Mao Zedong’s Planning and Guidance of the Strategic Offensive during the War of Liberation

During the War of Liberation, under Mao Zedong’s planning and guidance, the People’s Liberation Army, on the basis of having basically broken the Kuomintang army’s full-scale offensive and key-point offensive, launched a strategic offensive without waiting for its overall strength to surpass that of the Kuomintang army, transferred its main forces to exterior-line operations, carried the war into Kuomintang-controlled areas, annihilated large numbers of enemy troops on exterior lines, and opened up and established new liberated areas, thereby fundamentally reversing the war situation and accelerating the victory of the War of Liberation and the collapse of the Kuomintang regime. This was a vivid practice of Mao Zedong’s military strategic thought and was of great significance for the victory of the War of Liberation. This article intends to sort out and analyze the historical process of Mao Zedong’s planning and guidance of the strategic offensive during the War of Liberation from three important nodes, in order to deepen research on Mao Zedong’s military thought and the history of the War of Liberation.

解放战争时期，在毛泽东的谋划与指导下，人民解放军在基本打破国民党军队全面进攻和重点进攻的基础上，不等到力量全面超过国民党军队就实施战略进攻，以主力转入外线作战，将战争引向国民党统治区，在外线大量歼敌，开辟和建立新的解放区，从而从根本上扭转战争局势，加快了解放战争胜利和国民党政权垮台的进程。这是毛泽东军事战略思想的一次生动实践，对于解放战争的胜利具有重要意义。本文拟从三个重要节点对解放战争时期毛泽东谋划和指导战略进攻的历史进程进行梳理分析，以期深化毛泽东军事思想和解放战争史等相关研究。

I. Proposing the Southern Front Operations Plan on the Eve of the Kuomintang’s Launch of the Full-Scale Civil War, Laying the Groundwork for the Strategic Offensive

一、在国民党发动全面内战前夕提出南线作战计划，为战略进攻埋下伏笔

After the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Communist Party of China reflected and represented the interests and demands of the people of the whole country, striving to continue cooperation with the Kuomintang and enable China to embark on a path of peaceful and democratic development. However, relying on the support of the United States and its temporary military superiority, the Kuomintang, in order to maintain its dictatorial and autocratic rule, violated the agreements reached at the Chongqing Negotiations and the Political Consultative Conference and launched a full-scale civil war on June 26, 1946, aimed at eliminating the revolutionary forces led by the Communist Party of China. The Communist Party of China opposed the civil war and tried its best to avoid it, but ideologically it never relaxed for a moment, always preparing to defeat the Kuomintang army’s offensive from a position of self-defense. On the eve of the outbreak of the full-scale civil war, the Kuomintang, using the restoration of communications as a pretext, continuously mobilized troops and concentrated heavy forces “at key points around the various liberated areas and in positions prepared for attack,”[n] such as assembling 11 corps in the southern section of the Tianjin-Pukou Railway north of the Yangtze River, 6 corps in Xuzhou, 11 corps deployed around the Central Plains Liberated Area where the former New Fourth Army’s Fifth Division was located, and 4 corps concentrated in the Xinxiang and Anyang area on the north bank of the Yellow River. These troops were prepared to be used respectively to attack the Soviet-Anhui, Shandong, Central Plains, and Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan liberated areas led by the Communist Party of China. Among them, around the Central Plains Liberated Area, in addition to deploying 11 corps totaling 300,000 troops, the Kuomintang army also built more than 6,000 blockhouses, forming a large encirclement, and the Central Plains Liberated Area faced a perilous situation of being surrounded and annihilated. Based on this situation, the Communist Party of China judged that a full-scale civil war was inevitable, “Chiang Kai-shek is preparing for a big fight, it is difficult to turn back,”[n] and began active war preparations, planning military deployments after the outbreak of the full-scale civil war.

抗战胜利后，中国共产党反映和代表全国人民的利益和要求，力争与国民党继续合作，使中国走上和平民主的发展道路，但国民党倚仗美国的支持和暂时的军事优势，为了保持独裁专制统治，违背重庆谈判和政治协商会议达成的协议，在1946年6月26日发动了旨在消灭中国共产党领导的革命力量的全面内战。中国共产党是反对内战、竭力避免内战的，但在思想上一刻也没有松懈，时刻准备着站在自卫立场上打败国民党军队的进攻。全面内战爆发前夕，国民党以恢复交通为借口，不断调动军队，在“各解放区周围要点与进攻之准备位置”集结重兵，如在长江以北津浦铁路南段集结了11个军，徐州集结了6个军，原新四军第五师所在的中原解放区周围部署了11个军，黄河北岸新乡、安阳一带集结了4个军。这些部队准备分别用于进攻中国共产党领导的苏皖、山东、中原、晋冀鲁豫等解放区。其中，在中原解放区周围，国民党军队除部署了11个军共30万人外，还修筑了6000余座碉堡，形成一个大包围圈，中原解放区面临被围歼的险恶局面。中国共产党根据这种形势，判断全面内战不可避免，“蒋介石准备大打，恐难挽回”，开始积极备战，筹划全面内战爆发后的军事部署。

At that time, among the major strategic regions led by the Communist Party of China, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region undertook the northern front combat tasks, while the southern front combat tasks were mainly undertaken by the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region and the Shandong Military Region. On June 22, 1946, Mao Zedong drafted a telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPC to the leaders of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region and the Shandong Military Region, such as Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yi, proposing an operations plan for the Taihang (i.e., Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) and Shandong regions after the outbreak of the full-scale civil war, namely the Southern Front Operations Plan. This was an operations plan embodying Mao Zedong’s thought of active defense. The political and military situation at the time was, first, the enemy was strong and we were weak; the People’s Liberation Army in the liberated areas did not yet have the strength to completely defeat and annihilate the Kuomintang army. Second, the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations were still ongoing, the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation had not yet completely broken down, and the hope for achieving peace and democracy still existed. Under these circumstances, the operational goal of the People’s Liberation Army in the liberated areas was to repulse the Kuomintang army’s offensive, defend the liberated areas and the fruits of the War of Resistance victory, and achieve peace and democracy. Therefore, the Southern Front Operations Plan was strategically defensive, not offensive, and was not aimed at overthrowing the rule of the Kuomintang regime. However, in order to seize the initiative and achieve the goal of active defense, it was tactically and formally offensive, requiring the People’s Liberation Army in the liberated areas to implement an operational policy of exterior-line sorties, advancing when the enemy advances, with the Kuomintang army moving north and the People’s Liberation Army in the liberated areas moving south, thereby pinning down and repulsing the Kuomintang army’s attack on the liberated areas. The exterior-line operational policy and concept proposed by Mao Zedong in the Southern Front Operations Plan laid an important prerequisite and foundation for the strategic offensive.

当时，在中国共产党领导的各大战略区中，晋察冀军区承担北线作战任务，南线作战任务则主要由晋冀鲁豫军区和山东军区承担。1946年6月22日，毛泽东为中共中央起草致刘伯承、邓小平、陈毅等晋冀鲁豫军区和山东军区领导人电，提出全面内战爆发后太行(即晋冀鲁豫)和山东两区的作战计划，即南线作战计划。这是一个体现毛泽东积极防御军事思想的作战计划。当时的政治军事形势，一是敌强我弱，中国共产党领导的解放区人民军队还不具备完全打垮和消灭国民党军队的实力；二是国共谈判仍在进行，国共合作尚未最后破裂，实现和平民主的希望尚存。在此形势下，解放区人民军队的作战目标是打退国民党军队的进攻，保卫解放区和抗战胜利果实，实现和平民主。因此，南线作战计划在战略上是防御的，不是进攻的，不是为了推翻国民党政权的统治，但为了争取主动，达到积极防御的目的，它在战术上、形式上是进攻的，要求解放区人民军队实行外线出击的作战方针，敌进我进，国民党军队向北，解放区人民军队向南，以此来牵制和打退国民党军队对解放区的进攻。毛泽东在南线作战计划中提出的外线作战方针和设想，为战略进攻奠定了重要前提和基础。

The exterior-line operational policy and concept in the Southern Front Operations Plan basically included three aspects: First, the People’s Liberation Army in the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Liberated Area and the Shandong Liberated Area would take the initiative to strike. Among them, the People’s Liberation Army in the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Liberated Area would take the eastern Henan region as its main operational direction, concentrate its main forces to capture the points of Changyuan, Kaocheng, Minquan, Lanfeng, Fengqiu, Ningling, Suixian, Qixian, Chenliu, Tongxu, Taikang, Zhecheng, Huaiyang, Shangqiu, Luyi, and Xihua, annihilate the enemy’s effective strength in field battles, and seize the opportunity to occupy Kaifeng; the People’s Liberation Army in the Shandong Liberated Area would take the Xuzhou region as its main operational direction, concentrate its main forces to capture the points of Huangkou, Dangshan, Yucheng, Guoyang, Jiagou, Fuli, Su County, Renqiao, and Guzhen, mobilize the enemy in Xuzhou to annihilate them in field battles, and seize the opportunity to occupy Xuzhou. To coordinate the above operations, the main force of the former New Fourth Army’s Fifth Division (i.e., the Central Plains Military Region troops) would break out and move toward Henan, and Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin would lead the main force of the Central China Field Army to deal with the enemy north of the Yangtze River. Second, after the victory of the above operations (not necessarily capturing Kaifeng or Xuzhou), “if the situation is favorable, it may be considered to use the main forces of the Taihang and Shandong regions to cross the Huai River and advance toward the line of Dabie Mountains, Anqing, and Pukou.” Third, “the spirit of this plan emphasizes moving south,” relying on the old base areas and gradually advancing southward, conscripting manpower and material resources from Kuomintang-controlled areas, so that our old liberated areas would not be destroyed.

