New Communist Horizons in Communicative Capitalism

[US] Jodi Dean, [UK] Tomislav Medak, [Croatia] Petar Jandrić

【美】约迪·迪安、【英】托米斯拉夫·梅达克、【克罗地亚】佩塔尔·扬德里奇著

Translated by Liu Shuhui

刘曙辉译

Jodi Dean is Donald R. Harter Professor of Humanities and Social Sciences and Director of the Fisher Center for Gender and Justice at Hobart and William Smith Colleges in the United States. She received a BA in History from Princeton University, an MA in Literature, an MA in Philosophy, and a PhD in Political Science from Columbia University. Dean’s research focuses on the interaction between contemporary media technology and left-wing politics. Her works include *Aliens in America: Conspiracy Cultures from Outerspace to Cyberspace*, *Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics*, *The Communist Horizon*, and *Crowds and Party*. In 2018, she was interviewed by Petar Jandrić of the Zagreb University of Applied Sciences, Croatia, and Tomislav Medak of Coventry University, UK, responding to and explaining questions on what communicative capitalism is, the democratic crisis in the age of communicative capitalism and its way out, the importance of Marx, new communist horizons, forms of anti-capitalist struggle, and the interaction between crowds and parties.

约迪·迪安(Jodi Dean)是美国霍巴特和威廉史密斯学院唐纳德·R．哈特人文社会科学教授、费舍尔性别与公正研究中心主任。她先后获得普林斯顿大学历史学学士学位，哥伦比亚大学文学硕士学位、哲学硕士学位和政治学博士学位。迪安的研究兴趣集中在当代媒体技术与左翼政治之间的互动，其著作有《外星人在美国:从外太空到网络空间的阴谋文化》(Aliens in America:Conspiracy Cultures from Outerspace to Cyberspace)、《民主与其他新自由主义的幻象:交往资本主义和左翼政治》(Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies:Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics)、《共产主义视野》(The Communist Horizon)、《群众与政党》(Crowds and Party)等。2018年，她接受了克罗地亚萨格勒布应用科学大学佩塔尔·扬德里奇(Petar Jandric')和英国考文垂大学托米斯拉夫·梅达克(Tomislav Medak)的采访，对什么是交往资本主义、交往资本主义时代的民主危机及其出路、马克思的重要性、新的共产主义视野、反资本主义的斗争形式以及群众与政党的相互作用方式等问题作了回应和解答。

I. Communicative Capitalism against Democracy

一、反对民主的交往资本主义

Jandrić and Medak: Communicative capitalism is one of the main concepts in your work. What is communicative capitalism, and how does it differ from earlier forms of capitalism?

扬德里奇和梅达克:交往资本主义是您作品中的主要概念之一。请问什么是交往资本主义?它与早期资本主义有何不同?

Dean: Communicative capitalism refers to a new form of capitalism in which communication becomes central to capital accumulation. This means that communication plays a different and more fundamental role in the production, consumption, and circulation of commodities and natural resources. Due to the rise of networked media, informatization, and global communication networks, communication has become a resource, means, and tool of accumulation. Some call this form the information age or cognitive capitalism, but I think understanding it as communicative capitalism is most accurate and politically valuable. It allows us to see how communicative processes that previous generations considered the core of democracy are now fully co-opted. Communication drives the development of capitalist productive forces in a way more important than ever before. For example, if we consider communication as a resource, big data is very interesting because every communicative interaction generates metadata in this way, composed of location data, different levels of social relations and networks, and the connections between them. Currently, all our social content can be packaged, analyzed, and sold.

迪安:交往资本主义是指一种新的资本主义形式，其中交往成为资本积累的核心。这意味着交往在商品和自然资源的生产、消费和流通方面发挥着不同的且更根本的作用。由于网络媒体、信息化和全球通信网络的兴起，交往已成为积累的资源、手段和工具。有人将这种形式称为信息时代或认知资本主义，但我认为将它理解为交往资本主义最为准确，也最有政治价值。这让我们看到前几代人称为民主核心的交往过程在当前是如何被完全采纳的。交往以一种比以往任何时候都更加重要的方式推动着资本主义生产力的发展。例如，如果我们把交往视为一种资源，那么大数据就很有趣，因为每种交往互动都会通过这种方式生成元数据，元数据由位置数据、不同层次的社会关系和网络以及它们之间的联系组成。当前，我们所有的社会内容都可以进行封装、分析和出售。

Jandrić and Medak: Clearly, information and communication technologies are key elements of communicative capitalism. In your words, they enable connections and participation that were simply unthinkable within the democratic imaginary. That is, they replace democratic assumptions of representation, accountability, and legitimacy with a different set of values. Here, we emphasize subsidiarity, multi-stakeholderism, expertise, and reputation management, but this list is constantly changing and incomplete. What happens to democracy in the age of communicative capitalism?

扬德里奇和梅达克:显然，信息和通信技术是交往资本主义的关键要素。用您的话说，它们促成了在民主想象中根本无法想到的联系和参与。也就是说，它们用一组不同的价值观取代了对代表性、问责制和合法性的民主假设。在这里，我们强调的重点是辅助性、多利益相关者、专业知识和信誉管理，但这个列表是不断变化、且不完整的。在交往资本主义时代，民主会发生什么变化?

Dean: Norms associated with democratic interaction, such as inclusion, participation, and reciprocity, become the main drivers of capital production and circulation. Inclusion is not just political, or worse, political inclusion is the same as capital inclusion, because now including more people means turning more people’s communicative information into a resource, forming a consumer data supermarket and information data providers. “Participation,” which once had some political impact, now provides more personnel for the circulation and production of capital. People become content providers and consumers. This causes critique to lose all targets, becoming completely amorphous, like steam. Why is this? Because critique is just another kind of content, another thing to share and circulate. Thus, debate becomes a function of capital, and critique loses its ability to achieve its goals.

迪安:与民主互动相关的规范，如包容、参与和互惠，将成为资本生产和流通的主要动力。包容不仅仅是政治上的，或者更糟的是，政治包容与资本包容是一回事，因为现在纳入更多的人意味着将更多人的交往信息转变为资源，并形成消费者数据超市和信息数据提供者。“参与”曾经具有某种政治影响，现在则为资本的流通和生产提供更多的人员。人成为内容的提供者和消费者。这导致批判失去所有目标，变得全无定形，就像蒸汽一样。为什么会这样?因为批判只是另一种内容、另一种可以分享和传播的东西。因此，辩论成为资本的功能，而批判失去实现目标的能力。

I like to think about this using the Marxist concepts of use-value and exchange-value. Communication usually refers to a message from a sender to a receiver. We could say the use-value of a message is what the receiver can do with it and what they can understand. Today, the use-value of a message has been replaced by its circulation-value, or the message’s ability to be forwarded, shared, and distributed, and its circulation-value is unrelated to content. The message can be a lie, it can be a fact, or both, as long as it can be shared. Therefore, we have achieved a shift from the use-value of discourse to its circulation-value.

我喜欢用马克思主义的使用价值和交换价值的概念来思考这个问题。交往通常是指发送者给接收者的消息。我们可以说，消息的使用价值是接收者能够用它做什么以及能够理解什么。如今，消息的使用价值已被其流通价值所取代，或者说消息被转发、共享、分发的能力和流通价值与内容无关。消息可以是谎言，可以是事实，也可以是二者兼而有之，只要能够被分享即可。因此，我们实现了话语的使用价值到其流通价值的转变。

Jandrić and Medak: This rewrites the concept of communicative rationality and the view of democratic society as a reflexive structure, in which social learning processes unfold in the medium of communication.

扬德里奇和梅达克:这改写了交往理性的概念和民主社会是一种反身结构(reflexive structure)的观点。在这个结构中，社会学习过程在交往的媒介中展开。

Dean: My early work was within Habermas’s framework. I strongly believed in discourse ethics and understood communicative rationality as pointing to communication as a means of problem-solving, reaching consensus, and things like that. My second book was about alien abduction. When I interviewed academics and others who claimed to have been abducted by aliens, these people were firmly committed to the truthfulness of their statements. Here, the democratic and critical exchange of speech and belief, and the normative justification of opposing validity claims, were all fully accepted. Yet, from the mainstream view of reality, everyone in the UFO community seemed completely crazy and wrong. There was no middle ground! The fact is, they are neither idiots nor deceived, but they do have a completely different view of reality, and they support their views through peer-reviewed research, conferences, methods, and evidence discussions. So, I began to think that if we are dealing with opposing concepts of reality, then Habermas’s communicative solution to conflicts between opposing validity claims makes no sense.

迪安:我早期的工作是在哈贝马斯的框架内展开的。我非常相信话语伦理学，并把交往理性理解为指出交往是解决问题、达成共识的手段等诸如此类的事情。我的第二本著作是关于外星人绑架的。当我采访声称被外星人绑架的学者以及其他人时，这些人坚定地承诺其陈述具有真实性。在这里，言语与信仰之间民主的和批判性的交流以及相互对立的合法性诉求的规范性辩护都被完全接受。然而，从主流的现实观念来看，UFO社区中的每个人似乎都是完全疯狂和错误的。没有中间立场!现在的事实是，他们既不是白痴，也没有被欺骗，但他们确实对现实有着完全不同的看法，并且通过支持同行评议的研究、会议、方法和证据的讨论等来支持其观点。于是，我开始认为，如果我们要处理的是相互对立的实在概念，那么哈贝马斯对相互对立的合法性诉求之间的冲突的交往解决方案就没有意义。

Traditional liberalism is about opposing concepts of the good, but behind it there are also opposing concepts of reality. Therefore, the liberal version of democracy has a serious problem. Deliberation depends on some common background and criteria, that is, the standards people can use to evaluate validity, i.e., a common reality. But what happens when this reality itself is deeply divided? Democracy cannot contain its own foundations. So, communicative rationality has a conceptual limitation. Today, in the environment of communicative capitalism, we encounter a deeper problem: the increasing role of communicative exchange for capital. Now, communicative rationality seems to be a thin ideological cloak for communicative capitalism, where all communicative norms are increasingly embedded in and inseparable from the process of capital accumulation.

