“The Warmth and Cold of Revolution”: A Study of the People’s Army’s Clothing and Bedding Supply during the Revolutionary War Period

During the revolutionary war period, the people’s army under the leadership of the Communist Party of China operated for a long time in an environment of resource scarcity and highly mobile combat, making military supplies an urgent practical problem to be solved. Among these, the problem of clothing and bedding concerned not only the warmth and survival of individual soldiers but also affected the army’s sustained combat capability. Current academic research has given a certain degree of attention to the history of the people’s army’s military logistics, but specialized studies centered on the basic material of “clothing and bedding” are still rare. This article intends to start from the practical difficulties of supplying the people’s army with clothing and bedding (bedding, cloth blankets, clothing, etc.), examine the historical process of its production mobilization and institutionalized construction, in order to display the revolutionary optimism of our army’s officers and soldiers during the revolutionary war years and the deep bond between the army and the people.

革命战争时期，中国共产党领导下的人民军队长期处于资源匮乏、高度流动的行军作战环境之中，军需物资是一个急需解决的现实问题。其中的被服问题，不仅关乎战士个体的冷暖与生存，更影响军队的持续作战能力。当前学界对人民军队军需后勤史的研究给予了一定关注，但围绕“被服”这一基础物资的专门研究尚属少见。本文拟从人民军队被服（被褥、布毯、衣装等）供给的现实困境出发，考察其生产动员与制度化建构的历史过程，以展现革命战争年代我军官兵的革命乐观主义精神和深厚的军民鱼水之情。

I. “Urgent, Difficult, Worrisome, and Longed-For”: The “Hardship of Clothing and Bedding” in Marching and Combat

一、“急难愁盼”：行军作战中的“被服之苦”

During the revolutionary war years, clothing and bedding, as basic military supplies maintaining the survival and combat of the people’s army, were constrained by multiple factors such as geographical environment, war attrition, production capacity, and financial strain. They were few in quantity and poor in quality; most cloth for making clothes came from seizures. Their supply and guarantee became a problem for marching and combat from the very beginning, and also brought great inconvenience to the soldiers’ daily lives. This “hardship of clothing and bedding” both reflected the objective reality of the weak economic base in the revolutionary base areas and embodied the difficulties faced by the CPC’s military supply system in its establishment and development under the frequent changes in the revolutionary situation. Mao Zedong once pointed out: “The Red Army’s numbers are small, the Red Army’s weapons are poor, the Red Army’s material supplies such as grain and clothing are very difficult,” and “it is urgently necessary, especially, to make the Red Army’s provisions somewhat more adequate.” Xu Xiangqian also mentioned: “(Our army’s) rear supply organs were not sound, uniforms were not uniform either, we wore whatever was available,” “military uniforms were tattered and worn, caps and straw sandals were extremely scarce, and blankets and other bedding were even more out of the question.”

革命战争年代，被服作为维系人民军队生存与战斗的基础军需用品，因受地理环境、战争损耗、生产能力、经费紧张等多重制约，数量少、质量差，制衣布料大都以缴获为主，其供给保障从一开始就成为行军作战的难题，也给战士日常生活带来很大不便。这种“被服之苦”既反映了革命根据地经济基础薄弱的客观现实，也体现了革命形势频繁变动下中共军需供给体系建立和发展所面临的困境。毛泽东曾指出：“红军的数量是少的，红军的武器是差的，红军的粮食被服等物质供给是非常困难的”，“特别是红军的给养使之比较地充足一点，则是迫切地需要的”。徐向前也提到：“（我军）后方供给机关不健全，服装也不统一，有什么穿什么”，“军装破烂不堪，帽子和草鞋十分匮乏，毯子等被服更无从谈起”。

In its initial stage of establishment, the people’s army was in a complex struggle environment, with frequent military operations. Coupled with a weak economic base and blockade by hostile forces, it was difficult to form a stable source of clothing and bedding supply; it was mainly temporary procurement. In October 1930, the Central Committee of the CPC clearly stated in its instruction to the Red Army: “The replenishment of the Red Army’s various units with weapons and military supplies (grain, fodder, clothing, bedding) is mainly seized from the enemy, and secondarily prepared within the Soviet areas by the local military commissions.” However, the Kuomintang launched multiple “encirclement and suppression” campaigns and imposed economic blockades, which almost completely embargoed all Red Army supplies, further exacerbating the difficulty of clothing and bedding supply. In November 1934, the Red Army’s Fifth Counter-Encirclement and Suppression Campaign failed, and the Long March began. The Long March period was the stage of the most severe shortage of clothing and bedding. “Very few clothes were issued either, one set of unlined clothes per person, one cap, and in winter one cotton-padded jacket was issued,” “in winter we also wore only one pair of unlined trousers, there was absolutely no underwear.” Despite this, the soldiers still carried forward the spirit of unity and mutual aid: “One piece of clothing, you give it to me, I give it to you.” Besides the small quantity, the cold and illness caused by worn-out clothing and bedding also tested the soldiers. In May 1936, the Sixth Red Army Corps was blockaded by the enemy at the Great Jinchuan River; grain, clothing, and bedding supplies within the army were critically low. Zhu De and others immediately sent telegrams inquiring about the replenishment of clothing and bedding, demanding “along the route, collect sheepskin, wool, and wooden cloth, quickly replenish cotton-padded clothes.” In July, when marching through Xikang, the snowy mountains had thin air and a cold climate; the Red Army’s “lack of clothing and bedding affected the soldiers’ health, (many people) fell ill due to exposure to cold, and died from illness.” In August, the General Staff Department of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission sent a telegram to the Communist International reporting on the situation of the Red Army in the Northwest, also mentioning the plight of clothing and bedding supply during our army’s Long March: “For this winter’s clothing and bedding, we have only been able to purchase one set of winter clothes per person; other windproof clothing and bed sheets have not been purchased due to lack of funds. The most difficult thing is that the masses are too poor, their families have no spare cloth; even shoes must be purchased from the White areas or buy cloth to make ourselves.” The common people also deeply felt the hardships of the Red Army soldiers’ lives: “Their (the Red Army’s) clothes were very tattered, most were barefoot and wore straw sandals,” “very few wore socks,” “the better ones had their feet wrapped in pieces of gunny sack. Their legs and bodies were all in unlined clothes,” “a few wearing cotton-padded jackets had the cotton exposed outside,” “some soldiers’ long trousers had become shorts, their legs and chests were wrapped in pieces of gunny sack or sheepskin, their bare flesh was exposed, frozen black.” “Even so, the formation was neat,” “they kept saluting the welcoming masses, singing songs in their mouths, in high spirits, very inspiring.”

人民军队在初建阶段就处于复杂斗争环境中，军事行动频繁，加之经济基础薄弱与敌对势力封锁，难以形成稳定的被服供给来源，主要为临时性筹措。1930年10月，中共中央在给红军的训令中明确提到：“红军各部队的军械，军需（粮秣被服）之补充，主要的夺自敌人，其次的在苏区内由当地军委筹备。”但国民党多次发动“围剿”，实行经济封锁，几乎使得红军物资全部禁运，进一步加剧了被服的供给困难。1934年11月，红军第五次反“围剿”失败，开始长征。长征时期是被服最为紧缺的一个阶段，“发的衣服也很少，一人一套单衣，一顶帽子，冬天发一件棉袄”，“冬天也是穿一条单裤，根本没有什么衬衣”。尽管如此，战士们依然发扬团结互助精神，“一件衣服，你让给我、我让给你”。除了数量少之外，因被服破旧造成的身体上的寒冷、病痛同样考验着战士们。1936年5月，红六军团在大金川受敌封锁，军内粮食、被服物资告急，朱德等随即致电询问被服补充情况，要求“沿路须搜集羊皮、羊毛、木子布，速补充棉衣”。7月，行军西康时，雪山空气稀薄，气候寒冷，红军“衣服被褥的缺乏是影响了战士健康的，（很多人）因受寒而致病，因病而死”。8月，中革军委参谋部致电共产国际报告西北红军情况时也提到了我军长征过程中被服供给的困境：“今冬被服尚只购得每人冬衣1套，其他风衣、被单，因无款均尚未购。最困难的是群众太穷，家无余布，即鞋子也须向白区购买或买布自做。”对于红军战士生活的艰苦，老百姓同样深有感触：“他们的（红军）衣服非常破烂，多数赤脚蹬草鞋”，“穿袜子的很少”，“好一点的脚上裹麻袋片子。腿上、身上都是单衣”，“个别穿棉衣的棉花露在外面”，“一些战士的长裤变成了短裤，腿上、胸前裹着麻袋片或羊皮，肉皮露在外面，冻得发黑”。“虽然如此，但队形整齐”，“不时给欢迎的群众敬礼，嘴里唱着歌曲，精神抖擞，十分振人”。

Besides the main force of the Red Army on the Long March, the Red Army and guerrilla units remaining in the Soviet areas to wage guerrilla warfare also faced severe shortages of clothing and bedding. The guerrilla zones in the South not only had to deal with the Kuomintang’s frequent military “mopping-up” campaigns and economic blockades, but their clothing and bedding factories and cotton fields were also heavily destroyed by the enemy. Some soldiers had even “never worn cotton-padded clothes or covered themselves with quilts; when it was extremely cold, they would gather together, run a bit, move around, or light a fire to keep warm.”

