Setbacks and Reorganization: A Study of 21st-Century South Korean Left-Wing Thought

General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out: “An important feature of contemporary world Marxist thought is that many of its proponents critically reveal the structural contradictions of capitalism as well as its contradictions in the mode of production, class contradictions, and social contradictions, and conduct in-depth analyses of the capitalist crisis, the evolutionary process of capitalism, and the new forms and essence of capitalism. These views help us correctly understand the developmental trends and fate of capitalism, accurately grasp the new changes and new features of contemporary capitalism, and deepen our understanding of the changing trends of contemporary capitalism.” The evolution of 21st-century South Korean left-wing thought reflects the characteristics and trends of a medium-sized late-developing capitalist country that has a Confucian cultural background and started with an export-oriented strategy. From the perspective of its representativeness as a case, it is very worthy of attention and study.

习近平总书记指出:“当代世界马克思主义思潮，一个很重要的特点就是他们中很多人对资本主义结构性矛盾以及生产方式矛盾、阶级矛盾、社会矛盾等进行了批判性揭示，对资本主义危机、资本主义演进过程、资本主义新形态及本质进行了深入分析。这些观点有助于我们正确认识资本主义发展趋势和命运，准确把握当代资本主义新变化新特征，加深对当代资本主义变化趋势的理解。”世纪韩国左翼思潮的演变反映了具有儒家文化背景且依靠出口导向型战略起步的中等后发资本主义国家的特性和趋势，从其作为代表性个案的角度来看，非常值得关注和研究。

In 1987, after South Korea initially achieved political democratization, scientific socialism and social democracy became the two major currents of thought influencing the South Korean left-wing movement. Among them, because of the divided state of the Korean Peninsula, the idea of demanding the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the reunification of North and South won the favor of progressive youth and students, forming the National Liberation camp within the left-wing movement influenced by scientific socialism; the idea of criticizing the ills of South Korean capitalism and being keen on the labor movement and class struggle was welcomed by workers and trade unions, forming the People’s Democracy camp within the left-wing movement influenced by social democracy. However, the immediately ensuing collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc frustrated scientific socialism, and the Asian financial crisis also blocked social democracy. On the contrary, neoliberalism was in the ascendant, and left-wing thought was submerged in the “end of history” thesis that proclaimed the complete failure of socialism. Some even proposed that “the attempt at socialism and its failure are the two great legacies left by humanity to the 20th century.”

1987年，在韩国初步实现政治民主化以后，科学社会主义和社会民主主义成为影响韩国左翼运动的两大思潮。其中，因为朝鲜半岛的分裂状态，要求美国撤军和南北统一的思想赢得进步青年和学生的青睐，形成了左翼运动中受科学社会主义影响的民族解放阵营;批判韩国资本主义的弊端、热衷于劳工运动和阶级斗争的思想受到工人和工会的欢迎，形成了左翼运动中受社会民主主义影响的民众民主阵营。然而，随即而至的苏东剧变使科学社会主义受挫，亚洲金融危机又使社会民主主义受阻。相反，新自由主义大行其道，左翼思潮湮没在叫嚣社会主义彻底失败的“历史终结论”之中，甚至有人提出“社会主义的尝试及其失败是人类留给20世纪的两大遗产”。

However, since the 21st century, neoliberal reform has entered a dead end. The problems of temporary workers and unemployment after the dissolution of the lifetime employment system, as well as the problems of super-monopoly and polarization under the dominance of growth-first policies, have prompted progressive youth and the working masses to re-explore the direction and means of struggle. Various left-wing currents of thought have achieved reorganization in the process of combining with social movements. Among them, the relatively radical are Trotskyism and liquidationism; the former is an alternative plan for socialist revolution introduced into South Korea after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the latter is a special product of the South Korean political ecology within the Trotskyist lineage. The relatively conservative is the New Left, which advocates using Western Marxist theory to re-analyze new problems of capitalism. They not only study traditional labor issues but also incorporate emerging social movements such as feminism, environmentalism, anti-nuclearism, and sexual minority rights into their banner. The basic income theory is a new countermeasure theory in response to the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, belonging to a derivative of the New Left in the context of specific issues. With the emergence of the global “Marxist fever” in the 21st century, these competing left-wing political currents of thought have been continuously sublated in the practice of social movements.

然而，21世纪以来，新自由主义改革走入了死胡同。终身雇佣制解体后的临时工和失业问题以及增长优先支配下的超级垄断和两极分化问题促使进步青年和劳动大众重新摸索斗争方向和斗争途径，各种左翼思潮在与社会运动结合的过程中实现重组。此间，相对激进的是托洛茨基主义和清算主义，前者是苏联解体后传入韩国的社会主义革命替代方案，后者是托洛茨基主义脉络下韩国政治生态的特殊产物;相对保守的是主张用西方马克思主义理论来重新分析资本主义新问题的新左翼，他们不仅研究传统的劳工问题，而且将女性主义、环境主义、非核主义、性少数主义等新兴社会运动归入旗下;基本收入理论则是针对美国次贷危机的新对策理论，属于新左翼在具体问题脉络上的衍生。随着21世纪全球“马克思主义热”的出现，这些相互竞争的左翼政治思潮在社会运动的实践中被不断扬弃。

I. New Characteristics of South Korean Capitalist Development in the 21st Century

一、21世纪韩国资本主义发展的新特征

In the past 20 years, South Korean society has experienced the dominance and disillusionment of neoliberalism. The low tide of the international socialist movement after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc and the “pro-capital” reforms after the Asian financial crisis caused neoliberalism to spread rapidly in South Korea, even becoming the dominant ideology. It was not until 2008, with the outbreak of the global financial crisis and the rise of socialism with Chinese characteristics, that left-wing thought gradually revived. During this period, South Korean capitalist development exhibited new characteristics of “monopoly under freedom” and “extreme poverty amid prosperity.”

近20年以来，韩国社会经历了新自由主义的称霸和幻灭。苏东剧变后的国际社会主义运动低潮及亚洲金融危机后的“亲资本式”改革使新自由主义在韩国迅速蔓延，甚至成为主导思潮。直到2008年，随着全球金融危机的爆发和中国特色社会主义的崛起，左翼思潮才逐渐复苏。此间，韩国资本主义发展呈现出“自由下的垄断”和“繁荣下的赤贫”的新特征。

(1) Monopoly under Freedom

(一)自由下的垄断

Neoliberal reform brought South Korea “monopoly under freedom.” South Korea’s neoliberal reform did not eliminate the ills of the chaebol economy; on the contrary, it made the application of capital power more unrestrained. Facing the Asian financial crisis, the Kim Dae-jung government advocated comprehensive reform of South Korea’s economic structure, covering four major areas: government, finance, enterprises, and the labor market. For the government, it was to establish a “small but effective service government”; for finance, to establish a “sound and strong financial system”; for enterprises, to establish “strong and transparent enterprises”; for the labor market, to establish a “dynamic market with tripartite participation of labor, management, and government.” To this end, a series of reform measures involving enterprises, finance, chaebols, administration, fiscal policy, and education were successively introduced, with the essence of the reform pointing directly to privatization of ownership and liberalization of the management system. Thus, on the surface, government intervention in capital decreased, and the traditional government-led development model was abandoned; at a deeper level, the already-grown chaebol enterprises were no longer bound by various restrictions and could act arbitrarily in free competition.

新自由主义改革带给韩国“自由下的垄断”。韩国的新自由主义改革并没有消除财阀经济的弊端，反而使资本力量的运用更加无拘无束。面对亚洲金融危机，金大中政府主张对韩国经济结构进行全面改革，涵盖政府、金融、企业、劳动市场四大领域。就政府而言，是建立“小而有效的服务政府”;就金融而言，是建立“健全有力的金融体系”;就企业而言，是建立“强而透明的企业”;就劳动市场而言，是建立“劳资政共同参与的充满活力的市场”。为此，涉及企业、金融、财阀、行政、财政、教育等领域的一系列改革措施相继出台，改革要义直指所有制上的私有化和管理体制上的自由化。这样，从表层来看是政府对资本的干预在减少，传统的政府主导型发展模式被抛弃;从深层来看却是已经成长起来的财阀企业不再受各种束缚，在自由竞争中为所欲为。

First, from the perspective of labor-capital relations, capital power continued to strengthen. In 1998, the convenient dismissal system and the labor dispatch system were successively legalized, which enhanced the power of capital in the labor market. They could not only streamline existing employees but also reduce the number of new hires or increase the proportion of contract and temporary workers. That year, South Korea’s employment figures showed a downward trend, falling from 21.214 million in 1997 to 19.938 million in 1998. Among them, the decline in employment was most pronounced in the 20–29 age group, dropping from 4.964 million in 1997 to 4.401 million in 1998, a decrease of as much as 11.3%. By 2007, this figure had further fallen to 4.062 million, and after falling below 4 million in 2008, it had dropped to 3.699 million by 2018. Conversely, the number of temporary workers working 1–35 hours per week rose from 1.522 million in 1997 to 1.835 million in 1998, an increase of as much as 20.6%, and this trend has continued to the present day. By 2007, their number had further risen to 3.018 million, and by 2018 it had reached as high as 5.21 million. Although the extension of individual education socialization and population aging are also reasons for the decline in employment among the 20–29 age group, it is undeniable that youth unemployment and temporary employment have become chronic ills of South Korean society. The introduction of related systems and regulations, such as the youth employment subsidy system, online and offline employment promotion centers, on-campus employment experience programs, youth overseas employment subsidy programs, the system for promoting the conversion of temporary workers to regular workers, and the employment insurance system, precisely confirms the severity of this problem from the opposite side.

