The Great Expedition That Opened a New Situation: The Red Army’s Long March and the Realization of a Major Strategic Shift and Its Historical Significance

The Red Army’s Long March was not only a great feat that preserved the seeds of revolution, but also a strategic shift that profoundly changed China’s destiny. It was the key to the Chinese revolution’s turning from danger to safety, realized the Red Army’s major strategic shift, and laid an important foundation for the subsequent victory of the Chinese revolution.

红军长征不仅是一次保存革命火种的伟大壮举，更是一次深刻改变中国命运的战略转移。它是中国革命转危为安的关键，实现了红军的战略大转移，为后来中国革命的胜利奠定了重要基础。

I

一

The Red Army’s policy of marching north during the Long March was not achieved overnight, but rather underwent a process of evolution and development from “unconscious” to “conscious,” from “seeking survival” to “planning for the overall situation.” It was a great achievement of the Chinese Communist Party in adhering to seeking truth from facts through trials of blood and fire.

红军长征的北上方针，并非一蹴而就，而是经历了一个从“不自觉”到“自觉”，从“求生存”到“谋大局”的演变发展过程，是中国共产党在血与火的考验中坚持实事求是的伟大成果。

At the beginning of the Long March, the main force of the Central Red Army planned to advance west into western Hunan, intending to join forces with the Third Red Army (later restored to the name Second Red Army Corps) and the Sixth Red Army Corps, which had moved and transferred there. This decision had a clear character of “moving house,” attempting to establish a new base area in the Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan-Guizhou border region adjacent to the Central Soviet Area. However, the Kuomintang deployed heavy troops in southwestern Hunan; if the Central Red Army insisted on advancing, it risked total annihilation. At this critical juncture, Comrade Mao Zedong, at the Tongdao Conference, strongly advocated diverting the troops to Guizhou, gaining majority support; the subsequent Liping Conference formally decided to establish a new base area in the Zunyi-centered Sichuan-Guizhou border region; the Zunyi Conference further adopted suggestions from comrades such as Liu Bocheng and Nie Rongzhen, establishing the strategic concept of crossing the Yangtze River and establishing a base area in western or northwestern Sichuan.

长征伊始，中央红军主力计划西进湘西，意在与活动和转移到此的红三军（后恢复称红二军团）、红六军团会合。这一决策带有明显的“搬家”色彩，试图在邻近中央苏区的湘鄂川黔边区建立新的根据地。然而，国民党在湘西南布下重兵，若中央红军执意前行恐将面临覆灭之险。危急关头，毛泽东同志在通道会议上力主转兵贵州，得到多数支持；随后的黎平会议正式决定在以遵义为中心的川黔边建立新根据地；遵义会议则进一步采纳刘伯承、聂荣臻等同志建议，确立了渡过长江、在川西或川西北建立根据地的战略设想。

Shortly after the Zunyi Conference, due to the setback at the Tucheng Campaign, the river-crossing plan was temporarily shelved, but the Central Committee of the CPC did not rigidly adhere to established rules; instead, it flexibly adjusted and decided to create a base area in the Sichuan-Yunnan-Guizhou border region. Thereafter, Comrade Mao Zedong commanded the Central Red Army in crossing the Chishui River four times, skillfully crossing the Jinsha River, and forcibly crossing the Dadu River, arriving in northwestern Sichuan in June 1935, where it successfully joined forces with the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army. On the eve of the joining of the two armies, after analyzing the domestic situation at the time and the human geography and environment of the northwestern Sichuan region, the Central Committee of the CPC proposed that “in order to place the development of the Soviet movement on a more solid and powerful foundation, the general policy for our First and Fourth Front Armies from now on should be to occupy the three provinces of Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu and establish Soviet political power in the three provinces” [1]1 The Wayaobao Meeting (December 1935) was a pivotal Politburo session of the CPC held in Wayaobao, northern Shaanxi, shortly after the Long March. It formally adopted the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, marking the Party’s strategic shift from civil war to national resistance against Japan.. At the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC held after the two armies joined forces, i.e., the Lianghekou Conference, the “Strategic Policy on the Joining of the First and Fourth Front Armies” was adopted, which clearly stipulated that after the two front armies joined forces, “the strategic policy is to concentrate the main forces to attack northward, annihilate large numbers of the enemy in mobile warfare, first capture southern Gansu, in order to create a Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet base area” [2]2 The Great Revolution (1924–1927) refers to the first period of cooperation between the CPC and the Kuomintang (KMT) in a united front against warlords and imperialism. It ended when the KMT, under Chiang Kai-shek, turned against the CPC, launching a wave of suppression that forced the Communists underground and into armed struggle., formally clarifying the strategic policy of marching north.

