The Idea of Totality: From Hegel, Marx to the Founders of Western Marxism

Since modern times, with the transformation of social development and the progress of knowledge, on the one hand, the system of social division of labor has become increasingly refined, and the advancement of knowledge has become increasingly specialized; on the other hand, within this system of division of labor and the specialization of knowledge, the totality of society and the totalizing picture of the world seem to have become increasingly blurred. It is precisely in this context that philosophy, on the one hand, always seeks to lay a foundation of legitimacy for this transformation and development, establishing the premises and basis for existence of the new history; on the other hand, it also seeks to rediscover a totality for this fragmented world, delineating the overall picture of social life and the genealogy of knowledge. One important aspect of the theoretical impulse of the young Lukács was his disappointment with the fragmented world and his pursuit of totality; Korsch returned to the inner connection between Marx’s philosophy, political economy, and scientific socialism, striving to re-understand Marx’s philosophy; Gramsci took totality as an important determination of the theory of hegemony. All of them used totality as a crucial entry point to re-understand Marx’s philosophy, thereby achieving a separation from the research tradition of the Second International era, forming new research approaches, and exerting a tremendous influence on later scholars.

自近代以来，随着社会发展的转型和知识的进步，一方面，社会分工体系日益精细，知识的进展日益专业化；另一方面，在这种分工体系和知识的专业化中，社会的总体性以及世界的总体化图景，似乎日益模糊起来。正是在这样的情境中，哲学一方面总想为这种转型和发展奠定合法性的基础，确立新历史的前提和存在依据；另一方面又想为这个分离的世界重新寻找一种总体性，刻画社会生活的总体图景和知识谱系。青年卢卡奇的理论冲动，一个重要的方面就是对碎片化世界的失望和对总体性的追寻；柯尔施则重新回到马克思的哲学、政治经济学与科学社会主义的内在联系，力图重新理解马克思的哲学；葛兰西则将总体性作为领导权理论的重要规定性。他们都以总体性为重要入口来重新理解马克思的哲学，从而实现了与第二国际时代的研究传统的分离，形成了新的研究思路，对后来者产生了巨大的影响。

I. Totality: From Hegel to Marx

一、总体性：从黑格尔到马克思

“Free thought takes nothing for granted, but reflects upon its own presuppositions.” [1]1 G.W.F. Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic*, §78 Addition. The translation follows the standard English edition. This means that the premises of any philosophy must be subjected to reflection. In the essay “With What Must the Science Begin?”, Hegel discusses this issue in greater detail. In his view, philosophical thinking must have a beginning or starting point; this beginning must be absolute, presupposing nothing, and is itself the foundation of all science. But to avoid falling into dogmatism, this beginning or starting point must also be a demonstrated endpoint; in this sense, the starting point and the endpoint form a circle. “What is essential for science is not so much that a pure immediacy should be the beginning, but that the whole of science is in itself a circle, in which the first is also the last and the last is also the first.” [2]2 G.W.F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, “With What Must the Science Begin?”. The translation follows the standard English edition. As a science, philosophy itself constitutes a totality. In the discussion of the three attitudes of thought toward objectivity in the *Encyclopedia Logic*, Hegel further expresses a philosophical theory of totality: First, philosophy should not internally divide itself into unrelated regions; the continuity from starting point to endpoint means that no matter how many different moments philosophical thinking passes through, these moments are interconnected and inseparable. Second, the objectivity of philosophical thought is not only embodied in the objective logic of thought itself but also in the grasp of things themselves, which implies an inner communication and coordination between thought and things. Proceeding from this idea, Hegel criticizes Kant’s practice of drawing an insurmountable gulf between the thing-in-itself and thought. In Kant’s demarcation, he emphasizes the universality and necessity of thought, distinguishing it from the contingency and particularity of sensation, thereby bringing about a split in philosophical thought. This split turns the thing-in-itself into an empty, negative existence. “The thing-in-itself (and here ‘thing’ includes spirit and God as well) expresses an abstract object. — To abstract from an object all its connections with consciousness, all sense impressions, and all specific thoughts, yields the concept of the thing-in-itself. It is easy to see that what remains is merely an extreme abstraction, something completely empty, which can only be regarded as a beyond, the negation of representation, feeling, and specific thought. And it is equally simple to see that this leftover dross or corpse is still merely a product of thought, just the empty self or the product of an ever-pure abstract thought.” [1]1 G.W.F. Hegel, *The Encyclopedia Logic*, §78 Addition. The translation follows the standard English edition. Third, philosophy implies a totalizing idea; this totality is embodied not only in thought but also in the identity of thought and reality. The owl of Minerva takes flight only at dusk, thereby achieving a totalizing examination of spirit. In this process, pure thought itself is fluid; this movement of pure essentiality, “in its relation to its content, is the necessary developmental movement of the expansion of its content into an organic whole. Through this movement, the path that leads to the concept of knowledge also becomes a necessary and fully formed path.” [3]3 G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Preface. The translation follows the standard English edition. Spirit externalizes itself into otherness, then returns to itself from otherness; truth manifests itself in this totality.

“自由的思想就是不接受未经考察过的前提的思想。”1这意味着，任何哲学的前提都需要加以反思。在《必须用什么作为科学的开端?》一文中，黑格尔更为详细地讨论了这一问题。在他看来，哲学思考，必须有个开端或起点，这个开端必须是绝对的，不以任何东西为前提，它本身是全部科学的根据。但为了避免陷入独断主义，这个开端或起点又必须是作为论证过的终点，在这个意义上，起点和端点构成了一个圆圈。“对于科学说来，重要的东西倒并不很在乎一个纯粹的直接物作开端，而在乎科学的整体本身是一个圆圈，在这个圆圈中，最初的也将是最后的东西，最后的也将是最初的东西。”2作为科学的哲学，它本身构成了一个总体。在《小逻辑》中关于思想对客观性的三种态度的讨论中，黑格尔进一步表达了一种总体性的哲学理论：第一，哲学不应该从内部将自己区分为互不相关的区域，从起点到终点的连续性，意味着不管哲学的思考经历了何种不同的环节，这些环节之间是相互联系不可分割的。第二，哲学思想的客观性，不仅体现为思想本身的客观逻辑，而且是对事物自身的把握，这意味着思想与事物之间的内在沟通与协调。从这一理念出发，黑格尔批评了康德在物自体与思想之间划出一条不可逾越的鸿沟的做法。在康德的这一界划中，他强调的是思想的普遍性和必然性，以区别于感觉的偶然性和特殊性的东西，从而带来了哲学思想的分裂。这种分裂使得物自体成为一个空洞的否定性存在。“物自体(这里所谓‘物’也包含精神和上帝在内)表示一种抽象的对象。——从一个对象抽出它对意识的一切联系、一切感觉印象，以及一切特定的思想，就得到物自体的概念。很容易看出，这里所剩余的只是一个极端抽象，完全空虚的东西，只可以认作否定了表象、感觉、特定思维等等的彼岸世界。而且同样简单地可以看到，这剩余的渣滓或僵尸，仍不过只是思想的产物，只是空虚的自我或不断趋向纯粹抽象思维的产物。”1 第三，哲学意味着一种总体性的观念，这种总体性不仅体现在思维上，而且体现在思维与现实的同一性上。密涅瓦的猫头鹰总在黄昏的时候才起飞，从而实现对精神的总体性考察。在这个过程中，纯粹思想本身是流动的，纯粹本质性的这种运动，“就其为它的内容的关联来看，乃是它的内容扩张为一个有机的整体的必然的发展运动。由于这种运动，到达知识的概念的那条道路也同样成了一条必然的完全的形成道路。”3精神通过外化为他物，再从他物回归自身，真理就在这种总体性中呈现出来。