首先，从劳资关系来看，资本权力持续走强。1998年，便捷解雇制度和劳务派遣制度相继合法化，这使资方在劳动市场的权力增强，他们不仅可以对既有的员工进行精简，而且可以减少新员工聘用数量或加大合同工和临时工的比重。当年，韩国的就业人数就出现下降趋势，从1997年的2121.4万下降为1998年的1993.8万，其中在20—29岁的人群中就业人数下降最为明显，从1997年的496.4万下降为1998年的440.1万，降幅高达11.3%,2007年这一数字进一步下降为406.2万，2008年跌破400万以后，2018年已经下降为369.9万。相反，每周工作1—35小时的临时就业人数却从1997年的152.2万上升为1998年的183.5万，增幅高达20.6%，而且该趋势也延续至今，2007年其人数进一步上升为301.8万，2018年已经高达521万。虽然个人教育社会化延长与人口老龄化也是造成20—29岁就业人数下降的原因，但是不可否认，青年失业和临时就业已经成为韩国社会的顽疾。青年就业资助金制度、线上线下就业促进中心、在校生就业体验项目、青年海外就业资助项目、临时工向正式工转变促进制度、雇佣保险制度等相关制度法规的出台，正是从反面印证了此问题的严重性。

Second, from the perspective of capital-capital relations, the strong devouring the weak became more pronounced. After 1998, South Korea’s economic concentration—including general concentration measured by the share of large enterprises in the entire national economy, industrial concentration measured by the share of the top three industries in the entire national economy, and market concentration measured by the share of the top three enterprises in a given product market—showed a rapid upward trend. Although it declined somewhat from 1999 to 2002, it began to rise again after 2003, accelerated from 2008 to 2012, and only leveled off after 2013. Among them, the contrast between chaebol and non-chaebol enterprises was even more pronounced. South Korea’s eight major chaebols (Samsung Group, Hyundai Group, LG Group, SK Group, Lotte Group, Hanjin Group, Hanwha Group, and Doosan Group) basically controlled the domestic sales market, with the monopoly degree of the top four chaebols being even more obvious. In addition, South Korean chaebols also controlled more factors of production and management rights through unfair transactions and circular investments among subsidiaries. For example, in 2017, the chairmen and their families of South Korea’s four major chaebols held less than 2% of shares, yet they firmly controlled the management rights of the entire enterprise through low-price business outsourcing, technology acquisitions from small and medium-sized enterprises, and circular investments among subsidiaries. Conversely, the survival environment for small and medium-sized enterprises was difficult, with enterprise survival times rarely exceeding 10 years, to the extent that the South Korean government introduced a “long-lived small and medium-sized enterprise” confirmation system, specifically seeking to find enterprises that had survived for more than 45 years.

其次，从资资关系来看，强者通吃更为明显。1998年以后，韩国的经济集中程度，包括以大企业在整个国民经济中所占比重为标识的一般集中度、以前三位产业在整个国民经济中所占比重为标识的产业集中度、以某产品市场中前三位企业所占比重为标识的市场集中度，呈现急速上升趋势，虽然1999—2002年有所回落，但是2003年以后又开始回升，2008—2012年加速攀升，2013年以后才趋于平缓。其中，财阀与非财阀企业的对比更为明显。韩国的八大财阀(三星集团、现代集团、LG集团、SK集团、乐天集团、韩进集团、韩华集团和斗山集团)基本控制了国内销售市场，其中前四大财阀的垄断程度更为明显。另外，韩国财阀还通过不公正的交易和子集团之间循环投资的方法控制更多的生产要素和经营权。例如，2017年韩国四大财阀的会长及其家族持有的股份不到2%，却通过低价格的业务外包、对中小企业的技术收购、子公司之间相互循环投资等方式，牢牢控制整个企业的经营权。相反，中小企业生存环境艰难，企业存续时间难以超过10年，以致韩国政府出台“长寿中小企业”确认制度，着力寻找存续45年以上的中小企业。

Finally, from the perspective of labor-labor relations, internal divisions are continuously deepening. The implementation of the convenient dismissal system and the dispatched labor system has not only strengthened the power of capital but also weakened solidarity among workers and undermined the strength of trade union organizations. Workers are divided into two categories: regular employment and non-regular employment, and non-regular employment is further subdivided into contract labor, dispatched labor, temporary labor, and other types. Differences in labor treatment lead to inconsistent positions in collective bargaining between labor and capital, and the original trade unions in enterprises do not accept the membership of non-regular workers. Moreover, before 2011, South Korea did not implement a multiple trade union system, meaning each enterprise could only establish one trade union, which essentially deprived non-regular workers of the right to organize unions. Even after South Korea relaxed restrictions on multiple trade unions in 2011, the divisions among workers belonging to different unions were not eliminated. In recent years, the scale of non-regular employment has been continuously expanding, and capital has persistently shifted the crises of competition onto workers. In 2017, among 57 large enterprises in South Korea, the proportion of non-regular workers had already reached 40%, of which the proportion of indirectly employed workers was 77%. Chaebol enterprises [1]1 Chaebol (재벌) refers to the large, family-owned business conglomerates that dominate the South Korean economy, such as Samsung, Hyundai, and LG. in particular made extensive use of dispatched labor and suppressed union activities.

最后，从劳劳关系来看，内部分裂不断加深。便捷解雇制度和劳务派遣制度的实施不仅强化了资方的权力，而且削弱了劳动者之间的团结，弱化了工会组织的力量。劳动者被区分为正规就业和非正规就业两类，非正规就业又被区分为合同用工、派遣用工、临时用工等多种类型。因为劳动待遇的差异导致劳资集体谈判中的立场不一致，企业原有的工会不接受非正规就业人员的加入。再加上，2011年之前韩国并未实施复数工会制度，也就是说每个企业只能设立一个工会，这使非正规就业的劳动者基本丧失了组织工会的权利。即便2011年以后韩国放开复数工会的限制，分属不同工会的劳动者之间的分裂也并未消除。近年来非正规就业的规模在不断扩大，资方持续将竞争中的危机转嫁给劳动者。2017年，在韩国的57个大企业中，非正规就业劳动者的比例已经高达40%，其中间接雇佣的劳动者比例为77%，财阀企业更是大量使用劳动派遣用工并压制工会活动。

(2) Prosperity Amidst Abject Poverty

(二)繁荣下的赤贫

The characteristic of "monopoly under freedom" in South Korea's economic system has led to a situation of "prosperity amidst abject poverty" in social distribution. Since the 1960s, South Korea's economy has grown rapidly: first the "Miracle on the Han River" from the 1960s to the 1980s, then joining the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996, followed by a per capita GNP exceeding US$20,000 in 2006, and most recently a per capita GNP exceeding US$30,000 in 2018, transforming from a poor and backward country into a developed country. However, the South Korean people have far from felt the happiness of becoming a developed country. Especially after experiencing the Asian financial crisis and the US subprime mortgage crisis, the increasingly severe polarization is depriving the grassroots of their sense of gain.

韩国经济制度方面“自由下的垄断”的特征导致社会分配呈现“繁荣下的赤贫”的状况。1960年代以后韩国经济快速增长，先是1960—1980年代的“汉江奇迹”，后是1996年跻身经济合作与发展组织(OECD)国家行列，再是2006年人均国民生产总值超过2万美元，最近2018年人均国民生产总值突破3万美元，已经从一个贫穷落后的国家转变为发达国家。然而，韩国国民却远未感受到成为发达国家的幸福感。特别是经历亚洲金融危机和美国次贷危机之后，日益严重的两极分化正在剥夺底层民众的获得感。

First, the actual income of the grassroots is decreasing. On the one hand, there is an imbalance between the economic growth rate and the income growth rate. In 1998, South Korea's GNP fell by 5.5%, while national income fell by 8.2%; between 1999 and 2008, the GNP growth rate was consistently higher than the national income growth rate; this situation only reversed after 2009. On the other hand, there is an imbalance between the income growth rate and the inflation rate. In 1998, when South Korean national income was in negative growth, the consumer price growth rate was as high as 7.5%; in 2008, the national income growth rate was only 0.1%, while consumer prices grew by 4.7%. The growth rate of fresh food prices was particularly prominent, reaching 21.3% in 2010. This directly led to a year-on-year increase in South Korean household debt. By the end of 2018, the average household debt in South Korea was 75.31 million won, of which real estate debt was 20.85 million won and financial debt was 54.46 million won. Moreover, the average debt of low-income farming households and fishing households was as high as 26.37 million won and 42.45 million won, respectively. Thus, "personal bankruptcy" became a new term in South Korea's financial sector. In 2002, South Korea established a personal bankruptcy system, stipulating that when personal debt far exceeds the ability to repay from income, an application for bankruptcy could be filed with the court. After court verification and asset liquidation, the remaining debt could be discharged, but the individual's social rights would be greatly restricted after bankruptcy. In 2004, this system was changed to a "personal sacrifice" system, limiting the total amount of secured debt discharged to within 1 billion won and unsecured debt to within 500 million won. In 2009, the system was again changed to a "pre-debt adjustment" system, excluding high-interest loan debt from the scope of bankruptcy and changing debt discharge to debt adjustment.