除了进行长征的红军主力，留守在苏区进行游击战争的红军和游击队同样面临严重的被服不足。南方各游击区不光要应对国民党频繁的军事“清剿”和经济封锁，所属被服厂和棉田还遭敌人大肆破坏。有的士兵甚至“没有穿过棉衣、盖过被子，冷得厉害的时候，集合起来跑跑步，活动一下，或烧起火取暖”。

After Japan’s full-scale invasion of China, the war situation became even more severe. Along with the substantial increase in the number of Eighth Route Army troops, a serious contradiction between supply and demand in clothing and bedding work emerged. For example, in the winter of 1937, the 120th Division of the Jin-Sui Military Region, which was heading north to resist Japan, had 10% of its troops suffering from frostbite due to the lack of or untimely supply of cotton-padded clothes. The Eighth Route Army in the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region also urgently needed to solve the problem of clothing and bedding provisions. Nie Rongzhen once recalled: “(At that time) many of our commanders and fighters still had no cotton-padded clothes, and on their bare feet they still wore straw sandals. The problem of the troops’ provisions made the comrades responsible for supply work very worried. Without a certain source of supply, we often took care of today but couldn’t guarantee tomorrow.” In the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, “each soldier was issued only one set of military uniform per year, so they had to constantly mend and patch it. When they started opening up wasteland, moving back and forth through forests and thickets, the clothes wore out even faster,” “long trousers worn out were turned into shorts, shorts worn out were turned into underpants, and when the underpants were completely worn out, they were twisted into cloth strips to make shoes, or pasted into cloth shells to make shoe soles; not a single scrap of cloth was thrown away.” In the Central China region, the clothing and bedding problem also persistently troubled the New Fourth Army. Xiang Ying once lamented this: “(The troops) worry about cotton-padded clothes when winter comes, and are busy planning summer clothes when it gets hot; the impact is great, especially directly hindering the soldiers’ physical health, causing the number of sick soldiers in the troops to increase continuously.” When marching far from the base areas and rear support could not keep up, food could be flexibly supplemented according to the natural environment, but clothing and bedding were most easily cut off. Sometimes the soldiers even had to use straw to keep warm, and the combat effectiveness of the entire army was greatly affected.

日本全面侵华后，战争形势更为严峻，伴随着八路军人数的大幅增加，被服工作出现了严重的供需矛盾。例如，1937年冬季，晋绥军区北上抗日的120师因棉衣供给缺乏或者未能按时供给，部队中冻伤人数已占10%。在晋察冀军区的八路军，同样急需解决被服的给养问题。聂荣臻曾回忆：“（当时）我们的许多指战员还没有棉衣，赤脚上穿的还是草鞋。部队的给养问题，使得负责供给工作的同志很是发愁。没有一定的供给来源，常常是顾得了今天，顾不了明天。”在陕甘宁边区，“每个战士一年只发一套军衣，平时就得缝缝补补，开起荒来，在树林草丛里穿来穿去，衣服磨损得更快”，“长裤磨破了改成短裤，短裤磨破了改成裤衩，裤衩再磨碎了，就搓成布条打鞋，或糊成布壳纳鞋底，一块布头也舍不得丢掉”。在华中地区，被服问题也一直困扰着新四军。项英曾对此感慨：“（部队）到冬天愁着棉衣，到天热又忙于筹划夏衣，影响甚大，特别直接妨碍士兵的身体健康，使部队的病员不断增加”。在行军中远离根据地，后补跟不上的情况下，食物或能根据自然环境灵活找补，但衣被却最易断供，有时战士们甚至不得不用稻草御寒，整个军队的战斗力受到极大影响。

During the War of Liberation, the situation of clothing and bedding supply for the people’s army underwent some changes. On the one hand, production conditions and access to urban resources improved; on the other hand, the sharp increase in troops and large-scale field operations caused a sharp rise in demand for support, and the supply problem shifted from periodic scarcity to the pressure of scaled-up guarantee. The Central Committee of the CPC believed that “ensuring the supply of grain, clothing, bedding, and daily necessities for the military and civilians in all liberated areas is of particular importance to winning victory.” At this time, the clothing and bedding problem was no longer merely passive scarcity caused by the weak economy of the base areas, but a test of the carrying capacity of the logistics supply system led by our Party under the background of large-scale strategic decisive battles. The clothing and bedding guarantee of this period exhibited the characteristic of “coexistence of basic improvement and surging demand,” and the center of gravity of its contradiction had shifted from the survival plight of the early period to the pressure of batch supply.

解放战争时期，人民军队被服供给形势有所变化。一方面，生产条件与接收城市资源有所提升，另一方面，兵员剧增与大规模野战行动又使保障需求急剧上升，供给问题从阶段性匮乏转为规模化保障的压力。中共中央认为，“保证各解放区军民的粮食、被服及日用品的供给，关系于争取胜利特别重大”。此时，被服问题不再仅仅是根据地经济薄弱造成的被动匮乏，而是大规模战略决战背景下对我们党领导的后勤供应体系承载能力的考验。这一时期的被服保障呈现出“基础改善与需求激增并存”的特点，其矛盾重心已由早期的生存困境转向批量供给压力。

In summary, from the extreme scarcity of the Agrarian Revolutionary War period, to the contradiction between supply and demand during the All-People’s War of Resistance, and then to the pressure of scaled-up guarantee during the War of Liberation, the clothing and bedding problem of the people’s army, although manifesting differently, ran through the entire process of the revolutionary war. This historical process both reflects the changes in the war environment and economic conditions, and also illustrates the practical need for the mobilization of clothing and bedding production and the institutionalized construction of material guarantee.

总而言之，从土地革命战争时期的极端匮乏，到全民族抗战时期的供需矛盾，再到解放战争时期的规模化保障压力，人民军队的被服问题虽表现不一，却始终贯穿革命战争全过程。这一历史过程既反映出战争环境与经济条件的变迁，也说明了被服生产动员与物质保障制度化建设的现实需要。

II. “Independent Self-Sufficiency”: Production Behind Enemy Lines and Mass Mobilization

二、“独立自给”：敌后生产与群众动员

Facing the plight of clothing and bedding supply, the people’s army, in the practice of revolutionary struggle, gradually relied on the workers and peasants to establish its own clothing and bedding production system, explored a path of independent self-sufficiency in military supply guarantee, and provided a relatively stable material foundation for the army’s survival and combat.

