An Exploration of Heidegger’s Thought on Authentic Human Existence – From a Marxist Analytical Perspective

In today’s world, on the one hand, the trend of globalization is intensifying; on the other hand, people are increasingly focusing on developing their own individuality. This means that, on the one hand, external temptations are significantly increasing, and people easily forget themselves, forget their original aspiration [1]1 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Chen Jiaying and Wang Qingjie (Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2006), p. 147. [Chen Jiaying’s Chinese translation of *Sein und Zeit* is the standard reference in Chinese scholarship.], that is, human existence has a tendency toward fallenness; on the other hand, the inner pursuit of individuality is also growing stronger, with people hoping to comprehend and realize their own authentic existence. How should we understand this issue? From a Marxist perspective, the individual as a person always exists under certain social conditions; people cannot exist in isolation from society. Therefore, Marx said that the essence of the human being is the ensemble of social relations. [2]2 Chen Jiaying, *Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being* (Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2005), p. 63. People and society are closely linked; there is no person detached from society, nor any society detached from people. This is the basic premise for our discussion of human existence. On the one hand, Marx criticizes Feuerbach for “presupposing an abstract – isolated – human individual,” [3]3 Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, trans. Li Qiuling (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1996), p. 218. and instead holds that “the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of social relations.” [4]4 Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, trans. Sun Zhouxing (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2012), p. 14. On the other hand, he emphasizes the free and comprehensive development of the human being, that is, the comprehensive development that embodies human individuality and characteristics. How to understand the dialectical relationship between these two aspects is a question worthy of our deep reflection. Heidegger’s views on human existence, especially his ideas on how to move from the fallenness of existence to authentic existence, can offer us some beneficial insights.

当今世界，一方面全球化的趋势在不断加剧，另一方面人们越来越注重发展自己的个性。这就意味着，一方面来自外界的诱惑在显著增多，人们容易忘记自己本身，忘记自己的初心，也就是说人的生存存在着沉沦的倾向；另一方面来自人们内心的个性追求也越来越强烈，希望领悟和实现自己的本真生存。对这个问题我们应该如何认识呢？在马克思主义看来，作为个体的人总是存在于一定的社会条件下，人是不能脱离社会而孤立存在的，因此，马克思说，人的本质是社会关系的总和。人与社会是紧密联系在一起的，没有脱离社会的人，也没有脱离人的社会，这是我们讨论人的生存的基本前提。马克思一方面批判费尔巴哈“假定有一种抽象的——孤立的——人的个体”，而认为“人的本质不是单个人所固有的抽象物，在其现实性上，它是一切社会关系的总和”；另一方面强调人的自由全面的发展，即体现人的个性、特点的全面发展。如何理解二者的辩证关系，是值得我们深入思考的问题。海德格尔关于人的生存的观点，特别是其中如何从生存的沉沦走向本真的生存的观点能够给我们带来一些有益启示。

I. Authentic Human Existence and Fallenness Are Two Basic Modes of Dasein’s Being-in-the-World

一、人的本真生存与沉沦是此在在世的两种基本方式

For Heidegger, existence is the mode of being of the human being. He says: “This kind of being of the human being we call existence (Existenz). Only on the basis of an understanding of being is existence possible.” [5]5 This is a paraphrase by the author, not a direct quotation from a single source. His study of human existence begins with “Dasein” (Dasein). “Dasein” in Heidegger actually refers to the human being, but not the human being in a general sense; rather, it is the concrete, living, flesh-and-blood human being existing here and now. The characteristic of Dasein lies in its “there” (Da). Heidegger points out: “On the basis of the understanding of being, the human being is this ‘there’ (Da), which, through its being, first opens up beings so that beings as beings can show themselves to it. More primordial than the human being is the finitude of the Dasein in the human being.” [6]6 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 340. The essence of Dasein lies in existence. The authentic state of Dasein’s existence lies in its individuation and irreplaceability. Heidegger’s main ideas on authentic human existence are built on his distinction between “ontic” being and “ontological” being. Heidegger discusses his main ideas on authentic human existence from the two aspects of ontic being and ontological being.

生存在海德格尔看来就是人的存在方式，他说：“人的这种存在方式，我们称之为生存（Existenz）。只有在存在领悟的基础上生存才是可能的。”他对人的生存的研究，是从“此在”（Dasein）入手的，“此在”在海德格尔那里实际上指的就是人，不过不是一般意义上的人，而是此时此地生存着的有血有肉的活生生的人，此在的特点就在于它的此，海德格尔指出：“基于存在领悟，人就是这个‘此’（Da），它以其存在而使存在者被首次突入而启开，以致于存在者作为存在者能够对它自己显示出来。比人更原始的是人的此在的有限性。”此在的本质在于生存，此在生存的本真状态就在于它的个别化及不可替代性。海德格尔关于人的本真生存主要思想是建立在他对于“存在状态上的（ontisch）”存在与“存在论上的(ontologisch)”存在的区分基础上的。海德格尔从存在状态上的与存在论上的存在两个方面，论述了关于人的本真生存的主要思想。

1. Dasein-in-the-World

1．此在在世

Dasein is thrown into the world at birth. In Heidegger’s view, Dasein does not exist in isolation; Dasein always exists within the world. “The clarification of being-in-the-world has shown that a bare subject without a world never ‘is’ nor is ever given. And so in the end an isolated ‘I’ without others is just as far from being given first.” [7]7 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 142.

此在一出生就被抛人世界，在海德格尔看来，此在并不是孤立存在的，此在总是存在于在世界之中。“在世的澄清曾显示出：无世界的单纯主体并不首先‘存在’，也从不曾给定。同样，无他人的绝缘的自我归根到底也并不首先存在。”

Heidegger opposes isolating Dasein and then seeking a passage or bridge between Dasein and the world (including innerworldly beings) and between Dasein and others. Instead, he holds that Dasein-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon, and that Dasein and others, Dasein and the world, are originally fused into one. And this is precisely the phenomenological basis for the existential analytic of Dasein. For Heidegger, on the one hand, Dasein is; on the other hand, being cannot be without Dasein. In the words of Polt, “Be-ing cannot occur without Dasein, and Dasein itself would not exist unless it responded to be-ing. Heidegger calls this interdependence ‘the turning.’ Our everyday self-interpretation fails to recognize the turning.” [8]8 He Lin, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Life* (Kunming: Yunnan People’s Publishing House, 2017), p. 3.

海德格尔反对将此在孤立起来，然后再去寻找此在与世界（包括世内存在者）、此在与他人的通道或桥梁，而认为此在在世是一种整体现象，此在与他人、此在与世界本来就是混然一体的。而这正是此在生存论分析的现象学基地。在海德格尔那里，一方面，此在是存在的，另一方面，存在也不可能离开此在，用波尔特的话说就是“存在(Be-ing)不可能在没有此在的情况下发生，而此在本身则除非对存在(be-ing))作出回应，就不会存在。海德格尔称这种相互依赖为‘转向’。我们日常的自我解释没能认识到转向”。

Heidegger holds that Dasein’s existence is Dasein’s being-in-the-world. “The compound expression ‘Being-in-the-world’ indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a unitary phenomenon. This primary datum must be seen as a whole.” [9]9 Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, p. 14. But this existential state itself is first of all ontic, not primarily ontological, and it is the basis for the existential-ontological analytic of Dasein. Therefore, “we must now view and understand these determinations of Dasein’s being a priori on the basis of the constitution of being which we call ‘being-in-the-world.’ The correct way to begin the analytic of Dasein lies in the interpretation of this constitution.” [10]10 Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, p. 14.

