An Analysis of the Reform of the Vietnamese National Assembly’s Supervision System since the Đổi Mới Reforms

Since the Đổi Mới reforms of 1986, in order to prevent the spread of bourgeois liberalization within the Party and state organs, curb corruption and embezzlement, ensure the implementation of important resolutions and major strategic decisions of the Party Central Committee and the state, as well as the spirit of important directives and instructions of the General Secretary of the Party, and improve the effectiveness of National Assembly supervision, Vietnam has adhered to a problem-oriented approach, strengthened the National Assembly’s supervision over state organs and their personnel, and continuously improved the National Assembly supervision system. In Vietnam, National Assembly supervision has a specific connotation: it refers to a series of tracking, review, evaluation, disposal, and sanction activities carried out by the National Assembly and its Standing Committee, the National Assembly’s Ethnic Council and specialized committees, National Assembly delegations, and National Assembly deputies, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws and regulations, through means such as interpellation, document review, thematic supervision, confidence assessments, and confidence votes, targeting supervised institutions, organizations, and individuals. So, to address the above problems, what supervisory measures has the Vietnamese National Assembly adopted? And what lessons do they offer? This article will sort out and analyze these issues.

1986年革新开放以来，为了防止资产阶级自由化思潮在党和国家机关内部扩散蔓延，遏制贪污腐败现象，使党中央和国家的重要决议和重大战略决策部署以及党的总书记的重要指示批示精神得到贯彻落实，提高国会监督的效果，越南坚持问题导向，加大了国会对国家机关及其工作人员的监督力度，不断完善国会监督制度。在越南，国会监督有着特定内涵，是指国会及其常务委员会、国会民族委员会和专门委员会、国会代表团和国会代表依照宪法和相关法律法规，通过质询、审议文件、专题监督、信任测评和信任投票等方式对被监督机构、组织和个人进行的一系列追踪、审议、评估、处置和制裁活动那么，为了解决上述问题，越南国会采取了哪些监督措施？又带来怎样的启示呢？本文将对这些问题作出梳理和分析。

I. Preventing the Spread of Bourgeois Liberalization and Reform of the National Assembly Supervision System

一、防止资产阶级自由化思潮蔓延和国会监督制度改革

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, socialist countries in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe one after another took the capitalist road. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the drastic changes in Eastern Europe dealt a huge shock to the thinking of Vietnamese Party cadres and the masses. Vietnam experienced a crisis of faith in Marxism and a crisis of “deviating from the socialist orientation.” Phenomena of “self-evolution” and “self-transformation,” along with bourgeois liberalization, emerged within the Communist Party of Vietnam and state organs. In 1989, liberalization elements represented by Tran Xuan Bach, a former member of the Politburo and Secretariat of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, publicly published articles in newspapers and periodicals, advocating that Vietnam should follow the example of the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist countries by abolishing the guiding role of Marxism and implementing a multi-party system and political pluralism. Around 1998, liberalization elements represented by Tran Do, a former member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, again advocated political liberalization and a multi-party system, challenging the Communist Party of Vietnam in the form of a “ten-thousand-word letter,” stirring up a wave of bourgeois liberalization. In recent years, liberalization elements within Vietnam have colluded with those exiled abroad, continuing to vigorously advocate “liberalization.” They exploit some existing problems in Vietnam to attack the current political system, advocate for, exaggerate, and beautify the doctrine of “separation of powers,” demand the abandonment of the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam, and loudly propagate Western political democratization and the multi-party system. Under these circumstances, how to respond to the ideological shock brought to Party cadres by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the drastic changes in Eastern Europe, and to prevent cadres from ideologically abandoning Marxism and the socialist path, became one of the main tasks of the Vietnamese National Assembly’s supervision.