传统自由主义是关于相互对立的善的概念，但在其背后也存在着关于相互对立的实在的概念。因此，民主主义的自由主义版本有一个严重的问题。协商取决于某种共同的背景和准则，即人们可以用来评估有效性的标准，即共同的实在。但是，当这个实在本身存在严重分歧时，会发生什么呢?民主不能包含其自身的基础。所以，交往理性存在概念上的局限性。今天，在交往资本主义的环境中，我们遇到了一个更深层次的问题，即交往式交流对资本的作用越来越大。现在，交往理性似乎是交往资本主义一层薄薄的意识形态外衣，在这里，所有交往规范都越来越多地嵌入资本积累的过程中，并与这一过程密不可分。

Jandrić and Medak: Some scholars argue that one solution to the current democratic crisis might be more democracy, often radical democracy. However, in your co-authored book *Radical Democracy and the Internet: Interrogating Theory and Practice*, you argue that radical democracy is insufficient to meet the challenges of communicative capitalism. So, what is better?

扬德里奇和梅达克:一些学者认为，解决当前民主危机的一个方案可能是更多的民主，通常是激进民主。然而，在您参与写作的《激进民主与互联网:理论与实践的质疑》一书中，您认为激进民主不足以应对交往资本主义的挑战。那么，什么更好呢?

Dean: It’s very simple: communism. And it’s simple to say, so let’s step back and talk about what it means in practice. First, when the Left takes democracy as its political horizon, it makes a huge mistake, because this fails to grasp the fundamental problem of capitalism. Democracy cannot accurately articulate the political horizon of the Left; it can only articulate more of what we already have. The same holds under the conditions of communicative capitalism. Every left-wing radical finds themselves in a social environment where every solution is a website, an app, a better database, or some kind of pilot voting system. Let’s make an app for democracy, and somehow we’ll solve the problem! But that’s not how it works. The Left must be divisive, must articulate antagonism, name the antagonism, and struggle on the path of antagonism. We live in a democratic environment; we cannot simply reproduce the conditions of that environment! That is why radical democracy is insufficient.

迪安:这很简单，就是共产主义。说起来也很简单，让我们退一步说说它在实践中意味着什么。首先，当左翼认为自己的研究视野是民主时，他们犯了巨大的错误，因为这没有抓住资本主义的根本问题。民主不能准确表述左翼的政治视野，它只能表述我们已经拥有的更多相同的东西。在交往资本主义的条件下也是如此。每个左翼激进分子所处的社会环境都有一个特征，即所有解决方案都是一个网站、一个应用程序、一个更好的数据库或某种试点投票系统。让我们为民主做一个应用程序，我们就会以某种方式解决问题!但事实并非如此。左翼必须是引起分裂的，阐明对抗，命名对抗，并在对抗的道路上进行斗争。我们生活在一个民主的环境中，我们不能只是重复这一环境的条件!这就是为什么激进民主是不够的。

Jandrić and Medak: More than a decade ago, you wrote: “Despite the many significant changes brought about by information and communication technologies, the image of the nation-state continues to shape thinking about politics.” In your view, what role does the nation-state play in communicative capitalism? And what role should it play in the future?

扬德里奇和梅达克:十多年前，您写道:“尽管信息和通信技术带来了许多重大变化，但民族国家的形象仍在继续形成对政治的思考。”在您看来，民族国家在交往资本主义中扮演着什么角色?未来它的角色应该是什么?

Dean: I don’t believe the dominance of the nation-state today is as strong as this question implies. Regional institutional arrangements like the European Union go beyond the nation-state, and they seem to matter (for example, in Greece). Various complex trade agreements, arms agreements, and environmental agreements cut across nation-states, providing a larger framework than the nation-state. This again shows that if we think only in terms of the nation-state, we might miss something important. There is also something else that makes the nation-state different from its dominant form a hundred years ago: they are nodes of global communication, global trade, and multinational corporations headquartered in many countries. At the same time, conservative counter-revolutionary forces are everywhere: they are the main force behind the Netherlands, Hungary, the United States, or Brexit. On the basis of nationalism, we see the bourgeoisie asserting the political form of the nation-state to maintain its own power. Under communicative capitalism, the nation-state is clearly a site of struggle. In many struggles around borders, refugees, migration, and trade agreements, we see the fragility and instability of the nation-state… Clearly, the nation-state today is a different kind of power institution from the nation-state of the 20th century, but it has not died.

迪安:我不相信今天民族国家的主导地位像这个问题所暗示的那样强大。像欧盟这样的区域性制度安排超出了民族国家的范围，而且它们似乎很重要(例如在希腊)。各种复杂的贸易协定、武器协定和环境协定跨越民族国家，提供了比民族国家更大的框架。这再次表明，如果我们仅仅从民族国家的角度来思考，就可能遗漏一些重要的东西。还有别的东西使民族国家不同于其100年前的主导形式，它们是世界交往、全球贸易和在许多国家都设有总部的跨国公司。与此同时，保守的反革命力量无处不在:是荷兰、匈牙利、美国或英国脱欧背后的主要力量。在民族主义的基础上，我们看到资产阶级为维护自身的权力而主张民族国家的政治形式。在交往资本主义下，民族国家显然是斗争的场所。在围绕边界、难民、移民和贸易协定的许多斗争中，我们看到了民族国家的脆弱性和不稳定性……显然，现在的民族国家是不同于20世纪的民族国家那样的权力机构，但它们并没有消亡。

Jandrić and Medak: We would like to point out an interesting contrast between state monopoly capital and global monopoly capital. In the 1970s we had global competitive markets; now we have global monopoly markets, and the position of the nation-state as a regulatory body has been weakened. Today’s democracies cannot formulate economic policy; just look at how inefficient the Trump administration was in implementing a nationally-driven economic agenda.

扬德里奇和梅达克:我们想指出国家垄断资本和全球垄断资本之间有趣的对比。1970年代我们曾经拥有全球竞争性市场，现在我们拥有全球垄断性市场，民族国家作为监管机构的地位已经被削弱。今天的民主国家无法制定经济政策，只要看看特朗普政府在实施国民经济驱动的议程方面效率低下就知道了。

Dean: This is a very important point. Democracy is insufficient because it has almost nothing to do with what happens at the level of national democratic elections. Nation-states operate within global capitalist markets, and their ability to respond to challenges is not as agile as it once was. I am thinking of the water protests in Bolivia and the Water War in Cochabamba. Even if they achieve victory at one level, they run up against trade agreements at a higher level. In *This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate*, Naomi Klein discusses a legislative victory in Ontario, Canada, which provided some guarantees for local renewable energy companies, but it was ultimately defeated in the international trade arena. So, you are right: the state is losing its capacity to act as an intermediary. At the same time, what is the dominant rhetoric everywhere? It is democracy. Does this rhetoric mean we hope to regain the processes over which we have lost control? Or does democracy function ideologically through rhetoric like: “Hey everyone, go out and vote! Hey everyone, put your opinions online! Be active, you can do it!” I cannot find any mechanism that makes the former seem credible, so I think it is the latter.

迪安:这是非常重要的一点。民主是不够的，因为它几乎与国家民主选举层面发生的事情无关。民族国家在全球资本主义市场中运作，它们对挑战的反应不如以往那样灵敏。我想到了玻利维亚的水资源抗议和科恰班巴的水资源战争。它们即使在某个层面上取得了胜利，也会在更高的层面上与贸易协定相抵触。在《这改变了一切:资本主义与气候》一书中，娜奥米·克莱因(Naomi Klein)讨论了加拿大安大略省的立法胜利，它为当地的可再生能源公司提供了一些保障，但最终还是在国际贸易领域中被击败。所以，你们是对的:国家正在失去充当中介机构的能力。与此同时，到处都存在的主要言辞是什么?是民主。这种言辞是否意味着我们希望找回我们失去控制的过程?或者说，民主是不是通过以下言辞在意识形态上发挥作用:“嘿，各位，出去投票吧!嘿，各位，把你们的意见放到网上!积极一点，你可以做到的!”我找不到任何机制能让前者看起来可信，所以我认为是后者。

2. Marx in the Age of Communicative Capitalism

二、交往资本主义时代的马克思

Jandrić and Medak: In 2000, Richard Barbrook published “Cyber-Communism: How the Americans are Superseding Capitalism in Cyberspace,” claiming that network capitalism actually supports cybernetic communism. Although Barbrook himself claimed this argument was an ironic joke, some theorists took it very seriously. What is the potential of digital technology in creating a non-capitalist future?

扬德里奇和梅达克:2000年，理查德·巴比鲁克(Richard Barbrook)发表了《网络共产主义:美国人如何在网络空间取代资本主义》一文，宣称网络资本主义实际上支持控制论共产主义(cybernetic communism)。虽然巴比鲁克本人声称这个论点是一个具有讽刺意味的笑话，但一些理论家却非常重视它。数字技术在创造非资本主义的未来方面的潜力是什么?

Dean: Cybernetic communism seems to presuppose technical means that avoid political struggle and the formation of a collective will. It jumps straight to “imagine how we will organize everything cybernetically,” completely ignoring the political struggle needed to achieve that goal. I am more concerned with political struggle and the formation of a collective will. How do you get people sufficiently motivated to make all this happen? What strikes me is that we now have the technology to support participatory centralized planning. We have multiple ways to replace the market, to find good allocation mechanisms that don’t rely on things like prices. We do this online all the time; a lot of things circulate online without any consideration of the price mechanism, thus bypassing the market. We have the technical conditions for cybernetic communism, but we lack the political conditions, and technology can never provide us with those political conditions. So, this is where the focus needs to be, and where energy needs to be invested.