面对被服供给困境，人民军队在革命斗争实践中逐步依靠工农群众建立了自己的被服生产体系，探索出独立自给的军需保障路径，为军队生存与作战提供相对稳定的物质基础。

As early as the founding of the Red Army, clothing production dedicated to serving the troops emerged. In May 1928, following Mao Zedong’s instructions, the Red Army’s first clothing factory was established in Taoliao Village in the Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area. In the early period of production, “the focus of clothing replenishment was to ensure as far as possible the supply of cartridge bags, grenade bags, and ration bags”; as for other clothing and bedding, due to difficulties in sourcing cloth materials, production often failed to keep up with front-line demand. Generally, “when cloth was captured at the front, it was rushed to the rear and handed over to the clothing factory for production; if the factory could not handle it, it was distributed to local people for decentralized production.” The use of cloth was also carefully calculated to maximize material savings. After the Red Army entered Sichuan, to alleviate the shortage of military supplies, in October 1933 the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army established a clothing factory in Enyang, Sichuan. According to the recollections of Zhao Zhengfu, then political instructor of the clothing factory, “(at that time) the clothing factory did not have a single sewing machine; we relied entirely on our two hands, piecing together old wooden boards to cobble together a wide table. The task was to sew single-layer uniforms, using needle-and-thread kits as weapons.” As the revolutionary situation improved, captured sewing equipment and cloth gradually increased, but the supply of clothing remained tight. To address this, the troops mobilized the masses to participate in sewing, organizing residents around the clothing factory into four or five sewing squads, implementing a production model of “distributing materials in the morning and collecting finished clothes in the evening.” Later, to adapt to the Red Army’s shifting positions, some skilled sewing workers and machinery were dispersed to villages and towns to continue production.

早在红军建立之初，专门服务部队的被服生产就应运而生。1928年5月，根据毛泽东的指示，井冈山革命根据地桃寮村建立了红军的第一个被服厂。生产初期，“被服补充的重点是尽量保证子弹袋，手榴弹袋，干粮袋的供应”，至于其他衣被，由于布匹材料来源困难，制作经常跟不上前线需求，一般都是“前方缴获了布匹，赶紧送往后方，交给被服厂制作，做不过来就交当地群众分散制作”，布匹使用也是精打细算，最大限度地节约材料。红军入川后，为了缓解军需物资的不足，1933年10月，红四方面军在四川恩阳建立了一座被服厂。据时任被服厂指导员赵正富回忆，“（当时）被服厂没有一台缝纫机，全靠我们两只手，用旧木板七拼八凑镶了一个宽桌。任务是缝制单衣，针线包当武器”。随着革命形势向好，缴获的缝纫设备和布匹逐渐增多，但被服的供应依然紧张。为此，部队动员群众参与缝制，将被服厂周边居民编成四五个缝衣班，实行“早发料、晚收衣”的生产模式。后来为适应红军阵地转移的情况，又将部分缝纫技术工人和机器设备分散于村镇等地继续生产。

With successive Red Army victories, the base areas expanded continuously, and the Red Army’s numbers grew exponentially, further increasing the demand for clothing. But at this time the Kuomintang explicitly prohibited the transport of cotton and other clothing materials into the base areas, intensifying the pressure on clothing production and supply. In response, the Chinese Communist Party actively mobilized the masses to jointly solve this difficulty. In June 1934, the Party Central Committee issued a call to all the people: “The Red Army must have clothes to wear and quilts to cover themselves.” The masses were widely mobilized, actively participating in clothing production and material collection. Many local tailors, upon hearing of the opportunity to make uniforms for the Red Army, were willing to contribute their efforts. Everyone “worked with great vigor; whenever there was a task, as long as the Party branch mobilized and called on them, everyone would muster their strength and complete it no matter what. Sometimes, to meet deadlines, they worked during the day and continued by lamplight at night; when gas lamps broke, they lit kerosene lamps and worked around the clock.” During the Long March, logistical supply, centered on the key task of “ensuring the Red Army’s food while also ensuring the Red Army’s clothing,” vigorously launched campaigns to collect bed sheets, cotton, and military materials, and integrated these into the movement of the broad masses supporting the Red Army.

随着红军作战的接连胜利，根据地的面积不断扩大，红军人数也成倍增长，对被服的需求进一步增大。但此时国民党明确禁止棉花等制衣原料运入根据地，被服的制作、供给压力愈发加剧。对此，中国共产党积极发动群众共同解决这一困难。1934年6月，党中央向全体民众发出“红军一定要有衣穿，要有被盖”的号召，群众被广泛动员起来，积极参与被服生产和物资筹集工作。不少当地裁缝听闻有机会为红军做军装，都愿意出把力，大家“工作起来劲头很足，有什么任务，只要党支部一动员，一号召，大家一鼓作气非完成不可。有时为了赶任务，白天干，晚上点起灯继续干，汽灯坏了就点上煤油灯，昼夜突击”。长征过程中，后勤供应围绕“保障红军粮食，同时保障红军被服”的工作要点，大力开展了收集被单、棉花及军用材料的运动，并加入到广大群众拥护红军的运动之中。

The people’s army’s clothing supply system was truly established independently during the period of the All-Out War of Resistance against Japan. During this period, the funds allocated by the National Government were limited and could not meet the people’s army’s expenditures for purchasing military supplies. By the end of 1938, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army already numbered over 180,000, yet the National Government still issued funds and uniforms based on the initial strength of 45,000 at the time of the reorganization of the CCP’s troops, leaving most military clothing to be resolved by the CCP itself. In the winter of 1939, the die-hard Kuomintang faction launched an anti-communist upsurge, and the National Government suspended the payment of military salaries to the CCP’s troops. After the Southern Anhui Incident in 1941, the National Government completely halted funding and imposed a strict blockade on all base areas under CCP leadership. The people’s army could no longer purchase finished clothing and turned instead to a stage of complete self-sufficiency.

人民军队被服供给体系真正独立建立起来是在全民族抗战时期。这一时期，国民政府拨发的经费有限，并不能满足人民军队购买军需用品的支出。1938年底，八路军、新四军的人数已超过18万，而国民政府仍以中共部队改编初期4.5万人为准发放经费、服装，大部分军需被服需要中共自行解决。1939年冬，国民党顽固派发起反共高潮，国民政府暂停向中共军队发放军饷。1941年皖南事变后，国民政府彻底停发了经费，对中共领导下的各个根据地实行严密封锁。人民军队无法购买被服成品，转而走向全面自给的阶段。

As the War of Resistance entered the stage of strategic stalemate, the rear base areas became relatively stable, and the Party Central Committee began to promote economic construction in the border regions; developing self-reliant clothing production was an important part of this. In June 1939, the Central Military Commission issued a directive requiring that “in the material aspect of the military, arduous preparatory work should be carried out” and “ensure the self-sufficiency of our military’s material supply without relying on others. This is a difficult and painstaking task, but we must prepare for it no matter what.” In line with the directive’s spirit, in 1939 the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region established dozens of military and civilian factories, including clothing factories, on a modest scale within a short period. All base areas also publicized exemplary deeds and actively mobilized workers and the masses to widely carry out production emulation campaigns. For example, in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, “the 359th Brigade’s clothing factory produced 20,000 uniforms a year,” and “the Independent 1st Brigade’s clothing factory increased production, weaving 740 bolts of cloth in 21 days.” The military factories in the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region also set off a wave of learning from the production movement of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, achieving notable results. For instance, the clothing group of the 2nd Detachment of the 4th Military Sub-District of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region increased daily production from 50 to over 160 sets of uniforms; the clothing factory of the Jin-Sui Military Region organized a production emulation campaign to welcome May Day, with each person increasing uniform output by an average of two and a half times. Through various types of labor emulation, the technology, quality, and quantity of clothing production all saw significant improvement.