首先，底层民众的实际收入在降低。一方面，经济增长率与收入增长率之间存在不平衡的现象。1998年，韩国的国民生产总值下降5.5%，国民收入则下降8.2%;1999—2008年之间，国民生产总值的增长率均高于国民收入的增长率;2009年之后这种状况才出现反转。另一方面，收入增长率与通货膨胀率之间存在不平衡。1998年在韩国国民收入负增长的情况下消费者物价增长率高达7.5%,2008年国民收入增长率仅为0.1%，消费者物价增长却为4.7%，其中尤其是新鲜食品价格的增长率最为突出，2010年新鲜食品价格的增长率高达21.3%，这直接导致韩国家庭负债连年增加。截止2018年末，韩国家庭平均负债额为7531万韩元，其中房产负债2085万韩元，金融负债5446万韩元，而且收入偏低的农民家庭和渔民家庭的平均负债也分别高达2637万韩元和4245万韩元。这样，“个人破产”成为韩国金融领域的新名词。2002年，韩国设立个人破产制度，规定当个人债务远远超出收入偿还能力时可以向法院提起破产申请，经法院核实并清算资产后可以免除剩余债务，但破产后个人的社会权利会大大受限。2004年，该制度变更为“个人牺牲”制度，将免除的担保债务总额限制在10亿韩元以内，非担保债务总额限制在5亿韩元以内。2009年，该制度又变更为“事前债务调整”制度，将高利贷债务排除在破产范围之外，同时将免除债务变为调整债务。

Second, poverty among special groups and in-work poverty are prominent. Poverty among special groups refers to the phenomenon where socially disadvantaged groups in the labor and employment market are most likely to be discriminated against and laid off during enterprise hiring and structural adjustment. Since 2012, Statistics Korea, in conjunction with the Bank of Korea and the Financial Supervisory Service, has added poverty rate items for different types of groups in the "Household Financial Welfare Survey." The results show that South Korea's individual poverty rate hovers around 19%, with poverty rates particularly prominent among women, low-education groups, and the elderly. In the latest data from 2016, the individual poverty rate was 19.5%, the female poverty rate was 21.6%, the poverty rate for those with primary school education or below was 30.7%, and the poverty rate for those aged 65 and over was 61.8%. In-work poverty refers to the phenomenon where, despite working hard, one cannot escape poverty, meaning that personal labor income is less than 60% of the median income. It is specifically manifested as the "working poor" and the "housebound poor." The working poor are mostly in low-level employment or repeatedly oscillating between employment and unemployment, while the housebound poor are confined to their homes due to having no money for consumption. Data from the 2011–2015 Korea Welfare Panel Study shows that the proportion of the group with income between 30% and 60% of the median who experienced poverty in the past year was 15.7%, and the proportion experiencing poverty over the past five years increased to 27.2%, falling into what is called recurrent poverty. However, South Korea has not yet established a comprehensive and effective social security system. On the one hand, welfare expenditure has increased, but there is still a large gap compared to the average level of developed countries. In 1997, South Korea's welfare expenditure as a proportion of GNP was only 5.9%; although it rose to 13.4% in 2016, it is still far from the average of 20% in developed countries. On the other hand, the social security system is not well-established. In terms of unemployment insurance, South Korea's unemployment insurance has a low coverage rate due to complex eligibility conditions; in 2016, the proportion of unemployed people receiving benefits was only 37.3%, the lowest among OECD countries. In terms of medical and education security, the National Health Insurance Service has long had an imbalance between income and expenditure, and university tuition has long since entered the era of 10 million won per year. In terms of retirement security, a basic old-age pension system equivalent to 5% of the national pension was only established in 2008; after being converted to a basic pension system in 2014, the payment amount was only 10% of the national pension, approximately 200,000 won per month.

其次，特殊人群贫困现象和劳动贫困现象突出。特殊人群贫困现象是指劳动就业市场中的社会弱势群体在企业雇佣和结构调整中最容易成为被歧视和被解雇的对象这一现象。2012年以来，韩国统计厅联合韩国银行和金融监督院在“家庭金融福祉调查”中增加不同类型群体的贫困率项目，结果显示韩国的个人贫困率在19%左右徘徊，其中女性群体、低学历群体、老年群体的贫困率尤为突出;在2016年的最新数据中，个人贫困率为19.5%，女性贫困率为21.6%，小学以下学历人群的贫困率为30.7%,65岁以上老人的贫困率为61.8%。劳动贫困现象是指虽然辛勤工作却无法摆脱贫困的现象，即个人劳动收入不足收入中位数的60%，具体表现为“穷忙族”和“穷宅族”。穷忙族大都是低水平就业或在就业与失业之间反复徘徊，穷宅族则是因没钱消费而蜗居家中。2011—2015年韩国福利面板调查数据显示，收入在中位数的30%—60%的群体在过去一年经历贫困的比例是15.7%，过去5年经历贫困的比例则增加为27.2%,陷入所谓的反复贫困现象。然而，韩国目前为止还没有建立起全面有效的社会保障体系。一方面，福利支出有所增加，但与发达国家的平均水平相比还有较大差距。1997年韩国福利支出在国民生产总值中所占的比例仅为5.9%，虽然2016年上升为13.4%，但是与发达国家20%的平均水平相比还相距甚远。另一方面，社会保障制度不健全。在失业保障方面，韩国的失业保障因限制条件复杂而导致覆盖面偏低，2016年失业人群中受益比例仅为37.3%，在OECD国家中垫底。在医疗和教育保障方面，韩国医疗保险公团长期收支不平衡，大学学费也早进入每年1000万韩元的时代。在退休保障层面，2008年才建立起每月相当于国民年金5%水平的基础老龄年金制度，2014年转变为基础年金制度后支付额也仅为国民年金的10%，大约每月20万韩元。

II. The New Landscape of the Reorganization of 21st-Century South Korean Left-Wing Thought

二、21世纪韩国左翼思潮重组的新格局

Faced with the new characteristics of "monopoly under freedom" and "prosperity amidst abject poverty" emerging from neoliberal reforms, the South Korean left-wing movement began to adjust its struggle strategies. Left-wing thought, in its integration with practical movements, has taken on a new landscape. Trotskyism, liquidationism, the New Left, basic income theory, and others have gradually become important schools within this new landscape.

面对新自由主义改革中出现的“自由下的垄断”和“繁荣下的赤贫”的新特征，韩国左翼运动开始调整斗争战略，左翼思潮在与现实运动结合的过程中呈现新格局。托洛茨基主义、清算主义、新左翼、基本收入理论等渐渐成为新格局中的重要流派。

(1) Trotskyism

(一)托洛茨基主义

Trotskyism, marked by the "theory of permanent revolution," was regarded as heretical in the Soviet Union after the victory of the October Revolution, and Trotsky himself was expelled. Subsequently, although the Fourth International was established in opposition to the Communist International, internal splits occurred because its predictions of an imminent world revolution did not materialize. With the end of the Cold War, Trotskyism experienced a resurgence because it had long predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union. In South Korea, groups that had previously adhered to Soviet socialist ideology began to turn to Trotskyism, and after more than 20 years of development, it has become a major left-wing current.

“以不断革命论”为标志的托洛茨基主义在十月革命胜利后的苏联被视为异端，托洛茨基本人也被驱逐出境。此后，虽然成立过与共产国际相对抗的第四国际，但由于对世界革命即将到来的预言并未兑现而出现内部分裂。冷战结束，托洛茨基主义因为早已预言苏联的崩溃而重新活跃。就韩国而言，过去国内信奉苏联社会主义思想的团体开始转向托洛茨基主义，经过20多年的发展已经成为一股主要的左翼思潮。

The representative figure of South Korean Trotskyism is Jeong Seong-jin, the first director of the Institute of Social Sciences at Gyeongsang National University. He is also the editor-in-chief of *Marxist Studies*, the earliest professional journal for Marxist research in South Korea. He specializes in the study of capitalist economic issues, successfully predicted the South Korean economic crisis, and maintains close ties with the practical struggles of left-wing social movement organizations.

韩国托洛茨基主义的代表人物是庆尚大学社会科学研究院首任院长丁声镇，他同时也是韩国最早的马克思主义研究专业刊物《马克思主义研究》的主编，擅长研究资本主义经济问题，成功预测过韩国经济危机，并与左翼社会运动组织的实际斗争联系紧密。

The Trotskyism of Jeong Seong-jin has three core viewpoints. First, South Korea cannot avoid economic crisis. To begin with, since the 1970s, behind South Korea’s rapid economic growth lies a trend of declining profit rates, making economic crisis inevitable. Next, after the 1997 economic crisis, the economic recovery brought by South Korea’s neoliberal reforms did not resolve structural contradictions and financial imbalances. Finally, in the future, under the framework of the capitalist economic system, the possibility of seeking solutions from outside production no longer exists; only by starting from within production and thoroughly overthrowing the capitalist economic system can a way out be found.

丁声镇的托洛茨基主义主要有三个核心观点。第一，韩国无法避免经济危机。首先，1970年代以来，韩国高速经济增长的背后隐藏着利润率不断下降的趋势，经济危机不可避免;其次，1997年经济危机以后，韩国新自由主义改革带来的经济复苏并未解决结构矛盾和金融失衡的问题;最后，未来，在资本主义经济制度的框架下，从生产的外部来寻求解决方案的可能性已经不复存在，只有从生产的内部入手，彻底推翻资本主义经济制度，才能找到出路。

Second, the South Korean proletariat must completely break with the bourgeoisie. To begin with, the key to inheriting and developing Marxism is to master the critical method of Marxism and use Marxism to critically examine Marxist theory after Marx. Next, apart from Trotskyism being a faithful inheritance and development of Marxism, the thought of Lenin and Stalin and other post-Marxisms have all deviated from original Marxism. Finally, according to the demands of Trotskyism, class-compromise-style social movements do not help resolve the ills of neoliberal reforms; on the contrary, they may aid the evildoer and lead to the fragmentation of the working class. Only through a thorough “bottom-up” socialist revolution and the establishment of a “democratically participatory planned economic system” can the path to light be found.