Under this overarching idea, Hegel further discusses the problem of totality at different moments, taking the development of the concept as an example. From the perspective of the developmental process of spirit, it passes through the stages of sense-certainty, understanding, and reason; these constitute different moments of the totality of spirit. At these three different stages of development — sense-certainty, understanding, and reason — each has its own totality, each passing through the three moments of immediate identity, distinction, and then dialectical unity. For example, in the discussion of self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel confirms the formation of self-consciousness through labor. That is, in the labor process, the slave, on the one hand, accepts the master’s consciousness through fear, and on the other hand, through his own formative labor on things, feels his own consciousness in the process of objectification. Only through this double reception can genuine self-consciousness be formed. This kind of self-consciousness is, in the final analysis, an intersubjectivity, i.e., self-consciousness contains the recognition and acknowledgment of the consciousness of others and of one’s own consciousness. This is a thinking, free self-consciousness. In thought, although the object appears as an object existing in-itself, distinct from consciousness, it is in fact not different from consciousness; it is grasped in the form of the concept. This means that in thought I am free, because the self is no longer in an external object but is within itself. When this freedom is elevated to the level of caprice, it implies a Stoic freedom, a freedom that “maintains a lifeless stillness, which constantly withdraws from the movement of existence, from the activity of influencing others and being influenced, and retreats into the simple reality of thought.” [4]4 G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, “Freedom of Self-Consciousness: Stoicism, Skepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness”. The translation follows the standard English edition. This freedom is merely freedom in thought, only the concept of freedom, without living content, detached from the multiplicity of things. When this freedom acquires content, since it itself has no content, this content can only be given; when what is conceptual in Stoicism is realized, skepticism arises. What in the pure thought of self-consciousness were merely abstract, differentiated things become here differentiated real things. When the previously free self-consciousness feels itself to be free, it will feel things external to itself; at this point, freedom must be a freedom that can experience itself in the flux of things. Once it deals with present things, the original pure thought will feel itself to be a contingent, individual consciousness. Here, consciousness falls into a state of vacillation: on the one hand, it holds that external individual things or all differentiated things are to be negated wholesale; on the other hand, it easily falls into individual consciousness. At this point, when you point out the identity of things, this skeptical self-consciousness will emphasize non-identity; when you emphasize the non-identity of things, it will instead point out that things are identical. “In Stoicism, self-consciousness is the simple freedom of itself. In Skepticism, freedom is realized; self-consciousness negates the other side, namely, determinate finite existence, but thereby it doubles itself, and what it itself is now becomes a two-sided thing.” [4]4 G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, “Freedom of Self-Consciousness: Stoicism, Skepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness”. The translation follows the standard English edition. Thus arises the unhappy consciousness. The development of this divided unhappy consciousness ultimately reaches the unity of self-consciousness in-itself and for-itself, making consciousness certain that in its individuality it is in the absolute being-in-itself; thus consciousness returns to itself once again. Of course, this is not a simple repetition, but a return after passing through many mediations, forming a small cycle in the development of self-consciousness. This also shows that self-consciousness, in its developmental process, constructs itself as a totalizing existence.

在这一大的理念下，黑格尔以概念发展为例，进一步讨论了不同环节的总体性问题。从精神的发展过程来看，经历着从感性、知性到理性的过程，它们构成了精神总体性的不同环节。在感性、知性与理性这三个不同发展阶段，又有着各自的总体性，都经历着从直接同一性、区别、再到辩证的统一这三个环节。比如在《精神现象学》中讨论到自我意识时，黑格尔通过劳动确证了自我意识的形成，即在劳动过程中，奴隶一方面由于恐惧而接受了主人的意识，另一方面通过自己的陶冶事物的劳动，在对象化过程中感受到了自己的意识，在这样一种双重接受中，才可能形成真正的自我意识。这样一种自我意识，说到底是一种交互的主体性，即自我意识中包含着对他人意识和对自身意识的认可与承认。这是一种能思维的自由的自我意识，在思维中虽然对象看起来是以异于意识的自在存在的身份作为对象，但实际上与意识没有差别，它以概念的方式被把握，这意味着，在思维中我是自由的，因为自我不再处于外在的对象中，而是在自身中。把这样一种自由上升到一种任性的层面时，这就意味着一种斯多葛主义的自由，这种自由“保持一种没有生命的宁静，这种没有生命的宁静使它经常脱离生存的运动、脱离影响他人与接受影响的活动而退回到单纯的思想实在性之中。”4这种自由只是单纯思想中的自由，还只是自由的概念，而没有活生生的内容，脱离了事物的多样性。当这种自由具有内容时，由于它自身没有内容，这种内容就只能是被给予的，当斯多葛主义的概念中的东西实现时，就产生了怀疑主义。在自我意识的纯粹思维中仅仅是有差别的抽象的事物，在这里成为有差别的现实事物，当原先那个自由的自我意识感到自己是自由时，他会感受到外在于自身的事物，这时的自由就必须是在事物的变化之流中能够经验到自身的自由，而一旦与现在的事物打交道时，原来那纯粹的思维就会感到自己是一种偶然的个别的意识，在这里意识陷入到一种摇摆不定的状态：一方面认为外在的个别事物或一切有差别的所有事物是要全盘否定的，另一方面又易陷入到个别的意识中。在这时，当你指出事物的同一性，这种怀疑的自我意识就会强调不同一性，当你强调事物的非同一性时，它反而会指出事物是同一的。“在斯多葛主义里，自我意识是单纯的自身自由。在怀疑主义里，自由得到了实现，自我意识否定了另一方面即确定的有限存在这一面，但是这正所以双重化自身，而它自身现在就成为两面的东西。”4从而形成苦恼意识。这种分裂的苦恼意识的发展，最终达到自我意识的自在与自为的统一，使意识确信在其个别里就是在绝对自在的存在中，这样意识再次返回到自身。当然这不是简单的重复，而是经历了诸多中介后的回归，形成了自我意识发展的一个小循环。这也表明，自我意识在其发展过程中将自身建构为一个总体性的存在。

Although Marx subjected Hegel’s philosophy to repeated critiques, the idea of totality within Hegel’s philosophy was nevertheless carried forward and became an important feature of his critique of capitalist society. In the “Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy,” Marx distinguishes between a method of inquiry that proceeds from concrete reality and one that proceeds from the totality. In classical political economy, they start from concrete reality, such as population, which appears to be realistic and feasible. But Marx points out: if “the classes constituting the population are left aside, population is an abstraction. If I do not know the factors on which these classes are based, such as wage labour, capital, etc., the classes are an empty phrase.” [5]5 Karl Marx, “Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 12 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1962), pp. 750, 751. Therefore, population is an aggregate number; a population added up like so many potatoes appears concrete but is in fact abstract, because it reveals nothing of the differences among people within the social structure. The determinations abstracted from this kind of reality cannot achieve an understanding of the concrete. “The concrete is concrete because it is the synthesis of many determinations, hence the unity of diversity.” [5]5 Karl Marx, “Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 12 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1962), pp. 750, 751. Combining Marx’s relevant discussion, we can see: first, social existence and social life form a totality; any element within social existence can be understood only when placed within this totality. On the surface, population is a real existence, but if population is not placed within a specific structure of social relations, it cannot truly reflect the composition of different strata of the population and becomes merely statistical data. Second, the totality is mediated. Hegel strongly emphasizes that the totality is a mediated totality; the stages of reason’s unfolding constitute reason’s self-mediation. Marx likewise emphasizes this: any concrete existence is a unity of numerous determinations, a unity of diversity, an existence in relation to other things. Third, social existence as a totality has a dominant relational structure; in capitalist society, this is capital. It is this dominant relational structure that draws everything into a constantly churning vortex, forming a totality. Here, Marx’s idea of totality not only reveals the state of social construction under the logic of capital but also points the way for the critique of capitalist society: only by critiquing the totality of capital can one truly see the state of existence of concrete beings.

马克思虽然对黑格尔哲学进行了多次批判，但黑格尔哲学中的这种总体性思想却被继续下来，并成为他批判资本主义社会的一个重要特征。在《〈政治经济学批判〉导言》中，马克思区分了从具体的实在出发与从总体出发的研究方法。在古典政治经济学那里，他们从具体的实在如人口开始，看起来是合乎实际的，也是切实可行的。但马克思指出：如果“抛开构成人口的阶级，人口就是一个抽象。如果我不知道这些阶级所依据的因素，如雇佣劳动、资本等等，阶级又是一句空话”。5因此，人口是一个集合数，一个个像数土豆那样加起来的人口，看来是具体的，但实际上是抽象的，因为这里根本看不出不同人在社会结构中的差别，从这种实在出发抽象出来的规定，是无法达到对具体的理解的。“具体之所以具体，因为它是许多规定的综合，因而是多样性的统一。”5结合马克思的相关讨论可以看出：第一，社会存在与社会生活是一个总体，社会存在中的任何一个要素，都只有置于这个总体性中才能得到理解。表面看来，人口是一个真实的存在，但人口如果不置于特定的社会关系结构中，就不能真正地反映出不同阶层的人口构成情况，只会变成统计学意义上的数据。第二，总体是有中介的。黑格尔非常强调总体是有中介的总体，理性展开的环节就构成理性的自我中介。马克思同样强调这一点，任何一个具体的存在，都是众多规定性的统一，是多样性的统一，都是与他物的关系中的存在。第三，作为总体的社会存在，有着一个主导性的关系结构，在资本主义社会，这就是资本。正是这一主导性的关系结构，才将一切都拉到一个不断搅动的旋涡中，形成一个总体性的存在。在这里，马克思的总体性思想不仅揭示出资本逻辑的社会建构状态，同时也为批判资本主义社会指出了方向，即只有在对资本总体性进行批判时，才能真实地看清具体存在物的存在状态。