随着抗战进入战略相持阶段，敌后根据地相对稳定，党中央开始推进边区经济建设，自行发展被服生产就是其中一个重要内容。1939年6月，中央军委发布指示要求，“在军队的物质方面应有艰苦的准备工作”，“保证我军物质供给之自立而不依靠他人。这是一种艰难的刻苦的任务，但无论如何我们应当准备”。根据指示精神，1939年，陕甘宁边区在短时间内建立了包括被服厂在内的数十个初具规模的军需民用工厂。各根据地还宣传优秀事迹，积极动员工人群众广泛开展生产竞赛运动。例如，陕甘宁边区“359旅被服厂一年制衣两万套”，“独一旅被服厂生产提高，廿一天织布七百四十匹”等。晋察冀边区的军需工厂也掀起了学习陕甘宁边区生产运动的热潮，取得了明显成果。例如，晋察冀军区第四军分区二队被服组从每天生产50套军服提高到160多套，晋绥军区被服厂组织迎“五一”生产竞赛，每人平均增产军衣两倍半。通过各类劳动竞赛，被服生产的技术、质量和数量都有了显著提升。

However, meeting the clothing needs of the entire army could not rely solely on factory production; “the largest clothing factory was still the masses,” especially by mobilizing the labor enthusiasm of the broad masses of women. In March 1939, the “Directive Letter from the Women’s Committee of the CCP Central Committee on the Current Guidelines and Tasks of the Women’s Movement” proposed actively mobilizing women to participate in the production movement. The effective resolution of production problems “was impossible without the mobilization and organization of the broad masses of rural women.” Women in the border regions responded to the Party’s call, treating making uniforms for the soldiers of the people’s army as their own contribution to the War of Resistance, and teams for rushing uniform production were quickly organized. When producing clothing, if tasks were urgent and there was a large quantity of cloth materials, they would enlist local “outside workers” to help with the rush work. The tasks of cutting, quilting cotton, and sewing buttons were all done by local people. Some folk songs and poems vividly reflected the fiery scene of the entire population enthusiastically participating in clothing production: “A gust of autumn wind, a burst of chill, the Eighth Route Army on the front line feels the cold; Women’s National Salvation Association members all mobilized, three cotton-padded uniforms and a pair of shoes”; “Heavy snow falls, filling the sky, the sister in her room sews army jackets; past midnight she does not sleep, rushing to make twenty army jackets”; “The masses plow and weave under moon and stars, military industry production endures hardship. Newly made bullets tested on South Mountain, tailors store bags in North Village. Why fear enemies on all sides? Good people provide cover.” In 1944, to win the war, women in the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Sub-District “went all out, sewing through the night” for military clothing. When they saw the soldiers of the people’s army wearing the neat uniforms they had made as they marched to the front, they all clapped and cheered, shouting “Long live the Chinese Communist Party!” and “Long live victory in the War of Resistance!”

然而，要满足全军上下的被服需求，仅靠工厂自身开展生产远远不够，“最大的被服厂还是群众”，尤其是发挥好广大妇女的劳动积极性。1939年3月，《中共中央妇委关于目前妇女运动的方针和任务的指示信》提出，要积极动员妇女参加生产运动。生产问题的有效解决，“离开广大农村妇女的动员和组织是不可能的”。广大边区妇女纷纷响应党的号召，把为子弟兵做军衣等同于自身为抗日作贡献，赶制军衣的队伍很快就组织起来了。生产被服时，遇到任务急、布匹原材料多的情况，就请驻地“外工”帮忙突击。负责裁剪、绗棉、钉扣的都是当地群众。一些民歌、诗歌生动反映了当时全民踊跃参与被服制作的火热场景：“一阵秋风一阵凉，八路前线受风凉；妇救会员齐动员，三身棉衣鞋一双”；“大雪纷纷满天飘，姐在房里缝军袄；夜过子时也不睡，赶做军袄二十套”；“群众耕织披星月，军工生产茹苦辛。新造枪弹试南山，裁缝被袋储北村。何惧一里四面敌，掩护自有好人民”；等等。1944年，为夺取战争胜利，晋察冀军分区的妇女们“全力以赴、连夜缝做”军需被服。当她们看到子弟兵穿上了自己制作的整齐军装开赴前线的时候，皆拍手称快，高呼“共产党万岁！”“抗战胜利万岁！”。

With the participation of the broad masses, by 1941 the people’s army’s clothing production had begun to reach a certain scale. The products included not only single-layer and cotton-padded uniforms but also clothing for adults and children, as well as types such as satchels, cartridge bags, and gun covers. By 1942, the clothing production situation had further improved, and production capacity had greatly increased. For example, in the North China Anti-Japanese Base Areas, in 1942 alone, during the summer and autumn seasons, 900 workers produced 55,870 sets of single-layer uniforms and 14,040 sets of cotton-padded uniforms in a single month. Under limited equipment conditions, each person produced nearly 80 sets of clothes per month.

有了广大人民群众的参与，到1941年，人民军队的被服生产开始具备一定规模，产品不仅分单衣、棉衣，还分大人、小孩的衣物，更有挂包、子弹袋、枪炮衣等种类。到1942年，被服生产情况更为好转，生产能力也大幅提高。例如，在华北抗日根据地，1942年仅夏秋两季，900个工人单月就生产了单衣55870套，棉衣14040套，在设备条件有限情况下，每人每月生产近80套衣服。

Of course, constrained by limited conditions, clothing quality inevitably had some problems, such as “not being durable, inconsistent colors, even one garment with several colors, inaccurate sizing, and sloppy sewing.” Cotton-padded jackets and quilts stuffed with wool floss were described as “stinking by day, full of wool in the mouth by night.” To solve the problem of chaotic colors and one garment with several colors, each base area also paid attention to innovating production techniques, exploring methods of using local dyes to make clothing. For example, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region found a set of simple, easy-to-implement “local” dyeing methods: first, set up a large pot, put the cloth in to boil; after dyeing, wind one end of the cloth roll around a wooden stake, insert a wooden stick into the other end, and then wring it dry forcefully. Initially, they dyed the cloth gray, but the troops were easily spotted by the enemy during movement. Later, through collective brainstorming, they used locust flowers or rhubarb to turn the cloth yellow, and finally soaked it in caustic soda water to turn it green, until they produced cotton cloth suitable for guerrilla warfare. In 1944, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region also proposed improving clothing production technology, resolutely reducing “the past problems of insufficient stitch count on sewing, missing buttonholes, poorly attached sleeves and crotches, loose stitching, resulting in clothes that were not sturdy,” eliminating “bad clothes and bad quilts” of poor quality that “split when walking” or “tore when stretching legs,” and eliminating “one-week shoes,” striving to improve the quality of clothing production.

当然，受制于条件有限，被服质量也难以避免地存在一些问题，比如“不耐穿，颜色不一致，甚至一衣几色，大小尺码不准，缝制马虎”，用羊毛絮装的棉衣、棉被则被形容是“白天一身臭，晚上一嘴毛”等。为了解决颜色杂乱、一衣几色的问题，各根据地还注意创新生产技术，摸索出用土产染料制作被服的办法。例如，晋察冀军区就找到了一套就地取材、简单易行的染色“土”法：先弄一口大锅，把布放到里面煮，染好后，把一卷布的一端缠绕在一个木桩上，另一端插上木棍，然后用力拧干。开始染的灰布，但部队行动容易被敌人发现，后来经集思广益，用槐花或大黄使布变成黄色，最后用火碱水泡，使它变成绿色。直至染出适合游击作战穿着的棉布。1944年，陕甘宁边区还提出要提高被服生产技术，坚决消减“过去扎衣针码不够，遗漏扣眼，上袖合裆，针码稀松，以至衣服不结实”出现“开步走”“伸腿烂”等质量低劣的坏衣坏被，消灭“礼拜鞋”，努力提升被服生产质量。

As the scale of production expanded and the number of production links increased, the CPC gradually came to recognize the importance of establishing organizational management structures and unified leadership over production. In 1942, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government decided to place the work of clothing production, previously handled separately by the Central Committee, the Border Region, and the Military Commission, under the unified management of the Border Region’s Finance Department. In 1944, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government reorganized the clothing management agencies and established a specialized Clothing Bureau, aiming to guarantee clothing supply and improve the organizational efficiency and management level of clothing production. The gradual improvement of organizational structures made clothing production and mobilization work more efficient. In November 1945, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region clothing factory, in accordance with the Clothing Bureau’s requirements, “launched a production assault campaign to accelerate the completion of tasks and to oppose the Kuomintang’s civil war with concrete actions.” All workers “worked day and night, crowding at the workshop door as soon as it was light, and working until after nine o’clock in the evening before stopping.” Some workers stated: “The public treats us so well, giving us so much money for making a set of clothes, and also feeding us. The clothes must be made solidly; if they are not done well, we would have no conscience.”

