The Reshaping of Europe and Left-Wing Strategy in the Post-Pandemic Era

01 Introduction

01引言

It is widely believed that the COVID-19 pandemic crisis has inaugurated a New Era. We agree with this view, while finding it difficult to imagine the world returning to its previous state. Our position is that the world will not return to its former state; the COVID-19 pandemic did not cause but rather accelerated the “critical factors” that will determine global development in the coming years. This applies especially to the world system in which the unipolar hegemony of the United States is approaching its end. The aim of this article is to elucidate this issue from the perspective of Europe and its integration process.

人们普遍认为，新冠肺炎疫情危机开启了一个新时代。我们同意这一观点，同时很难想象世界会回到原状。我们的观点是，世界不会再回到原状了，新冠肺炎疫情并非导致而是加速了“关键因素”，从而决定了未来几年的全球发展。这尤其适用于美国单边霸权即将终结的世界体系，本文的目标是尝试从欧洲及其一体化进程角度阐发这一问题。

On December 31, 2019, China notified the World Health Organization of “pneumonia of unknown cause” occurring in Wuhan; on January 12, 2020, China shared the full genome sequence of the novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) with the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) and the WHO. That is to say, by February 13, 2020, when the health ministers of EU member states met in Brussels, they had sufficient information and time to respond, yet failed to take timely preventive measures to stop the development of the epidemic. Subsequently, these countries, whose healthcare systems had been weakened by decades of austerity policies, could only allow the epidemic to spread rapidly. In mid-March, although the European Central Bank responded to the imminent crisis with a €120 billion bond-buying program, the finance ministers of EU countries merely agreed to temporarily suspend the Fiscal Compact. [1]1 The Fiscal Compact, formally the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, is an intergovernmental treaty signed in 2012 that requires signatory EU states to maintain balanced budgets and limits their structural deficits. This meant they only proposed a temporary solution to problems that would not have existed without the Fiscal Compact in the first place. The “flagship program” of the Schengen Agreement [2]2 The Schengen Agreement, signed in 1985 and implemented in 1995, abolished internal border controls among participating European countries, allowing passport-free travel across most of the EU. — the free movement of people within the EU — was suspended, not due to a collective decision to temporarily close borders, but because of disagreements among individual European governments when making decisions. In early March, Germany even banned the export of protective medical equipment, which was not only a mockery of European “solidarity” but also violated the originally sacrosanct rules of the EU market.

2019年12月31日，中国即向世界卫生组织通报武汉发生“不明原因肺炎”；2020年1月12日，中国与全球共享流感数据倡议组织（GISAID）和世界卫生组织分享了新型冠状病毒（SARS-CoV-2）的全基因组序列。也就是说，2020年2月13日，当欧盟成员国的卫生部长们在布鲁塞尔开会时，他们有足够信息、时间做出反应，却未能及时采取预防措施阻止疫情发展。随后，这些因数十年紧缩政策而削弱医疗体系的国家，只能任由疫情迅速蔓延。3月中旬，尽管欧洲央行对迫在眉睫的疫情危机做出回应，推出1200亿欧元的债券购买计划，但欧盟国家的财长们只是同意暂时搁置《财政协定》。这意味着他们仅是为解决可能产生的问题提出了一个临时方案，而如果没有《财政协定》，这些问题则根本不会存在。《申根协定》所赋予的欧盟人口自由流动的“旗舰计划”被搁置了，这不是源于临时关闭边界的集体决定，而是由于欧洲各国政府决策时个别国家意见不一致。3月初，德国甚至禁止保护性医疗设备的出口，这不仅是对欧洲“团结”的嘲弄，也违反了原本神圣不可侵犯的欧盟市场规则。

Thus, the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the sharp contradictions of the EU treaties: the EU requires member states to adopt social and healthcare policies, yet restricts their fiscal foundations through EU legislation — primarily the Growth and Stability Pact (i.e., the Fiscal Compact). This damaged the EU’s reputation, especially in countries relatively severely affected by the epidemic, making their post-disaster recovery more difficult. This existential crisis is relentlessly exposing the structural defects of the EU: (1) erroneously prioritizing European treaties; (2) focusing not on the well-being of the people but on the smooth functioning of the market; (3) incorrectly dividing competencies among EU institutions, thereby replacing the principle of democratic parliamentary will-formation at the national level with opaque interactions between governments and EU bureaucracies at the European level.

由此可见，新冠肺炎疫情暴露出欧盟条约的尖锐矛盾，欧盟要求成员国采取社会和医疗政策，却通过欧盟立法——主要是《增长和稳定条约》（即《财政协定》）限制各国的财政基础。这损害了欧盟的声誉，尤其是那些受疫情影响相对严重的国家，使其灾后恢复更加困难。这场生存危机正在无情地暴露欧盟的结构性缺陷：（1）错误地将欧洲条约置于优先地位；（2）主要关注点不是人民福祉，而是市场运作的通畅；（3）错误划分欧盟机构间权限，从而以欧洲层面的政府与欧盟官僚机构间不透明的互动，取代了国家层面民主议会式意愿形成原则。

At the time of writing, the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic in the EU appears to have ended. Almost all countries have lifted restrictions on citizens’ free movement and on public life, including most economic activities. Although there are concerns about a resurgence of the epidemic in autumn and winter, the current focus is on the economic crisis, whose extent and duration remain uncertain. Prominent economists warn that this could be the largest economic crisis of capitalism in peacetime to date. Based on its economic governance and the prevailing neoliberal economic supply-side theory, we have reason to believe that the EU is not prepared to protect the people from the impact of the economic crisis.