But this does not mean that Marx’s idea of totality is no different from Hegel’s. First, for Hegel, the totality is a totality of spirit’s self-differentiation, self-deepening, and self-synthesis; this is thought’s comprehension and grasp of the concrete. For Marx, social life itself manifests as a constantly developing and changing totality; since the emergence of capitalist society, it has manifested as a transformation from local history to world history. Hence, the foundation of the totality is social existence; the movement of categories is the mental expression of the production and reproduction process of real life. Society is both the field in which this productive activity occurs and the result of this activity. Second, the totality of concepts is a reproduction of the totality of reality itself; it is the product of the thinking mind, and this is the method by which thought grasps the world. The developmental process of the totality of thought is consistent with the developmental process of reality itself. Marx uses the category of “labour” as an example to illustrate this feature of concepts. As the category of labour in classical political economy, it underwent a developmental process from mercantilism, through the physiocrats, to Smith. When Smith proposed the labour theory of value, this was likewise a totalizing perspective on social life; in this perspective, Smith saw the integrative significance of industrial production for social life. Third, within the totality of capitalist society, what truly occupies the dominant position is capital and its logic of operation. Marx holds that in all social forms, there is one relation of production that determines the others and occupies a dominant and leading position. In capitalist society, what occupies this dominant and leading position is capital; it is like a special ether; only by starting from capital can one understand any concrete form of existence, such as agriculture and ground-rent. Hegel once discussed the starting point and endpoint of philosophy and unified the two. Inverted, within the totality of capitalist social existence, capital is the true starting point and endpoint. Fourth, although both emphasize totality, the theoretical aims of Marx and Hegel are fundamentally different. Hegel’s totality, in the sense of social history, points to a totality of the relationship between capital and reason, regarding reason as a limiting force capable of restraining the malignant development of capital; this is the practical orientation of his philosophical idea of totality. In Marx’s case, within the totality of capitalist society there are irreparable fissures. On the level of the general social structure, Marx described this through the contradiction between productive forces and relations of production; in capitalist society, Marx described it through the contradictions of commodity production and exchange, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, etc., in order to demonstrate the transitory nature of capitalist society. Marx does not believe that capitalist society is capable of self-repair, still less that it can be reconciled through the power of reason. This is the fundamental difference between him and Hegel.

但这并不意味着马克思的总体性思想与黑格尔并无区别。第一，对于黑格尔来说，总体是精神自我区分、自我深化与自我综合的总体，这是思维对具体的理解与把握。对于马克思来说，社会生活本身表现为一个不断发展变化的总体，自资本主义社会产生之后，就表现为从地方性历史向世界性历史的转变，因而总体的根基是社会存在，范畴的运动是现实生活的生产与再生产过程在思想上的表现，社会既是这种生产行为得以发生的场域，也是这一行为的结果。第二，概念的总体性是对现实本身的总体性的再现，是思维着的头脑的产物，这是思维用来把握世界的方法。思维的总体性的发展过程，与现实本身的发展过程相一致。马克思以“劳动”范畴为例来说明概念的这一特征。作为古典政治经济学的劳动范畴，经历了自重商主义、重农学派再到斯密的发展过程，当斯密提出劳动价值论时，这同样是对社会生活的总体性透视，在这种透视中，斯密看到了工业生产对社会生活的整合性意义。第三，在资本主义社会的总体性中，真正占据主导地位的是资本及其运行逻辑。马克思认为，在一切社会形式中，都有一种生产关系决定着其他生产关系，处于支配和主导地位。在资本主义社会中，处于这种支配和主导地位的就是资本，它就像一种特殊的以太一样，只有从资本出发，才能理解任何一种具体的存在形式，如农业和地租。黑格尔曾讨论哲学的起点和终点，并将两者统一起来。颠倒过来看，资本主义社会存在的总体性中，资本才是真正的起点和终点。第四，虽然都强调总体性，但马克思与黑格尔的理论旨趣存在着根本的差别。黑格尔的总体性，从社会历史的意义上来说，指向的是资本与理性关系的总体性，将理性看作是能够制约资本恶性发展的限制性力量，这是其哲学总体性理念的现实指向。而在马克思那里，资本主义社会的总体性内部存在着无法弥合的裂缝，马克思从一般社会结构层面，曾以生产力与生产关系的矛盾来描述；在资本主义社会，马克思以商品生产与交换的矛盾、资本利润率递减的趋势等来描述，以展现资本主义社会的暂时性。马克思并不认为资本主义社会是能够自我修复的，更不能以理性的力量来进行调和。这是他和黑格尔的根本区别。

This idea of totality in Marx is an important concept and method for his study of the logic of capital, but in the direct presentation of his texts, the contradictory movement of social relations and the operation of capital and its internal contradictions become the explicit content. This is what traditional researchers have been most concerned with; the idea of totality in Marx’s philosophy has not received genuine attention. Among the Marxists of the Second International era, an excessive focus on the thinking of the contradictory movement of productive forces and relations of production caused the critical implications of the idea of totality in Marx’s philosophy to disappear. It was precisely in seeing this problem that Lukács’s *History and Class Consciousness* brought Marx’s idea of totality to light once again.

马克思的这一总体性思想是他研究资本逻辑的重要理念和方法，但在其文本的直接呈现中，社会关系的矛盾运动与资本的运行及其内在矛盾成为显性的内容，这是传统研究者最为关心的内容，马克思哲学中的总体性思想并没有得到真正的重视。在第二国际时代的马克思主义者那里，过于关注生产力与生产关系矛盾运动的思维，使得马克思哲学中总体性思想的批判意蕴消失不见了，正是看到这个问题，卢卡奇的《历史与阶级意识》使马克思的总体性思想再次呈现出来。

II. Lukács and the Restoration of the Idea of Totality in Marx’s Philosophy

二、卢卡奇与马克思哲学总体性思想的恢复

In the history of Marxist philosophy since the Second International, Lukács was the first to propose rethinking Marxist philosophy through the concept of totality, thereby opening up a line of thought different from the orthodox research of the time and forming the research tradition of Western Marxist philosophy.

在第二国际以来的马克思主义哲学发展史上，卢卡奇率先提出了以总体性来重新思考马克思主义哲学的理念，从而开启了与当时正统研究不同的思路，形成了国外马克思主义哲学的研究传统。

The young Lukács was initially deeply influenced by neo-Kantianism and completed the book *Soul and Form*. In this book, the young Lukács put forward a pessimistic philosophy of the existential predicament of modern people: in modern society, human beings are in a state of fragmentation; not only are they abandoned by God, but their own existence and soul are also in a state of division. At this time, Lukács sought, through the method of literary and artistic criticism, to give new form to life and return to the eternal value of life.

青年卢卡奇一开始深受新康德主义影响，完成了《心灵与形式》一书。在这本书中，青年卢卡奇提出了一种现代人生存困境的悲观哲学，即在现代社会，人处于分裂状态，人不仅被上帝所抛弃，人本身的生存与灵魂也处于分裂之中。此时的卢卡奇想通过文艺批评的方式，对生活重新赋形，重回生命的永恒价值。

With the progression of thought, in *The Theory of the Novel*, Lukács turned from Neo-Kantianism to Hegel. Although he faced the same theme—the problem of the fragmentation of the world and existence—Lukács’s solution manifested a different dimension. Taking ancient Greece as a cultural model, Lukács regarded it as a fulfilled epoch, an era in which the individual and the world were in a state of total interconnection. “It is a homogeneous world, and even the separation between man and world, between I and you, does not disturb its homogeneity. Like every other part of this harmony, the soul stands at the center of the world.”[6]6 Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), p. 29. [Citation from the original Chinese text; the English translation is adapted accordingly.] This is a life of completeness; “the completeness of this sphere constitutes the transcendental nature of their life, while for us this sphere has been breached; we can no longer breathe in a complete world.”[6]6 Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), p. 29. [Citation from the original Chinese text; the English translation is adapted accordingly.] Modern society is a society that has stepped out of transcendental completeness. If ancient Greece was a fulfilled world, then modern society is a world that continuously extends into the distance, where people are forever on a road without an end. In this new world, people have many forms of invention and creation, life patterns that constantly break boundaries, an external world that can be explored infinitely, and rich and varied forms of life. “Yet this richness and variety annuls the basic and positive meaning of their existence: totality.”[7]7 Ibid., p. 34. [Citation from the original Chinese text; the English translation is adapted accordingly.] Similarly emphasizing the fragmentation of life, but unlike *Soul and Form*, Lukács expressed the shaping of life through the idea of totality, rather than the pure concept of form.