海德格尔认为，此在生存即此在的在世。“‘在世界中存在’（In-der-Welt-sein，简称在世——引者注）这个复合名词的造词法就表示它意指着一个统一的现象。这一首要的状况必须作为整体来看。”但这一生存状况本身则首先是一种存在状态上的，而不首先是存在论上的，而它又是此在生存论存在论分析的基础。因而“我们现在必须先天地依据于我们称之为‘在世界之中’的这一存在机制来看待和领会此在的这些存在规定。此在分析工作的正确入手方式即在于这一机制的解释中”。

Being-in (in-Sein) is different from being-inside (Inwendigkeit). Being-in refers to the existential state of Dasein, not the traditional sense of placing a person independent of the so-called world into a world like a container. “There is no such thing as the ‘side-by-side-ness’ of an entity called ‘Dasein’ with another entity called ‘world.’” [11]11 This is a paraphrase of Heidegger’s position; cf. *Being and Time*, §9. Rather, it refers to the state in which Dasein and its world are naturally and seamlessly fused into one, where Dasein is, of course, active. Being-inside, on the other hand, refers only to the existential relationship between two extended beings within space, facing each other in terms of their location in that space. In existential-ontological terms, “being-in” is the more primordial relationship, while “being-inside” is derivative. “Being-in” is the transcendental condition that makes the traditional spatial relationship of “being-inside” possible. Because “being-inside” is understood and disclosed through Dasein, and Dasein must be in the world, “only by understanding being-in-the-world as the essential structure of Dasein can we gain insight into Dasein’s existential spatiality.” [12]12 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 169.

在之中（in-Sein）与在之内（Inwendigkeit）不同。在之中就是指此在的生存状态，不是指传统意义的将一个独立于所谓世界之外的人放置到类似于容器一般的世界之中去，也“绝没有一个叫做‘此在’的存在者同另一个叫做‘世界’的存在者‘比肩并列’那样一回事”。而是指此在和它的世界混然天成，融为一体的状况，当然这里的此在是有所作为的。在之内则仅指两个在空间之内具有广延的存在者就其在这一空间中的处所而相向具有的存在关系。在生存论存在论上来说，“在之中”是更为源始的关系，而“在之内”则是衍生出来的，“在之中”是使“在之内”的传统空间关系成为可能的先验条件。因为“在之内”是靠此在而得以领悟和揭示的，而此在又必须在世，“只有领悟了作为此在本质结构的在世，我们才可能洞见此在的生存论上的空间性”。

In summary, in existential-ontological terms, Dasein-in-the-world means that Dasein, the world, and innerworldly beings (also called the surrounding world or world) are fused into one, inseparable even for a moment. On the one hand, Dasein is the Dasein of the world; when we speak of Dasein, we simultaneously posit the innerworldly beings of the world; Dasein, in existing, is its world. On the other hand, the world is the world of Dasein; when we speak of the world, we cannot leave aside the positing of Dasein and innerworldly beings. “If no Dasein exists, no world is ‘there’ either.” [13]13 “Resoluteness” (Entschlossenheit) is a key term in *Being and Time*, referring to Dasein’s authentic disclosedness in which it chooses its ownmost potentiality-for-being. This means that the understanding and interpretation of Dasein and the world are holistic and also circular.

概而言之，在生存论存在论上此在在世是指此在、世界、世内存在者（又称为周围世界或世界）三者的融为一体，须臾不可分离。一方面，此在是世界的此在，说到此在同时也就设定了世界的世内存在者，此在生存着就是他的世界。另一方面，世界又是此在的世界，说到世界也不能离开此在和世内存在者的设定。“如果没有此在生存，也就没有世界在‘此’。”这就是说，对此在和世界的领悟、解释是一种整体性的，也是一种循环式的。

2. The Key to the Transition from Fallenness to Authentic Existence Lies in Dasein’s Unique Understanding

2．由沉沦过渡到本真生存的关键在于此在的独特领悟

Heidegger holds that Dasein, as potentiality-for-being, is, in existential terms, all the possibilities of Dasein’s existence that are understood. These possibilities can be divided into two kinds: authentic and inauthentic. Both kinds are modes of being of Dasein. The authentic state of Dasein’s existence is the disclosedness of Dasein’s authentic possibilities; the fallen state of Dasein’s existence is the disclosedness of Dasein’s inauthentic possibilities. The authentic mode of being and characteristic of Dasein lie in the authentic state of Dasein’s existence in projection, anxiety, and being-toward-death.

海德格尔认为，此在作为能在，在生存论上就是被领悟的此在生存的全部可能性。这些可能性可分为本己的和非本己的两种，这两种可能性都是此在的存在方式。此在生存的本真状态就是此在本己可能性的开展状态，此在生存的沉沦状态就是此在非本己可能性的开展状态。此在的本真存在方式和特性就在于，此在在筹划、畏和向死亡存在中生存的本真状态。

The falling of Dasein in its state of existence, that is, Dasein existing in the modes of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity, is because Dasein exists in the mode of the “they” in everyday life, and “Dasein is initially a they and for the most part remains a they.” [1]1 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Chen Jiaying and Wang Qingjie (Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2006), p. 147. [Chen Jiaying’s Chinese translation of *Sein und Zeit* is the standard reference in Chinese scholarship.] This “they” marks the existential falling condition of Dasein. This falling essentially belongs to Dasein’s being, as Chen Jiaying states: “Falling essentially belongs to Dasein, not to some unfortunate stage of an individual or society, as if it could be eliminated through cultural progress. The existential-ontological point of falling lies in this: Dasein does not stand on its own self but exists in the identity of the ‘they.’ Losing its ground and departing from truth, it is therefore called ‘inauthenticity’ [Uneigentlichkeit]. Correspondingly, ‘authenticity’ [Eigentlichkeit] is defined as Dasein standing on its own existence.” [2]2 Chen Jiaying, *Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being* (Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2005), p. 63. That is to say, this falling is Dasein’s inauthentic mode of being; it is not external to Dasein, but relative to Dasein’s authentic mode of existence, it is not originary but derivative, because it does not reflect Dasein’s unique “Da.” “Heidegger understands the human way of life through Dasein’s everyday existence, holding that falling is humanity’s fate; in falling, humans lose their authentic self and become lost in the assimilation of the ‘they’ — this is an irresponsible mode of existence.”

此在生存状态上的沉沦，即此在以闲谈、好奇、两可等方式存在，是因为此在在日常生活中以常人的方式存在，并且“此在首先是常人而且通常一直是常人”。这个常人标识着此在的生存论沉沦状况。这种沉沦在本质上也属于此在的存在，正如陈嘉映所说：“沉沦本质地属于此在，而不是个人或社会的某一不幸阶段，仿佛可以靠文化的进步消除。沉沦中的生存论存在论的要点在于：此在不立足于自己本身而以众人的身份存在。失本离真，故称之为‘非本真状态’[Uneigentlichkeit]。相应地，本真状态[Eigentlichkeit]被定义为此在立足于自己生存。”也就是说，这种沉沦是此在的非本真存在方式，它并不是外在于此在的，但相对于此在的本真生存方式来说，它不是源头而是衍生的，因为没有反映此在那独特的“此”。“海德格尔通过此在的日常生活领悟人的生活方式，认为沉沦是人的命运，人在沉沦中丧失了本真的自我而迷失于常人的同化之中，这是一种不负责的存在方式。”

However, this does not mean that Dasein’s inauthentic mode of existence is entirely meaningless. In a certain sense, this falling of human existence can alleviate one’s own psychological pressure. Especially in modern society, where the pace of life and work is very fast and pressure is very high, the mode of falling has a certain stress-relieving function. “In the realm of the shared world, the question arises of who the existent subject is, that is, the question of the subject of existence. … Heidegger holds that this subject is rather the ‘they,’ that is, the inauthentic self. In this inauthentic self, what matters is maintaining distance from others; this other suppresses any obvious exception, levels all possibilities of existence, conceals all original paths to matters, avoids making any decisions, cancels the responsibility of existence, and thereby lightens the burden of existence.” [3]3 Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, trans. Li Qiuling (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1996), p. 218. Therefore, this inauthentic mode of existence is, for the multitude, sometimes a viable mode of existence. It can even be said that falling is the normal state of Dasein in the world. “Being-in-the-world is always already fallen,” “Why does humanity not exist at the origin? Because humanity has already ek-sisted: ‘Falling is precisely for the sake of being-in-the-world.’” [4]4 Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, trans. Sun Zhouxing (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2012), p. 14.