20世纪80年代末90年代初，苏联和东欧的社会主义国家纷纷走上资本主义道路。苏联解体、东欧剧变给越南党员干部和民众的思想带来巨大冲击，越南出现了对马克思主义的信仰危机和“偏离社会主义方向”的危机，越南共产党和国家机关内部出现了“自我演变”“自我转化”现象和资产阶级自由化思潮。1989年，以原越南共产党中央政治局委员、书记处书记陈春柏为代表的自由化分子在报刊上公开发表文章，主张越南要像苏联和东欧社会主义国家那样取消马克思主义的指导地位，实行多党制和政治多元化。1998年前后，以原越南共产党中央政治局委员陈度为代表的自由化分子再次鼓吹政治自由化和多党制，以“万言书”形式向越南共产党发难，掀起一股资产阶级自由化思潮。近年来，越南国内的自由化分子与流亡海外的自由化分子相互勾结，继续大力鼓吹“自由化”。他们利用越南存在的一些问题攻击越南现行的政治体制，鼓吹、夸大和美化“三权分立”学说，要求放弃越南共产党的领导，大肆宣扬西方的政治民主化和多党制。在这种形势下，如何回应苏联解体、东欧剧变给党员干部带来的思想冲击，预防党员干部从思想上放弃马克思主义和社会主义道路，就成为越南国会监督的主要任务之一。

To prevent the spread of bourgeois liberalization within the Party and state organs, the Vietnamese National Assembly first dismissed and removed Tran Xuan Bach and Tran Do from their positions in the National Assembly and their status as National Assembly deputies. Subsequently, it clarified comprehensive supervisory power over all state organs and public officials elected or approved by the National Assembly, stipulating that all such organs and officials must accept interpellation by National Assembly deputies, must report on their work to the National Assembly at its regular sessions, and that legal documents and project proposals they review and adopt must also be submitted to the National Assembly for review. Before the Đổi Mới reforms of 1986, only the Council of Ministers (renamed the Government in 1992) and its members, the President of the Supreme People’s Court, and the Director of the Supreme People’s Procuracy needed to accept interpellation by National Assembly deputies; only the State Council (renamed the National Assembly Standing Committee in 1992), the Government, the Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme People’s Procuracy reported on their work to the National Assembly; and only the legal documents and project proposals they reviewed and adopted needed to be submitted to the National Assembly for review.

为了防止资产阶级自由化思潮在党内和国家机关内部扩散和蔓延，越南国会先是罢免和撤销了陈春柏和陈度等人在国会中的职务和他们的国会代表身份，随后又明确了对所有由国会选举和批准产生的国家机关和公职人员的全面监督权，规定所有由国会选举和批准产生的国家机关和公职人员都必须接受国会代表的质询，都必须在国会例会上向国会报告工作，由他们审议通过的法律文件和项目提案也必须交由国会审核等。在1986年革新开放之前，只有部长会议（1992年改为政府）及其成员、最高人民法院院长和最高人民检察院检察长需要接受国会代表的质询，只有国务委员会（1992年改为国会常务委员会）和政府、最高人民法院、最高人民检察院向国会报告工作以及只有它们审议通过的法律文件和项目提案需要交给国会审核。

Since the Đổi Mới reforms of 1986, along with the continuous increase in the number of state organs responsible and reporting to the National Assembly and the continuous expansion of the National Assembly’s personnel appointment and removal powers, more and more state organs and public officials have come under the supervision of the National Assembly. In April 1992, the National Assembly included the State President and the Chairperson of the National Assembly among the targets of interpellation by National Assembly deputies, and included the work report of the State President among the objects of National Assembly review. In May 2005, Vietnam carried out a state institutional adjustment, placing the State Audit Office under the leadership of the National Assembly. Subsequently, the National Assembly included the Auditor General of the State Audit Office among the targets of interpellation by National Assembly deputies, and stipulated that the State Audit Office should be responsible to and report on its work to the National Assembly. By November 2013, the National Assembly had included all state organs and public officials elected or approved by the National Assembly within the scope of its supervision targets. In addition, the Vietnamese National Assembly also strengthened supervision over all state organs and public officials elected or approved by it. At the end of 2005, due to mismanagement by then Prime Minister Phan Van Khai, the Ministry of Transport embezzled public funds for football gambling. In September 2006, National Assembly deputies conducted a concentrated interpellation of Phan Van Khai. Under pressure from the National Assembly deputies, Phan Van Khai was forced to resign, thus becoming the first Prime Minister in Vietnamese history to resign under pressure from National Assembly interpellation. In June 2010, the National Assembly overwhelmingly rejected the North-South high-speed railway project proposal led by the government. Although the National Assembly had previously rejected government proposals, this was the first time it rejected a high-speed railway project proposal led by the Prime Minister, the Standing Deputy Prime Minister, and several ministers.

