front, on the basis of continuing the approach of “using commerce to conceal the Party,” began to try new work models such as “independently running businesses.” In November 1928, Zhou Enlai assigned Ke Lin and He Cheng to open the “Dasheng Hospital” on Yan’an Lane, Sichuan Road, Shanghai, as a venue for the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee to hold regular meetings and for comrades to make contact. Later, Hu Yungong was assigned to establish the “Qiuyang Bookstore,” through which funds from the Communist International were remitted under the guise of ordering books. The Central Special Branch also opened various shops, such as a furniture store on Nicheng Bridge, the “Fei Guoxi Lawyer’s Office” and the “Xinyi Agency” on Tongfu Road. The “Songbai Zhai Antique Shop” at the intersection of Xiafei Road and Songshan Road was specifically built by Liu Ding and Dong Jianwu, ostensibly dealing in antiques but actually used for organizing intelligence transmission. To enhance the cover effect, Liu and Dong also actively studied cultural relic knowledge to improve their professionalism. Similar situations included several antique shops set up in the French Concession, near the Xieqiao Club on Jing’an Temple Road, and at the intersection of Aiwenyi Road and Gordon Road.

在党的领导下，秘密工作战线在延续“以商掩党”思路的基础上，开始尝试“独立办商”等新的工作模式。1928年11月，周恩来委派柯麟、贺诚在上海四川路延安里开办“达生医院”，作为中共中央政治局举行例会和组织同志接头的场所。后又委派胡允恭创办“秋阳书店”，以订购书籍名义汇入共产国际给予的经费。中央特科也开设了各种店铺，比如泥城桥的木器店、同孚路上的“费国禧律师通讯处”和“信谊代办所”等。位于霞飞路与嵩山路口的“松柏斋古玩店”由刘鼎与董健吾具体筹建，表面经营古玩，实则用来组织情报传递。为增强掩护效果，刘、董二人还主动学习文物知识，提升专业程度。类似情况还包括法租界、静安寺路斜桥总会附近及爱文义路戈登路口等处设立的多家古玩店。

The CPC Central Committee also explored a business model combining the advantages of both “familialization” and “socialization” — “husband-and-wife shops.” This model could meet living requirements such as renting a house, serve as a guarantee for the shop, and possibly generate profits to supplement organizational funds. In 1928, Deng Xiaoping, then Secretary-General of the CPC Central Committee, rented a residence on Qinghefang, Zhejiang Road, with the organ upstairs and a shop downstairs selling daily necessities such as soap and matches. After Deng Xiaoping moved away, the couple Zhang Jien and Zhang Yuexia, staff of the Central Secretariat, continued there, using the identity of grocery store owners as cover, while the upstairs continued to serve as a secret venue for relevant comrades to meet and hold meetings. From the summer of 1929 to the end of 1930, the CPC Central Committee organ at No. 344 South Shanxi Road outwardly operated under the signboard “Rongfeng Hao” trading in securities and stocks; Gu Yuliang, head of the internal transportation section of the Central Secretariat, lived with his wife Shen Enzhen and young son in the back room on the second floor, undertaking the task of covering the organ. “Fuxing Commercial Firm” was also a highly representative example. In 1928, Xiong Jinjing, on Zhou Enlai’s orders, rented a building on Yunnan Road, ostensibly dealing in Hunan homespun cloth, but actually serving as the venue for the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to meet and work; leaders including Li Weihan, Ren Bishi, Deng Xiaoping, and Li Fuchun all met there. The organization transferred Zhu Duanxiao to operate it with him under the guise of a “husband-and-wife” relationship; the two later became a real couple, making the firm’s operation more stable and convenient, until it was forced to close after Gu Shunzhang’s defection in 1931.