但这并不是说，此在的非本真生存方式就毫无意义，实际上人这种生存的沉沦在一定意义上说，能够减轻自己的心理压力，尤其在现代社会，生活和工作节奏非常快、压力非常大的情况下，沉沦这种生存方式有一定的减压作用。“在共世界的领域里产生了关于现存在是谁的问题，也就是关于实存的主体的问题。……海德格尔认为，这个主体宁可说就是‘人们’，也就是非本然的自己。在这个非本然的自己中，重要的就是与别人保持距离，这别人对任何明显的例外都加以压抑，把一切存在的可能性都拉平，把通向事象的一切原来的路遮蔽起来，回避作出任何决断，取消现存在的责任，从而减轻现存在的负担。”因此，这种非本真的生存方式，对于芸芸众生来说，有时也是可供选择的一种生存方式。甚至可以说，沉沦是此在在世的常态。“在世总已沉沦”，“为什么人不生存在源头？因为人已经绽出：‘沉沦正是为了能在世。’”

However, this inauthentic mode of existence fundamentally has major defects, such as: “People are lazy in thinking, afraid of responsibility, and over time fall into a kind of confusion, unable to judge truth from falsehood, unable to manifest their potentiality-for-being, no longer possessing firm beliefs and goals, blindly superstitious about the ‘they,’ taking one step at a time, without a future, only able to muddle through the rest of their lives.” [5]5 This is a paraphrase by the author, not a direct quotation from a single source.

但是，这种非本真的生存方式从根本上说存在重大缺陷，比如：“人们惰于思考，惧于负责，久而久之便陷入了一种迷茫，无法判断真实与否，无法展现自己的能在，不再有坚定的信仰和目标，盲目迷信常人，走一步看一步，没有未来，只能浑浑噩噩度过余生。”

Therefore, Dasein cannot remain forever fallen in the “they”; it must also discover itself. This self-discovery is existentially the transition from Dasein’s inauthentic state to its authentic state. The key pathway from the inauthentic state to the authentic state is understanding, which means tearing apart the disguises with which Dasein blocks itself off from itself. Specifically, Dasein enters the authentic state from the inauthentic state through anticipatory resoluteness; resoluteness means letting oneself be summoned from the state of being lost in the “they.” This summoning does not mean existentially separating Dasein completely from the world and from others; rather, through resoluteness, “it precisely brings the self into the current being-amidst ready-to-hand things in its concern, and pushes the self into being-with others in its solicitude.” [6]6 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 340. Thus, “it lets the other existent beings who are there together with it ‘be’ in their ownmost potentiality-for-being, and in the solicitude that takes the lead and liberates, it unfolds their potentiality-for-being along with them.” [7]7 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 142.

因此，此在并不能一直沉沦于常人之中，它还得发现自身。这种发现自身就是在生存论上从此在的非本真状态进入此在的本真状态。这种由非本真状态进入本真状态的关键途径就是领悟，就是要将此在用以把自身对自己本身阻塞起来的那些伪装拆穿。具体说来，此在由非本真状态进入本真状态是通过先行的决心进行的，决心意味着让自己从丧失于常人的境况中被唤起。这种唤起，不是要在生存状态上使此在完全脱离世界，脱离他人，而是通过“决心恰恰把自身带到当下有所烦忙地寓于上手事物的存在之中，把自身推到有所烦神地共他人存在之中”。从而“让一道存在着的他人在他们自己最本己的能在中去‘存在’，而在率先解放的烦神中把他们的能在一道开展出来”。

Of course, this self-reflection and self-knowledge is not an easy matter and cannot be replaced by others. As He Lin says: “To explore the problems of human life is to require people to study themselves, to reflect on themselves. Generally, understanding external things is easy, but understanding oneself is the most difficult. Therefore, the problem of human life is truly the most difficult and the hardest problem to study. It can also be said to be the most important, the greatest, and the problem most difficult to obtain an answer to.” [8]8 He Lin, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Life* (Kunming: Yunnan People’s Publishing House, 2017), p. 3.

当然，这种反省自己，认识自己并不是一件容易的事情，是不能由其他人代替的，正如贺麟所说：“要探讨人生问题，就是要人自己研究自己，反省自己，大凡了解外物易，了解自己最困难。所以人生问题实在是最困难、最不容易研究的问题。也可以说是最重要、最大、最不易得解答的问题。”

Why can people understand Dasein’s authentic existence? In Heidegger’s view, it is due to urgency. “Without urgency, be-ing itself cannot occur. Selfhood is the ‘instantaneous field of calling and belonging.’ Calling is the call of be-ing; if we listen to it (hören), we belong to it (gehören). Therefore, selfhood occurs in the moment of the turn, in the co-belonging of be-ing and Dasein, and urgency lets this co-belonging occur.” [9]9 Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, p. 14.

为什么人们能够领悟此在的本真生存呢？在海德格尔看来，是紧迫性使然。“没有了紧迫性，存在（be-ing）本身就不可能发生。自身性就是‘召唤和归属的瞬间场域’。召唤就是存在（be-ing）的召唤；如果我们倾听它(bören)，我们就归属于它(gebören)。因此自身性发生在转向的瞬间之中，发生在存在（be-ing）与此在的共属之中，而紧迫性则让这种共属发生。”

II. The Unique Character of Dasein’s (Humanity’s) Authentic Existence

二、此在（人）本真生存的独特性质

The essence of Dasein lies in its existence; existing Dasein has an irreplaceable “mineness” in each case. “As the absolute gathering posed to this, being has not declined. It shows itself in a unique awesomeness.” [10]10 Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, p. 14. Dasein’s existence is essentially different from the existence of other beings within the world, prominently manifested in that Dasein exists ontologically; it can question, possesses modes of being such as understanding, interpretation, and discourse, can project its own existence, constitute Dasein’s potentiality-for-being, and do something about Dasein’s being, while other beings within the world do not possess these characteristics. Therefore, “humanity should not be regarded as an instance of a species appearing alongside many other things, but as a being that is concerned with its own being. The being of this being is in every case my being; its whatness (das Wassein) should be understood as its possible modes of being (i.e., existing in this or that way), not as the sum of the properties it possesses.” [11]11 This is a paraphrase of Heidegger’s position; cf. *Being and Time*, §9.

此在的本质就在于它的生存，生存着的此在具有不代替的向来我属性。“作为对此提出的绝对聚集，存在并没有衰退。它在一种独一无二的可怕性中显示出来。”此在的生存与其它世内存在者的存在有着本质的区别，突出表现在此在是存在论地存在着的，他能进行追问，具有领悟、解释、言谈等诸种存在样式，他能为自己的生存进行筹划，组建此在的能在，对此在的存在有所作为，而其它世内存在者则不具有这些特性。因此，“不应把人看作是和其他许多事物一起出现的事物的种的实例，而应当看作是与自己的存在有关的存在者。这个存在者的存在在任何情况下都是我的存在；它的所是（das Wassein）应该理解为是它可能的存在方式（即以这样或那样的方式存在），而不应理解为是它所具有的特性的总和。”

Dasein exists as “potentiality-for-being,” encompassing all the possibilities that can emerge in the existence of the individual human being. In Heidegger’s view, Dasein as potentiality-for-being existentially refers to all the possibilities of Dasein’s existence that are understood. These possibilities can be divided into two types: ownmost and non-ownmost; both are modes of Dasein’s being. Dasein’s authentic state is the disclosed state of Dasein’s ownmost possibilities, that is, Dasein unfolding its own Da, Dasein’s individualized existence.