遵义会议后不久，由于土城战役受挫，渡江计划暂时搁浅，但中共中央并未固守成规，而是灵活调整，决定在川滇黔边境创建根据地。此后，毛泽东同志指挥中央红军四渡赤水、巧渡金沙江、强渡大渡河，于1935年6月抵达川西北，与红四方面军胜利会师。两军会师前夕，中共中央分析当时的国内形势和川西北地区人文地理环境后，提出“为着把苏维埃运动之发展放在更巩固更有力的基础之上，今后我一、四两方面军总的方针应是占领川陕甘三省，建立三省苏维埃政权”（中共中央文献研究室、中央档案馆：《建党以来重要文献选编（1921—1949）》第十二册，中央文献出版社2011年版，第212页）。在两军会师后召开的中共中央政治局会议即两河口会议上，作出《关于一、四方面军会合后的战略方针》明确规定两个方面军会合后，“战略方针是集中主力向北进攻，在运动战中大量消灭敌人，首先取得甘肃南部，以创造川陕甘苏区根据地”（《建党以来重要文献选编（1921—1949）》第十二册，第226页），正式明确了北上的战略方针。

In response to the delay in marching north caused by Zhang Guotao’s splittist errors [3]3 The counter-encirclement-and-suppression campaigns were a series of five military campaigns launched by the KMT against the Chinese Soviet Republic and its Red Army in Jiangxi and other base areas between 1930 and 1934. The failure of the fifth campaign forced the Red Army to abandon its base areas and begin the Long March., the Central Committee of the CPC, at the Shawo Conference, reaffirmed the historical task of creating the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu base area, profoundly pointing out that the reactionary rule and imperialist forces in the northwest region were weak, and that it was close to the Soviet Union, which was beneficial for the development of the Soviet movement. In September, the Central Committee decisively decided to march north first. At the subsequent E’jie Conference, it proposed the concept of “through guerrilla warfare, opening up communication with the International, reorganizing and resting troops, expanding the Red Army ranks, first creating a base area in a place close to the Soviet Union, and later developing eastward” [4]4 Institute of Party History and Literature of the CPC Central Committee: *Chronicle of Mao Zedong*, Volume 1, Central Party Literature Press, 2023 edition, p. 471..

针对张国焘分裂主义错误导致的北上延宕，中共中央在沙窝会议重申创建川陕甘根据地的历史任务，深刻指出西北地区反动统治及帝国主义力量薄弱，且接近苏联，有利于苏维埃运动发展。9月，中央果断决定先行北上。在随后召开的俄界会议上，提出“通过游击战争，打通同国际的联系，整顿和休养兵力，扩大红军队伍，首先在与苏联接近的地方创建一个根据地，将来向东发展”的设想（中共中央党史和文献研究院：《毛泽东年谱》第一卷，中央文献出版社2023年版，第471页）。

In September of the same year, the Central Committee of the CPC stationed itself in Hadapu, Min County, Gansu. By reading newspapers published in Kuomintang-controlled areas, Comrade Mao Zedong and other central leaders learned that not only were the original Shaanxi-Gansu Red Army persisting in struggle, but also the Twenty-Fifth Red Army, led by Xu Haidong and others, had already arrived in northern Shaanxi. This indicated that there was still an intact revolutionary base area in northern Shaanxi, so they decided that the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment should head for northern Shaanxi. At a meeting of cadres at and above the regimental level held on September 22, Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out: “At present, Japanese imperialism is invading China; we must go north to resist Japan. First, we must go to northern Shaanxi, where there is Liu Zhidan’s Red Army. Our line is correct.” On September 27, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC held a meeting in Bangluo Town, Tongwei County, formally deciding to make northern Shaanxi the foothold of the Long March and the forward position for resisting Japan. On October 19, the Central Committee of the CPC arrived at Wuqi Town in the Shaanxi-Gansu base area, proclaiming the victorious conclusion of the Central Red Army’s Long March, which had lasted one year, traversed eleven provinces, and covered 25,000 li.