中共中央还摸索出兼具“家庭化”与“社会化”优点的办商模式——“夫妻开店”。这种模式既可满足租房等生活要求，又能作为商铺的担保，还有可能盈利以补充组织经费。1928年，时任中共中央秘书长邓小平在浙江路清河坊租住，楼上是机关，楼下开商铺，售卖肥皂、火柴等日用品。邓小平搬离后，中央秘书处工作人员张纪恩、张越霞夫妇接续在此，以杂货店老板的身份进行掩护，楼上继续作为有关同志组织碰头、开会的秘密场所。1929年夏至1930年底，山西南路344号的中共中央机关对外以“荣丰号”招牌从事证券股票买卖，中央秘书处内部交通科长顾玉良与夫人沈恩珍及幼子居住于二楼后间，承担掩护机关的任务。“福兴商号”也是一个极具代表性的例子。1928年，熊瑾玎奉周恩来之命租下云南路一处楼房，表面经营湖南土布，实为中央政治局开会与办公场所，李维汉、任弼时、邓小平、李富春等领导人均曾在此碰头开会。组织调来朱端绶与其以“夫妻”名义经营，后两人结为真实夫妻，使商号的经营更为稳固便利，直到1931年顾顺章叛变才被迫关闭。

It should be noted that “independently running businesses” and the earlier strategies of “borrowing commerce” and “pretending to be in commerce” were not a replacement but complementary. During this period, the Central Special Branch used the “Sanmin Photo Studio” opened by non-Party figure Fan Mengju as a secret base for leadership contacts and storing weapons. However, the limitations of “borrowing commerce” and “pretending to be in commerce” became increasingly prominent as the environment deteriorated. The risk of “borrowing” lay in the uncontrollability of external forces; for example, Xiang Zhongfa, because he had frequented the Sanmin Photo Studio, was betrayed by the shop owner to Kuomintang secret agents for a reward. [19]19 Xiang Zhongfa (1880–1931) was a General Secretary of the CPC. He was arrested in Shanghai in June 1931 and defected to the Kuomintang, but was executed shortly after. “Pretending,” if done improperly, was also fraught with risk. In September 1930, Tu Zuochao rented the entire building at No. 12, Lane 391, Julai Da Road in the French Concession, outwardly calling it the “Shanghai Welfare Electric Appliance Company Factory,” but in reality it was the CPC’s first radio training class. Gu Shunzhang misjudged the investigative capabilities of the French Concession patrol police, abandoned the principle of “decentralized teaching and single-line contact,” and switched to centralized instruction. Ultimately, because the trainees’ clothing was mixed and there was no actual business, it was detected by the concession patrol police, raided, and shut down, causing serious losses.

需要说明的是，“独立办商”与早期的“借商”“扮商”之策并非替代关系，而是互为补充。这一时期，中央特科就借党外人士范梦菊开办的“三民照相馆”作为领导接头、存放武器的秘密据点。但“借商”“扮商”的局限随着环境恶化日益凸显，“借”的风险在于外部力量的不可控性，如向忠发因曾出入三民照相馆，被店主因为赏金出卖给国民党特务。“扮”若失当，同样风险重重。1930年9月，涂作潮租下法租界巨籁达路391弄12号整栋楼，对外称“上海福利电器公司工厂”，实则是中共第一个无线电培训班。顾顺章误判法租界巡捕房侦查能力，放弃“分散教学、单线联系”原则，改用集中授课，最终因为学员着装混杂且无实际业务，被租界巡捕侦破，遭突袭查封，造成严重损失。

In addition, the details of secret work were also continuously improved. In May 1928, the Organization Bureau of the CPC Central Committee published a special issue on “Common Knowledge of Secret Work” in the central Party organ “School Journal,” requiring Party organizations at all levels to study and implement it seriously. The document emphasized that the location of organs “should be mixed among the residential masses,” the building structure must ensure soundproofing and visual isolation, and emergency exits should be set up; at the same time, the background of the landlord should be strictly investigated, “to avoid sending oneself to the house of a spy or others unfavorable to us”; interior decoration should be “popularized,” maximizing conformity to local customs and habits, such as worshipping gods and Buddhas, pasting charms and hanging pictures, and setting off firecrackers during festivals, all according to local practices; identity disguise should be “standardized,” with clothing and speech consistent with the assumed identity. These specific detailed requirements constructed a complete set of normative systems for setting up underground organs. This was both a summary of the CPC’s previous experience in underground struggle and a practical guide for the strategy of “secrecy, socialization, and professionalization.”