第二，韩国无产阶级必须与资产阶级彻底决裂。首先，继承和发展马克思主义的关键是掌握马克思主义的批判方法，用马克思主义来批判地考察马克思以后的马克思主义理论;其次，除托洛茨基主义是对马克思主义的忠实继承和发展以外，列宁、斯大林的思想和其他的后马克思主义都背离了原初的马克思主义;最后，根据托洛茨基主义的要求，阶级调和式的社会运动无助于解决新自由主义改革的弊端，甚至会助纣为虐，导致劳动阶层的分裂，只有通过“自下而上”的彻底的社会主义革命，建立“民主参与的计划经济体制”，才能走向光明。

Third, the era of globalization requires the great unity of the world proletariat. To begin with, Marx’s political economy only completed the first half of “capital—landed property—wage labor”; the second half of “the state—foreign trade—the world market” awaits supplementation and improvement. Next, the core question that the second half of “the state—foreign trade—the world market” must answer is the theory of capitalist global value and the theory of global economic crisis, used to explain the division of labor and polarization in the world economy

第三，全球化时代需要世界无产阶级的大联合。首先，马克思的政治经济学仅完成了“资本—土地所有制—雇佣劳动”的前半部，“国家—对外贸易—世界市场”的后半部有待补充完善;其次，“国家—对外贸易—世界市场”的后半部需要回答的核心问题是资本主义全球价值论和全球经济危机论，用以说明世界经济的分工和两极分化的现象，而不是用全球化本身来说明全球化带来的问题;再次，从全球价值论和全球经济危机论来看，全球资本利润率的下降、全球资本过度积累、全球生产和消费的矛盾、全球实体资本与金融资本之间的矛盾，是造成全球经济危机的原因;最后，解决全球经济危机的钥匙是世界无产阶级的联合下的劳资斗争，而不是发达国家与发展中国家之间的斗争。总之，韩国的托洛茨基主义批判了马克思之后的各种马克思主义理论，注重分析资本利润率和资本积累率的变化趋势，从国内和国际两个层面说明资本主义经济危机不可避免，提倡无产阶级的大联合和不妥协性斗争。

Left-wing movement groups guided by Trotskyism mainly include “We Are Together,” “Revolutionary Group,” and “Bolshevik Group.” Most of them declare themselves to be “vanguard parties waging class struggle for human liberation,” refer to “South Korea” as “South Joseon,” and aim to “establish a Soviet government” and “rebuild the Fourth International.” The guiding ideology of these Trotskyist groups is concretely manifested in actions such as the 2008 candlelight demonstrations against the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the relaxation of restrictions on importing US beef, the 2012 demonstrations against presidential election candidates, and the 2016 demonstrations against the Park Geun-hye regime. In the 2008 candlelight demonstrations, Trotskyist groups defined the South Korea-US Free Trade Agreement as a transfer of interests among imperialist financial capital, arguing for total opposition rather than partial compromise, and criticized groups such as the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, the Socialist Labor Union, the Democratic Labor Party, and the Progressive New Party for the bureaucratism and compromise stance they displayed in the demonstrations. In the 2012 demonstrations against presidential election candidates, they regarded both Park Geun-hye and Moon Jae-in as representatives of the bourgeoisie, with Park Geun-hye being the far right and the left-leaning Moon Jae-in likewise being “pro-American, pro-capital, and anti-working class,” with no essential difference between the two. In the 2016 struggle against the Park Geun-hye regime, they raised the slogans “Down with the Park Geun-hye regime” and “Build a workers’ government.”

以托洛茨基主义为指导思想的左翼运动团体主要有“我们在一起”、“革命家团体”、“布尔什维克集团”等，它们大都宣称是“为了人类解放而展开阶级斗争的先锋队”，将“韩国”称为“南朝鲜”，目标指向“建立苏维埃政权”和“重建第四国际”。这些托洛茨基主义团体的指导思想在行动上集中体现为2008年反对自由贸易协定(FTA)放宽进口美国牛肉限制的烛光示威、2012年反对总统选举候选人示威、2016年反朴槿惠政权的示威。托洛茨基主义团体在2008年的烛光示威中，将韩美自由贸易协定定义为帝国主义金融资本之间的利益输送，认为应该全面反对而不是部分妥协，批判民主劳总、社会主义劳动联合、民主劳动党、进步新党等团体在示威中表现出的官僚主义和妥协立场。在2012年反对总统选举候选人示威中，将朴槿惠和文在寅都视为资产阶级的代表，其中朴槿惠是极右势力，偏左的文在寅同样是“亲美、亲资本、反劳动阶级”，两者并无本质区别。在2016年的反对朴槿惠政权的斗争中，喊出“打倒朴槿惠政权”、“建设劳动者的政权”的口号。

The rise of Trotskyism reflects the complexity of the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie under the backdrop of globalization; incomplete struggle is often accompanied by a stronger backlash from capitalism. After experiencing the “progressive decade” of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, South Korea instead fell into the more rightward-turning circumstances of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, which provided favorable practical conditions for the spread of Trotskyism. However, because the struggle goals of Trotskyism are overly idealistic and difficult to achieve in the short term, constructive goals are neglected while combative goals are strengthened. Liquidationism developed precisely within this context.

托洛茨基主义的抬头反映了全球化背景下无产阶级与资产阶级斗争的复杂性，不彻底的斗争往往伴随着资本主义更为强烈的反弹。韩国在经历了金大中和卢武铉的“进步十年”后反而陷入李明博和朴槿惠更向右转的境遇，这为托洛茨基主义的传播提供了有利的现实条件。然而，托洛茨基主义的斗争目标因为过于理想化而难以在短期内得以实现，这导致建设性目标被忽视，斗争性目标被强化。清算主义正是在此脉络中发展起来的。

(2) Liquidationism

(二)清算主义

Liquidationism, whose core viewpoint is the total negation of the history of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as well as the Soviet system, is a derivative within the Trotskyist lineage. Unlike Trotskyism, liquidationism not only negates Soviet socialism but also negates the “theory of permanent revolution,” falling into post-Marxism and postmodernism with diverse and disparate viewpoints. Because liquidationism has only commonly opposed ideas and no commonly endorsed ideas, its connotation and denotation are unclear.

以全盘否定苏联和苏共历史、苏联制度为核心观点的清算主义是托洛茨基主义脉络中的衍生物。与托洛茨基主义不同的是，清算主义不仅否定苏联社会主义，而且否定“不断革命论”，陷入了观点庞杂各异的后马克思主义和后现代主义之中。因为清算主义只有共同反对的理念而没有共同赞成的理念，所以它的内涵和外延并不明晰。

The representative scholar of South Korean liquidationism is Lee Jin-kyung, a professor of general education at Seoul National University, who is also a leading figure in postmodernism and post-Marxism. His representative works include *The Future of Marxism* (2006), *Communalism* (2010), *The Masses and Trends* (2012), and *Marxism and Modernity* (2014). His core viewpoints can be summarized in three aspects.

韩国清算主义的代表学者是首尔大学通识教育教授李真景，其实他也是后现代主义和后马克思主义的领军人物，代表著作有《未来的马克思主义》(2006)、《公社主义》(2010)、《大众和潮流》(2012)、《马克思主义与现代性》(2014)等。他的核心观点可以概括为三个方面。

First, he attempts to replace communism with communalism. First, “all living beings” (both animate and inanimate) have the right to form communes; it is not only humans but all “existences” that are the subjects of the commune. This is a sublation of original political economy and ecology, termed a biopolitics that transcends humanism. Second, humans are no longer the center of the commune; the various “existences” in the commune cannot be independent of others and can only be mutually dependent, with no center or periphery, and no subject or object. Third, labor is no longer the sole source of value; humans and other “existences” can all create value, and there is no such thing as surplus value or capital accumulation. Finally, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are no longer antagonistic classes; class struggle is replaced by friendly politics. The two pillars of the commune are productive forces and democracy, and its two characteristics are commonality and equality.

第一，妄图用公社主义代替共产主义。首先，“众生”(有生命的和无生命的)都有组成公社的权利，不仅仅是人，所有的“存在”都是公社的主体，这是对原有政治经济学和生态学的扬弃，称为超载人道主义的生命政治学;其次，人不再是公社的中心，公社中的各种“存在”都无法独立于他者，只能相互依存，无所谓中心和边缘，也无所谓主体和客体;再次，劳动不再是价值的唯一源泉，人和其他“存在”都可以创造价值，无所谓什么剩余价值和资本积累;最后，无产阶级和资产阶级不再是对抗的阶级，阶级斗争被友善的政治而取代，公社的两大支柱是生产力和民主主义，公社的两大特征是共同性和平等性。

Second, he attempts to replace the concept of class with the concept of the masses. First, he negates the substantiality of the masses. Following the thought patterns of Gabriel Tarde, Wilhelm Reich, Gilles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari, he interprets the masses as “the masses in a trend” rather than “the masses united together,” as “liquid” rather than “solid.” Second, he emphasizes the externality and spontaneity of the masses. Individuals who have not stepped out of their accustomed internal environment and gathered together cannot be called the masses; crowds that are manipulated and mobilized to gather also cannot be called the masses. Only when people break out of their original internal environment, discover a common new goal from the outside, and automatically form cohesion can they be called the masses. Third, he denies that the masses have any transcendental characteristics. The masses are neither good nor evil, neither peaceful nor violent; they are merely swept along in a trend. He opposes attributing the concrete phenomena of mass movements to the natural characteristics of the masses, arguing that the actions of the masses are merely reactions to environmental conditions. Finally, he views mass revolution as a collective challenge to the existing system, turning “inaudible voices” into “audible voices,” revealing the power of existence.

