The French Phenomenological Foundation of Western Marxist Spatial Philosophy

As one of the mainstream discourses of Western left-wing radical thought after the 1960s, the Marxist critical theory of space, which originated in France and flourished in English-language academia, has a profound metaphysical connection with the logical trajectory of French phenomenology in the mid-to-late 20th century. On the one hand, from the perspective of specific academic-historical origins, this is reflected in the fact that, as the starting point of the spatial turn in Western Marxist philosophy, the concept of "differential space," [1]1 "Differential space" (差异空间) is a concept developed by Henri Lefebvre in *The Production of Space* (1974), referring to a space of difference and resistance that opposes the homogenizing, abstract space of capitalism. which aims to sublate the abstract spatial order of capital and is constructed around the spatial triad dialectic, is, in effect, Lefebvre's critical inheritance of phenomenological categories such as the "situational" ambiguous experience proposed by Merleau-Ponty within the horizon of the "body-space" dialectic, and the "otherness" spatial heterotopia [2]2 "Heterotopia" (异托邦) is a concept introduced by Michel Foucault in his 1967 lecture "Of Other Spaces," describing real, existing spaces that are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted, functioning as counter-sites. identified by Foucault in the context of the "body-power" dialectic. On the other hand, from the general trajectory of intellectual history, this is also manifested in the resonance effect at the spatial level between the traditions of "corporeality," "otherness," and "experientiality" peculiar to French phenomenology—which, by simultaneously adopting the perspectives of Heidegger's and Hegel's philosophies, engages in an existentialist and materialist "misreading" of Husserl's idealist phenomenological legacy—and the characteristics of "materiality," "practicality," and "struggle" emphasized by Marxist philosophy. In other words, with Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, and Lefebvre as nodal points, the conceptual evolution apparent in the intellectual historical dimension—from "ambiguous experience" to "other space" to "differential space"—reflects both the opportunity for French phenomenology to ally with Marxist philosophy through the intermediary of the topic of "space," and the attempt of Western Marxist thought to seek inspiration for a discursive turn from the field of phenomenology.

作为20世纪60年代之后西方左翼激进思潮的主流话语之一，起源于法国并在英语学界呈滥觞之势的马克思主义空间批判理论，与20世纪中后期法国现象学的逻辑走向之间，存在深刻的形而上学关联。一方面，从具体的学术史渊源来看，这反映在，作为西方马克思主义哲学空间转向的起点，旨在扬弃资本抽象空间秩序，并围绕空间三元辩证法所建构的“差异空间”概念，毋宁是列斐伏尔对梅洛-庞蒂在“身体—空间”辩证法视域下所提出的“情境性”含混体验，以及福柯在“身体—权力”辩证法语境中所指认的“他者性”空间异托邦，等现象学范畴进行批判性继承的结晶。另一方面，从一般的思想史轨迹来讲，这又体现为，同时以海德格尔和黑格尔哲学的视角，对胡塞尔的观念论现象学遗产进行实存论与物质论“误读”的法国现象学，所特有的“身体性”“他者性”“体验性”传统，与马克思主义哲学所强调的“物质性”“实践性”“斗争性”特质，在空间层面产生的共鸣效应。换言之，以梅洛-庞蒂、福柯、列斐伏尔三者为节点，而在思想史维度显现为从“含混体验”到“他者空间”再到“差异空间”的概念演进历程，既反映了法国现象学以“空间”话题为中介，同马克思主义哲学联姻的契机；又折射出西方马克思主义思潮试图从现象学领域获得话语转向灵感的尝试。

Thus, although the Western Marxist philosophical critique of space, pioneered by Lefebvre, subsequently developed in a complex and diverse manner, later scholars' explorations of related issues cannot bypass the theoretical high ground opened up by Lefebvre. Precisely because of this, the "spatial" thought, nurtured by French phenomenology and implanted into the framework of Marxist philosophy by Lefebvre through critical inheritance, undoubtedly determines that the grand Marxist critical trend of space after the 1960s is essentially the intellectual crystallization of French phenomenology's intervention into Marxism (or vice versa).

由此可见，尽管以列斐伏尔为先驱的西方马克思主义空间哲学批判，在之后的发展中呈纷繁复杂之势，但后世学者对相关问题的探讨，都无法绕过由列斐伏尔所开辟的理论高地。正因为如此，为法国现象学所孕育，并被列斐伏尔以批判性继承的方式，植入马克思主义哲学框架之内的“空间”思想，无疑决定了20世纪60年代之后蔚为大观的马克思主义空间批判思潮，本质上是法国现象学向马克思主义介入（抑或相反）的思想结晶。

I. Merleau-Ponty's Body-Space Dialectic and Ambiguous Experience

一、梅洛-庞蒂的身体—空间辩证法与含混性体验

The advent of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body can be regarded as a weathervane for the spatial turn in the research approach of Western Marxism. By reconstructing the fragments of spatial philosophy within Husserl's phenomenological legacy, he outlined a new interpretive perspective for Marx's youthful theoretical presupposition concerning the dialectical relationship among "matter—practice—freedom," and indirectly provided the metaphysical foundation of space, tinged with phenomenology, for the shift in the discourse paradigm of Western Marxism after the 1960s. From a theoretical standpoint, the core of the issue lies in Merleau-Ponty's attempt, within the dimension of the phenomenology of perception, to replace Husserl's essentialist transcendental intuition with the situational bodily intentionality, thereby highlighting, through the dialectical relationship between the body and space, the ambiguous experience carried by space, and accordingly echoing Marx's free practice mediated by matter. This mainly includes the following three mutually progressive levels:

梅洛-庞蒂身体哲学的问世，可视为西方马克思主义研究理路发生空间转折的风向标。通过重构胡塞尔现象学遗产中的空间哲学片断，他为马克思青年时期有关“物质—实践—自由”三者间辩证关系的理论预设，勾勒出全新的解读视角，并间接地为20世纪60年代之后西方马克思主义言说范式的更迭，提供了以现象学为底色的空间形而上学基础。从学理上来看，问题的核心在于，梅洛-庞蒂试图在知觉现象学维度，用情境性的身体意向取代胡塞尔本质主义的先验直观，进而围绕身体与空间的辩证关系，凸显出以空间为载体的含混体验，据此呼应马克思以物质为中介的自由实践。这主要包括以下三个相互递进的层次：

First, the situational body's repositioning of transcendental space. This is undoubtedly the foundational link for Merleau-Ponty to overturn the phenomenological tradition since Husserl and thereby introduce the concept of ambiguity. For Husserl, objectified space or spatial things are the result of the transcendental apperception (Auffassung) in the perceptual field of sensations characterized by turning-toward (Zuwendung) and grasping (Er-fassung). Moreover, "the field as perceptual field is a perceptual space, containing within it all individual things together with all their spatial forms. And each perceptual thing presents itself within perception as a filling of space at its position in the field, that is, through its qualitatively filled form." [3]3 This is a paraphrase or direct quotation from Husserl's *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, Book II, concerning the constitution of spatial objects in perception. In other words, in the context of Husserl's phenomenology, space is, in effect, the intentional form projected outward by the "perceptual field" imbued with spatial significance. Through transcendental reduction, it is further transformed into the "primal presence" (Urpräsenz) field for people's scientific understanding of space. In this way, space becomes a purely reflective existence that suspends personal experience, and, through its indubitability in transcendental intuition, it eliminates the ambiguity of experience itself. To this, Merleau-Ponty sharply points out: "We should not remain in a reflective attitude, in an irreproachable Cogito, but should also understand that reflection is aware of being subsequent to it, and thus of being part of its definition, the natural situation; therefore, one no longer affirms an absolute unity (Unité)." [4]4 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*. Furthermore, "the center of philosophy is no longer the transcendental subjectivity that is everywhere and nowhere." [5]5 Ibid. It is not difficult to see from this that the key link in Merleau-Ponty's transformation of Husserl's view of space is the re-confirmation of the absolute priority of the "natural situation" in which the intentional subject resides over the reflective space governed by "transcendental subjectivity." And what is called "situation" (or "circumstance"), in Merleau-Ponty's view, is nothing other than the phenomenal connection point between the body, where intentionality occurs, and space. He points out: "Everyone feels that they have been given a body, given a situation, and through the body and situation given existence; everything they know about themselves enters into the other at the moment they feel their astonishing power." [6]6 Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*. That is to say, it is precisely the situationality of the body itself that grants the possibility of objectification to transcendental spatial phenomena.

首先，是情境性的身体对先验空间的重新定位。这不啻为梅洛-庞蒂颠覆胡塞尔以来的现象学传统，并借机引出含混性概念的奠基性环节。对于胡塞尔来说，客体化的空间或空间物，是以朝向（Zuwendung）和把握（Er-fassung）为特点的感觉，在知觉场中被先验统握（Auf-fassung）的结果。并且，“作为知觉场的场就是一知觉空间，就包含着其中一切单个物连同其一切空间形态。而每一知觉物都在知觉内呈现为在该场的位置上对空间的充实化，也就是通过其在性质上被充实的形态加以呈现。”换言之，在胡塞尔现象学的语境中，空间毋宁是具有空间意蕴的“知觉场”向外投射的意向性形式。它通过先验还原，进一步转变为人们对空间进行科学认识的“元现前”（Urpräsenz）场域。如此一来，空间就成为悬置个人体验的纯粹反思性存在，并且以其在先验直观中的明白无误性，取消了体验本身的含混性。对此，梅洛-庞蒂尖锐地指出：“我们不应该处在一种反省的态度中，处在一种无可非议的我思（Cogito）中，而且也应该理解反省意识到自己是继它而来，因而是其定义的一部分的自然处境，因此，人们不再肯定一种绝对的统一性（Unité）。”并且，“哲学的中心也不再是无所不在和无所在的先验主体性。”从中不难看出，梅洛-庞蒂对胡塞尔空间观进行改造的关键环节，就是重新确认意向性主体居于其中的“自然处境”，对受“先验主体性”统驭的反思性空间的绝对优先性。而所谓“处境”（或“情境”），在梅洛-庞蒂看来，不啻为意向性得以发生的身体，同空间的现象性连接点。他指出：“每人都感到自己被给予了一个身体，被给予了一种境遇，通过身体和境遇又被给予了存在；他对自身所知的一切在他感到他令人吃惊的力量的瞬间就进入到他者那里去了。”也就是说，正是身体自身的情境性，赋予了先验性的空间现象以客体化的可能。

This in turn leads to the constitutive question of the body in relation to space. It should be said that "in Husserl's initial approach to the subject, space is regarded as a strict object. Therefore, it is impossible here for a living spatial concept capable of responding to the existential body to emerge. Even if he emphasizes the centrality or centered body as the essence of objective space, the latter remains a purely visible space." [7]7 This appears to be a summary or quotation from a secondary source on Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. In essence, this is merely the result of the "I think" (Cogito), as the transcendental subject, constructing the essence of space through the mode of "seeing" (Voir). As for concrete spatial experience, it is transcendentally suspended in the intentional process. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty argues: "The ultimate meaning of the Cogito is not to reveal a universal constituting agent, or to reduce perception to an act of understanding, but to confirm this fact of reflection that both governs and preserves the ambiguity of perception." [8]8 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*. And the ambiguity of perception is precisely the mode of existence within space of the body that is situated in a situation and constructs spatial images from a situational perspective. Therefore, space is, in effect, the "horizon" of the body. It "is a new type of being, a porous, implicative, or universal being, a being in whose presence the horizon unfolds, a being that is captured and contained within itself." [9]9 Ibid. Under such circumstances, space is no longer a purely positional relationship of things or a static intentional form of the subject, but rather "a complex qualitative existence capable of responding to the subject's kinesthetic experience and thereby being actualized." [10]10 This appears to be a paraphrase or quotation from a secondary source on Merleau-Ponty's spatial theory. Taking the situation as its fulcrum, it reflects the conjugate structure between the body and space.