南线作战计划中的外线作战方针和设想，基本内容包括三个方面：第一，晋冀鲁豫解放区和山东解放区的人民军队主动出击。其中，晋冀鲁豫解放区人民军队以豫东地区为主要作战方向，集中主要兵力攻取长垣、考城、民权、兰封、封丘、宁陵、睢县、杞县、陈留、通许、太康、柘城、淮阳、商丘、鹿邑、西华各点，在野战中消灭敌军有生力量，相机占领开封；山东解放区人民军队以徐州地区为主要作战方向，集中主要兵力攻取黄口、砀山、虞城、涡阳、夹沟、符离、宿县、任桥、固镇各点，调动徐州之敌于野战中歼灭之，相机占领徐州。为配合上述作战，原新四军第五师主力(即中原军区部队)突围向河南出动，粟裕、谭震林率领华中野战军主力对付江北之敌。第二，上述作战胜利后(不一定要取得开封、徐州)，“如形势有利，可考虑以太行、山东两区主力渡淮河向大别山、安庆、浦口之线前进”。第三，“这一计划的精神着重向南”，以老根据地为依靠逐步向南，从国民党统治区征用人力物力，使我老解放区不受破坏。

The above exterior-line operational policy and concept, on the one hand, had a clear offensive character, and on the other hand, clearly designated the main operational direction as “southward,” carrying the war into Kuomintang-controlled areas, which was obviously consistent with the subsequent strategic offensive thinking of the People’s Liberation Army’s thrust into the Central Plains. Therefore, it can be said that the Southern Front Operations Plan had actually already indicated the strategic offensive direction of the People’s Liberation Army and was the foreshadowing and precursor of the strategic offensive in the War of Liberation.

上述外线作战方针和设想，一方面有着明确的进攻色彩，另一方面把作战的主要方向明确为“向南”，把战争引向国民党统治区，明显与后来人民解放军挺进中原的战略进攻思路一致。因此可以说，南线作战计划实际上已经指明了人民解放军的战略进攻方向，是解放战争战略进攻的伏笔和先声。

However, given the development of the situation at the time, the Southern Front Operations Plan was not immediately put into effect. On the one hand, this plan was formulated before the Kuomintang launched the full-scale civil war; it was a strategic pre-positioning made by Mao Zedong after a profound analysis of the war situation. But at that time, the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation had not yet broken down, and implementing this plan would put us in a politically passive position. On the other hand, judging from the actual situation at the time, with the People’s Army at a clear disadvantage in strength, fighting by relying on the revolutionary base areas, taking advantage of the familiar geographical environment and favorable mass conditions, was more conducive to preserving itself and annihilating the enemy’s effective strength. Therefore, after the outbreak of the full-scale civil war, Mao Zedong, after comprehensively considering the opinions of frontline commanders and the situation of the Kuomintang army launching a full-scale offensive against the liberated areas, did not immediately put the Southern Front Operations Plan into effect. On July 4, 1946, Mao Zedong drafted a telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission to Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi, and the Central China Bureau, pointing out: “The stubborn enemy in Jiaozhou-Jinan, Xuzhou, northern Henan, eastern Henan, and northern Jiangsu may attack us simultaneously. If so, it would be politically more advantageous for us to first fight a few victorious battles on interior lines before turning to exterior lines.” In accordance with this directive, after the outbreak of the full-scale civil war, the People’s Liberation Army in the various liberated areas still mainly fought on interior lines. Although the Southern Front Operations Plan was not implemented at the time, its main spirit and strategic concept laid an ideological foundation and provided important strategic preparation for the strategic offensive that was actually carried out later.

然而，鉴于当时形势的发展，南线作战计划并未立即付诸实施。一方面，这一计划制定于国民党发动全面内战之前，是毛泽东对战争形势作出深刻分析后作出的战略预置，但在当时，国共合作仍未破裂，如果实施这一计划将在政治上陷于被动。另一方面，从当时的实际情况看，人民军队在力量处于明显劣势的情况下，依托革命根据地，利用熟悉的地理环境和有利的群众条件进行作战，更有利于保存自己，消灭敌人有生力量。因此，全面内战爆发后，毛泽东在综合考虑前线将领的意见和国民党军队向解放区展开全面进攻的形势后，并没有将南线作战计划立即付诸实施。1946年7月4日，毛泽东为中央军委起草致刘伯承、邓小平、陈毅和华中局电，指出：“胶济、徐州、豫北、豫东、苏北之顽可能同时向我进攻，果如此，我先在内线打几个胜仗再转至外线，在政治上更为有利。”按照这一指示，全面内战爆发后，各解放区人民军队仍以内线作战为主。尽管南线作战计划当时并未实施，但其主要精神和战略设想为后续实际开展的战略进攻打下了思想基础，提供了战略上的重要准备。

II. Clearly Proposing to “Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek” at the Central Committee Meeting of the CPC Held on November 21, 1946, Strategizing a Key Step of the Strategic Offensive

二、在1946年11月21日召开的中共中央会议上明确提出“打倒蒋介石”，谋定战略进攻的关键一步

The strategic offensive of the People’s Liberation Army during the War of Liberation was aimed at overthrowing the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang. At the time of the outbreak of the full-scale civil war, the People’s Liberation Army led by the Communist Party of China mainly stood on the ground of self-defense to counter the Kuomintang army’s offensive and strive for peace and democracy. However, the subsequent development and changes in the military and political situation caused Mao Zedong’s strategic guiding thought on the War of Liberation to gradually change, from striving for peace and democracy to overthrowing the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang. This change had a critical impact on the strategic offensive of the War of Liberation.

解放战争时期人民解放军的战略进攻，是以推翻国民党的反动统治为目标的。全面内战爆发时，中国共产党领导的解放区人民军队主要是站在自卫的立场上反击国民党军队的进攻，争取实现和平民主，但此后军事政治形势的发展变化，使得毛泽东关于解放战争的战略指导思想逐步发生变化，由争取和平民主转变为推翻国民党的反动统治。这一变化对解放战争战略进攻的影响是关键性的。

From the perspective of the development and changes in the military situation, at the beginning of the all-out civil war, the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong did not have full confidence in whether they could defeat the Kuomintang’s military offensive. However, because they adopted a correct operational policy, the people’s armies in the liberated areas won successive victories, and the effective strength of the Kuomintang army suffered repeated annihilating blows. Less than three months into the war, the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong had already begun to see the dawn of victory. The landmark event with a turning-point significance was the victory of the Dingtao Campaign, fought from September 3 to 7, 1946, by the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army under Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping. The campaign lasted five days and annihilated the entire Kuomintang reorganized 3rd Division and part of the reorganized 47th and 41st Divisions, totaling over 17,000 men. Mao Zedong, on behalf of the Central Military Commission, drafted a telegram to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, celebrating the “great victory of annihilating the 3rd Division” by the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army and “conveying commendations to the entire army.” Yan’an’s *Liberation Daily* published an editorial titled “The Chiang Army Is Doomed to Defeat,” pointing out: “The victory of the Dingtao Campaign is another great victory following the victory of our Central Plains troops’ breakout and the great victory in Central Jiangsu. These three victories have played an important role in turning the situation around on the southern front of the entire liberated area. The situation in which the Chiang army is doomed to defeat and our army is bound to win is now settled!” Related to this, on September 6, Mao Zedong drafted a telegram on behalf of the Party Central Committee to the CPC delegation in Nanjing, proposing that the People’s Liberation Army planned to annihilate one-third of the first-line Kuomintang invading forces, that is, 54 of the 162 brigades, within six to eight months, in order to change the overall situation. This telegram indicated that the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong believed that through military victories they could reverse the situation in which the enemy was strong and we were weak, and the enemy was on the offensive and we were on the defensive. At this time, the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong’s positioning of the war’s objectives also began to undergo an important change.