迪安:控制论共产主义似乎以避免政治斗争和形成集体意志的技术手段为前提。它一下子跳到“想象一下我们将如何在控制论意义上组织一切”，而完全忽略了实现这一目标的政治斗争。我更关心的是政治斗争和集体意志的形成。你是如何使人们受到如此程度的刺激从而让这一切发生的?让我印象深刻的是，我们现在拥有支持参与式集中规划的技术。我们有多种办法来取代市场，找到无需依赖于价格之类的东西的好的分配机制。我们在网上一直都是这样做的，很多东西都是在根本不考虑价格机制的情况下在网上流通，从而绕开了市场。我们拥有控制论共产主义的技术条件，但我们缺少政治条件，技术永远无法为我们提供这些政治条件。所以，这就是需要重点关注的地方，也是需要投入精力的地方。

Jandrić and Medak: A key factor in the digital potential for creating a more just world is the principle of net neutrality. Therefore, it is no surprise that net neutrality is a site of ongoing struggle between the people and big capital. Let us imagine that big capital succeeds in abandoning net neutrality, and all internet traffic is commodified. What impact would this scenario have on the nature of communicative capitalism?

扬德里奇和梅达克:在创造一个更公正的世界的数字潜力中，关键因素是网络中立原则。因此，网络中立是人民与大资本之间持续斗争的场所，也就不足为奇了。让我们想象一下，大资本成功地放弃了网络中立，所有互联网流量都被商品化。这种设想对交往资本主义的性质有什么影响?

Dean: At a general theoretical level, I think net neutrality is primarily a struggle between factions within capitalism. I am not neutral between these factions. I think it is terrible for some providers to determine the dominance of content based on factors like ability to pay. This is a struggle within capitalism, but its outcome could make things more or less difficult for us. If the decision against net neutrality continues to hold, what happens next? Is this an opportunity to build a better public infrastructure? Before the internet became a tool for private enterprise, people promised a more responsive, more widely distributed, more horizontal, more equal, and more networked infrastructure. Paradoxically, five years from now, we might say: Oh, the end of net neutrality was also the end of Facebook, and everyone finally switched to this better, more widely distributed technology. I don’t usually take an accelerationist position, but in this case, I hope there might be a silver lining. But I don’t believe it. If this were possible within the capitalist world, it should have happened already.

迪安:在一般的理论层面上，我认为网络中立主要是资本主义内部各派系之间的斗争。我在这些派系之间并不保持中立。我认为，一些供应商基于支付能力等因素来决定内容的主导地位是可怕的。这是资本主义内部的斗争，但其结果可能会或多或少地使我们陷入困境。如果反对网络中立的决定继续有效，那么接下来会发生什么?这是否是建立一个更好的公众基础设施的机会?在互联网成为私营企业的工具之前，人们就承诺要建立一种响应更快、分布更广、更水平化、更平等和更网络化的基础设施。矛盾的是，五年后，我们可能会说:哦，网络中立的终结也是脸书的终结，所有人最终都转向这种更好的、分布更广的技术。我通常不会采取加速主义的立场，但在这种情况下我希望会有光明的一面。但我并不相信。如果这在资本主义世界里是可能的，那它应该早就发生了。

Jandrić and Medak: To some extent, net neutrality allows the internet to operate in a way not unlike anarchy. However, since Bakunin split with Marx in the First International, communist thought and anarchist thought have developed along very different paths. In the age of communicative capitalism, should we strive to reconcile anarchism and communism, or should we continue to insist on the differences between them? Can you point to the possible contributions of communicative anarchism in replacing communicative capitalism?

扬德里奇和梅达克:在某种程度上，网络中立允许互联网以与无政府状态相差无几的方式运行。然而，自从巴枯宁与马克思在第一国际中分裂以来，共产主义思想和无政府主义思想沿着截然不同的道路发展。在交往资本主义时代，我们应该努力调和无政府主义与共产主义，还是继续坚持两者之间的差异?您能指出交往无政府主义在取代交往资本主义方面可能做出的贡献吗?

Dean: As long as the capitalist economy is dominant, capitalists will lock up and devour anything we produce. I think that even if we manage to develop a new people’s internet, it will be devoured. Therefore, I believe the important questions are related to organizing the people for political struggle. If we do not want capitalism to always take everything away, we must get rid of capitalism. The anarcho-egalitarian vision still cannot contend with the power laws that constitute complex networks. Albert-László Barabási, in his book *Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life*, points out that complex networks are not flat or horizontal at all, but rather have the characteristics of preferential attachment, growth, and preferential attachment. These three characteristics generate hubs, and their links follow a power-law distribution, where the top (the hub or most popular node) has twice as many links as the next, and the next has twice as many as the one after that, and so on. So, the top is one, and below is many. The horizontal processes supported by anarcho-libertarians create the conditions for the hierarchy they oppose. It is as if they see the long tail, rather than the hierarchy, that is, the steep curve. Dismantling this structure requires greater organizational force. Once one understands the structure of complex networks, it is no surprise that communicative capitalism produces monopolies; that is what its dynamics release.

迪安:只要资本主义经济占主导地位，资本家就会锁闭并吞噬我们制造的任何东西。我认为，即使我们设法开发一个新的人民互联网，它也会被吞噬。因此，我认为重要的问题与组织人民进行政治斗争有关。如果不希望资本主义总是把一切都拿走，我们就必须摆脱资本主义。无政府水平主义的视野仍然无法同构成复杂网络的权力法则相抗争。阿尔伯特·拉兹洛·鲍劳巴希(Albert Laszlo Barabasi)在其著作《联系:一切事物与其他事物如何联系及其对商业、科学和日常生活的意义》中指出，复杂的网络根本不是平面的或水平的，而是具有自由选择、增长和优先依附的特征。这三个特征生成集线器，它们的链接按照幂律分布，其中顶部(集线器或最受欢迎的节点)的链接数是下一个的两倍，而下一个的链接数又是再下一个的两倍，以此类推。所以，顶部是一，下面是多。无政府自由主义者支持的水平过程创造了他们所反对的等级制度的条件。好像他们看到的是长长的尾巴，而不是等级制度，即陡峭的曲线。拆除这个结构需要更大的组织力量。一旦人们了解复杂网络的结构，交往资本主义产生垄断就不足为奇了，这就是它的动力释放出来的东西。

Yandrich and Medak: Network effects…

扬德里奇和梅达克:网络效应……

Dean: Exactly. That is what pains me. Why do these tech-savvy anarchists never consider network effects?

迪安:确实是。这就是令我痛苦的东西。为什么这些精通技术的无政府主义者从不考虑网络效应呢?

Yandrich and Medak: More and more people today are committed to reviving Marx in the era of communicative capitalism. What are your thoughts on these efforts? What relevance does Marxist theory, developed in the early days of industrial society, have for our current digitally saturated environment?

扬德里奇和梅达克:如今越来越多的人致力于在交往资本主义时代复兴马克思。您对这些努力有何看法?在工业社会初期发展起来的马克思主义理论与我们当前这个数字化饱和的环境有什么相关性?

Dean: Now, Marx is more important than 200 years ago. Why is that? Because of the intensification of capitalism. Specifically, there are three reasons. The first reason is proletarianization and the intensification of the labor market. In the Northern Hemisphere, the collapse of the institutions and structures of the welfare state has produced a more turbulent, more competitive labor market than in the mid-20th century. We have less security, have become more fragile, more unstable, and have a 24/7 labor market. In *Capital*, and especially in *The Communist Manifesto*, Marx predicted the intensity of capital that we now see from a global perspective. The second reason comes from Marx’s understanding of expropriative accumulation. This mode of accumulation is realized through taking and locking up (rather than through exploitation). One of the main ways communicative capitalism operates is by locking up communicative commons. Marx’s famous discussion of primitive accumulation in Part Eight of *Capital* is essential for understanding this locking up. Now, even just walking down the street, our activities are locked up in a data set; the information about my whereabouts is now someone else’s property. The third reason is Marx’s political writings. Most people only see Marx’s economic writings, but living in the United States of the Trump era, Marx’s *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* is more important than ever. As we see in the new alliance between the disgruntled petty bourgeoisie and the working class, Marx’s political writings resonate loudly in the contemporary context.

迪安:现在，马克思比200年前更加重要。为什么会这样?因为资本主义的强化。具体来讲有三个原因。第一个原因是无产阶级化和劳动力市场的强化。在北半球，福利国家的制度和结构的崩溃产生了一个比20世纪中叶更加动荡、更具竞争性的劳动力市场。我们的安全感更低，变得更脆弱、更不稳定，并拥有了一个全天候的劳动力市场。在《资本论》中，特别是在《共产党宣言》中，马克思预言了我们现在从全球的角度所看到的资本强度。第二个原因来自马克思对剥夺性积累的理解。这种积累方式是通过拿走和锁闭(而不是通过剥削)来实现的。交往资本主义发挥作用的主要方式之一是锁闭交往公共产品。马克思在《资本论》第八部分中关于原始积累的著名论述对于理解这一锁闭是必不可少的。现在，即使只是走在街上，我们的活动也被锁闭在一个数据集中，我的行踪信息现在是别人的财产了。第三个原因是马克思的政治著作。大多数人只看到马克思的经济著作，但生活在特朗普时代的美国，马克思的《路易·波拿巴的雾月十八日》比以往任何时候都更重要。正如我们在心怀不满的小资产阶级与工人阶级之间新的联盟中看到的，马克思的政治著作在当代语境中发出了响亮的声音。

Yandrich and Medak: If Marx is as important as ever, why propose the concept of communicative capitalism? What is wrong with the concept of capitalism presented in Marx’s works?

扬德里奇和梅达克:如果马克思像以往一样重要，为什么还要提出交往资本主义的概念呢?马克思著作中提出的资本主义概念有什么问题?

Dean: Communicative capitalism skips over or changes the commodity form. It is a way capital transforms into a form of exploitation that directly enters the social substance without making that substance take the form of a commodity. Instead, the processes of locking up, capturing, storing, archiving, and searching transform all the data we generate and discard into a resource algorithmically available for pattern mining. These algorithms produce commodities for sale (like data on specific purchasing patterns). Through daily communicative activities, people provide the raw material, the “natural” resource. So, we can use Marx’s theory to understand the process of exploitation, take that as a basis, and then recognize that production does not proceed in exactly the same way. Industrial production still exists, remnants of the industrial layer still exist to some extent, but other layers are on top, the network layer, the information layer, the communicative layer have other functions. This is a new set of difficulties. The difficulty is not scarcity, but that there is a lot that cannot be monetized, so we now face the problem of how to pay for this type of labor. How do these laborers get food and survive while providing materials, content, and inputs that escape the commodity form and are not monetized in the same way? Marx provides us with the foundation for research.

