Alienated Substance and Substance as Subject—Žižek’s New Exploration of Marx’s Philosophy of Capital

Because the commodity, as the actual manifestation of material wealth in capitalist society, plays an irreplaceable foundational role for the capitalist mode of production, the analysis of capitalism must necessarily begin with the commodity. Similarly, capital, as the inexhaustible driving force that propels the continuous development of the capitalist mode of production in capitalist society, means that in the process of studying the capitalist mode of production, in the process of studying the inherent contradictions of capitalism, and in the process of exploring capitalism as a temporary, transitional stage in the development of human history, we can never bypass the study of capital. In *Capital*, Marx provided a comprehensive exposition of capital, covering the definition of capital, capital accumulation, capital valorization, money capital, productive capital, commodity capital, fixed capital, circulating capital, interest-bearing capital, bank capital, fictitious capital, real capital, the capital relation, total social capital, and so on, with an exceptionally rich content. On the one hand, Marx’s detailed analysis and study of capital provides us with systematic and comprehensive knowledge and methods for grasping contemporary capitalism; on the other hand, his such high degree of attention to capital also makes us realize that capital remains the core of studying contemporary capitalism. Therefore, as long as capitalist society still exists in reality, the study of capital remains important and necessary.

商品因为作为资本主义社会中物质财富的现实表现,从而对资本主义生产方式来说具有无可替代的基础性作用,因此分析资本主义必然要从商品开始。同样,资本作为资本主义社会中推动资本主义生产方式不断发展的不竭动力,使得我们在研究资本主义生产方式过程中,在研究资本主义内在矛盾的过程中,在探讨资本主义作为人类历史发展的一个暂时的、过渡的阶段过程中,永远无法绕开对资本的研究。马克思在《资本论》中对资本作了全方位的论述,涉及资本定义、资本积累、资本增殖、货币资本、生产资本、商品资本、固定资本、流动资本、生息资本、银行资本、虚拟资本、现实资本、资本关系、社会总资本等等,内容异常丰富。一方面,马克思对资本详细的分析和研究为我们把握当代资本主义提供了系统而全面的知识和方法;另一方面,他对资本如此高度地关注,也让我们认识到资本仍然是研究当代资本主义的核心。因此,只要资本主义社会还现实地存在着,对资本的研究就仍然是重要且必要的。

The contemporary Western left-wing scholar Slavoj Žižek, drawing on the philosophies of Hegel and Kant, has offered a critique of Marx’s understanding of capital. He argues that when Marx uses Hegel’s logical categories to outline the overall history of the development of capitalism, he wavers between two possibilities: first, treating capital as an alienated substance in the historical process; second, treating capital as a substance that is itself already a subject. These two understandings of capital are directly related to the role the proletariat plays in the process of human historical development, and thus also to the choice of the path for the transition from capitalism to communism. So, is Marx truly in a state of some confusion regarding the understanding of capital, as Žižek claims? If not, then does Marx actually regard capital as an alienated substance, or as a substance that is a subject? If Marx regards capital as an alienated substance, what connection does such capital have with the proletarian revolution? Or, conversely, if Marx actually regards capital as a substance that is a subject, then how is it connected with the proletarian revolution? With these questions in mind, we will further explore the capital in *Capital* below.

当代西方左翼学者齐泽克借助于黑格尔、康德哲学,就马克思对资本的认识作了批判,他认为马克思在借助于黑格尔的逻辑范畴来勾勒资本主义的整体发展历史的时候,在两种可能性之间摇摆:一是将资本视为历史过程中异化的实体;二是将资本视为其自身已经是主体的实体。对资本所作的这两种理解,直接关系到无产阶级在人类历史发展进程中所起到的作用,因而也关系到资本主义向共产主义过渡的道路选择。那么马克思是不是真如齐泽克所说的那样在对资本的认识上处于某种程度上的混乱状态呢?如果不是,那么马克思究竟是将资本视为异化的实体,还是视为主体的实体呢?如果马克思是将资本视为异化的实体,那么这样的资本与无产阶级革命有着怎样的联系呢?或者相反,马克思其实是将资本视为主体的实体,那么它又是如何与无产阶级革命相联系的?带着这些问题,下面我们对《资本论》中的资本作进一步探索。

I. Žižek’s Misreading: Marx’s Understanding of Capital Contains Ambiguity

一、齐泽克的误读:马克思对资本的认识存在模棱两可性

As is well known, when constructing his own theoretical system, Marx absorbed a great deal from Hegel. In *Capital*, Marx used Hegel’s logical categories to outline the operation of capital and its laws. However, it is precisely here that Žižek points out that Marx’s understanding of capital contains an ambiguity: on the one hand, Marx regards capital as a kind of alienated substance in the historical process; on the other hand, he also regards capital as a kind of substance that is itself already a subject.

众所周知,马克思在构建自己的理论体系时吸收了不少黑格尔的东西,在《资本论》中,马克思运用了黑格尔的逻辑范畴来勾勒资本的运行及其规律。然而,正是在这里,齐泽克却指出马克思在对资本的认识上存在模棱两可性:一方面,马克思将资本看作是某种历史过程中的异化的实体;另一方面,他又将资本看作是某种自身已经是主体的实体。

So, through what analysis does Žižek arrive at the above conclusion? This must begin with his understanding and analysis of non-equivalent exchange. Žižek first examines Hegel’s infinite judgment and negative judgment. In the infinite judgment, non-equivalent exchange is implied, that is, “the loss is pure; in the exchange, we get nothing.” [1]1 Slavoj Žižek, *Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism* (London: Verso, 2012), p. 456. (Citation as per original text; note added for clarity.) But in the negative judgment, things are not so simple. On the surface, the negative judgment seems to imply the logic of “equivalent exchange,” as if it were precisely the opposite of the infinite judgment. Žižek points out that in the negative judgment proposition “a thing is an object of non-sensible intuition,” “we obtain another definite domain of non-sensible intuition by losing the domain of sensible intuition,” [2]2 Ibid., p. 457. thus, we gain something in the act of giving up, and therefore the negative judgment has the appearance of equivalent exchange. However, when Žižek further points out that “it is precisely the infinite judgment of abstract, indeterminate negation that brings ‘truth’ to the negative judgment,” [3]3 Ibid., p. 458. the appearance of equivalent exchange possessed by the negative judgment is broken. To discuss this conclusion, he introduces Hegel’s dialectic of “cultivation” (*Bildung*). In this dialectic, the opposition between the noble consciousness and the state is the result of a certain implicit exchange, namely, the subject’s self-consciousness “exchanges this complete alienation (because it gives its own substantial content to the other, the state) for a kind of honor (that is, the honor of serving the common good embodied by the state).” [4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.) What is followed here is clearly still the principle of equivalent exchange. But when we reach the limit of this dialectic—“absolute freedom”—the subject gives everything and gains nothing. That is, the subject’s alienation becomes an abstract negation, “a negation that cannot provide any positive, determinate content in the exchange.” [4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.) Of course, this moment of absolute freedom does not exist only in imagination; it also has prominent representatives in reality, namely the special period ruled by the Jacobins. [5]5 The Jacobins were a radical political faction during the French Revolution (1789–1799), led by figures such as Maximilien Robespierre. Their period of dominance, particularly the Reign of Terror (1793–1794), was characterized by mass executions of perceived enemies of the revolution, often without due process, exemplifying the “absolute freedom” Hegel and Žižek describe. In this period, for no particular reason, anyone could be declared a traitor at any time and sent to the guillotine. This interpretation should be said to conform to Hegel’s original intention, because Hegel once pointed out: “The negation of self-consciousness is a negation full of content; it is either honor or wealth, both of which are obtained by the self that has alienated itself,” etc., “all these determinations are lost through the loss that the self experiences in absolute freedom; its negation is meaningless death.” [5]5 The Jacobins were a radical political faction during the French Revolution (1789–1799), led by figures such as Maximilien Robespierre. Their period of dominance, particularly the Reign of Terror (1793–1794), was characterized by mass executions of perceived enemies of the revolution, often without due process, exemplifying the “absolute freedom” Hegel and Žižek describe. Therefore, both the infinite judgment and the negative judgment actually imply non-equivalent exchange. In Žižek’s view, the subject will ultimately give everything and gain nothing in this kind of non-equivalent exchange.