随着生产规模扩大和生产环节增多，中共逐渐认识到建立组织管理机构、领导统一生产的重要性。1942年，陕甘宁边区政府决定将被服生产工作由此前中央、边区和军委分别负责改为由边区财政厅统一管理。1944年，陕甘宁边区政府改组被服管理机构，成立专门的被服局，旨在保证被服供给，提高被服生产的组织效率和管理水平。组织机构的渐趋完善，使得被服生产和动员工作更为高效。1945年11月，陕甘宁边区被服厂根据被服局要求，“发动生产突击运动，加速完成任务，以实际行动反对国民党的内战”，全体职工“日夜加工，天刚明大家即拥至工房门口，加工直到晚上九点钟以后始下工”。有的工人表示：“公家对我们这样好，做一套衣服，给这么多钱，还给我们吃饭，衣服要做的扎扎实实，做不好就算没良心。”

During the War of Liberation, clothing production work involving broad mass participation was further consolidated and developed. In June 1946, the Kuomintang tore up the ceasefire agreement and the Political Consultative Conference agreement, brazenly launching an all-out civil war. To guarantee the clothing supply at the front, various clothing factories stepped up the rush production of military quilts and uniforms, achieving a certain increase in production efficiency. For example, the No. 2 Clothing Factory of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region completed the production of 6,000 sets of single-layer military uniforms in four months. Since the two processes of buttonhole stitching and button sewing for cotton-padded military uniforms still had to be done by hand, masses from over a dozen surrounding villages were mobilized to come and assist. Another example: the Southern Hebei Military Region “completed the task thirty-four days ahead of schedule under the slogan of guaranteeing that frontline soldiers would receive their single-layer uniforms in time,” and the Shandong Military Region’s “various clothing factories under the Military Supply Department generally overfulfilled their summer clothing quotas.” In addition, during this period, the clothing production of the CPC’s army also saw improvements in style, technology, and other aspects. In terms of style, the Shandong Military Region’s “soldier-style uniform tunic had padded shoulders, and the trousers were Chinese-style or drawstring waist-tightening style,” and it also put forward the requirement of “sturdy, durable, attractive, and satisfying the frontline soldiers.” “The improvement in clothing styles greatly enhanced the army’s appearance.” In terms of technology, the East China Military Region “used gasoline drums to modify dyeing vats and used wooden shafts fitted with bearings for roll dyeing,” which increased work efficiency and resulted in “good quality and uniform color.”

解放战争时期，有群众广泛参与的被服生产工作得到了进一步的稳固发展。1946年6月，国民党撕毁停战协定和政协协议，悍然发动全面内战。为保障前线的被服供给，各被服厂加紧赶制军被军装，生产效率上有了一定提升。例如，冀鲁豫军区的被服二厂在4个月的时间里完成了6000套单军衣的制作任务，由于棉军衣的锁扣眼、钉扣子两道工序仍需手工完成，又动员了周边十几个村庄的群众赶来支援。又如，冀南军区“在保证前线战士及时穿单衣的口号下，提前三十四天完成任务”，山东军区“军供部各被服厂夏衣普遍超产”等。此外，这一时期中共军队的被服生产在样式、技术等方面也都有了一定提升。在样式方面，山东军区“制服式的战士服上衣有绗肩，下衣是中式或抽带收腰式”，还提出“坚固、耐用、美观、使前方战士满意”的要求，“被服制式的改进，使军容大为改观”；在技术方面，华东军区“利用汽油桶改制成染布槽，用木质轴按上轴承进行捲染”，工效提高且“质量好色泽一致”等。

Besides establishing stable production and supply in the rear, under special circumstances the troops themselves also undertook the work of clothing supply. Sometimes, due to marching and fighting, they could not obtain timely material supplies from the rear, and army officers and soldiers had to learn to make and mend clothing themselves. For example, in October 1947, after the Liu-Deng troops [6]6 The Liu-Deng troops refer to the main force of the People’s Liberation Army commanded by Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, which advanced from the Shandong-Henan-Hebei border region into the Dabie Mountains in August 1947, marking the beginning of the strategic offensive in the War of Liberation. advanced into the Dabie Mountains, they were threatened by severe cold, and cotton-padded winter uniforms became a necessity for the officers and soldiers on the march. Because the enemy had cut off supply lines, the winter uniform problem had to be solved by the troops themselves. The troops’ procurement personnel scoured all the towns to buy cloth but still could not meet the need. Upon hearing this, the local masses came forward to donate their own cotton and homespun cloth. Since the cloth varied in quality, some coarse and some fine, and the colors were mixed, the troops decided to dye, cut, and make the uniforms themselves. Thus, the “Dabie Mountains Clothing Factory” was established. The “Song of the Cotton-Padded Uniform,” written by Li Zhen, then director of the Political Department of the 6th Column of the Central Plains Military Region, depicted the scene of the entire army relying on its own efforts to solve the winter uniform problem: “In October, the autumn wind is sharp in the Dabie Mountains, Liu-Deng’s brave soldiers wear single-layer uniforms; fighting deep in the Dabie Mountains without a rear, where can one find winter clothing for a hundred thousand? The entire army is of one mind, able to turn no clothing into clothing; millions of officers and soldiers sew themselves, weaving cotton-padded uniforms to survive the winter. This has never been seen in ancient or modern times; a miracle for the ages emerges from our army.”

除了在后方建立稳固的生产供给，特殊情况下部队自身也会承担起被服的供给工作。有时因行军作战无法及时获得后方的物资供应，军队官兵还必须自己动手学习被服的制作、缝补。例如，1947年10月，刘邓部队挺进大别山后，受严寒威胁，御寒棉衣成为官兵们的行军必需。由于敌人切断了供应线，棉衣问题就得靠部队自己设法解决。部队采购人员跑遍了所有城镇买布也未能满足需要，当地群众听闻后纷纷送来自家的棉花和土布。由于布的质量有粗有细、颜色杂乱，部队决定自己染色、自己剪裁、自己制作，于是“大别山被服厂”就这样建立起来了。曾任中原军区六纵政治部主任的李震所作《棉衣歌》就描写了当时全军自力更生解决棉衣问题的情景：“十月大别秋风急，刘邓健儿着单衣；大别出战无后方，十万冬衣何处觅；全军上下一条心，能使无衣成有衣；千万将士自己缝，织成棉衣度寒冬；此事古今从无有，千古奇迹出我军”。

III. “Establishing Rules and Regulations”: Standardization of Clothing Supply and Management Systems

三、“建章立制”：被服供给标准及管理制度化

In order to adapt to changes in the war situation, economic conditions, and military circumstances, the People’s Army also focused on improving the military logistics supply system, making comprehensive provisions for clothing supply standards and management systems.

为了能够适应战争形势、经济条件和军事状况的变化，人民军队还注重完善军队后勤供应体系，对被服的供给标准和管理制度作出统筹规定。

As early as the Central Soviet Area period, the Red Army had set fixed time, quantity, and quota regulations for clothing production. For example, the No. 1 Clothing Factory of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission stipulated: “Adult workers must sew 30 tunics per day and make 4 pairs of military trousers; apprentices must sew 8 tunics per day.” By the period of the All-Out War of Resistance against Japan, production efficiency had increased, and the army gradually established a supply system. “Each unit had its own rear.” “This system (the supply system) was most suitable for the principle of centralized command in the army and for giving play to the effectiveness of the division of labor with responsibility.” First, it could ensure centralized command and clear organizational division of labor, “avoiding each acting on its own without coordination, which would hinder the conduct of war.” Second, it considered that if wartime prices soared, it could manage to provide material guarantees to meet the needs of the War of Resistance. At the same time, storage was also standardized accordingly. For example, the 129th Division issued an order stipulating that clothing and other materials should be stored according to the principles of dispersal, secrecy, clever preservation, and re-inspection. However, in actual work, some specific regulations were not implemented ideally. Some units had chaotic management and lax enforcement, “with damage, abandonment, alteration, and dismantling of clothing being especially frequent, so that clothing could often not be replenished.” Therefore, it was very necessary to establish a more systematic, complete, and strictly managed clothing supply system as soon as possible.