迪安:交往资本主义跳过或改变了商品形式。它是资本转化为一种剥削形式的方式，这种剥削形式直接进入社会物质，而不使这种物质采取商品的形式。相反，锁闭、捕获、存储、归档和搜索的过程将我们所有生成和丢弃的数据都转化为一种从算法上可用于模式挖掘的资源。这些算法生产出待售的商品(比如关于特定购买模式的数据)。通过日常的交往活动，人们提供原材料，即“自然”资源。所以，我们可以用马克思的理论来理解剥削的过程，以此为基础，然后认识到生产并不是以完全相同的方式进行。工业生产仍然存在，工业层等的残余物在一定程度上仍存在，但其他层又在上面，网络层、信息层、交往层有其他的作用。这是一系列新的难题。难的不是稀缺，而是有很多无法货币化的东西，所以我们现在面临着如何支付这类劳动的问题。这些劳动力是如何在提供材料、内容和投入(它们逃避了商品的形式，没有以同样的方式货币化)的同时获得食物和生存的呢?马克思为我们提供了开展研究的基础。

III. Communist Horizons in the 21st Century

三、21世纪的共产主义视野

Yandrich and Medak: In the Trump era, your book *Aliens in America: Conspiracy Cultures from Outerspace to Cyberspace* has become increasingly important.

扬德里奇和梅达克:在特朗普时代，您的著作《外星人在美国:从外太空到网络空间的阴谋文化》变得越来越重要。

Dean: I am glad you asked about this, because in this book, published 20 years ago, I diagnosed what Trump calls fake news and others call post-truth. In that book, I talked about competing concepts of truth undermining the possibility of democratic debate. It is not a question of news being true or false; there is no fundamental reality that determines whether a story is false or true. Let me be clear: this does not mean there is no fundamental reality, but rather that there is no way to resolve these oppositions, which lead people to have different perceptions of reality. In *The Ticklish Subject*, Slavoj Žižek proposed a great term — the decline of symbolic efficiency — which I have been using. It denotes the lack of a common set of symbols, norms, and overarching concepts; the lack of common meaning. When I drive long distances, I sometimes listen to right-wing radio, because I want to know what the enemy is thinking. Yesterday, while listening to Rush Limbaugh, someone called into the show and asked: In today’s era of fake news, what is the most objective news source? He replied: None. The only thing you can do is look at several things and then decide for yourself. I was surprised, but he too agreed that there is no common symbolic layer, only individual determination. Individuals decide for themselves what is right, what is true. Strangely, Limbaugh shares common ground with liberal relativists, who see the individual as the foundation of everything.

迪安:我很高兴你们问起这个问题，因为在这本20年前出版的书中，我诊断出特朗普所说的假新闻和其他人所说的后真相。在该书中，我谈到了相互对立的真实概念破坏了民主辩论的可能性。这并不是新闻真假的问题，没有一个根本的现实来决定一个故事是假的还是真的。我要澄清的是，这并不意味着没有根本的现实，而是没有办法解决这些对立，它们导致人们对现实产生不同的看法。在《敏感的主体》一书中，斯拉沃热·齐泽克(Slavoji6ek)提出了一个很棒的术语———符号效率的下降，我一直在使用这个术语。它表示缺乏一套共同的符号、规范和总体概念;缺乏共同的意义。当我长途驾驶时，我有时会听右翼广播，因为我想知道敌人在想什么。昨天，当我收听拉什·林博(Rush Limbaugh)的演讲时，有人打电话到节目问道:在当今的假新闻时代，最客观的新闻来源是什么?他回答说:没有。你唯一能做的就是多看几件事，然后自己决定。我很惊讶，但他也同意并没有共同的符号层，只有个人的决心。个人为自己决定什么是正确的，什么是真实的。奇怪的是，林博与自由主义相对论者竟然有一致之处，后者认为个人是一切事物的基础。

Yandrich and Medak: You have quoted Langdon Winner as saying that in Western technological societies, the primary orientation towards the world is religious rather than scientific. What is the main problem with religious-based political thought and practice?

扬德里奇和梅达克:您曾经引用兰登·温纳(Langdon Winner)的话说，在西方技术社会中，对世界的主要取向是宗教的而不是科学的。基于宗教的政治思想和实践的主要问题是什么?

Dean: In the United States, the primary problem is that the prominent position of religious thought hinders Congress from addressing the issue of climate change. Many conservatives, especially evangelical Christians in the conservative coalition, deny climate change science. This stems from their belief in creationism and rejection of evolution. From a very practical perspective, this has global significance, because the United States accounts for a very large proportion of global emissions of carbon, methane, and other greenhouse gases.

迪安:在美国，首要的问题是宗教思想的重要地位阻碍国会应对气候变化问题。许多保守派，特别是保守派联盟中的福音派基督徒，否认气候变化科学(climate change science)。这源于他们信奉神创论，排斥进化论。从非常实际的角度来看，这具有全球意义，因为美国排放的碳、甲烷以及其他温室气体占全球排放总量的很大比例。

If we think less pragmatically and more theoretically, then I begin to worry: Am I a secret liberal? Am I merely repeating liberal views on the separation of church and state? Perhaps not; perhaps I can find an answer in Marx's "On the Jewish Question." Marx points out: "The existence of religion is the existence of a defect." [1]1 James Surowiecki, *The Wisdom of Crowds* (New York: Anchor Books, 2005). So, I can happily say that I am not a secret liberal; I simply recognize, along with Marx, the persistence of the defects of the bourgeois liberal state.

如果我们不那么务实地思考，而是更多地从理论上思考，那么我会开始担忧:我是秘密的自由主义者吗?我只是在重复关于政教分离的自由主义观点吗?也许不是;也许我可以从马克思的《论犹太人问题》中寻找答案。马克思指出:“宗教的定在是一种缺陷的定在。”那么，我可以高兴地说，我不是秘密的自由主义者，我只是同马克思一样认识到了资产阶级自由国家的缺陷的持续存在。

Yandridge and Medak: Marx pointed out: "Religion is the opium of the people." [2]2 Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction" (1844). The full sentence is: "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people." Yet, despite the apparent benefits of scientific reasoning, religion seems inscribed in human nature. Should we oppose capitalism by insisting on atheism/agnosticism? Do we need a new (communicative) communist religion?

扬德里奇和梅达克:马克思指出:“宗教是人民的鸦片。”然而，尽管科学推理有明显的好处，但宗教似乎铭刻在人性中。我们应该通过坚持无神论/不可知论来反对资本主义吗?我们需要一种新的(交往)共产主义宗教吗?

Dean: In the United States, we face a serious opioid problem. American life expectancy has now decreased for two consecutive years, partly due to the opioid crisis. This crisis occurs in areas with many religious people, so religion seems insufficient to stop people from using opioids. If we favor tolerant drug policies, should we also favor tolerant religious policies? The opioid issue should not exert influence in political debate, and religious disputes should not hinder the development of science.

迪安:在美国，我们面临严重的阿片类药物问题。现在美国的预期寿命已经连续两年减少，这部分缘于阿片类药物危机。这一危机发生在宗教人士众多的地区，因此宗教似乎不足以阻止人们使用阿片类药物。如果我们赞成宽容的毒品政策，那么是否也应该赞成宽容的宗教政策?阿片类药物问题不应该在政治辩论中发挥影响，宗教争论不应该阻碍科学的发展。

In the ideal communist society I envision, we would not exclude religious people or put them in concentration camps. People can be allowed to believe in religion, as long as we ensure that religious disputes are not political disputes! Nor do I endorse a religion of communicative communism. This reminds me of the view Rousseau put forward in *The Social Contract*, that some kind of civil religion must be established. [3]3 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (1762), Book IV, Chapter 8: "On Civil Religion." Rousseau argues that the state should establish a purely civil profession of faith, the dogmas of which are sentiments of sociability necessary for being a good citizen. I think we should set aside religion and let people do what they want in this domain. If we ensure economic and political equality, we don't need to worry about other things, like religion and sex; we will leave space for people's beliefs and loves, as long as they do not infringe on basic equality.

在我认为的理想的共产主义社会里，我们不会排斥宗教人士，不会把他们关进集中营。可以让人们信教，只要确保宗教争论不是政治争论!我也不赞成一种交往共产主义的宗教。这让我想起了卢梭在《社会契约论》(The Social Contract)中提出的观点，即必须建立某种公民宗教。我认为，我们应该抛开宗教，让人们在这个领域做他们想做的事。如果我们确保经济上和政治上的平等，就不用担心其他事情，比如宗教和性，我们将给人们的信仰和爱留有空间，只要他们不侵犯基本的平等。

Yandridge and Medak: We suspect there is an element of Alain Badiou in your political theory. So far, we must return from commitment to reality. What do you think of the theology in political theory that Badiou discusses in *Saint Paul*? [4]4 Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism* (1997; English translation 2003). Badiou reads Paul as a militant figure who breaks with particularism and founds a universal truth procedure based on fidelity to an event (the Resurrection).

扬德里奇和梅达克:我们猜测您的政治理论中有阿兰·巴迪欧(Alain Badiou)的成分，到目前为止，我们必须从承诺回到现实来看。您怎么看待巴迪欧在《圣保罗》(Saint Paul)一书中提到的政治理论中的神学?