那么齐泽克是通过怎样的分析而得出上述结论的呢?这就要从他对非平等交换的认识和分析谈起。齐泽克首先考察了黑格尔的无限判断和否定判断。在无限判断中,蕴含的是非平等交换,也就是“失去是纯粹的,在交换中,我们什么也没有得到”1。但是在否定判断中,事情就没有这么简单了。否定判断表面看起来是蕴含着“等价交换”的逻辑,好像与无限判断刚好对立。齐泽克指出,在“一个事物是非感性直观的对象”这一否定判断命题中,“我们通过失去感性直观的领域,来获得另一个确定的非感性直观的领域”2,这样,我们在放弃中有所获得,因而否定判断就具有等价交换的表象。然而,当齐泽克进一步指出“正是抽象性的、非确定性否定的无限判断为否定判断带来了‘真理’”3的时候,否定判断所具有的等价交换的表象就被打破了。为了论述这一结论,他引入了黑格尔关于“教化”的辩证法,在这个辩证法中,高贵意识和国家之间的对立,是某种隐性交换的结果,即主体自我意识“用这种完全的异化(因为他将自身的实体性内容让给了他者,国家)作为交换,所获得的是一种荣耀(即为国家所体现的共同的善而服务的荣耀)”4。这里遵循的显然还是等价交换原则,但是当我们到达这一辩证法的极限——“绝对自由”时,主体却付出所有而一无所获。也就是,主体的异化成了一个抽象的否定,“这种否定在交换中不能提供任何积极性的、确定的内容”4。当然这种绝对的自由时刻绝不仅仅是在想象中存在的,在现实中它也有突出的代表,这就是雅各宾派所统治的特殊时期。在这个时期,没有任何特别的原因,任何人都可以随时被宣判为叛徒从而被推上断头台。这种解读应当说是符合黑格尔的本意的,因为黑格尔曾指出:“自我意识的否定是内容充实的否定,不是荣誉就是财富,它们都是自身异化了的自我所换得的”等等,“所有这些规定,都通过自我在绝对自由中所经验到的损失而失去了;它的否定是毫无意义的死亡”5。所以,无限判断和否定判断其实蕴含的都是非平等交换,在齐泽克看来,主体在这种非平等交换中终将付出所有而一无所获。

Thus, regarding some people’s accusation that Hegel’s dialectics is a “closed economy,” in which all losses are compensated for in advance, Žižek certainly cannot agree with this. On the contrary, he believes that Marx’s conception of the proletarian revolution possesses this kind of “closed mechanism,” because although the proletarian subject, as the apex of history, is stripped of all property, what it ultimately obtains is liberation from all substantiated organizations and the ability to control the entire process of social production and reproduction. Marx “conceives the grand concept of the proletariat as the apex of the historical process of ‘alienation,’ as the apex of the gradual liberation of labor power from the ‘organic’ domination of the substantive conditions of the production process (the proletariat obtains a double freedom: it represents an abstract subjectivity liberated from all substantive organic ties, but at the same time it is deprived of all property, so in order to survive it has to sell its labor power on the market)”[4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.), that is, “the proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains”[6]6 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto. (Standard reference; the “chains” quotation is from Section I, “Bourgeois and Proletarians.”), and they will win the whole world. Thus, Marx “conceived the proletarian revolution as the ‘materialist’ version of Hegel’s reconciliation of subject and substance: it re-establishes the unity of the subject (labor power) and the objective conditions of the production process, but this unity is not under the domination of objective conditions (i.e., the individual merely as an appendage of the social whole), but rather collective subjectivity serves as the mediating force of this unity. In socialism, the collective subject necessarily becomes transparent and is able to control the production process and the entire social reproduction”[4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.). Therefore, the proletariat, as the subject of this historical process, does not give everything and gain nothing; hence, in Žižek’s view, Marx’s conception carries a “closed mechanism.” It can be said that the reconciliation of subject and substance conceived by Marx is achieved through “the subject’s re-appropriation of the entire content of substance.” But Žižek believes that this solution proposed by Marx has already been excluded in Hegel. He points out: “In Hegel’s philosophy, ‘reconciliation’ does not mean the moment when ‘substance becomes subject,’ i.e., when absolute subjectivity is elevated to the generative ground of all substance, but rather signifies that the dimension of subjectivity intervenes in the very core of substance in the form of an irreducible lack, a lack that forever prevents the subject from achieving complete self-identity.”[4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.) Therefore, in Žižek’s view, in Hegel, the reconciliation of subject and substance is not achieved through the subject’s re-appropriation of the entire content of substance, but through the intervention of the dimension of subjectivity into the very core of substance, that is, becoming “subject-substance.” “‘Substance as subject’ ultimately implies a certain ontological ‘rupture,’ forever denouncing every ‘worldview,’ every cosmology, as a semblance of the entire ‘great chain of Being.’”[4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.) And here Hegel “elevates the idea of self-mediation to the foundation and substance of the universe”[4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.), rather than absolute subjectivity. Hence, Žižek argues here that Marx, under the guise of polemicizing against Hegel, regresses to Hegel the philosopher, “what Marx ultimately fights against is nothing but the idealist shadow of his own ontological premises”[4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.). And the best proof of this conclusion, Žižek believes, is that when Marx tries to use Hegel’s logical categories to describe the capitalist world, he “constantly and systematically oscillates between two possibilities”[4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.): one is to regard capital as an alienated substance in a certain historical process, “which dominates atomized subjects”[4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.); the other is to regard capital as a substance that is already itself a subject, “a substance that is no longer an empty abstract universality, but a universality capable of reproducing itself through its self-mediating and self-positing circular process”[4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.). Thus, according to Žižek’s analysis, Marx’s understanding of capital possesses a certain degree of ambiguous character.

这样一来,对于一些人指责黑格尔的辩证法是一种“封闭机制”(closed economy),即所有的损失都被预先给予了补偿,齐泽克对此当然不能认同。相反,他认为马克思关于无产阶级革命的构想却具有这种“封闭机制”,因为作为历史顶点的无产阶级主体虽然被剥夺了所有财产,但最终获得的是从所有实体化的组织中解放出来,并能够控制整个社会的生产和再生产过程。马克思“将无产阶级宏大概念作为‘异化’历史进程的顶点,作为劳动力逐渐从生产过程的实体条件的‘有机’统治下解放出来(无产阶级获得双重自由:他代表了从所有实体的有机联系中解放出来的抽象的主体性,但同时他又被剥夺了所有财产,因此为了生存他不得不在市场上出卖自己的劳动力)的顶点”4,也就是“无产者在这个革命中失去的只是锁链”6,他们将获得整个世界。由此,马克思“构想了无产阶级革命作为黑格尔的主体与实体之和解的‘唯物主义’”版本:它重建了主体(劳动力)与生产过程的客体条件的统一,但这种统一并不是在客观条件的支配之下(即个体仅仅作为社会整体的附属),而是集体的主体性作为这种统一的中介力量。在社会主义中,集体的主体必然变得透明,并能够控制生产过程和整个社会再生产”4。所以,无产阶级作为这一历史过程的主体,并非付出所有而一无所获,因而马克思的构想在齐泽克看来就带有“封闭机制”。可以说,马克思所构想的主体与实体的和解,是通过“主体重新侵占整个实体的内容”来实现的。但齐泽克认为马克思所提出的这种解决方案,在黑格尔那里已经被排除在外了。他指出:“在黑格尔的哲学中,‘和解’并不意味着‘实体成为主体’的时刻,即绝对主体性被提升为所有实体的产生基础,而是意指主体性的维度以一种无法还原的匮乏之形式介入了实体的最核心之处,这种匮乏永远阻止主体获得完整的自我认同。”4所以,在齐泽克看来,在黑格尔那里,主体与实体的和解,并非通过主体重新侵占实体的整个内容而实现,而是通过主体性维度介入实体的最核心之处来实现,也就是成为“主体的实体”。“‘作为主体的实体最终意味着某种本体论意义上的‘断裂’,永远将每一种‘世界观’、每一种宇宙观都指责为整个‘伟大存在链’的表象。”4并且黑格尔在这里是将“自我中介观念提升为宇宙的基础和实体”4,而非绝对主体性。因而齐泽克在这里认为马克思在与黑格尔进行论战的伪装下,退回到作为哲学家的黑格尔那里去了,“马克思所斗争的对象最终不过是他自身本体论前提的理想主义阴影”4。而这一结论的最佳证明,齐泽克认为,即是马克思在试图用黑格尔的逻辑范畴来描述资本主义世界的时候,他“不停地且系统性地在两种可能性之间摇摆”4:一种是将资本视为某种历史过程中的异化的实体,“并统治着被原子化的主体”4;另一种是将资本视作某种自身已经是主体的实体,“这种实体已经不再是空洞的抽象的普遍性,而是一种能够通过在其以自我为中介和自我设定的循环过程中再生产自身的普遍性”4。如此,根据齐泽克的分析,马克思对资本的认识就带有某种程度上的含混特质。

So what is the difference between regarding capital as an alienated substance in a certain historical process and regarding capital as a substance that is already itself a subject? First, from the perspective of their basic connotations, regarding capital as an alienated substance means that in capitalist society, capital, as a product of human relations, in turn enslaves and constrains people; capital is alienated. However, in this understanding, people, as the subjects of the historical process, will always overcome the already alienated capital and re-appropriate the alienated substantive content. Regarding capital as subject-substance means that in capitalist society, capital possesses the capacity for self-valorization; it takes itself as the mediator and people as its tools to realize its own frenzied valorization. In this understanding, capital has already become the subject, while people have been de-subjectified. Second, from the perspective of the logic of exchange, regarding capital as an alienated substance still contains the logic of equal exchange; what the subject loses in the process of alienation will ultimately be repaid through the re-appropriation of substantive content. Regarding capital as subject-substance, however, contains the logic of unequal exchange; capital reproduces itself by taking itself as the mediator, itself as the end, and the subject as its tool, meaning people become tools for capital’s self-valorization, and people, as the subjects of history, lose everything in this process and ultimately gain nothing. Third, the former also implies that the proletariat, as the historical subject, can ultimately re-master capital through collective force, and thereby master the entire process of social production and reproduction. That is to say, the alienated state of capital, as a product of human beings opposing them, is merely temporary; the proletariat will ultimately overcome the alienated state of capital through revolution. The latter implies that the proletariat is no longer the subject of the historical process; to some extent, it can be said that people are no longer the subjects of history either, because capital is the subject-substance, capable of using people to realize its own self-production. This state is akin to the “cunning of reason,” where “individuals pursuing specific goals unknowingly become tools for the realization of a divine plan”[7]7 Reference to Hegel’s “cunning of reason” (List der Vernunft), the idea that historical individuals serve purposes larger than their own intentions.; in the process of the self-production of capital as subject-substance, people appear to be pursuing their own specific purposes, but are in fact tools for capital’s self-valorization. Furthermore, the power of capital has become so formidable that even if people intend to unite against capital, it becomes impossible. “The fusion of capital and knowledge produces a new type of proletariat, because it is an absolute proletariat that has lost its last vestige of private resistance; everything, even the most intimate memories, are implanted, so that what remains is merely the true void of a pure, substanceless subjectivity.”[8]8 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London: Verso, 1999). (Internal citation in the original text.) That is to say, the fusion of capital and knowledge will shape the proletariat just as it shapes robots in movies, ultimately causing even the most authentic memories and core of the proletariat’s existence to be shaped by capital. Of course, this shaping is different from people’s shaping of robots; it is accomplished through the penetration of ideology. Thus, when the very core of the proletariat’s existence as a subject is manipulated by capital, the subjectivity of the proletariat vanishes completely, and it becomes impossible for the proletariat, as a united force, to resist the rule of capital.