1986年革新开放以来，伴随着向国会负责并报告工作的国家机关的不断增多和国会人事任免权的不断扩大，越来越多的国家机关和公职人员需要接受国会的监督。1992年4月，国会将国家主席和国会主席纳入国会代表质询的对象，将国家主席的工作报告纳入国会审议的对象。2005年5月，越南进行国家机构调整，将国家审计署置于国会的领导之下，随后国会又将国家审计署审计长纳入国会代表质询的对象，并规定了国家审计署应向其负责并报告工作。截止到2013年11月，国会将所有由国会选举和批准产生的国家机关和公职人员都列入其监督的对象和范围。除此之外，越南国会还加大了对所有由其选举和批准产生的国家机关和公职人员的监督力度。2005年年底，由于时任政府总理潘文凯管理失误，越南交通部挪用公款进行赌球。2006年9月，国会代表对潘文凯进行了集中质询。在国会代表的压力下，潘文凯被迫辞职，从而成为越南历史上首位迫于国会代表质询压力提出辞职的总理。2010年6月，国会高票否决了由政府牵头的南北高铁项目提案。虽然国会之前也否决过政府的提案，但此次否决由政府总理、常务副总理和几名部长牵头的高铁项目提案还是首次。

II. Curbing Corruption and Embezzlement and Reform of the National Assembly Supervision System

二、遏制贪污腐败现象和国会监督制度改革

Since the Đổi Mới reforms of 1986, in order to stimulate economic vitality and improve social productive forces, Vietnam introduced market mechanisms into the economic sphere. Influenced by marketization factors, coupled with the low salaries of state public officials, phenomena of “power rent-seeking” and “buying and selling official positions” and other corruption and embezzlement emerged within the Communist Party of Vietnam and state organs. Although the Communist Party of Vietnam and the government have implemented many tough measures, the problem of corruption and embezzlement has not been effectively resolved, becoming a “national calamity” and one of the “four major dangers” plaguing Vietnam’s development. [1]1 The “four major dangers” (bốn nguy cơ) are a set of challenges identified by the Communist Party of Vietnam: corruption, wastefulness, bureaucracy, and the degeneration of cadres. At the turn of the 21st century, the Deputy Director of the Supreme People’s Procuracy and 19 government members were implicated in Vietnam’s top criminal case, the “Truong Van Cam gang case,” [2]2 The Truong Van Cam (also known as Nam Cam) gang case was a major organized crime and corruption scandal in Vietnam in the early 2000s, involving high-ranking officials and law enforcement. causing great shock among the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam and ordinary citizens. To demonstrate its determination to fight corruption to the public, the Communist Party of Vietnam formulated an anti-corruption strategy focusing on “hunting tigers.” [3]3 “Hunting tigers” (đả hổ) is a term used in Vietnamese anti-corruption campaigns, analogous to the Chinese term, referring to the targeting of high-ranking officials. In response to the needs of the domestic anti-corruption situation, the Vietnamese National Assembly also began to formulate and implement supervisory measures specifically targeting senior state leaders, gradually focusing the key targets of supervision on the “minority within the minority” of senior state leaders, strengthening key supervision over them, thereby achieving the effect of striking the mountain to frighten the tiger. [4]4 “Striking the mountain to frighten the tiger” (đả sơn kinh hổ) is a Chinese idiom meaning to make a symbolic example of someone to warn others.