早在中央苏区时期，红军就对被服制作提出了定时定量定额的规定。例如，中革军委第一被服厂规定：“成年工人每天要缝30件上衣，做军裤4条，学徒每天缝8件上衣”。到全民族抗战时期，生产效率有所提高，军队逐渐建立起了供给制度，“各个部队都有自己的后方”。“这种制度（供给制度），是最适合于军队中集权指挥的原则和发挥分工负责制的效能的”。一是能够保障集权指挥，组织分工明确，“避免各自为政不能配合，使战争进行遭受阻碍”，二是考虑一旦战时物价飞涨，能设法给予实物保证，满足抗战需要。同时，保管也作了相应规范，例如129师发布命令，规定被服等物资要按照分散、秘密、巧妙保存、再检查的原则进行保管。但在实际工作中，一些具体规定执行得并不理想。有的部队管理混乱，执行不严，“被服的损坏、遗弃、改拆等（现象）特别多，以至被服经常补充不了”，因此很有必要尽快建立更加系统完善、严格管理的被服供给制度。

In April 1940, the Northern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee convened a high-level cadre meeting of the Party, government, and military from the Taihang, Taiyue, and Southern Hebei regions in Licheng County, Shanxi. At the meeting, the requirement of “unified planning and unified expenditure, opposing waste” was put forward. In December of the same year, to implement the spirit of the Licheng meeting, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army held a large-scale logistics work conference, comprehensively summarizing the logistics work issues of our army and proposing that “building logistics work is one of the three major tasks of army building.” Peng Dehuai, then Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army, pointed out at the meeting: “The army has grown large; it must move toward regularization. It must have sound logistics work; otherwise, it cannot exert its due combat effectiveness.” This meeting marked the gradual regularization of the entire army’s logistics supply work. Thereafter, the various systems for the People’s Army’s logistics supply were further improved, and the supply and management of clothing gradually became institutionalized.

1940年4月，中共中央北方局在山西黎城召开了太行、太岳、冀南地区的党政军高级干部会议，会上提出“统筹统支、反对浪费”的要求。同年12月，为贯彻黎城会议精神，八路军总部召开了大规模的后勤工作会议，全面总结我军后勤工作问题，提出“建设后勤工作是建军三大任务之一”。时任八路军副总指挥彭德怀在会上指出：“军队大了，必须走向正规化，必须要有健全的后勤工作；否则，就不能发挥应有的战斗力。”这次会议标志着全军后勤供给工作逐步走向正规。此后，人民军队后勤供给各项制度进一步完善，关于被服的供给以及管理工作也逐步实现制度化。

First, unified management and supply by level were implemented. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War period, “because the sources of supply were not fixed, there were basically no unified, fixed standards for supplying the troops,” which brought many problems to practical work. Starting from the period of the All-Out War of Resistance against Japan, the system of unified management was gradually established and improved. In December 1942, Mao Zedong emphasized, “It is necessary to establish a unified work system that commands as one wishes and allows policies and systems to be implemented thoroughly.” At the same time, he also required, “Carry out collective planning and collective inspection of production and supply by level, and study improvements in production technology, in order to increase production, improve supply, and correct all abnormal phenomena.” Under this directive, the Eighth Route Army began to implement unified management and worked to build a standardized military logistics support system. For example, in 1945, the Eighth Route Army headquarters made unified regulations on distribution details, requiring that clothing be issued centrally at the regimental, battalion, and company levels. In the Central Hebei Military Region, the issuance of military uniforms and equipment implemented a system of wholesale from the Military Supplies Section of the Supply Department and then collection from the clothing factory, forming a management mechanism of “unified management and unified allocation, factory storage on behalf of the troops.” At the same time, a clear system of supply by level was implemented in the troops. The Central Committee, according to the order of battle, supplied different quantities of clothing step by step to the field armies, local forces, local authorities, and rear-area organs of the troops. For example, in the standard for issuing single-layer uniforms, the field armies, local forces, and rear-area organs showed a decreasing trend step by step. In the supply of military shoes, the field armies were issued 6 to 8 pairs, the local forces 6 pairs, and the rear-area organs only 4 pairs, reflecting the characteristic that the supply standard decreased as it moved toward the rear according to the order of battle. This issuance model of unified organization and graded management ensured that clothing resources were tilted toward the frontline combat troops.

一是进行统一管理，按级供给。在土地革命战争时期，“由于供给来源不固定，对部队的供给，基本上没有统一、固定的标准”，给实际工作带来了不少问题。从全民族抗战时期开始，统一管理的制度逐步建立完善起来。1942年12月，毛泽东强调，“要建立统一的、指挥如意的、使政策和制度能贯彻到底的工作系统”，同时也要求，“按级举行生产与供给的集体计划与集体检查，并研究生产技术的改进，以期增进生产，改善供给，纠正一切不正常的现象”。在此指示下，八路军开始实行统一管理，并致力于构建标准化的部队后勤保障体系。例如，1945年，八路军总部对配发细节作出统一规定，要求以团、营、连为单位，集中发放服装。在冀中军区，部队的被装发放实行由供给部军实科批发再到被服厂领取的制度，形成“统管统配、工厂代存”的管理机制。同时，在部队实行明确的按级供给制度，中央根据作战序列，对野战军、地方军、地方及部队后方机关实行逐级供应不同数量的被服。例如，在单衣配发标准中，野战军、地方军、后方机关呈现出逐级递减趋势；在军鞋的供应上，野战军配发6双至8双，地方军为6双，后方机关仅为4双，体现出保障标准随作战序列向后方递减的特点。这种统一组织、分级管理的发放模式，确保了被服资源向一线战斗部队的倾斜。

Second, fixed-quota and quantitative distribution to improve supply efficiency. Beyond distribution by level, there were also specific organizational and management requirements for how clothing was distributed and maintained at different times and in different scenarios to maximize its utility. In April 1941, the Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army issued the *Provisional Regulations on Company-Level Supply Work*, which clearly stated: “Company-level supply work is the foundation of the entire supply work; to establish a standardized supply system, it must begin at the company level.” For example, in terms of clothing quantities, it stipulated that each person be issued four pairs of straw sandals in summer and autumn, four pairs of cloth shoes in winter and spring, two sets of summer uniforms, and one set of winter cotton uniforms and one cotton quilt per person. In terms of service life, it required cotton uniforms to be worn for two years, cotton overcoats for three years, leather overcoats for five years, woolen blankets for five years, and cotton blankets for three years. These regulations, starting from the company level, imposed rigid time constraints to improve the efficiency of clothing use. In February 1942, the Central Military Commission further elevated the care of clothing to the level of discipline, issuing an order requiring: “Cooperate with political organs to protect clothing and cherish public property”; “Implement registration and statistics of clothing and public property, establish clothing accounts, and report monthly by level”; “When a unit commander is transferred, a handover of clothing and public property must be conducted”; “When receiving new items of clothing, shoes, or hats, old items must be turned in and canceled”; “Violators shall be subject to disciplinary sanctions,” thereby strengthening the disciplinary mechanism for clothing storage and ensuring the full utilization of limited materials. In August of the same year, the Eighth Route Army Headquarters, in its *Instructions on Clothing Sewing Work for Supply Offices of Military Sub-Districts*, made detailed provisions on sewing tasks, clothing styles, material use, and distribution. At the same time, to unify distribution and control costs, it specified prices and distribution standards for various types of clothing and bedding. For example, the *Field Supply Unit Supply Standards Table* issued in November 1942 stipulated: summer uniforms at 208 yuan, two sets per person per year; cotton uniforms at 614 yuan, one set per person per year; bedding at 557 yuan, half a set per person per year. The person-specific and time-specific quantitative distribution standards not only ensured the best use of limited resources but also demonstrated the institutional advantages of the People’s Army in concentrating strength and efficient management under harsh wartime conditions.