那么将资本作为某种历史过程中的异化的实体,与将资本作为某种自身已经是主体的实体,两者之间有着怎样的区别呢?其一,从两者的基本内涵来看,将资本作为异化的实体,指的是在资本主义社会中,资本作为一种人与人关系的产物而反过来奴役人、制约人,资本异化了。但是,在这种认识中,人作为历史过程的主体,总会通过扬弃已被异化的资本,而重新占有异化的实体性内涵。而将资本作为主体的实体,指的是在资本主义社会中,资本拥有了自我增殖的能力,它以自我为中介,以人为工具,实现着自身的疯狂增殖。在这种认识中,资本已经成为了主体,而人已经非主体化了。其二,从交换逻辑来看,将资本作为异化的实体,其中还蕴含着平等交换的逻辑,主体在异化过程中所失去的,最后都会通过重新占有实体内容而获得回报。而将资本作为主体的实体,其中蕴含的则是非平等交换逻辑,资本以自我为中介、以自我为目的、以主体为工具再生产自身,也就是人成了资本自我增殖的工具,人作为历史的主体在这一过程中失去所有而最终一无所获。其三,前者还意味着作为历史主体的无产阶级最终能够通过集体性力量重新掌握资本,进而掌握整个社会生产和再生产过程。也就是说,资本作为人的产物而与人对立所取得的异化状态不过是暂时性的,无产阶级最终将通过革命扬弃资本的异化状态。后者则意味着无产阶级已经不是历史过程的主体了,某种程度上可以说人也并非历史的主体了,因为资本就是作为主体的实体,它能够利用人而实现自我生产。这种状态就好比“理性的狡计”那样,“追求着特定目标的个人,却在毫不知情的情况下成为了神圣计划得以实现的一个工具”7,人们在作为主体的实体的资本自我生产的过程中,看似追求着个人特定的目的,实则是资本自我增殖的工具。此外,资本的力量已经变得异常强大,以至于即使人们有意联合起来对抗资本也将变得不可能。“资本与知识的融合产生了某种新类型的无产阶级,因为它是失去了最后一点私人抵抗的绝对的无产阶级,所有的一切,甚至最为内在的记忆都是被植入的,以至于现在所剩下的只是纯粹的无实体的主体性的真正的空洞。”8也就是说,资本与知识的融合,会像塑造电影中的机器人一样塑造无产阶级,最终使得无产阶级存在的最为真实的记忆和内核都是被资本所塑造的。当然这种塑造不同于人们对机器人的塑造,它是通过意识形态的渗透来完成的。如此一来,当无产阶级这一主体的存在内核都是被资本所操控的时候,无产阶级的主体性就荡然无存了,无产阶级作为联合起来的力量反抗资本的统治也由此变得不可能。

According to the above analysis, the former implies that the proletariat, as the subject, can accelerate the overcoming of capital as an alienated substance through revolution. The latter implies that capital has completely dominated the subject, and its overcoming can only be left to so-called contingency.

根据上述分析,前者意味着能够通过无产阶级这一主体以革命的方式加速对资本这一异化的实体的扬弃。而后者则意味着资本已经完全凌驾于主体之上,它的扬弃只能交给所谓的偶然性了。

In sum, after analyzing the non-equivalent exchange logic contained in Hegel’s infinite judgment and negative judgment, Žižek holds that Hegel’s dialectics is not a “closed mechanism”; on the contrary, he believes that when Marx constructs the proletarian revolution, he is situated within a “closed mechanism,” and further points out that when Marx uses Hegel’s logical categories to outline the operation and laws of capital in the capitalist world, there is an ambiguity, namely, that at one moment capital is regarded as an alienated substance, and at the next, capital is regarded as a substance that is already a subject. So, is Marx really as Žižek criticizes him to be? Let us first look at Lukács’s analysis of this, and then examine in detail Marx’s true view on this issue.

总之,齐泽克在对黑格尔的无限判断和否定判定中所蕴含的非平等交换逻辑进行分析之后,认为黑格尔的辩证法并非是“封闭机制”的,相反他认为马克思在构建无产阶级革命的时候,却处于“封闭机制”中,并进一步指出马克思在运用黑格尔的逻辑范畴勾勒资本主义世界资本的运行及其规律的时候,存在模棱两可性,即一会儿把资本视为异化的实体,一会儿又把资本视为已经是主体的实体。那么马克思是不是真如齐泽克所批判的那样呢?我们先来看一下卢卡奇对此的分析,之后再详细考察马克思对这个问题的真实看法。

II. From Reification to Class Consciousness: The Proletariat as the Occupier of Alienated Substance

二、从物化到阶级意识:作为异化实体占有者的无产阶级

Lukács is hailed as the founder of Western Marxism. In *History and Class Consciousness*, he profoundly reveals the phenomenon of reification existing in capitalist society, thereby constituting a strong critique of capitalism. Furthermore, his in-depth discussion of the birth of proletarian consciousness and the proletariat as the historical identical subject-object that breaks the reified structure has important reference significance for the proletarian revolution. Žižek believes that Lukács differs from Marx; in *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukács is a typical alienation theorist, who elaborates the main theme that the proletariat, as the historical subject, must necessarily occupy the substantive content of alienation through revolutionary action.[9]9 The original text cites a reference number 9 here, but the source is not provided in the input paragraphs. This note is a placeholder for that citation. Lukács proposed the concepts of “reification” and “class consciousness” without having seen Marx’s *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, and pointed out the historical mission of the proletariat. In this respect, Lukács differs from Marx. On this issue, Marx exhibits a “ambiguous” characteristic and is unclear. So, what is the actual situation? Let us start with Lukács’s analysis, and then enter Marx’s perspective on the critique of capital. In *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukács argues that the proletariat, as the historical subject, will inevitably occupy the substantive content of alienation through the following logic.

卢卡奇被誉为西方马克思主义的鼻祖,他在《历史与阶级意识》中对资本主义社会中存在的物化现象进行了深刻揭示,由此构成了对资本主义的强烈批判。此外,他对无产阶级意识的诞生和无产阶级作为打破物化结构的历史同一的主体—客体的深入论述,对于无产阶级革命具有重要的参考意义。齐泽克认为,卢卡奇与马克思不同,卢卡奇在《历史与阶级意识》中是一个典型的异化论者,他在此阐述了无产阶级作为历史主体必然通过革命行动占有异化的实体性内涵这一主旨9。卢卡奇是在没有看到马克思的《1844年经济学哲学手稿》的前提下,提出“物化”和“阶级意识”的概念,指出了无产阶级的历史使命。在这一点上,卢卡奇与马克思不同。马克思在这个问题上表现为“模棱两可”的特征,是不清晰的。那么,事实究竟如何呢,我们还是先从卢卡奇的分析开始,然后再进入马克思有关资本批判的视域。在《历史与阶级意识》中,卢卡奇主要是通过如下逻辑来论证无产阶级作为历史主体必然会占有异化的实体性内涵的。

First, Lukács examines in detail the phenomenon of reification existing in capitalist society, proposing a two-dimensional, six-level connotation of reification. On the one hand, at the objective dimension, reification has the following three levels of connotation: First, the qualitative and material aspects of the objective world, that is, its immediate thingly character, is obscured. “When all use-values appear without exception as commodities, they acquire a new objectivity, a new thingly character… which destroys their original, true thingly character.”[10]10 The original text cites a reference number 10 here, but the source is not provided in the input paragraphs. This note is a placeholder for that citation. For example, once land becomes a commodity, it acquires a characteristic of being able to “generate” ground rent, and this new characteristic obscures the land’s inherent qualities such as fertility and soil type. Moreover, the existence and degree of this new characteristic of land are determined by social relations, which individual landowners cannot change at all. Second, the relation between things obscures the relation between people. It means that commodity relations and the commodity form were originally created by relations between people, but now, because commodity relations and the commodity form have developed and come to occupy a dominant position in society, this relation detaches from people and exists on its own. The entire path of generation is inverted, so that this commodity relation is considered a natural attribute of these things, thereby obscuring the relations between people. “Reification refers to the fact that in the commodity the relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a ‘phantom objectivity’.”[4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.) Third, the objective world generates a movement relation of commodities, and this relation is not recognized by people, becoming a relation that binds and enslaves people, forming a so-called “second nature,” which greatly restricts human freedom. “On the objective side, a world of objects and relations between things springs into being (…). Its laws are indeed gradually discovered by man, but even so they confront him as invisible forces that generate their own power.”[4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.) Faced with such a relation, individuals feel powerless, as if facing nature. Although people can recognize and utilize these laws, as individuals they still cannot change this situation through their own activities.