这继而引申出身体之于空间的构成性问题。应当说，“在胡塞尔向主体的首次切入中，空间被视为严格的客体。因此，在这里不可能出现能够回应生存性身体的活的空间观念。即便他在此强调了中心性或中心化的身体是客观空间的本质。但后者依然是纯粹的可视性空间。”究其实质，这不过是作为先验主体的“我思”，以“看”（Voir）的方式对空间进行本质构造的结果。至于具体的空间体验，则在意向性过程中被先验的悬置了。与之相反，梅洛-庞蒂则认为：“我思的最终意义不是揭示一个普遍的构成者，或把知觉归结为理解活动，而是证实既支配又保持知觉的含混性的反省的这个事实。”而知觉的含混性，恰好是身处情境当中，并以情境化的视角构造空间意象的身体，在空间内的存在方式。因此，空间毋宁是身体的“视域”。它“是一种新的存在类型，是一个多孔性、蕴含性或普遍性的存在，是视域在其面前展开的存在被捕捉、被包含在自己之中的存在。”在这样的情形下，空间就不再是物的纯粹位置性关系或主体的静态意向性形式，而毋宁是“是一种能够回应主体的动觉性（Kinesthetically）经验，并据此得以现实化的复杂质性存在。”它以情境为基点，折射出身体与空间之间的共轭结构。

Second, there is the significance-bestowing function of the ambiguity of bodily experience on kinesthetic space. If the introduction of the concept of situation marks Merleau-Ponty’s initial negation of Husserl’s conclusions on the definition of the attributes of space, then his so-called process of ambiguous bodily experience bestowing meaning on space signifies the ultimate establishment, at the perceptual level, of a spatial phenomenology premised on dialectical negation. The latter can be regarded as Merleau-Ponty’s deepening of the inquiry into the constitutive problem of space. Admittedly, Husserl also made a specific analysis, concerning the relationship between perception and spatial objects, of the situational basis on which space is constituted. He held that “in the constitution of the sensory spatial object itself, even if it is merely a purely visual spatial phantasm,” “we already have a formation of a constitutive synthesis that is latent and revealed through analysis; it is indeed a ‘manifestation,’ which refers to the kinesthetic ‘milieu’ to which it belongs.” “This object becomes the foundation of all spatial objects, and therefore of all objects of material reality.” [11]11 Edmund Husserl, *Ding und Raum: Vorlesungen 1907*, trans. Xiao Zhonghua (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2014), p. 161. [The Chinese translation of Husserl’s lecture course *Thing and Space*.] However, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, the “kinesthetic milieu” (i.e., the phenomenal field) that Husserl regarded as the basis of spatial objects and spatial perception remains a transcendental category in the purely reflective sense. It denies the primordiality of bodily experience and treats the “I’s being-there” as a false existence ultimately abstracted by transcendental intuition. Consequently, “any momentary perceptual space (the perceptual field of the primordial present) or space as the stable total form of the perceived objects at that moment” can only be a lateral manifestation of vision within a transcendental sensory field presented as a total form. In this way, the perceptual constitution of space by the body is transformed into a transcendental constitution, by the “perceptual field,” of the specific position or manner (Wie) through which the body grasps space. In view of this, Merleau-Ponty points out that the body’s constitution of space is not a passive positional confirmation, by a subject controlled by transcendental ego, of a space already pre-grasped by transcendental ideas within the scope delineated by the “perceptual field” of the primordial present. On the contrary, it is rather a process in which the living body, according to the current situation, bestows meaning on space itself. By appropriating the concept of negation from Hegel’s dialectics, he further analyzes:

其次，是身体体验的含混性对动觉空间的意义赋予。如果说情境概念的提出，标志着梅洛-庞蒂对胡塞尔就空间属性的界定问题所做论断的初步否定；那么他所谓含混的身体体验对空间意义的赋予过程，则意味着以辩证的否定为前提的空间现象学，在知觉层面的最终确立。后者可视为梅洛-庞蒂对空间的构成性问题进行探究的深化。诚然，胡塞尔也曾围绕知觉与空间物的关系，就空间得以构成的情境性基础专门做出过分析。他认为，“在感觉空间物本身的构成中，即使只是一种纯视觉的空间幻象”，“我们也已经有了一种潜在的、经分析显示的构成性综合之形成物；它确实是一种‘显现’，此显现指涉它所属的动觉的‘环境’”。“此对象成为一切空间对象的因此也成为一切具物质性实在的物对象之基础”。然而，在梅洛-庞蒂看来，被胡塞尔视为空间物以及空间性知觉之基础的“动觉环境”（即现象场），依然是纯粹反思意义上的先验范畴。它否认身体体验的原初性，并将“我之在场”当作最终被先验直观抽离的虚假存在。于是，“任何一时性的知觉空间（元现前的知觉场）或作为在该时刻内被知觉对象之稳定的全体形式之空间元现前”，就只能是以全体形式呈现的先验感觉场，对视觉的侧显形态。如此一来，身体对空间的知觉性构成就被转化为，先验的“知觉场”对身体由以把握空间所依赖具体位置或方式（Wie）的先验构成过程。鉴于此，梅洛-庞蒂指出，身体对空间的构成，并非是受先验我思操控的主体，在元现前的“知觉场”所划定的范围内，对已然被先验观念预先把握的空间，进行被动的位置性确认。与之相反，这毋宁是活的身体根据当前的处境，对空间本身意义赋予的过程。通过挪用黑格尔辩证法中的否定概念，他进一步分析道：

In fact, this false certainty of my being-there is merely a deeper or double negation. It completely occupies my life-field, yet this also means that it will re-integrate into the world: in a moment, when I say these words, it may have disappeared, giving way to another this, which determines my emptiness only because it is fleeting and constantly threatened by another this. Its “pressure” on me is merely the negation of other negations of the “was” of the past this and the “will be” of the future this; thus, filling the cracks actually excavates the fissures.

事实上，我之在场的这种虚假的确定性只不过是更加深的或双重的否定。它完全占据我的生命场，然而这也意味着它将要重新融入世界中：再过一会儿，当我说这些的时候，它可能已经消失，把位置让给另一个这，它只是因为是转瞬即逝的、不断被另一个这威胁着，才决定着我的空无。它对我的“压力”，只是过去的这“曾经是”和未来的这“将是”的另一些否定的否定，这样，填充裂痕，实际上是挖掘裂缝。

It is evident that Merleau-Ponty, by revealing the instantaneous correspondence between the “I’s being-there” and a specific spatial position, identifies the inner mechanism by which the perceptual body constitutes phenomenal space through its own dialectical movement. As the intermediary for the subject’s leap from the “life-field” to the “world,” the “this” that can fill positions and thereby determine the form in which the body bestows meaning on space is nothing other than the primordial spatial situation conjugated with bodily experience. In the alternation of past and future tenses, it marks the possibility for the body, enveloped by the perceptual field constructed by current experience at a certain position, to grasp emptiness imaginally and thereby bestow spatial meaning upon it. This undoubtedly shows that only through the dialectical movement of the primordial spatial situation and bodily experience can space be integrally constituted at the diachronic level. The latter not only signifies the body’s experiential grasp of different perceptual fields but also indicates that the totality of space is merely “a mixed totality of body and spirit, tightly wrapped in the mist of what is called the sensible world and the historical world, enveloped by the person of bodily life and the person of human life, by the present and the past.” [12]12 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Jiang Zhihui (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2001), p. 116. [The Chinese translation of Merleau-Ponty’s major work.] Therefore, the body’s construction of space or bestowal of meaning is actually a process in which the subject injects the ambiguity of situational experience into homogeneous space and thereby acknowledges the possibility of spatial relations with others who are also in other situations. Its essence is “to rediscover phenomena, to rediscover the living experiential layer in which others and objects first appear to us, and the ‘I-others-objects’ system in its initial state.” [13]13 Ibid., p. 72. In other words, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, the body’s constitution of space is the establishment of ambiguous intersubjectivity.