1986年革新开放以来，为了激发经济活力和提高社会生产力，越南在经济领域引入了市场机制。受市场化因素的影响，再加上国家公职人员工资较低，越南共产党和国家机关内部出现了“权力寻租”和“买官”“卖官”等贪污腐败现象。虽然越南共产党和政府推行了许多强硬措施，但是贪污腐败的问题一直没有得到有效解决，成为困扰越南发展的“国难”和“四大危险”之一。在21世纪到来之际，越南最高人民检察院副检察长和19名政府成员卷入越南第一重案“张文甘黑社会集团案”，引发越南共产党领导层和普通民众的巨大震惊。为了向民众表达反腐败的决心，越南共产党制定出以“打老虎”为重点的反腐败战略。根据国内反腐败形势的需要，越南国会也开始制定和实施专门针对国家高级领导干部的监督措施，逐步将监督的对象重点放在国家高级领导干部这一“关键少数”中的“少数”，加大对国家高级领导干部的重点监督，从而达到敲山震虎的效果。

In December 2001, the Vietnamese National Assembly decided for the first time to hold votes of confidence on all senior leading cadres elected and approved by it, and to decide whether to dismiss them based on the results of the votes of confidence. However, due to the influence of various complex factors, the National Assembly was unable to successfully organize the votes of confidence. In 2010, due to poor government management, Vietnam’s largest state-owned shipping enterprise, the Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group (Vinashin), incurred huge losses, causing enormous economic damage to the country. After the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in January 2011, deputies to the National Assembly increasingly called for a vote of confidence on the then Prime Minister, Nguyễn Tấn Dũng. Influenced by Nguyễn Tấn Dũng’s status as a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam and other factors, the National Assembly ultimately failed to hold a vote of confidence on him. To reduce resistance to organizing votes of confidence, in November 2012, the National Assembly promulgated Vietnam’s first “Resolution on Confidence Assessments and Votes of Confidence for Persons Elected or Approved by the National Assembly and People’s Councils,” providing a legal basis for the National Assembly to organize votes of confidence. This resolution limited the targets of National Assembly votes of confidence to the President and Vice President, the Chairperson and Vice Chairpersons of the National Assembly, the Chairperson of the National Assembly’s Ethnic Council and the Chairs of its specialized committees, other members of the National Assembly Standing Committee, the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Ministers, the ministers and other members of the government, the President of the Supreme People’s Court, the President of the Supreme People’s Procuracy, and the Auditor General of the State Audit Office. Subsequently, the National Assembly decided to adopt a gradual strategy, first conducting confidence assessments on all senior leading cadres elected and approved by the National Assembly, and then deciding whether to hold votes of confidence on them based on the results of the confidence assessments. Subsequently, the Vietnamese National Assembly conducted confidence assessments on the aforementioned senior leading cadres in June 2013 and November 2014. Since no senior leading cadre’s confidence assessment results met the conditions for a vote of confidence, the National Assembly was unable to hold votes of confidence on them, and no senior leading cadre was dismissed.

2001年12月，越南国会首次决定对由其选举和批准产生的所有高级领导干部进行信任投票，并根据信任投票的结果决定是否罢免高级领导干部。但受各种复杂因素的影响，国会未能成功组织信任投票。2010年，因政府管理不善，越南最大的国有轮船企业越南船舶工业集团（Vinashin）出现巨额亏损，给国家造成巨大经济损失。2011年1月越南共产党十一大召开之后，国会代表要求国会对时任政府总理阮晋勇进行信任投票的呼声越来越高。受阮晋勇的越南共产党中央政治局委员身份和其他因素的影响，最终国会未能对其进行信任投票。为了减少组织信任投票的阻力，2012年11月，国会颁布了越南首部《关于对国会和人民议会选举或批准产生的任职人员进行信任测评和信任投票的决议》，为国会组织信任投票提供了法律保障。该决议将国会信任投票的对象限定为国家主席和副主席、国会主席和副主席、国会民族委员会主席和专门委员会主任、国会常务委员会其他成员、政府总理和副总理、政府的各部部长和其他成员、最高人民法院院长、最高人民检察院检察长、国家审计署审计长。随后国会决定推行渐进式策略，先对所有由国会选举和批准产生的高级领导干部进行信任测评，再根据信任测评的结果决定是否对他们进行信任投票。随后，越南国会在2013年6月和2014年11月对上述高级领导干部进行了信任测评。由于没有一个高级领导干部的信任测评结果符合信任投票的条件，国会未能对他们进行信任投票，也没有一个高级领导干部被罢免。