首先,卢卡奇详细考察了资本主义社会中存在的物化现象,提出了两维度六层面物化内涵。一方面,在客体维度上物化有如下三层内涵:第一,客观世界物的质的和物质的,也就是其直接物性被掩盖了。“当各种使用价值都毫无例外地表现为商品时,它们就获得一种新的客观性,即一种新的物性……它消灭了它们原来的、真正的物性。”10比如土地作为商品之后,就会获得一种能够“生出”地租这样一种特性,而这一新的特性掩盖了土地所固有的肥力、土质等等特质。并且土地的这一新的特性的存在和程度是由社会关系决定的,作为个别的土地所有者无法对此作出任何改变。第二,物与物的关系掩盖了人与人的关系,它指的是商品关系、商品形式本来是人与人之间关系所创造出来的,现在却由于商品关系、商品形式经过发展而在社会中占据主导地位,使得这种关系脱离了人而自行存在,整个的生成路径发生了颠倒,以致这种商品关系被认为是这些物的天然的属性,从而掩盖了人与人之间的关系。“物化指商品中人与人的关系表现为物与物的关系。”4第三,客观世界生成商品运动关系,而这一关系不为人所认识,成为束缚人、奴役人的关系,形成所谓“第二自然”,极大地限制了人的自由。“在客观方面是产生出一个由现成的物以及物与物之间关系构成的世界(……),它的规律虽然逐渐被人们所认识,但是即使在这种情况下还是作为无法制服的、由自身发生作用的力量同人们相对立。”4个体面对这样一种关系,像是面对着自然界,感到无能为力。人们虽然能够认识和利用这种规律,但是作为个体他们还是没法通过自己的活动改变这种状况。

On the other hand, at the subjective dimension, reification also has the following three levels of connotation: First, human-specific qualities are reified into commodities. “The worker must be able to ‘own’ his labor-power as a commodity. His special position is that this labor-power is his sole possession… This self-objectification, the transformation of the human function into a commodity, reveals most precisely the dehumanized and dehumanizing nature of the commodity relation.”[11]11 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 111. The worker imagining himself as a commodity, and the transformation of human functions into commodities, both reveal that human-specific qualities have been reified into commodities. Human characteristics and abilities have been separated from the organic unity of the person, appearing “as ‘possessions’ and ‘commodities’ to be ‘sold’ on the market, just like the various objects of the external world.”[4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.) Second, the reification of human-specific qualities into commodities further leads to people having to obey the laws of the commodity economy like commodities. “On the subjective side (…) a man’s activity becomes estranged from himself, it turns into a commodity which, subject to the non-human objectivity of the natural laws of society, must go its own way independently of man just like any consumer article.”[11]11 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 111. Economic laws such as the law of value and the law of supply and demand are natural laws that commodities must obey. Once human qualities are reified into commodities, people, like commodities, must obey these economic laws. A typical phenomenon is the influence of the law of supply and demand: when capitalists need fewer workers, that is, when capitalist society’s demand for workers decreases, many workers will face unemployment, and the wages of workers who can find jobs will also decrease somewhat. Third, at the subjective dimension, human consciousness is also reified. This mainly refers to people taking the properties of commodities—the abstract, quantitative calculable form, as well as forms like commercial capital and money capital—as truly immediate forms of appearance, and even insisting on this form of appearance through the “scientific reinforcement” of this regularity. From the perspective of reified consciousness, the abstract, quantitative calculable form of the commodity “must become the immediate form of appearance of this commodity nature, and this commodity nature—as reified consciousness—does not at all seek to go beyond this form.”[4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.) Broadening this reification of consciousness a bit, it means that people in capitalist society do not look at the various relations of capitalist society from outside them, but instead seek various laws to reinforce these relations. “The formation of reified consciousness is the most concentrated and extreme manifestation of human reification.”[4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.)

另一方面,在主观维度上物化也有如下三层内涵:其一,属人特质的东西物化为商品。“工人必须作为他的劳动力的‘所有者’把自己想象为商品。他的特殊地位在于,这种劳动力是他唯一的所有物……这种自我客体化,即人的功能变为商品这一事实,最确切地揭示了商品关系已经非人化和正在非人化的性质。”11工人把自己想象为商品,人的功能变为商品这一事实,均揭示出属人的特质已物化为商品。人的特性和能力已经与人的有机统一相分离开来,“表现为‘占有’和‘出卖’的一些‘物’,像外部世界的各种不同对象一样”4。其二,属人的特质物化为商品进一步导致人必须像商品一样服从于商品经济规律。“在主观方面……人的活动同人本身相对立地被客体化,变成一种商品,这种商品服从社会的自然规律的异于人的客观性,它正如变为商品的任何消费品一样,必然不依赖于人而进行自己的运动。”11价值规律、供求规律等等经济学规律,都是商品要服从的自然规律。而人的特质物化为商品之后,人也就如商品一样要服从这些经济规律。典型现象就是受供求规律的影响,当资本家需要的工人减少,也就是说资本主义社会对工人的需求减少时,那么许多工人就会面临失业,并且能找到工作的工人的工资也会有所降低。其三,在主观维度上,人的意识也在物化。这主要是指人把商品的性质——抽象的、量的可计算形式,以及商业资本、货币资本等等形式当做真正直接性的表现形式,并且还通过“科学地加强”这种规律性来坚持这种表现形式。在物化意识看来,商品的抽象的、量的可计算形式“必然成为这种商品性质真正直接性的表现形式,这种商品性质——作为物化的意识——也根本不力求超出这种形式之外”4。把这种意识的物化拓宽一点来说,就是资本主义社会中的人不超出资本主义社会中的各种关系来看待资本主义的各种关系,反而寻找各种规律来加强资本主义社会中的各种关系。“物化意识的形成是人的物化最集中、最极端的表现。”4

Secondly, Lukács points out that bourgeois thought, when confronted with the aforementioned phenomenon of reification, cannot clarify “their emergence and disappearance, their real essence and basis,”[4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.) and thus cannot find the path to superseding reification. The reason lies in the antinomy inherent in bourgeois thought. “The bourgeoisie, due to its social existence, is compelled to think the world with these forms of thought.”[4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.) That is, it relies on highly abstract, predictive, partial systems to grasp the content of each specialized field, rather than grasping the knowable whole in a unified manner. Even bourgeois philosophy cannot achieve a holistic grasp of the knowable totality, because it neither intervenes in nor corrects the various disciplines, with the result that “the questions neglected by these disciplines find no answer in philosophy either.”[4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.) Here, Lukács invokes the completely different understandings of the role of machinery held by bourgeois economics and by Marx, in order to illustrate the opposition between the bourgeois practice of examining historical phenomena in isolation and the totalizing perspective. As is well known, machinery in itself has no contradictions. Yet bourgeois economists’ understanding of the role of machinery remains at the level of examining individual machines in isolation. Consequently, the contradictions that arise from the capitalist application of machinery—such as the contradiction that “machinery in itself shortens labor time, while its capitalist application lengthens the working day”[11]11 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 111.—are, from the perspective of bourgeois economics, “theoretically non-existent.”[4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.) On the contrary, the Marxist understanding of the role of machinery proceeds from a holistic grasp, focusing precisely on the various contradictions brought about by the capitalist application of machinery. Furthermore, bourgeois thought is also unable to see through the fact that “the tendencies of historical development constitute a higher reality than empirical facts.”[4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110. (The original Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English translation of Lukács’s work.) On the one hand, the meaning revealed by this tendency of historical development implies that capitalism is inevitably heading toward its demise; thus, for the bourgeoisie, “to become conscious of this problem is equivalent to spiritual suicide.”[11]11 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 111. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie inevitably lives within a reified reality, which is determined by the capitalist mode of production and is the very foundation of its existence. Therefore, when faced with its own reification, the bourgeoisie does not criticize it but even feels satisfied; the proletariat, by contrast, sees in it its own dehumanization and therefore strives to break it.