第二，妄图用大众概念代替阶级概念。首先，否定大众的实体性，顺着加布里埃尔·塔尔德(Gabriel Tarde)、威尔海姆·赖希(Wilhelm Reich)、吉尔·德勒兹(Gilles Deleuze)和费利克斯·加塔里(Felix Guattari)的思维模式，将大众解释成“潮流中的大众”而不是“团结在一起的大众”，是“液体”而不是“固体”;其次，强调大众的外部性和自发性，没有走出已经习惯的内部环境的个人聚集在一起并不能称为大众，被操纵和动员而聚集在一起的人群也不能称为大众，只有跳出原有的内部环境，从外部发现共同的新目标而自动形成凝聚力，才能称为大众;再次，否认大众具有任何先验性的特征，大众无所谓善也无所谓恶，无所谓和平也无所谓暴力，只是被裹挟在潮流中而已，反对将大众运动的具体现象归结于大众的天然特性，认为大众的行动只是对环境条件的反应而已;最后，将大众革命看作是对现行制度的集体性挑战，是将“听不见的声音”变为“听得见的声音”，显现出存在的力量。

Third, it attempts to “liquidate” the basic theories of Marxism, including dialectical materialism. First, it emphasizes the particularity of things, adopting the philosophical core of Baruch Spinoza and ignoring the connections and changes among things. Second, it holds that the basic theories of Marxism are all products of modern society and have historical limitations — the labor theory of value, historical materialism, and scientific socialism are all treated this way. Finally, it declares the need to thoroughly transform Marxism, absorbing the ideas of Kurt Gödel, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, and Laozi to demonstrate the feasibility of communalism. In sum, liquidationism in South Korea advocates criticizing Marxism from both methodological and theoretical-content perspectives, attempting to bridge East and West spatially and connect the modern and the postmodern temporally, thereby proposing a communitarian scheme tinged with utopian socialism.

第三，妄图“清算”包括唯物辩证法在内的马克思主义基本理论。首先强调事物的特殊性，采用巴鲁赫·斯宾诺莎(Baruch Spinoza)的哲学内核，忽略事物之间的联系和变化;其次，认为马克思主义的基本理论都是近代社会的产物，具有历史局限性，劳动价值论、历史唯物主义、科学社会主义都是如此;最后，宣称要彻底改造马克思主义，吸收库尔特·哥德尔(Kurt Godel)、弗里德里希·威廉·尼采(Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche)、米歇尔·福柯(Michel Foucault)和老子的思想，论证公社主义的实现可能性。总之，韩国的清算主义主张从方法论和理论内容两个方面批判马克思主义，试图在空间上打通西方与东方，在时间上连接现代与后现代，提出了一个具有空想主义色彩的公社主义方案。

No group in the South Korean left-wing movement has explicitly taken liquidationism as its guiding ideology, yet traces of liquidationism can be seen in every large-scale street protest. First, there is the movement to liquidate accumulated evils. This movement opposes the long-standing malpractices of South Korean society — bureaucracy, corruption, unspoken rules, and the like — and normally exists in the form of associations and propaganda, turning into collective protests when stimulated by hot-button social issues. The 2014 Sewol Ferry Incident [6]6 The Sewol Ferry Incident (2014): a South Korean passenger ferry capsized and sank, killing 304 people, mostly high school students. The government’s inadequate response sparked massive public outrage and accusations of bureaucratic corruption and incompetence. and the 2016 “Korea-Japan Comfort Women Secret Agreement Incident” [7]7 The Korea-Japan Comfort Women Secret Agreement Incident (2016): revelations that the South Korean government had secretly agreed with Japan in 2015 to a final and irreversible resolution of the “comfort women” issue, without consulting victims, triggering protests. each triggered liquidation movements against the government’s accumulated evils. The 2018 “Seo Ji-hyun Sexual Harassment Accusation Incident” [8]8 The Seo Ji-hyun Sexual Harassment Accusation Incident (2018): a female prosecutor publicly accused a senior ministry official of sexual harassment, sparking a broader #MeToo movement in South Korea against patriarchal culture. sparked a liquidation movement against the accumulated evils of patriarchal culture. Second, there is the historical liquidation movement. This movement targets historical events and figures related to treason, dictatorship, and human rights violations in modern South Korean history, and is centered on various “Historical Truth Investigation Committees.” Examples include the movement of the bereaved families of the April 19 Movement [9]9 The April 19 Movement (1960): a student-led pro-democracy uprising that overthrew the authoritarian First Republic of South Korea under Syngman Rhee., the movement of the bereaved families of the October Struggle [10]10 The October Struggle (1946): a series of nationwide protests and uprisings against the U.S. military government in South Korea, suppressed with heavy casualties., the movement of the bereaved families of U.S. military atrocities, and the movement opposing state-designated history textbooks. Third, there is the capital liquidation movement. This movement targets the chaebol monopoly system and is the result of the socialization of union activities. The 2005 Samsung Motors scandal involving over 300 billion won in fraudulent debt, the 2008 allegation that Samsung Group Chairman Lee Kun-hee evaded over 1 trillion won in taxes, and the 2015 allegation that Samsung C&T and Cheil Industries pressured the National Pension Service during their merger — all these became triggers for the capital liquidation movement.

韩国左翼运动中并没有明确将清算主义列为指导思想的团体，但是在每一次大型的街头示威中又都可以看到清算主义的影子。首先，是积弊清算运动。积弊清算运动反对韩国社会长久以来形成的官僚主义、腐败、潜规则等恶习，平时以结社和宣传的方式存在，在社会热点问题的刺激下变为集体性示威。2014年的“世越号事件”，2016年的“韩日慰安妇秘密协议事件”先后引发反对政府积弊的清算运动。2018年的“徐智贤性骚扰告发事件”引发反对家父长制文化积弊的清算运动。其次是历史清算运动。历史清算运动的对象是韩国近代以来与卖国、独裁和人权侵害有关的历史事件和相关人物，以各类“历史真相调查委员会”为中心展开。“4·19”运动时期被害人遗属运动、“十月抗争”被害人遗属运动、美军暴行被害人遗属运动、反对国家指定历史教材运动等即是此类运动。最后是资本清算运动。资本清算运动的对象是财阀垄断体制，是工会活动社会化的结果。2005年三星汽车涉嫌3000多亿韩元债务假账，2008年三星集团会长李健熙涉嫌逃税1兆韩元以上，2015年三星物产与第一毛织合并过程中涉嫌施压国民年金公团，这些都成为资本清算运动的导火线。

In fact, in South Korea, “liquidationism” and “liquidation” are not the same. If liquidationism is a left-wing intellectual trend, then “liquidation” is used across the left-right spectrum to strike down political opponents, manifesting in various “liquidation slogans” and “liquidation policies.” In short, liquidationism as a left-wing intellectual trend is a current that lacks a dialectical core and in which negation overwhelms everything; after deconstruction, it lacks construction. “Liquidation slogans” and “liquidation policies,” by contrast, are used across the left-right spectrum as means for different political factions to attack one another, and are a product of the long-term division and confrontation in South Korean politics.

其实，在韩国“清算主义”和“清算”并不相同，如果说“清算主义”是左翼思潮，那么“清算”则不分左右，广泛被用来打倒政敌，表现为各类“清算口号”和“清算政策”。总之，作为左翼思潮的清算主义是一种缺乏辩证法内核的否定压倒一切的思潮，在解构之后缺乏建构。“清算口号”和“清算政策”则不分左右，是不同政治派别之间相互倾轧的手段，是韩国政治长期分裂对抗的产物。

(3) The New Left

(三)新左翼

The South Korean New Left emerged as an alternative current of Marxism after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Its scope extends beyond the labor movement to include the women’s movement, the environmental movement, the human rights movement, and others, and it is the product of the confluence of the democratization movement and the left-wing movement. Unlike the radical character of Trotskyism and liquidationism, the New Left movement belongs to the conservative category within left-wing thought. In terms of theory, it advocates building a multi-themed, active civil society; in practice, it emulates the practices and experiences of Europe’s “May ’68 movement.”

韩国的新左翼是苏东剧变后马克思主义的替代思潮，在范围上超越了劳工运动，将女性运动、环境运动、人权运动等包括在内，是民主化运动与左翼运动合流的产物。与托洛茨基主义和清算主义的激进特性不同，新左翼运动属于左翼思潮中的保守范畴，在理念上主张建立多主题的、活跃的市民社会，在实践上效仿欧洲“六八运动”的做法和经验。