从军事形势的发展变化看，全面内战开始之时，中共中央和毛泽东对于能否打败国民党的军事进攻，并没有充分的把握，但由于采取了正确作战方针，各解放区的人民军队连战告捷，国民党军队的有生力量不断遭到歼灭性的打击。战争进行了不到三个月，中共中央和毛泽东就已开始看到胜利的曙光。具有转折意义的标志性事件是1946年9月上旬刘伯承、邓小平率领晋冀鲁豫野战军取得了定陶战役的胜利。是役从9月3日进行至7日，历时5天，全歼国民党整编第3师以及整编第47师和41师等一部，共1.7万余人。毛泽东为中央军委起草致刘伯承、邓小平电，庆祝晋冀鲁豫野战军“歼灭第三师的大胜利”，并“传令全军嘉奖”。延安《解放日报》为此发表《蒋军必败》的社论，指出：定陶战役的胜利“是继续中原我军突围胜利与苏中大捷之后又一次大胜利。这三个胜利，对于整个解放区的南方战线，起了扭转局面的重要作用。蒋军必败，我军必胜的局面是定下来了!”与此相联系的是，9月6日，毛泽东为中共中央起草致南京中共代表团电，提出人民解放军计划在6个月至8个月内，歼灭第一线国民党进犯军的1/3，即162个旅中的54个旅，以转变整个局势。该电说明中共中央和毛泽东认为可以通过军事上的胜利转变敌强我弱、敌攻我防的态势。这时，中共中央和毛泽东对于战争目标的定位也开始发生重要改变。

In late September 1946, Chen Geng and others, leading the 4th Column of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army and troops of the Taiyue Military District, near Fushan City in southwestern Shanxi, surrounded and annihilated over 4,000 men of the so-called “Number One Brigade in the World,” the 1st Brigade of the Kuomintang Hu Zongnan’s reorganized 1st Division, achieving another important victory. This victory further strengthened the confidence of the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong in defeating the Kuomintang army. On September 25, Mao Zedong drafted a telegram on behalf of the Party Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying, and others, reporting this victory and pointing out that although the Kuomintang army had occupied or was about to occupy some important towns and places in the liberated areas, it was entirely possible for our army to annihilate forty to fifty enemy brigades in field operations, and “as long as this goal is achieved, the situation will change.” On September 28, Mao Zedong again drafted a telegram on behalf of the Party Central Committee to the CPC delegation in Nanjing and Ye Jianying, clearly stating that in negotiations with the Kuomintang, our side’s conditions for a ceasefire should be “to solve all problems in accordance with the January 1946 Ceasefire Agreement and the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference,” that is, to demand that the Kuomintang army withdraw from the towns and places it had occupied in the liberated areas, retreat to the positions held before the ceasefire order of January 13, 1946, and faithfully implement the Political Consultative Conference resolutions to establish a democratic coalition government. This was something the Kuomintang could not possibly accept. Proposing such ceasefire conditions actually meant that the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong no longer hoped to solve the problem through negotiations but were more confident in defeating the Kuomintang through war to establish a new, peaceful, democratic, independent, and unified China.

1946年9月下旬，陈赓等率领晋冀鲁豫野战军第4纵队和太岳军区部队，在晋西南的浮山城附近，包围歼灭号称“天下第一旅”的国民党胡宗南部整编第1师第1旅4000余人，取得又一个重要胜利。这一胜利进一步增强了中共中央和毛泽东战胜国民党军队的信心。9月25日，毛泽东为中共中央起草致周恩来、叶剑英等电，通报这一胜利，指出国民党军队虽然占领或将要占领解放区的一些重要城镇和地方，但我军在野战中歼敌四五十个旅是完全可能的，“只要此目的达到，局面即将改观”。9月28日，毛泽东又为中共中央起草致南京中共代表团并叶剑英电，明确提出在与国民党的谈判中，我方停战条件应是“一切按照今年一月停战协定及政协决议解决问题”，即要求国民党军队退出所占领的解放区城镇和地方，撤回至1946年1月13日停战令发布前的位置，并切实履行政协决议，建立民主的联合政府。这是国民党所不可能答应的。提出这样的停战条件，实际上意味着中共中央和毛泽东已不再希望通过谈判解决问题，而是更有信心通过战争打败国民党来建立和平民主、独立统一的新中国了。

On October 1, 1946, Mao Zedong drafted an important inner-Party directive titled “Summary of Three Months’ Operations.” This directive was an important sign of the change in the strategic guiding ideology of the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong after the people’s army had annihilated a large amount of the effective strength of the Kuomintang army and achieved a series of important victories. The directive analyzed and summarized the war situation in the three months after the outbreak of the all-out civil war, holding that the operations of these three months had already proved that we could defeat Chiang Kai-shek, and the whole Party should have full confidence in this. The directive proposed that the task for our army in the coming period was to annihilate another 25 enemy brigades on the basis of the 25 brigades annihilated in the past three months. The directive predicted: “When the task of annihilating the second 25 brigades is completed, our army will surely be able to seize the strategic initiative and shift from the defensive to the offensive. The task at that time will be to annihilate the enemy’s third 25 brigades.” This was the first time Mao Zedong proposed in an inner-Party directive that our army should shift from strategic defense to strategic offensive at an appropriate time. Although at this time the timing judgment of the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong regarding our army’s shift from defense to offense was not entirely consistent with the subsequent actual situation, it can be seen that with the change in strategic guiding ideology, Mao Zedong’s planning and deployment for strategic offensive became increasingly clear and definite.

1946年10月1日，毛泽东为中共中央起草了题为《三个月总结》的重要党内指示。这个指示是中共中央和毛泽东在人民军队大量歼灭国民党军队有生力量，取得一系列重要胜利后，战略指导思想发生变化的一个重要标志。指示分析和总结了我军在全面内战爆发后3个月的战况，认为这3个月的作战，业已证明我们能够战胜蒋介石，全党对此应当有充分的信心。指示提出，我军今后一个时期的任务，是要在过去3个月歼敌25个旅的基础上，再歼敌25个旅。指示预计：“在歼灭第二个二十五个旅这一任务完成的时候，我军必能夺取战略上的主动，由防御转入进攻。那时的任务，是歼灭敌军第三个二十五个旅。”这是毛泽东第一次在党内指示中提出我军在适当的时候要由战略防御转入战略进攻。虽然此时中共中央和毛泽东对我军由防御转入进攻的时机判断与后来的实际情况不完全一致，但从中可以看出随着战略指导思想的改变，毛泽东对于战略进攻的谋划和部署愈发清晰和明确起来。

After entering October 1946, in view of the development and changes in the situation, Mao Zedong began to revive the implementation of the Southern Front Operations Plan. On October 13, Mao Zedong drafted a telegram on behalf of the Party Central Committee to Chen Yi, Su Yu, and others, requiring them to concentrate the Shandong Field Army and the Central China Field Army to fight several major battles in the Huai-Hai region to open up the situation, holding that this was not only beneficial to the current war situation but also conducive to “future operations to move out to the Dabie Mountains and shift to exterior-line operations (a few months later).” On October 15, Mao Zedong again drafted a telegram on behalf of the Party Central Committee to Chen Yi, Su Yu, and others, requiring them to concentrate the Shandong Field Army and the Central China Field Army to annihilate 7 to 10 brigades of the Kuomintang army under Xue Yue within two to three months, in order to “change the situation, recover the Huai’an and Huaiyin areas, and prepare for future operations to move out to the Central Plains.” On October 29, Mao Zedong again drafted a telegram on behalf of the Party Central Committee to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, proposing: “After annihilating about half of the enemy’s forces in interior-line operations and recovering most of the lost territory, the main force should be used to move out to the Central Plains in accordance with the previous plan.” The “previous plan” referred to here is the Southern Front Operations Plan. Mao Zedong’s revival of the implementation of the Southern Front Operations Plan at this time was closely related to the political and military situation at the time, especially the military situation. The results of the three months after the outbreak of the all-out civil war showed that our army could annihilate large amounts of the enemy’s effective strength. If the results of the past three months could be replicated, the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves would undergo a major change, thereby creating more favorable conditions for our army to move out to the Central Plains. On the other hand, however, the Southern Front Operations Plan at this time was no longer exactly the same as the plan before the outbreak of the all-out civil war. The difference lay in the fact that its offensive nature was more pronounced, and its purpose was no longer to stop the civil war and restore peace, but to overthrow the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang. Therefore, the Southern Front Operations Plan at this time had actually become an important component of Mao Zedong’s strategic offensive deployment.