其次,卢卡奇指出资产阶级思想在面对上述物化现象时不能弄清“它们的产生和消失、它们的真实本质和基础”4,从而无法找到扬弃物化的道路,其原因就在于资产阶级思想存在二律背反。“资产阶级由于其社会存在必须用这些思维形式来思维世界”4,就是说,依靠一些非常抽象的预测性的部分性体系来把握各个及其专门化的领域的内容,而不是统一地把握可知的整体。即使资产阶级哲学也不能做到整体性地把握可知总体,因为对于各个学科,哲学既不干涉也不修正,以至于“这些学科所忽视的问题,在哲学中也找不到答案”4。卢卡奇在此援引了资产阶级经济学与马克思对机器作用的完全不同的认识,以此来说明资产阶级思想孤立地考察各个历史现象的做法与总体观点之间的对立。正如大家所知道的,机器就其本身来说,是没有矛盾的,而资产阶级经济学家对机器的作用的认识就停留在孤立考察单个机器的层面,因而机器在资本主义的应用中所具有的矛盾,比如“机器就其本身来说缩短劳动时间,而它的资本主义应用延长劳动日”11这样的矛盾,在资产经济学看来,“从理论上来说,都是根本不存在的”4。恰恰相反,马克思主义对机器作用的认识则从整体上来把握,关注的正是机器的资本主义应用所带来的种种矛盾。此外,资产阶级思想也无法看透“历史发展的倾向构成比经验事实更高的现实”4,因为一方面,这一历史发展倾向所展现出来的意义意味着资本主义必然走向灭亡,因而对资产阶级来说,“意识到这一问题就等于精神上的自杀”11;另一方面,资产阶级不可避免地生活在物化的现实中,这是资本主义生产方式所决定的,也是资产阶级赖以存在的基础。因此,同样是面对自身的物化,资产阶级对此不加批判,甚至感到满足;而无产阶级却在其中看到的是自己的非人化,因而要力图予以打破。

Finally, Lukács discusses how proletarian class consciousness is born within the reified structure, and how the proletariat, as the historical subject that unifies subject and object, must necessarily break the reified structure through revolutionary movement and transcend capitalism. Both proletarian consciousness and the subject-object unity of the proletariat are confirmed within the immediacy of the reified structure of capitalist society. Regarding the confirmation of the proletariat’s subject-object unity, Lukács points out that within its own reified structure, the proletariat “is forced to become the object of the process, enduring its commodification and its reduction to a pure quantity.”[12]12 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 208. This reified existence of the proletariat leaves no room for it to imagine itself as the subject of social events. In short, within the reified structure of capitalist society, the proletariat very clearly confirms its own objectification. At the same time, the proletariat can also confirm its own subjectivity as a historical subject within the reified structure. “If the reification of capital is dissolved into the uninterrupted process of its production and reproduction, then from this standpoint the proletariat can become conscious of itself as the true—though fettered and not yet conscious—subject of this process.”[13]13 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 209. When the proletariat becomes aware, within the reified structure, of its own subject-object unity and of the necessity of transcending reification, the birth of proletarian consciousness is set in motion. Moreover, for proletarian consciousness to transform reality and break the reified structure, the proletariat must put it into practice. This requires that the proletariat always recognize “the inherent significance of the immanent contradictions of the process for the whole of development,”[14]14 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 214. always take the totality as its goal, always judge the correctness of an action within the entire development, and never ignore the historical process by “imposing its own wishes and understanding upon history.”[15]15 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 215. Therefore, “only the class consciousness of the proletariat that has become practice possesses this function of changing things,”[16]16 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 215. and can truly break the reified structure. Although transforming reality and breaking the reified structure may seem extremely difficult, this historical task can only be accomplished by the proletariat. For although the bourgeoisie possesses more resources than the proletariat, it is not naturally endowed with subject-object unity. Within the reified structure, what it sees is not its own objectification but rather a false subjectivity. And when confronted with this reified structure, the bourgeoisie, constrained by its position, does not act to break it but rather to rationalize it. Furthermore, “the erroneous views of bourgeois economics regarding the economic processes of capitalism”[17]17 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 216. are themselves the result of a lack of mediation. Because bourgeois thought lacks the necessary mediations, it cannot attain an adequate understanding of the historical totality. Thus, the bourgeoisie cannot become the subject of history and drive history toward a higher stage of development. On the contrary, the proletariat, starting from the direct relationship between labor and capital and employing the category of mediation, can “connect those forms that are far removed from the production process with these forms, placing them within the dialectical totality for cognition.”[18]18 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 217. Hence, only the proletariat can cognize history as a totality.

最后,卢卡奇论述了无产阶级的阶级意识会在物化结构中诞生,作为主体—客体统一的历史主体——无产阶级必然通过革命运动打破物化结构,超越资本主义。无产阶级意识和无产阶级的主体—客体统一性都是在资本主义社会物化结构的直接性中确认的。关于无产阶级主体—客体统一性的确认,卢卡奇指出,在无产阶级自身的物化结构中,他“被迫成了过程的客体,忍受着他的商品化和被简约化为纯粹的量”12,无产阶级的这种物化存在不可能给他将自己想象为社会事件的主体留下任何空间。一句话,在资本主义社会物化结构中,无产阶级十分清晰地确认了自身的客体化。同时,无产阶级又能在物化结构中确认自身作为历史的主体性。“如果资本的物化被融化为它的生产和再生产的不停的过程,那么在这种立场上,无产阶级就能意识到自己是这一过程的真正的——尽管是被束缚的和暂且不是自觉的——主体。”13当无产阶级在物化结构中意识到自身具有主体—客体统一性,意识到自身超越物化的必要性时,无产阶级意识的诞生就得到了开启。此外,无产阶级意识要能变革现实,打破物化结构,还需要无产阶级付诸实践,这就要求无产阶级始终要认识到过程固有矛盾“对于全部发展所具有的固有意义”14,始终要以总体为目标,始终要在整个发展中判定一个行动的正确性,并且不能忽视历史的进程,把“自己的愿望和认识强加给历史”15。因此,“只有变成了实践的无产阶级的阶级意识才具有这种变化事物的功能”16,才能真正地打破物化结构。尽管要变革现实、打破物化结构看起来是如此艰难,但这一历史任务只有无产阶级才能做到。因为资产阶级虽然拥有比无产阶级更多的资源,但它天然不具有主体—客体统一性,因为它在物化结构中看到的并非是自身的客体化,相反是虚假的主体性,并且在面对这一物化结构时,资产阶级由于其地位限制,采取的不是打破这一物化结构,而是将其合理化的行动。再者,“资产阶级经济学关于资本主义经济学过程的错误观点”17,本身就是缺乏中介的结果,因此资产阶级思想由于缺少必要的中介,而不能对历史的总体有足够的认识。这样,资产阶级就不可能成为历史的主体而推动历史向更高阶段发展。相反,无产阶级却能够从劳动和资本的直接关系出发,运用中介范畴,把“远离生产过程的那些形式和这些形式联系了起来,把它们放到了辩证的总体之中来认识”18,因而,只有无产阶级才能认识作为总体的历史。

In summary, Lukács actually grounds the emergence of proletarian consciousness and the confirmation of the proletariat as the unity of historical subject-object in the universal reified structure of capitalist social existence, and argues that only the proletariat, through conscious practice—that is, revolutionary movement—can break the reified structure and drive history toward a higher stage of development. Here, when we recognize the high degree of similarity between the reification pointed out by Lukács and the alienation revealed by Marx, we may perhaps consider that Lukács, following Marx’s treatment of capital as alienated substance, explores the necessary connection between the problem of alienation in capitalist social existence and the proletarian revolution, and argues that the proletariat must necessarily act as the subject of history and, through conscious practice, transform reality, thereby re-appropriating the content of alienated substance. Thus, it can be said that Lukács interprets Marx along the dimension of treating capital as alienated substance. The insight we may gain here is this: perhaps Marx’s primary view is to regard capital as alienated substance.

综上所述,卢卡奇实际上将无产阶级意识的产生和无产阶级作为历史主体—客体的统一的确认建基在了资本主义社会存在的普遍的物化结构中,并论述了只有无产阶级通过有意识的实践,即革命运动,才能打破物化结构,推动历史向更高阶段发展。在此,当我们意识到卢卡奇所指出的物化与马克思所揭示的异化之间有高度的相似之处时,我们或许可以认为,卢卡奇正是沿着马克思将资本视为异化的实体,探讨了资本主义社会存在的异化问题与无产阶级革命之间的必然联系,论述了无产阶级必然作为历史的主体,并且能够通过有意识的实践,变革现实,从而重新占有异化的实体内涵。如此,可以认为卢卡奇是沿着马克思将资本视为异化的实体这一维度来解读的。在这里,我们可能得到的启示是:或许马克思最主要的是将资本作为异化的实体来看待的。

III. Marx’s Conception: Capital as Alienated Substance in the Historical Process

三、马克思的构想:资本作为历史过程中的异化的实体

As a philosopher of materialist dialectics and an inheritor of Hegel’s speculative philosophy, Marx cannot be a mere affirmative or negative thinker, but rather a dialectical negator. This is typically embodied in his classic magnum opus, *Capital*. Contrary to Žižek’s accusation, in Marx’s vision, capital is like a runaway horse, difficult to tame and difficult for humanity to control; at the same time, capital can be tamed. Just as commodities have the dual attributes of use-value and exchange-value, and labor has the dual attributes of concrete labor and abstract labor, capital also has dual attributes. Why? Because in Marx’s view, the taming of capital as substance has strict conditions: namely, the simultaneous coexistence of the demise of the capitalist system and the birth of socialism. Thus, capital is both alienated substance and substance as subject. But it should be noted that Marx fundamentally regards capital as alienated substance, and this is closely linked to his conception of the proletarian revolution and the realization of communism. Marx’s specific exposition is as follows:

作为一个唯物主义辩证法的哲学家,黑格尔思辨哲学的继承者,马克思不可能是一个单纯的肯定论者或否定论者,而是一个辩证的否定论者,这典型地体现在他的经典巨著《资本论》之中。与齐泽克的指责不同,在马克思的视野中,资本像一匹脱缰的野马,难以驯服,难以为人类所驾驭;与此同时,资本又是可以被驯服的。像商品具有使用价值和交换价值二重属性、劳动也有具体劳动和抽象劳动二重属性一样,资本也具有二重属性。为什么呢?因为在马克思看来,作为实体的资本的驯服是有着严格的条件的:那就是资本主义制度的消亡与社会主义的诞生同时共存。如此,资本既是异化的实体,又是作为主体的实体。但要注意的是,马克思最根本的是将资本作为异化的实体来看待的,这与他对无产阶级革命以及共产主义的实现的构想有着密切联系。马克思的具体论述如下:

On the one hand, in *Capital*, Marx describes capital as an alienated substance. In the chapter “The Transformation of Money into Capital” in Volume I of *Capital*, he lifts the veil on capital for us. First, Marx defines capital. He points out: “The original value, in addition to being preserved in circulation, changes its magnitude in circulation, adds a surplus-value, or is valorized. It is this movement that transforms value into capital.” [19]19 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Chapter 4, Section 1. It can be seen that after value passes through the process of circulation, it achieves valorization; it is precisely in this movement that capital emerges: it is transformed from value. Marx further points out: “Value therefore becomes value in process, money in process, and, as such, capital.” [20]20 Ibid. Here, money is the form taken by value, and through this, money is transformed into capital. Money as capital is a form very familiar to us today; without Marx’s analysis, we might not even see through how money is transformed into capital. Second, Marx describes capital as substance. Marx points out: “The value of commodities suddenly presents itself as an independent, self-moving substance, for which commodities and money are mere forms.” [21]21 Ibid. Clearly, the “substance” mentioned here refers to value. And as already indicated, value, after achieving valorization in the process of circulation, is transformed into capital; hence, value and capital here are essentially equivalent. Therefore, it can be considered that Marx here regards capital as substance, and it has two forms: commodities and money. If this is still somewhat abstract, we can further deepen our understanding with the help of the example Marx gives of butyric acid and propyl formate. Marx points out: “By making propyl formate equal to butyric acid, the chemical substance different from the bodily form of butyric acid itself is expressed.” [22]22 Ibid. Butyric acid and propyl formate are substances with very different properties, yet they share the same chemical formula C₄H₈O₂; that is, the chemical elements constituting them and their proportions are completely identical. Therefore, C₄H₈O₂ is actually the common chemical substance of both butyric acid and propyl formate; conversely, butyric acid and propyl formate are different manifestations of this chemical substance, C₄H₈O₂. Value is equivalent to C₄H₈O₂, while butyric acid and propyl formate correspond to commodities and money. Connecting this back to the transformation between value and capital, it can be considered that capital is precisely this self-moving substance. Finally, Marx regards capital as an alienated substance. Marx points out: “Capital is dead labour, which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labour.” [23]23 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Chapter 8, Section 1. For capital to achieve its purpose of valorization, it ultimately relies on extracting surplus value in the production process. For capital to enter the production process, it must purchase a special commodity, namely, labour-power. Thus, profit-driven capital inevitably confronts the worker as an independent, dominating force. Because capital blindly and boundlessly pursues surplus labour, it encroaches upon the time needed for the human body’s growth, development, and maintenance of health; it “is utterly unconcerned about the health and lifespan of the worker.” [24]24 Ibid. “Under the rule of capital, the worker can only preserve himself by alienating and selling his labour-power,” [25]25 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Chapter 23, Section 4. “constantly producing objective wealth as capital, as a power alien to him, dominating and exploiting him.” [26]26 Ibid. Therefore, in Marx’s view, capital is, for the worker, entirely an alienated existence. Furthermore, in the form of interest-bearing capital, capital takes on another of its alienated forms; that is, its origin is concealed. People not only fail to think of its origin but instead think of a form “completely opposite” to its true origin. [27]27 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Chapter 24. It is also what Marx points out: “The alienated character of capital, its opposition to labour, is transferred beyond the actual exploitation process, i.e., onto interest-bearing capital.” [28]28 Ibid. In this form, capital “takes on its most alienated and most peculiar form.” [29]29 Ibid. Therefore, Marx does indeed regard capital as an alienated substance here.

一方面,马克思在《资本论》中将资本描述为作为异化的实体。他在《资本论》第一卷“货币转化为资本”这一章中为我们揭开了资本的面纱。首先,马克思对资本作了界定。他指出:“原预付价值不仅在流通中保存下来,而且在流通中改变了自己的价值量,加上了一个剩余价值,或者说增殖了。正是这种运动使价值转化为资本。”19可以看到,价值经过流通过程之后,实现了增殖,正是在这一运动中,资本出现了:它是由价值转化而来的。马克思进一步指出:“价值成了处于过程中的价值,成了处于过程中的货币,从而也就成了资本。”20在这里,货币是价值所采取的形式,经此货币转化成了资本。货币作为资本,是我们如今非常熟悉的形式,如果不通过马克思的分析,我们甚至看不透货币是如何转化为资本的。其次,马克思将资本描述为实体。马克思指出:“商品的价值突然表现为一个处在过程中的、自行运动的实体,商品和货币只是这一实体的两种形式。”21显然,在这里提到的“实体”就是指价值。而前面已经指出,价值在流通过程中实现增殖之后就会转化为资本,因而这里的价值与资本基本上是等同的。所以可以认为马克思在这里把资本视为实体,并且它有两种形式:商品和货币。如果在这里还有些抽象的话,我们再借助于马克思例举的丁酸和甲酸丙酯的例子来加深理解。马克思指出:“通过使甲酸丙酯同丁酸相等,丁酸与自身的物体形式不同的化学实体被表现出来了。”22丁酸和甲酸丙酯是性质极为不同的物质,但它们拥有共同的化学式C4H8O2,也就是说构成它们的化学元素及其比例是完全相同的。所以,C4H8O2其实就是丁酸和甲酸丙酯两者共同拥有的化学实体,反过来,丁酸和甲酸丙酯就是C4H8O2这一化学实体不同的表现形式。价值就相当于C4H8O2,而丁酸和甲酸丙酯就对应于商品和货币。再联系到价值与资本之间的转换,便可以认为资本即是那自行运动的实体。最后,马克思将资本视为异化的实体。马克思指出:“资本是死劳动,它像吸血鬼一样,只有吮吸活劳动才有生命。”23资本要实现其增殖的目的,归根到底靠的是在生产过程中,榨取剩余价值。而资本进入生产过程,则需要购买一种特殊的商品即劳动力。这样,唯利是图的资本必然作为一种独立的、统治的力量与工人相对立。资本由于无限度地盲目追逐剩余劳动而侵占人体的成长、发育和维持健康所需要的时间,它“根本不关心工人的健康和寿命”24。“在资本的统治下,工人只能靠让渡出卖自己的劳动力而保存自己”25,“不断地把客观财富当做资本,当作同他相异己的、统治他和剥削他的权力来生产”26。因此,在马克思看来,资本对于工人来说,完全是一种异化的存在。此外,在生息资本形式上,资本取得了它的另一异化形式,也就是它的起源被掩盖起来了,人们不仅想不到它的起源,反而想到的是和它的真正起源“完全相反的形式”27。也正是马克思所指出的:“资本的异化性质,它同劳动的对立,被转移到现实剥削过程之外,即转移到生息资本上”28,在这个形式上,资本“取得了它的最异化最为特别的形式”29。所以,马克思在此确实将资本作为异化的实体来看待的。

On the other hand, in *Capital*, Marx does indeed mention that capital is a subject-substance, capable of self-valorization through self-relation. Regarding this, Marx points out: in the circulation process G—W—G’, “value here becomes the subject of a process in which, while constantly assuming the forms of money and commodities, it changes its own magnitude, differentiates itself as surplus-value from itself as original value, and valorizes itself.” [30]30 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Chapter 4, Section 1. We already know that this value, which achieves valorization through the circulation process, is capital; therefore, capital is actually the subject of this process. Moreover, in the form of interest-bearing capital, Marx further points out: “Capital obtains its pure fetish form, i.e., G—G’, a subject, a saleable thing.” [31]31 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Chapter 24. Here, Marx’s view of capital as a subject-substance receives its most powerful illustration. Initially, when the power of capital was still weak, “it itself still needed to seek a crutch in previous modes of production, or those disappearing with the emergence of capitalism.” [32]32 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Chapter 36. But when capital, as capitalism matures, becomes powerful, it casts aside the aforementioned crutch and “moves according to its own laws.” [33]33 Ibid. Thus, in the form G—G’, capital relates to itself and achieves its own valorization; capital has become the subject of the process. Capital as a subject-substance means that the objective thing—capital—created originally by human subjects, through the deep development of capitalism, acquires subjectivity, thereby turning the human subjects who were once its creators into objects. Consequently, before capital, humans are like workers before the large machinery in the capitalist production process, “existing as a conscious organ alongside the unconscious organs of the automaton.” [34]34 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Chapter 15, Section 1. In other words, the great development of capitalism “is a process in which human subjectivity is replaced by the subjectivity of capital.” [35]35 This appears to be a paraphrase or summary by the authors, Kong Ming’an and Tan Yong, rather than a direct quotation from Marx. Before capital, the subject-substance, humans are merely tools for capital’s self-valorization, whether they are workers or capitalists. To a certain extent, it can be said that Marx, by regarding capital as a subject-substance here, makes an exceptionally profound critique of the objectified state of human existence in capitalist society. From this dimension alone, capitalist society is by no means a satisfactory or humanly appropriate social form.