Dean: Does theology have a monopoly on hope for things that do not yet exist? I think theology is not the only way to conceptualize hope; what about philosophy, art, or science? I was born in South Carolina and grew up in a Baptist family in the South, where religion was often discussed. We went to church three times a week. One thing about communism that has always resonated with me is its close relationship with Acts 4:35: "Distribution was made to each as any had need." [5]5 Acts 4:35 (New Revised Standard Version). The verse describes the early Christian community in Jerusalem: "They laid it at the apostles' feet, and it was distributed to each as any had need." Admittedly, there may be a theological element here, but I want to insist on the theoretical point that theology is not the sole source of the above thinking. Badiou's Saint Paul is far from a theological figure; he is a brilliant fighter who allows us to see fidelity as a correct political orientation. This is not only the political orientation of the believer, but also of the comrade.

迪安:神学是否垄断了对尚未存在的事物的希望?我认为神学不是将希望概念化的唯一途径;哲学、艺术或科学呢?我出生在南卡罗来纳州，在南部一个浸礼会家庭中长大，那里经常谈论宗教。我们每周去教堂三次。关于共产主义，总是让我产生共鸣的一件事是它与《使徒行传》第4章第35节的密切关系:“照各人所需用的，分给各人。”无可否认，这里可能有神学的成分，但我想坚持这样一个理论观点，即神学不是上述思维的唯一来源。巴迪欧的圣保罗与神学人物相去甚远，他是一个光彩夺目的斗士，他让我们将忠诚视为一种正确的政治取向。这不仅是信徒的政治取向，也是同志的政治取向。

Yandridge and Medak: In the late 20th century, communists and Christian believers (mainly in Latin America, but also elsewhere) reconciled Marxism and Christianity in the form of liberation theology. [6]6 Liberation theology is a Christian theological movement that emerged in Latin America in the 1960s-70s, emphasizing the "preferential option for the poor" and interpreting Christian faith through the lens of Marxist social analysis and class struggle. Key figures include Gustavo Gutiérrez and Leonardo Boff. What are your views on liberation theology? Is it a positive step towards forming a stronger left-wing alliance, or sleeping with the enemy, or somewhere in between?

扬德里奇和梅达克:20世纪后期，共产主义者与基督教信徒(主要是在拉丁美洲，也包括其他地方)以解放神学的形式调和了马克思主义与基督教。您对解放神学有什么看法?这是朝着结成更强大的左翼联盟迈出的积极一步还是与敌人同床共枕或者介于二者之间?

Dean: It is a positive step towards building better connections with the left and a model for infiltrating other structures. The left is always worried about how to attract people out, how to get more people to do this and that, while the church is still an institution that can regularly get people out! People come here every day or every Sunday... Can you imagine if the left were as strong as churches all over the world? That would be amazing! I think liberation theology is a way for the left to take over the Catholic Church, and also a way to reach people who have been alienated by the left in other regions.

迪安:这是朝着与左翼建立更好的联系和一种向其他结构渗透的模式迈出的积极一步。左翼总是担心如何吸引人们走出来，如何让更多的人做这做那，而教会仍然是可以定期让人们走出来的机构!人们每天或者每个星期日都来这里……你能想象如果左翼像全世界的教会一样强大吗?这将是惊人的!我认为解放神学是左翼接管天主教会的途径，也是接触那些被其他地区的左翼疏远的人的途径。

Yandridge and Medak: Let's return to space travel. In *Aliens in America: Conspiracy Cultures from Outerspace to Cyberspace*, you claim: "The US space program was designed to attract an audience. People at home and abroad saw its achievements as signs of the success of the democratic project. Anyone could look up and see Americans walking on the moon. Through the space program, the US created a narrative of freedom and progress that would constitute people's common understanding of truth and subjectivity." [7]7 Jodi Dean, *Aliens in America: Conspiracy Cultures from Outerspace to Cyberspace* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. [page number not provided in source text]. What are these understandings? Who should benefit from them?

扬德里奇和梅达克:让我们回到太空旅行。在《外星人在美国:从外太空到网络空间的阴谋文化》中，您声称:“美国的太空计划是为了吸引观众。国内外的人们将其成就看作民主项目成功的标志。任何人都可以仰望在月球上行走的美国人。通过太空计划，美国创造了一种关于自由和进步的叙事，这个叙事将构成人们对真理和主体性的普遍理解。”这些理解是什么?谁应该从中受益?

Dean: The standards of truth and subjectivity were formulated according to a very specific American exceptionalist, masculinist, colonialist view of what freedom is, what victory is, and how capitalism and democracy will always produce the best outcomes. This vision of truth and subjectivity is just a small part of the American fantasy. The only correct way to think about the US space program is to recognize its place in the Cold War. Had it not been for the Cold War, it could never have gotten started. That's why Kennedy was so worried about launching the manned space program. [8]8 John F. Kennedy, President of the United States (1961-1963). He announced the goal of landing a man on the moon before the end of the decade in a speech to Congress on May 25, 1961, partly in response to Soviet successes in space. The entire audience for the moon landing program was national and international. The US space program was designed to build national confidence, because when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, our rockets kept crashing, and America felt technologically defeated... It was so shameful that America could hardly launch any decent rocket while the Soviet Union was so successful. Globally, the US space program aimed to tell others that Americans had the technology and will for space travel, thereby demonstrating the superiority of capitalism and democracy.

迪安:真理和主体性的标准是根据一个非常具体的美国例外主义的、男性主义的、殖民主义的观点制定的，即什么是自由，什么是胜利，以及资本主义和民主将如何始终产生最好的结果。这种对真理和主体性的憧憬只是美国幻想的一小部分。正确思考美国太空计划的唯一途径是认识到它在冷战中的地位。要不是冷战，它不可能起步。这就是为什么肯尼迪如此担心载人航天计划启动的原因。整个登月计划的观众是全国性的和国际性的。美国的太空计划旨在建立国家信心，因为当苏联发射人造卫星时，我们的火箭却不断坠毁，美国感到在技术层面被打败了……美国很难发射任何像样的火箭，而苏联却如此成功，这真是太丢人了。在全球范围内，美国的太空计划旨在告诉其他人，美国人拥有太空旅行的技术和意愿，从而显示资本主义和民主的优越性。

Yandridge and Medak: The era of space travel, especially the heroes of space travel, helped enhance Americans' (and Russians on the other side of the world) pride in their own achievements, which naturally strengthened national sentiment. However, the era of digital technology has brought a very different feeling. Some Americans may be proud of Silicon Valley's achievements, but digital citizenship is transnational, even global. So far, this has only facilitated the rise of global corporations and even intensified harsher forms of capitalism; internationalism, traditionally a key factor in proletarian struggle, now seems to have turned against it. Is there any way to bring internationalism back to a position supporting the contemporary left?

扬德里奇和梅达克:太空旅行的时代，尤其是太空旅行中的英雄们，有助于增强美国人(和世界另一边的俄罗斯人)对自身成就的自豪感，这也顺理成章地增强了国民感。然而，数字技术的时代带来了一种截然不同的感受，一些美国人可能为硅谷的成就感到骄傲，但数字公民身份是跨国的，甚至是全球性的。到目前为止，这只是促成了全球公司的崛起，甚至加剧了更为严酷的资本主义形式;国际主义在传统上一直是无产阶级斗争的关键因素，现在却似乎已经转向反对它。有什么办法可以让国际主义回到支持当代左翼的立场呢?

Dean: After the failure of the former Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist states, the Western left turned into liberals. They had been in the process of becoming liberals since 1968; by 1991 or 1992, the left acknowledged that socialism was defeated and recognized capitalist democracy as the most worthy of attention. [9]9 1968 refers to the global wave of protests and social movements (May 1968 in France, the Prague Spring, anti-Vietnam War protests, etc.). 1991 refers to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After that, the only vision of internationalism was a combination of global trade, capitalism, and human rights. Within the ideological structure of the Global North, the discourse of human rights must be recognized as a substitute for genuine proletarian internationalism. This allowed the right wing to take over the space where the resentment and anger of the working class, who were struggling in global trade, could be expressed, and to mobilize them using things like nationalism and patriotism.

迪安:前苏联和东欧社会主义国家失败后，西方左翼变成了自由主义者。自1968年以来，他们一直处于成为自由主义者的过程中;到1991年或1992年，左翼承认社会主义被击败，认可资本主义民主是最值得关注的。在那之后，国际主义的唯一愿景是全球贸易、资本主义和人权的结合。在全球北方的意识形态结构中，必须承认人权话语是真正的无产阶级国际主义的替代品。这使得右翼能够接管在全球贸易中陷入困境的工人阶级的怨恨和愤怒得以表达的空间，并利用民族主义和爱国主义之类的东西动员他们。

I believe that faith in Silicon Valley is not part of American patriotism. It may be the mentality of the tech elite, enthusiasts, some children, etc., but it is actually more of a coastal mindset than a nationwide one. In the American heartland, the vehicles of patriotism are country music, the flag, and a bizarre cultural custom, such as wearing ugly “Make America Great” style hats, eating fast food, and claiming that drinking 64-ounce sodas is our right. This is a reactive patriotism, directed against elites connected to Silicon Valley, who do technical work that people in the American heartland do not understand and who have taken their jobs. Intellectuals are internationalists; the working class is not. Thus, we can see a rather small and not necessarily effective national and global left, which is primarily liberal. We need to connect this with political economy (analysis of finance, production, debt, circulation, logistics) and an expanded consciousness of working-class struggle (education, health, and environmental struggles should be understood as class struggle).

我认为，对硅谷的信心不是美国爱国主义的一部分。这可能是科技精英、狂热爱好者、一些孩子等的心态，但这实际上更多的是一种沿海心态，而不是全国范围内的心态。在美国中部，爱国主义的载体是乡村音乐、国旗和一种怪异的文化习俗，比如戴难看的“让美国伟大”风格的帽子，吃快餐，声称喝64盎司的可乐是我们的权利。这是一种回应性的爱国主义，针对的是与硅谷有联系的精英们，这些精英们做着美国中部的人们所不理解的技术工作，并夺走了他们的工作。知识分子是国际主义者，工人阶级则不是。因此，我们可以看到一个相当小且不一定有效的国家和全球左翼，它主要是自由主义的。我们需要把它与政治经济学(对金融、生产、债务、流通、物流的分析)和扩大的工人阶级斗争意识(教育、卫生和环境斗争应被理解为阶级斗争)联系起来。

Jandrić and Medak: Your historical analysis suggests that “before the space program, the US rarely explicitly identified itself as a colonial power, although expansionism had been part of its self-understanding.” [10]10 The original source of this quotation is not provided in the text. It appears to be a reference to a prior work by Jodi Dean or a collaborative work with the interviewers. Yet, in the second half of the 20th century, governments and researchers had already adopted Vannevar Bush’s metaphor of science and technology, from space travel to computing, as an “endless frontier” (US Office of Scientific Research and Development, 1945). These days, we learn that the “endless frontier” is a hoax designed to promote what Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron called the Californian Ideology. We understand that in the era of the Anthropocene there is no such thing as an endless frontier. Clearly, the struggle against communicative capitalism is not just about changing the social system; more importantly, it also involves internalizing the fact that colonialism cannot continue forever. How do you deal with this issue?