进入1946年10月后，鉴于形势的发展变化，毛泽东开始重提执行南线作战计划。10月13日，毛泽东为中共中央起草致陈毅、粟裕等电，要求他们集中山东野战军和华中野战军在淮海地区打几个大仗，打开局面，认为这样做不仅对目前的战局有利，而且有利于“将来出大别山转入外线作战(几个月之后)”。10月15日，毛泽东又为中共中央起草致陈毅、粟裕等电，要求他们集中山东野战军和华中野战军，于2至3个月内歼灭国民党军薛岳部7至10个旅，以“转变局势，收复两淮，并准备将来向中原出动”。10月29日，毛泽东又为中共中央起草致刘伯承、邓小平电，提出：“内线作战歼灭敌人一半左右，失地大部收复之后应照前计划以主力向中原出动”。这里所说的“前计划”，即指南线作战计划。毛泽东此时重提执行南线作战计划，是与当时的政治军事形势特别是军事形势密切相关的。全面内战爆发后3个月的战绩表明，我军是能够大量歼灭敌人有生力量的。如能复制过去3个月的战绩，敌我力量对比将发生重大变化，从而为我军向中原出动创造更加有利的条件。但另一方面，此时的南线作战计划，已不完全是全面内战爆发前的南线作战计划。区别就在于，它的进攻性质更加明显，目的不再是制止内战、恢复和平，而是推翻国民党的反动统治。因此，这时的南线作战计划，实际上已成为毛泽东战略进攻部署的重要组成部分。

From the perspective of the development and changes in the political situation, after the outbreak of the all-out civil war, the Kuomintang-Communist peace talks continued for a period of time, but the Kuomintang persistently adhered to the policy of dictatorship and civil war. Not only did it launch an all-out offensive against the liberated areas, but it also repeatedly crossed the red lines set by the Chinese Communist Party in negotiations. On October 11, 1946, after successively occupying the important liberated-area cities of Chengde, Huaiyin, and Huai’an, the Kuomintang army also occupied Zhangjiakou City, the political, economic, and military center of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Liberated Area. This was the last remaining provincial capital city under Chinese Communist control within the Pass [n], and it had important symbolic significance. When the Kuomintang army launched its attack on Zhangjiakou City, the Chinese Communist Party had issued a solemn statement: “If the government does not immediately stop all military actions against Zhangjiakou and its surrounding areas, the Chinese Communist Party cannot but consider that the government has openly declared a complete rupture and has finally abandoned the policy of political settlement.” However, the Kuomintang not only turned a deaf ear to this but also violated the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference. Disregarding the opposition of the Chinese Communist Party and the democratic parties, it convened a Kuomintang-dominated “National Assembly” on November 15, 1946, completely tearing up the Political Consultative Conference resolutions and ultimately breaking off the Kuomintang-Communist peace talks.

从政治形势的发展变化看，全面内战爆发后，国共和谈仍持续了一段时间，但国民党始终坚持独裁内战的方针，不仅向各解放区发动全面进攻，而且一再越过中国共产党设定的谈判红线。1946年10月11日，国民党军队在相继占领解放区的重要城市承德、淮阴、淮安后，又占领晋察冀解放区的政治、经济、军事中心张家口市。这是中国共产党在关内剩下的最后一座省会城市，具有重要的象征意义。当国民党军队向张家口市发动进攻时，中国共产党曾严正声明：“如果政府不立即停止对张家口及其周围的一切军事行动，中共不能不认为政府业已公然宣告全面破裂，并已最后放弃政治解决的方针。”然而，国民党不仅对此置若罔闻，还违反政协决议，不顾中国共产党和各民主党派的反对，于1946年11月15日召开国民党一党包办的“国民大会”，彻底撕毁政协决议，使国共和谈最终破裂。

The breakdown of the Kuomintang-Communist peace talks, on the one hand, educated the people of the whole country and the democratic parties, making them recognise that the Chinese Communist Party represented the interests of the people, while the Kuomintang was always unwilling to abandon its policy of dictatorship and civil war. This enabled the Chinese Communist Party to win popular support, to stand on the side of reason and advantage politically, and to lay a solid and broad mass foundation for overthrowing the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang. After the breakdown of the Kuomintang-Communist peace talks, Zhou Enlai said that the talks had “made the masses understand the CCP’s policy of peace and democracy and Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of dictatorship and civil war.” Mao Zedong also said: in the past, the people all hoped the Kuomintang and the Communist Party would not fight; now the people’s illusions about Chiang Kai-shek have greatly diminished, and “many people hope we will win.” On the other hand, the closing of the door to negotiations objectively forced the Central Committee of the CPC and Mao Zedong to resolve the Kuomintang-Communist contradiction only by military means. Therefore, after the breakdown of the Kuomintang-Communist peace talks, the Central Committee of the CPC and Mao Zedong determined the policy of “overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek,” and Mao Zedong’s overall plan for the strategic offensive accelerated its formation under these conditions.

国共和谈的破裂，一方面教育了全国人民和各民主党派，使他们认识到中国共产党才是代表人民利益的，而国民党则始终不愿放弃独裁内战方针，这就使中国共产党赢得了人心，在政治上站在了有理有利的一面，为推翻国民党的反动统治奠定了坚实而广泛的群众基础。国共和谈破裂后，周恩来曾说，国共和谈“使党的和平民主方针与蒋介石的独裁内战方针被群众所认识”。毛泽东也说：过去人民都希望国共不打仗，现在人民对蒋介石的幻想少多了，“许多人希望我们胜利”。另一方面，和谈大门的关闭，也在客观上迫使中共中央和毛泽东只能以军事手段解决国共矛盾。因此，国共和谈破裂后，中共中央和毛泽东确定了“打倒蒋介石”的方针，毛泽东关于战略进攻的总体部署也在这种条件下加速形成。

The meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC held on 21 November 1946 was a key node in Mao Zedong’s planning of the strategic offensive. This meeting analysed the political and military situation facing the Chinese Communist Party after the breakdown of the Kuomintang-Communist peace talks and the policies and measures that should be adopted. Mao Zedong pointed out at the meeting: Chiang Kai-shek launched the full-scale civil war almost five months ago; our army has already annihilated 38 brigades of the Kuomintang army, a little more than half of the Kuomintang army’s 75 brigades. Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek’s offensive can be broken. In terms of popular support, although the Kuomintang-Communist peace talks could not stop the civil war, they educated the people: “Now the people already know who wants to fight and who wants peace; the deception of the U.S. government is also clearer to the people.” Because the development of the military and political situation was favourable to the Chinese Communist Party and unfavourable to the Kuomintang, Mao Zedong proposed at the meeting that from now on we should do the work of “overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek.” Based on Mao Zedong’s proposal, this meeting determined the policy of “overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek.” This policy was a major decision of overall importance made by the Chinese Communist Party after the breakdown of the Kuomintang-Communist peace talks, sizing up the situation, and it had directional significance for the development of the War of Liberation. After this, the main problem that the Chinese Communist Party needed to solve in its guiding ideology was no longer whether to “overthrow Chiang Kai-shek,” but how to “overthrow Chiang Kai-shek.”

1946年11月21日举行的中共中央会议，是毛泽东谋划战略进攻的关键节点。这次会议分析了国共和谈破裂后中国共产党面临的政治军事形势和应该采取的方针政策。毛泽东在会上指出：蒋介石发动全面内战差不多5个月了，我军已歼灭国民党军队38个旅，占到国民党军队75个旅的半数多一点。因此，蒋介石的进攻是可以打破的。在人心向背方面，虽然国共和谈没能停止内战，但教育了人民，“现在究竟谁要打谁要和，人民已经知道了；美国政府的欺骗，人民也更清楚了”。由于军事政治形势的发展都有利于中国共产党而不利于国民党，因此毛泽东在会上提出，今后我们要做“打倒蒋介石”的工作。根据毛泽东的提议，这次会议确定了“打倒蒋介石”的方针。这个方针是中国共产党在国共和谈破裂后，审时度势作出的一个事关全局的重大决策，对于解放战争的发展具有定向的重要意义。在此之后，中国共产党在指导思想上需要解决的主要问题不再是要不要“打倒蒋介石”，而是如何“打倒蒋介石”了。