此外，秘密工作的细节也在不断完善。1928年5月，中共中央组织局曾在中央机关报《校刊》上发表《秘密工作常识》专辑，要求各级党组织认真学习执行。文件强调，机关选址“要杂居于居民群众之中”，房屋结构需确保隔音隔视，并设置应急出口，同时严格考察房东背景，“免得自己送到包探或其他不利于我们的家里去”；内部布置要“通俗化”，最大限度向当地风俗习惯靠拢，如敬神拜佛、贴符挂画、逢节燃放爆竹等举动都需按照当地人的习惯来；身份伪装要“一致化”，着装、谈吐均应与身份保持一致等。这些具体的细节要求构建起一套完整的地下机关设置规范体系，既是中共对此前地下斗争经验的总结，又成为“秘密化、社会化、职业化”策略的实践指导。

Against the background of the Kuomintang’s continuously intensified investigation and crackdown, by 1930, the CPC Central Committee organs in Shanghai still developed to “as many as eighty or ninety locations, with over 170 staff members,” which fully demonstrated the improvement of the concealment capability of the CPC Central Committee organs and the maturity of the professional team. Facing a severe struggle situation, the CPC was able to flexibly adjust its organizational form and working methods, showing extremely strong adaptability and strategic flexibility. This political ability and spiritual quality of sizing up the situation, being adept at struggle, and actively seeking change particularly demonstrated its extraordinary resilience and wisdom in an extreme environment.

在国民党不断加大侦查打击力度的背景下，至1930年，在上海的中共中央机关仍发展至“八九十处之多，工作人员有百七十人以上”，这充分说明中共中央机关隐蔽能力的提高与专业队伍的成熟。面对严峻的斗争形势，中共能够灵活调整组织形态与工作方式，表现出极强的应变能力与策略弹性，这种审时度势、善于斗争、主动求变的政治能力和精神品质，在极端环境中尤其体现出其非凡的韧性与智慧。

III. The Expansion of “Independently Running Businesses” and the Reconstruction of CPC Central Committee Organs in Shanghai after Gu Shunzhang’s Defection

三、“独立办商”的铺开与顾顺章叛变后中共中央机关在上海的重建

On April 24, 1931, Gu Shunzhang, head of the Central Special Operations Division [Central Tekeb], was arrested in Hankou and defected. The Party Central Committee immediately organized an emergency evacuation of its organs in Shanghai, completing the withdrawal of organs and personnel within two or three days. However, because Gu Shunzhang was extremely familiar with the addresses and security arrangements of the organs, he provided the Kuomintang secret service with a large amount of first-hand intelligence. For a time, the Central Committee organs in Shanghai "had scarcely a foothold," and Party organizations in Nanjing, Suzhou, Tianjin, Beiping, Hankou, and elsewhere were successively destroyed, dealing an unprecedented blow to work in the White Areas. [1]1 White Terror: A term used to describe the violent suppression and massacres of communists and leftists by the Kuomintang (KMT) regime, especially following the KMT-CCP split in 1927. On June 10, Zhou Enlai presided over a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee, which conducted a profound summing-up of the Gu Shunzhang defection, re-stipulated organizational principles and work discipline, and decided that Chen Yun would serve as Secretary of the Central Special Operations Division and Head of its First Section, tasked with rectifying and restoring the organs.

1931 年4月24日，中央特科负责人顾顺章在汉口被捕叛变，党中央立即组织在沪机关进行紧急转移，两三天内基本完成了机关与人员的撤离。但因顾顺章对机关地址、布防方式极为熟悉，为国民党特务提供了大量一手情报。一时间，中共中央机关在沪“几无立锥之地”，南京、苏州、天津、北平、汉口等地党组织亦接连遭破坏，白区工作遭受前所未有的重创。6月10日，周恩来主持中共中央政治局会议，对顾顺章叛变事件进行深刻总结，重新规定组织方针与工作纪律，并决定由陈云担任中央特科书记兼第一科科长，承担起整顿恢复机关的任务。

During this period, the most urgent task was to reorganize the underground organs, which had fallen into near paralysis. A batch of shops that had been opened and were operating well under the Jiangsu Provincial Committee, and which had not yet been exposed, were directly transferred to the management and use of the Party Central Committee to ensure the continuation of underground work. For example, the "New Life Printing House" at No. 17 Zhaoqing Lane, Shanguan Road, had been opened around 1930 by Chen Yun through Li Weiji. After Gu Shunzhang's defection, it was transferred to the management of the Central Committee and became a central liaison and meeting organ. The printing house purchased two small printing presses and installed a telephone. Li Shiying, a member of the Central Special Operations Division, worked there as a worker, while Chen Yun, "wearing a long gown, with a short vest over it and a red cap, looking exactly like an accountant," skillfully organized a large amount of covert struggle while "running a shop and doing business." Another example was the "Yuda Grocery Store" opened at the corner of Xinzha Road and Datong Road. It sold goods on the surface but was actually used to receive remittances from the Communist International and to provide shop guarantees and funds for renting premises for newly established organs. The transfer of such mature shops saved the preparation time needed for setting up new organs and, relying on their existing business foundation and social credibility, helped the Central Committee quickly restore communications, fund circulation, and other work, thereby meeting the most pressing needs.