随着思想的进展，在《小说理论》中，卢卡奇从新康德主义转向了黑格尔。虽然面对的是同样的主题，即世界与生存的破碎化问题，但卢卡奇的解决方案却体现出不同的维度。卢卡奇以古希腊作为文化范本，认为这是一个圆满的时代，一个个体与世界处于总体关联的时代。“这是一个同质的世界，而且，即使把人和世界、我和你分离开来，也不会妨碍其同质性。如同这一和谐的每一其他部分一样，心灵处于世界的中心”。6这是一种完整性的生活，“这个领域的完整性构成了他们生活的先验本性，而对我们来说这个领域已被突破了；我们再也不会在一个完整的世界里呼吸了。”6现代社会是一个走出先验完整性的社会，如果说古希腊是一个圆满的世界，那么现代社会则是一个不断延伸到远方的世界，人永远处在没有终点的路上。在这个新世界里，人有很多形式的发明与创造，有着不断突破边界的生活模式，有着可以无限探索的外部世界，有着丰富多彩的生活形式，“然而，这种丰富多彩却扬弃了它生存的基本的和积极的意义：总体。”7同样是强调生活的裂变，但与《心灵与形式》不同的是，卢卡奇将生活的赋形以总体性这个理念表达出来，而不是纯粹的形式概念。

In *The Theory of the Novel*, Lukács’s idea of totality is mainly manifested as follows: First, totality means that what exists within itself is complete. Lukács’s imagination of ancient Greek culture belongs to this content; in his view, in the ancient Greek era, humans and the external world were integrated into one, constituting a complete world. Second, totality is the fundamental reality of every individual phenomenon. Everything within the totality develops toward its own perfect form and realizes its connection with the totality. Third, the reason totality is totality is because everything occurs within it. This totality of ancient Greek culture, oriented toward the unity of the human soul and the world, has in the depths of the human soul neither interior nor exterior; it neither loses itself nor thinks of seeking itself. Fourth, totality is an existence tending toward perfection. “Only where everything is already homogeneous before being encompassed by forms, only where forms are not a compulsion but merely conscious, merely the surfaceward tendency of things that as vague longings have not yet manifested themselves within what is to be shaped, only where knowledge is virtue and virtue is happiness, only where beauty makes the meaning of the world evident—only there is the totality of existence possible.”[7]7 Ibid., p. 34. [Citation from the original Chinese text; the English translation is adapted accordingly.] Although these discussions of Lukács have a cultural-utopian character, the longing for a beautiful totality and the critique of fragmented life became the driving force of his philosophical thinking at this time. Such an idea of totality, in *History and Class Consciousness*, became the entry point for Lukács to reinterpret Marx’s philosophy.

在《小说理论》中，卢卡奇的总体性思想主要体现为：第一，总体性意味着存在于它自身之内的东西是完整的。卢卡奇关于古希腊文化的想象就属于这一内容，在他看来，古希腊时代人和外部世界浑然一体，构成了一个完整的世界。第二，总体性是每个个别现象的根本实在。一切东西都在总体内部向着自身的完美形式发展起来，并实现着与总体的联系。第三，总体之所以为总体，是因为一切都发生在其内部。古希腊文化的这种总体性，以人的心灵与世界的一体为取向，在人的心灵深处，既没有内部，也没有外部，既不会迷失自我，也不会想到要去寻找自我。第四，总体性是趋向完美的存在。“只有在一切东西被诸形式包容进去之前就已经是同质的地方，只有在诸形式不是一种强制而只是有所意识，只是万物(它们在应被赋形者的内部作为模糊的渴望尚未显示出来)趋向表面的地方，只有在知识就是美德、美德就是幸福的地方，只有在美使世界的意义变得显而易见的地方，存在的总体才是可能的。”7虽然卢卡奇的这些讨论具有文化乌托邦的性质，但对美好总体性的向往，对碎片化生活的批判，成为他此时哲学思考的冲动力。这样一种总体性的理念，在《历史与阶级意识》中成为卢卡奇重新理解马克思哲学的切入点。

In the essay “What Is Orthodox Marxism?”, Lukács points out: “Let us assume for the sake of argument that recent research had disproved once and for all every one of Marx’s individual theses. Even if this were to be proved, every ‘orthodox’ Marxist would still be able to accept all such modern findings without reservation and hence dismiss all of Marx’s theses in toto—without having to renounce his Marxist orthodoxy for a single moment. Orthodox Marxism, therefore, does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx’s investigations… On the contrary, orthodoxy refers exclusively to method. It is the scientific conviction that dialectical Marxism is the correct method of investigation, and that this method can only be developed, expanded and deepened in the direction laid down by its founders.”[8]8 Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), p. 1. [Citation from the original Chinese text; the English translation is adapted accordingly.] Here, Lukács points out that orthodox Marxism actually grasps the soul and essence of Marx’s thought, namely the dialectical method. How is the dialectical method to be understood? At this time, Lukács had not seen the *Grundrisse* (1857–1858), but his line of argument is very similar to Marx’s introduction on method in the “Introduction” [to the *Grundrisse*]. Lukács likewise starts from the then-popular empirical, positivist method, but he then points out that this method, which appears to grasp pure facts, is not scientific, because any empirical fact does not exist in isolation but within a specific objective structure; in capitalist society, these facts are existences within the structure of capitalist society. “Only when the isolated facts of social life are grasped as moments of historical development and integrated into a totality can knowledge of facts become knowledge of reality.”[8]8 Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), p. 1. [Citation from the original Chinese text; the English translation is adapted accordingly.] Here it can be seen that Lukács regards the method of totality as the fundamental method in Marx’s dialectics, and this is also the methodological basis for his critical examination of the reified society of capitalism.

在《什么是正统的马克思主义?》一文中，卢卡奇指出：“我们姑且假定新的研究完全驳倒了马克思的每一个个别的论点。即使这点得到证明，每个严肃的‘正统’马克思主义者仍然可以毫无保留地接受所有这种新结论，放弃马克思的全部所有论点，而无须片刻放弃他的马克思主义正统。所以，正统马克思主义并不意味着毫无批判地接受马克思研究的成果……恰恰相反，马克思主义问题中的正统仅仅是指方法。它是这样一种科学的信念，即辩证的马克思主义是正确的研究方法，这种方法只能按其创始人奠定的方向发展、扩大和深化。”8在这里，卢卡奇指出，正统的马克思主义实际上抓住的是马克思思想的灵魂与精髓，即辩证的方法。怎么理解辩证的方法呢?此时的卢卡奇并没有看到《1857—1858年经济学手稿》,但其论证思路与“导言”中马克思关于研究方法的导论是非常相似的。卢卡奇同样从当时流行的那种实证的、经验的方法入手，但他接着指出，这种看似掌握了纯粹事实的方法并不是科学的，因为任何经验的事实并不是孤立的存在，而是特定的客观结构中的存在，在资本主义社会，这些事实就是资本主义社会结构中的存在。“只有在这种把社会生活中的孤立事实作为历史发展的环节并把它归结为一个总体的情况下，对事实的认识才能成为对现实的认识。”8在这里可以看到，卢卡奇认为，总体的方法才是马克思辩证法中的根本方法，这也是他批判考察资本主义物化社会的方法论基础。

In *History and Class Consciousness*, totality has two meanings: first, totality as methodology. Lukács regards totality as the core of the dialectical method. From the perspective of totality, things are interconnected with one another, mutually mediating, constituting a totality with internal relations. This means that concrete research is to study social relations as a whole, which is reflected not only in the composition of relations at the level of social existence, but also in the fact that people’s consciousness and existence together constitute a total connection. But this does not mean that any elements within the totality are undifferentiatedly identical; on the contrary, their relationship is a dynamic, developing dialectical relation. Any concrete total society is not only a static structure but also a historical process of change. In this process, there is a dominant factor that plays a role in governing the totality. For example, in capitalist society, this dominant factor is capital. The perspective of totality became the basic principle of Lukács’s investigation of problems.

在《历史与阶级意识》中，总体性具有两方面的含义：一是作为方法论的总体性。卢卡奇将总体性看作是辩证方法的核心。在总体性的视野中，事物与事物之间相互联系，互为中介，它们构成具有内在关系的总体。这意味着，具体的研究就是要研究作为整体的社会关系，这不仅体现在社会存在层面的关系构成，而且意味着人们的意识与存在之间同样构成一种总体性的关联。但这并不是说在总体之内的任何要素之间是无差别的同一性，相反，它们之间的关系是一种动态的、发展的辩证关系，任何一个具体总体的社会不仅是一个静态的结构，而且是一个历史性的变化过程。在这个过程中，存在着一种主导性的因素，起着统摄总体的作用。比如在资本主义社会，这种主导性的因素就是资本。总体性视野成为卢卡奇考察问题的基本原则。

The other meaning of totality is manifested as the ideal state of social existence. On this point, Lukács continued his earlier thought. Starting from the ideal totality, present social life is non-total, and this non-totality is mainly reflected in two aspects: the reified and fragmented reality of existence, and the antinomies in thought and ideas driven by this reification and fragmentation.