Regarding how to “overthrow Chiang Kai-shek,” Mao Zedong also put forward a clear and definite plan at the meeting. He said: “After half a year to a year, eliminate seventy or eighty of his brigades, stop his offensive, we begin the counter-offensive, break the strength he has accumulated over seven or eight years with U.S. aid within one year, and bring the forces of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party into balance. Once balance is reached, it is easy to surpass it. Then we can strike outward, first Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Gansu, and then we can develop further south of the Yangtze River. This will take about three to five years.” The above plan actually sketched out the blueprint for the People’s Liberation Army’s strategic offensive. This blueprint for the strategic offensive was based on the Southern Front Operations Plan, but greatly developed its content. First, although both this blueprint for the strategic offensive and the Southern Front Operations Plan had the content of advancing into the Central Plains, the advance into the Central Plains in this blueprint was based on the balance of forces between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, possessing a higher strategic level, while the Southern Front Operations Plan did not yet have such clear strategic-level considerations. In this blueprint, eliminating seventy or eighty brigades of the Kuomintang army and bringing the forces of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party into balance was an important prerequisite. Without such a prerequisite and foundation, even if the People’s Liberation Army conducted exterior-line operations and assumed an offensive form, it could only be a local, tactical offensive, not a true strategic offensive. Second, the goal to be achieved by the Southern Front Operations Plan was mainly to defeat the offensive of the Kuomintang army and realise peace and democracy, with the scope of operations limited to north of the Yangtze River, while this blueprint for the strategic offensive stood higher and saw farther, raising the goal to developing south of the Yangtze River and liberating the whole of China, thereby becoming a strategic offensive concept guiding the overall War of Liberation. The strategic offensive operations in the second year of the War of Liberation were basically based on this blueprint, and the strategic pattern of the three main forces advancing into the Central Plains was also basically carried out according to this blueprint.

关于如何“打倒蒋介石”，毛泽东在会上也提出了清晰而明确的计划。他说：“经过半年到一年消灭他七八十个旅，停止他的进攻，我们开始反攻，把他在美国援助下七八年积蓄的力量在一年内打破，使国共两党的力量达到平衡。达到了平衡就很容易超过它。那时我们就可以打出去，首先是安徽、河南、湖北、甘肃，然后可以再向长江以南发展，这大约要用三年到五年的时间。”上述计划实际上擘画了人民解放军战略进攻的蓝图。这一战略进攻蓝图，是以南线作战计划为基础的，但大大发展了南线作战计划的内容。第一，这一战略进攻蓝图和南线作战计划虽然都有向中原进军的内容，但这一战略进攻蓝图中的向中原进军建立在国共双方力量达到平衡的基础上，具有更高的战略层次，而南线作战计划尚没有这样清晰的战略层面的考量。在这个蓝图中，消灭国民党军队七八十个旅，使国共两党力量达到平衡，是个重要前提。如果没有这样的前提和基础，人民解放军即使进行外线作战，具有进攻的形式，也只能是局部的、战术上的进攻，而不可能是真正的战略进攻。第二，南线作战计划所要实现的目标主要是打败国民党军队的进攻，实现和平民主，作战的范围仅限于长江以北，而这一战略进攻蓝图站得更高，看得更远，把目标提高到向长江以南发展，解放全中国，从而成为指导解放战争全局的战略进攻设想。解放战争第二年的战略进攻行动基本上是以此为蓝本的，三路大军挺进中原的战略格局也基本上是按照这一蓝图进行的。

III. Comprehensive Deployment of the Strategic Offensive at the Xiaohe Conference Held from 21 to 23 July 1947, Further Securing Victory in the War

三、在1947年7月21日至23日召开的小河会议上对战略进攻进行全面部署，进一步锁定战争胜局

From the beginning of 1947, the Central Committee of the CPC and Mao Zedong began to deploy the specific actions of the strategic offensive. The Central Committee of the CPC and Mao Zedong first issued the task of preparing to launch the strategic offensive to the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army led by Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping. On 2 January 1947, the Central Military Commission telegraphed Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, and others, putting forward clear requirements for the strategic strike and various preparatory tasks. On 18 January, Mao Zedong, on behalf of the Central Military Commission, drafted a telegram to Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, and others, requiring them to lead their troops to launch the Henan-Anhui border campaign, using about two months to turn the vast area north and south of the Longhai Railway into a mobile battlefield, attracting and annihilating the main forces of the Kuomintang troops, while also proposing: “Around May of this year, the main force can move into the Central Plains.” Shortly thereafter, the Central Committee of the CPC and Mao Zedong issued the task of preparing to move into the Central Plains to the East China Field Army led by Chen Yi, Su Yu, and others. On 24 January, Mao Zedong, on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPC, drafted a telegram to Chen Yi and others, proposing that the Liu-Deng Field Army was preparing to begin moving into the Central Plains in May, “and the East China side should also handle matters according to this plan, striving to complete the annihilation of the main force of the Chiang army on the interior lines before May Day, and complete all preparatory conditions for exterior-line operations (ammunition, new soldiers, cadres, funds, etc.).” From the order in which tasks were issued, it can be seen that when the Central Committee of the CPC and Mao Zedong deployed the specific actions of the strategic offensive, they placed the Liu-Deng Field Army in the most important position from the very beginning. Thereafter, the overall layout of the strategic offensive by the Central Committee of the CPC and Mao Zedong was basically carried out around the Liu-Deng Field Army.

从1947年初开始，中共中央和毛泽东开始部署战略进攻的具体行动。中共中央和毛泽东首先向刘伯承、邓小平率领的晋冀鲁豫野战军下达了准备发起战略进攻的任务。1947年1月2日，中央军委致电刘伯承、邓小平等，对战略出击和各项准备工作提出了明确要求。1月18日，毛泽东为中央军委起草致刘伯承、邓小平等电，要求他们率部发动豫皖边战役，用大约两个月的时间，将陇海路南北广大地区创造为机动战场，吸引国民党部队主力而歼灭之，同时提出：“大约在今年五月间主力即可向中原出动。”此后不久，中共中央和毛泽东又向陈毅、粟裕等率领的华东野战军下达了准备向中原出动的任务。1月24日，毛泽东为中共中央起草致陈毅等电，提出刘邓野战军准备5月开始向中原出动，“华东方面亦请按此计划办理，努力争取于五一以前在内线解决蒋军主力，并完成外线作战的一切准备条件(弹药、新兵、干部、经费等)”。从下达任务的先后顺序可以看出，中共中央和毛泽东在部署战略进攻的具体行动时，一开始就是把刘邓野战军摆在最主要的位置上。此后，中共中央和毛泽东关于战略进攻的总体布局，基本上都是围绕刘邓野战军展开。

As the War of Liberation entered the first half of 1947, the situation was complex and intertwined. On the one hand, the military situation of the War of Liberation was increasingly developing in a direction favorable to the people, and the Chinese Communist Party had the confidence and certainty to defeat the Kuomintang and win the revolutionary victory. On February 1, 1947, the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee held an enlarged meeting, discussing and passing the intra-Party directive drafted by Mao Zedong, “Greet the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution.” The directive pointed out: “Our Party and the Chinese people have every certainty of achieving final victory; of this there is no doubt whatsoever.” The directive analyzed the situation facing the War of Liberation, pointing out that our army had already annihilated 56 enemy brigades in the past seven months, and must annihilate another 40 to 50 enemy brigades in the coming months; when combined with the previous number to total around 100 enemy brigades annihilated, a major change would inevitably occur in the military situation. This directive further scientifically predicted the course of the War of Liberation and specified the necessary conditions for the People’s Liberation Army to shift to the strategic offensive, namely, the annihilation of around 100 enemy brigades. On the other hand, in order to reverse the increasingly unfavorable political and military situation, Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang concentrated its forces to launch key-point offensives against the Shandong Liberated Area and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, occupied Yan’an, and threatened the safety of the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong, plunging the War of Liberation into its most arduous period. Under the leadership of the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong, the people’s armies in the Shandong Liberated Area and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region adopted correct operational policies, continuously annihilating the enemy’s effective strength and bringing in a stream of victorious reports. Therefore, even before the Kuomintang army’s key-point offensives had been completely smashed, Mao Zedong, based on changes in the battlefield situation, had already judged that the conditions for the People’s Liberation Army to shift to the strategic offensive were gradually maturing, and put forward to the entire Party and army the task of making all-out preparations for a great counteroffensive. After the People’s Liberation Army on the Northwest battlefield annihilated the 135th Brigade of the Kuomintang’s Hu Zongnan [7]7 Hu Zongnan (1896–1962) was a senior Kuomintang general who commanded the key-point offensive against the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the capture of Yan’an in March 1947. forces, on May 1, 1947, Xinhua News Agency published a revised editorial by Mao Zedong, “Make All-Out Preparations for the Great Counteroffensive — Commemorate ‘May Day’.” The editorial pointed out: The situation of the war “is changing from the Kuomintang army’s local offensives and the People’s Liberation Army’s local counteroffensives to the Kuomintang army’s full-scale defense and the People’s Liberation Army’s full-scale counteroffensive.” “Our task is to mobilize all forces and make all-out preparations for the great counteroffensive.” These expositions both specified the concrete conditions necessary for the People’s Liberation Army to shift to the strategic offensive and timely put forward to the entire Party and army the task of making all-out preparations for the great counteroffensive.