在撰写本文时，新冠肺炎疫情在欧盟的急性发展阶段似乎已经结束。几乎所有国家都取消了对公民自由行动，以及包括大部分经济活动在内的公共生活的限制。尽管人们担心疫情会在秋冬两季卷土重来，但现在的关注焦点却是经济危机，人们无法确定其程度和持续时间。著名经济学家警告说，这可能是和平时期资本主义迄今最大的经济危机。基于其经济治理以及流行的新自由主义经济供给理论，我们有理由认为，欧盟并未准备好保护人民免受经济危机的影响。

Europe should now be united to curb the “carnival of nationalism,” yet the reality is that the crisis has been exploited by radical right-wing parties: nationalist thinking holds that global crises can be resolved through states competing with each other for scarce resources. This is completely irrational, especially for the small and medium-sized countries of the EU. The more absurd the nationalist viewpoint, the greater the temptation of authoritarian governance. It has been proven that illiberal democracy in the EU may be a shortcut to authoritarian rule.

欧洲当前本应团结一致，从而遏止“民族主义的狂欢”，而现实情况却是，这场危机为激进右翼政党所利用：民族主义思想认为，可以通过国家间相互争夺稀缺资源来解决全球性危机。这是完全不合理的，对于欧盟的中小国家来说尤其如此。民族主义观点越荒谬，独裁统治方式的诱惑就越大。事实证明，欧盟不自由的民主可能是通往独裁统治的捷径。

For example, a political and cultural “backlash” has already occurred, manifested in an increase in domestic violence and a reduction in women’s public discourse. Paradoxically, the pandemic has instead proven the extreme importance of care work, now predominantly performed by women. European left-wing parties need to confront the grim situation. “Capitalism is encountering its systemic limits.” However, for this statement to be more than just ideological self-affirmation, we need to discuss the choices currently facing the people of Europe and the possible paths toward a new mode of production and culture.

例如，现在已经发生政治和文化上的“反弹”，这表现为家庭暴力的增加以及妇女公共话语的削减。矛盾的是，疫情反而证明了现如今主要由妇女从事护理工作的极端重要性。欧洲左翼政党需要直面严峻形势。“资本主义正遭遇其体制性局限”，然而，为使这一表述不仅只是意识形态上的自我肯定，我们还需要就欧洲人民目前所面临的选择，以及通向一种新的生产和文化方式的可能路径进行讨论。

02 How Will Europe Face Recession?

02欧洲将如何面对衰退？

The European economic recession is an indisputable fact; it remains unclear whether it will lead to a longer Great Depression. In the last financial crisis, although there were victims, it did not lead to the collapse of capitalism. On the contrary, the world’s wealthiest class was even able to push their wealth levels to unimaginable new heights and, through financial markets, control the populace and states more firmly than ever before. Compared with previous recessions, the current one is not triggered by the collapse of an overinflated financial sector, but by a sudden rupture in the supply and demand sides of the real economy and in value chains.

欧洲经济衰退已是不争事实，尚不清楚是否会导致更长时间的大萧条。上一次金融危机中，尽管有受害者，但并没有导致资本主义的崩溃。相反，世界上最富有的阶层甚至还能够将其财富水平推升到难以想象的新高度，并通过金融市场比以往任何时候都更加牢固地掌控民众和国家。与此前的衰退相比，当前的衰退不是源于过度膨胀的金融部门的崩溃，而是由实体经济的供求面和价值链的突然断裂而引发。

Theoretically, one might expect a rapid return to normalcy in economies after the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic. In reality, however, the real economy, affected by geopolitical tensions, was already in decline before the outbreak. Central banks have correctly attempted to use expansionary monetary policy to stimulate investment and the real economy, but whether this approach can be sustained effectively is questionable. Most importantly, given the digital and environmental crises, the capitalist economy is at a tipping point of comprehensive transformation, which requires strategies beyond neoclassical economics.

从理论上讲，人们预期在新冠肺炎疫情的急性阶段结束后，各经济体会迅速恢复正常。但实际上，在疫情爆发前，受地缘政治紧张局势影响的实体经济已经处于下滑状态。各国央行试图利用扩张性货币政策来刺激投资和实体经济的做法是正确的，但这种做法能否持久有效却令人怀疑。最重要的是，鉴于数字化和环境危机，资本主义经济正处于全面转型的临界点，这需要新古典经济学以外的其他策略。

At the same time, unemployment has reached alarming levels. According to the International Labour Organization, 2.7 billion workers worldwide have been affected by partial or complete lockdown measures. The social time bomb created by millions of temporary labor relationships in Europe, unprotected by labor laws and social welfare, is in danger of exploding. To prevent the adverse social and economic effects of lockdowns, governments have implemented unprecedented special programs. For example, the German government enacted a series of measures at the end of March 2020, providing financial support totaling the equivalent of 10% of GDP. Economists expect the debt-to-GDP ratio of eurozone member states to rise by 10 to 15 percentage points. The European Commission has limited itself to ex post facto confirmation of national decisions. In contrast, the European Central Bank’s actions at least indicate a willingness to purchase government bonds totaling €750 billion, which can temporarily alleviate national debts.

同时，失业率也达到了惊人的程度。根据国际劳工组织的数据，全球有27亿工人受到部分或完全封锁措施的影响。欧洲数以百万计不受劳动法和社会福利保护的临时劳动关系所制造的社会定时炸弹，正处于爆炸的危险中。为防止封锁对社会和经济造成不利影响，各国政府已通过前所未有的特殊计划。例如，德国政府2020年3月底颁布了一系列措施，提供的资金支持总额相当于GDP的10%。经济学家预计，欧元区成员国的债务与GDP之比将上升10~15个百分点。欧盟委员会将其自身局限于对各国决定进行事后确认。相比之下，欧洲央行的行动至少表明其愿意以总价7500亿欧元的价格购买国债，这可以暂时缓解各国债务。

Clearly, the impending crisis may ultimately evolve into a threat to the EU and its integration process. It is far from sufficient to respond with only transitional monetary policy measures; strong fiscal stimulus is needed, and this cannot be left to member states to resolve alone. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed a €750 billion European development plan, “Next Generation EU.” When the plan was finalized, there were still disputes among member states on some issues, such as how to raise funds and the proportion of subsidies versus repayable loans for the countries most severely affected by the crisis. However, the plan was ultimately vetoed by the relevant countries, because their sovereign debt had already exceeded sustainable development levels and they could not afford to take on more borrowing. Therefore, without significant spending cuts, today’s COVID-19 crisis will ultimately lead to future national debt crises and austerity policy crises.