总体性的另一种含义则体现为社会存在的理想状态，在这一点，卢卡奇延续了早期的思想。从理想的总体性出发，当下的社会生活就是非总体性的，这种非总体性主要体现在两个方面：即物化和碎片化的现实存在，以及由这种物化和碎片化推动的思想观念上的二律背反。

In *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukács’s discussion of reification is undoubtedly a very brilliant chapter, often compared by scholars with the young Marx’s discussion of alienation. Lukács’s critique of reification is mainly focused on two levels: First, starting from Marx’s *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* and *Capital*, he points out that relations between people in society degenerate into relations between things. In *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx had already stated: “A social relation of production appears as something existing outside individuals, and the definite relations into which they enter in the process of production of their social life appear as specific properties of a thing; this inversion, this mystification which is not imaginary but prosaically real, is characteristic of all social forms of labour which produce exchange-value.” [9]9 Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, in *Marx Engels Collected Works*, vol. 29, p. 290. Here Marx points out the characteristic of reification in the era of the universalization of commodity production and exchange in capitalist society, a reification that in *Capital* is directly expressed as commodity fetishism. Lukács cites Marx’s discussion of commodity fetishism in *Capital*, and absorbs Simmel’s critique of social reification, as well as Weber’s discussion of rationalization, pointing out that “this rational objectification conceals above all the immediate—qualitative and material—character of all things. When use-values appear universally as commodities, they acquire a new objectivity, a new thing-character—which they do not possess in the epoch of their merely occasional exchange, and which destroys their original, genuine thing-character.” [10]10 Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 92. Here, Lukács distinguishes two kinds of thing-character: one is the original thing-character of things, the other is the thing-character of things after they become commodities; this is a new thing-character, and it is this latter thing-character that constitutes the core of current social relations, and reification also occurs at this level. In commodity fetishism, Marx mainly reveals how the social relation between people is inverted and appears as a relation between things; for Lukács, he further reveals the specific characteristics of reification, such as rationalization, calculability, and the resulting enslavement of the mind to things. It is precisely because of rationalization and calculability that social existence and human existence are decomposed into manipulable, quantifiable existences; this is a way of fragmenting the overall picture. Second, because of the reification and fragmentation of social existence and the mode of human existence, the disappearance of the overall picture leads to the return to totality becoming an inherent pursuit of modern philosophy, especially the development of classical German philosophy. Modern philosophy arises from the reified structure of consciousness, and the antinomy is an important manifestation of this reified consciousness. Kant’s philosophy holds that the relationship between cognition and the object is oriented toward whether the object conforms to cognition, rather than taking the object as the standard as was previously thought; this is the philosophical reversal marked by Kant’s Copernican Revolution. Thus, the cognition of the rational subject becomes the core content of philosophy, and the world we cognize should be the product and object of reason. Of course, Kant did not take this to the extreme; he posited the thing-in-itself as the limit of reason, reason can only cognize the phenomenal world, and the thing-in-itself is something reason cannot grasp. In this regard, Lukács explains that the thing-in-itself is like Smith’s “invisible hand,” a world that philosophy at that time could not reach; thus the world is split into a knowable world and an unknowable world, and totality is in this sense split; this split is also something Kant’s philosophy cannot bridge.

在《历史与阶级意识》中，卢卡奇对物化的讨论无疑是非常精彩的一章，人们常将之与青年马克思关于异化的讨论相比较。卢卡奇的物化批判主要集中在两个层面：第一，他从马克思的《政治经济学批判》和《资本论》出发，指出人与人在社会中的关系蜕化为物的关系。在《政治经济学批判》中，马克思就曾指出：“一种社会生产关系表现为一个存在于个人之外的物，这些个人的社会生活的生产过程中所发生的一定关系表现为一个物品的特有属性，这种颠倒，这种不是想象的而是平凡实在的神秘化，是生产交换价值的劳动的一切社会形式的特点。”9在这里马克思指出了资本主义社会商品生产与交换普遍化时代的物化特征，这种物化在《资本论》中则直接以商品拜物教表现出来。卢卡奇援引了《资本论》中马克思关于商品拜物教的讨论，并吸收了席美尔对社会物化的批判，以及韦伯关于合理化的讨论，指出“这种合理的客体化首先掩盖了一切物的——质的和物质的——直接物性。当各种使用价值都毫无例外地表现为商品时，它们就获得了一种新的客观性，即一种新的物性——它仅仅在它们偶然进行交换的时代才不具有，它消灭了它们原来的、真正的物性。”10在这里，卢卡奇区分了两种物性：一是事物的原本物性，一是事物商品化后的物性，这是一种新的物性，正是后一种物性构成当下社会关系的内核，物化也发生于这个层面。在商品拜物教中，马克思主要揭示了人与人的社会是如何颠倒地表现为物与物之间的关系的，在卢卡奇这里，他进一步揭示了物化的具体特征，如合理化、计算化以及由此产生的对心灵的物役等。正是由于合理化和计算化，社会存在以及人的存在被分解为可操控的、可量化的存在，这是将总体图景碎片化的方式。第二，由于社会存在与人的存在方式的物化和碎片化，导致了总体性图景的消失，因此重归总体性，成为近代以来的哲学、特别是德国古典哲学发展的内在追求。近代以来的哲学是从意识的物化结构中产生的，二律背反就是这一物化意识的重要表现。康德哲学认为认识与对象的关系，是以对象是否符合于认识为指向，而不是像过去所认为的那样以对象为标准，这就是康德的哥白尼革命所标识的哲学反转，由此，理性主体的认识成为哲学的核心内容，我们所认知的世界应该是理性的产物和对象。当然，康德并没有将这一点极致化，他将物自体作为理性的界限提出来，理性只能认识现象界，物自体是理性无法把握的。对此，卢卡奇解释说，物自体就像斯密的“看不见的手”,这是当时的哲学所无法达及的世界，由此世界分裂为可知的世界和不可知的世界，总体在这个意义上是分裂的，这种分裂也是康德哲学无法弥合的。

If Kant’s approach starting from the subject cannot solve the problem of the antinomy, then French materialism starting from the object also failed to solve it. French materialism merely directly stated that the current capitalism had become an existence independent of human will, just like nature. This means that eighteenth-century French materialism is likewise a manifestation of reified consciousness.

如果说康德从主体出发的思路不能解决二律背反问题，那么从客体出发的法国唯物主义同样也没有解决这一问题。法国的唯物主义只是直接说出了当下的资本主义已成为不以人的意志为转移的存在，就像自然一样。这意味着，18世纪的法国唯物主义同样是物化意识的表现。

This antinomy drives the development of classical German philosophy. Logically, to solve this problem, it is necessary to resolve the opposition between subject and object, form and content, thereby achieving the unity of opposites in the fluidity of logic; this is precisely the way Hegel’s philosophy solves this problem. For example, the unity of subject and object implies an inner reciprocity between subject and object; the subject’s consciousness of the object is at the same time the object’s own consciousness; subject and object mutually construct each other in historical development; therefore history becomes an important field for the development of Hegel’s philosophy. According to the logic of theory, Hegel should have turned here to the study of history itself, rather than treating it as a footnote to reason, but Hegel did not do so, merely regarding history as a stage for the performance of reason. The most important step here was taken by Marx. The crucial change in Marx’s philosophy lies in shifting from the center of thought to social-historical life, thereby discussing the structure of social existence itself and its historical changes, revealing the foundation from which reified consciousness arises; this provides a way out for fundamentally solving the problem of the antinomy.

这一二律背反推动着德国古典哲学的发展。从逻辑上来说，要解决这一问题，就要解决主体与客体、形式与内容的对立，从而在逻辑的流动性中实现对立面的统一，这正是黑格尔哲学解决这一问题的方式。比如主体与客体的统一，意味着主体与客体有着内在相互性，主体对对象的意识同时也是对象自身的意识，主体与客体在历史的发展相互建构，因此历史成为黑格尔哲学发展的重要场域。按照理论的逻辑，黑格尔这里应该转向对历史本身的研究，而不是将之当作理性的注脚，但黑格尔没有这么做，只是把历史看作理性表演的场所。这里最重要的一步是由马克思跨出来的。马克思哲学的重要改变在于，从思想中心转向社会历史生活，从而讨论社会存在本身的结构及其历史变化，展现物化意识得以产生的根基，这为从根本上解决二律背反问题提供了出路。

Any philosophical critique presupposes a certain ideal state; Lukács’s critique of reification and the antinomy is likewise based on an ideal totality. In this sense, totality has a certain ontological significance for Lukács. If this ideal totality is not yet more clearly delineated in *History and Class Consciousness*, it is discussed more in later works such as *The Ontology of Social Being*. In *The Ontology of Social Being*, Lukács establishes an ontology of social being based on labor, holding that this ontology constitutes the foundation of all Marx’s economic research. “Marx’s economics always proceeds from the totality of social being and always returns again to this totality.” [11]11 Georg Lukács, *The Ontology of Social Being*, vol. 2, p. 6. This totality, based on purposive labor, promotes the formation of social totality through reproduction; this totality not only means totality at the material level of social being, but also means the total connection between ideology and social production; the totality in thought is the reproduction of the totality of social being. “The systematic critique that we acknowledge as having been consciously developed in Marx proceeds from the totality of being by means of the connections sought, and attempts to understand it as closely as possible in all its complex and multifaceted relations. But the totality here is by no means a formal and conceptual totality, but rather the reproduction of what really exists; categories are not the building materials of a hierarchical system structure, but are actually ‘forms of being, determinations of existence,’ constituent elements of relatively complete real and moving complexes, whose dynamic interaction produces complexes that are increasingly extensive in breadth and depth.” [11]11 Georg Lukács, *The Ontology of Social Being*, vol. 2, p. 6.