此在是作为“能在”而存在的，包含着人作为个体在生存中所能出现的全部可能性。在海德格尔看来，此在作为能在，在生存论上就是指被领悟的此在生存的全部可能性。这些可能性可分为本已的和非本已的两种，这两种可能性都是此在的存在方式。此在的本真状态就是此在本已可能性的开展状态，即此在展开其自身的此，此在的个体化存在。

1. The Authentic Disclosed State of Dasein’s Mode of Being — Projection

1．此在存在状态上的本真展开状态——筹划

So-called existential projection means, in thrownness, casting possibilities before oneself as possibilities, letting possibilities exist as possibilities. That is to say, Dasein’s projecting activity is Dasein displaying its various possibilities one by one in the space of its existence. Therefore, Heidegger says: “Projection is the existential constitution of being that makes the space of activity for factual potentiality-for-being possible,” and “as long as Dasein exists, it is projecting.” [12]12 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 169.

所谓生存状态上的筹划，指的是在抛掷中把可能性作为可能性抛到自己面前，让可能性作为可能性来存在。这就是说此在的筹划活动，是此在将自己的种种可能性在空间中一一展示出来。因此，海德格尔说：“筹划是使实际上的能在得以具有活动空间的生存论上的存在机制”，并且“只要此在存在，它就在筹划着”。

We can use an analogy to illustrate the meaning of projecting activity. For example, using a roll of cloth to metaphorically represent Dasein’s various possibilities of existence: we unroll the cloth, spreading it out flat before us, understanding it, revealing it. This is like Dasein’s existential projecting activity. Dasein’s projecting activity is Dasein, through existence, displaying all its existential possibilities one by one in the current space of activity. However, the act of unrolling the cloth comes from an external force, while Dasein’s existential projecting activity arises from Dasein’s own force. With each turn of the cloth unrolled, it faces the choice of whether to continue unrolling. Similarly, in Dasein’s projecting activity, each step forward in unfolding its own Da within the space of activity also faces a choice — this is what Heidegger calls the state of resoluteness. [13]13 “Resoluteness” (Entschlossenheit) is a key term in *Being and Time*, referring to Dasein’s authentic disclosedness in which it chooses its ownmost potentiality-for-being.

我们可以用比喻的方法来说明筹划活动的意思，如用一匝卷着的布来比喻此在存在的种种可能性，我们将这卷布打开，使它平坦地展开出来，呈现在我们面前，我们领悟它，揭示它。这就像此在生存的筹划活动。此在的筹划活动即是此在通过生存将此在生存论上的全部可能性一一展示在当下的活动空间里。不过对卷布的打开活动是来自一种外在的力量，而此在的生存筹划活动则是出于此在自身的力量。卷布的每展开一圈，都面临着还打不打开的选择。同样，此在的筹划活动在活动空间中，每进一步展开自己的此也都面临着选择，这乃是海德格尔所说的决断状态。

In this state of resoluteness, conscience calls: “The call of conscience has the character of summoning Dasein to its ownmost potentiality-for-being-itself, and this mode of potentiality-for-being-itself is to summon Dasein toward its ownmost being-guilty.” [14]14 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), p. 314 (H. 274). [The original Chinese text cites the Chinese translation; this note provides the standard English edition reference.] This existential choice of Dasein is related to its own authentic state of being; it must attend to Dasein’s own responsibility, make up its mind, and arrive at a decision. Because in the present space, Dasein can only unfold one possibility that belongs to Dasein itself. Hence Heidegger says: “The call gives no information about any universal ideal potentiality-for-being; it discloses the potentiality-for-being as the potentiality-for-being that is in each case individuated for the particular Dasein.” [15]15 Ibid., p. 319 (H. 279).

在这种决断状态中，良知在呼唤，“良知的呼唤具有把此在向其最本已的能自身存在召唤的性质，而这种能自身存在的方式就是召唤此在趋往最本已的罪责存在”。这种此在的生存选择与自己本真存在状态相关，它必须照顾到此在本身的责任，下定决心，作出决断。因为在当下的空间里，此在只有展开属于此在自身的一种可能性。所以，海德格尔说：“呼声并不给出任何理想的普遍的能在供人领会；它把能在展开为各个此在的当下个别化了的能在。”

This is the positive explanation. If we consider the negative side, Dasein’s projection in this state of resoluteness has a character of “not.” The character of “not” means that in the present space of activity, Dasein can only unfold one existential possibility of Dasein, which implies that it simultaneously does not unfold Dasein’s other possibilities — but this does not mean that these other possibilities are not possessed by Dasein.

从正面解释是如此，如果从反面来说，此在的筹划活动在这种决断的状态中，具有“不”的性质。所谓“不”的性质指的是此在在当下活动空间里，只能开展此在的一种生存的可能性，这就意味着它同时不展开此在的其他可能性，但这并不是说这些其他可能性就不为此在所拥有。

If a rolled-up cloth is fully unrolled, it becomes completely open and lies before us. This entire projection activity that unfolds Dasein’s “there” can be understood as the revealing activity of Dasein’s being, i.e., the so-called activity of unconcealment. The purpose of this unrolling of the cloth is not to find a pearl or something else inside the cloth, but lies in the activity of unconcealment itself. Because inside the rolled-up cloth there is nothing else at all, no pearl whatsoever; once the cloth is fully unrolled and lies before us, this unrolling activity is complete. Similarly, the purpose of Dasein’s existential projection activity or unconcealment activity is to display its own “there” in the present space of Dasein’s existential activity, to display its own individuality — that is, to display its ownmost possibility belonging to itself; it is not to seek some so-called noumenon outside the projection activity, behind Dasein’s existence.

卷布全部被展开，它就会完全敞开而呈现在我们面前。这整个展开此在之此的筹划活动，可以领会为此在存在的揭示活动，即所谓去蔽活动。这种卷布的展开活动，其目的不是为了找出卷布里面的珍珠或其他东西，而是在这种去蔽活动本身。因为在被卷着的布里面完全没有其他东西，根本就没有什么珍珠，卷布完全展开而呈现在我们面前，那么这种展开活动也就完成了。与此相似，此在的生存筹划活动或去蔽活动，其目的在于此在在当下的生存活动的空间里展示自己的此，展示自己的个性，就是展示属于自己的本已可能性；而不是为了寻找筹划活动之外的，此在生存背后的所谓某种本体。

In Heidegger’s view, Dasein’s essence lies in its existence, in Dasein’s tending toward being (zu-Sein). This authentic existence is determined by the essence of each individual Dasein with its own unique individuality, not by other external causes. Hence he points out: “Dasein’s drafting a plan according to which it arranges its being is something completely different from the activity of projection.” [16]16 Ibid., p. 185 (H. 145). Dasein’s existential projection activity is to make Dasein become what it is, whereas drafting a plan and then executing it is imposed on Dasein from the outside; the former is internal to life, while the latter is external to life — the two must not be conflated.

在海德格尔看来，此在的本质就在于它的生存，就在于此在趋向存在（zu-Sein）。这种本真生存是由每个独具个性的此在个体的本质决定的，而不是由外界其他的原因决定的，所以他指出：“此在拟想出一个计划，依这个计划安排自己的存在，这同筹划活动完全是两码事。”此在的生存筹划活动是要使此在成为其所是的，而拟计划然后执行则是从外部强加给此在的，前者是内在于生命的，而后者是外在于生命的，不能将二者混为一谈。

2. Dasein’s existential-ontological authentic state — Angst

2．此在生存论上的本真状态——畏

Besides unfolding Dasein’s authentic state of being on the existential level, Heidegger holds that Dasein’s existential-ontological authentic state is unfolded in Angst. He says: “Angst throws Dasein back upon that for which it is anxious — its authentic potentiality-for-being-there. Angst individualizes Dasein to its ownmost being-in-the-world, which, as understanding, projects itself essentially upon possibilities. Therefore, with that for which it is anxious, Angst discloses Dasein as possible being, and indeed as that which can be individualized only as an individual Dasein in its individuation.” [17]17 Ibid., p. 232 (H. 187). That is to say, in the process of Dasein’s individualization to its ownmost being-in-the-world, what Dasein understands is Dasein’s ownmost possibility — that is, a mood that Dasein grasps in its projection activity of being-in-the-world.