扬德里奇和梅达克:您的历史分析表明，“在太空计划之前，美国很少明确表明自己是殖民大国，尽管扩张主义已经成为其自我理解的组成部分”。然而，在20世纪下半叶，各国政府和研究人员已经采纳尼瓦尔·布什(Vannevar Bush)的比喻，即把从太空旅行到计算机领域的科学技术比喻成“无止境的前沿”(美国科学研究与发展办公室，1945年)。这些天来，我们了解到，“无止境的前沿”是一个旨在宣传理查德·巴布鲁克(Richard Barbrook)和安迪·卡梅伦(Andy Cameron)所称的加州意识形态的骗局。我们明白，在人类世的时代不存在无止境的前沿这样的东西。显然，与交往资本主义的斗争不仅仅是社会制度的改变;更重要的是，它还涉及将殖民主义不可能永远持续下去这一事实内在化。您怎么处理这个问题?

Dean: I was born in 1962. When I was a child, my father served in the Air Force. We lived near the base, where the space program was a large part of the imagination. Watching the moon landing and people walking on the moon was fantastic, so exciting! Then, in the early 1990s, the space program had almost no funding, there was no enthusiasm for it anymore, the Challenger exploded… Space travel was no longer an exciting field or one people wanted to develop; all the excitement and direction of development revolved around the internet. This meant a shift in the imagination, and I think it is very important that it shifted from outer space to interpersonal interaction on Earth.

迪安:我出生于1962年。在我小时候，我爸爸在空军服役。我们住在基地附近，那里的太空计划是想象的一大部分。观看登月和人们在月球上行走真是太棒了，太令人兴奋了!然后，在1990年代初，太空计划几乎没有资金支持了，人们对它也不再有热情，“挑战者号”爆炸了……太空旅行不再是一个令人兴奋或想要发展的领域;所有的兴奋和发展方向都围绕着互联网。这意味着想象的转变，我认为它从外太空向地球上的人际互动转变是非常重要的。

So what happened to the left? The left no longer held a vision, no longer waged a global struggle against capitalism and for communism; instead, it began to worry about internal relations. The left turned its perspective inward, thinking about its own development. This is the same kind of shift. I don’t think it’s a question of colonization versus decolonization, or progress versus non-progress, but rather where people see the scope of political possibility and the scope of struggle. If we once turned towards a grand vision, we can turn towards it again. I don’t fully know how to make this shift, but I think through continuous active struggle, this shift can be realized.

那么左翼发生了什么呢?左翼不再抱有远见，不再开展反对资本主义和支持共产主义的全球斗争，反而开始担心内部关系。左翼将视角转向国内，思考自身的发展。这是同一种转变。我认为这不是关于殖民与非殖民的问题，也不是关于进步与非进步的问题，而是人们在哪里看到政治可能性的范围和斗争的范围的问题。如果我们曾经转向一个大的愿景，我们可以再次转向它。我不完全知道如何做出这一转变，但我认为通过不断的积极斗争，这一转变会实现。

IV. The Many Faces of the Anti-Capitalist Struggle

四、反资本主义斗争的诸多面孔

Jandrić and Medak: We have slowly but surely entered the era of precarious employment. Precarity is not a new concept, but its current manifestations are deeper and broader than before. With the emergence of capitalist online platforms like Uber and Airbnb, information technology seems to have added fuel to the fire. How can this brutal network capitalism be counterbalanced? Is the platform cooperativism movement led by Trebor Scholz and Nathan Schneider a possible direction for development?

扬德里奇和梅达克:我们已经缓慢但确实进入了就业不稳定的时代。不稳定并不是一个新概念，但它目前的表现形式比以往更深刻、更广泛。随着优步(Uber)和爱彼迎(Airbnb)等资本主义在线平台的出现，信息技术似乎更是火上浇油。怎样才能制衡这种残酷的网络资本主义?由特雷博尔·朔尔茨(Trebor Scholtz)和内森·施奈德(Nathan Schneider)领导的平台合作主义运动是一个可能的发展方向吗?

Dean: I attended several of their events at The New School in the US, and I think platform cooperativism is not a way to overcome precarity under communicative capitalism. Uber, TaskRabbit, Deliveroo, and other platforms are tools that exacerbate this precarity. Simply saying these platforms will be owned by cooperatives does not change this basic structure. I believe moving forward must involve rebuilding and revitalizing trade unions (currently, US union membership is at an all-time low). This is another reason why Marx is relevant today. The Communist Manifesto was written when the workers’ movement had not yet achieved significant successes, when workers’ organizations were emerging, and when efforts were being made to build unions and organize the working class into political parties. This is also the situation faced by precarious contract laborers today. People are dispersed across different workplaces, so organizing this labor force is the only way, but not through methods like platform cooperativism.

迪安:我在美国新学院参加了他们的几次活动，我认为平台合作主义不是交往资本主义条件下超越不稳定的一种方式。优步、跑腿兔(Task Rabbit)、户户送(Deliveroo)和其他平台都是加剧这种不稳定性的工具，仅仅说这些平台将归合作所有并不改变这种基本结构。我认为，向前迈进必须重建和振兴工会(当前美国工会会员人数处于历史最低点)。这也是马克思在今天之所以重要的又一个原因。《共产党宣言》是在工人运动尚未取得重大成就、工人组织正在兴起以及正在努力建立工会和将工人阶级组织成政党的时候写成的。这也是目前不稳定的契约劳工面临的情况。人们分散在不同的工作场所，所以将这些劳动力组织起来是唯一的途径，但不是通过平台合作主义这类方式。

Jandrić and Medak: How do you view users understood as workers, such as in the Facebook Wage Movement?

扬德里奇和梅达克:您如何看待被理解为工人的用户，比如脸书工资运动?

Dean: There is nothing liberating about online platforms like Amazon Mechanical Turk, where people do trivial work for small amounts of money — it’s just another form of shit work. However, the Facebook Wage Movement can be understood as similar to the Wages for Housework Movement of the 1970s, which was a thought experiment aimed at pushing for more radical politics. If we look at the Facebook Wage Movement in this way, it points to the strange fact that these platforms rely on unpaid labor, treating us as a natural resource for capital, just as women’s unpaid domestic labor was treated as a natural resource for capital. Therefore, this movement is useful. Maria Mies’s book Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labour discusses how colonization, nature, and domestic labor were treated as resources. The Facebook Wage Movement is a useful way to think about how labor in communicative capitalism is treated as a resource. But the following version of the Facebook Wage Movement is useless: I work 8 hours a day on Facebook, so I should get $8 in wages. There must be a more liberating vision here.

迪安:在像土耳其机器人这样的在线平台上，没有什么具有解放性的东西，人们做一些微不足道的工作，就得到一些小钱———这只是另一种形式的垃圾劳动。然而，脸书工资运动可以被理解为类似于1970年代的家务劳动工资运动，这是一场旨在推动更激进政治的思想实验。如果我们以这种方式来看待脸书工资运动，就可以发现它指出了一个奇怪的事实，即这些平台依赖于无偿劳动，它们把我们当作资本的自然资源，就像把女性的无偿家务劳动当作资本的自然资源一样，因此这一运动是有用的。玛利亚·米斯(Maria Mies)的《父权制和世界范围内的积累:国际分工中的妇女》一书讨论了殖民、自然和家务劳动是如何被视为资源的。脸书工资运动是思考交往资本主义中的劳动如何被视为资源的一种有用的方式。但以下版本的脸书工资运动是没有用的:我每天在脸书工作8小时，所以我可以得到8美元的工资。这里必须有一种更具解放性的视野。

Jandrić and Medak: The Facebook Wage Movement points to the fact that communication and social relations are preconditions for communicative capitalism, just as the Wages for Housework Movement pointed out that social reproduction labor is hidden but very important for the reproduction of capitalist relations.

扬德里奇和梅达克:脸书工资运动指出了这样一个事实，即交往和社会关系是交往资本主义的先决条件，正如家务劳动运动指出的，社会再生产劳动是隐蔽的，但对资本主义关系的再生产是非常重要的。

Dean: Certainly. That’s why there is such a resurgence of interest in social reproduction theory right now.

迪安:当然。这就是现在人们对社会再生产理论重新产生这么大兴趣的原因。

Jandrić and Medak: The struggle against communicative capitalism is being waged on many different fronts simultaneously. One of these developments is the degrowth movement, which envisions an economic and political future not based on growth. Such a future is directly opposed to the logic of capitalism. How do you view the potential of the degrowth movement in the struggle against communicative capitalism?

扬德里奇和梅达克:反对交往资本主义的斗争在许多不同的战线上同时进行。其中一个发展动向就是去增长运动，它设想的经济和政治的未来并非基于增长。这样的未来与资本主义的逻辑是直接对立的。您如何看待去增长运动在反对交往资本主义的斗争中的潜力?