同年9月，中共中央进驻甘肃岷县的哈达铺。毛泽东同志和其他中央领导人通过阅读国统区出版的报纸，得知不但原有的陕北红军在坚持斗争，而且徐海东等领导的红二十五军已经抵达陕北。这说明陕北还有一块完整的革命根据地，遂决定陕甘支队前往陕北。在9月22日召开的团以上干部大会上，毛泽东同志指出：“目前，日本帝国主义侵略中国，我们就是要北上抗日。首先要到陕北去，那里有刘志丹的红军。我们的路线是正确的。”9月27日，中共中央政治局常委会在通渭县的榜罗镇召开会议，正式确定将陕北作为长征的落脚点和抗日的前进阵地。10月19日，中共中央到达陕甘根据地的吴起镇，宣告历时一年，纵横十一个省，行程二万五千里的中央红军长征胜利结束。

II

二

From the initiation of the strategic shift to the foothold in northern Shaanxi, the destination of the Red Army’s Long March changed several times. Although making a foothold in northern Shaanxi was not an initial conscious choice, in the later period of the Long March, the Central Committee of the CPC, based on changes in the situation, made the decision to march north, closely integrating marching north with resisting Japan, and ultimately made the decision to make a foothold in northern Shaanxi. This shift was crucial to the subsequent development of the Chinese revolution.

从开启战略转移到落脚陕北，红军长征的目的地几经变化。尽管落脚陕北并不是一开始的自觉选择，但在长征后期，中共中央根据形势的变化作出北上的决定，并将北上与抗日紧密结合起来，最终作出落脚陕北的决策，这种转移对后来中国革命的发展至关重要。

In modern times, the aggression of Western powers against China first occurred in the south; hence, the semi-colonial and semi-feudal character of the south developed earlier than that of the north. For this reason, the center of gravity of China’s New Democratic Revolution since the May Fourth Movement was initially in the south. The early organizations of the Chinese Communist Party were mostly established in southern provinces; the early members of the Party were also mostly from the south; the Party’s founding congress was held in Shanghai. At that time, the Kuomintang’s forces were also mainly active in the south; the center of gravity of the National Revolution movement carried out after the realization of the First United Front between the Kuomintang and the CPC was also in the south; the Northern Expedition naturally proceeded from south to north. After the failure of the Great Revolution, the most basic regions where the CPC carried out the agrarian revolution and established revolutionary base areas were the southern provinces where the worker-peasant movement was most active during the high tide of the Great Revolution.

近代以来，西方列强对中国的侵略首先发生在南方，因而南方的半殖民地半封建化早于北方。正因为如此，五四运动以来的中国新民主主义革命，其重心一开始是在南方。中国共产党早期组织大都成立在南方省份，党的早期成员也大多出身于南方，党的成立大会是在上海召开的。当时，国民党的力量也主要活动于南方，第一次国共合作实现后开展的国民革命运动重心也在南方，北伐战争自然也是由南而北进行的。大革命失败后，中共开展土地革命、建立革命根据地最基本的区域，是在大革命高潮中工农运动最活跃的南方各省。

By the time the Red Army’s Long March began, the domestic situation had begun to undergo major changes. In 1931, Japan launched the September 18th Incident and occupied Northeast China; subsequently, it continuously infiltrated the area inside the Shanhai Pass; in 1935, taking advantage of Chiang Kai-shek’s full-force “suppression” of the Red Army on the Long March, it launched the North China Incident, attempting to turn North China into a second Northeast China, and then turn the whole of China into a colony. Under such circumstances, how to organize and lead resistance against Japan became the most urgent and critical issue for the Chinese revolution. Undoubtedly, at this time, the front line of resistance against Japan was North China. If the Chinese Communist Party and the armed forces it led were still mainly active in the southern regions, even if their anti-Japanese propositions were the most thorough and their anti-Japanese slogans were shouted the loudest, it would be difficult to gain widespread sympathy, response, and support from all sectors of society.