显而易见，梅洛-庞蒂通过揭示“我之在场”与特定空间位置的即时性对应关系，指认了知觉性的身体如何通过自身的辩证运动构成现象性空间的内在机理。而作为主体由“生命场”向“世界”跃迁的中介，能够填充位置并据此决定身体以何种形式赋予空间以意义的“这”，不啻为与身体体验共轭的原初空间情境。在过去与未来时态的更迭中，它标志着处于某一位置并由当前体验所建构的知觉场包裹的身体对空无进行意象性把握，从而赋予其空间意义的可能性。这无疑表明，唯有通过原初的空间情境与身体体验的辩证运动，空间才在历时态层面被整体的建构出来。后者不仅意味着身体对不同知觉场的体验性统握，更表明空间整体不过是“被人们称之为可感世界和历史世界的雾团紧紧包裹着，被身体生命的人和人文生命的人，被现在和过去包裹着的身体和精神混杂的总体。”因此，身体对空间的建构或意义的赋予，实际上是主体将情境性体验的含混性注入均质性空间，并借此承认自身同处于其他情境的他人得以发生空间性关联的过程。其实质，就是“重新发现现象，重新发现他人和物体得以首先向我们显现的活生生的体验层，以及处于初始状态的‘我—他人—物体’系统”。换言之，在梅洛-庞蒂看来，身体对空间的构成就是含混的主体间性的确立。

Third, there is the metaphor of ambiguous spatial experience for free material practice. It should be said that Merleau-Ponty’s dual emphasis on spatial situation and ambiguous experience, in a phenomenological manner, secretly echoes Marx’s early presupposition of free practice within a material environment. Undoubtedly, for Marx, “the first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature.” [14]14 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology* (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1961), p. 19. [The standard Chinese edition of Marx and Engels’s early work.] From this, it is not difficult to see that Marx actually identifies the bodily elements from which practice arises and their synchronic connection with the surrounding material situation. In this regard, Merleau-Ponty further points out in a phenomenological context: “In Marx, ‘matter,’ like ‘consciousness’ elsewhere, is never considered in isolation; it is embedded in the system of human coexistence, where it creates a common situation for contemporary and successive individuals, ensuring the universality of their projects, making possible another line of development and a historical meaning.” [15]15 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Les Aventures de la dialectique*, trans. Chen Xiang (Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2009), p. 76. [The Chinese translation of Merleau-Ponty’s *Adventures of the Dialectic*.] In this way, Merleau-Ponty establishes a phenomenological equivalence, respectively, between experiential situation and the material environment in which practice unfolds, and between the bodily subject and the practical subject. And prior to this, he had also stated: “The spatiality of the body is not a spatiality of position like that of external objects or that of ‘spatial sensations,’ but a spatiality of situation.” [16]16 Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 137. Accordingly, Merleau-Ponty introduces the concept of space into the explanatory framework of practice within the material relationship between body and environment.

再次，是含混的空间体验对自由的物质实践的隐喻。应当说，梅洛-庞蒂对空间情境与含混体验的双重强调，实则以现象学的方式，隐秘地呼应了马克思早年对处于物质环境中的自由实践的预设。毋庸置疑，对于马克思而言，“全部人类历史的第一个前提无疑是有生命的个人的存在。因此，第一个需要确认的事实就是这些个人的肉体组织以及由此产生的个人对其他自然的关系。”从中不难看出，马克思实际上指认了实践得以发生的身体性要素，及其与周边物质性情境的共时性关联。对此，梅洛-庞蒂在现象学的语境下进一步指出：“在马克思那里，‘物质’同其他地方的‘意识’一样，从未被孤立地加以考虑，它被嵌入人类的共存系统，在那里为同时代的和相续的个体缔造一种共同处境，确保他们的谋划的普遍性，另一种发展路线和一种历史意义得以成为可能。”如此一来，梅洛-庞蒂就在体验性的情境与实践由以展开的物质环境，以及身体主体与实践主体之间，分别建立了一种现象学式的等价关系。而在这之前，他又曾表示：“身体的空间性不是如同外部物体的空间性或‘空间感觉’的空间性那样的一种位置的空间性，而是一种情境的空间性。”据此，梅洛-庞蒂就在身体与环境的物质性关系中，将空间概念引入对实践范畴的解释框架之内。

It is worth mentioning that, since the bodily experience coupled with the situation is ambiguous, then at the spatial level, “what Marx calls praxis is the meaning that emerges spontaneously in the interweaving of the various activities through which man organizes his relations with nature and with others.” [17]17 Merleau-Ponty, *Les Aventures de la dialectique*, p. 76. This “interweaving,” corresponding to “ambiguity,” not only reflects the complexity of the situation (or environment) on which practice relies but also highlights the transcendence of practice itself over that situation. In this regard, Merleau-Ponty, around Marx’s so-called dialectical relationship between economic base and ideology, opportunely adds: “The economy of an era inspires an ideology because it is experienced by those who seek to realize themselves within it; in this sense, this economy limits their horizon, but in another sense, like Marx himself, they do not simply undergo it but understand it, and thus can transcend it.” [18]18 Ibid., p. 77. This transcendence implies freedom. As Marx says: “For the practical materialist, i.e., the communist, it is a question of revolutionizing the existing world, of practically attacking and changing existing things.” [19]19 Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 38. As for the change and revolutionizing of the existing world or things, in Merleau-Ponty’s system of perceptual phenomenology, it is nothing other than the body’s positional negation of the existing situation and its re-bestowal of spatial meaning. It reveals that the body, attached to “here” and “now,” is always in the midst of spatial meaning, and, with the drift of the “perceptual field” constructed by the situation, undergoes a historical shift in its perspective on the mode of grasping the world.

值得一提的是，既然与情境相耦合的身体体验具有含混性，那么在空间层面，“马克思所谓的实践（Praxis），就是在种种活动——人借助这些活动来组织他与自然、与他人的关系——的交织中自发呈现出来的意义。”这种与“含混”相对应的“交织”，不仅体现出实践所依托情境（或环境）的复杂性，更突显出实践本身之于该情境的超越性。对此，梅洛-庞蒂围绕马克思所谓经济基础与意识形态之间的辩证关系，不失时机地补充道：“一个时代的经济之所以激发一种意识形态，乃是因为它被那些寻求在那里自我实现的人们所经历；在这种意义上，这种经济局限了他们的视野，但在另一种意义上，就像马克思本人那样，他们不单纯经受它，还会理解它，从而有可能超越它。”而这种超越性则意味着自由。诚如马克思所言：“对实践的唯物主义者即共产主义者来说，全部问题都在于使现存世界革命化，实际地反对并改变现存的事物。”至于对现存世界或事物的改变与革命化，在梅洛-庞蒂的知觉现象学体系中，不啻为身体对既有情境的位置性否定，及其对空间意义的重新赋予。它揭示出，附着于“此地”和“此时”的身体始终处于空间意义的中途，且随着由情境所建构的“知觉场”的游移，而对世界的把握方式进行历史性的视域转换。

It is evident that by appropriating Husserl’s phenomenological paradigm, Merleau-Ponty’s spatial-philosophical interpretation of Marx’s early thought, taking the body–space dialectical movement as its point of departure, restores in the context of perceptual phenomenology (albeit in a distorted form) the transcendence of Marx’s practical philosophy over Hegel’s philosophy of cognition, and intends to realize at the level of reality the ideological principle of philosophical emancipation. Consistent with the negation of transcendental spatial construction by ambiguous spatial experience, “as the young Marx said, people ‘destroy’ philosophy as transcendent cognition only in order to ‘realize’ it.” [20]20 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, trans. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 133. The internal quotation is from Marx’s early writings. Precisely for this reason, Marx did not cast dialectics into things situated in transcendental space, “but transplanted it into humanity.” [21]21 Ibid., p. 133. Only thus can practice, in real space, by virtue of the transcendence generated by the ambiguity of situation and bodily experience, impel society gradually toward “the accomplished naturalism of man and the accomplished humanism of nature.” [22]22 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 298. Hence, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological reading of the young Marx’s thought can be regarded as a reconstruction of Marx’s theory of material practice from the perspective of the philosophy of the subject, by foregrounding bodily space. As an academic metaphor, the latter laid the initial humanist foundation for the formation of Western Marxist spatial thought, which originated in France and flourished in Anglophone academia after the 1960s.

显而易见，通过挪用胡塞尔的现象学范式，梅洛-庞蒂对马克思早年思想的空间哲学解读，实则以身体—空间的辩证运动为契机，在知觉现象学的语境中还原了（尽管以歪曲的形式）马克思实践哲学对黑格尔认识哲学的超越，并意欲在现实层面实现哲学解放的思想原理。与含混的空间体验对先验的空间建构的否定相一致，就像“青年马克思所说，人们‘摧毁’作为超然的认识的哲学，只不过是为了‘实现’它。”正因为如此，马克思并没有将辩证法投向身处先验空间的事物当中，“而是把它移植到了人类中。”唯有如此，实践才能在现实的空间中，凭借由情境与身体体验的含混性所生发的超越性，促使社会逐渐趋于“人的实现了的自然主义和自然界的实现了的人道主义。”由此可见，梅洛-庞蒂对马克思青年时期思想的现象学解读，可视为他以突显身体空间的方式，对马克思物质实践理论的主体哲学重构。作为一种学术隐喻，后者为肇始于法国，并在20世纪60年代之后于英语学界蔚为大观的西方马克思主义空间思想的形成，奠定了最初的人道主义基调。

II. Michel Foucault’s Body–Power Dialectic and the Space of Otherness

二、米歇尔·福柯的身体—权力辩证法与他者性空间

If Merleau-Ponty, on the basis of the spatial intentionality of the body, opened up the theoretical high ground of existential phenomenology for the spatial-philosophical turn of contemporary Western Marxism, then Foucault, by shifting from existential phenomenology to material phenomenology, further identified that the dialectical relationship between the situated body and space is in fact the result of power projecting itself into the empirical world. Admittedly, at first glance Foucault appears as an opponent of phenomenology. Yet an indisputable fact is: “He always unconsciously regarded phenomenology as an important pathway for solving the dual problem of human existence (the cogito and the non-cogito – author’s note). Compared with the decisive role of Husserlian transcendental self-constitution for all objective meaning, Foucault was more inclined to his teacher Merleau-Ponty’s thesis that the transcendental subject must be in the world through the body.” [23]23 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 34. This indicates that “he accepted Merleau-Ponty’s view that ‘incarnate consciousness has priority in existential phenomenology,’ and endorsed existential phenomenology’s analysis of actual experience.” [24]24 Ibid., p. 35. Precisely for this reason, by examining the metaphysical premises from which oppressive power arises in the Western philosophical tradition of idealism, he sought, through the negation of transcendental reflection, to restore the freedom of the empirical subject manipulated by conceptual order. This coincides with the original theoretical intention of contemporary Western Marxism. It is worth noting that Foucault’s investigation of the dialectical relationship among “subject–power–freedom” also involves an analysis of the “body–space” conjugate structure. According to the corresponding logical order, the latter mainly covers the following three aspects:

如果说梅洛-庞蒂以身体的空间意向性为基础，为当代西方马克思主义的空间哲学转向开辟出实存论现象学的理论高地，那么福柯则凭借实存现象学向物质现象学的移位，进一步指认了居于情境中的身体之于空间的辩证关系，实际上是权力投射于经验世界的结果。诚然，从直观上来看，福柯以现象学的反对者身份出现。但一个不争的事实却是：“他总是不自觉地把现象学视为解决人的双重存在问题（我思与非思——笔者注）的重要途径。相较于胡塞尔式的先验自我构造活动，之于全部客观意义的决定作用，福柯更倾向于他的老师梅洛-庞蒂有关先验主体必须通过身体而处于世界之中的论断。”这表明，“他对梅洛-庞蒂所谓‘肉身化意识在实存论现象学总具有优先性’的观点持接纳态度，并赞成实存论现象学对实际经验的分析。”正因为如此，通过审视西方哲学观念论传统中，压迫性权力由以产生的形而上学前提，他才以否定先验反思的方式，试图恢复被观念性秩序操控的经验性主体的自由。而这又与当代西方马克思主义的理论初衷不谋而合。值得一提的是，福柯对“主体—权力—自由”三者间辩证关系的考察，同样涉及对“身体—空间”共轭结构的分析。按照相应的逻辑次序，后者主要涵盖以下三方面内容：

First, the replacement of the material “empirical” subject by the conceptual “cogito” subject, and the problem of the knowledge-based constitution of the modern power schema. For Foucault, this is closely related to the formalizing tendency of the discourse system that constructs and transmits knowledge in modern Western society. He points out that since the 19th century, with the decline of the representational function of discourse and its development toward formalization, the complete autonomy of words, brought about by literature itself or the emergence of pure writing, undoubtedly caused the ideational and material aspects of words to coexist, leading to the extreme expansion of the materiality of words. Under such circumstances, “the ‘said’ (Dit) becomes an external material force alienated from the subject, incorporating the subject, originally the user of discourse, into the enunciative logic of discourse itself.” [25]25 Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), p. 84. In this way, “when a subject uses a certain discourse, these various forms are reduced to different identities, positions, and stances that the subject can occupy or accept, reduced to the discontinuity of the subject’s domain of utterance. Moreover, if these domains are connected by a sequence of relations, then the establishment of this relational sequence is not determined by the synthetic activity of a consciousness that is identical to itself, silent toward all speech, and prior, but by the specificity of discursive practice.” [26]26 Ibid., p. 55. From this it is not difficult to see that Foucault, by identifying the modern turn in the nature of discourse, reveals the internal semantic mechanism by which the subject is dominated by conceptual power. But more importantly, the acquisition of the material self-sufficiency of conceptual discourse or words fundamentally originates from the dominant position of the “cogito”-type transcendental subject in the modern Western philosophical tradition. On this point, Heidegger specifically emphasized: “Now man’s position among beings is completely different from that of medieval and ancient man; the decisive thing is that man himself particularly takes this position as one constituted by himself, man consciously observes this position as the one he has taken, and secures this position as the basis for a possible unfolding of humanity.” [27]27 Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 132. Clearly, it is precisely because the “cogito,” through reflection, indirectly “constitutes” the subject as a being and its “position” of existence that conceptual power becomes the basis for “securing humanity.” Formal discourse or words are merely the concrete expression of this power.

其一，是观念性的“我思”主体对物质性的“经验”主体的取代，及其对现代权力图形的知识性构成问题。对于福柯来说，这又与建构并传递知识的话语体系，在现代西方社会的形式化趋势密切相关。他指出，19世纪以来，随着话语表象功能的式微，及其向形式化方向的发展，因文学本身或纯粹写作的出现而导致的语词的完全自主性，无疑促使词的观念性与物质性并存，进而导致词的物质性极度膨胀。在这样的情形下，“言说”（Dit）就成为与主体相疏离的外在物质性力量，它把原本作为话语使用者的主体，纳入话语本身的陈述性逻辑当中。如此一来，“当主体使用某一种话语时，这些各不相同的形态则归结为不同的身份、位置，主体能占据或接受的立场，归结为主体言及领域的不连续性。并且，如果这些领域是由一个关系序列连接起来，那么建立这个关系序列不是由与自身同一、对任何言语都是保持沉默和在先的意识的综合活动所确定，而是由话语实践的特殊性所确定。”由此不难看出，福柯实际上通过指认话语属性的现代性转向，揭示了主体被观念性权力宰制的内在语义学机理。但更为重要的是，观念性话语或语词之物质自足性的获得，又从根本上导源于“我思”性的先验主体，在现代西方哲学传统中占据主导地位。对此，海德格尔曾专门强调：“现在，人在存在者中间的地位完全不同于中世纪和古代人了；决定性的事情乃是，人本身特别地把这一地位采取为由他自己所构成的地位，人有意识地把这种地位当作被他采取的地位来遵守，并把这种地位确保为人性的一种可能发挥的基础”。显然，正是由于“我思”以反思的方式，对作为存在者的主体及其存在“地位”进行的间接“构成”作用，观念性的力量才成为“确保人性”的基础。而形式性的话语或语词，不过是这种力量的具体表达。

In view of this, borrowing Heidegger’s words, Foucault further asks: since within the “cogito” in the modern sense there is a “distancing” function that both separates and recombines the thought facing the self from the thought rooted in the “non-cogito,” then, when the direct correspondence between the “cogito” (i.e., conceptual reflection) and the “I am” (i.e., empirical existence) disappears, an acute question becomes unavoidable: namely, in order that I am what I do not think, and that my thought is what I am not, how should the “I” as the thing that thinks, and what I think, be defined? This leads to Foucault’s fierce critique of the Husserlian tradition of transcendental phenomenology. For the latter, the answer to the above question is none other than the transcendental subject’s complete subordination of the external to itself through thorough reflection, thereby achieving the complete unity of concepts. But Foucault argues that this is precisely the source from which phenomenology subsequently continuously disintegrates into an ontological description of experiential “non-cogito.” It is precisely such a “non-cogito” being that intermittently drifts outside reflective “cogito,” thereby arousing the latter’s intention to grasp it, so that the conceptual system of knowledge can be historically perfected. That is to say, the driving force that truly endows concepts or epistemes with material power is none other than the process by which the “cogito” subject reflectively appropriates the “non-cogito,” which is both within and outside it and appears in the form of the “other.” It implies that the power mechanism disciplining the empirical subject is in fact the result of the subject’s self-alienation through reflection in the face of its own “non-cogito” situation (or circumstance). The latter corresponds in Hegel to the in-itself opposed to the for-itself, and in Marx directly to alienated man.

鉴于此，套用海德格尔的话，福柯进一步追问道，既然在现代性意义上的“我思”之内，有一种能够把面对自我的思维与那种植根于“非思”中的思维，既相分离又重新结合的“距离性”作用，那么，当“我思”（即观念性反思）与“我在”（即经验性存在）的直接对应关系消失之后，一个尖锐的问题就在所难免：即为了我是我并不思考的东西，为了我的思想是我所不是的东西，作为进行思考的东西的“我”，与作为我的思想的东西该如何界定？这就引申出福柯对胡塞尔先验现象学传统的激烈批判。对于后者来说，上述问题的答案，毋宁是先验主体通过彻底的反思而使外在完全服从于自身，从而实现观念的完全统一性。但福柯却认为，这恰恰是现象学在之后，不断地解体为对体验性“非思”进行存在论描述的源头。正是这样一种“非思”性的存在，间歇性地游离于反思性的“我思”之外，进而激起“我思”对之进行把握的意向，观念性的知识体系才能历史性地被完善。也就是说，真正赋予观念或知识型以物质性权力的动力因，毋宁是“我思”主体对既在其中又在其外并以“他者”形式呈现的“非思”，进行反思性统摄的过程。它意味着对经验主体进行规训的权力运行机制，实则是主体面对自身的“非思”处境（或情境），而以反思的形式自我异化的结果。而后者在黑格尔那里是与自为相对应的自在，在马克思那里则径直表现为异化的人。

Second, it is the disciplinary training of the existential “subject-body” by the epistemological “power system” and the spatial foundation this provides for modern political structures. In Foucault’s view, the process by which power emerges and functions actually includes two mutually reinforcing links: the conceptual subsumption of “non-thinking” existence by the “cogito” subject, and the re-projection of the resulting “reflective” order back into the “non-thinking” existence already grasped by the transcendental subject. This is mainly manifested in the fact that when the self becomes “a theme or object (subject) of oral discourse or written verbal activity manipulated by conceptual power, and this alienated self-experience is further strengthened and broadened in such behavior,” then this “disciplinary technique of power exerted on the body” produces from “the enslaved body a series of conceptual power orders such as the mind-subject, the self, the mind, etc.” [28]28 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 29. For Foucault, the key link connecting the two is power’s construction of space and its dissemination within space. In this regard, he specifically pointed out in an interview: “People often accuse me of being obsessed with these spatial concepts, and I am indeed obsessed with them. But I believe that through these concepts I have indeed found what I was seeking: the relationship between power and knowledge. Once knowledge can be described in terms such as region, domain, transplantation, and transposition, we can grasp the process by which knowledge, as a form of power, disseminates the effects of power.” [29]29 Michel Foucault, “Questions on Geography,” in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 69. Thus, space in a broad sense is rather the discursive boundary of conceptual knowledge and the positional assemblage where knowledge produces power effects. The mechanism by which power manipulates the subject, in Foucault’s view, is manifested as the transgression of the transcendental spatial order constructed by the “reflective” subject into empirical space. This is concentratedly reflected in: “Once forms of power operate directly in daily life, they classify individuals. They mark individuality on him, attach an identity, impose a set of truth laws, so that he himself and others can recognize themselves through them. It is the forms of power that make individuals into subjects.” [30]30 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, eds. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 212. That is to say, the so-called subjectivation of the individual is in fact the spatial positioning of the existential individual by epistemological power. Its concrete form is the oppressive disciplinary training of the body by political forces residing within space.