显然，即将到来的危机最终可能演变为对欧盟及其一体化进程的威胁。仅采取过渡的货币政策手段来应对是远远不够的，更需要强有力的财政刺激措施，而这不能留给成员国独自去解决。欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩提出了一项7500亿欧元的欧洲发展计划，即“下一代欧盟”。当该计划定稿时，成员国之间在一些议题上仍然存有争议。比如，如何筹措资金，以及对受危机影响最严重的国家提供补贴或可偿还贷款的比例。不过该计划最终被相关国家否决，因为这些国家的主权债务已经超过可持续发展水平，无力继续承担更多借款。因此，如果不大幅削减开支，今天的新冠疫情危机终将导致未来的国家债务危机和紧缩政策危机。

The impact of debt accumulation is clearly different for different countries: economically strong states benefit from it, while weak states are discriminated against. The impact of debt accumulation is also astonishing: although Germany accounts for only 26% of the EU economy, it has so far accounted for 50% of the crisis-response spending among EU member states. Therefore, the debt problem will further exacerbate inequality between Southern and Eastern Europe and the EU’s major economic powers. In addition, there are important effects that are difficult to predict. The transformation of the economic structure will change the position of industries, regions, and countries in the competition of capitalist globalization, alter their financial influence, and add new contradictions and competition to the already existing East/West and North/South divides, potentially even affecting the core values of European integration. Furthermore, the economic reconstruction after the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic must be combined with the ecological transformation of industry and the adjustment of the energy base of the economy, which will require unprecedented investment. Therefore, the financing of private and public debt, which has again grown massively during the crisis, will become a key issue in the post-pandemic period. Resolving this issue is also the most important task now facing the left.

债务积累对各国的影响显然是不同的，经济强国会因此受益，而弱国则遭到歧视。债务积累的影响也十分惊人：尽管德国在欧盟经济中所占份额只有26%，但迄今为止，其在欧盟成员国应对危机的支出中却占到50%。因此，债务问题将进一步加剧南欧和东欧地区与欧盟经济大国之间的不平等。此外，还有一些难以预测的重要影响。经济结构转型将改变行业、地区和国家在资本主义全球化竞争中的地位，改变其金融影响力，并给业已存在的东方/西方和北方/南方分裂增添新的矛盾和竞争，甚至可能影响欧洲一体化的核心价值。此外，新冠肺炎疫情急性传播结束后的经济重建，必须与工业的生态转型和经济的能源基础调整相结合，这将需要前所未有的投资。因此，危机期间再次大量增长的私人和公共债务融资，将成为后疫情时期的关键问题。解决这个问题，也是左翼现在所面对的最重要任务。

In this context, the debate over the mutualization of European debt, which had already emerged during the 2007 financial crisis, has heated up again. The proposal for the mutualization of European debt is to issue eurobonds, using the joint fiscal strength of eurozone member states to provide low-interest loans, distributed proportionally to each country based on the extent of the pandemic’s impact and the degree of economic recession. However, the German government has flatly rejected this proposal, casting a shadow over the prospects for European integration in the post-pandemic era. Although eurobonds could alleviate the problem, unless European debt is substantially reduced and the distribution of resources and income is changed, the widespread high debt levels in various countries, and their negative impact on the distribution of material and political resources between states and classes, will persist.

在这种情况下，2007年金融危机期间就已经出现的关于欧洲债务互助化的争论再次升温。欧洲债务互助化的提议是，通过发行欧元债券，利用欧元区成员国共同的财政力量发放低息贷款，依据受疫情影响和经济衰退程度将这些贷款按比例提供给各国。但德国政府断然拒绝这一提议，从而给后疫情时代欧洲一体化的前景蒙上了阴影。尽管欧元债券可以缓解问题，但除非大幅度削减欧洲债务、改变资源与收入的分配方式，否则各国普遍存在的高负债问题，及其对国家和阶级间物质与政治资源分配的负面影响将持续存在。

The option of using inflation to finance national debt will face strong political opposition in some EU member states. The alternative is either to shift the burden onto the people through austerity and privatization programs, as in the last crisis, or to make the wealthy, who hold the largest share of loans, bear the interest burden of public budgets through debt relief, confiscatory taxes, and capital gains taxes. At the same time, capital controls must be implemented, and claims on pension and health insurance funds must be guaranteed. This should be accomplished by the public sector taking over these funds, which must be enacted by member states, while requiring support and coordination at the supranational level.

利用通货膨胀为国债融资的方案，将在某些欧盟成员国遭到政治上的强烈反对。替代方案或是像上次危机那样，通过紧缩和私有化计划将负担转嫁给民众，或是通过减免债务、没收性赋税和资本利得税等方式，使占据最大贷款份额的富人承受公共预算的利息负担。与此同时，还需实行资本管制，并保证对养老金和医疗保险基金的债权。这应该通过公共部门接管这些基金来完成，必须由成员国来颁布，同时需要获得超国家层面的支持和协调。

In the coming months, even mainstream economists will repeatedly assure us that they never supported neoliberalism, and the left can construct a strategy in the cracks of the public discourse crisis. We know from the last financial crisis that this “window of opportunity” will remain open until the ruling classes of the major European powers reach a consensus on how to respond to the crisis. Therefore, the left should avoid becoming a liberal-style mainstream left. This is not a struggle over “isms.” This crisis raises the question of the hegemony of social interests, which is crucial in responding to the crisis.