这一时期，当务之急是重组几乎陷入瘫痪的地下机关。一批由江苏省委开设、运营良好且尚未暴露的商铺被直接划归党中央管理使用，保证地下工作的继续开展。比如，位于山海关路肇庆里17号的“新生印刷所”，1930年左右由陈云委托李伟基开办，在顾顺章叛变后划归党中央管理，成为中央联络和会议机关。印刷所购置两部小型印刷机并安装电话，中央特科人员李士英以工人身份在此工作，陈云则“穿一件长褂子，外面套一件短背心，戴一顶红帽头，俨然一个账房先生”，在“开铺子做买卖”的过程中巧妙地组织了大量隐蔽斗争。又如，在新闸路与大通路拐角处开办的“裕大南货店”，表面售卖货物，实际用于接收共产国际的汇款，为新设机关租房提供铺保和资金。这类成熟商铺的划转，既省去新设机关的筹备时间，又凭其已有的经营基础与社会信誉，帮助中共中央迅速恢复通信联络、经费周转等工作，以解燃眉之急。

At the same time, the Central Committee further guided the Central Special Operations Division to rely on social connections and the specialized skills of Party members to open new shops in various districts of Shanghai, actively building a larger-scale organ network. For instance, a newly built briquette factory on Wuma Road became the headquarters of the Central Special Operations Division. The factory site was found by Pan Hannian on Zhongshan Road and built, with the purchase of equipment and production of briquettes serving as cover for the Special Operations Division's work. The "Xu Faji Second-Hand Store" on Hongmiao Road was actually an organ of the Central General Affairs Section, used for storing and trading furniture, facilitating the flexible establishment and dissolution of organs. "When an organ moved, things were all taken there; when an organ was to be set up, furniture could be moved back, which was very convenient. It was a warehouse, a shop, and a contact point." Li Weiji recalled, "There were many cases like this of opening shops as cover." In order to carry out work around the Nanshi Gaochangmiao Iron Works—a Kuomintang factory for repairing guns and artillery—Chen Yun sent people to "open a teahouse nearby by all means" to contact workers and exchange intelligence. To create a secretarial liaison point for the Standing Committee of the Shanghai Provisional Central Politburo, the Central Committee selected a "two-up, two-down" [2]2 Soviet Areas: Rural base areas established by the Chinese Communist Party, most famously the Jiangxi-Fujian Soviet, before the Long March. lane house at No. 1 Yunshang Village. Ying Xiuren and his wife lived downstairs, while the upstairs was rented by Ke Qingshi in his own name and then sublet to other comrades within the Party. The interior was furnished with rosewood furniture. When Ying Xiuren went out, he wore a fur robe, pretending to be a "rich young master." Chen Yun also visited many times, often disguised as a "businessman," wearing a skullcap and carrying a briefcase, "discussing business and trade in a grand manner," but in reality discussing financial and economic work with Ying Xiuren and others.

与此同时，中共中央进一步指导中央特科依托社会关系与党员特长，在上海各区开设新店，积极构建更大规模的机关网络。比如，新建于五马路的煤球厂成为中央特科总部所在地，是由潘汉年在中山路找到厂基修建而成，以购买设备、生产煤球为特科工作进行掩护。位于虹庙路的“徐发记旧货店”实为中央总务科机关，用于寄存和买卖家具，便于机关的灵活设立及撤销，“机关搬家的时候，东西都弄到它那里去，要成立机关，家具又可搬来，很方便，是仓库，又做商店，又接头”。李伟基回忆，“像这样开店作为掩护的情况很多”。为了在南市高昌庙铁工厂——国民党修理枪炮的工厂周边开展工作，陈云派人“千方百计在附近开了一家茶馆”，联系工人、互通情报。为了创建一个上海临时中央政治局常委的秘书联络点，中共中央在云上邨1号选定一幢“两上两下”的里弄楼房，应修人夫妇住楼下，楼上由柯庆施出面承租后再转给其他党内同志。室内陈设均为红木家具，应修人外出时身着皮袍，装作“富家少爷”。陈云也多次到访，常扮作“经商先生”，头戴瓜皮帽、手提公事包，“大大方方地谈生意做买卖”，实则是与应修人等商议财经工作。