到了红军长征开始之际，国内形势开始发生重大变化。1931年日本发动九一八事变侵占东北，随后又不断地向关内渗透，1935年更是利用蒋介石全力“追剿”长征中的红军之机，发动华北事变，企图将华北变成第二个东北，进而使整个中国成为殖民地。在这样的情况下，如何组织领导抗日，成为中国革命最迫切、最关键的问题。毫无疑问，此时，抗日的第一线是华北。如果中国共产党及其领导的武装力量仍主要在南方地区活动，即使抗日的主张最彻底、抗战的口号喊得最响，也难以得到社会各界的广泛同情、响应与支持。

The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia region, centered on northern Shaanxi, as a base for the Chinese revolution, certainly had many unfavorable conditions: the land was barren and the people were poor, products were not abundant, transportation was inconvenient, the economy and culture were backward, and it was little influenced by the Great Revolution. However, it also had many favorable conditions. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia region was vast, with great strategic depth, which could provide the Red Army and the base area with relatively large space for development; although it was relatively poor and backward, this was also unfavorable for Chiang Kai-shek to deploy and use troops on a large scale; the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia region was far from China’s political and economic centers, and Kuomintang rule was relatively weak. The local forces in northern Shaanxi were weak in strength, while the larger Northeastern Army and Northwestern Army, whose main leaders Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng had demands for resisting Japan, made it easier for our Party to reach consensus with them on the issue of resisting Japan and form a united front. In addition, there was an existing base area here, with a certain number of Red Army troops. These factors all made northern Shaanxi an ideal foothold for the Red Army’s Long March.

以陕北为中心的陕甘宁地区作为中国革命的基地，固然有许多不利条件：这里地瘠民穷、物产不丰、交通不便、经济文化落后、受大革命的影响小等。但是，这里也有许多有利条件。陕甘宁地区地域广阔，具有很大的战略纵深，能为红军和根据地提供较大的发展空间；这里虽较为贫穷落后，但也不利于蒋介石大规模运兵和用兵；陕甘宁地区远离中国政治经济中心，国民党统治力量相对薄弱。陕北本地的地方势力力量弱小，而实力较大的东北军和西北军，其主要领导人张学良、杨虎城有抗日要求，我们党容易与其在抗日问题上达成共识、形成统一战线。此外，这里有一块现成的根据地，有一定数量的红军队伍。这些因素都使陕北成为红军长征理想的落脚点。

More importantly, with the deepening of Japan’s invasion of China, the contradiction between the Chinese nation and Japan continuously deepened and rose to become the principal contradiction in society. After the North China Incident, North China had become the front line of resistance against Japan. At this time, the most fundamental demand of the people of the whole country for various political forces was to resist Japan. For any domestic political force to gain popular support, it could only truly raise the banner of resisting Japan. Northern Shaanxi was adjacent to North China; making a foothold in northern Shaanxi created conditions for the Red Army to quickly advance into North China to resist Japan in the next step.

更为重要的是，随着日本侵华的步步深入，中日民族矛盾不断加深并上升为社会主要矛盾。华北事变之后，华北已成为抗日第一线。这时全国人民对各种政治力量的最根本要求是抗日。国内任何政治力量要想得到民众支持，唯有真正举起抗日旗帜。陕北紧邻华北，落脚陕北，为红军下一步迅速出兵华北抗日创造了条件。

There were many reasons for the defeat in the Central Soviet Area’s Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign and the downturn of the agrarian revolution, but the most fundamental one was the deviation in the line, principles, and policies at that time. As the national contradiction replaced the class contradiction to become the principal contradiction in society, to win broad support from all classes and strata, it was necessary to take resisting Japan as the call and take concrete action, and the Red Army also had to be able to advance to the front line of resisting Japan at the fastest speed.