在接下来的几个月中，即便是主流经济学家也会一再保证他们从未支持新自由主义，而左翼可以在公共话语危机的缝隙中构建战略。我们从上一次金融危机可以获知，在主要欧洲大国的统治阶级就如何应对危机达成共识之前，这种“机会之窗”将一直敞开。因此，左翼应避免成为自由主义式的主流左翼。这不是“主义”之争。这场危机提出了有关社会利益霸权的问题，这在应对危机中至关重要。

Although the ecological crisis has temporarily faded from public discourse, the epochal challenge it poses remains. An alternative based on the interests of the majority must link the resolution of this severe crisis with a socio-ecological transformation. The decisive criterion is not reaching a consensus among the broad goals already existing across Europe, but rather reaching agreement on the tools to achieve these goals. The issue lies in the balance of power between institutions and classes. We must have the courage to discuss, at the enterprise, city, national, and EU levels, the new role of the state, the socialization of property and the financial industry, capital controls, economic democracy, and the elevation of the status of wage-dependent people. This is the only way we can use the opportunity, under the new hegemonic context, to expand social space.

虽然生态危机暂时淡出公众话语，但其提出的划时代挑战依然存在。基于大多数人利益的替代性选择，必须将解决这场严重危机与社会—生态转型联系起来。其决定性标准不是在欧洲各界业已存在的广泛目标间达成共识，而是要在实现这些目标的工具上形成一致。问题在于制度和阶级之间的权力平衡。我们必须有勇气在企业、城市、国家和欧盟层面探讨国家新角色、财产和金融业的社会化、资本管制、经济民主，以及提升工资依赖者的地位等议题。这是我们在新霸权背景下，利用机会扩大社会空间的唯一途径。

03 Market, Democracy, Dilemma

03市场、民主、困境

At the end of 2019, the European Commission and the European Parliament had already promised to hold a conference of citizens to discuss the future of Europe. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, this process has been postponed indefinitely. Since the financial crisis, the crisis of integration has been a theme of European policy. In 2017, the European Commission published the “White Paper on the Future of Europe,” which outlined five scenarios for the EU’s future, whose main author was the then-President of the European Commission, now gradually forgotten, Jean-Claude Juncker. In September of the same year, French President Emmanuel Macron, in a keynote speech at the Sorbonne, proposed a “European initiative,” calling for the elimination of unemployment, ecological transformation, the implementation of a financial transaction tax and a digital tax, the establishment of a minimum standard wealth tax, the promotion of social cohesion, a significant increase in the EU budget, and the democratization of EU institutions. Macron did not ignore various EU deficits in his call to rebuild Europe! But shortly thereafter, when the heads of government of Germany and France met in Paris for the 55th anniversary conference of the signing of the Élysée Treaty, Macron’s proposals were not mentioned in the closing remarks. Thus, before the European Parliament elections, the relevant discussions had already stalled.

2019年底，欧盟委员会和欧洲议会已承诺举行一场由公民参与的会议，就欧洲的未来进行讨论。因为新冠肺炎疫情的缘故，这一进程被无限期推迟。自金融危机以来，一体化危机一直是欧洲政策的主题。2017年，欧盟委员会发表了《欧洲未来白皮书》，揭示了欧盟未来的五种情景，其主要作者是当时担任欧盟委员会主席、但如今已被逐渐忘却的让—克洛德•容克。同年9月，法国总统伊曼纽尔•马克龙在索邦大学的主题演讲中提出“欧洲倡议”，呼吁消除失业、生态转型、实施金融交易税和数字税、确立最低标准财富税率、促进社会融合、显著增加欧盟预算以及欧盟机构民主化。马克龙在呼吁重建欧洲时并未忽略各种欧盟赤字!但在不久之后，当德国和法国政府首脑在巴黎举行《德法爱丽舍条约》签署55周年会议时，闭幕词中并未提及马克龙的提议。因此，在欧洲议会选举之前，相关讨论已经陷入停滞。

The “flagship projects” on which member states might reach agreement are arms plans and the expansion of Frontex. [3]3 Frontex: The European Border and Coast Guard Agency, responsible for managing the EU’s external borders. Military spending and preventing refugees are clearly feasible, while the banking union means that the financial obligation of large banks to fund European deposit insurance has been shelved. The European Commission’s “European Green Deal,” proposed in 2019 to address the climate crisis, is equally disappointing in terms of the scope and method of financing. The EU’s failure in social and climate policy is not surprising, because the integration of capitalist states within the union is primarily achieved through the market, and the market, of course, cannot meet the needs of the whole of society. Milestones in EU development, such as the Treaty of Rome, the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty, and the Treaty of Lisbon, have continuously deepened the market-economy character of the EU. [4]4 Treaty of Rome (1957): Established the European Economic Community (EEC). Single European Act (1986): Aimed to create a single market by 1992. Maastricht Treaty (1992): Founded the European Union and set criteria for Economic and Monetary Union. Treaty of Lisbon (2007): Reformed EU institutions and decision-making processes. Even Macron called the internal market “the true soul of Europe,” in stark contrast to his innovative posture in his Sorbonne speech. However, the proposition of integration through the market has, from the outset, encountered resistance from an “anti-social tendency,” which arises because European institutions prioritize centrally planned political decisions, advocating for the incorporation of the economy into policy goals through state and supranational institutions. Therefore, the history of European integration is also a history of conflict between market integration and centrally planned political decisions.