Dean: Degrowth feels very much like a new peasantization. It doesn’t advocate for better, cleaner use of industrial processes and resources, but rather for cutting them off entirely. I like flying places, I think penicillin and public health are good things, and I don’t like working in a garden. Degrowth hopes to re-establish social relations tied to the land. As a symptom of and reaction to global urbanization, this makes sense. But for most of the world’s people, it hasn’t slowed the pace of urbanization. Combine this with urbanism and other city-centered movements, and this new peasantization turns into a new feudalism. So you get cities and places like Silicon Valley, which have cool cultural activities, surrounded by a peasant hinterland engaged in high-intensity labor, who then go home and play online for a while. I think we need a vision that doesn’t pretend we can abandon industry, but rather makes industry better. We have already experienced industrial development; now we need to rectify industry ecologically, economically, and politically. This means collectivizing industry, subordinating it to political decisions about whether industry is needed and how it should be organized.

迪安:去增长感觉很像新农民化。它不是提倡更好、更清洁地使用工业流程和资源，而是将其完全切断。我喜欢飞行场所，我认为青霉素和公共卫生是很好的东西，我不喜欢在花园里工作。去增长希望重新建立与土地相关的社会关系。作为全球城市化的征兆和反应，这是有意义的。但对世界上大多数人来说，它并没有延缓城市化的步伐。再加上城市主义等围绕城市的运动，这种新农民化就变成了新封建制度。因此，你会得到城市和像硅谷这样的地方，这些地方有着很酷的文化活动，周围是农民的腹地，他们从事着高强度的劳动，然后回家在网上玩一会儿。我认为，我们需要一个愿景，不是假装我们可以放弃工业，而是让工业发展得更好。我们已经经历工业的发展，现在需要从生态、经济、政治方面对工业进行整顿。这意味着将工业集体化，使工业服从于以下政治决定，即是否需要工业以及如何组织工业。

Jandrić and Medak: What do you think of Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams’s critique of localism and horizontalism?

扬德里奇和梅达克:您如何看待尼克·斯尔尼塞克(Nick Srnicek)和亚历克斯·威廉姆斯(Alex Williams)对地方主义和水平化的批判?

Dean: I agree with a lot of what they say; they draw heavily on Kathi Weeks and Shulamith Firestone. Feminists have already made these arguments, but Srnicek and Williams get a lot of credit for them. It’s a bit annoying: men stealing women’s thunder again! The fully automated part is what I dislike most, because it provides a rationale for pushing so many people out of the labor market without offering any guarantee of their livelihood during the transition.

迪安:我同意他们的很多观点，他们从凯西·威克斯(Kathi Weeks)和舒拉米思·费尔斯通(Shulamith Firestone)身上汲取了很多东西。女权主义者已经提出过这样的论点，但斯尔尼塞克和威廉姆斯却因此获得很多赞誉。这有点恼火:男人又一次抢了女人的功劳!完全自动化的部分是我最讨厌的地方，因为它有理由把这么多人赶出劳动力市场，却没有在过渡时期为他们的生计提供任何保障。

Jandrić and Medak: Whether we like it or not, today’s technology is beginning to destroy more jobs than it creates, and this trend is likely to continue (at least) in the near future. How should we respond to rising technological unemployment? Perhaps a universal basic income is the way to go?

扬德里奇和梅达克:无论我们喜欢与否，当今的技术开始摧毁的就业机会超过了其创造的就业机会，而且这种趋势很可能(至少)在不久的将来会持续下去。我们应该如何应对技术性失业的上升?也许实行全民基本收入是可行之道?

Dean: I oppose universal basic income because it individualizes the cause, the problem, and the solution. It’s just another excuse to implement neoliberal privatization and individualization processes, in which public goods — schools, healthcare, parks, nature, forests, etc. — inevitably disappear. Universal basic income only concerns the individual and their consumption needs. It’s no surprise that Silicon Valley people support universal basic income, because it produces what they want: more consumers.

迪安:我反对全民基本收入，因为它使原因、问题和解决方案个人化。这只是实施新自由主义私有化和个人化进程的另一个借口，在这个进程中，公共产品———学校、医疗保健、公园、自然、森林等———不可避免地会消失。全民基本收入只涉及个人及其消费需求。硅谷人支持全民基本收入并不奇怪，因为它生产出他们想要的东西，即更多的消费者。

Jandrić and Medak: Recently, Russian President Putin announced massive investment in robot soldiers. This particular kind of technological unemployment could save many lives; it also leads to an abstraction of war, where the ability to win a war might become a question of who has better equipment. What do you think of this abstraction? What kind of (hypothetical) future does it bring?

扬德里奇和梅达克:最近俄罗斯总统普京宣布对机器人士兵进行大规模投资。这种特殊的技术性失业可以挽救许多人的生命;它也导致战争的抽象化，赢得战争的能力可能变成谁拥有更好装备的问题。您怎么看待这种抽象化?它会带来什么样的(假想的)未来?

Dean: Your question immediately makes me think of the Obama administration’s drone war, which caused massive civilian deaths in Syria and also made the American public more desirous of war without war. This is even worse than traditional war, because it is far removed from any form of critique and response. But the dead people are real. I think a military future based on robots and gadgets is the end of the world. It’s the Terminator.

迪安:你们的问题让我立刻想到奥巴马政府的无人机战争，这场战争导致叙利亚大量平民死亡，也使美国公众更期盼没有战争。这甚至比传统战争还要糟糕，因为它远离任何形式的批判和回应。但死去的人是真实的。我认为，基于机器人和小装置的军事的未来是世界末日。它是终结者。

V. The Masses and the Party

五、群众与政党

Jandrić and Medak: Please describe the way the masses and the party interact.

扬德里奇和梅达克:请您描述一下群众与政党之间相互作用的方式。

Dean: Online and offline, we see the power of numbers, like the numbers on the streets; these quantities are the power of the masses, and they have a certain intensity for the masses. Right now, intensity is almost everything for the masses. They have no political proposition: when you see a trending hashtag on Twitter, you don’t understand its political proposition until you interpret the mass of information. The “party” is the political form that politicizes the masses or finds politics within the masses. A communist party sees the people in the masses. That is, it upholds the perspective of class struggle, seeing in popular uprisings the oppressed rising up against the oppressors. What the party sees is not a small or specific segment of the population with its particular grievances, but people from the whole world. This interaction between the masses and the party recognizes the power of numbers and holds that this power is distinct from politics; politics comes from a political form like the party, which responds to mass events and sees the people as the cause or subject of those events.

迪安:线上线下，我们看到了人数的力量，如街头的人数，这些数量是群众的力量，它们对群众来说具有一定的强度。现在强度几乎是群众的全部。他们没有政治主张:当你在推特上看到热门标签时，你在解释大量信息之前并不了解它的政治主张。“政党”是将群众政治化或在群众中找到政治的政治形式。共产党会在群众中看到人民。也就是说，它捍卫阶级斗争的观点，即在民众起义中看到被压迫者起来反抗压迫者。政党看到的不是一小部分或特定的有其特殊不满的人口，而是整个世界的人。群众与政党的这种相互作用认识到了人数的力量，并认为这种力量不同于政治;政治来自像政党这样的政治形式，它对群体性事件作出反应，并认为人民是群体性事件的原因或主体。

Jandrić and Medak: Some people say the internet is communitarian. To a large extent, it really is. Everything has its own community, which helps abstract the idea that society exists. What are your thoughts on the problem of the collective and organization?

扬德里奇和梅达克:有人提到互联网是社群主义的。它在很大程度上确实是如此。每个事物都有自己的社区，这有助于抽象出这样一个观念，即社会是存在的。您对集体和组织的问题有何看法?

Dean: After Trump was elected, the liberal media complained that it was because people were in their own online bubbles, in “echo chambers,” talking to like-minded people without actively engaging other viewpoints. I disagree with this diagnosis. In fact, I think we need more online bubbles, especially left-wing ones. The left must emphasize the divisions between us and the capitalists; these bubbles and “echo chambers” help us recognize that we are actually a force. This is not about community, but about society: society is fundamentally divided, with fundamental antagonisms. We must struggle for this antagonism. This means making ourselves a fighting force by strengthening divisions and reinforcing alliances. My discussion of the masses and the party stems from this emphasis on fundamental antagonism.

迪安:在特朗普当选后，自由主义媒体抱怨，这是因为人们置身于自己的网络泡沫中，置身于“回音室”中，与志同道合者交谈，而不主动接触其他观点。我不同意这个诊断。实际上，我认为我们需要更多的网络泡沫，尤其是关于左翼的网络泡沫。左翼必须强调我们与资本家之间的分歧，这些泡沫和“回音室”有助于认识到我们实际上是一种力量。这与社群无关，而与社会有关:社会从根本上是分裂的，存在着根本的对立。我们必须为这种对立而斗争。这意味着需要通过加强分裂和强化联盟来使我们自己成为一支战斗力量。我对民众与政党的讨论源于对这种根本对立的强调。

Jandrić and Medak: The internet turns employment into a reputation game — for journalists, Twitter follower counts are more important than the quality of their articles (in fact, bad articles often seem to attract more clicks). For scholars like us, citations and speaking invitations often matter more than the content of our work. On the path of opposing communicative capitalism, how should we handle reputation?

扬德里奇和梅达克:互联网将就业变成一种声誉游戏———对记者而言，推特的关注者数量比文章的质量更重要(实际上，糟糕的文章似乎常常会吸引更多的点击)。对像我们这样的学者来说，观点被引用和演讲邀请往往比我们工作的内容更重要。在反对交往资本主义的道路上，我们应该如何处理声誉?

Dean: I think the problem within capitalism is that reputation is linked to economic gain and efficiency. Therefore, we must ensure that reputation does not bring economic benefits. Structurally, escaping reputation is almost impossible; all you can do is get rid of the platforms that rely on and stimulate the production, measurement, and comparison of reputation, and try to construct modes of interaction where reputation becomes less and less important.

迪安:我认为，资本主义内部的问题是声誉同经济收益和效益相关。因此，我们必须确保声誉不会带来经济效益。从结构上讲，摆脱声誉几乎是不可能的，你所能做的就是摆脱依赖和刺激声誉的生产、测量和比较的平台，并试图构建使声誉越来越不重要的互动模式。

Jandrić and Medak: This also involves the question of the vanguard.