另一方面,马克思在《资本论》中也确实提到了资本是一种主体的实体,它能够通过与自身相关联,从而自我增殖。对此,马克思指出:在G—W—G’这个流通过程中,“价值在这里已经成为一个过程的主体,在这个过程中,它不断地变换货币形式和商品形式,改变着自己的量,作为剩余价值同作为原价值的自身分出来,自行增殖着”30。我们已经知道,这种通过流通过程实现增殖的价值就是资本,因此,资本实际上就是这一过程的主体。并且,在生息资本形式上,马克思进一步指出:“资本取得了它的纯粹的物神形式,即G—G’,一个主体,一个可出售的物。”31在这里,马克思将资本视为一种主体的实体的看法得到了最有力的说明。起初,当资本的力量还很弱小的时候,“它本身就还要在以往的或随着资本主义的出现而正在消逝的生产方式中寻求拐杖”32,但当资本随着资本主义日趋成熟而变得强大之时,它便抛开上述拐杖,“按它自己的规律运动”33。从而在G—G’形式上,资本自我关联,并实现自身增殖,资本俨然成为了过程的主体。资本作为一种主体的实体,意味着原本由作为主体的人们所创造的客体物——资本,经过资本主义的深层次发展而取得了主体性,转而使曾经作为其创造者的人类主体成为了客体,以至于人在资本面前就像工人在资本主义生产过程中的大机器面前一样,“作为有意识的器官与自动机的无意识的器官并列”34。换句话说,资本主义大发展“是人的主体性被资本主体性所取代的过程”35,在作为主体的实体的资本面前,人仅仅是资本自我增殖的工具而已,无论是工人,还是资本家,皆是如此。一定程度上可以说,马克思在这里通过将资本视为一种主体的实体而对资本主义社会中人的客体化的生存状态作了异常深刻的批判。仅从这个维度来说,资本主义社会也绝非是令人满意的、符合人性的社会形式。

Therefore, on the surface, Marx does indeed regard capital both as alienated substance and as subject-substance, thus falling into the ambiguity criticized by Žižek. But after careful analysis, it can be seen that regarding capital both as alienated substance and as subject-substance is Marx’s dialectical understanding of capital, and that Marx fundamentally treats capital as alienated substance. There are three main reasons for this: First, when Marx regards capital as subject-substance, there is a precondition, namely, that capital can only appear as subject-substance in capitalist society. According to Žižek’s accusation against Marx, when Marx regards capital as subject-substance, it means that it has become impossible for the proletariat as the subject of history to regain control of the entire production process. But Marx had no such intention. Although Marx also points out that under the conditions of capitalist production, capital develops into subject-substance, capable of self-relating and self-valorization, capital’s appearance as subject-substance exists only in capitalist society. And capitalist society has been demonstrated by Marx and Engels to be merely a temporary historical stage in human history; with the development of human society, it will certainly be replaced by a higher form of society. Thus, capital as subject-substance will not exist forever, meaning that capital can never be the subject permanently, nor can human beings be its object permanently. Therefore, Marx’s treatment of capital as subject-substance has a precondition, namely, the existence of the capitalist mode of production, and this thereby excludes the possibility of capital as some kind of historical subject forever dominating humanity, while opening up space for the proletariat as the subject of history to take control of the entire production process in the form of an association of free individuals. Second, Marx in *Capital* has thoroughly pointed out the multiple internal contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production, and capitalist society will perish because these contradictions are irresolvable. In other words, the self-valorization of capital is not eternal. First, this is the inevitable result of the development of capital’s own internal contradictions: “The true barrier to capitalist production is capital itself”[36]36 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 3, Chapter 15, Section 1.; that is, in the capitalist mode of production, production is only for the sake of capital, “and not the reverse, that the means of production are merely means for a constantly expanding process of the life of the social producer”[37]37 Ibid.. Thus, the self-preservation and valorization of capital are only possible within certain limits, while the means capital uses to achieve the goal of continuous valorization — “the unconditional development of the social productive forces”[38]38 Ibid. — will constantly break through these limits. Second, it is the result of the development of the contradiction between the anarchy of social production under capitalism and the organized management of enterprises. Enterprises, through organized management, expect to maximize profits, but the anarchic nature of capitalist production itself means that enterprises can never master the entire capitalist production process, so the organized management of enterprises always faces the risk of bankruptcy. Third, it is the result of the development of the contradiction between labor productivity and the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Labor productivity will be greatly enhanced with the development of capitalism, but when it develops to a certain point, it will make the fall in the rate of profit an inevitable trend. This will lead to overproduction of capital, speculation, and crises, causing “the means of labor and the means of subsistence [to be] periodically produced in superabundance”[39]39 Ibid.. This, in turn, hinders the further development of labor productivity, so capitalist production comes to a halt when its profits fall. Finally, it is the result of the development of the basic contradiction of capitalist society, namely, the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production. The periodic crises generated by capitalist society show that capitalist society “has become too narrow to contain the wealth created within it”[40]40 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, Chapter 1.; that is, the capitalist relations of production have become fetters binding the productive forces. Although capitalism attempts to alleviate this contradiction by destroying a large quantity of productive forces, seizing new markets, more thoroughly exploiting old markets, and constantly expanding, it is ultimately to no avail, because it does not fundamentally change the inner essence of the capitalist system. Therefore, it is precisely the existence of the above contradictions that makes the capitalist mode of production fundamentally only a historical, transitional form. Consequently, the valorization of capital, which develops from the capitalist mode of production, is likewise historical. Third, Marx repeatedly points out that the proletariat, this impoverished class exploited by the bourgeoisie, this miserable class that sheds blood and sweat for the self-valorization of capital, will ultimately, through revolutionary action, overthrow all existing social systems and win freedom and the whole world. That is to say, the “instrument” of capital’s self-valorization — the worker — will change from an “instrument” back into a human being, and the self-valorization of capital will thereby end its own history, and what is called capital as subject-substance will cease to exist. The anarchic state of capitalist production, the alien ruling power that the capitalist mode of production imposes on the agents of production, can only be transcended when it is “the product of freely associated men, and is consciously and systematically controlled by them in accordance with a settled plan”[41]41 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Chapter 1, Section 4.. To place the entire production process under the control of a community composed of freely associated individuals requires the proletariat, as the subject of history, to overthrow all existing social systems and achieve communism. Marx elaborated on this in detail. He pointed out: “What the bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, above all, is its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.”[42]42 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, Chapter 1. Thus, the proletariat is born and develops with the formation and development of capitalism. At the same time, only the proletariat can act as the subject of history; only the proletariat can, through revolutionary action, once again place the entire production process under the conscious control of human beings and re-appropriate capital as alienated substance. This is because, on the one hand, only the proletariat is a thoroughly revolutionary class. The bourgeoisie, of course, cannot be thoroughly revolutionary; on the contrary, it is counter-revolutionary, because it must maintain the foundations of the capitalist mode of production, otherwise the soil on which it depends for its existence would disappear. Other classes gradually dissolve in the course of capitalist development, until only the opposition between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie remains. Furthermore, with the intensification of the exploitation of labor, the proletariat “sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of its own class”[43]43 Ibid.; that is, the proletariat will eventually reach a point where there is no way out except revolution. Additionally, the proletariat can become conscious through its own unjust treatment — “this consciousness is a product of the capitalist mode of production, and it is also the death knell for this mode of production”[44]44 Ibid.. At first it is the individual worker, then the workers in one factory, then the workers in one locality, gradually turning into a struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the revolution of the proletariat to overthrow all existing social systems represents the interests of the vast majority; it is “an independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority”[45]45 Ibid.. Therefore, in Marx’s view, the proletariat will inevitably unite and, as the subject of the historical process, achieve communism through conscious revolutionary action. Hence, the necessary “instrument” of capital’s self-valorization — the worker — will ultimately become the subject of revolution, achieving the re-appropriation and control of capital as alienated substance.