To achieve the effect of overseeing senior leading cadres of the state and to improve the efficiency of organizing and implementing votes of confidence and confidence assessment activities, in November 2014 and November 2015, the National Assembly successively amended and improved the aforementioned 2012 resolution and the Vietnamese “Law on Oversight Activities of the National Assembly,” changing the aforementioned “other members of the National Assembly Standing Committee” and “the ministers and other members of the government” to “members of the National Assembly Standing Committee” and “heads of ministerial-level agencies of the government.” At this point, the positions subject to National Assembly votes of confidence and confidence assessments were reduced to approximately 50, and the targets of National Assembly votes of confidence and confidence assessments were also concentrated on a small number of senior leading cadres of the state.

为了达到监督国家高级领导干部的效果，提高组织和实施信任投票和信任测评活动的效率，2014年11月和2015年11月，国会先后对上述2012年决议和越南《国会监督活动法》进行了修改和完善，将上述“国会常务委员会其他成员”和“政府的各部部长和其他成员”改为“国会常务委员会委员”和“政府部级机构负责人”。至此，国会信任投票和信任测评的职位缩减为50个左右，国会信任投票和信任测评的对象也集中到了少数国家高级领导干部身上。

III. Implementing the Major Strategic Decisions and Deployments of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the Reform of the National Assembly’s Oversight System

三、贯彻落实越共党中央重大战略决策部署和国会监督制度改革

As the leading force and core of leadership of the state and society in Vietnam, the Communist Party of Vietnam emphasizes the need to resolutely uphold the core position of the Party’s General Secretary in the Party Central Committee and the entire Party, uphold the authority of the Party Central Committee and its centralized, unified leadership, and implement the important resolutions and major strategic decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee and the state, as well as the important directives and instructions of the Party’s General Secretary, in the construction of a socialist modern industrial country. In practice, some regions, sectors, and units in Vietnam have not aligned well with the Party Central Committee, lacking political awareness, awareness of the overall situation, core awareness, and awareness of responsibility [5]5 These four concepts — political awareness, awareness of the overall situation, core awareness, and awareness of responsibility — are a Vietnamese Communist Party formulation analogous to the Chinese Communist Party’s “Four Consciousnesses” (political consciousness, consciousness of the overall situation, core consciousness, and alignment consciousness), used to demand loyalty and alignment with the Party Central Committee., and have problems such as implementing the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee in a way that does not conform to reality, is not resolute, is not thorough, and is compromised. Therefore, starting from the 9th National Assembly, the National Assembly has increased the intensity of thematic oversight over the implementation work of relevant regions, sectors, and units.

作为越南国家和社会的领导力量和领导核心，越南共产党强调，要坚决维护党的总书记在党中央和全党的核心地位，维护党中央权威和集中统一领导，将党中央和国家的重要决议和重大战略决策部署以及党的总书记的重要指示批示精神贯彻落实到社会主义现代化工业国建设中去。在实践中，越南个别地区、部门和单位却没有很好地与党中央保持一致，缺乏政治意识、大局意识、核心意识和责任意识，存在贯彻落实党中央决策部署不符合实际、不坚决、不彻底和打折扣等问题。因此，从第九届国会开始，国会加大了对相关地区、部门和单位在贯彻落实工作方面的专题监督力度。

To effectively implement thematic oversight activities, the Vietnamese National Assembly stipulates that, in addition to thematic oversight activities carried out by individual National Assembly deputies, most thematic oversight activities of the National Assembly, the National Assembly Standing Committee, the National Assembly’s Ethnic Council and specialized committees, and National Assembly delegations must be carried out by thematic oversight groups established for each purpose. To achieve the democratization and scientification of thematic oversight activities and ensure that all personnel related to the thematic oversight activities can participate in them, the Vietnamese National Assembly also stipulates that the members of thematic oversight groups must be composed of members of institutions and organizations such as the National Assembly, the National Assembly Standing Committee, the National Assembly’s Ethnic Council, the National Assembly’s specialized committees, and National Assembly delegations, as well as representatives of the people.