The representative scholars of the South Korean New Left are mainly Professor Jo Dae-yeop of Korea University’s Department of Sociology and Professor Jeong Cheol-hee of Jeonbuk National University’s Department of Sociology. They were active in the 1990s after South Korea had basically achieved democratization. They advocate pan-democratism, pushing democratization into all spheres of society, focusing on the cultivation of civil society or grassroots society, and proposing concepts such as micro-democracy, life democracy, and participatory democracy. Their specific views can be summarized in three aspects. First, civil society is an important driving force of democratization. To begin with, the driving force of democratization lies within civil society; influenced by the theories of Jürgen Habermas, Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe, they analyze the democratic dynamics within civil society from a micro perspective. Next, internal changes in South Korean civil society are an important indicator of the maturity of the democratization movement; changes in indicators of civil society’s mobilization and organization around the time of the June Struggle of 1987 [11]11 The June Struggle (1987): a massive nationwide pro-democracy protest movement that forced the authoritarian Chun Doo-hwan government to accept direct presidential elections, marking a watershed in South Korea’s democratization. are the fundamental reason it became a watershed in the democratization movement. Finally, the further activation of South Korean civil society is the driving force for the deepening of democracy; grassroots politics, post-materialist politics, new class politics, and new cultural politics are all political changes brought about by the further development of civil society. Second, the transformation of civic groups and civic movements is the foundation for continuous social change. To begin with, there is a tension between the degree of organization and institutionalization of civic movements and the vitality and depth of civil society; the higher the degree of organization and institutionalization, the greater the influence of civic movements and the easier it is to achieve set goals, yet the drawbacks of internal rigidity and clearly demarcated external action boundaries also become prominent. Next, South Korea’s civic movements have reached a period where change is necessary; the rise of the Roh Moo-hyun government was the result of the further organization and institutionalization of South Korean civic movements, but it also turned subsequent civic movements into stagnant water, hindering further social development. Finally, integration and deepening are the future directions for the transformation of South Korean civic movements; universal values that transcend the left-right divide — such as participation, equality, peace, and ecology — should become the guiding principles of civil society, aiming for the integration rather than division of civic groups, and for consultation rather than confrontation. Third, contemporary society, with its diversified interests and values, requires democracy to develop toward the micro and the everyday. To begin with, modern society, with its diversified interests and values, exhibits antagonisms in various fields, labeled as disintegrating society, risk society, network society, conflict society, and so on. Next, these antagonisms can be divided into political and non-political antagonisms; political antagonisms refer to traditional ruling party-opposition party antagonisms, party antagonisms, and the like, while non-political antagonisms refer to antagonisms over issues such as human rights, the environment, and women. Finally, to eliminate various antagonisms, civil society must develop in a micro and everyday direction; only by developing micro-democracy can disputes and antagonisms be resolved through mutual understanding and dialogue, and only by developing life democracy can a horizontal network-structured political participation system be established, promoting social development with the values of autonomy, responsibility, and cooperation. In sum, the South Korean New Left focuses on civic movements, no longer uses class analysis, and claims to belong neither to Marxism nor to Western liberalism, opposing both universalism and particularism. It is a product combining post-Marxism, the Western New Left, and East Asian social movement theory, holding that the routinization, institutionalization, and collaboration of civic groups and civic movements are the foundation for social reform in South Korea, and that only by transcending the particular values of individual groups and forming a situation of mutual collaboration among different groups can comprehensive social reform be promoted.

韩国新左翼的代表学者主要有高丽大学社会学教授赵大烨和全北大学社会学教授郑铁喜，在韩国基本实现民主化后的1990年代表现活跃，他们主张泛民主主义，将民主化推到社会各个层面，关注市民社会或草根社会的培育，提出微观民主主义、生活民主主义、参与民主主义等概念，其具体观点可以概括为三个方面。第一，市民社会是民主化的重要动力。首先，民主化的动力在市民社会内部，受于尔根·哈贝马斯(Jurgen Habermas)、恩斯特·拉克劳(Ernesto Laclau)和尚塔尔·墨菲(Chantal Mouffe)的理论影响，从微观的角度入手分析市民社会内部的民主主义动力;其次，韩国市民社会的内部变化是民主化运动成熟与否的重要标志，1987年“六月抗争”前后市民社会在动员和组织层面的指标变化，是其成为民主化运动分水岭的根本原因;最后，韩国市民社会的进一步活跃是民主主义向纵深发展的动力，草根政治、超物质主义政治、新阶级政治、新文化政治等都是市民社会的进一步发展引起的政治变化。第二，市民团体和市民运动的变革是社会持续变革的基础。首先，市民运动的组织化和制度化程度与市民社会的活跃性和深入性之间存在张力，组织化与制度化程度越高，市民运动的影响力越大，也越容易实现既定目标，然而，其内部僵化和外部行动边界明显的弊端也会同时凸显;其次，韩国的市民运动到了必须变革的时期，卢武铉政府的上台是韩国市民运动进一步组织化和制度化的结果，但也使此后的市民运动变为一潭死水，阻碍了社会的进一步发展;最后，统合和深入是未来韩国市民运动变革的方向，参与、平等、和平、生态等超越左右之争的普遍性价值应成为市民社会的指导理念，以实现市民团体的统合而不是分裂，协商而不是对立。第三，利益和价值多元化的当前社会要求民主主义向微观和日常发展。首先，利益和价值多元化的现代社会在各个领域存在对立现象，这被冠以解体社会、危险社会、网络社会、冲突社会等名称;其次，这种对立可以分为政治对立和非政治对立，政治对立是指传统的朝野对立、政党对立等，非政治对立是指在人权、环境、女性等问题上的对立;最后，要消除各种对立需要市民社会向微观化和日常化的方向发展，只有发展微观民主主义才能以相互理解和对话的方式解决此间的争议和对立，只有发展生活民主主义才能建立起水平网络结构式的政治参与结构，以自律、责任和合作为价值推动社会发展。总之，韩国的新左翼关注市民运动，不再使用阶级分析法，标榜既不属于马克思主义也不属于西方的自由主义，既反对普世主义也反对特殊主义。它是将后马克思主义、西方的新左翼和东亚的社会运动理论结合在一起的产物，认为市民团体和市民运动的日常化、制度化和协作化是韩国社会改革的基础，只有超越团体的个别价值从而在不同团体之间形成相互协作的局面，才能推动社会全面改革。

New Left social movement organizations are the most numerous and have the broadest influence in South Korea. In the Seoul and Gyeonggi Province area alone, there are over 200 New Left social movement organizations, including representative groups such as the “Corporate Responsibility Citizens’ Group,” the “Democratic Press Citizens’ Alliance,” the “National Alliance for the Unemployed,” the “Construction and Transportation Citizens’ Alliance,” the “Walkable City Citizens’ Alliance,” the “Citizens’ Alliance for Economic Justice,” the “International Development Cooperation Civil Society Forum,” “Green Future,” the “Northeast Asia Peace Alliance,” the “Citizens’ Association for Eradicating Corruption,” the “Seoul Environmental Alliance,” and the “Women’s Political Democracy Alliance.” In South Korea’s regions, there are also over 100 New Left social movement organizations with local characteristics, spread across Incheon, Gangneung, Gyeongsang, Jeolla, Chungcheong, and Jeju, such as the “East Sea Environmental Protection Association,” the “Gimhae Women’s Association,” the “Pohang Environmental Movement Alliance,” the “Jeju Fishermen’s Association,” the “Mokpo Local Autonomy Citizens’ Alliance,” and the “Incheon Poor People’s Alliance.” Most of these New Left social movement organizations have focused themes and goals, with high member homogeneity, covering economic, political, cultural, social, ecological, and international peace issues. Thus, aside from sustained struggles around specific objectives, they also coalesce in social reform movements with universal values, which is how the Citizens’ Social Solidarity Network was born. Launched in 2001, the Citizens’ Social Solidarity Network currently has over 300 member organizations, which have jointly exerted force in movements such as the “Electoral Law Reform Movement,” the “Stop the Jeju Naval Base Construction Movement,” the “Open National Assembly Movement,” the “Sewol Ferry Truth Investigation Movement,” the “Movement Against the Deployment of THAAD,” and the “Movement to Urge Park Geun-hye’s Impeachment.” [12]12 The Sewol Ferry sank off the coast of South Korea in April 2014, killing 304 people, mostly high school students; the disaster sparked massive protests against the government of President Park Geun-hye. THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) is a U.S. missile defense system whose deployment in South Korea in 2017 provoked strong opposition from China and domestic civic groups. Park Geun-hye was impeached and removed from office in 2017 following a massive corruption scandal.

新左翼社会运动团体在韩国数量最多、影响最为广泛。就首尔及京畿道地区来看，新左翼社会运动团体超200多个，其中代表性的团体包括“企业责任市民团体”、“民主舆论市民联合”、“全国失业解决团体联合”、“建设交通市民联合”、“适宜步行城市建设市民联合”、“经济正义实践市民联合”、“国际发展合作市民社会论坛”、“绿色未来”、“东北亚和平联合”、“杜绝腐败市民会”、“首尔环境联合”、“女性政治民主联合”等。就韩国地方来看，富有地方特色的新左翼社会运动团体也超过100个，遍布仁川、江陵、庆尚、全罗、忠清、济州各地，例如“东海环境保护会”、“金海女性会”、“浦项环境运动联合”、“济州渔民会”、“木浦地方自治市民联合”、“仁川贫民联合”等等。这些新左翼社会运动团体大都主题和目标集中，会员同质性高，涵盖经济、政治、文化、社会、生态、国际和平等各个方面。这样，除围绕特定目标持续斗争外，它们还会在具有普遍价值的社会改革运动中形成合力，市民社会团体联合会就是这样诞生的。2001年发起的韩国市民社会团体联合会目前有300多个会员团体，先后在“选举法修改运动”、“停止建设济州海军基地运动”、“国会开放运动”、“世越号真相调查运动”、“反对设置萨德运动”、“敦促朴槿惠下台运动”等运动中共同发力。

In sum, the South Korean New Left has deconstructed the concept of class struggle, incorporating various social movements and organizations into it and seeking cooperation across different struggle objectives and interests. As the renowned New Left movement scholar George Katsiaficas has stated, South Korea’s civic movements have transcended inherent class and labor divisions, and a popular community is taking shape. However, because objectives and interests are difficult to reconcile, cooperation often remains at the level of joint demonstrations during major social movements, making it hard to deepen, thereby leading to a sense of directionlessness and a lack of scientific rigor.