中央苏区第五次反“围剿”战争失利和土地革命转入低潮，固然有许多原因，但最根本的，还是当时路线方针政策出现了偏差。随着民族矛盾取代阶级矛盾成为社会主要矛盾，要争取各阶级各阶层的广泛支持，必须以抗日为号召并采取切实行动，红军也必须能以最快的速度开赴抗日第一线。

After the main Red Army forces arrived in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia region and had a brief period of rest and recuperation, they were quickly reorganized and dispatched to the front lines upon the outbreak of the all-out War of Resistance Against Japan. This turned the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia region into an ideal springboard for subsequent outward expansion. As Snow said after interviewing Comrade Mao Zedong in 1936: “History subsequently showed that what they emphasized was undoubtedly the second basic reason for the Long March—advancing into the strategically important Northwest—and it was correct. They correctly foresaw that this region would play a decisive role in the immediate fate of China, Japan, and the Soviet Union.” (Mao Zedong: Talks with Snow in 1936, People’s Publishing House, 1979, p. 105) In this sense, the Long March was undoubtedly a great expedition to open new horizons.

主力红军长征落脚陕甘宁后，经过短暂的休养生息，在全民族抗战爆发后迅速改编开赴前线，又使陕甘宁成为此后向外发展的理想出发点。正如斯诺1936年访问毛泽东同志后所说的：“历史随后表明，他们强调的无疑是长征的第二个基本理由——挺进到有战略意义的西北去——是正确的。他们正确地预见到这个地区将对中国、日本和苏俄的当前命运起决定性的作用。”（《毛泽东一九三六年同斯诺的谈话》，人民出版社1979年版，第105页）从这个意义上说，长征无疑是一次开创新局的伟大远征。

III

三

Once the policy of advancing northward was formally established, the purpose of the Long March was no longer merely to secure a place for the Red Army to survive, but, more importantly, to lead the Chinese nation’s great cause of resistance against Japan. As soon as the Party Central Committee arrived in northern Shaanxi, it convened a Politburo meeting in Wayaobao [1]1 The Wayaobao Meeting (December 1935) was a pivotal Politburo session of the CPC held in Wayaobao, northern Shaanxi, shortly after the Long March. It formally adopted the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, marking the Party’s strategic shift from civil war to national resistance against Japan.. In response to the changing situation, it lost no time in formulating the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, began implementing the transition from civil war to the War of Resistance Against Japan, and carried out a series of policy adjustments. The purpose of doing so was to organize and mobilize all people willing to resist Japan to unite and jointly save the nation from peril.

北上的方针正式确定之后，长征的目的就不仅是为了使红军获得生存之地，更重要的是引领中华民族抗日大业。中共中央一到陕北，就在瓦窑堡召开政治局会议，针对形势变化，不失时机地制定了抗日民族统一战线的政策，开始实施由国内战争到抗日战争的转变，并进行一系列政策调整。这样做的目的，就是要组织动员一切愿意抗日的人们团结起来，共同挽救民族危亡。

After the failure of the Great Revolution [2]2 The Great Revolution (1924–1927) refers to the first period of cooperation between the CPC and the Kuomintang (KMT) in a united front against warlords and imperialism. It ended when the KMT, under Chiang Kai-shek, turned against the CPC, launching a wave of suppression that forced the Communists underground and into armed struggle., Communists and the revolutionary masses were brutally suppressed by the Kuomintang reactionaries and had no choice but to wage armed struggle against them. Even the Long March itself was a strategic shift that the Red Army was compelled to undertake after its defeat in the counter-encirclement-and-suppression campaigns [3]3 The counter-encirclement-and-suppression campaigns were a series of five military campaigns launched by the KMT against the Chinese Soviet Republic and its Red Army in Jiangxi and other base areas between 1930 and 1934. The failure of the fifth campaign forced the Red Army to abandon its base areas and begin the Long March.. Comrade Mao Zedong later said: “A person like me, who had never fought a battle before, who had never even thought of fighting a battle, was forced to take up arms by the running dogs of the imperialists.” (Selected Diplomatic Writings of Mao Zedong, Central Party Literature Press and World Affairs Press, 1994, pp. 564–565) However, in the face of the massive invasion by Japanese imperialism, at the critical moment of national survival, the Communist Party of China took the initiative to propose a cessation of the civil war and unity against the foreign enemy, and moved its forces northward to the vicinity of the front lines of resistance. This demonstrated its position of placing the interests of the nation, the country, and the people above all else, and established a positive image among the masses.