为了有效实施专题监督活动，越南国会规定，除了国会代表实施的专题监督活动，国会、国会常务委员会、国会民族委员会和专门委员会、国会代表团的大部分专题监督活动都必须由各自设立的专题监督团负责实施。为了实现专题监督活动的民主化和科学化，确保与专题监督活动有关的所有人员都能够参与到专题监督活动中来，越南国会还规定，专题监督团的成员必须由国会、国会常务委员会、国会民族委员会、国会专门委员会和国会代表团等机构和组织的成员以及民众代表组成。

For a long time, thematic oversight groups of the National Assembly have mainly implemented thematic oversight activities through the following forms. First, by reviewing the work reports of the oversight targets to assess the achievements, existing problems, and their causes in the process of the oversight targets implementing the important resolutions and major strategic decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee and the state, as well as the important directives and instructions of the Party’s General Secretary. For example, to inspect the implementation of policies and laws supporting the development of education for ethnic minorities and mountainous areas in Kon Tum Province during the period 2010–2017, in March 2018, the thematic oversight group of the National Assembly’s Ethnic Council held a thematic oversight meeting in Kon Tum Province, reviewed the report of the Kon Tum Provincial People’s Committee on the implementation of the aforementioned policies and laws, comprehensively assessed the achievements, existing problems, and their causes, and put forward some specific recommendations. Second, on-site investigation. To conduct in-depth oversight of the activities of the oversight targets, thematic oversight groups of the National Assembly often dispatch oversight teams to the sectors, institutions, or localities where the oversight targets are located for on-site research and inspection. For example, to obtain information on the implementation of policies and laws on establishing schools, investing in, and ensuring the quality of higher education training nationwide, in the first five months of 2010, the thematic oversight group of the National Assembly Standing Committee conducted three research trips in the Northern, Central-Highlands, and Southern regions of Vietnam, and also dispatched three oversight teams to conduct in-depth investigations of 51 higher education institutions nationwide. Third, organizing seminars and discussion meetings. To obtain more opinions and suggestions from relevant organizations and individuals on thematic oversight activities, thematic oversight groups of the National Assembly also often organize seminars and discussion meetings with the participation of scientists, experts, National Assembly deputies, and relevant organizations. For example, from October 2014 to October 2015, during the thematic oversight of the management of land by state-owned farms and forestry farms nationwide during the period 2004–2014, the thematic oversight group of the National Assembly Standing Committee organized seminars on forestry and agricultural land use in Yên Bái City and Buôn Ma Thuột City, respectively.

长期以来，国会专题监督团主要通过以下形式实施专题监督活动。一是通过审议监督对象的工作报告来评估监督对象在贯彻落实党中央和国家的重要决议和重大战略决策部署以及党的总书记的重要指示批示精神过程中取得的成绩、存在的问题及其原因。例如，为了检查崑嵩省在2010~2017年期间对支持少数民族和山区教育发展政策和法律的贯彻落实情况，2018年3月，越南国会民族委员会的专题监督团在崑嵩省召开了专题监督会议，审议了崑嵩省人民委员会对上述政策和法律的贯彻落实情况报告，全面评估了取得的成绩、存在的问题及其原因，并提出一些具体建议。二是实地调查。为了对监督对象的活动进行深入监督，国会专题监督团经常派遣监督小组到监督对象所在的部门、机构或地方进行实地调研和考察。例如，为了获得全国各地对设立学校、投资和确保高等教育培训质量政策和法律的贯彻落实情况，2010年前五个月，越南国会常务委员会的专题监督团在越南北部、中部-高地地区、南部三个地区进行了三次调研，还派遣了3个监督小组对全国51个高等教育机构进行了深入调查。三是组织研讨会和讨论会。为了获得更多相关组织机构和个人对专题监督活动的意见建议，国会专题监督团还经常组织由科学家、专家、国会代表、相关组织机构参加的研讨会和讨论会。例如，2014年10月至2015年10月，越南国会常务委员会的专题监督团在对全国2004~2014年期间国有农场和林场的土地管理情况进行专题监督过程中，在越南安沛市和邦美蜀市分别组织了关于林业和农业用地情况的研讨会。