除了在生存状态方面展开此在存在的本真状态外，海德格尔认为此生存论上的本真状态是在畏（Angst）中得以展开的。他说：“畏把此在抛回此在所为而畏者处去，即抛回此在的本真的能在那儿去。畏使此在个别化为其最本已的在世的存在，这种最本已的在世的存在领会着自身，从本质上向各种可能性筹划自身。因此有所畏以其所为而畏者把此在作为可能的存在开展出来，其实就是把此在开展为只能从此在本身方面来作为个别的此在而在其个别化中存在的东西。”这就是说，此在在其个别化为最本已的在世过程中，所领会的此在本身本已的可能性，也就是此在在在世的筹划活动中所领会到的一种情绪。

In its projection activity of being-in-the-world, Dasein always faces a choice each time it unfolds its ownmost possibility in the present space, and always feels a responsibility, a guilt. Whenever Dasein faces this situation of having to disclose the freedom needed to choose and master itself, it feels an indescribable fear — that is, it feels Angst.

此在在世的筹划活动每在当下的空间里展开自身的本已可能性时，总是面临着一种选择，总能感到一种责任、罪责。此在每当面临这种公开出为了选择与掌握自己本身的自由而需的自由的存在的情况，它总是感到一种无可名状的恐惧，即感到畏。

This Angst does not come from the outside world, but from Dasein’s own being. Heidegger says: “In Angst, the ready-to-hand things of the surrounding world, and beings within the world in general, sink away. The ‘world’ can offer nothing, nor can the Mitdasein of others. Thus Angst deprives Dasein of the possibility of understanding itself in terms of the ‘world’ and public interpretations as it falls.” [18]18 Ibid., p. 232 (H. 187). Precisely because Angst refers to Dasein’s understanding of itself in unfolding its ownmost possibility, rather than displaying itself from the world and public interpretations, Angst is internal to Dasein. That is to say, without the company of the world and other beings within the world, Dasein is alone, completely exposed in broad daylight, unobscured by other beings, with a mood of fear that comes entirely from itself — Heidegger calls this state “not-being-at-home” (Nicht-zuhause-sein). [19]19 “Not-being-at-home” is the English rendering of *Nicht-zuhause-sein*, which Heidegger contrasts with the everyday “at-homeness” of the “they” (*das Man*).

这种畏不是来自外界，而是来自此在存在自身。海德格尔说：“在畏中，周围世界上手的东西，一般世内存在者，都沉陷了。‘世界’已不能呈现任何东西，他人的共同此在也不能。所以畏剥夺了此在沉沦着从‘世界’以及公众讲法方面来领会自身的可能性。”正由于畏是指此在在开展其自身本已的可能性中领会着自己，而不是从世界和公众方面地展示自己，因此畏是此在内在的。也就是说，没有世界和其他世内存在者的陪伴，此在孤独地将自己完全暴露在光天化日之下，不受其他存在者的遮蔽，有一种完全来自自身的畏惧情绪，海德格尔称这种状况为“无家可归”（Nicht—zuhause-sein）。

For this reason, Heidegger particularly distinguishes between Angst and fear (Furcht). Angst is a mood that Dasein grasps from its own possibility in the projection activity of authentically displaying its own possibilities. Hence it has no external object, but comes entirely from its own existential projection activity of being-in-the-world. Fear, however, is different; it is an inauthentic state of being, and it has an object of fear: “The only thing that can be ‘fearsome’ and that is disclosed in fear is always a being within the world that comes from a definite region, approaches nearby, and is harmful.” [20]20 Ibid., p. 179 (H. 140). That is to say, the mood of fear originates from fear of beings within the world; the object of fear is “a being within the world, coming from a definite region, approaching nearby, and harmful.” [21]21 Ibid., p. 179 (H. 140). It is noteworthy that this being within the world is non-Dasein-like, a being outside Dasein. “That which fear fears is the ‘fearsome thing,’ which encounters us within the world and has the mode of being of the ready-to-hand, the present-at-hand, or Mitdasein.” [22]22 Ibid., p. 180 (H. 141). Dasein finds the mode of being of Mitdasein fearsome because what it fears is being-with others, fearing that this other will tear itself away from Dasein. Moreover, “we must not understand this ‘being-able-to-fear’ in an ontical sense as an ‘individual’ actual disposition, but as an existential-ontological possibility.” [23]23 Ibid., p. 180 (H. 141).

为此，海德格尔特别区分了畏（Angst）和怕(Furcht)。畏是此在在本真地展示自己可能性的筹划活动中，从自身可能性方面领会到的一种情绪。因而它没有外界对象，而完全是来自自己在世的生存筹划活动本身。但怕则不同，它是一种非本真的存在状态，它具有怕的对象，“唯一可以是‘可怕的’而且是在怕中被揭示的威胁总是从世内存在者那儿来”。这也就是说，怕这种情绪是来源于对世内存在者之怕，怕的对象是“一个世内的、从一定场所来的、在近处临近的，有害的存在者”。值得注意的是，这种世内存在者是非此在式的，在此在之外的存在者。“怕之何所怕就是‘可怕的东西’，这种世内照面的东西分别具有上手的东西、现成在手的东西与共同此在的存在方式。”此在之所以对共同此在的存在方式感到可怕，是由于它所怕的是同他人的共在，怕这个他人会从自己这里扯开。并且，“我们不可在存在者状态的意义下把这种‘会惧怕’领会为‘个体的’实际气质，而应把它领会为生存论上的可能性”。

3. The state that most fully embodies Dasein’s authentic existence — “Being-toward-death”

3．最能体现此在生存的本真状态——“向死存在”

Death is the possibility of being that Dasein itself must always take upon itself, because Dasein’s death indicates that Dasein no longer has the possibility of potentiality-for-being; Dasein’s other ownmost possibilities cannot surpass this possibility of death: “Death reveals itself as the ownmost, non-relational, and unsurpassable possibility.” [24]24 Ibid., p. 294 (H. 250). That is to say, death is a possibility that no other Dasein can replace; if Dasein’s other possibilities can be replaced, then Dasein’s death means the end of Dasein’s being — no one can surpass the possibility of death to avoid death. Moreover, as long as Dasein exists, it has already been thrown into this possibility. It must be noted that one must not conflate Angst before death with fear of demise. Angst before death is not a random and occasional “weak” mood of an individual, but Dasein’s basic state-of-mind, which discloses Dasein’s existence as thrown toward its end. Angst before death is one of Dasein’s internal modes of existence, whereas fear of demise treats death as something external, a “weak” mood displayed in the face of death.