成员国有可能达成协议的“旗舰项目”，是军备计划、扩充欧盟边防局。军事开支和防范难民显然是可行的，而银行业联盟则意味着大型银行为欧洲存款保险提供资金的金融义务遭到搁置。欧盟委员会在2019年为应对气候危机而提出的《欧洲绿色协议》，在融资范围和方式上同样令人失望。欧盟在社会和气候政策方面的失败不足为奇，因为资本主义国家在联盟中的一体化主要是通过市场来实现，而市场当然无法满足全社会的需求。《罗马条约》《单一欧洲法案》《马斯特里赫特条约》《里斯本条约》等欧盟发展的里程碑，不断深化了欧盟的市场经济特征。就连马克龙也把国内市场称为“欧洲真正的灵魂”，这与他在索邦大学演讲时的创新姿态形成了鲜明对比。然而，经由市场实现一体化的主张，从一开始就遭遇“反社会倾向”的抵制，产生抵制的原因是欧洲机构将中央计划的政治决策置于优先地位，主张通过国家和超国家机构将经济纳入政策目标。因此，欧洲一体化的历史，也是市场一体化和中央计划的政治决策间发生冲突的历史。

In 1951, the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) replaced the International Authority for the Ruhr, which had placed West Germany’s heavy industry under Allied control after the war. [5]5 International Authority for the Ruhr: An Allied body (1949–1952) that controlled Ruhr coal and steel production to prevent German rearmament. This move, besides achieving trade in heavy industrial products without tariff barriers, also established a High Authority with extensive economic control powers. In 1984, the “politics-market” conflict reached its climax when the first directly elected European Parliament adopted the “Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union,” written under the guidance of Altiero Spinelli. [6]6 Altiero Spinelli (1907–1986): Italian communist and federalist, a key figure in the European integration movement. It stipulated that the European market economy should be subordinated to social objectives, specifically including achieving full employment, overcoming inequality, protecting the environment, and cultural progress, among others. Furthermore, initiatives to further strengthen and develop EU cooperation were shifted to the European Parliament, but in this process, the powers of national parliaments were not restricted or constrained. What followed ran counter to Spinelli’s wishes. In 1985, the heads of state and government adopted the Single European Act, which set the goal of rapidly and fully achieving the European internal market, marking the victory of the market-economy tendency. In 1992, after the establishment of neoliberalism and fundamental changes in the world economy and geopolitical landscape, the heads of state and government met at a summit in Maastricht and adopted the now-famous “convergence” criteria to establish an Economic and Monetary Union, consolidating this victory.

1951年，欧洲煤钢共同体（ECSC）的成立取代了鲁尔国际管理局，后者在战后将西德的重工业置于盟军控制之下。此举除了实现没有关税壁垒的重工业产品贸易外，还建立了具有广泛经济控制权的高级机构。1984年，“政治—市场”冲突达到高潮，首届直选产生的欧洲议会接受了在阿尔铁特•斯皮内利指导下所撰写的《欧洲联盟条约草案》。它规定欧洲市场经济要服从于社会目标，具体包括实现充分就业、克服不平等、保护环境和文化进步，等等。此外，进一步加强和发展欧盟合作方面的倡议是转向欧洲议会，但在此进程中，并未对各国议会的权力进行限制和约束。随后发生的事情与斯皮内利的愿望相悖。1985年，各国元首和政府首脑通过了《单一欧洲法案》，该法案设定了快速全面实现欧洲内部市场的目标，这标志着市场经济趋向的胜利。1992年，在新自由主义确立，以及世界经济和地缘政治格局发生根本变化之后，各国元首和政府首脑在马斯特里赫特举行峰会，通过了至今著名的“融合”标准，以建立经济和货币联盟来巩固这一胜利。

In 2005, heads of state proposed the new concept of the *Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe*, but it was ultimately rejected by the French and Dutch publics, and conflict erupted once again. Two years later, because the *Treaty of Lisbon* bypassed popular referendums, the failed constitution was finally adopted at an intergovernmental conference, but this did nothing to enhance the standing of the European Union.

2005年，各国元首提出《欧洲宪法条约草案》的新构想，但其最终遭到法国和荷兰公众的否决，冲突再次爆发。两年后，由于《里斯本条约》绕开了人民公投，失败的宪法终于在一次政府间会议上通过，但这无助于提高欧盟的地位。

The latest climax of the struggle between market and democracy occurred in 2015, when the Greek Coalition of the Radical Left, which had come to power, attempted to break free from the constraints of neoliberal austerity policies. But its efforts to seek alternative solutions to the crisis were suppressed by creditors, and the severity of the austerity plan imposed on it frightened many Europeans (the austerity plans implemented in Ireland and Portugal were even harsher), while also reawakening the long-standing divisions within the radical left over attitudes toward the EU.

市场与民主之争的最新高潮发生在2015年，当时上台执政的希腊激进左翼联盟试图摆脱新自由主义紧缩政策的束缚。但其寻求危机解决替代性方案的努力被债权人压制，而强加其上的紧缩计划的严酷性吓坏了许多欧洲人（爱尔兰和葡萄牙实施的紧缩计划更加严厉），同时也重新唤起了激进左翼内部始终存在的对待欧盟态度的分歧。

The question that both the European left and the left in individual countries must answer is: what scale and form should European cooperation and integration take in order to combat contemporary capitalism? The answer depends on the different emphases placed on Europe as a whole and on individual countries, as well as on the developmental situation of each country.