大革命失败后，共产党人和革命群众遭到国民党反动派的残酷镇压，不得不与之开展武装斗争，乃至长征也是红军在反“围剿”失利的情况下不得不进行的战略转移。毛泽东同志后来说：“像我这样的一个人，从前并不会打仗，甚至连想也没有想到过要打仗，可是帝国主义的走狗强迫我拿起武器。”（《毛泽东外交文选》，中央文献出版社、世界知识出版社1994年版，第564~565页）但是，在日本帝国主义大举侵华面前，在民族存亡的关键时刻，中国共产党主动提出停止内战、一致对外的主张，并且移师北上至抗日前线附近，表明了将国家、民族和人民的利益看得高于一切的立场，在人民群众中树立了良好形象。

Before the Long March began, the Kuomintang reactionaries had engaged in extensive propaganda to stigmatize the Communist Party of China and the Red Army. For the vast majority of the people who had never come into contact with the Communist Party or the Red Army, their understanding of the CPC was extremely limited, and most held only a sympathetic attitude. However, as the Party Central Committee settled in northern Shaanxi and the proposal for the Anti-Japanese National United Front was put forward, the Communist Party led the Chinese people in fighting the powerful enemy with unyielding resolve, building a Great Wall with their own flesh and blood, and achieving the first complete victory in the struggle against foreign invasion since modern times. Through this, the people came to realize that the Communist Party of China was not only a force fighting for the interests of the poor and suffering masses, but also a force striving for the survival and development of the Chinese nation. This led an increasing number of people to consciously identify with and accept the Party’s propositions, and to sincerely support the Party’s leadership.

长征开始前，国民党反动派曾大肆对中国共产党和红军进行污名化宣传。对于广大未曾接触过共产党与红军的人民大众而言，他们对中共的了解极为有限，大多仅抱持一种同情心理。而随着中共中央落脚陕北和抗日民族统一战线主张的提出，共产党领导中国人民以铮铮铁骨战强敌、以血肉之躯筑长城，取得近代以来反抗外敌入侵的第一次完全胜利。人民群众由此认识到，中国共产党不仅是为穷苦大众争取利益的队伍，更是为中华民族谋求生存与发展的队伍，这使得越来越多的人开始自觉认同并接受党的主张，衷心拥护党的领导。

The Long March changed the strategic layout of the Chinese revolution, created the conditions for the main forces of the Red Army to quickly advance to the front lines of resistance after the outbreak of the all-out War of Resistance Against Japan, enabled the people’s army to develop its strength in a broader geographical area, and realized the transition from a domestic revolutionary war to a national war of resistance against Japan. This laid a solid foundation for winning the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japan and, subsequently, for winning the New Democratic Revolution. Therefore, the Long March was not only a geographical shift “from south to north,” but also achieved a political shift “from narrow to broad” and a strategic shift “from passivity to initiative.”

长征改变了中国革命的战略布局，为全民族抗战爆发后红军主力迅速开赴抗日前线创造了条件，使人民军队能够在更广阔的地域内发展力量，实现了国内革命战争向抗日民族战争的转变，为夺取中国人民抗日战争胜利，进而夺取新民主主义革命胜利打下了坚实基础。因此，长征不仅是地理上的“由南向北”，更实现了政治上的“由窄向宽”、战略上的“由被动向主动”。

(Authors: Luo Pinghan and Gao Anyi, respectively Professor of the Department of CPC History Teaching and Research, Party School of the CPC Central Committee [National Academy of Governance], and Professor of the School of Marxism, Harbin Institute of Technology [Shenzhen])

（作者：罗平汉、高安益，分别系中央党校〔国家行政学院〕中共党史教研部教授、哈尔滨工业大学〔深圳〕马克思主义学院教授）