任何哲学批判都是以一定的理想性状态为前提的，卢卡奇对物化与二律背反的批评，同样以理想的总体性为基础，在这个意义上，总体性对于卢卡奇而言具有一定的本体论意味。如果说这种理想的总体性在《历史与阶级意识》中还没有得到更为清晰的刻画，那么在《关于社会存在的本体论》等后期著作中则讨论得较多。在《关于社会存在的本体论》中，卢卡奇确立了以劳动为基础的社会存在本体论，认为这种本体论构成了马克思所有经济学研究的基础。“马克思的经济学总是从社会存在的总体出发，并且总是再次返回到这种总体性之中。”11这种总体性以有目的的劳动为基础，通过再生产推动着社会总体性的形成，这种总体性不仅意味着社会存在在物质性层面的总体性，而且意味着意识形态与社会生产之间的总体性关联，思想中的总体性是社会存在的总体性的再现。“我们所承认的在马克思那里所发现的自觉发展了的体系批判是借助所寻求的联系本身从存在的总体性出发的，并且试图在这种总体性的所有复杂的和多方面的关系中，尽可能接近地理解它。但是，这里的总体性决不是形式上的和思想上的总体性，而毋宁说是现实存在的东西的再现，范畴不是等级制体系结构的建筑材料，而实际上是‘存在形式、存在规定’,是相对完整的现实的和运动着的复合体的构成要素，这些复合体动态的相互作用产生了广度和深度上都越来越广泛的复合体。”11

The totality here, on the one hand, has the character of the methodology under discussion; on the other hand, totality embodies an ideal state of social existence. In Lukács’s discussion, the totality of social being is based on labor, because only in labor can man and nature, man and man, man and himself truly establish relations; only in labor can social being be endowed with purposiveness; only at this level can freedom and human development be manifested. Therefore, the ontology based on labor fundamentally provides an anthropological justification for the free development of man. Social being as totality, precisely in this sense, is an expression of an ideal society. It is precisely because of this ideal state of totality that Lukács can critique the alienation of capitalist society.

这里的总体性一方面具有所讨论的方法论的特征，另一方面，总体性又体现了理想的社会存在状态。在卢卡奇的讨论中，社会存在的总体性以劳动为基础，因为只有在劳动中，人与自然、人与人、人与自身才能真正地建立联系，也只有在劳动中，社会存在才能被赋予目的性，只有在这个层面，自由和人的发展才能展现出来。因此，以劳动为基础的本体论，从根本上来说是为人的自由发展提供人类学意义上的论证。作为总体性的社会存在，也正是在这个意义上，是理想社会的一种表达。正是有了总体性的这一理想状态，卢卡奇才能对资本主义社会的异化提出批判。

III. Totality: Korsch and Gramsci

三、总体性：柯尔施与葛兰西

Korsch’s discussion of Marxism was likewise directed against the orthodox interpretations of the Second International era. In response to the prevailing neglect of the philosophical content of Marxism at that time, Korsch emphasized in *Marxism and Philosophy* that Marx’s philosophy is consistent with his scientific socialist thought. Just as German idealism was the philosophical expression of the German bourgeois revolution, Marx’s philosophy is the theoretical expression of the proletarian revolution. Therefore, the unity of theory and practice is the fundamental characteristic of Marxist philosophy. This also means that Marx’s philosophy permeates his thought and guides practice. What is a theory permeated by philosophical thought? “It is a theory which conceives and comprehends social development as a living totality; or, more precisely, it is a theory which conceives social revolution as the living totality of theory and practice. At this stage, any division of this totality into separate branches of knowledge—economic, political, and ideological—is undoubtedly an analysis and critique proceeding from historical fidelity, even when the specific features of each isolated element are grasped. Of course, not only economics, politics, and ideology, but also the historical process and conscious social action, constantly constitute the living unity of ‘revolutionary practice.’ The *Communist Manifesto* is the best example of Marxist theory in its early, youthful vitality.” [12]12 Karl Korsch, *Marxism and Philosophy* (1923), citing the *Communist Manifesto* (1848) as an example of the living unity of theory and practice in early Marxism.

柯尔施关于马克思主义的讨论同样针对的是第二国际时代的正统解释。针对当时忽视马克思主义哲学内容的做法，在《马克思主义和哲学》中，柯尔施强调，马克思的哲学与其科学社会主义思想是一致的，正如德国唯心主义是德国资产阶级革命的哲学表达一样，马克思的哲学就是无产阶级革命的理论表达。因此，理论与实践的一致，这是马克思主义哲学的根本特征。这也意味着，马克思的哲学渗透在其思想之中，并指导着实践。什么是被哲学思想渗透的理论呢?“它是一种把社会发展看作和理解为一个活生生的总体的理论；或者更确切地说，它是一种把社会革命看作理论与实践的活生生的总体的理论。在这一阶段，毫无疑问，任何把这一总体划分为经济的、政治的和思想的知识分支的作法，即使在每一个分离的要素的具体特征被把握时，它都从历史的忠实性出发来分析和批判。当然，不仅经济、政治和意识形态，而且历史过程和有意识的社会行动，都不断构成‘革命的实践’的活的统一体。《共产党宣言》就是马克思主义理论在早期时，充满青春活力的最好的例子。”12

From Korsch’s discussion, it can be seen that one important characteristic of Marxist philosophy is totality. In the process of creating his thought, although Marx absorbed many different ideas, it was only through their creative integration that a social theory capable of a total examination and critique of social life was formed. This theory emphasizes the combination of such theory with practice; this combination is precisely the living totality of revolutionary theory. Even in the later period of Marx’s thought, although this total revolutionary theory was sometimes demonstrated through different aspects, this did not alter the totalistic character of Marxist philosophy. With the development of society and the evolution of knowledge itself, in the later expressions of Marx and Engels, Marxism as a total intellectual landscape increasingly seemed to decompose into different branches of knowledge—such as philosophy, political economy, dialectics of nature, scientific socialism, etc. The umbilical cord of the natural connection between these different knowledges appeared to have been severed. This phenomenon led later scholars to decompose Marx’s thought into different objects of knowledge. Korsch believed this was a misunderstanding. In Marx and Engels, independent elements of theory were never used to replace the total theory; in particular, the connection between its philosophy and other parts constitutes an important feature of Marxism. When its philosophical thought is not taken seriously, this is precisely a vulgarization of Marxism. This is also an important reason why he emphasized the need to re-discuss Marx’s “philosophy.” Therefore, Korsch strongly opposed dividing Marxist philosophy into different factors and then conducting empirical analyses of these factors to enhance the “scientificity” of Marxism. Doing so not only fails to deepen the understanding of Marxism but, in a manner characteristic of modern capitalism, restricts the totalistic and critical character of Marxist philosophy.

从柯尔施的这个讨论中可以看出，马克思主义哲学的一个重要特征就是总体性。在马克思的思想创立过程中，虽然他吸收了诸多不同的思想，但这些思想经过创造性整合，才形成了对社会生活进行总体考察与批判的社会理论，并强调将这种理论与实践结合起来，这种结合才是活生生的总体性革命理论。即使在马克思思想的后期，虽然这种总体的革命理论有时通过不同的侧面来进行论证，但这并没有改变马克思主义哲学的总体性特征。随着社会的发展和知识本身的进化，在马克思恩格斯的后期表述中，作为总体性知识图景的马克思主义似乎越来越分解为不同的知识门类，比如哲学、政治经济学、自然辩证法、科学社会主义等，这些不同知识之间的自然联系的脐带似乎已经断裂，这种现象造成了后来者将马克思的思想分解为不同的知识对象。柯尔施认为，这是一种误解，在马克思和恩格斯那里从来就不会以理论的各个独立要素来取代总体性的理论，特别是其哲学与其他部分之间的联系，构成了马克思主义的重要特征。当其哲学思想不被重视时，恰恰是对马克思主义的庸俗化。这也是他为什么强调要重新讨论马克思的“哲学”的一个重要原因。因此，柯尔施非常反对将马克思主义哲学划分为不同的因素，然后对这些因素进行实证性的分析，以增加马克思主义的“科学性”。在这样做时，不仅没有加深对马克思主义的理解，而是以现代资本主义的方式，限制了马克思主义哲学的总体性与批判性特征。