欧洲左翼和各国左翼都必须回答的问题是，为了对抗当代资本主义，欧洲合作与一体化应采取何种规模和形式。答案取决于对欧洲整体和个别国家的不同关注，也取决于每个国家的发展形势。

The right of each country to withdraw from the EU or the eurozone is beyond question. Although centrifugal tendencies are growing, at least under peaceful conditions, a disorderly breakup of the EU or its constituent parts is unlikely. A more likely scenario is the re-eruption of the old conflict between a German-dominated Central European bloc and a French-led Southern and Western European bloc. Whether the new European order constructed after such a conflict would be conducive to stabilizing social and political relations in each country remains open to question.

各国退出欧盟或欧元区的权利不容置疑。尽管分裂趋势在增长，但至少在和平条件下，欧盟成员国或其他组成部分发生无序分裂的情况是不太可能出现的。更有可能的情况是，德国主导下的中欧集团与法国领导的南欧和西欧集团之间的旧日冲突重新爆发。冲突爆发后所构建的欧洲新秩序，是否有利于稳定各国社会和政治关系，结果有待质疑。

In fact, the long-standing disillusionment with the EU in many countries has evolved into a conviction that the EU is “unreformable.” We cannot ignore this shift in sentiment, nor can we paper over differences in views on the EU through compromise, because this will constitute the starting point for current strategic discussions.

事实上，许多国家对欧盟希冀的长期幻灭已经演变为一种信念，即欧盟是“无法改革的”。我们不能忽视这种情绪变化，也不能通过妥协来掩盖对于欧盟看法的差异，因为这将构成当前战略讨论的出发点。

If the strategic task is to restore popular sovereignty and to act in solidarity rather than against one another in the face of financial market processes, then the people’s democratic self-determination and their control over the state must be defended. This means that every progressive government has the right to break the rules that hinder the well-being of its country and society. Therefore, we must call for the *Growth and Stability Pact*, which has lost its vitality during the pandemic crisis, not to return after the crisis ends, and for it to be abolished. In its place, the EU’s financial instruments—the European Central Bank, the European Investment Bank, and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)—must fund national plans to rebuild health and social systems and complete the ecological transformation of the economy.

如果战略任务是恢复人民主权，在面对金融市场过程时不是相互对抗而是团结应对，那么就必须捍卫人民的民主自决及其对国家的控制权。这意味着每个进步政府都有权突破那些妨碍其国家和社会福祉的规则。因此，我们必须呼吁在疫情危机期间已失去活力的《增长与稳定条约》在危机结束后不再回归，并且必须被废除。取而代之的是，欧盟的金融工具——欧洲央行、欧洲投资银行和欧洲稳定机制（ESM）必须资助国家计划，以重建医疗和社会系统以及完成经济的生态转型。

Mobilizing the necessary fiscal capacity beyond the current EU budget to strengthen social infrastructure, rebuild European industry and ecological transformation, eliminate regional disparities, and establish efficient energy and transport networks all require long-term, flexible supranational cooperation. To avoid market mechanisms disrupting this process, fairly close supranational political cooperation is also needed.

通过动员超出当前欧盟预算范围的必要财政能力，以加强社会基础设施、重建欧洲工业和生态转型、消除区域差异、建立高效的能源和运输网，所有这些都需要长期、弹性的超国家合作。若想规避市场机制对这一过程的干扰，则还需要相当紧密的超国家政治合作。

The left should construct a strategic plan for this cooperation. Today’s EU is a strange hybrid: on the one hand, a free trade and single currency zone with bureaucratic institutions that have proven incapable of effective action in crises; on the other hand, a parliament with no power to manage markets and the bureaucracy. This raises the question of political leadership. As a force seeking hegemony, the European left must also remain active on the European political stage. To gain political leadership, it must fight for the expansion of democracy. The liberal view that Europe’s democratic deficit lies in the lack of a European public opinion is untenable. More precisely, the influence of European civil society, trade unions, and social movements on European policy is limited. Beyond the structural neoliberalism and undemocratic features of the EU, the decisive factor remains the hierarchical structure of member states determined by their economic and political weight.

左翼应当为这一合作构建战略计划。今天的欧盟是个奇怪的混合体：一方面是拥有官僚机构的自由贸易和单一货币区，但事实证明这些官僚机构在危机中无法采取有效行动；另一方面，议会无权管理市场和官僚体制。这就提出政治领导权的问题。作为一支寻求领导权的力量，欧洲左翼也需要在欧洲政治舞台上保持活跃。要想获得政治领导权，就必须为扩大民主进行斗争。自由派认为，欧洲的民主赤字在于缺乏欧洲公众舆论，这个观点站不住脚。更准确地说，欧洲公民社会、工会和社会运动对于欧洲政策的影响力有限，除了结构上的新自由主义和欧盟的非民主特征之外，决定性因素仍然在于由经济和政治权重所决定的成员国层级结构。

It can be said that the basic strength of the left originates in the nation-state. In any case, it is strategically necessary to protect it from the destructive effects of an uncontrolled market economy. It must be emphasized that in any conceivable system of European cooperation/integration, nation-states remain economic and political forces in their own right, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. This needs to be reflected in a system with clear, transparent, and effective jurisdictions, with checks and balances between these jurisdictions and the EU. However, due to the uneven political development and influence of different countries, the excessive weight of certain powerful states in European policy becomes a factor hindering social change. This brings us to an impasse.

可以这样说，左翼的基本力量源于民族国家。无论如何，从战略上有必要保护其免受失去控制的市场经济的破坏性影响。必须强调的是，在所有可以想象的欧洲合作/一体化体系中，各民族国家仍是具有自身权利的经济和政治力量，在可预见的将来也是如此。这需要在一个管辖范围明确、透明、有效的系统中得到体现，并在这些管辖范围和欧盟之间进行制衡。但是，由于各国政治发展及其影响力的不均衡，某些强势国家在欧洲政策中的过分权重也就成为社会变革的阻滞因素。这使我们陷入僵局。

The only way to overcome the impasse is to extend democratic principles to all levels of decision-making, which means that at the European level, diverse parties need to cooperate or compete with each other to enhance their influence. In the long process of rebuilding Europe in a post-capitalist era, one step is to establish a sovereign, freely elected parliament that interacts with trade unions, social, ecological, and civic movements. The European Parliament must replace the European Council, composed of heads of state and government, and become the decision-making center of EU affairs. The key factor here is the intervention of parties at the European institutional level. The Party of the European Left should seriously study ways to improve European institutions and call on parties to participate in European Parliament elections on the basis of European lists.