总之，韩国的新左翼已经解构了阶级斗争概念，将各种社会运动和团体纳入其中，在不同的斗争目标和利益中寻求合作。正如著名的新左翼运动研究学者乔治·卡特西法卡(George Katsiaficas)所言，韩国的市民运动已经超越了固有的阶级和劳动分工，民众共同体正在形成。然而，由于目标和利益的难以调和，合作往往停留在重大社会运动时联合示威的层面，很难深入下去，从而导致前途迷茫，缺乏科学性。

(4) Basic Income Theory

(四)基本收入理论

South Korea’s basic income theory is one of the New Left’s economic reform proposals, which gained popularity after the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis. This theory holds that the root cause of economic crises is relative overproduction due to insufficient consumption, and insufficient consumption is caused by excessively low incomes; therefore, increasing income for all members of society can alleviate economic crises. Unlike previous conditional and differentiated welfare policy concepts, basic income theory argues that there should be no restrictions based on family, employment, property, or ability in the enjoyment of basic income, and even those who voluntarily do not engage in social labor should be entitled to basic income security. Philippe Van Parijs is the founder of basic income theory; he argues that every member of society has the right to unconditionally receive a basic income from the social community, and the amount of basic income should be the highest sustainable standard that the social community can bear, with the aim not of guaranteeing a basic standard of living, but of freeing people from material constraints on freedom.

韩国的基本收入理论是新左翼社会改革的经济方案之一，在美国次贷危机之后开始流行。该理论认为，经济危机的根本原因是消费不足带来的生产相对过剩，消费不足的原因则是收入过低，因此通过为社会全体成员增加收入的手段可以缓解经济危机。与以往的有条件的、差别化的福利政策理念不同，基本收入理论认为不应该在基本收入的享有上设置家庭、就业、财产、能力等限制，甚至主动不从事社会劳动的人群也应该享有基本收入保障。菲利普·范·帕里斯(Philippe Van Parijs)是基本收入理论的奠基人，他主张，任何社会成员都有权利无条件地从社会共同体获得基本收入，基本收入的额度应该是该社会共同体可以持续承受的最高标准，其目的不是为了保障基本的生活水平，而是为了摆脱物质对自由的束缚。

The representative scholar of South Korean basic income theory is Kang Nam-hoon, a professor of economics at Hanshin University. From an economic perspective, he has transformed basic income theory from a value-based “ought” into a practical possibility, using real-world cases and data to refute the stereotype that providing basic income fosters laziness. He founded the Basic Income Korean Network and promoted the implementation of specific projects such as free school lunches in Gyeonggi Province and the Seongnam City Youth Allowance to ground the theory in practice. Since 2011, South Korea’s Park Jong-cheol Publishing House has planned a “Basic Income Series,” currently comprising four volumes: *Basic Income for All* (Choi Gwang-eun, 2011), *Controversies over Basic Income and an Alternative Society* (Kim Won-tae et al., 2014), *Global Status and Prospects of the Basic Income Movement* (Kang Nam-hoon et al., 2014), and *The Economics of Basic Income* (Kang Nam-hoon, 2019).

韩国基本收入理论的代表学者是韩神大学经济学教授江南勋，他从经济学的视角出发将基本收入理论从价值的应然变为现实的可能，用现实的案例和数据反驳提供基本收入会养懒汉的刻板观念，创建韩国基本收入联合活动团体，通过推动京畿道地区中小学免费午餐和城南市青年津贴等具体项目以实现理论落地。自2011年起，韩国朴钟哲出版社开始策划“基本收入系列丛书”，目前共有四册，分别是《为所有人提供基本收入》(崔光恩，2011)、《基本收入的争议与替代社会》(金元泰等，2014)、《基本收入运动的全球现状与展望》(江南勋等，2014)、《基本收入的经济学》(江南勋，2019)。

Currently, the main content of South Korea’s basic income theory focuses on three aspects. First, South Korea needs to establish a basic income system. To begin with, multiple countries and regions around the world are already piloting or implementing basic income systems: Brazil enacted the world’s first basic income law, Namibia promoted an unconditional basic income system, and the Alaska Permanent Fund and Native corporation fund systems in the United States have been operating well. Next, the dominant theories of the real world have triggered various crises: the polarization brought by neoliberalism and the structural crisis faced by the welfare state have placed immense pressure on politics, economy, and society, with tax increases accompanied by a decline in citizens’ sense of well-being. Finally, South Korea, facing the same crises, needs to introduce a basic income system; only by establishing a basic income system can it break the outdated relationship among labor, income, and welfare, fundamentally solve South Korea’s unemployment problem, and construct a new economic paradigm.

目前，韩国的基本收入理论的主要内容集中在三个方面。第一，韩国有必要建立基本收入制度。首先，世界多个国家和地区已经在试行或实行基本收入制度，巴西制定了世界上最早的基本收入法案，纳米比亚推广过无条件基本收入制度，美国阿拉斯加州的永久基金和原住民公司基金制度延续状况良好;其次，现实世界的支配理论引发各种危机，新自由主义带来的两极分化以及福利国家遭遇的结构性危机给政治、经济和社会各个方面带来诸多压力，税收增加的同时民众的获得感却在下降;最后，面临相同危机的韩国有必要引入基本收入制度，只有建立基本收入制度，才能打破劳动、收入和福利三者之间的陈旧关系，根本解决韩国的失业问题，构建经济新范式。

Second, basic income system theory demonstrates progressive social value on multiple levels. To begin with, the establishment of a basic income system will promote the improvement of human rights and citizenship rights. As society progresses, the concept of human rights has shifted from a philosophical perspective to a social one; increases in poverty, unemployment, and temporary employment infringe on social human rights. Implementing a basic income system will not only guarantee individuals’ right to survival but also enhance their right to participation, thereby laying the foundation for deliberative democracy. Next, the establishment of a basic income system will help address the challenges that an AI society poses to labor. Artificial intelligence is replacing many forms of human labor, weakening the relationship between labor and production, and making the value of intelligent labor difficult to assess. Implementing a basic income system will make labor freer, making exploratory and artistic labor more common. Finally, the establishment of a basic income system will help build a universal social welfare system. The various conditions attached to public relief and public welfare systems limit their scope in solving problems and increase their implementation costs. Implementing a basic income system expands the scope of beneficiaries while saving operational costs.

第二，基本收入制度理论在多个层面显示出进步的社会价值。首先，基本收入制度的建立将促进人权和市民权的完善，随着社会的进步，人权的概念已经从哲学的视角转变为社会的视角，贫困、失业和临时雇用的增加侵害了社会人权，实施基本收入制度不仅会保障个人的生存权，而且会提升他们的参与权，从而为审议民主主义奠定基础;其次，基本收入制度的建立将有助于应对人工智能社会对劳动的挑战，人工智能使许多人类劳动被替代，劳动与生产的关系被弱化，智能劳动价值难以评估，实施基本收入制度将使劳动变得更加自由，探索性劳动和艺术性劳动变得更加普遍;最后，基本收入制度的建立将帮助建立起普遍的社会福利体系，公共救济和公共福利制度附加的各种条件限制了它们解决问题的范围，也增加了它们实施过程中的成本，实施基本收入制度在扩大受惠范围的同时节约了运行成本。

Third, it is possible for South Korea to establish a basic income system. To begin with, implementing a basic income system will not reduce the labor supply; workers’ enthusiasm for work will not be extinguished by receiving a basic income. Relevant experiments in India have also shown that a basic income system does not become a cause of voluntary unemployment. Next, implementing a basic income system will not lower the social wage level. With basic income guaranteed, labor is pursued for the sake of worthwhile work, which will only lead to an increase in wage levels, not a decrease. Finally, the implementation of a basic income system has feasible financial support. Through reforms to the tax system and related institutions, South Korea can ensure a monthly basic income of 300,000 won for all citizens. In sum, South Korea’s basic income theory is a concrete concept within the civic movement; seemingly absurd, it directly targets human freedom and liberation, striving to return alienated labor to its authentic state.

第三，韩国有可能建立基本收入制度。首先，基本收入制度的实施不会减少劳动力供给，劳动者的工作热情并不会因为拿到基本收入而熄灭，印度的相关实验也表明基本收入制度并未成为诱发主动失业的原因;其次，基本收入制度的实施不会降低社会的工资水平，在基本收入得到保障的基础上，劳动是为了追求值得的工作，这只会引起工资水平提高而不是下降;最后，基本收入制度的实施有切实可行的财政支持，通过税收等相关制度的改革，韩国可以保证每月为所有国民提供30万韩元的基本收入。总之，韩国的基本收入理论是一种市民运动的具体理念，看似荒诞不经，却直指人类的自由和解放，力图让异化的劳动回归本真。

The basic income social movement in South Korea started relatively late. Although a joint activist group called the "Basic Income Network" was established in South Korea as early as 1989, it remained little known and did not become active until 2009. In 2009, the Socialist Party incorporated the establishment of a basic income system into its policy objectives; at the same time, the "Basic Income Network" opened an online discussion room, making basic income a hot topic on the internet. In 2010, South Korea held an international academic conference on basic income and issued the *Seoul Declaration on Basic Income*. In the same year, a Basic Income Federation appeared in local elections, marking the formal start of the basic income social movement in South Korea. Currently, the basic income social movement has established branches across South Korea, covering Incheon, Daejeon, North Jeolla, South Jeolla, Daegu, Busan, and other areas, steadily advancing concrete basic income practices within the context of local autonomy. Examples of such practices include the free lunch program for primary and secondary schools in Gyeonggi Province, the youth allowance program in Seongnam City, and the farmer basic income program in Yeoju City. At the national level, in February 2018, the South Korean National Assembly passed the *Child Allowance Act*, stipulating that children under six years old in households within the bottom 90% of income can receive a monthly subsidy of 100,000 won. Although children from the top 10% of wealthy households are still excluded from the beneficiary group, this is close to a universal level and can be regarded as the first concrete practice of a basic income system in South Korea.