This thought of Korsch’s is even more evident in *Karl Marx: Marxist Theory and the Class Movement*. This book is divided into three parts: the first part discusses the relationship between Marxist revolutionary theory and the then-emerging sociology; the second part discusses the relationship between Marxist revolutionary theory and the critique of political economy; the third part discusses the philosophical implications of Marxist revolutionary theory. In the concrete discussion, Korsch focuses on the totalistic connection of these ideas with Marxist theory, especially the internal connections between the various components of Marxism. For example, when discussing the critique of political economy, Korsch emphasizes: Marx’s critique of political economy proceeds from a revolutionary standpoint. Connecting this with the earlier discussion of revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice means that Marx’s critique of political economy has an internal connection with his philosophical thought. Only by achieving the transformation from “philosophical idealism” to “materialist science” could Marx transcend the limits of classical political economy and form an original theory of the critique of political economy. He believed that it was only after the 1850s that Marx developed the fully developed form of his materialist theory. “It is simultaneously political economy and the critique of political economy. … It reveals that economic concepts and fundamental principles, including the most general ones, are expressions of the ‘fetishistic’ disguise of existing social relations, merely historically valid laws of a certain epoch of the socio-economic formation.” [13]13 Karl Korsch, *Karl Marx: Marxist Theory and the Class Movement* (1938), arguing that Marx’s critique of political economy is inseparable from his revolutionary theory and philosophy. In the critique of political economy, although Marx’s direct object is capital, the actual object is “labor.” This labor is no longer the labor of early capitalism, where workers still possessed their own means of production and exchanged their products as commodities with other labor. Rather, it specifically refers to “wage labor” separated from the material means of production, i.e., labor under the oppression of capital. The fundamental purpose of the critique of political economy lies in the realization of socialism. This determines the connection between Marx’s critique of political economy and scientific socialism. If this connection is abandoned, Marxism cannot be grasped in its totality. The methodological sense of totality that Korsch emphasizes is actually the key point we should focus on when re-reading Korsch today.

柯尔施的这一思想，在《卡尔·马克思——马克思主义理论与阶级运动》中表现得更为明显。本书分三个部分：第一部分讨论马克思主义革命理论与当时正在兴起的社会学的关系，第二部分讨论马克思主义革命理论与政治经济学批判的关系，第三部分讨论马克思主义革命理论的哲学内涵。在具体讨论中，柯尔施关注的都是这些思想与马克思主义理论的总体性联系，特别是马克思主义各组成部分之间的内在联系。比如在谈到政治经济学批判时，柯尔施就强调：马克思的政治经济学批判是从革命的立场出发的，联系到前面关于革命理论与革命实践的讨论，这意味着马克思的政治经济学批判与其哲学思想有着内在的联系，马克思只有实现了从“哲学唯心主义”向“唯物主义科学”的转变，才能超越古典政治经济学的界限，形成独创的政治经济学批判理论。他认为，自19世纪50年代以后，马克思才制定出其唯物主义理论的充分发展的形式，“它既是政治经济学，同时也是政治经济学批判。……它揭示经济学的、包括其最一般的所有概念和基本原理，是现存社会关系‘拜物教式’掩饰的表达方式，仅仅是社会经济形态一定时代历史地有效的规律。”13在政治经济学批判中，马克思直接的对象虽然是资本，但实际的对象是“劳动”,这种劳动不再是资本主义早期那种还拥有自己的实际的生产资料，并将劳动产品作为商品与其他劳动相交换的劳动，而是特指与物质生产资料相分离的“雇佣劳动”,即处于资本压迫下的劳动，政治经济学批判的根本意旨在于社会主义的实现，这决定了马克思的政治经济学批判与科学社会主义的关联，如果离开了这种联系，就无法从总体上把握马克思主义。柯尔施所强调的方法论意义上的总体性，实际上也是我们今天重读柯尔施时应该关注的要点。

Similar to Korsch, Gramsci likewise emphasized the idea of totality in the study of Marxism. When discussing what constitutes the orthodoxy of Marxism, Gramsci pointed out: The orthodoxy of Marxism is not guaranteed by any particular adherent of Marxism, nor should evidence be sought from some non-Marxist external trend of thought. Marxism is “self-sufficient.” “This concept of ‘self-sufficiency’ not only constructs all the basic elements necessary for a comprehensive, complete worldview and a comprehensive philosophy and natural science theory, but also contains all the elements necessary to activate a complete actual social organization and transform it into a comprehensive and complete civilization.” [14]14 Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks* (1929–1935), defining Marxist orthodoxy as a self-sufficient, total worldview encompassing philosophy, science, and social organization.

与柯尔施相近，葛兰西同样强调马克思主义研究中的总体性理念。葛兰西在谈到什么是马克思主义的正统时指出：马克思主义的正统并不以某个马克思主义拥护者为保证，也不是要从某个非马克思主义的外在思潮中去寻找证据，马克思主义是“自足”的，“这个‘自足’概念不仅构建了一种全面的、完整的世界观以及一种全面的哲学和自然科学理论所需要的一切基本要素，而且也包含有使一个完整的实际社会组织活跃起来，变成一种全面完整的文明所需要的一切要素。”14

Gramsci emphasizes that Marxism is a totality, which is reflected in two aspects: First, in terms of the fundamental characteristics of Marxism, philosophy and politics, or theory and practice, form a whole. For example, he believes that Marx and Lenin represent two stages respectively: Marx created a new worldview, while Lenin put this worldview into practice. Marx and Lenin embody the most fundamental unity of theory and practice in history. This unity is the result of the development of Western civilization. “The Renaissance and the Reformation, German philosophy and the French Revolution, Darwinism and British classical political economy, the liberalism of giants and this historicism rooted in the entire modern conception of life. The philosophy of praxis is the culmination of this entire intellectual and moral reform movement, which forms a dialectic between opposing mass culture and high culture. It achieves the combination of the Protestant Reformation and the French Revolution: it is both a politics that is philosophy and a philosophy that is politics.” [15]15 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, describing the philosophy of praxis (his term for Marxism) as the synthesis of the Reformation and the French Revolution, uniting philosophy and politics.

葛兰西强调马克思主义是一个总体，这种总体体现在两个方面：第一，从马克思主义的根本特征来说，哲学与政治，或者说理论与实践是一个整体。比如他认为，马克思与列宁分别代表了两个阶段：即马克思创立了一种新的世界观，而列宁则将这一世界观付诸实践，马克思和列宁体现了历史上理论与实践的最根本的统一，这种统一是西方文明发展的结果。“文艺复兴和宗教改革，德国哲学和法国革命，达尔文主义和英国古典政治经济学，巨人的自由主义和植根于整个现代生活观的这种历史主义。实践哲学是这整个精神和道德改革运动的顶峰，它在对立的大众文化和高级文化之间形成了辩证法。它实现了新教改革与法国革命的结合：它既是一种政治的哲学，又是一种哲学的政治。”15

Second, Gramsci emphasises that among the important constituent elements of Marxism there exists a totality-related interconnection. In response to the tendency at the time to divide Marxism into philosophy, political economy and politics, Gramsci pointed out that dividing Marx’s thought into three component parts reflects a genetic inquiry into historical origins, but in reality it is impossible to separate these contents from the philosophy of praxis and assign each its own value; in fact these elements are interwoven into an organic totality. If philosophy, economics and politics constitute the component elements of the philosophy of praxis, then “in their theoretical principles there must necessarily be contained the possibility of transition from one activity to another, and of mutual translation into the special language appropriate to each constituent element. Each element is contained in the other two, and the three together form a homogeneous circle.”[16]16 Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1971, p. 462. For example, when discussing Ricardo, Gramsci stresses the need to establish an inner connection between Ricardo, Hegel and Robespierre. These are three different currents of thought; to establish connections among them, one must break with any kind of a priori assumption and, within the historical situation, reveal the similarity of their problems. This is the historicism of the philosophy of praxis that Gramsci emphasises.