克服僵局的唯一方法是使民主原则扩散到各级决策，这意味着在欧洲层面，多样化的政党间需要相互合作或对抗，以提升影响力。在后资本主义时代欧洲重建的漫长过程中，步骤之一是需要建立一个与工会、社会、生态和公民运动互动，且拥有主权的自由选举的议会。欧洲议会必须取代由国家元首和政府首脑所组成的欧洲理事会，并成为欧盟事务的决策中心。其中的关键因素是政党在欧洲机构层面的干预。欧洲左翼党应当认真研究改进欧洲机构的办法，并呼吁各党派在欧洲名单的基础上参加欧洲议会选举。

04 The Dilemma of Pan-Europeanism

04泛欧主义的困境

Brexit will not only change the lives of 3.5 million EU citizens in the UK and 1.2 million British citizens in EU member states, but will also change the entire EU. The UK is the EU’s third-largest economy and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The far-reaching trade agreement it negotiated in parallel with the United States reflects the geopolitical significance of Brexit. The EU mainly emphasized trade and competition in the negotiations, while the UK seemed to attach little importance to this aspect. The European Commission harbored unrealistic expectations about the UK’s dependence on the EU. Therefore, we cannot judge the European Commission’s actual negotiating capacity solely on this basis.

英国脱欧不仅会改变英国境内350万欧盟公民以及欧盟各成员国中120万英国公民的生活，而且还会改变整个欧盟。英国是欧盟第三大经济体，也是联合国安理会五大常任理事国之一。它与美国平行谈判所达成意义深远的贸易协定，反映出英国脱欧在地缘政治层面的意义。欧盟在谈判中主要强调贸易和竞争，而英国似乎并不重视这一方面。欧盟委员会关于英国对欧盟的依赖程度抱有不切实际的指望。因此，我们无法仅仅据此判断欧盟委员会的实际谈判能力。

The UK’s key demand is that its financial services companies continue to have unimpeded access to the EU market. This will harm the interests of other UK sectors, such as fisheries. Furthermore, Brexit has intensified centrifugal tendencies within the UK; Scotland is planning an independence referendum and then rejoin the EU, which will encourage existing separatist tendencies elsewhere in Europe. At the same time, the danger of hostilities breaking out in Northern Ireland cannot be underestimated; Brexit may jeopardize the implementation of the *Belfast Agreement* [7]7 The *Belfast Agreement* (also known as the Good Friday Agreement), signed in 1998, largely ended the Northern Ireland conflict (the Troubles) by establishing a power-sharing government and cross-border institutions. Brexit reopened the question of the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, a key element of the Agreement..

英国方面的重点诉求在于，其金融服务公司能够继续在欧盟市场中畅通无阻。这将损害英国其他部门的利益，如渔业。此外，脱欧加剧了英国内部的解体趋势，苏格兰正策划举行独立公投，然后重新加入欧盟，这将助长欧洲其他地区现有的分离主义倾向。与此同时，不能低估北爱尔兰爆发敌对行动的危险，英国脱欧可能将危及《贝尔法斯特协议》的履行。

Whenever a UK-EU partnership treaty is concluded, it must go through a complex approval process involving the European Council, the European Parliament, and the UK Parliament, and may also require ratification by the parliaments of EU member states. This process could extend into 2021 or even longer. The left naturally favors a fair and equitable agreement between the UK and the EU. But the success of the negotiations is uncertain; if they break down amid mutual recriminations, it will only benefit nationalists on both sides of the English Channel. Brexit reminds us once again that pan-Europeanism is not confined to the actual borders of the EU, and we must look at the actually existing union in a new way.

无论何时缔结英欧伙伴关系条约，都必须经过欧洲理事会、欧洲议会和英国议会的复杂审批过程，也可能需要得到欧盟各成员国议会的批准。这一过程可能会延续到2021年甚至更久。左翼当然赞成英国和欧盟之间达成公平公正的协议。但谈判能否成功尚无定数，如果谈判在相互指责中破裂，则只会使英吉利海峡两岸的民族主义者受益。英国脱欧再次提醒我们，泛欧主义并不局限于欧盟的实际边界，我们必须以一种崭新方式来看待实际存在的联盟。

The EU is not a universal European entity, nor will it become one in the foreseeable future. EU member states face a clear fiscal deficit crisis, which prevents the EU from monopolizing the issue of European cooperation or integration. Therefore, the view that the EU’s “final state” is one of continuous expansion on the American model is actually misleading. The EU’s recent strategic failure in Ukraine has already demonstrated the danger of this gradual expansion model.

欧盟并非一个普适性的欧洲实体，在可预见的未来也不会如此。欧盟成员国面临着明显财政赤字危机，使欧盟无法以垄断的形式应对欧洲合作或一体化问题。因此，那种认为欧盟的“最终状态”是美国模式下不断谋求扩张的观点，实际上是一种误导。欧盟最近在乌克兰所遭遇的战略失败，就已表明这种渐进性扩张模式的危险性。

05 Europe’s Place in the World

05欧洲在世界上的地位

The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 made it clear that the greatest threats facing humanity are not war, but social and ecological ones, and people around the world are becoming increasingly aware of this issue.