解放战争进入1947年上半年，形势错综复杂。一方面，解放战争的军事形势日益朝着有利于人民的方向发展，中国共产党已经有信心有把握战胜国民党，夺取革命胜利。1947年2月1日，中共中央政治局召开扩大会议，讨论通过了毛泽东起草的党内指示《迎接中国革命的新高潮》。指示指出：“我党和中国人民有一切把握取得最后胜利，这是毫无疑义的。”指示分析了解放战争面临的形势，指出我军在过去的7个月内已歼敌56个旅，在今后数月内必须再歼敌40至50个旅，连带之前的数量共歼敌100个旅左右，则军事形势必将发生重大变化。这个指示进一步科学预测了解放战争的进程，指明了人民解放军转入战略进攻所必须具备的条件，即歼敌100个旅左右。另一方面，蒋介石国民党为扭转日益不利的政治军事形势，集中兵力向山东解放区和陕甘宁边区进行重点进攻，并占领了延安，威胁到中共中央和毛泽东的安全，解放战争进入最艰苦的岁月。在中共中央和毛泽东的领导下，山东解放区和陕甘宁边区的人民军队采取了正确的作战方针，不断歼灭敌人有生力量，捷报频传，因此在国民党军队的重点进攻还没有被完全粉碎的时候，毛泽东就已根据战场形势的变化，判断出人民解放军转入战略进攻的条件已逐渐具备，向全党全军提出了全力准备大反攻的任务。在西北战场的人民解放军歼灭国民党胡宗南部135旅后，1947年5月1日，新华社发表经毛泽东修改的社论《全力准备大反攻——纪念“五一节”》。社论指出：战争的形势“由蒋军的局部进攻与人民解放军的局部反攻，改变到蒋军的全面防御与人民解放军的全面反攻”。“我们的任务，就是动员一切力量，全力准备大反攻。”这些论述既指明了人民解放军转入战略进攻必须具备的具体条件，又及时向全党全军提出了全力准备大反攻的任务。

On May 4, 1947, Mao Zedong drafted a telegram on behalf of the Party Central Committee to Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, and the leaders of the East China, Southern Shanxi, and Northern Shaanxi field armies, clearly assigning to the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army led by Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping the task of thrusting into the Central Plains. The telegram demanded that the main force of the Liu-Deng Field Army immediately begin rest and reorganization, and after June 1 “independently pass through Hebei-Shandong-Henan to enter the Central Plains, taking the Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu Border Region and the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Region as base areas, and the area north of the Yangtze River, south of the Yellow River, east of the Tongguan-Nanyang line, and west of the Tianjin-Pukou Railway as the zone of maneuver, to strike either at Zhengzhou and Hankou, or at Kaifeng and Xuzhou, or at the Funiu Mountains, or at the Dabie Mountains, as circumstances permit, moving freely as the occasion demands.” Later, the main force of the Liu-Deng Field Army forcibly crossed the Yellow River southward on the night of June 30, acting precisely in accordance with this order. Thus, starting from this telegram, the long- brewing strategic offensive of the People’s Liberation Army began to be put into practice.

1947年5月4日，毛泽东为中共中央起草致刘伯承、邓小平以及华东、晋南、陕北各野战军领导人电，明确给刘伯承、邓小平率领的晋冀鲁豫野战军下达了挺进中原的任务。电报要求刘邓野战军主力立即开始休整，在6月1日后“独力经冀鲁豫出中原，以豫皖苏边区及冀鲁豫边区为根据地，以长江以北，黄河以南，潼关、南阳之线以东，津浦路以西为机动地区，或打郑汉(郑州和汉口)，或打汴徐(开封和徐州)，或打伏牛山，或打大别山，均可因时制宜，往来机动”。后来刘邓野战军主力在6月30日夜强渡黄河南下，就是按照这一命令进行的。所以从这封电报开始，酝酿已久的人民解放军的战略进攻开始付诸实施。

It is noteworthy that the recipients of this telegram included Chen Yi and Su Yu, but the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong did not issue the same order to the East China Field Army led by Chen Yi and Su Yu. As mentioned earlier, on January 24, 1947, the Party Central Committee had telegraphed Chen Yi and others, demanding that the East China Field Army, like the Liu-Deng Field Army, complete all preparations for exterior-line operations before May Day and move into the Central Plains in May. This was in effect a demand that the East China Field Army coordinate with the Liu-Deng Field Army, forming a pattern where the two main forces of the Southern Front field armies would thrust into the Central Plains together. However, in the telegram of May 4, the Party Central Committee only demanded that the Liu-Deng Field Army “independently pass through Hebei-Shandong-Henan to enter the Central Plains,” making no mention of the East China Field Army moving into the Central Plains. The primary reason for this was that at the time, the Kuomintang army’s key-point offensives against the Shandong Liberated Area and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region had not yet been finally broken, and the main forces of the Kuomintang army attacking the Liberated Areas had not yet been eliminated. Therefore, against the backdrop of preparing to launch a great counteroffensive, the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong decided first to concentrate forces on annihilating the main forces of the Kuomintang army attacking the Liberated Areas, and only then to organize a full-scale strategic offensive.

值得注意的是，这封电报的接收者包括陈毅、粟裕，但中共中央和毛泽东没有给陈毅、粟裕率领的华东野战军下达同样的命令。前已述及，中共中央在1947年1月24日致电陈毅等，要求华东野战军跟刘邓野战军一样，在五一前做好外线作战的一切准备，在5月间向中原出动。这实际上是要求华东野战军与刘邓野战军互相配合，形成南线两支野战军主力一道挺进中原的格局。但在5月4日的电报中，中共中央只要求刘邓野战军“独力经冀鲁豫出中原”，对华东野战军向中原出动则没有提及。之所以如此，最主要的原因是当时国民党军队向山东解放区和陕甘宁边区的重点进攻尚未最后打破，国民党军队进攻解放区的主力尚未被消灭，因此中共中央和毛泽东在准备发动大反攻的背景下，决定先集中力量歼灭国民党进攻解放区的主力部队，然后再组织全面的战略进攻。

Thus, in the telegram of May 4, the following situation emerged: on the one hand, it ordered the main force of the Liu-Deng Field Army to move into the Central Plains via Hebei-Shandong-Henan after June 1; on the other hand, it proposed that the operational task of the Liu-Deng Field Army and the East China Field Army was to cooperate in smashing the main forces attacking the Shandong Liberated Area, led by Kuomintang Army Commander-in-Chief Gu Zhutong, while the operational task of the Fourth Column of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army, led by Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi on the Southern Shanxi battlefield, and the Northwest Field Army, led by Peng Dehuai and Xi Zhongxun on the Northern Shaanxi battlefield, was to cooperate in smashing the main forces of Hu Zongnan attacking the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. That is to say, the strategic objective of the operations of the various units mentioned above remained the annihilation of the main Kuomintang forces attacking the Shandong Liberated Area and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region; even the Liu-Deng Field Army’s move into the Central Plains was intended to assist the main force of the East China Field Army in achieving this objective. At that time, Mao Zedong attached great importance to the Shandong battlefield, where the East China Field Army was located. On this battlefield, the Kuomintang had concentrated 32 reorganized divisions and 85 brigades. Mao Zedong believed that among the battlefields within the Passes [8]8 “Within the Passes” (关内) refers to the area east of the Shanhaiguan Pass, i.e., China proper, as distinct from the Northeast (Manchuria)., the East China Field Army bore the heaviest burden and also faced the most opportunities to annihilate the enemy. He regarded the Shandong battlefield as the country’s main battlefield. After issuing the order for the Liu-Deng Field Army to move into the Central Plains, he further proposed to the East China Field Army that it concentrate all its main forces in the area north of the Jinan-Linyi-Haizhou line in Shandong, preparing to use six to seven months to “annihilate the enemy along this line one by one.” He believed that if this objective could be achieved, its significance would be extremely great: “The day this line is broken is the day of overall great victory.” Proceeding from this line of thinking, although Mao Zedong had issued the order for the Liu-Deng Field Army to move into the Central Plains after June 1, he still regarded interior-line operations as the main task of the People’s Liberation Army, hoping to first annihilate the Kuomintang’s main forces through interior-line operations before launching a full-scale strategic offensive.