二是定额定量发放，提高供给效率。除按级发放之外，在不同的时间、场景如何发放、维护被服，最大限度发挥好使用效果，也有着具体的组织管理要求。1941年4月，八路军总部发布《连队供给工作暂行条例》明确指出：“连队的供给工作，是整个供给工作的基础，建立正规化的供给制度，必须从连队开始”。例如在被服数量上，规定了夏秋季节每人发草鞋4双，冬春每人发布鞋4双，夏季每人发单衣2套，冬季每人发棉衣1套、棉被1床等；在使用时间上，要求棉衣穿2年，棉大衣穿3年，皮大衣穿5年，毛毯用5年，棉毯用3年等。这些规定从连队抓起，通过时间上的刚性约束，从而提高被服的使用效率。1942年2月，中央军委进一步将爱护被服上升到纪律高度，颁布命令要求：“协同政治机关进行保护被服、爱惜公物”；“实行被服公物登记统计，建立被服账目，并按月按级报告”；“遇有单位首长调动时，要办理被服公物的移交”；“不论被服鞋帽，领取新品时，须将旧品缴销”，“如违者应给以纪律制裁”，以此强化被服保管惩戒机制，确保有限物资的充分利用。同年8月，八路军总部在《给各军分区供给处服装缝制工作的指示》中，分别对缝制任务、服装样式、材料使用以及分发等作了详细规定。同时，为了统一分配和控制成本，又对各种类别的衣服、被褥标明了价格和发放标准。例如，1942年11月颁布的《野供部队供给标准表》规定：单衣208元，每人每年发两套，棉衣614元，每人每年一套，被褥557元，每人每年半床。因人、因时的定量发放标准，不仅保证了有限条件下的物尽其用，也展现了人民军队在艰苦战争环境下集中力量、高效管理的制度优势。

Third, continuously refine systems and practice the tradition of diligence and frugality. How to produce as much clothing as possible under existing conditions to meet the needs of the majority of troops, while reducing costs and expenditures, was a problem the People’s Army continuously explored and solved during the revolutionary war years. By refining management standards for clothing production and distribution in light of actual conditions, the army reduced waste. For example, in the Taihang region, where local cotton was not produced and transportation was difficult, sourcing raw materials for clothing was a challenge. To increase supply, from 1940 onward, the Eighth Route Army Headquarters stipulated that military cloth “be cut from the original 7.5 to 8 sets of uniforms per zhang of foreign cloth to 9 sets”; after 1942, “each set of uniforms was reduced from 34 square feet to only 30 square feet”; starting in 1943, all summer uniforms were shortened by one inch; in 1944, they were shortened by another two inches, and both summer and cotton uniforms had their collars removed. In 1945, the Eighth Route Army issued the *Provisional Supply Regulations of the Eighteenth Group Army*, with a separate chapter on clothing, further subdividing institutional points into detailed provisions on clothing budget (and final accounts) systems, sewing systems, supply (allocation) systems, statistical reporting systems, storage systems, and disposal of waste clothing. After refining the various standards for clothing production and distribution, “due to strict systems, a great deal was saved in overall military expenditures. Waste was greatly reduced.” This not only alleviated the difficulty of clothing supply but also promoted and practiced the values of diligence and frugality throughout the entire Party and army.

三是不断细化制度，践行勤俭传统。如何在现有条件下生产尽可能多的被服满足大多数部队战士的需求，降低成本、减少开支，是人民军队在革命战争年代不断探索解决的一项工作。结合实际情况，军队通过不断细化被服生产、分配的管理标准，减少了浪费。例如在太行地区，由于当地不产棉花，加之运输困难，被服原料的解决是一个难题。为加大供给，从1940年起，八路军总部规定：军用布匹“由原来的每尺洋布裁剪7.5至8套军衣增加到9套”，1942年后，“每套军衣由用34平方尺减到只用30平方尺”，从1943年开始，所有单军衣都改短1寸，1944年又减短2寸，单衣、棉衣都去掉了翻领。1945年，八路军发布了《第十八集团军暂行供给法规》，被服单列一章，制度要点进一步细分，从被服的预（决）算制度、缝制制度、供给（给与）制度、统计报告制度、保管制度、处理被服废品制度等方面进行了详细规定。细化被服生产和分配的各项标准后，“由于制度严格，对于整个军费开支，节省了好多。浪费现象大大减少”，不但缓解了被服供给困难的局面，也在全党全军宣扬和践行了勤俭节约的价值观念。

Furthermore, to adapt to changes in the war situation during the Liberation War period, the People’s Army’s clothing supply standards underwent dynamic adjustments, with the successive issuance of institutional documents such as the *Order on Supply Standards and Production Tasks for 1946* and the *1948 Troop Supply Standards*. In 1949, as major cities in North China and East China were liberated one after another and troops entered the cities, military supplies underwent standardization reforms, and clothing styles were also unified with reference to the Soviet military system while being adapted to China’s national conditions. In April of the same year, the Central Military Commission formally issued a notice, beginning a comprehensive trial of nationwide unified logistics supply standards and systems, including clothing. Through classified distribution and quota management for different branches and positions, the issuance of clothing was institutionalized and standardized, with quantities also taking into account seasons and usage scenarios. Unified category settings and style requirements objectively ensured the neatness of military appearance, allowing clothing to meet practical functions while also attending to the overall image of the army.

此外，为了适应战争形势的变化，解放战争时期，人民军队的被服供给标准实行动态化调整，先后发布了《关于一九四六年供给标准及生产任务的命令》《一九四八年部队供给标准》等制度文件。1949年，随着华北、华东地区各大城市陆续解放，部队进入城市，军需产品采用制式改革，服装制式也在适合我国国情的基础上参照苏军制式进行统一改革。同年4月，中央军委正式发出通知，开始了全面试行包括被服在内的全国统一的后勤供给标准和制度。通过对不同兵种及岗位的分类配发与定额管理，实现了被服发放的制度化与规范化，配发数量也结合了季节与使用场景；统一的品类设置与制式要求，客观上保证了军容的整齐，使被服在满足实用功能的同时，兼顾了军队的整体形象。

With the improvement of the supply system, the styles and appearance of the People’s Army’s uniforms also evolved from disorder to regularity. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War period, “the clothes the Red Army wore were very mixed; some wore civilian clothes, some wore uniforms, some were gray, blue, or yellow”; some “wore clothes sewn from blue homespun cloth, some with cloth buttons, some with round buttons, and the caps had red five-pointed stars on top.” After the outbreak of the full-scale War of Resistance Against Japan, army uniforms “gradually took the form of gray and yellow imitation Zhongshan-style suits, with styles and sizes basically achieving unit and regional uniformity.” Starting in 1942, under the coordination of the border region governments, uniform colors were unified to gray, with the upper garment in the Zhongshan suit style and the lower garment generally in Chinese-style trousers. By the later period of the War of Resistance, two-button-opening jodhpur-style cotton trousers were designed, enhancing wear resistance at the knees and hips while saving cloth and being convenient, and were well received by soldiers. During the Liberation War period, clothing products were not only durable and aesthetically pleasing but also more standardized. In terms of clothing color, the army uniformly adopted grass green, the navy black, and the air force blue, with stitch sizes required to be appropriate and manufacturing to be sturdy and durable.

随着供给制度的完善，人民军队军装的式样与外观也经历了从杂乱到规整的演变。在土地革命战争时期，“红军穿的衣服很杂，有穿便衣的，有穿制服的，有灰的、青的、黄的”，有的“穿的衣裳是青土布缝的，有的布纽子，有的是圆扣子，帽子高头有红五星”等。全民族抗战爆发后，部队军装“逐渐形成灰、黄两色仿中山装式样，制式、型号基本实现了部队和地区性的统一”。自1942年开始，由边区政府统筹，军装颜色统一为灰色，上装为中山装样式，下装一般为中式裤。到抗战后期，设计出两门开口的马裤式棉裤，增强了膝臀部耐磨度，且省布、方便，深受战士欢迎。解放战争时期，被服产品不仅耐用、美观，而且更为规范化。在被服颜色方面，陆军一律采用草绿色，海军一律黑色，空军一律蓝色，针码也要求大小适当，制造务求坚固耐用。

In summary, by the later period of the Liberation War, thanks to the accumulation of years of marching and combat experience and advances in production management technology, the People’s Army’s clothing support had already exhibited characteristics of systematization and institutionalization. Supply and management work gradually got on the right track, effectively guaranteeing the final victory of the revolution. As the Central Military Commission summarized at the logistics conference in January 1949: Because our logistics work ensured the supply of various materials for the army and established many systems (such as those for finances, grain, and clothing), “we built up our household assets from nothing, or from small to large, strengthening our economic base,” “enabling our military situation to develop smoothly and achieve unprecedented great victories.”

综上，到解放战争后期，得益于多年行军作战经验的积累以及生产管理技术的进步，人民军队被服保障已经呈现出体系化、制度化的特点，供给、管理工作逐步走上正轨，有力保障了革命的最终胜利。正如中央军委在1949年1月后勤会议上所总结指出的：由于我们的后勤工作保障了军队各项物资的供应，创立了许多制度（如各种财粮、被服等），“从无到有，或从小到大地建立了家务，壮大了我们的经济基础”，“使我们的军事形势顺利地向前发展，获得了空前的伟大胜利”。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

Looking back on revolutionary history, clothing was not only the soldiers’ survival gear but also a symbolic carrier of their political identity, revolutionary sentiment, and class belonging. It witnessed the soldiers’ arduous yet optimistic revolutionary spirit, connected frontline soldiers with the rear-area masses, highlighted the profound bond between the People’s Army and the masses, and today carries political significance and symbolic value far beyond its material form.