Compared with previous underground work, the advantages and effectiveness of "independently running businesses" were very evident. First, it better ensured organizational security. The shops operated normally on ordinary days and could be evacuated quickly in an emergency; Party members, using their identity as shop assistants as cover, were difficult to be directly identified as "Reds" even if arrested, and the organization could also use the "employer's" name to rescue and negotiate. It was precisely thanks to the cover of "independently running businesses" that, even under the extremely dangerous situation after Gu Shunzhang's defection, the Central Committee still survived in Shanghai for nearly three years, winning precious buffer time for the revolutionary struggle. In January 1933, the Central Committee evacuated from Shanghai. The Kuomintang only learned of this long afterwards, and Dai Li called it the most significant failure in the history of the intelligence services. [3]3 All-Out War of Resistance (1937-1945): The Chinese term for the Second Sino-Japanese War. War of Liberation (1945-1949): The Chinese Civil War between the CPC and the KMT. Even Kuomintang agents lamented that the new organizational strategy of the Chinese Communist Party had made the Kuomintang's ears deaf and eyes blind. "We only knew that the Communist Party's underground organization had changed, but how? Who was responsible? Where were the organs located? We were completely in the dark about all the specific circumstances." Gu Shunzhang's post-defection work, *The Theory and Practice of Secret Service Work*, had a rather limited understanding of commercial cover. When introducing the functions of the First Section of the Central Special Operations Division, it placed commerce last, vaguely explaining it as "setting up shops, establishing commercial contact relations, running small businesses." Regarding the arrangement of organs, it mentioned that "when contact points have many visitors, a lawyer's correspondence address can be assumed," remaining at the level of "pretending" to be a merchant. This precisely reflects the change in thinking regarding the use of "commerce" as cover by the Chinese Communist Party organs around 1931, indirectly confirming the effectiveness achieved after the Central Committee comprehensively promoted "independently running businesses," which effectively ensured the security and development of Party organizations under extremely harsh conditions.

相对于以前的地下工作，“独立办商”的优势和成效十分明显。首先，较好地保障组织安全。商铺平日照常营业，紧急情况可迅速撤离；党员以店员身份为掩护，即便被捕，也难以被直接认定为“赤色分子”，组织还可以“雇主”之名营救交涉。正是得益于“独立办商”的掩护，即使在顾顺章叛变后的极端危险形势下，中共中央仍在上海存续近3年之久，为革命斗争赢得宝贵的缓冲时间。1933年1月，中共中央从上海撤离，国民党事后很久才知晓，戴笠称之为情报部门有史以来最为失败的一件事。连国民党特务都感叹道，中共新的组织策略使国民党的耳朵失灵，眼睛失明，我们只知道共党的地下组织已经变了，但是怎样变？何人负责？机关设在哪里？一切具体情况，我们便茫然无知。顾顺章叛变后写的《特务工作之理论与实际》对商业掩护的认识相当有限，在介绍中央特科第一科职能时将商业放在末位，笼统解释为“设立商店、联络商业往来关系、经营小贩”，机关布置方面，提到“接头机关往来人多时，可假设律师通讯处”，停留在“扮”商的层面。这恰好映射出1931年前后中共机关以“商”作掩护的思路变化，从侧面印证中央全面推广“独立办商”后所取得的成效，有效保障了极端恶劣环境下党组织的安全和发展。

Second, it more closely linked mass mobilization with underground work, effectively promoting the socialization of the organization. These ideas for struggle provided important references for how the Party should conduct underground work in enemy-occupied areas during the War of Resistance Against Japan. Mao Zedong once pointed out in this regard that it was necessary to use possible legal forms to establish "pure social professional organs and professional activities (teahouses, restaurants, employment agencies, etc.) that have close ties with the masses, and even use factory workshops, schools, and shops. Under the slogan of jointly deceiving and dealing with the enemy and traitors, and protecting the Chinese people, forming some kind of amorphous alliance among all the personnel within them is also a very good form of mass organization." In Shanghai, "independently running businesses" relied on the masses and originated from the masses. Chinese Communists used this to penetrate the lives of the masses and carry out mass work, effectively promoting close ties between the underground organization and the masses. This was not only a distinctive feature of the Party's underground work in the struggle against the enemy but also demonstrated the Party's fundamental character of serving the people wholeheartedly.