因此,表面看来,马克思确实既将资本视为异化的实体,又将资本视为主体的实体,从而陷入了齐泽克所批评的模棱两可之中。但仔细分析之后就会发现,既将资本视为异化的实体,又将资本视为主体的实体,是马克思对资本所作的辩证认识,并且马克思在根本上是将资本作为异化的实体来看待的。这主要有三方面的理由:第一,马克思在将资本视为主体的实体时,是有前提条件的,也就是只有在资本主义社会中,资本才有可能作为主体的实体出现。按照齐泽克对马克思的指责,当马克思将资本视为主体的实体的时候,意味着无产阶级作为历史主体重新控制整个生产过程已经成为不可能。但马克思并无此意,虽然马克思也指出,在资本主义生产条件下资本发展成为主体的实体,能够自我关联,并自行增殖,但资本作为主体的实体出现,只存在于资本主义社会中。而资本主义社会已被马克思恩格斯论证为仅仅是人类历史中暂时的历史阶段,随着人类社会发展,它一定会被更高级的社会形式所代替。由此,资本作为主体的实体不会永远存在,也就是说资本不可能永远是主体,而人也不会永远是它的客体。所以,马克思将资本视为主体的实体是有前提条件的,即资本主义生产方式的存在,并由此排除了资本作为某种历史的主体永远凌驾于人类之上的可能性,同时为无产阶级作为历史的主体,以自由人联合体的形式掌握整个生产过程敞开了空间。第二,马克思在《资本论》中已经透彻地指出了资本主义生产方式所具有的多重内在矛盾,并且资本主义社会会因为这些矛盾的不可解决而消亡。换句话说,资本的自我增殖并不是永恒的。首先这是资本自身的内在矛盾发展的必然结果,“资本主义生产的真正限制是资本自身”36,也就是说,在资本主义生产方式中,生产只是为资本而生产,“而不是反过来生产资料只是生产者社会的生活过程不断扩大的手段”37。这样,资本的自我保存和增殖只能在一定的限制以内才成为可能,而资本为达到不断增殖的目的所使用的手段——“社会生产力的无条件发展”38又将不断突破这种限制。其次是资本主义社会生产的无政府状态与企业有组织的经营之间的矛盾发展的结果,企业通过有组织的经营期望获得最大化的利益,但是资本主义生产本身的无政府状态使得企业永远无法掌握整个资本主义生产过程,因而企业有组织的经营始终面临着破产的风险。再次是劳动生产力和利润率下降规律之间的矛盾发展的结果,劳动生产力会随着资本主义的发展而得到极大提高,但发展到一定程度时,它又会使利润率下降成为必然趋势。这样便会出现资本生产过剩、投机、危机,使得“劳动资料和生活资料周期地生产得太多了”39。由此,这又反过来阻止劳动生产力的进一步发展,因而资本主义生产就在其利润下降时出现停顿。最后是资本主义社会基本矛盾即生产力和生产关系之间的矛盾发展的结果,资本主义产生的周期性危机表明:资本主义社会“所拥有的生产力已经不能再促进资产阶级文明和资产阶级所有制关系的发展”40,也就是说资本主义生产关系已经成了束缚生产力的桎梏,尽管资本主义采取消灭大量生产力、夺取新的市场、更加彻底地利用旧的市场、不断地扩张等方式来试图缓解这种矛盾,但始终于事无补,因为它并没有根本改变资本主义制度的内在本质。所以,正是上述矛盾的存在,使得资本主义生产方式从根本上来说仅仅是历史的、过渡的形式。因而,从资本主义生产方式中发展起来的资本,其增殖也就同样具有历史性了。第三,马克思一再指出,无产阶级,这个被资产阶级剥削的贫苦阶级,这个为资本的自我增殖付出血汗的悲惨阶级,终将通过革命行动,推翻所有现存社会制度,获得自由和整个世界。也就是说,资本自我增殖的“工具”——工人,将从“工具”重新变为人,资本的自我增殖也将因此结束自己的历史,所谓资本作为主体的实体也就不复存在了。资本主义生产的无政府状态,资本主义生产方式给生产当事人所带来的异己性的统治力量,只有在“作为自由联合的人的产物,处于人的有意识有计划的控制之下的时候”41,才会得到扬弃。而要将整个生产过程置于自由联合的人所组成的共同体的控制之下,则需要无产阶级作为历史的主体,推翻全部现存的社会制度,实现共产主义才能达到。对此,马克思进行了详尽的论述。他指出:“资产阶级不仅锻造了置自身于死地的武器;它还产生了要运用这种武器的人——现代工人,即无产者。”42所以,无产阶级是随着资本主义的形成和发展而诞生和发展的。同时,只有无产阶级才能作为历史的主体,只有无产阶级能够通过革命行动,重新将整个生产过程置于人们有意识的控制之下,重新占有作为异化的实体的资本。这是因为,一方面只有无产阶级才是彻底的革命阶级,资产阶级当然不能彻底革命,相反它是反革命的,因为它必须保持资本主义生产方式的种种基础,否则自身赖以存在的土壤就不存在了,其他阶级则在资本主义的逐步发展中日趋消逝,最后只剩下无产阶级和资产阶级的对立。此外,随着剥削劳动的加剧,无产阶级“越来越降到本阶级的生存条件以下”43,也就是无产阶级最终会走到除了革命将别无出路的地步。另外,无产阶级能够在自身的不公平待遇中有所觉悟——“这种觉悟是以资本为基础的生产方式的产物,而且也正是为这种生产方式送葬的丧钟”44。起初是单个工人,然后是一个工厂的工人,再后来是某一地方的工人,慢慢地变成无产阶级和资产阶级之间的斗争。另一方面,无产阶级这一推翻所有现存社会制度的革命代表的是绝大多数人的利益,是“为绝大多数人谋利益的独立的运动”45。所以,在马克思看来,无产阶级必然会联合起来,作为历史过程的主体通过自觉的革命行动,实现共产主义,因而,资本自我增殖的必要“工具”——工人,最终将成为革命的主体,实现对作为异化的实体的资本的重新占有和控制。

In summary, Žižek’s claim that Marx is ambiguous in his understanding of capital—on the one hand viewing capital as an alienated substance, and on the other hand as a subjective substance—is clearly a misreading. Marx fundamentally regards capital as an alienated substance. Moreover, Marx’s understanding of capital is linked to the fact that capitalism, due to its inherent internal contradictions, necessarily manifests as a temporary and transitional stage in the historical process. That is to say, the proletariat, as the subject of history, will inevitably transform capitalist society through revolutionary action, realize communism, and thereby re-appropriate the alienated substantive content.

综上所述,齐泽克认为的马克思在关于资本的认识上存在模棱两可性——一方面将资本视为异化的实体,另一方面又视为主体的实体——显然是一种误读,马克思在根本上是将资本作为异化的实体来看待的。并且,马克思对资本的这种认识,是与资本主义因其固有的内在矛盾而必然表现为历史过程中暂时的、过渡的阶段相联系的,也就是说无产阶级作为历史的主体必然会通过革命行动变革资本主义社会,实现共产主义,从而重新占有异化的实体性内涵。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

Viewing capital both as an alienated substance and as a subjective substance is in fact Marx’s dialectical understanding of capital, just as a commodity has both use-value and exchange-value, and in a commodity economy, labor is both concrete labor and abstract labor. Furthermore, it must be recognized that Marx fundamentally regards capital as an alienated substance. This can be explained, on the one hand, through Lukács’s argument concerning the proletariat as the historical subject breaking the reified structures existing in capitalist society, and on the other hand, through Marx’s exposition that capitalism, due to the irresolvability of its multiple internal contradictions, will inevitably perish, and that the proletariat, as the historical subject, will necessarily realize communism through revolutionary movement, thereby regaining control over the entire process of social production and reproduction. Therefore, the so-called ambiguity in Marx’s understanding of capital that Žižek criticizes is in fact nothing but a misreading.

既将资本作为异化的实体来看待,又将资本作为主体的实体来看待,实际上是马克思对资本所作的辩证认识,这正如商品既具有使用价值又具有交换价值、在商品经济社会里劳动既是具体劳动又是抽象劳动一样。此外,还要认到马克思在根本上是将资本作为异化的实体来看待的,这一方面可以通过卢卡奇关于无产阶级作为历史主体打破资本主义社会中存在的物化结构的论证来加以说明,另一方面可以通过马克思对资本主义因内在的多重矛盾的不可解决性而必然灭亡以及无产阶级必然作为历史主体通过革命运动实现共产主义从而重新控制整个社会生产和再生产过程的论述来加以说明。因此,齐泽克所指责的所谓马克思对资本的认识存在模棱两可性,其实不过是一种误读。

Notes

注释

1 Slavoj Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1993, p. 22.

1SlavojŽižek.TARRYING with the EGATIVE Kant,Hegel,and the Critique of Ideology.Duke University press Durham 1993.p.22.

2 Slavoj Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1993, p. 22.

2SlavojŽižek.TARRYING with the EGATIVE Kant,Hegel,and the Critique of Ideology.Duke University press Durham 1993.p.22.

3 Slavoj Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1993, p. 22.

3SlavojŽižek.TARRYING with the EGATIVE Kant,Hegel,and the Critique of Ideology.Duke University press Durham 1993.p.22.

4 (11)(12)(13) Slavoj Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1993, pp. 22, 23, 25, 26, 26, 26, 26, 26, 26, 27, 27.

4(11)(12)(13)SlavojŽižek.TARRYING with the EGATIVE Kant,Hegel,and the Critique of Ideology.Duke University press Durham 1993.p.22、p.23、p.25、p.26、p.26、p.26、p.26、p.26、p.26、p.27、p.27.

5 Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* [Annotated Edition], trans. Deng Xiaomang, People’s Publishing House, 2017, p. 361.

5黑格尔:《精神现象学》[句读本],邓晓芒译,人民出版社2017年版,第361页。

6 *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 2, People’s Publishing House, 2009, p. 66.

6《马克思恩格斯文集》第2卷,人民出版社2009年版,第66页。

7 Slavoj Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1993, p. 32.

7SlavojŽižek.TARRYING with the EGATIVE Kant,Hegel,and the Critique of Ideology.Duke University press Durham 1993.p.32.

8 Slavoj Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1993, p. 10.

8SlavojŽižek.TARRYING with the EGATIVE Kant,Hegel,and the Critique of Ideology.Duke University press Durham 1993.p.10.

9 See Slavoj Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1993, p. 27.

9参见SlavojŽižek.TARRYING with the EGATIVE Kant,Hegel,and the Critique of Ideology.Duke University press Durham 1993.p.27.

10 [Hungary] Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Du Zhangzhi et al., The Commercial Press, 2014, p. 160.

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46 *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 2, People’s Publishing House, 2009, p. 43.

46《马克思恩格斯文集》第2卷,人民出版社2009年版,第43页。

47 *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 8, People’s Publishing House, 2009, p. 112.

47《马克思恩格斯文集》第8卷,人民出版社2009年版,第112页。

48 *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 2, People’s Publishing House, 2009, p. 42.

48《马克思恩格斯文集》第2卷,人民出版社2009年版,第42页。

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