其二，是知识性的“权力体系”对生存性的“主体身体”的规训，及其对现代政治结构的空间性奠基问题。在福柯看来，权力的产生与发挥作用的过程，实际上包含“我思性”主体对“非思性”存在进行观念性统摄，并将由此形成的“反思性”秩序再度投射进已然被先验主体把握的“非思性”存在当中，这是两个相辅相成的环节。其主要表现为，当自我成为受观念性权力操控的口头话语或言辞书写活动的“一个主题或对象（主体），并在这种行为中被进一步强化和拓宽了这种异化的自我体验”之后；这种“施加于身体的权力的惩戒技术”又从“被奴役的身体中产生出某种心灵—主体、我、心灵，等等”一系列观念性的权力秩序。而沟通二者的关键环节，对福柯而言，就是权力对空间的建构及其在空间中的散播。对此，他在接受访谈时专门指出：“人们常指责我迷恋于这些空间的概念，我确实对它们很迷恋。但是，我认为通过这些概念我确实找到了我所追寻的东西：权力与知识之间的关系。一旦知识能够用地区、领域、移植、换位这样的术语来描述，我们就能够把握知识作为权力的一种形式和播散权力的效应的过程。”由此可见，空间在广义上毋宁是观念性知识的言说边界以及知识由以产生权力效应的位置性集合。而权力对主体进行操控的机理，在福柯看来则表现为，由“反思性”主体建构的先验空间秩序，向经验空间的侵越。这集中反映在：“权力形式一旦在日常生活中直接运作，就会对个体进行归类。在他身上标示出个体性，添加身份，施加一套真理法则，这样，他本人和其他人都能借此认出自己。正是权力形式，使得个体成为主体。”也就是说，所谓个体的主体化，实则是知识性的权力对生存性个体的空间定位过程。而其具象化形式，则是寓于空间之内的政治力量对身体的压迫性规训。

Accordingly, Foucault believes that in the operation of conceptual power, “the body is also directly involved in a certain political field; power relations directly control it, intervene in it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to perform certain tasks, manifest certain rituals, and emit certain signals. This political intervention in the body, according to a complex interactive relationship, is closely linked to the economic use of the body.” [31]31 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 25. In this way, original bodily experience is dispossessed by conceptual spatial power, and thus degenerates into a carrier and appendage of the transcendental order. At the phenomenological level, this is prominently manifested in the alienating effect of pure “seeing” within visible space on inter-subjective relations. The former, as a “gaze of surveillance,” prompts “everyone, under the pressure of this gaze, to gradually and consciously become their own surveillant, thereby achieving self-imprisonment.” [32]32 Michel Foucault, “The Eye of Power,” in *Power/Knowledge*, 155. In response, Foucault cannot help but exclaim: “This method is truly wonderful: power can be implemented concretely and meticulously like mercury pouring onto the ground, and at minimal cost.” [33]33 Foucault, “The Eye of Power,” 155. It should be said that through a phenomenological investigation of the dialectical relationship among body, space, and power, Foucault has undoubtedly hit upon the deep mechanism of modern Western political structures. This “is nothing other than the complex relationship between the subject and ‘speech’ (discourse analysis), ‘action’ (care of the self), and ‘knowledge’ (self-knowledge), the core of which is attention to the power strategies directed at body and mind.” [34]34 The author’s paraphrase of Foucault’s thematic concerns; cf. Michel Foucault, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-1982*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2005). Therefore, Foucault’s academic task lies in: “revealing the fate of bodily experience in the process of modernity, and thereby providing one or several alternative choices for the body’s return to itself.” [35]35 The author’s summary of Foucault’s project; cf. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990). In view of this, a conception of an “other space” concerning bodily liberation and subject freedom is ready to emerge. This in turn constitutes the ultimate purport of Foucault’s material phenomenology.

据此，福柯认为，在观念性权力的操作过程中，“肉体也直接卷入某种政治领域；权力关系直接控制它，干预它，给它打上标记，训练它，折磨它，强迫它完成某些任务、表现某些仪式和发出某些信号。这种对肉体的政治干预，按照一种复杂的交互关系，与对肉体的经济使用紧密相联”。如此一来，原初性的身体体验，就被观念性的空间权力所褫夺，进而沦为先验秩序的载体与附庸。在现象学层面，这突出地表现为，可视性空间内纯粹的“看”，之于主体间关系的异化作用。前者作为一种“监视的目光”，促使“每一个人在这种目光的压力之下，都会逐渐自觉地变成自己的监视者，这样就可以实现自我监禁。”对此，福柯不禁感叹：“这个办法真是妙极了：权力可以如水银泻地般地得到具体而微的实施，而又只需花费最小的代价。”应当说，通过对身体、空间、权力三者间辩证关系的现象学考察，福柯无疑切中了现代西方政治结构的深层机理。而这“不外乎是主体与‘言’（话语分析）、‘行’（自身关怀）、‘知’（自我认识）的复杂关系，其核心是关注针对身心的权力策略，”因此，福柯的学术任务就在于：“揭示身体经验在现代性进程中的命运，进而为身体回归自身提供某种或某些替代性的选择。”鉴于此，一种有关身体解放和主体自由的“他者空间”的设想便呼之欲出。而这又构成福柯物质现象学的最终旨趣。

Third, it is the opening of the other-oriented “space of heterotopia” to a totalizing “politics of liberation,” and the spatial substitution this provides for the modern order of power. An indisputable fact is that Foucault’s phenomenological investigation of the relationship between the body (or subject) and power aims to construct a spatial-philosophical perspective capable of grasping the trajectory of modern Western society, and to outline the metaphysical basis for power’s own back-and-forth transformation “from the grand strategy of geopolitics to the petty tactics of the dwelling.” [36]36 Michel Foucault, “The Meshes of Power,” in *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography*, eds. Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 153. Accordingly, he further identifies that the conceptualization of the body and space by the transcendental “cogito” subject is rather the logical starting point from which oppressive power is born. The latter implies that “the subject will one day—in the form of historical consciousness—reclaim all those things remotely controlled by difference, restore its domination over them, and find in them the place where we can become the site of subject consciousness.” [37]37 Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 328. That is to say, the essence of disciplinary power is the elimination of difference by space conceptualized by subject consciousness. But the crux of the issue is precisely that this “difference” as the “other” of transcendental reflection (i.e., the aforementioned “non-thinking”) constitutes an important node for dismantling the power system. In the spatial perspective, Foucault further concretizes it as “heterotopias” and points out that, as an other-oriented space, “this kind of place is not located in any place, even if it may be possible to indicate their positions in reality. Because they are completely different from all the various places they reflect or refer to, I call them ‘heterotopias’ in contrast to utopias.” [38]38 Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces,” trans. Jay Miskowiec, *Diacritics* 16, no. 1 (1986): 24.

其三，是他者性的“空间异托邦”对总体性的“解放政治学”的开启，及其对现代权力秩序的空间性替代问题。一个不争的事实就是，福柯对身体（或主体）与权力关系的现象学考察，旨在建构一种能够把握现代西方社会运行轨迹的空间哲学视角，并勾勒出权力自身“从地缘政治的大战略到住所的小策略”之间来回转换的形而上学基础。据此，他进一步指认，先验的“我思”主体对身体和空间的观念化作用，毋宁是压迫性权力由以诞生的逻辑起点。后者意味着，“主体终有一天——以历史意识的形式——将所有那些被差异遥控的东西重新收归己有，恢复对它们的支配，并在它们中找到我们可以成为主体意识的场所的东西。”也就是说，权力规训的实质，就是被主体意识观念化的空间对差异性的祛除。但问题的关键在于，恰恰是这种作为先验反思之“他者”的“差异”（即上文所述的“非思”），构成瓦解权力体系的重要节点。在空间视域下，福柯进一步将其具象化为“异托邦”（heterotopias），并指出，作为一种他者性的空间，“这种地点不在任何地点之中，即便可能在现实中能够指明它们的位置。因为它们完全不同于它们所反映或提到的各种场所，所以我将它们称为与乌托邦相对照的‘异托邦’。”

It is worth noting that Foucault here actually takes the distinction between “utopia” and “heterotopia” as an opportunity to extend his dual critique of the Western tradition of conceptual philosophy and the Western humanist Marxism that takes it as its standard. For him, “utopia, which presents society itself in a perfect but completely inverted form, yet has no real place in empirical reality,” is nothing less than the best metaphor for the transcendental “cogito” reflectively subsuming empirical existence itself. It is precisely for this reason that a conceptual system of power can be established in space. As a static intentional wish, it is utterly incompatible with living being-in-the-world, which is itself constituted by “non-thinking” others. Under such circumstances, even if a revolutionary or struggle movement premised on this becomes possible (for example, a revolutionary movement aimed at abstract and static humanitarianism), it is merely a false utopia rooted in a conceptual grand narrative that has not eradicated the disciplinary system of power. Reflected in the Western Marxism influenced by this, this is concentrated in the fact that, “in order to bring into play the theme that opposes the openness of historical life to the ‘static’ state of structure, the ‘closed’ system, and the necessary ‘synchronicity,’ people have had to humanize Marx’s doctrine, turn Marx into a holistic historian, and rediscover humanist discourse in his writings.” Little do they realize that this precisely castrates the important trait of Marxism as something that drifts outside the existing power system and continuously negates it in the capacity of an “other.” Just as Marx emphasized when defining communism, “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence.” [39]39 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 57. The translation follows the standard English edition. From this it is not difficult to see that Foucault’s treatment of “spatial heterotopia” as the continuous negation of the conceptual power system by the “non-thinking” other precisely echoes Marx’s identification of “communism” as “a movement that constantly transforms reality according to existing material premises.” From a phenomenological perspective, this is nothing less than the empirical bodily experience (or practice) carrying out a total transformation of existence itself, which is enveloped by conceptual power (or ideology), within the space constructed by the “non-thinking” other (i.e., the material environment or situation).