第二，葛兰西强调在马克思主义的重要组成要素之间，存在着一种总体性的关联。针对当时将马克思主义划分为哲学、政治经济学和政治学的倾向，葛兰西指出，将马克思的思想划分为三个组成部分，这体现了一种历史源泉的发生学探讨，但实际上，不可能将这些内容从实践哲学中分离出来并强调各自的价值，实际上这些要素交织在一个有机的总体之中。如果说哲学、经济学、政治学构成了实践哲学的组成要素的话，那么在“它们的理论原则中，就必然包含有从一种活动到另一种活动的可转变性，以及彼此转译成适合于每一种组成要素的特殊语言的可能性。任何一种要素都包含在另外两种之中，这三种要素一起构成为一个同质的循环。”16比如，在谈到李嘉图时，葛兰西就强调，要在李嘉图与黑格尔、罗伯斯庇尔之间建立起内在的联系。这是三种不同的思潮，要想在它们之间建立联系，就必须打破任何一种先验性的设定，在历史的情境中去展现他们问题的相似性，这就是葛兰西所强调的实践哲学的历史主义。

Third, proceeding from Marx’s perspective of totality, when Gramsci discusses hegemony he stresses that hegemony is a theory that integrates politics, economics and culture. In the understanding of hegemony, people often reduce it to a theory of cultural hegemony, which is in fact a misunderstanding. Gramsci believed that if the workers could achieve economic hegemony, this would be of great significance for the revolution and liberation of the workers. In his early years he launched factory councils and organised workers to study technology, precisely in order to enable workers to master the production process through mastering technology and thereby achieve a kind of economic hegemony. He also attached importance to political hegemony. Although he joined the Italian Communist Party, unlike the ultra-leftist thinking that existed within the Party at the time, Gramsci did not ignore struggle in the sense of political legitimacy. These reflections are not contradictory to his emphasis on cultural hegemony; indeed, it can be said that when the proletariat is unable to achieve economic or political hegemony, strengthening cultural hegemony becomes a possible path for the proletariat to change itself and the world.

第三，从马克思的总体性视角出发，葛兰西在谈到领导权时强调，领导权是一种集政治、经济与文化为一体的理论。在对领导权的理解中，人们常常将之简化为一种文化领导权理论，这实际上是一种误解。葛兰西认为，如果工人能够在经济上获得领导权，这对于工人的革命和解放来说意义重大，他早年发动工厂委员会，组织工人学习技术，实际上都是想让工人通过掌握技术来掌握生产过程，从而获得一种经济上的领导权。政治上的领导权他同样重视，虽然他加入了意大利共产党，但与当时意大利共产党内存在的极左思想不同，葛兰西并不无视政治合法性意义上的斗争。这些思考与他强调文化上的领导权并不矛盾，甚至可以说，当无产阶级在无法获得经济、政治上的领导权时，加强文化上的领导权成为无产阶级改变自身与世界的可能途径。

Lukács, Korsch and Gramsci, as the first generation of Western Marxists, grasped the most important content of Marxist philosophy, namely the investigation of the totality of social life, in order to reconstruct the theoretical tradition and important content of Marxist philosophy. This played a positive role in breaking away from the mechanised Marxism of the Second International period and restoring the vitality of Marxist philosophy. By re-examining the relationship between Marx and Hegel, they introduced the problem of subjectivity in Marx’s philosophy into the discussion of totality, forming different interpretive approaches. Although the three share many commonalities, the differences among them are also very clear: comparatively speaking, Lukács is more of a philosopher, full of theoretical radicalism and imagination, and his critique of reification derived from philosophy possesses a very strong penetrating power into reality; Korsch, while also emphasising the philosophical content of Marx, is more inclined to explore the connections among philosophy, political economy and socialism in Marx’s thought, and this is especially evident in his book *Karl Marx*; Gramsci, proceeding from the reality of Italy, is more concerned with the connection between Marx’s thought and reality, emphasises the integration of politics, economics and culture, and presents the image of a revolutionary rich in theory. Together, the three restored and reconstructed the theory of totality in Marxist philosophy, thereby forming a line of thought different from the orthodox research of the time, which had a relatively far-reaching influence on later generations, especially in the 1930s–1960s, directly influencing the Frankfurt School and promoting the theoretical development of Western Marxism.

卢卡奇、柯尔施与葛兰西作为第一代国外马克思主义者，抓住了马克思主义哲学中最为重要的一个内容，即对社会生活的总体性考察，以重新建构马克思主义哲学的理论传统和重要内容，这对于摆脱第二国际时代的机械化的马克思主义、恢复马克思主义哲学的活力起着积极的推动作用。通过重新讨论马克思与黑格尔的关系，他们在对总体性的讨论中引入了马克思哲学中的主体性问题，形成了不同的解释思路。尽管他们三人有着诸多的共同点，但彼此之间的差异也是非常明显的：相比较而言，卢卡奇更像哲学家，充满着理论的激进与想象力，从哲学而来的物化批判有着非常强的现实穿透力；柯尔施虽然也强调马克思的哲学内容，但他更愿意探讨马克思思想中哲学、政治经济学与社会主义之间的联系，特别是《卡尔·马克思》这本书，这一点更为明显；葛兰西从意大利现实出发，更关注马克思的思想与现实的联系，强调政治、经济与文化的一体化，展现给人的是一个富有理论的革命家的形象。他们三人共同恢复和重构了马克思主义哲学的总体性理论，从而形成了不同于当时正统研究的另一种思路，对后来者产生了较为深远的影响，特别是在20世纪30—60年代，直接影响到法兰克福学派，推动着国外马克思主义的理论发展。

Notes

注释

1 [German] Hegel: *The Science of Logic*, trans. He Lin, Commercial Press, 1980, pp. 118, 125.

1 [德]黑格尔:《小逻辑》,贺麟译,商务印书馆,1980年,第118、125页。

2 [German] Hegel: *The Science of Logic*, Vol. 1, trans. Yang Yizhi, Commercial Press, 1966, p. 56.

2[德]黑格尔:《逻辑学》,上卷,杨一之译,商务印书馆,1966年,第56页。

3 [German] Hegel: *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Vol. 1, trans. He Lin and Wang Jiuxing, Commercial Press, 1996, p. 22.

3[德]黑格尔:《精神现象学》,上卷,贺麟、王玖兴译,商务印书馆,1996年,第22页。

4 [German] Hegel: *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Vol. 1, trans. He Lin and Wang Jiuxing, Commercial Press, 1996, pp. 134, 139.

4[德]黑格尔:《精神现象学》,上卷,贺麟、王玖兴译,商务印书馆,1996年,第134、139页。

5 *Complete Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 30, People’s Publishing House, 1995, pp. 41, 42.

5《马克思恩格斯全集》,第30卷,人民出版社,1995年,第41、42页。

6 [Hungarian] Lukács: *The Theory of the Novel*, trans. Yan Hongyuan and Li Huaitao, Commercial Press, 2012, pp. 23, 24.

6[匈]卢卡奇:《小说理论》,燕宏远、李怀涛译,商务印书馆,2012年,第23、24页。

7 [Hungarian] Lukács: *The Theory of the Novel*, trans. Yan Hongyuan and Li Huaitao, Commercial Press, 2012, pp. 25, 25.

7[匈]卢卡奇:《小说理论》,燕宏远、李怀涛译,商务印书馆,2012年,第25、25页。

8 [Hungarian] Lukács: *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Du Zhangzhi et al., Commercial Press, 1992, pp. 47–48, 56.

8[匈]卢卡奇:《历史与阶级意识》,杜章智等译,商务印书馆,1992年,第47-48、56页。

9 *Complete Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 31, People’s Publishing House, 1998, p. 442.

9《马克思恩格斯全集》,第31卷,人民出版社,1998年,第442页。

10 [Hungarian] Lukács: *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Du Zhangzhi et al., Commercial Press, 1992, p. 154.

10[匈]卢卡奇:《历史与阶级意识》,杜章智等译,商务印书馆,1992年,第154页。

11 [Hungarian] Lukács: *The Ontology of Social Being*, Vol. 1, trans. Bai Xikun, Zhang Xiping and Li Qiuling et al., Chongqing Publishing House, 1993, pp. 648, 654.

11[匈]卢卡奇:《关于社会存在的本体论》,上卷,白锡堃、张西平、李秋零等译,重庆出版社,1993年,第648、654页。

12 Karl Korsch, *Marxism and Philosophy*, trans. by Fred Halliday, NLB, 1970, p. 57.

12Karl Korsch,Marxism and Philosophy,trans.by Fred Halliday,NLB,1970,p.57.

13 [German] Korsch: *Karl Marx*, trans. Xiong Ziyun and Weng Tingzhen, Chongqing Publishing House, 1993, p. 71.

13[德]柯尔施:《卡尔·马克思》,熊子云、翁廷真译,重庆出版社,1993年,第71页。

14 Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebook*, ed. and trans. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1971, p. 462.

14Antonio Gramsci,Selections from the Prison Notebook,ed.and trans.by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith,Lawrence and Wishart Ltd.,1971,p.462.

15 Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebook*, ed. and trans. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1971, p. 395.

15Antonio Gramsci,Selections from the Prison Notebook,ed.and trans.by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith,Lawrence and Wishart Ltd.,1971,p.395.

16 [Italian] Gramsci: *Prison Notebooks*, trans. Cao Leiyu et al., China Social Sciences Press, 2000, p. 316.

16[意]葛兰西:《狱中札记》,曹雷雨等译,中国社会科学出版社,2000年,第316页。

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