回顾革命历史，被服既是战士的生存家当，又是其政治身份、革命情感、阶级归属的象征载体，它见证着战士们艰苦乐观的革命精神，联结了前线战士与后方群众，凸显出人民军队与群众的深厚情感，在今日承载着远超其本身的政治意涵与象征价值。

In the arduous years of the revolutionary war, “two sets of clothes, one pair of shoes, one set of bedding, and one hat” constituted a soldier’s basic marching kit. Though the soldiers were clad in tattered clothes and coarse food, and their bodies were exhausted, their revolutionary morale remained high, fully displaying a tenacious and optimistic revolutionary will. According to Zhou Wenlong, a former deputy minister of the Eighth Route Army’s Supply Department, “A clothing storekeeper had two large gunny sacks of military shoes loaded on the pack animal he was leading, yet the uppers of the shoes on his own feet had been torn to shreds by the rocks, his toes were worn raw and had formed black scabs of blood, and he absolutely would not touch the shoes in the sacks.” [7]7 Zhou Wenlong (1909–2001), a veteran of the Long March, served as deputy minister of the Eighth Route Army Supply Department and later as minister of the General Logistics Department of the People’s Liberation Army. The American journalist Agnes Smedley recorded in her writings her experience of visiting a clothing factory when she arrived in Yan’an in 1937. Zhu De had introduced her to the Red Army’s first batch of standardized uniforms: “The new uniforms were gray-blue in color, and each set came with a pair of leggings and a cap with a red star. They were not as good as foreign military uniforms, but for us, they were truly incomparably fine.” [8]8 Agnes Smedley (1892–1950), an American journalist and writer, was a supporter of the Chinese Communist revolution and author of *The Great Road: The Life and Times of Chu Teh*. In a wartime environment where supplies such as clothing and bedding were scarce, the soldiers knew well how hard it was to come by new clothes; they carefully stored away the new uniforms they received, working bare-backed in the summer, preferring to let the sun peel several layers of skin off their backs rather than wear the new uniforms. When it turned cold, they only put on old clothes patched over and over again. Almost everyone’s clothing and bedding, once damaged, were repeatedly mended, so “putting on patches” became the most effective method for soldiers to extend the service life of their clothes and bedding. And the uniforms covered in “patches” gradually evolved from a simple, common wartime memory into a symbol of the soldiers’ hardworking, frugal, and indomitable revolutionary spirit of that era.

在艰苦卓绝的革命战争年代，“两套衣服、一双鞋子、一床被褥、一顶帽子”，这些就算一个战士基本的行军生活家当。战士们尽管敝衣粝食、身体疲惫，但革命士气依然旺盛，尽显顽强乐观的革命意志。据曾任八路军供给部副部长的周文龙回忆：“一位被服保管员，他牵着的牲口背上驮着两大麻袋军鞋，可他自己脚上的鞋帮都被石头挂烂了，脚趾磨破后已结成黑色的血痂，硬是不动麻袋里的鞋。”美国记者史沫特莱在其著作中记录了1937年到延安时参观被服厂的经历。朱德曾为她介绍了红军的第一批正规化军装，“新军装颜色是灰蓝，每一套有一副裹腿和一顶带有红星的军帽。它们没有外国军装那么好，但对于我们来说，可真是其好无比了”。在被服等物资短缺的战争环境下，战士们深知新衣难得，发下的新军服都仔细收藏好，夏天光着膀子干活，宁肯叫背上被太阳晒掉几层皮，也舍不得穿上新军服。天冷了，也只穿上补丁摞补丁的旧衣服。几乎每个人的衣被在破损后都经过反复修补，因此“打补丁”也成了战士们延长衣被使用寿命最有效的办法。而打满“补丁”的军装也从一个简单、常见的战时回忆，逐渐演变成那个时代战士艰苦朴素、坚韧不拔的革命精神的象征。

Military clothing and bedding also embodied the deep feelings between the People’s Army and the broad masses. To meet the army’s needs for clothing and bedding, the masses actively threw themselves into the labor upsurge of weaving cloth, sewing clothes, and supporting the front lines. They produced cotton cloth, cotton quilts, and military uniforms day and night and sent them to the front, providing a basic guarantee for the army’s logistical material supply. From the Jinggang Mountains to Yan’an, from the War of Resistance of the Whole Nation to the liberation of all China, the People’s Army’s clothing and bedding went from being funded by the Nationalist government’s budget and captured on the battlefield to having its own clothing factories, achieving independent production. [9]9 The Jinggang Mountains, on the border of Jiangxi and Hunan provinces, were the site of the first rural revolutionary base area established by Mao Zedong and Zhu De in 1927–1928. From the warmth of the body to the warmth of emotion, the battle-hardened figures of the troops, undaunted by the cold, and the hard-working figures of the masses, laboring diligently, constituted the precious memories of the revolutionary war years. It was precisely in this interweaving of warmth and cold and memory that clothing and bedding acquired a dual function, both material and symbolic, becoming a “living fossil” that transmitted the revolutionary spirit and the “army-people fish-and-water” sentiment. [10]10 “Army-people fish-and-water sentiment” (军民鱼水情) is a standard Chinese Communist metaphor for the close, interdependent relationship between the People’s Liberation Army and the civilian population. Zhu De once exclaimed with emotion: “Our army’s ammunition, clothing and bedding, medicine, grain and pay, etc., have received no supplement of any kind for three or four years. This force of several hundred thousand men, without ammunition, without grain and pay, without medicine, without clothing and bedding, fighting bitterly for several years in the most difficult circumstances, is probably an unprecedented strange affair and unheard-of wonder in the whole world, and this is indeed a fact in our War of Resistance, and naturally it should also be called a miracle.” The shortage of soldiers’ clothing and bedding not only tested the army’s will but also gave birth to an independent, mass-oriented clothing and bedding supply production organization and logistics system, “creating a history of self-reliance and arduous struggle moving toward complete self-sufficiency.”

军队被服还凝结着人民军队与广大群众之间的深厚情感。为了满足部队的被服需要，广大群众积极投入到织布缝衣、支援前线的劳动热潮中。他们日夜生产棉布、棉被和军装送往前线，使得军队后勤物资供应有了基础保障。从井冈山到延安，从全民族抗战到解放全中国，人民军队的被服从靠国民党政府经费购买和战场缴获，到拥有自己的被服厂，实现了生产的独立自主。从身体的暖到情感的暖，部队战士不畏严寒的战斗身影和人民群众奋力劳作的生产身影，构成了革命战争年代的珍贵记忆。正是在这冷暖与记忆的交错中，被服具有了物质性与象征性的双重功能，成为传承革命精神和“军民鱼水”情感的“活化石”。朱德曾感叹道：“我军之弹药、被服、医药、粮饷等等，三四年来不能得到任何方面的补充。这种无弹药、无粮饷、无医药、无被服的数十万大军，在最困难的环境中苦战数年，恐怕是全世界空前未有的怪事奇闻，而这确是我们抗战中的事实，自然也应该说是奇迹。”战士衣被短缺既考验军队意志，也催生了独立的、群众化的被服供给生产组织和后勤体系，“创造了一段自力更生、艰苦奋斗走向全面自给的历史”。

The history of how the People’s Army solved the difficulties of clothing and bedding supply during the revolutionary war period demonstrates the Party’s and the people’s spirit of self-reliance in the face of extremely difficult military material shortages, and also reflects the Party’s unique political wisdom in war mobilization, institutional construction, and revolutionary narrative. These historical experiences and memories not only constitute an important part of the CPC’s revolutionary narrative but also possess precious spiritual value today.

革命战争时期，人民军队解决被服供给困难的历史，展现了党和人民在极其艰难的军事物资困境下自力更生的奋斗精神，也折射出党在战争动员、制度建设与革命叙事中的独特政治智慧。这些历史经验与记忆不仅构成了中共革命叙事的重要组成部分，也在今天有着弥足珍贵的精神价值。