值得一提的是，福柯在此实际上是以“乌托邦”和“异托邦”之间的区分为契机，引申出他对西方观念哲学传统，和以之为圭臬的西方人本主义马克思主义的双重批判。对他来说，“以完美但完全颠倒的形式表现社会本身，却在经验性的现实世界中没有真实位置的乌托邦”，不啻为先验性的“我思”对经验性的存在本身，进行反思性统摄的最佳隐喻。正因为如此，观念性的权力体系才能在空间当中被确立起来。它作为静态的意向性愿望，与本就是由“非思性”他者构成的活生生的在世存在格格不入。在这样的情形下，即便是以之为前提的革命或斗争运动得以可能（例如以抽象和静态的人道主义为目标的革命运动），它也仅仅是植根于观念性的宏大叙事，且没有根除权力规训体系的虚假乌托邦而已。反映在受此影响的西方马克思主义那里，这集中体现在，“为了发挥这一把历史生命的开放同结构的‘静止’状态，‘封闭’系统，必然的‘共时性’对立起来的主题，人们只好把马克思的学说人本化，把马克思变成一个整体性的历史学家，并在他的论述中重新找出人本主义的言论。”殊不知，这恰恰阉割了马克思主义作为游离于现存权力体系之外，并以“他者”身份不断对其进行否定的重要特质。诚如马克思对共产主义进行界定时所强调的，“共产主义对我们来说不是应当确立的状况，不是现实应当与之相适应的理想。我们所称为共产主义的是那种消灭现存状况的现实的运动。这个运动的条件是由现有的前提产生的。”由此不难看出，福柯把“空间异托邦”视作“非思性”他者对观念性权力体系的不断否定，恰好与马克思对“共产主义”是一种“根据既有物质前提而不断变革现实的运动”的指认相呼应。在现象学视域下，这不啻为经验性的身体体验（或实践），在“非思性”他者（即物质性环境或情境）所建构的空间当中，对受观念性权力（或意识形态）裹挟的存在本身进行总体性变革。

Undoubtedly, Foucault’s emphasis on power space and “spatial heterotopia,” on the basis of deepening Merleau-Ponty’s dialectic of bodily space, further clarified a more specific discursive path for the subsequent spatial turn of Western Marxism through his emphasis on the concept of the “other.” It should be said that “his theories of experience, knowledge, and power resemble a certain effort at reduction, and to a certain extent approach what Merleau-Ponty calls bodily experience, only he places greater emphasis on the material dimension of the body.” [40]40 Author’s reference to a secondary source; the specific citation is not provided in the original text. Accordingly, by concretizing “experiential” “situation” into the “non-thinking” “other,” and equating the transcendental “cogito” with conceptual “power,” he provided a corresponding spatial-philosophical basis for Marx’s conception of political emancipation, which is scaffolded by material practice, in the transformation from ambiguous spatial experience to alterior spatial heterotopia. This line of thought was then fully inherited by Lefebvre, the pioneer of Western Marxist spatial philosophy. It is precisely on the basis of Foucault’s material-phenomenological reconstruction of Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology, and his identification of the fact that conceptual power continuously diffuses in space, that Lefebvre, in the context of the critique of everyday life, with the pursuit of “differential space” as his goal, laid the initial metaphysical foundation for the subsequent Western Marxist spatial critique trend that proliferated in academia.

毋庸置疑，福柯对权力空间和“空间异托邦”的强调，在深化梅洛-庞蒂身体空间辩证法的基础上，又通过对“他者”概念的强调，为之后西方马克思主义的空间哲学转向明确了更为具体的言说路径。应当说，“他关于经验、知识和权力的理论类似于某种还原的努力，并在一定程度上接近于梅洛-庞蒂所说的身体体验，只是他更强调身体的物质性维度”。据此，凭借把“体验性”的“情境”具象化为“非思性”的“他者”，并将先验性的“我思”等价于观念性的“权力”，他就在含混性的空间体验向他者性的空间异托邦的转化中，为马克思以物质性实践为座架的政治解放构想，提供了相应的空间哲学依据。而这一思路又被西方马克思主义空间哲学的开拓者列斐伏尔全面继承。正是基于福柯对梅洛-庞蒂实存论现象学的物质现象学重构，及其对观念性权力在空间中不断弥散这一事实的指认，列斐伏尔才在日常生活批判的语境中，以对“差异性空间”的追寻为目标，为之后滥觞于学界的西方马克思主义空间批判思潮奠定了最初的形而上学底色。

III. Henri Lefebvre’s Spatial Triadic Dialectic and Differential Space

三、亨利·列斐伏尔的空间三元辩证法与差异性空间

The tradition of body–space philosophy, constructed successively by Merleau-Ponty and Foucault in the fields of existential phenomenology and material phenomenology respectively, was truly implanted into the theoretical genealogy of contemporary Western Marxist philosophy only in Lefebvre. Accordingly, Merleau-Ponty’s identification of the priority of the ambiguous experience of the situational body over reflective transcendental space, and Foucault’s proposed negation of conceptual spatial power by the body propelled by the “non-thinking” other, both acquired new expression in the context of Marxist philosophy. As the metaphysical starting point of the spatial turn in Western Marxism, they were further reduced by Lefebvre to the process in which practical individuals in everyday life seek a “differential space” capable of realizing self-emancipation beyond the spatial representations woven by capital power. In this way, this leads to the spatial triadic dialectic involved in Lefebvre’s radical reading of the body–space relationship.

由梅洛-庞蒂和福柯先后在实存现象学和物质现象学领域，分别建构的身体—空间哲学传统，在列斐伏尔那里，才真正被植入当代西方马克思主义哲学的理论谱系当中。据此，梅洛-庞蒂所指认的情境性身体的含混体验，之于反思性先验空间的优先性；以及福柯所提出的由“非思性”他者推动的身体，之于观念性空间权力的否定性，就在马克思主义哲学的语境中获得了全新的表达。而它们作为西方马克思主义空间转向的形而上学起点，又被列斐伏尔进一步归结为，日常生活中的实践性个体，在资本权力编织的空间表象之外，寻找能够实现自我解放的“差异空间”的过程。这样一来，就引申出列斐伏尔对身体—空间关系进行激进解读时所涉及的空间三元辩证法。

Not coincidentally, in the same vein as the phenomenological tradition according to which Merleau-Ponty holds that space is an interweaving of situational experience and conceptual reflection, and Foucault holds that space is a mixture of alterior “heterotopia” and conceptual “field of power,” Lefebvre’s construction of Marxist spatial theory begins, in a similar form, with a reflection on the ambiguity of the landscape of everyday life. He points out: “Everyday life is a space in which the dialectical movement process reaches an interruption point, where opacity and transparency, the clearly visible and the invisible, the decisive and the fleeting, become entangled unpredictably.” [41]41 Henri Lefebvre, *Critique of Everyday Life*, vol. 2 (London: Verso, 2002), p. 214. The translation follows the standard English edition. This “entanglement,” in Lefebvre’s view, is nothing other than the mutual game and antagonistic fusion between material spatial practice and the ideas (i.e., ideology) that influence the form of spatial practice at a given stage. Together, they delineate the dialectical unity of the abstractness of (social) ideas and the concreteness of (social) practice in everyday life. On this, Lefebvre further emphasizes: “This produced object (i.e., the social form of existence of everyday life space—author’s note) crosses over abstraction, without disappearing into abstraction or leaving abstraction behind. Abstraction is not a concrete copy of something, but abstraction and the concrete are inseparable; the unity of abstraction and the concrete determines everyday life.” [42]42 Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 71. The translation follows the standard English edition. The crux of the matter is that, with the historical intervention of capitalist production and modes of exchange, the inherent balance of this dialectical unity of the abstract and the concrete at the level of everyday life, which constitutes the human existential condition, is broken. Prior to this, Lefebvre had specifically mentioned that concrete spatial practice (la pratique spatiale), abstract representations of space (les représentations de l’espace), and transcendent spaces of representation (les espaces de représentation) “will each, according to their own nature and attributes, and according to the requirements of society or the so-called mode of production and the requirements of the historical stage, make their own contribution to the production of space in their own ways.” [43]43 Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, p. 46. The translation follows the standard English edition. In other words, everyday life space was originally the concretization at the real level of the triadic dialectical relationship among spatial practice, representations of space, and spaces of representation. But the alienating abstraction of the logic of capital, through abstract representations of space, completely usurps the constructive significance of spatial practice and spaces of representation for space itself.

无独有偶，与梅洛-庞蒂所谓空间是情境性体验同观念性反思的交织，以及福柯所谓空间是他者性“异托邦”同观念性“权力场”的混杂，这一现象学传统一脉相承，列斐伏尔对马克思主义空间理论的建构，以相类似的形式，起始于对日常生活景观之含混性的反思。他指出：“日常生活是这样一种空间，在这种空间里，辩证运动过程到达一个中断点，不透明和透明、清晰可见和不可见、决定性和转瞬即逝，不可预料地纠缠在一起。”而这种“纠缠”在列斐伏尔看来，毋宁是物质性的空间实践，同某一阶段影响空间实践形式的思想观念（即意识形态），彼此间的博弈与对抗性融合。它们共同勾勒出（社会）观念的抽象性与（社会）实践的具体性，在日常生活中的辩证统一关系。对此，列斐伏尔进一步强调：“这个生产出来的对象（即日常生活空间的社会存在形式——笔者注）跨过抽象，没有消失在抽象里，也没有离开抽象。抽象并非是某种事物具体的复制，但抽象和具体是不可分的，抽象和具体的统一决定了日常生活。”问题的关键在于，随着资本主义生产与交往方式的历史性介入，这种抽象与具体的辩证统一关系，在构成人类生存境遇的日常生活层面所固有的平衡被打破了。而在此之前，列斐伏尔曾专门提到，具体的空间实践（Lapratiquespatiale）、抽象的空间表象（Les reprèsentationdel’espace）和超越性的象征空间（Les espacedereprèsentation），“将按照其各自的性质与属性，按照社会的或所谓生产方式的要求与历史阶段的要求，以各自不同的方式为空间生产做出自己的贡献。”换言之，日常生活空间原本是空间实践、空间表象和象征空间三者间的三元辩证关系，在现实层面的具象化。但资本逻辑异化的抽象作用，却通过抽象的空间表象，完全褫夺了空间实践和象征空间之于空间本身的建构意义。

In Lefebvre’s view, this is undoubtedly closely related to the nature of spatial representation itself. As Marx said: “In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity. It is a particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which has materialized within it.” [44]44 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1973), 106–107. Correspondingly, as a constitutive element of space that is “linked to the relations of production and the ‘order’ they impose, and linked to knowledge, signs, and the ‘presence’ of codes,” spatial representation is the concrete form of expression of this “particular ether.” For this reason, it is naturally the first vehicle of power that the logic of capital must seize in order to manipulate space. On this premise, “capitalism has found itself able to attenuate its own internal contradictions for a century and to succeed in generating new ‘development’—by occupying and producing a space.” [45]45 Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 410. This space is an “abstract space” in which capital holds absolute dominance and comprehensively colonizes everyday life. Within it, concrete practical activity is no longer “activity related to the reproductive process, the permanent factor in social life. On the contrary, it is detached from this activity and occupied by abstractions—that is, by abstract social labour and abstract space.” [46]46 Henri Lefebvre, *The Survival of Capitalism: Reproduction of the Relations of Production*, trans. Frank Bryant (London: Allison & Busby, 1976), 85. Thus, the subject’s practical construction of space is alienated into the process of capitalist production and reproduction of space. This means that the ideational power of capital acquires a material foundation, enabling it to act upon empirical everyday life in an exclusionary manner.