扬德里奇和梅达克:这也涉及先锋的问题。

Dean: The “vanguard” are innovators and early adopters. Of course, when people who are not the vanguard claim to be the vanguard, we criticize them as false vanguards. In the tech world, if you call someone an innovator, everyone gets excited. But in politics, if innovators are called the vanguard, everyone hates them. I think we need to stop the old 1960s critique of the vanguard, and also stop the critique of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Incidentally, given their influence and how widely their views are cited, they themselves are actually the vanguard. The idea that we can do without a vanguard is a myth. We must get rid of this myth and acknowledge the vanguard; if we don’t like them, we can dismantle them based on the specificity of their politics, not on the fact that they are the vanguard. In *The Communist Horizon*, I argue that the Occupy Wall Street movement was a vanguard; everyone in the world followed the original occupiers. We didn’t condemn this movement for doing something new; we admired it and followed it.

迪安:“先锋”是创新者和早期采用者。当然，当不是先锋的人声称自己是先锋的时候，我们会批评他们是虚假的先锋。在科技界，你把人称为创新者，每个人都会很兴奋。但在政治上，如果创新者被称为先锋，则每个人都会讨厌他们。我认为，我们需要停止1960年代对先锋的老式批判，也要停止对迈克尔·哈特(Michael Hardt)和安东尼奥·奈格里(Antonio Negri)的批判。顺便说一句，考虑到他们的影响力以及其观点被广泛引用的程度，实际上他们本身就是先锋。没有先锋也行，这是一个神话。我们必须摆脱这个神话，承认先锋，如果我们不喜欢他们，可以因其政治的特殊性，而不是因为他们是先锋这一事实瓦解掉他们。在《共产主义视野》(The Communist Horizon)一书中，我认为占领华尔街运动是一个先锋，世界上每个人都追随最初的占领者。我们并不会因为这一运动做了一些新的事情就谴责它，而是钦佩它并追随它。

Yandrić and Medak: You also define the party on the basis of an affective infrastructure, and define the expression of this structure as the vanguard. Whether personalized or not, the party demands that everyone act together toward a common goal.

扬德里奇和梅达克:您也根据情感基础结构来定义政党，并将这一结构的表达定义为先锋。不管是否个人化，政党都会要求每个人朝着一个目标共同行动。

Dean: The party’s affective structure expresses how the party is united. The party is not a top-down command from a central committee to a group of followers, but rather a series of interpersonal relationships among comrades. In the psychoanalytic sense, these relationships are “transferential”; they are colored by projection, intensity, expectation, and guilt. We must always remember that party membership is voluntary. People choose to join and become part of a political collective. As a collective, the party functions as a new symbolic order for its members. The more it functions in this way, the more it can influence “companions” outside the party.

迪安:政党的情感结构体现了政党是如何团结起来的。政党不是中央委员会对一群追随者自上而下的命令，而是同志之间的一系列人际关系。在心理分析的意义上，这些关系是“移情的”，他们带有投射、强度、期望、内疚的色彩。我们必须永远记住，政党成员身份是自愿的。人们选择加入并成为政治集体的一部分。作为集体，政党作为其成员的新的象征秩序发挥作用。它发挥的作用越多，就越能影响政党外的“同伴”。

Yandrić and Medak: In the early days of the development of the internet, there was great interest in the wisdom of crowds. Please evaluate the epistemology of the wisdom of online crowds.

扬德里奇和梅达克:在互联网发展的早期，人们非常关注群众智慧。请您评价一下网络群众智慧的认识论。

Dean: Yes, in my book *Crowds and Party* I also thought of Howard Rheingold’s *Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution*, which draws on an understanding of crowd knowledge and crowd sources. His views are shared and extended in James Surowiecki’s *The Wisdom of Crowds*.[1]1 James Surowiecki, *The Wisdom of Crowds* (New York: Anchor Books, 2005). Surowiecki makes it particularly clear that crowd knowledge or “the wisdom of crowds” has nothing to do with crowds at all. It actually uses crowds as generators or producers of knowledge, knowledge that can be exploited and controlled by owners or corporations. In fact, the composition referred to as “crowds” in this literature is not even a real group that interacts with one another. They are just data sets. Thus, what we call “the wisdom of crowds” here is a conception generated from an individualist perspective. It takes the form: “I have a problem I want to solve, so I try to create a crowd that will solve it.” It is merely an operation initiated for one’s own solution, not a group that genuinely creates knowledge or does anything.

迪安:是的，我在《群众与政党》(Crowds and Party)一书中也想到了霍化德·莱茵戈德(Howard Rheingold)的《聪明的暴徒:下一次社会革命》(Smart Mobs:The Next Social Revolution)，这源自该书对群众知识和群众来源的理解。他的观点在詹姆斯·苏罗维茨基(James Surowiecki)的《群众的智慧》(The Wisdom of Crowds)(3)30一书中得到分享和延伸。苏罗维茨基特别清楚的是，群众知识或“群众智慧”与群众完全无关。它实际上是将群众用作知识的产生者或生产者，这些知识可以被所有者或公司利用和控制。事实上，在这些文献中被称为“群众”的组成物甚至都不是相互影响的真正的群体。它们只是数据集。因此，我们在这里所说的“群众智慧”是从个人主义的角度产生的一个构想。它采取的形式是:“我有我想要解决的问题，所以我试着创造一个会解决这个问题的人群。”它只是一个为自己的解决方案而启动的操作，而不是一个真正创造知识或做任何事情的群体。

Yandrić and Medak: What about Wikipedia?

扬德里奇和梅达克:那维基百科呢?

Dean: Wikipedia is very interesting as a form of distributed knowledge registration, knowledge recording, and knowledge archiving. It does not produce new knowledge. People who write entries need to prove that their entries are valid or correct by citing the work of others. Of course, this is not the same thing as the wisdom of crowds.

迪安:维基百科作为一种分布式的知识注册、知识记录和知识存档的形式非常有趣。它不产生新的知识。撰写词条的人需要通过引用他人的作品来证明其条目是有效的或是正确的。当然，这同群体智慧不是一回事。

Yandrić and Medak: How do you deal with knowledge when defining the crowd? What do you think is the epistemology of the crowd?

扬德里奇和梅达克:您在定义群众时如何处理知识呢?您认为群众的认识论是什么?

Dean: I would not say that crowds produce knowledge; crowds produce intensity. My main theoretical basis for thinking about crowds in this way comes from Elias Canetti’s *Crowds and Power* (1984). Crowds can be heaps of grain, oceans, mountains, money. “Crowd” should not be understood primarily as a cognitive or epistemological intensity; it is an abstract intensity generated through the gathering of people and things.

迪安:我不会说群众产生知识，群众产生强度。我以这种方式思考群众的主要理论依据来自埃利亚斯·卡内蒂(Elias Canetti)的《群众与权力》(Crowds and Power,1984)。群众可以是成堆的粮食、海洋、山脉、金钱。“群众”不应该主要被理解为认知的或认识论的强度;它是一种抽象的强度，通过人和物的聚集而产生。

Yandrić and Medak: In order to fight powerful enemies, such as communicative capitalism, the contemporary Left should unite. However, as you wrote in your book *Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics*: “We have an ethical consciousness. But we lack a coherent political proposition, mainly because we still cling to our current values.” Which values are you thinking of? In your view, what is the main reason for the division of the contemporary Left?

扬德里奇和梅达克:为了对抗强大的敌人，例如交往资本主义，当代左翼应该团结起来。然而，正如您在《民主与其他新自由主义的幻想:交往资本主义和左翼政治》(Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies:Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics)一书中所写道的:“我们有一种伦理意识。但是，我们缺乏连贯的政治主张，主要是因为我们仍然执着于我们当前的价值观。”请问您想到了哪些价值观?在您看来，当代左翼分裂的主要原因是什么?

Dean: The values I had in mind in that book are technology, free trade, and democracy, values that configure determination as personal intuition, ethics as liberal acquiescence, and certainty as psychosis. The fundamental reason for the division of the Left is the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and Eastern European state bloc. In order to unite the Left into the Left we need, our political goal should be to make the vision of communism clearly visible.

迪安:我在该书中想到的价值观是技术、自由贸易和民主，这些价值观把决心配置为个人的直觉，把伦理配置为自由主义的默许，把确定性配置为精神病。左翼分裂的根本原因是前苏联东欧国家集团的解体。为了将左翼团结成我们需要的左翼，我们的政治目标应该是使共产主义的愿景清晰可见。

Yandrić and Medak: For you, the party is the basic form of political struggle. Why?

扬德里奇和梅达克:对您来说，政党是政治斗争的基本形式。为什么?

Dean: I do not think the party is the basic form of political struggle, but I think it is an effective form of political struggle that we currently need. In so-called advanced capitalist parliamentary societies, the political form for confronting state power is the party. The party can function at various levels: local, regional, national, and international. It is a political tool that transcends the scope of the state, bringing people together to fight for a specific political vision. This is why we need the party now more than ever — it is the vision of a fighting collective committed to changing the world. (Notes omitted)

迪安:我不认为政党是政治斗争的基本形式，但我认为这是我们当前需要的有效的政治斗争形式。在所谓的先进的资本主义议会制社会中，对抗国家权力的政治形式是政党。政党可以在地方、地区、国家和国际各个层面发挥作用。它是一种超越国家范围的政治工具，把人们聚集在一起，为特定的政治愿景而战。这就是为什么我们现在比以往任何时候都更需要政党的原因———它是一个致力于改变世界的战斗集体的愿景。（注释略）

(Jodi Dean: Hobart and William Smith Colleges, USA; Tomislav Medak: Coventry University, UK; Petar Yandrić: Zagreb University of Applied Sciences, Croatia; Liu Shuhui: Editorial Department of *Studies on Marxism*, Academy of Marxism, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

（约迪·迪安：美国霍巴特和威廉史密斯学院；托米斯拉夫·梅达克：英国考文垂大学；佩塔尔·扬德里奇：克罗地亚萨格勒布应用科学大学；刘曙辉：中国社会科学院马克思主义研究院《马克思主义研究》编辑部）

Online Editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