其次，将群众动员与地下工作更加紧密地联系起来，有效地推动组织社会化。这些斗争思路都为抗战时期党在敌占区如何开展好地下工作提供了重要参考。毛泽东曾对此指出，要利用可能的合法形式建立“纯粹的但与群众有密切联系的社会职业机关与职业活动（茶馆、饭店、荐头房等），甚至利用工厂厂房、学校、店铺，在为了共同欺骗与应付敌人汉奸，保护中国人的口号下，成立其中所有人员某种无定形的联盟，亦是一种很好的群众组织形式”。在上海，“独立办商”依靠群众、来源群众，中国共产党人以此深入群众生活、开展群众工作，有效促进了地下组织与人民群众的密切联系，这既是对敌斗争中党开展地下工作的鲜明特色，更能展现出中共全心全意为人民服务的政党底色。

Third, it advanced economic autonomy and underground work together, comprehensively enhancing combat capability. During this period, the Party faced severe financial difficulties for a long time. "Independently running businesses" allowed Party members to obtain legitimate income, which could promote the autonomization of organizational funds, not only reducing dependence on higher-level subsidies but also opening up stable and sustained sources of funding for the organization. The increasingly mature "independently running businesses" began to undertake richer revolutionary tasks, serving a broader revolutionary struggle. For example, in the course of carrying out "Red-White trade," [4]4 "Red-White trade" (chibai maoyi 赤白贸易) refers to the clandestine trade conducted between the Communist-controlled Soviet Areas (Red) and the KMT-controlled areas (White). Shanghai commercial firms led by the Party secretly undertook the important task of exchanging materials and conducting trade with the Soviet Areas. Shanghai firms purchased tea and other goods from the Soviet Areas at low prices and sold them at high prices in Shanghai. The profits obtained were remitted to the Soviet Areas through secret channels. This not only transported urgently needed materials to the Soviet Areas but also accomplished important tasks such as intelligence transmission and personnel transport, gradually becoming a link connecting the Soviet Areas and the White Areas. The leap in the level of the Chinese Communist Party's "running businesses" around 1931 is evident both in the Party's internal documents and can be corroborated in the records of defectors. For example, Yu Lexing, who left the Party during the April 12 Counter-Revolutionary Coup [5]5 The April 12 Counter-Revolutionary Coup (四一二反革命政变, April 12, 1927) was a massacre of Communists and left-wing KMT members in Shanghai ordered by Chiang Kai-shek, marking a major split in the First United Front. and later joined the Kuomintang's "Fuxing Society" [6]6 The Fuxing Society (复兴社, "Renaissance Society") was a secretive, right-wing KMT organization founded in 1932, heavily involved in intelligence and political policing. to engage in secret service work, had a relatively good understanding of the cover methods of the Chinese Communist Party's organs in Shanghai. In his self-compiled work *Secret Work*, he subdivided the Chinese Communist Party's "cover organs or names" into more than 20 types, including a large number of actual forms such as "residences, schools, hospitals, churches, furniture stores, car dealerships, small money shops, printing houses, teahouses, restaurants, employment agencies, stationery stores, photography studios, Western pharmacies, hardware stores, law firms, banks, pawnshops, traveling merchants, newspaper offices or magazine editorial departments, and general grocery stores." In short, the "independently running businesses" model took into account both underground work and economic work, demonstrating the revolutionary spirit and political capability of the Chinese Communists to hold firm to their convictions and fight to the end.