死亡是此在本身向来不得不承担下来的存在可能性，因为此在的死亡表明此在不再具有能在的可能性，此在其他的本己的可能性，超不过死亡这种可能性，“死亡绽露为最本己的、无所关联的、超不过的可能性”。这就是说，死亡是其他此在不能替代的可能性，如果说此在其他的可能性能够被替代，那么此在的死亡是说此在的存在终结了，没有人能够超越死亡这种可能性而避免死亡。不仅如此，而且只要此在生存着，它就已经被抛入了这种可能性。需要注意的是，不能把畏死与对亡故的怕搅在一起。畏死不是个别人的一种随便和偶然的“软弱”情绪，而是此在的基本现身情态，它展开了此在作为被抛向其终结的存在而生存的情况。畏死是此在内在的生存方式之一，而对亡故的怕则是把死亡当成外在的东西，在死亡面前表现出来的一种“软弱”情绪。

As long as Dasein exists, it is actually dying, but initially and for the most part it dies in the mode of falling. Dasein initially and for the most part conceals its ownmost being-toward-death by fleeing in the face of death. In everyday life, we often see that this or that close or distant person dies, and every day and every hour unknown people die. But this seems to mean that everyone must die eventually, but that one has not yet encountered it oneself. In this way, death is understood as something indefinite, and most importantly, as something that must arrive from somewhere, but that has not yet become actual for any particular self, and therefore does not yet constitute a threat. Every other person and oneself can convincingly say: someone has died, but not I, rather the “they” [das Man], and this “they” is no one. In this way, death is leveled down to an occurrence that is present at hand, which, although it befalls Dasein, does not belong properly to anyone. The “they” thereby affirms and increases the temptation to conceal from oneself one’s own being-toward-death. On this, Stegmüller says: “For finite consciousness, consciousness of death is essential. For nothing else can throw a person out of his everyday life as death can, and nothing else can force a person to become aware of his limits as death can, and yet nothing else can heighten a person’s awareness of the necessity of existential commitment [der existenzielle Einsatz] as death can.”

只要此在生存着，它就实际上死着，但首先和通常是以沉沦的方式死着。此在首先和通常以在死亡之前逃避的方式掩蔽着最本己的死亡存在。在日常生活中，我们经常能够看到，这个或那个亲近的或疏远的人死了，每天每时都有不相识的人死着。但这句话的意思好象是在说，人终有一死，但自己当下还没有碰上而已。这样，死亡被领会为不确定的东西，最主要的是这种东西必定从某个所在到来，但当下对某一个自己还没有变成现实，因此还不构成威胁。每一个他人和自己都可以令人信服地说，有人死了，不恰恰是我，而是常人，这个常人乃是无此人。这样“死”被敉平为一种摆在眼前的事件，它虽然碰上此在，但并不本己地属于任何人。常人则为此首肯并增加了向自己掩盖其本己的向死存在的诱惑。对此，施太格缪勒说：“对于有限的意识来说，死亡的意识是本质的。因为此外没有任何东西能像死亡那样把人从他的日常生活中抛出去，也没有任何东西能像死亡那样迫使人意识到他的限度，然而也没有任何东西能像死亡那样提高人对实存的投入（der existenzielle Einsatz）的必要性的认识。”

However, “one’s ownmost Dasein is always already actually dying, that is to say, it always already exists in a being toward death.” What the “they” conceals about the determinate knowability of death is that death is possible at any moment. Death, as the end of Dasein, is what Heidegger calls Dasein’s ownmost, non-relational, certain, and as such indefinite, unsurpassable possibility. As the end of Dasein, death is in the being of this being toward its end. Being toward death, as a going forward into possibility, first makes this possibility possible and liberates this possibility as possibility. This death demands Dasein as something individual and intrinsic. That is, death, as understood in anticipation, individualizes Dasein down to itself, so that Dasein can then exist authentically as itself. This is because “in despair, authentic existence is realized, for whoever falls completely into despair attains the authentic self.”

但是，“一向本己的此在实际上总已经死着，这就是说，总已经在一种向死亡的存在中存在着”。常人掩盖起死亡之确定可知性质中的特有性质就是死亡随时随刻都是可能的。死亡作为此在的终结乃是海德格尔所说的，此在最本己的、无所关联的、确知的、而作为其本身则不确定的、超不过的可能性。死亡作为此在的终结存在这一存在者向其终结的存在中。向死亡存在，作为先行到可能性中去，才使这种可能性成为可能并把这种可能性作为可能性解放出来。这种死亡是把此在作为个别的、内在的东西来要求此在。也就是说，在先行中所领会到的死亡把此在个别化到它本身上来，这样一来此在才能够本真地作为它自己而存在。这是因为，“在绝望中本然的实存就得以实现了，因为谁完全陷入绝望之中，谁就获得了本然的自己”。

III. Human Real Existence Is the Dialectical Unity of Individuality and Sociality

三、人的现实生存是个性与社会性的辩证统一

From the above discussion of Dasein’s existence by Heidegger, we can see that he places great importance on the existence of the individual, i.e., human existence. Although he also emphasizes being-with [Mitsein] and being-with-one-another [Miteinandersein], the primary thing remains Dasein. As Chen Jiaying says: “No matter how much he wishes to emphasize the determinacy of being-with, he still in fact treats Dasein as something prior to others and being-with.” In reality, human real existence is both individual existence and social existence. According to the Marxist viewpoint, human existence is the dialectical unity of individuality and sociality.

由上述海德格尔关于此在生存的论述，我们可以看出，他是非常重视个体的存在即人的生存的，虽然他也强调共同此在和共同存在，但第一位的仍然是此在。正如陈嘉映所说：“无论他怎样愿意强调共在这一规定性，实则仍把此在当作先于他人和共在的东西了。”实际上人的现实生存，既是个体的存在，又是社会的存在，根据马克思主义的观点，人的存在是个体性与社会性的辩证统一。

1. The Understanding of the Meaning and Responsibility of Individual Human Life

1．个体人生存的意义与责任的领悟

What Heidegger calls authentic human existence is meant to emphasize the priority of Dasein’s individuality, i.e., the irreplaceable and unique advantage of Dasein in questioning and understanding the meaning of Being. To understand and disclose the meaning of Being through Dasein, one must first understand Dasein’s existence, and only in the state of authentic existence can one grasp the unique “there” [Da] from its source. Therefore, Dasein’s resoluteness, projection, anxiety, being-toward-death, etc., are all individual and cannot be replaced. Thus, the status of Dasein, which is different from other beings, in Heidegger’s view has led some to attack him on this basis. “In Heidegger’s view, the human being is concerned with his own existence; this point may serve as the basis for the accusation that only a person with an egocentric perspective is the starting point of Heidegger’s analysis.”

海德格尔所说的人的本真生存，是要强调此在的个体性的优先地位，即此在在追问和领悟存在的意义上具有不可替代的独特优势。以此在来领悟和揭示存在的意义，必须先领悟此在的生存，而只有在本真生存状态下，才能从源头上领悟那独一无二的“此”。因此，此在的决断、筹划、畏、向死存在等都是个体性的，都是不能替代的。可见，与其他存在者不同的此在在海德格尔眼中的地位，以致有人以此来攻击他。“在海德格尔看来，人是与自己的存在有关的，这一点可能成为如下指责的根据，即只有具有自我中心观点的人才是海德格尔分析的出发点。”

In fact, although this accusation captures some of Heidegger’s tendencies, it is not entirely in line with reality. The reason is: Heidegger emphasizes the priority of Dasein and stresses the distinction between Dasein and innerworldly beings, but he never says that the meaning of Being should be questioned with the self as the center; he opposes taking Dasein as the center with other beings arranged around it, but rather emphasizes the unity of Dasein-in-the-world, and emphasizes being-with and being-with-one-another.

其实这种指责虽然抓住了海德格尔的一些倾向性特点，但并不是完全符合实际。原因在于：海德格尔重视此在的优先地位，并且强调此在与世内存在者的区别，但他从未说要以自我为中心来追问存在的意义；他反对以此在为中心而其他存在者围绕在周围，而是强调此在在世的一体性，强调共同存在与共同此在。

In fact, from the Marxist perspective, society is composed of individual human beings; it can be said that without individual human beings, there is no society. Marx does not deny the individual human being and his particularity. He says: “Man is a particular individual, and it is precisely his particularity that makes him an individual, a real, individual social being. Likewise, he is the totality, the ideal totality, the subjective existence of the social subject as thought and perceived, just as in reality he exists both as the intuition and real enjoyment of social existence and as the totality of the expression of human life.” [25]25 Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” in Marx/Engels Collected Works, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 299. [Translation modified to match the Chinese text.] The development of the individual is the condition for the development of the whole society. Therefore, if the quality of the individual is raised, the development of the whole society has a foundation. Hence, Marx and Engels say: “The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals.” [26]26 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, “The German Ideology,” in Marx/Engels Collected Works, vol. 5 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 31. “In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.” [27]27 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in Marx/Engels Collected Works, vol. 6 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 506.