所以在5月4日的电报中，就出现了这样的情况：一方面命令刘邓野战军主力在6月1日以后经冀鲁豫向中原出动；另一方面又提出刘邓野战军和华东野战军的作战任务是协力击破国民党陆军总司令顾祝同率领的向山东解放区进攻的主力部队，晋南战场陈赓、谢富治率领的晋冀鲁豫野战军第四纵队和陕北战场彭德怀、习仲勋率领的西北野战兵团的作战任务是协力击破向陕甘宁边区进攻的胡宗南的主力部队。也就是说，上述各路部队作战的战略目的仍是歼灭国民党向山东解放区和陕甘宁边区进攻的主力部队，甚至刘邓野战军向中原出动都是为了协助华东野战军主力达到这一目的。当时毛泽东对华东野战军所在的山东战场极为重视。在这一战场，国民党集中了32个整编师85个旅，毛泽东认为在关内各战场中，华东野战军负担最大，同时面临的歼敌机会也最多。他把山东战场看成是全国的主要战场，在向刘邓野战军下达向中原出动的命令后，又对华东野战军提出，集中全部主力于山东的济南、临沂、海州之线以北地区，准备用六七个月时间，“各个歼灭该线之敌”。他认为如果能够达到这一目的，意义极其重大，“该线击破之日，即是全局大胜之时”。从这种思路出发，毛泽东当时虽然一方面向刘邓野战军下达了6月1日以后向中原出动的命令，另一方面他仍然把内线作战作为人民解放军的主要任务，希望通过内线作战歼灭国民党的主力部队后再发起全面的战略进攻。

On the night of June 30, 1947, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping led the main force of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army, comprising four columns and over 120,000 troops, in a forced crossing of the Yellow River southward, raising the curtain on the People’s Liberation Army’s strategic offensive. The Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong paid extremely close attention to and placed great importance on this. “Upon hearing the news that the Liu-Deng Army had safely crossed the Yellow River and advanced into the Central Plains, the location of the Party Central Committee was immersed in joy; Chairman Mao, Comrades Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi were especially elated, beaming with smiles.” After the successful forced crossing of the Yellow River southward by the main force of the Liu-Deng Field Army, Mao Zedong’s thinking on the strategic offensive began to undergo an important change. This was: it was not necessary to completely smash the Kuomintang army’s offensives against all Liberated Areas, nor to wait for the two major battlefields of Shandong and Northern Shaanxi to annihilate the Kuomintang’s main attacking forces through interior-line operations, nor to wait for the People’s Liberation Army’s overall strength to surpass that of the Kuomintang army; the main force of the People’s Liberation Army could shift to exterior-line operations, carrying the war into the Kuomintang-controlled areas, changing from primarily interior-line operations to primarily exterior-line operations.

1947年6月30日夜，刘伯承、邓小平率领晋冀鲁豫野战军主力4个纵队12万余人，强渡黄河南下，揭开了人民解放军战略进攻的序幕。中共中央和毛泽东对此极为关注和重视。“听到刘邓大军安全渡河进军中原的消息，党中央所在地沉浸在一片欢乐之中，毛主席、恩来、弼时同志尤其兴高采烈，喜笑颜开”。在刘邓野战军主力成功强渡黄河南下后，毛泽东关于战略进攻的思想开始发生重要变化。这就是：不需要完全粉碎国民党军队对各解放区的进攻，不需要等到山东、陕北两大战场通过内线作战歼灭国民党进攻的主力部队，不需要等到人民解放军的力量在总体上超过国民党军队的力量，人民解放军主力部队就可以转入外线作战，将战争引向国民党统治区，从以内线作战为主转变为以外线作战为主。

Mao Zedong’s planning for the strategic offensive underwent the above-mentioned changes for two main reasons. First, during the first year of the War of Liberation, the Kuomintang army successively launched an all-out offensive and then a key-point offensive against the various liberated areas. The People’s Liberation Army mainly fought on interior lines, and the fighting took place mostly in the liberated areas. The consumption of manpower, material resources and financial resources in the various liberated areas had nearly reached its limit, and they faced a predicament in which they could not sustain themselves. Under these circumstances, only by sending the main forces of the People’s Liberation Army out to fight and drawing the war into the Kuomintang-ruled areas could the consumption of manpower, material resources and financial resources in the liberated areas be reduced and the protracted prosecution of the War of Liberation be supported. Second, the interior-line operations of the East China Field Army on the Shandong battlefield did not go as smoothly as expected. After the East China Field Army annihilated the Kuomintang’s Reorganized 74th Division in mid-May, Mao Zedong was greatly encouraged and for a time was extremely optimistic about the prospect of annihilating the main Kuomintang forces on the Shandong battlefield. He therefore demanded that the East China Field Army concentrate its main forces, make full preparations, and aim to annihilate seven brigades of the Kuomintang’s 5th Army and the 75th and 85th Divisions in operations in mid-June. However, the Kuomintang army learned from its defeat, changed its operational methods, and adopted a new tactic of “advancing in echelons rather than abreast, advancing in concentration rather than in separate columns, with three divisions advancing in overlapping echelons.” The East China Field Army found it difficult to find good opportunities to annihilate the enemy for a considerable period, and its interior-line operations did not go smoothly; throughout the entire month of June it achieved no major new results. This showed that, at a time when the overall strength of the Kuomintang army still exceeded that of our army, it was still difficult to attempt to annihilate the main attacking forces of the Kuomintang through interior-line operations in a short period. Under these circumstances, Mao Zedong abandoned the plan of first annihilating the main attacking forces of the Kuomintang on the interior lines and then launching a full-scale strategic offensive. Instead, he creatively shifted the operational focus and objectives of the People’s Liberation Army to exterior-line operations ahead of schedule, creating new battlefields by advancing into the Central Plains to turn the situation around and open up a new situation.

毛泽东关于战略进攻的谋划之所以发生上述变化，主要有两个方面的原因：第一，解放战争第一年，国民党军队先后向各解放区发动全面进攻和重点进攻，人民解放军以内线作战为主，战争主要在各解放区进行，各解放区人力物力财力的消耗差不多达到极限，面临着难以为继的困境。在这种情况下，人民解放军的主力只有打出去，将战争引向国民党统治区，才能减少解放区人力物力财力的消耗，支持解放战争的长期进行。第二，华东野战军在山东战场的内线作战不如预期顺利。华东野战军在5月中旬歼灭国民党整编第74师后，毛泽东受到极大鼓舞，一度对山东战场歼灭国民党主力部队的前景极为乐观，因此曾要求华东野战军集中主力，充分准备，在6月中旬的作战中以歼灭国民党第5军及第75师、第85师共7个旅为目标。但国民党军队吸取失败教训，改变作战方法，采取“并进不如重迭，分进不如合进，以三个师重迭交互前进”的新战法，华东野战军在相当长的一段时间里难以找到歼敌良机，内线作战并不顺利，整个6月份没有取得新的重大战果。这说明，在当时国民党军队的整体力量仍然超过我军的情况下，企图在短时期内通过内线作战歼灭国民党进攻的主力部队，仍然是有困难的。在这种情况下，毛泽东放弃了在内线战场歼灭国民党进攻主力部队之后再全面进行战略进攻的方案，而是创造性地提前将人民解放军的作战重点和作战目标转移到外线作战，通过向中原进军创造新的战场来扭转局势，打开局面。

It was precisely along these lines that, shortly after the main forces of the Liu-Deng Field Army [n9] forced their way south across the Yellow River, the Central Military Commission and Mao Zedong made an important strategic decision: to change the original assignment of the Chen-Xie Column [n10] (the Fourth Column of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army, led by Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi), which had been sent to the northern Shaanxi battlefield to assist the Northwest Field Corps in operations, to instead cross the Yellow River and move south, and to form the Chen-Xie Group to coordinate with and support the main forces of the Liu-Deng Field Army in their operations in the Central Plains.