再次，将经济自主和地下工作共同推进，全面提升斗争能力。这一阶段党长期面临严重的经费困难，“独立办商”使党员获得合法收入，可推动实现组织经费的自主化，不但减轻对上级津贴的依赖，还可为组织开辟稳定且持续的经费来源。日趋成熟的“独立办商”开始承担更为丰富的革命任务，服务于更为广阔的革命斗争。比如，在开展“赤白贸易”的过程中，党领导的上海商号秘密承担起与苏区物资交换与贸易往来的重要任务。上海商行低价购买苏区茶叶等，在沪高价销售，其所得利润通过秘密渠道汇往苏区，不仅为苏区输送紧缺物资，还完成了情报传递、人员输送等重要任务，逐步成为联结苏区与白区的纽带。1931年前后中共“办商”水平的跃升，既见诸中共党内文件，亦能在叛变者的记录中得到印证。比如，在四一二反革命政变中脱党，后来加入国民党“复兴社”从事特务工作的余乐醒因对中共驻沪机关掩护方法较为了解，在自己编写的《秘密工作》中将中共的“掩护机关或名义”细分为20余种类型，包含了“住家、学校、医院、教会、木器店、汽车行、小钱庄、印刷局、茶馆、饭馆、荐头行、书纸店、照相馆、西药房、五金店、律师事务所、银行、典当、贩卖行商、报馆或杂志编辑、杂货零碎小商店”等大量实际形式。总之，“独立办商”模式，兼顾了地下工作和经济工作，展现出中国共产党人坚定信念、斗争到底的革命精神和政治能力。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

In the 1920s and 1930s, the concealment measures of the central organs of the CPC stationed in Shanghai evolved from an early spontaneous model relying on personal residences and disguised shops to a mature state of “independently running businesses” and embedding into society. This constructed a flexible and efficient system of organ establishment and cover for the central organs of the CPC to gain a foothold in Shanghai, which was shrouded in White Terror. [1]1 White Terror: A term used to describe the violent suppression and massacres of communists and leftists by the Kuomintang (KMT) regime, especially following the KMT-CCP split in 1927. In particular, “independently running businesses,” as a key measure, was not only a realistic choice for the CPC to preserve its strength but also a successful exploration that organically integrated security protection, economic autonomy, and mass work, enabling the CPC to continue leading the revolutionary struggle of the workers and peasants even under extremely difficult circumstances.

上世纪二三十年代，中共中央驻沪机关的隐蔽措施，经历了从早期依赖个人寓所、借扮商铺的自发模式逐步走向“独立办商”、嵌入社会的成熟状态。这为中共中央机关在白色恐怖笼罩的上海立足，构建起一套灵活高效的机关设置与掩护体系。特别是“独立办商”作为其中的关键举措，不仅是中共中央保存力量的现实选择，更是将安全防护、经济自主与群众工作有机结合的成功探索，使中共在极端困难的环境中仍能领导工农群众开展革命斗争。

With the relocation of the CPC Central Committee to the Soviet Areas in 1933, [2]2 Soviet Areas: Rural base areas established by the Chinese Communist Party, most famously the Jiangxi-Fujian Soviet, before the Long March. the focus of underground work in Shanghai shifted from preserving the command center to long-term infiltration and intelligence liaison. Most of the original organs were closed or transferred, but the practice of “running businesses” did not cease; it continued to play a role in united front liaison, material transportation, and intelligence delivery. More importantly, the experiences accumulated during this period—combining open struggle with secret struggle, permeating professional cover with social relations, and unifying economic autonomy with the needs of struggle—laid a solid foundation for the development of the Party’s covert front work during the period of the All-Out War of Resistance and the War of Liberation. [3]3 All-Out War of Resistance (1937-1945): The Chinese term for the Second Sino-Japanese War. War of Liberation (1945-1949): The Chinese Civil War between the CPC and the KMT. This political quality and wisdom in struggle—assessing the situation, being adept at struggle, and actively seeking change—is also the key to understanding how our Party could survive, develop, and ultimately achieve victory in an extremely harsh environment.

随着1933年中共中央迁往苏区，上海地下工作的重心从保存指挥中枢转向长期潜伏、情报联络，原有机关多被关闭或转移，但“办商”实践并未停止，继续在统战联络、物资运输、情报输送等方面发挥作用。更重要的是，这一时期积累的公开斗争与秘密斗争相结合、职业掩护与社会关系相渗透、经济自主与斗争需要相统一等经验，为全民族抗战时期、解放战争时期党的隐蔽战线工作的发展打下了坚实基础。这种审时度势、善于斗争、主动求变的政治品质和斗争智慧，亦是理解我们党何以能在极端环境中生存、发展并取得最终胜利的关键。

About the author: Ma Xiaohan, doctoral student at the School of Marxism, Tsinghua University.

作者简介：马小涵，清华大学马克思主义学院博士生。