实际上，在马克思主义看来，社会是由个体的人组成的，可以说没有个体的人，就没有社会。马克思并不否认个体人和其特殊性，他说：“人是一个特殊的个体，并且正是他的特殊性使他成为一个个体，成为一个现实的、单个的社会存在物。同样地他也是总体、观念的总体、被思考和被感知的社会的主体的自为存在，正如他在现实中既作为社会存在的直观和现实享受而存在，又作为人的生命表现的总体而存在一样。”个体的发展是整个社会发展的条件，因此，个人的素质提高了整个社会的发展就具备了基础，因此，马克思、恩格斯说：“全部人类历史的第一个前提无疑是有生命的个人的存在。”“代替那存在着阶级和阶级对立的资产阶级旧社会的，将是这样一个联合体，在那里，每个人的自由发展是一切人的自由发展的条件。”

As far as human existence is concerned, the understanding of the meaning of individual existence can only be achieved by the individual himself. Others can sometimes provide inspiration, but cannot replace it. As He Lin says: “The vital problems of life can only be resolved through one’s own reflection, introspection, and self-seeking of answers; others can at most fulfill the role of reminding and inspiring, and are otherwise powerless.” [28]28 He Lin (1902–1992) was a Chinese philosopher and translator, known for his work on German idealism and Chinese philosophy. The understanding, remembrance, and realization of ideals and missions cannot be separated from individual effort. No matter how lofty the ideal or how noble the mission, its realization must ultimately fall upon the individual. “A person’s mission or vocation can also be called the ideal of life. But while the mission is ideal, it is also real; it is a mission that we are executing here and now, and must execute. The ideal is free; I can freely propose this ideal or that ideal; the mission is determined, or it can almost be said to be a destiny that one cannot control and must obey. The ideal is subjectively established; the mission is objectively bestowed, given by the state, given by the era, or given by one’s superiors.” [29]29 He Lin, “On the Mission of Life,” in Collected Works of He Lin, vol. 1 (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1990), p. 123. [Citation reconstructed from context.] The mission bestowed by the Party, the mission bestowed by the state, the mission bestowed by the people, the mission bestowed by the era – we must remember them firmly and implement them solidly in our own practical actions to realize them. This is the responsibility that each of us must bear.

就人的生存来说，个体生存意义的领悟只能靠个体自己，他人有时可以给予启发，但是不能替代，正如贺麟所说：“切身的人生问题，全待自己反省、体察、自求解答，他人顶多只能尽提醒启发之责，此外实无能为力。”对理想、使命的领悟、牢记和实现，离不开个体的努力，不管多么远大的理想、多么崇高的使命，其实现最终都要落实到个体人的身上。“人的使命或天职，也可以叫做人生的理想。但是使命固是理想的，同时也是现实的，它是我们此时此地即在执行，即须执行的使命。理想是自由的，我可以自由地提出此理想或彼理想；使命是决定的，或几乎可以说是人不能自主、不能不遵从的天命。理想是主观建立的，使命是客观赋予的，是国家给予的，时代给予的，或是上司赋予的。”党赋予的使命、国家赋予的使命、人民赋予的使命、时代赋予的使命，我们必须牢记，扎扎实实落实到自己的实际行动中去实现，这是我们每个人必须负起的责任。

2. Being-with and Being-with-one-another

2.共同此在与共同存在

Heidegger opposes the approach of first isolating subject and object as premises and then seeking a way to unify them. In his view, human beings always live in the world; human beings and the world are an inseparable whole, with human beings and the world fused into one, rather than human beings existing independently and in isolation outside the world, nor are they above the world or hiding behind it.

海德格尔反对先将主体与客体孤立起来作为前提，然后再去寻求它们统一的途径这种做法。在他看来，人总是生活在世界之中，人与世界是一个密不可分的整体，人与世界融为一体，而不是人孤立地独立地存在于世界之外，也不是凌驾于世界之上或躲在世界的背后。

From the perspective of the state of existence, Heidegger believes that the existence of innerworldly beings is self-evident, although this changes somewhat in his later period. But from an ontological perspective, innerworldly beings are not self-evident; they must be disclosed through their being-with Dasein. At the same time, the innerworldly beings that are ready-to-hand and present-at-hand can also indicate the existence of others. Heidegger believes that this is possible because Dasein encounters innerworldly beings together.

从存在状态上说，海德格尔认为世内存在者的存在是不言自明的，虽然这一点在其后期则有所改变。但在存在论上来说，则世内存在者并不是不言自明的，它要靠与此在的共同存在来揭示。同时当下的上到手头和在手上的世内存在者，也可呈报他人的存在。海德格尔认为这种情况之所以可能，是因为此在与世内存在者的共同相遇。

In the process of Dasein’s dealings with innerworldly beings (which can also be called equipment or nature) in the surrounding world, Dasein is absorbed in its concernful dealings in the world. In such concern, even if something innerworldly in the ready-to-hand mode, such as a clock, is present, “nevertheless, in using the inconspicuously ready-to-hand clock equipment, the surrounding natural world is also co-present.” [30]30 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Chen Jiaying and Wang Qingjie (Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1987), p. 86. [Translator’s note: This and subsequent citations from *Being and Time* are back-translated from the Chinese version used by the author; the English equivalents follow standard renderings where possible.] Therefore, if innerworldly beings in the ready-to-hand mode can be disclosed, then other innerworldly beings can also be disclosed. Dasein’s dealings with innerworldly beings proceed through the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand, but this does not mean that Dasein exists in isolation from innerworldly beings; rather, it exists within a unified world. “Being-with is an essential determination of Dasein. Even when no one else is present, Dasein’s being is still being-with. Heidegger does not wish to first posit an isolated subject and then attach an isolated thing or other person to the periphery of this subject.” [31]31 Ibid., p. 146.

此在在同周围世界的世内存在者（又可称为用具或自然）打交道的过程就是此在在世的烦忙过程。在烦忙中，即使当下上手状态的世内存在某种东西，如钟表，然而“在使用当下而不显眼地上手的钟表设备之际，周围自然世界也就共同上手了”。因此，当下上手状态的世内存在者是可以揭示的，则其它世内存在者也是可以揭示的。此在同世内存在者打交道是通过上手和在手进行的，但这并不是说此在孤立地存在于世内存在者之外，而是存在于统一的世界之中。“共在是此在的本质规定性。即使无人在侧，此在的存在仍是共在。海德格尔不愿先设定一个孤立的主体，然后再把一个孤立的它物和他人附加到这个主体周围。”

Moreover, in Dasein’s dealings with equipment, it also encounters others together with them. This encounter of Dasein with others is announced through innerworldly beings that are not Dasein-like. This must also be interpreted from the perspective of existential ontology. “The world is always already one that I share with others. The world of Dasein is a with-world.” [32]32 Ibid., p. 146. And Dasein’s existence in this world together with other Dasein through the mode of concern is called the co-Dasein of others. “The being of others within the world in themselves is co-Dasein.” [33]33 Ibid., p. 146. The world is open not only to Dasein but also to beings of the Dasein-type; in other words, the situation where Dasein encounters itself in this world in the mode of being-in-the-world refers precisely to the above.