2020年新冠肺炎疫情清楚地表明，人类面临的最大的威胁不是战争，而是社会和生态，全世界人民越来越清楚地意识到这个问题。

Protection against military aggression is first and foremost a political task, which includes strengthening international law and cooperative organizations. The withdrawal of the United States and Russia from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the impending expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty will trigger the risk of uncontrolled large-scale weapons of mass destruction, posing a persistent threat to Europe. Ending the arms race and addressing the ecological crisis require global international cooperation, and Europe must redefine its own role. This necessitates reviving those cooperative mechanisms that, in the public eye, have disappeared behind the European Union: the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe—organizations to which all countries on the European continent belong.

保护不受军事侵略首先是一项政治任务，这其中包括强化国际法与合作组织。美国和俄罗斯退出《中导条约》以及《削减战略武器条约》的即将到期，将会引发大规模毁灭性核武器失控的危险，这对欧洲构成了持续性威胁。结束军备竞赛和应对生态危机需要在全球范围内开展国际合作，欧洲必须重新定义自身角色。这需要复兴那些在公众看来已经消失在欧盟背后的合作机制：联合国欧洲经济委员会、欧洲理事会和欧洲安全与合作组织——欧洲大陆所有国家都隶属于这些组织。

The COVID-19 pandemic and the global ecological crisis show that the neoliberal world-market plan has failed as a model of civilization, inflicting severe losses not only in the countries of the Global South but also in the developed world, including Europe. Yet at the same time, the necessary global transformations are repeatedly encountering obstacles in a turbulent world political and military order. Against this backdrop, we must interpret Donald Trump’s presidency more as a consequence than a cause of the crisis of U.S. hegemony. While Trump tried to use scapegoating tactics to divert attention from his government’s poor crisis management and accused China of lacking cooperation, the Financial Times reported on ongoing collaboration between Chinese and American scientists in investigating the origins of the coronavirus. Shortly thereafter, Trump even turned his fire on the World Health Organization. Under the current escalating tensions, the EU must remain vigilant against the unstable and irrational stance of the United States.

新冠肺炎疫情和全球生态危机表明，新自由主义的世界市场计划作为一种文明模式已经失败，其不仅在南方国家，而且在包括欧洲在内的发达世界都造成了惨重损失。然而与此同时，必要的全球变革却在动荡不安的世界政治和军事秩序中接连碰壁。在这一背景下，我们必须把唐纳德•特朗普的总统任期更多地解读为美国霸权危机的后果，而非原因。在特朗普试图利用“甩锅”手段分散人们对其政府应对危机不利的注意力，并指责中国缺乏合作时，《金融时报》报道了中美科学家在调查新冠病毒起源方面正在进行的合作。不久之后，特朗普甚至将矛头指向了世界卫生组织。在目前不断扩大的紧张局势下，欧盟必须对美国不稳定、非理性的立场保持警惕。

Ironically, just as the outbreak of COVID-19 in Europe highlighted the importance of strengthening international cooperation, the European Commission sought to pander to aggressive thinking across the Atlantic by declaring China an “institutional threat.” Although we are by no means advocating an uncritical supportive stance toward China’s actions, and a pluralistic European left upholding democratic socialist values can hardly fully endorse China’s ideological model, China is nonetheless not only the world’s most populous country but also the EU’s largest trading partner. Moreover, the political and military conflicts provoked by the U.S. president’s confrontational policies would also endanger global trade and global cooperation in addressing the ecological crisis.

具有讽刺意味的是，就在欧洲新冠肺炎疫情爆发凸显加强国际合作的重要性之际，欧盟委员会却试图迎合大西洋彼岸的攻击性思维，宣称中国是其“制度威胁”。尽管我们绝非主张对中国的行动不加分析地采取支持立场，秉持民主社会主义价值观的多元化欧洲左翼，也难以完全认同中国的意识形态模式，但无论如何，中国不仅是世界上人口最多的国家，同时还是欧盟最大的贸易伙伴。更何况，由美国总统的对抗性政策所诱发的政治和军事冲突，也会危及全球贸易以及应对生态危机的全球合作。

Therefore, Europe needs a realistic plan based on the interests of the people. China is a world power with a huge impact on Europe. The EU should not view China’s cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries, nor its dialogue with EU member states and non-member states, as a threat, but rather seize the political and economic opportunities within them and explore new forms of international cooperation. The EU-China summit originally planned for autumn 2020 in Germany was postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This summit is not only a diplomatic event but should also become an opportunity for extensive discussion on how these two major forces can develop diplomatic relations and build a more peaceful, equal, and united world.

因此，欧洲需要一种基于人民利益的现实方案。中国是世界大国，对欧洲也有巨大影响。欧盟不应将中国与中东欧国家的合作及其与欧盟成员国和非成员国之间的对话视为一种威胁，而是应把握其中的政治和经济机遇，探索国际合作新形式。原计划2020年秋天在德国举办的欧盟—中国峰会因新冠肺炎疫情而推迟。这次峰会不仅是一个外交事件，同时也应成为广泛讨论这两大力量如何发展外交关系，构建更和平、平等和团结世界的契机。

(Author’s bio: Walter Baier, Austrian economist, served as Chairman of the Communist Party of Austria from 1994 to 2006, and has been the General Coordinator of the European left-wing website “Transform! Europe” since 2007. Translators’ bio: Li Xin, doctoral candidate at the School of Marxism, Shandong University; Yu Haiqing, researcher at the Institute of Marxism, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.)

（作者简介：沃尔特•拜尔，奥地利经济学家，1994—2006年担任奥地利共产党主席，2007年至今担任欧洲左翼网站“转型!欧洲”总协调人。译者简介：李鑫，山东大学马克思主义学院博士研究生；于海青，中国社会科学院马克思主义研究院研究员。）

Online editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