这在列斐伏尔看来，无疑与空间表象自身的性质密切相关。诚如马克思所言：“在一切社会形式中都有一种一定的生产决定其他一切生产的地位和影响，因而它的关系也决定其他一切关系的地位和影响。这是一种普照的光，它掩盖了一切其他色彩，改变着它们的特点。这是一种特殊的以太，它决定着它里面显露出来的一切存在的比重。”与之相对应，作为“与生产关系及其强加的‘秩序’联系在一起，并与知识、符号以及符码性的‘现前’关系联系在一起”的空间构成性要素，空间表象就是这种“特殊以太”的具体表达形式。正因为如此，它就自然是资本逻辑为操纵空间，首先需要攫取的权力性载体。以之为前提，“资本主义就发现了自己能够淡化自身一个世纪以来的各种内部矛盾，并成功获取全新‘发展’契机的手段：即占有并生产出一种空间。”而该空间则是资本占绝对主导地位，并对日常生活进行全面殖民的“抽象空间”。其中，具体的实践活动将不再是“与再生产过程这个社会生活的永久性因素相关的活动。与之相反，它游离于这一活动外，并被抽象物所占据。即被抽象的社会劳动与抽象空间所侵占。”如此一来，主体对空间的实践性建构，就被异化为资本主义空间的生产与再生产过程。它意味着资本的观念性权力获得了物质性的基础，从而能够以排他性的方式作用于经验性的日常生活当中。

From a metaphysical perspective, this again involves Lefebvre’s creative elaboration of the idea, found in Merleau-Ponty and Foucault, of the domination of ideational (or reflective) power over empirical (or situated) bodies. It is worth noting that when Marx discussed related issues, he took the symbolic character of money as an example, indirectly pointing out that within the space of capital premised on abstract labour and value exchange, “in order to determine the value of a product in thought, it is sufficient to perform this change of form in the head alone (in which the product exists purely as an expression of quantitative relations of production). This abstraction suffices for comparing commodities; in actual exchange, however, this abstraction must be objectified, symbolized, realized through a certain sign.” [47]47 Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. N. I. Stone (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1904), 80. That is to say, within the abstract space of capital, the symbol already endowed with material force (money itself) will, as the ideational power that manipulates spatial practice, play a decisive role in determining the form in which space appears. Accordingly, Lefebvre further emphasizes: “Like all social practice, spatial practice is a living and immediate reality before it is conceptualized; but because fictional speculative thought takes priority over life, practice, along with life, disappears.” [48]48 Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 411. Clearly, what Lefebvre calls “fictional speculative thought” is the inherent attribute of the metaphysics of money contained in the logic of capital. It constructs a complete oppressive order of power and, mediated by the rational subject that obeys the laws of the market, forcibly implants the abstract space of capital into everyday life. This is epitomized in the fact that “as a product, social space is manufactured according to the operational instructions of a group of experts and technical authorities, who themselves represent specific interests and, at the same time, a mode of production. Hence, there is no genuine or pure space; only space produced according to a certain model (i.e., a mode of production) developed by a particular group within the general social structure.” [49]49 Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 411. It signifies an exclusionary power of knowledge that, in the abstract form of totality, relentlessly oppresses the individuals within it. The crux of the matter is that this knowledge-terrorism diffused throughout space has its profound metaphysical foundation in the idealist tradition of Western philosophy. The “reflective” philosophy of the subject, which rejects the “non-thinking” natural situation and the ambiguous bodily experience, is the prime culprit. Under its dominance, “the abstract seizes hold of what pertains to the body; nature recedes into the background. This misunderstanding of the Western tradition proves that it merely stands at the threshold of discourse, enumerating all its crimes in order to exonerate tradition while defending ‘real’ abstract space.” [50]50 Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 411. Thus, the abstract unity of ideational power obscures the concrete differences of empirical practice, and the former, in the form of capitalist social relations, constitutes the sole foundation determining the attributes of social space.

从形而上学的角度来看，这又再度涉及，列斐伏尔对梅洛-庞蒂和福柯所谓观念性（或反思性）权力之于经验性（或情境性）身体的宰制，这一思想的创造性发挥。值得一提的是，马克思谈及相关问题时，曾以货币的符号性特质为例，旁敲侧击地指出，在以抽象劳动和价值交换为前提的资本空间之内，“为了在观念上决定产品的价值，只要在头脑中进行这种形态变化就够了（在这种形态变化中，产品单纯作为量的生产关系的表现而存在）。在对商品进行比较时，这种抽象就够了；而在实际交换中，这种抽象又必须物化，象征化，通过某个符号而实现。”也就是说，在资本的抽象空间当中，已然被赋予物质力量的符号（即货币本身），将作为操纵空间实践的观念性权力，对空间以何种形态呈现起决定性作用。据此，列斐伏尔进一步强调，“和所有社会实践一样，空间实践在它被概念化之前也是活生生的和直接的现实；但由于虚构的思辨性优先于生命，从而导致实践连同生活的消失。”显然，列斐伏尔所说的“虚构的思辨性”，就是资本逻辑所蕴含货币形而上学的内在属性。它建构出一整套压迫性的权力秩序，并以服从市场法则的理性主体为中介，将资本的抽象空间强行植入日常生活当中。这集中体现在，“作为一种产品，社会空间是按照一群专家、技术权威手中的操作指令制造出来的，而这些专家、技术权威本身代表了特定的利益，同时代表了一种生产方式。所以，没有地地道道或纯正的空间，只有按照一般社会结构内某种特殊群体发展起来的一定模式（也就是生产方式）生产出来的空间。”它表征一种排他性的知识性权力以抽象的总体形式，对身处其中的个体进行无情的压迫。问题的关键在于，这种弥散于空间当中的知识恐怖主义，在西方哲学的观念论传统当中又有其深刻的形而上学基础。而拒斥“非思性”自然处境与含混性身体体验的“反思性”主体哲学，就是始作俑者。在其主导下，“抽象掌握着与身体有关的东西，自然消退为背景。这种西方传统的误解证明：它只是站在话语的门口历数它全部的罪行，以便为传统开脱的同时，为‘真实’的抽象空间进行辩护。”55如此一来，观念性权力的抽象统一就遮蔽了经验性实践的具体差别，前者以资本主义社会关系的形态，构成决定社会空间属性的唯一基础。

However, Lefebvre discovered from this abstractly unified order of power the inherent contradictions of capitalist space. This is epitomized in the fact that, in the process of the politicization of knowledge-power, “social space both concentrates and consolidates political centralization, and at the same time makes it specialized and fragmented. While the state determines and solidifies decision-making centres, space classifies locations according to their hierarchical relationship with the centre, thereby atomizing them.” [51]51 Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 412. The direct cause of this situation stems from the structural paradox that the spatial planning of capital, premised on value exchange, cannot itself overcome. On this point, Marx points out on the one hand: “The universal tendency of capital is to assimilate all places that become circulation premises, that become centres of production for circulation, i.e., to turn them into locations for capitalized production and locations for productive capital.” [52]52 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, 533. That is to say, the first important task of the logic of capital is to incorporate space as a whole into the operational trajectory of the capitalist power system. But on the other hand, Marx also emphasizes: “Capital as a whole exists simultaneously, side by side in space, in its various different stages. Thus it performs its functions in all stages and all functional forms in succession.” [53]53 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 2, trans. David Fernbach (London: Penguin, 1992), 183. This indicates that, besides assimilating spatial landscapes through abstract power, the second important task of the logic of capital is to place each of its own links into different spatial units one by one, thereby realizing value exchange within space. Hence, a great tension arises between capital’s abstract domination of space and its fragmented design. It is precisely through this spatial contradiction that Lefebvre discovers the possibility of dismantling the capitalist order of power. He points out:

然而，列斐伏尔却从这种抽象统一的权力秩序当中，发现了资本主义空间固有的矛盾。这集中体现为，在知识权力的政治化过程中，“社会空间既集中并巩固了政治的集中化，又使其特殊化和碎片化。国家在决定并凝固决策中心的同时，空间又以与中心的等级性关系为地点进行分类，从而使其原子化。”而造成该状况的直接原因，毋宁导源于以价值交换为前提的资本空间规划，自身难以克服的结构性悖论。对此，马克思一方面指出：“资本的普遍趋势是在一切成为流通的前提，成为流通的生产中心的地点，把这些地点加以同化，也就是把它们变为进行资本化生产的地点和生产资本的地点。”也就是说，资本逻辑的第一个重要任务，就是把空间整体纳入资本权力体系的运行轨迹当中。但在另一方面，马克思又强调：“资本作为整体是同时地、在空间上并列地处在它的各个不同阶段上。从而依次在一切阶段和一切职能形式中执行职能。”这表明，除了以抽象权力同化空间景观之外，资本逻辑的第二个重要任务，就是把自身的各个环节，逐一置于不同的空间单位当中，借此实现空间内的价值交换。于是，在资本对空间的抽象性统驭和碎片化设计之间产生了巨大的张力。列斐伏尔正是通过这种空间矛盾，发现了瓦解资本权力秩序的可能。他指出：

Space itself is both a product of the capitalist mode of production and a politico-economic tool of the bourgeoisie. But now this becomes the manifestation of its inherent contradiction. That is to say, the dialectics of space, which once emerged in time and expressed itself through its own actualization, will begin to function in space in unexpected ways. This directly manifests as: spatial contradictions do not eliminate the contradictions arising from historical time, but leave them behind and raise the old contradictions to a higher level on a global scale. While some contradictions weaken, others are fully intensified. At this point, the system of contradictions takes on an entirely new meaning and signals “something other”—that is, the birth of another mode of production. [54]54 Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 412.