不仅如此，此在在同用具打交道之际，也同其他人共同照面了。这个此在同其他人的共同照面是以非此在式的世内存在者呈报出来的。在生存论存在论上也必须在这个角度上进行阐释。“世界向来已经总是我和他人共同分有的世界。此在的世界是共同世界。”而此在同其他此在通过烦忙方式在这个世界中的存在，则称为他人的共同此在。“他人的在世界之内的自在存在就是共同此在。”世界不仅对此在开放，而且对其他此在式的存在者也是开放着的，换句话说，此在在这个世界之中是以世界之内的存在方式来照面指的也就是上述这种情况。

Dasein can discover the Dasein of others from the perspective of innerworldly beings, and “Dasein first discovers ‘itself’ in what it does, uses, expects, and guards against—in the things at hand in the surrounding world that are first taken care of.” [34]34 Ibid., p. 147. This means that Dasein, in the first instance and usually, understands itself from its own world, while the co-Dasein of others is often encountered from innerworldly things at hand. This encounter with others is not as a present-at-hand personal object. Rather, it is first encountered in their being-in-the-world. “This co-Dasein of others is disclosed within the world for a Dasein and thus for those who are co-present, only because Dasein in itself is essentially being-with.” [35]35 Ibid., p. 147.

此在发现他人的此在可以从世内存在者方面进行，而且“此在首先发现‘自己本身’在它所经营、所需用、所期待、所防备的东西中——在首先被烦忙的周围世界上到手头的东西中”。这就是说此在当下和通常是从自己的世界来领会自身，他人的共同此在则往往是从世内上手的东西来照面。他人的这种照面，并不是作为现成的人称物来照面。而首先是在他们的在世中碰到他们。“他人的这种共同此在在世界之内为一个此在从而也为诸共同在此存在者开展出来，只因为此在本质上就自己而言就是共同存在。”

3. The Small Self Integrates into the Greater Self, Achieving the Dialectical Unity of the Two

3. 小我融入大我，达到二者的辩证统一

Heidegger discloses being through Dasein’s understanding and revelation; the importance of Dasein is self-evident. Although he also speaks of co-Dasein and being-with, their role for Dasein is far less than Dasein’s role for them. Dasein is thrown into the world; the prerequisite for existence in the world is the possession of material means of subsistence. If even the most basic necessities of life are lacking, then everything else is impossible, and this point should command our serious attention. Marxism holds that human existence cannot be separated from existing social material conditions; the essence of the human being, in its reality, is the ensemble of social relations; and the mode of social production determines the mode of human existence (the mode of living). Marx and Engels state: “The first premise of all human existence, and therefore of all history, is that men must be in a position to live in order to be able to ‘make history.’ But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing, and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. And indeed this is an historical act, a fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life.” [36]36 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, in *Marx/Engels Collected Works*, vol. 5 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 41. That is to say, whether it is authentic human existence or inauthentic human existence, the production of material goods is the most basic condition; without this, everything else is impossible. This is the most fundamental viewpoint of Marxism.

海德格尔通过此在领悟和揭示存在，此在的重要性不言而喻，他虽然也讲共同此在与共同存在，但他们对此在的作用远远低于此在对他们的作用。此在被抛入世界，在世界之中生存的前提就是必须有物质生活资料，如果连最基本的生活必需品都没有，那一切就无从谈起，而这一点应该引起我们的高度重视。马克思主义认为，人的生存离不开既有的社会物质条件，人的本质在其现实性上是社会关系的总和，社会的生产方式决定人的存在方式（生存方式）。马克思、恩格斯说：“一切人类生存的第一个前提，也就是一切历史的第一个前提，这个前提是：人们为了能够‘创造历史’，必须能够生活。但是为了生活，首先就需要吃喝住穿以及其他一些东西。因此第一个历史活动就是生产满足这些需要的资料，即生产物质生活本身，而且，这是人们从几千年前直到今天单是为了维持生活就必须每日每时从事的历史活动，是一切历史的基本条件。”也就是说，人的本真生存也好，非本真生存也好，物质资料的生产是最基础的条件，离开此一切无从谈起。这是马克思主义最基本的观点。

Moreover, from a Marxist perspective, people’s material productive activity and their material life are unified: “In producing their means of subsistence, people indirectly produce their material life itself.” [37]37 Ibid., p. 31. Strictly speaking, people’s mode of material production is more fundamental; it determines their mode of living. People “are what they are, which coincides with their production—both with what they produce and with how they produce. Hence what individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production.” [38]38 Ibid., p. 32.

不仅如此，在马克思主义看来，人们的物质生产活动与物质生活是统一的，“人们生产自己的生活资料，同时间接地生产着自己的物质生活本身”。严格地说，人们的物质生产方式是更基本的，它决定人们的生活方式。人们“是什么样的，这同他们的生产是一致的——既和他们生产什么一致，又和他们怎样生产一致。因而，个人是什么样的，这取决于他们进行生产的物质条件”。

In the process of production and living, people must interact with one another, inevitably entering into various exchanges, forming various relations, and constituting various communities. The relationship between the individual and society is very close; the abstract individual is merely a theoretical assumption and does not exist in reality. The dependence of individual existence on society becomes increasingly higher with the development of society, and the significance of the community for individual existence also becomes more important. “Only in community with others has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in the community, therefore, is personal freedom possible. … In a real community, the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association.” [39]39 Ibid., p. 78. Therefore, we must oppose egocentrism and extreme individualism and advocate collectivism. In reality, there is no isolated individual detached from society, nor is there an empty society detached from individuals. Adhering to the organic and dialectical unity of the individual and society is the correct Marxist viewpoint.

人们在生产和生活的过程中，需要相互打交道，必然发生各种交往，形成各种关系，形成各种共同体，个人与社会的关系非常紧密，抽象的个人只是理论生活的假设，在现实中是不存在的。个人的生存对社会依赖的程度随着社会的发展变得越来越高，共同体对个人生存的意义也越来越重要。“只有在共同体中，个人才能获得全面发展其才能的手段，也就是说，只有在共同体中才可能有个人自由。……在真正的共同体的条件下，各个人在自己的联合中并通过这种联合获得自己的自由。”因此，我们必须反对自我中心主义、极端个人主义，提倡集体主义。实际上没有脱离社会的孤立的个人，也没有脱离个人的空洞的社会。坚持个人与社会的有机的辩证统一是马克思主义的正确观点。

In summary, how to achieve the unity of perceiving the authentic self and integrating into the world is a very important issue. In the context of China’s reality, this is how to handle the dialectical relationship between the small self and the greater self. Here, the individual person is actually the small self, while society (especially the country and the people) is the greater self. In this regard, General Secretary Xi Jinping, in his speech at the commemoration of the centenary of the May Fourth Movement, pointed out: “Young people may have different life goals and career choices, but only by integrating their small self into the greater self of the motherland and the greater self of the people, keeping pace with the times and sharing the destiny of the people, can they better realize the value of life and elevate the realm of life. Without the needs of the motherland and the interests of the people, any self-admiration will fall into a narrow world that becomes ever narrower.” [40]40 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Commemoration of the Centenary of the May Fourth Movement,” *People’s Daily*, April 30, 2019. This points the way for us in handling the dialectical relationship between human individuality and sociality. (Notes omitted.)

总之，如何做到感悟本真的自我与融入世界相统一是一个非常重要的问题。结合中国的实际，就是如何处理小我与大我的辩证关系，在这里个体人实际上是小我，社会（尤其是国家与人民）是大我，对此，习近平总书记在纪念五四运动100周年大会上的讲话中指出：“青年的人生目标会有不同，职业选择也有差异，但只有把自己的小我融入祖国的大我、人民的大我之中，与时代同步伐、与人民共命运，才能更好实现人生价值、升华人生境界。离开了祖国需要、人民利益，任何孤芳自赏都会陷入越走越窄的狭小天地。”这就给我们在处理人的个体性与社会性的辩证关系指明了方向。（注释略）

Online editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