正是沿着上述思路，刘邓野战军主力强渡黄河南下后不久，中央军委和毛泽东作出了一个重要的战略决策，将原定派往陕北战场协助西北野战兵团作战的陈谢纵队(陈赓、谢富治率领的晋冀鲁豫野战军第四纵队)改为渡河南下，并组建陈谢集团，配合和支持刘邓野战军主力经略中原。

Against this background, from July 21 to 23, 1947, Mao Zedong presided over an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC in Xiaohe Village, Jingbian County, northern Shaanxi, historically known as the Xiaohe Meeting. At this time, the War of Liberation had been going on for nearly one year and one month. Although the People’s Liberation Army was still at a disadvantage in numbers and equipment compared with the Kuomintang army, it had successfully annihilated 97.5 brigades of Kuomintang troops. As mentioned earlier, at the Politburo meeting of the Central Committee in February 1947, Mao Zedong had judged that after the People’s Liberation Army annihilated about 100 enemy brigades, the military situation would inevitably undergo major changes. According to this judgment of Mao Zedong, by the time the Xiaohe Meeting was convened, the basic conditions for the People’s Liberation Army to launch a full-scale strategic offensive were already in place. Therefore, launching and organizing a full-scale strategic offensive by the People’s Liberation Army became the theme of the Xiaohe Meeting. At the meeting, Mao Zedong formally announced the change in the direction of use of the Chen-Xie Column, shifting it from entering northern Shaanxi to coordinate with the Northwest Field Corps in attacking Hu Zongnan [n11] to crossing the Yellow River and moving south toward the Central Plains. He said: “This is advantageous both strategically and in terms of grain supply.” Regarding the attack on Hu Zongnan, Mao Zedong proposed: “This year we can only weaken Hu Zongnan; by July next year we can create the conditions to annihilate him.” At the meeting, he clearly proposed shifting the main forces of the People’s Liberation Army from interior lines to exterior lines in order to support a protracted war. He said: “The enemy bases its hope of victory on our inability to sustain a long war; our countermeasure is to shift the main forces to exterior lines and practice economy internally.” Shifting the main forces of the People’s Liberation Army to exterior-line operations was an important strategic policy decided at the Xiaohe Meeting. In accordance with this strategic policy, on the very day the Xiaohe Meeting ended, Mao Zedong drafted a telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission to Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi, Su Yu, and others, changing the plan proposed in the earlier telegram of May 4, which had called for the Liu-Deng Field Army to move into the Central Plains with the Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu border area and the Hebei-Shandong-Henan border area as its base. The new telegram required the Liu-Deng Field Army to “not attack the Longhai Railway, not attack the area east of the New Yellow River, and not attack the Beijing-Hankou Railway; resolve to have no rear area, and in a march of half a month, go straight to the Dabie Mountains, occupy several dozen counties centered on the Dabie Mountains, eliminate the local militia, mobilize the masses, and establish base areas,” thereby further determining the direction and objective of the Liu-Deng Field Army’s offensive. In this telegram, Mao Zedong also proposed a plan for the Ye and Tao Columns of the East China Field Army (i.e., the First and Fourth Columns of the East China Field Army, commanded respectively by Ye Fei and Tao Yong) to cross the Yangtze River southward and establish a base area in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi. Although this plan was not ultimately implemented, it likewise reflected the strategic policy of shifting the main forces to exterior-line operations decided at the Xiaohe Meeting.

在此背景下，1947年7月21日至23日，毛泽东在陕北靖边县小河村主持召开了中共中央扩大会议，史称小河会议。这时，解放战争已进行了差不多1年零1个月的时间。虽然与国民党军队相比，人民解放军在数量上、装备上仍处于劣势，但人民解放军已成功歼灭国民党军队九十七个半旅。前已述及，在1947年2月的中央政治局会议上，毛泽东曾判断人民解放军歼敌100个旅左右，军事形势必将发生重大变化。根据毛泽东的这一判断，小河会议召开时，人民解放军发动全面战略进攻的基本条件已经具备了。因此，发动和组织人民解放军的全面战略进攻，成为小河会议的主题。在会议上，毛泽东正式宣布改变陈谢纵队的使用方向，将陈谢纵队由进入陕北协同西北野战兵团攻打胡宗南改为渡河南下，向中原出动。他说：“这样在战略上和粮食供给上都有利。”对于攻打胡宗南，毛泽东提出：“今年我们只能削弱胡宗南，到明年七月可以造成消灭他的条件。”他在会议上明确提出，要把人民解放军的主力由内线转入外线，以此来支持长期战争。他说：“敌人把取胜放在我们不能长期支持这一点上，我们的对策就是主力转入外线，内部精简节约。”人民解放军以主力转入外线作战，是小河会议决定的重要战略方针。根据这一战略方针，在小河会议结束的当天，毛泽东为中央军委起草致刘伯承、邓小平及陈毅、粟裕等电，改变前述5月4日电报中提出的刘邓野战军兵出中原以豫皖苏边区和冀鲁豫边区为根据地的计划，要求刘邓野战军“不打陇海，不打新黄河以东，亦不打平汉路，下决心不要后方，以半个月行程，直出大别山，占领大别山为中心的数十县，肃清民团，发动群众，建立根据地”，从而进一步确定了刘邓野战军的进攻方向和目标。在这封电报中，毛泽东还提出了以华东野战军叶、陶两纵队(即华东野战军第一纵队和第四纵队，分别由叶飞和陶勇任司令员)南渡长江，创立闽浙赣根据地的计划。这一计划后来虽然没有付诸实施，但同样反映了小河会议决定以主力转入外线作战的战略方针。

The Xiaohe Meeting further clarified the objectives, policies, and specific plans for the People’s Liberation Army’s strategic offensive, providing scientific guidance for the unfolding of the strategic offensive and exerting a profound influence on the subsequent course of the War of Liberation. After the Xiaohe Meeting, on September 1, 1947, Mao Zedong drafted an inner-Party directive for the Central Committee, “The Strategic Policy for the Second Year of the War of Liberation.” This directive was clearly drafted in accordance with the spirit of the Xiaohe Meeting. The directive stipulated that the basic task for the second year of the War of Liberation was: “To launch a nationwide counteroffensive, that is, to send the main forces to fight on exterior lines, draw the war into the Kuomintang areas, annihilate large numbers of enemy troops on exterior lines, and thoroughly smash the Kuomintang’s counterrevolutionary strategic policy of continuing to draw the war into the liberated areas, further destroying and consuming the manpower and material resources of the liberated areas, and making it impossible for us to sustain a protracted war.” Guided by the spirit of the Xiaohe Meeting and this directive, the People’s Liberation Army’s strategic offensive unfolded in full. On August 11, 1947, after successfully fighting the Battle of Southwest Shandong, the main forces of the Liu-Deng Field Army crossed the Longhai Railway in three columns and advanced a thousand li into the Dabie Mountains. On the night of August 22 and the early morning of August 23, the Chen-Xie Group, formed with the Fourth Column of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army as its core and led by Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi, forced its way south across the Yellow River and advanced into western Henan. On September 26, the main forces of the East China Field Army, led by Chen Yi and Su Yu, crossed the Longhai Railway southward and entered the Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu area. Thus, with the Liu-Deng Field Army as the core, a magnificent strategic offensive pattern of three major armies advancing into the Central Plains took shape. While the three major armies advanced into the Central Plains, the People’s Liberation Army on other battlefields also successively shifted from defense to counteroffensive, and the People’s War of Liberation fully entered a new stage of strategic offensive. On October 10, 1947, the General Headquarters of the People’s Liberation Army issued the “Manifesto of the People’s Liberation Army,” drafted by Mao Zedong, which put forward the resounding slogan “Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and Liberate All China.” With the full unfolding of the various military operations of the strategic offensive, the doom of the reactionary Kuomintang rule was sealed, and the victory of the People’s War of Liberation and the New Democratic Revolution was not far off.

小河会议进一步明确了人民解放军战略进攻的目标、方针以及具体方案，为战略进攻的展开提供了科学指南，也对解放战争后续进程产生了深远影响。小河会议后，毛泽东在1947年9月1日为中共中央起草了党内指示《解放战争第二年的战略方针》。这个指示显然是根据小河会议的精神起草的。指示规定，解放战争第二年的基本任务是：“举行全国性的反攻，即以主力打到外线去，将战争引向国民党区域，在外线大量歼敌，彻底破坏国民党将战争继续引向解放区、进一步破坏和消耗解放区的人力物力、使我不能持久的反革命战略方针。”以小河会议的精神和这个指示为指导，人民解放军的战略进攻全面展开。1947年8月11日，刘邓野战军主力在胜利地进行鲁西南战役后，分三路越过陇海路，千里跃进大别山；8月22日夜和23日凌晨，陈赓、谢富治率领以晋冀鲁豫野战军第四纵队为核心组建的陈谢集团，强渡黄河南下，向豫西地区进军；9月26日，华东野战军主力在陈毅、粟裕率领下越过陇海路南下进入豫皖苏地区，从而形成了以刘邓野战军为核心，三路大军挺进中原的波澜壮阔的战略进攻格局。在三路大军挺进中原的同时，其他战场的人民解放军也先后由防御转入反攻，人民解放战争全面进入战略进攻的新阶段。1947年10月10日，中国人民解放军总部发布毛泽东起草的《中国人民解放军宣言》，提出了“打倒蒋介石，解放全中国”的响亮口号。随着战略进攻各项军事行动的全面展开，国民党反动统治的灭亡大势已定，人民解放战争和新民主主义革命的胜利也已经为期不远了。