空间本身既是资本生产方式的产物，又是资产阶级的政治经济工具。但现在这却成为它固有矛盾的体现。也就是说，曾经在时间中出现并通过自身的现实化而表现出的空间辩证法，将以意想不到的方式开始在空间中发挥作用。这直接表现为，空间矛盾并没有消除从历史时间中产生出来的矛盾，而是把它留在身后，并将旧的矛盾在全球范围内提升至更高的水平。伴随一些矛盾的削弱，另一些矛盾却得到充分的强化。此时，矛盾体系呈现出全新的意义并标志着“某种他者”，即另外一种生产方式的诞生。

Clearly, Lefebvre here deepens his understanding of the spatial triad. By introducing the concept of the “other,” he further transforms the previously addressed triad of “spatial practice—representations of space—representational spaces” into the triad of “abstract space—spatial contradictions—differential space.” As the spatial basis from which “another mode of production,” distinct from the capitalist mode of production, emerges, “differential space,” in Lefebvre’s view, is opposed to the homogenizing tendency of abstract space and seeks to explore a new space of existing differences and particularities. Therefore, this is “another world, a thoroughly open meta-space, where everything can be found, and new possibilities for discovery and political strategies emerge endlessly; but here one must always be ceaseless, constantly engaging in self-criticism, to move toward new places and new understandings, to perpetually seek difference; this is a space of ‘otherness,’ a strategic and heterotopic space ‘beyond’ the known and the taken-for-granted.” In other words, what Lefebvre calls “differential space” is in fact a negating “third term” within the binary oppositional structure of capital’s abstract space. In the form of absolute exteriority, it continuously impacts the metaphysical system of power inherent in the logic of capital.

显然，列斐伏尔在此深化了对空间三元辩证法的理解。借助“他者”概念的提出，他将之前涉及的“空间实践—空间表象—象征空间”的三元辩证关系，进一步转化为“抽象空间—空间矛盾—差异空间”的三元辩证关系。而作为与资本生产方式相区别的“另外一种生产方式”由以诞生的空间性基础，“差异空间”在列斐伏尔看来，毋宁与倾向于同质化的抽象空间相对立，并意欲探索现存的差异性和特殊性的新型空间。因此，这是“另一个世界，一个彻底开放的元空间，一切事物都能够在这里找到，新的可能发现与政治策略层出不穷；但这里人们始终要永不停息，不断进行自我批评，以迈向新的地点和新的认识，要不断探求差异；这是一个‘他性’的空间，一个‘超越’已知的和理所当然的空间之外的战略性的和异类的空间。”换言之，列斐伏尔所谓的“差异空间”，实则是处于资本抽象空间之二元对立格局之内的否定性“第三者”。它以绝对的外在形式，不断对资本逻辑内在的权力形而上学体系造成持续的冲击。

Based on the above judgment, Lefebvre, focusing on the dialectical relationship between the abstract spatial power structure and concrete spatial practical movements, further points out: “Structure is the finite (determinate and logical) aspect of movement, while situation is the infinite, changing aspect. Situation is expressed through structure, and structure marks situation. However, when situation changes, structure also changes, even collapses. Structure tends to maintain and stabilize situation. For this reason, structure and situation have a dialectical relationship, with neither being absolutely prominent; but in this dialectical relationship, the third party, the process of transformation, plays a fundamental role.” It is not difficult to see from this that Lefebvre’s analysis of “differential space” appearing in the form of a “third party” is actually based on his creative appropriation and organic integration of the “situational” experience identified by Merleau-Ponty and the “otherness” of space identified by Foucault. Its ultimate aim is to prove that the starting point of Marxist philosophy’s counteraction against the capitalist system is precisely its exploration of practical possibilities outside the existing power order. For Marx himself, this interest was already evident in the early stage of his doctoral dissertation. In his commentary on Epicurus’s theory of the swerve of the atom, Marx states: “Epicurus expresses the materiality of the atom through its motion in a straight line, and realizes the formal determination of the atom through the swerve away from the straight line, and these opposing determinations are seen as motions opposed to the straight line. Hence Lucretius correctly asserts that the swerve breaks the ‘bonds of fate,’ and just as he immediately applies this thought to consciousness, it can also be said of the atom that the swerve is precisely something in its breast that can struggle and resist.” It can be seen from this that Marx, taking Epicurus’s concept of the “swerve of the atom” as a starting point, opens up the metaphysics of emancipatory politics, which profoundly echoes Merleau-Ponty’s “ambiguous experience,” Foucault’s “heterotopia,” and Lefebvre’s “differential space” in their negation of the conceptual power order of capital. For this reason, Lefebvre, through the dialectical negation contained in “differential space,” provides “a nomadic Marxism with a path to a thoroughly open space. This space is not in the ‘middle’ of his bipolar world of center and periphery, nor in their synthesis. It is ‘far away,’ in a (third) world, a space that can only be entered and explored through meta-philosophy.” The so-called “meta-philosophy” is nothing other than a spatial critical theory that emphasizes “difference,” “contingency,” “the other,” and “ambiguity” and “intertwining.” Through this, Lefebvre, as the terminator of the marriage between French phenomenology and Marxism and the founder of Marxist spatial philosophy, provided direct academic foundations and initial practical paradigms for the subsequent flourishing Western left-wing radical spatial critical思潮.

基于上述判断，列斐伏尔围绕抽象的空间权力结构与具体的空间实践运动二者间的辩证关系，进一步指出，“结构是运动有限（确定的和逻辑的）方面，而情境则是那些无限的、变化的方面。情境以一种结构表达出来，结构标志了情境。然而，当改变情境时，结构也改变了，甚至坍塌。结构倾向于维持和稳定情境。基于这一理由，结构与情境具有一种辩证关系，没有哪一个绝对突出，但是，在这个辩证关系中，第三方，即转变过程，发挥了基本作用。”从中不难看出，列斐伏尔对以“第三方”形式出现的“差异空间”所做的分析，实则建立在他对梅洛-庞蒂和福柯分别指认的“情境性”体验与“他者性”空间，进行创造性挪用与有机整合的基础之上。其最终目的就是要证明，马克思主义哲学对资本主义制度进行反制的起点，不啻为它对现存权力秩序之外的实践可能性的探寻。而对马克思本人来说，这一旨趣早在其博士论文的创作阶段就已初现端倪。在对伊壁鸠鲁原子偏斜说的评论中，马克思谈到：“伊壁鸠鲁以原子的直线运动表述了原子的物质性，又以脱离直线的偏斜实现了原子的形式规定，而这些对立的规定又被看成是直线对立的运动。所以，卢克莱修正确地断言，偏斜打破了‘命运的束缚’，并且正如他立即把这个思想运用于意识那样，关于原子也可以这样说，偏斜正是它胸中能进行斗争和对抗的某种东西。”由此可见，马克思以伊壁鸠鲁的“原子偏斜”概念为起点，对解放政治的形而上学开启，同梅洛-庞蒂的“含混体验”、福柯的“他者空间”以及列斐伏尔的“差异空间”，之于资本观念性权力秩序的否定，存在深刻的呼应关系。正因为如此，列斐伏尔才通过“差异空间”所蕴含的辩证否定内涵，为“游牧式的马克思主义提供了通往彻底开放的空间道路。这个空间不在他那中心与边缘的两极世界的‘中间’或二者的合成中。它在‘远处’，在一个（第三）世界里，只有通过元哲学才能够进入这个空间并对之进行探索。”而所谓的“元哲学”，毋宁是强调“差异”“偶然”“他者”以及“含混”与“交织”的空间批判理论。借此，列斐伏尔就作为法国现象学与马克思主义联姻的终结者，以及马克思主义空间哲学的开创者，为之后甚嚣尘上西方左翼激进空间批判思潮，提供了直接的学术依据和最初的实践范式。

It is certain that the spatial-philosophical turn of Western Marxism in the mid-to-late 1960s was by no means an accidental event in the evolution of intellectual history. On the contrary, it was the intellectual crystallization produced by the creative “misreading” of the German phenomenological tradition initiated by Husserl, as interpreted by French academia through the philosophical perspectives of Heidegger and Hegel. Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, and Lefebvre are precisely the founders of this interest. At the same time, on the metaphysical level, the history of thought’s evolution from the “ambiguous” experience of bodily space, through the “otherness” of spatial heterotopia, to the “thirdness” of differential space, undoubtedly reflects the process of French philosophy’s phenomenological discourse, themed around bodily intentionality, marrying Marxist philosophy from the perspective of “space.” This is both the logical necessity for French academia to overcome the crisis of existential phenomenology and thus turn to material phenomenology, and an inherent requirement of the specific characteristics of French phenomenology itself, such as corporeality, ambiguity, situationality, and otherness. This coincides with Marx’s early emphasis on “contingency,” “materiality,” and “struggle,” and his later, in the context of mature historical materialism, presupposition of an emancipatory politics that uses free and conscious material practice to resist the irrational system of capitalism. For this reason, the concept of space generated in the soil of phenomenology, with Lefebvre’s implicit absorption of Merleau-Ponty and Foucault’s thought as a critical juncture, was fully implanted into the framework of Western Marxist philosophy. Furthermore, as Lefebvre’s successors and representatives of Western Marxist spatial critical theory, whether David Harvey, Manuel Castells, Edward Soja, or their students, all take Lefebvre as a reference or object of critique. This fully confirms that the Western Marxist spatial-philosophical trend, which originated in the 1960s and flourished in English-language academia, shares a common French phenomenological resource. (Notes omitted)

可以肯定的是，20世纪60年代中后期，西方马克思主义的空间哲学转向，绝非思想史演进历程中的一次偶然事件。与之相反，它是由胡塞尔开辟的德国现象学传统，被法国学界以海德格尔和黑格尔的哲学视角，创造性“误读”所产生的思想性结晶。而梅洛-庞蒂、福柯以及列斐伏尔毋宁是该旨趣的奠基人。与此同时，在形而上学的层面，从“含混性”的身体空间体验，经由“他者性”的空间异托邦，再到“第三性”的差异性空间，所突显的思想流变史，无疑反映出法国哲学以身体意向性为主题的现象学话语，在“空间”视域下，同马克思主义哲学进行联姻的历程。而这既是法国学界为克服实存现象学危机，进而转向物质现象学的逻辑必然，又是法国现象学自身所特有的身体性、含混性、情境性、他者性等特质的题中应有之义。这就与马克思早年对“偶然性”“物质性”“斗争性”的强调，及其之后在日臻成熟的历史唯物主义语境中，以自由自觉的物质性实践反抗资本主义不合理制度的解放政治预设不谋而合。正因为如此，在现象学土壤中生成的空间概念，就以列斐伏尔对梅洛-庞蒂和福柯思想的隐性吸收为临界点，完全植入到西方马克思主义哲学的框架当中了。此外，作为列斐伏尔的后学，同时也是西方马克思主义空间批判理论的代表人物，无论是大卫·哈维、曼纽尔·卡斯特、爱德华·索亚，还是他们的学生，无不以列斐伏尔为参照或批判对象。这就充分印证了，发端于20世纪60年代，并滥觞于英语学界的西方马克思主义空间哲学思潮，分享共同的法兰西现象学资源。（注释略）

Online Editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