韩国的基本收入社会运动起步较晚。虽然1989年韩国就已经成立名为“基本收入网络”的联合活动团体，但却鲜为人知，直到2009年才具有一定活跃性。2009年，社会党将建立基本收入制度纳入政党的政策目标，与此同时，“基本收入网络”开辟网络讨论室，使基本收入成为网络热门话题。2010年，韩国召开基本收入国际学术大会，发表《基本收入首尔宣言》。同年，在地方选举中出现基本收入联合会的身影，标志着韩国基本收入社会运动正式起步。目前，基本收入社会运动已经在韩国各地建立分部，涵盖仁川、大田、全北、全南、大邱、釜山等地，在地方自治的环境中稳步推进基本收入的具体实践，京畿道中小学免费午餐方案、城南市青年津贴方案、骊州市农民基本收入方案等都属于此类实践。就全国层面来看，2018年2月，韩国国会通过《儿童补贴法》，规定收入在下位90%以内的家庭中未满6岁的儿童每月可以领取10万韩元补贴，虽然处于上位10%的富裕家庭儿童仍被排除在受惠人群之外，但是已经接近普惠水平，这可以看作基本收入制度在韩国的首例具体实践。

In summary, the theory of basic income in South Korea is a relatively concrete type among various left-wing struggle programs. Conceptually, it repositions the goal of social security not merely as maintaining basic living standards or coping with income crises such as unemployment, but as guaranteeing the right to enjoy freedom free from material constraints simply by virtue of being human. In practice, it gains more support by gradually advancing the implementation of relevant systems.

总之，韩国的基本收入理论是各种左翼斗争方案中比较具体化的类型，它在理念上使社会保障的目标不只局限于维持基本生活或应对失业等收入危机，而将其定位为保障生而为人就拥有不受物质条件限制享有自由的权利，在实践上通过推动相关制度的渐进落地而获得更多支持。

III. New Directions in the Evolution of 21st-Century South Korean Left-Wing Thought

三、21世纪韩国左翼思潮演变的新方向

Just as, under the influence of the new characteristics of South Korean capitalism—"monopoly under freedom" and "extreme poverty amid prosperity"—the relatively radical Trotskyism and liquidationism, along with the relatively conservative New Left and basic income theory, have become the main content of left-wing thought, so too will South Korean capitalism in the future face the situation of "labor marginalization under artificial intelligence" and "changes in labor-capital relations under trade protectionism." This will also prompt left-wing thought to exhibit new features of individual deepening in different fields.

正如在目前韩国资本主义的新特征“自由下的垄断”和“繁荣下的赤贫”的影响下，相对激进的托洛茨基主义和清算主义与相对保守的新左派和基本收入理论成为左翼思想的主要内容一样，未来韩国资本主义将面临“人工智能下的劳动边缘化”与“贸易保护主义下的劳资变局”的形势，这也将促使左翼思潮出现在不同领域个别深化的新特征。

First, the relatively radical Trotskyism and liquidationism will gradually fade. During periods of major capitalist adjustment and transformation, labor movements and other left-wing social movements will inevitably experience severe shocks. Advances in artificial intelligence technology have pushed industrial production into a fifth revolution, further marginalizing simple labor amid technological innovation. The reduction in job opportunities has split the labor camp. The combination of reindustrialization in developed capitalist countries and trade protectionism has fractured horizontal international divisions of labor, undermining workers' motivation for international cooperation and, to some extent, hindering the international workers' movement. The differentiation and reorganization of domestic and international labor groups will cause Trotskyism and liquidationism, which emerged from critiques of the Soviet model, to gradually fade. Of course, the influence of the unique culture of political liquidation in South Korea's political ecosystem will persist, but because it lacks concrete theoretical support and relies solely on a trait of "opposing for the sake of opposing," it is not sufficient to be labeled a school of thought.

首先，相对激进的托洛茨基主义和清算主义将逐渐褪色。在资本主义大调整和大变革的时期，劳工运动和其他左翼社会运动必然会经历剧烈震荡。人工智能技术的进步使工业生产进入第五次革命，简单劳动在技术革新中被进一步边缘化，工作机会的缩减促使劳动阵营分裂。发达资本主义国家的再工业化与贸易保护主义的结合使横向的国际分工断裂，劳动者的国际合作动机受损，国际工人运动在一定程度上受阻。国内和国际劳动群体的分化和重组将使以批判苏联模式而兴起的托洛茨基主义和清算主义逐渐褪色。当然，韩国政治生态中特有的清算文化的影响还将持续存在，但是因为它缺乏具体的理论支撑，仅仅凭借“为了反对而反对”的特质，还不足以冠名为一种思潮。

Second, apart from basic income theory, the New Left will deepen policy research in various fields. Since 2015, with the spread of social movements in areas such as women's rights, the environment, disability rights, and sexual minority rights, corresponding theories have gradually taken shape. The Me Too movement has pushed feminism toward gender egalitarianism; the disability rights movement has driven the refinement of research on social service standards for the disabled; the green environmental movement has deepened research on environmental rights. All these developments have made left-wing social movements more concrete and targeted. Specifically, the gender egalitarianism movement has already brought together women and sexual minorities, not only fighting for paid maternity and paternity leave for women but also providing anti-discrimination and anti-bullying support for sexual minorities. The disability rights movement has incorporated items such as income, medical care, employment, housing, caregiving, counseling, and development support. The green environmental movement has also shifted its vision from economic issues of resources and energy consumption to lifestyle issues of attitudes and habits, as seen in "sustainable fashion" and "minimalist living."

其次，除基本收入理论外，新左翼将在各个领域深化对策研究。2015年以来，随着女性、环境、残疾人、性少数人等领域的社会运动的扩散，相应的理论开始逐渐成型。反性骚扰(Me too)运动实践推动女性主义向性平权主义方向发展，残疾人维权运动催生残疾人社会服务标准研究走向细化，绿色环保运动使环境权研究不断深入，这些都使左翼社会运动更加具体化和富有针对性。具体来看，性平权运动已经将女性和性少数人群结合在一起，不仅为女性争取带薪产假和育儿假，而且为性少数群体提供反歧视、反欺凌支持;残疾人维权运动已经把收入、医疗、就业、住房、看护、咨询、发展支持等项目纳入其中;绿色环保运动的理念也将视野从经济层面的资源和能耗问题转向生活层面的态度和方式问题，“可持续性时尚”和“极简生活”即是如此。

Finally, the theory and method of scientific socialism will regain attention. Compared with the trend of Trotskyism and liquidationism gradually fading, the call to return to and strengthen classical Marxist studies is gaining increasing resonance. More South Korean left-wing scholars recognize that the basic principles of scientific socialism have not become outdated. Enriching and developing the content of scientific socialism in light of the new characteristics and trends of capitalist development remains an unavoidable task for contemporary Marxists. After 2012, the translation of the complete works of Marx and Engels into Korean was officially launched. Popular readings of *Capital* and the *Communist Manifesto* have been published one after another, and works analyzing capitalist economic crises and future social directions from a Marxist perspective have gradually increased. In this way, the marginalization of Marxism in South Korean left-wing social movements will be ameliorated. "What kind of doctrine a country adopts depends on whether that doctrine can solve the historical challenges facing that country." Only when scientific socialism is closely integrated with solving the problems of South Korean capitalism will its vitality flourish.

最后，科学社会主义的理论与方法将重新受到重视。与托洛茨基主义和清算主义逐渐褪色的趋势相比，重新回归并加强经典马克思主义研究的呼声开始得到越来越多人的响应。更多的韩国左翼学者认识到科学社会主义的基本原理并未过时，根据资本主义发展的新特点和新趋势，进一步丰富和发展科学社会主义的内容，仍是当代马克思主义者不能绕过的课题。2012年以后，马恩全集韩文版的翻译工作正式启动，《资本论》和《共产党宣言》的通俗性读物相继问世，从马克思主义视角分析资本主义经济危机和未来社会走向的成果逐渐增多。这样，韩国左翼社会运动中马克思主义被边缘化的状况将会得到改善。“一个国家实行什么样的主义，关键要看这个主义能否解决这个国家面临的历史性课题”，科学社会主义只有与解决韩国资本主义的难题紧密结合，它的生命力才会旺盛。

The 21st century is an era of reorganization for South Korean left-wing thought. As the drawbacks of neoliberalism are continuously exposed, left-wing social movements have begun to show trends of deepening and unification. Innovatively studying and developing Marxism has become an important task for left-wing social workers and theorists. The traditional labor movement remains the main tide of the left wing, while emerging women's movements, environmental movements, anti-nuclear movements, and sexual minority movements are the waves of left-wing development. The new industrial technological revolution represented by artificial intelligence, set against the backdrop of capital monopoly and polarization, is the whirlpool the left wing encounters. Only by riding the force of the waves to go with the current in the whirlpool can one stand at the forefront. (Notes omitted.)

21世纪是韩国左翼思潮重组的时代，在新自由主义的弊端不断暴露的情况下，左翼社会运动开始出现深化和联合的趋势，创新性地研究和发展马克思主义成为左翼社会工作者和理论家的重要内容。传统的劳工运动仍是左翼的大潮，新兴的女性运动、环保运动、反核运动、性少数群体运动则是左翼发展的波浪，资本垄断与两极分化背景下的以人工智能为代表的工业技术新革命是左翼遭遇的漩涡，只有借助波涛的力量在漩涡中顺势而上，才能屹立潮头。（注释略）

Online Editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