In carrying out thematic supervision activities, in order to obtain information and documents related to the subject and content of supervision, the National Assembly’s thematic supervision delegation often cooperates with relevant organizations and institutions. For example, from June 2016 to May 2017, during the process of conducting thematic supervision on the implementation of food safety policies and laws nationwide in Vietnam for the period 2011–2016, the Vietnamese National Assembly and its thematic supervision delegation cooperated with 21 provinces and centrally governed cities representing the three regions of northern, central-highland, and southern Vietnam; 210 food production and processing enterprises under investigation; and the Vietnamese Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, and Ministry of Industry and Trade, which are responsible for managing the field of food safety. They required these entities to provide information and relevant documents on the implementation of food safety policies and laws nationwide. In addition, to clarify issues related to the content of supervision, the thematic supervision delegation actively organized explanatory meetings with the participation of other relevant organizations and institutions. For instance, during the thematic supervision of the implementation of land management policies and laws for state-owned farms and forest farms nationwide in Vietnam for the period 2004–2014, the Standing Committee of the Vietnamese National Assembly and its thematic supervision delegation organized an explanatory meeting in August 2015 with the participation of the Vietnamese Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ministry of Finance, and Government Inspectorate. At the explanatory meeting, representatives from the above-mentioned departments explained and clarified for the Standing Committee of the National Assembly and its thematic supervision delegation the state’s responsibility in guiding and implementing land management policies and laws, as well as its responsibility in effectively managing and using the land of farms, forest farms, and forestry management committees. In practice, the cooperation between the National Assembly’s thematic supervision delegation and relevant organizations and institutions has not only enhanced the efficiency of thematic supervision activities but also provided important information and technical support for the scientific deliberation and evaluation of the activities of the subjects under supervision.

在实施专题监督活动中，为了获得与监督对象和监督内容有关的信息和文件，国会专题监督团经常同相关组织机构进行合作。例如，2016年6月至2017年5月，越南国会及其专题监督团在对越南全国2011~2016年期间食品安全政策和法律的贯彻落实情况进行专题监督的过程中，与分别代表越南北部、中部-高地地区、南部三个地区的21个省和中央直辖城市，被调查的210个食品生产和加工企业，负责管理食品安全领域的越南卫生部、农业和农村发展部、工业和贸易部进行了合作，并要求它们提供越南全国食品安全政策和法律的贯彻落实情况以及相关文件。另外，为了澄清与监督内容有关的问题，国会专题监督团还积极组织由其他相关组织机构参加的解释会议。例如，在对越南全国2004~2014年期间国有农场和林场土地管理政策和法律的贯彻落实情况进行专题监督过程中，越南国会常务委员会及其专题监督团在2015年8月组织了由越南自然资源和环境部、农业和农村发展部、财政部和政府监察总署参加的解释会议。在解释会议上，上述部门的代表为国会常务委员会及其专题监督团解释和澄清了国家在指导和落实土地管理政策和法律中的责任以及在有效管理和使用农场、林场、林业管理委员会的土地中的责任。实践中，国会专题监督团与相关组织机构的合作既提高了专题监督活动的效率，也为国会专题监督团科学审议和评估监督对象的活动提供了重要信息和技术支持。

IV. Ineffective National Assembly Supervision and Reform of the National Assembly Supervision System

四、国会监督效果不佳与国会监督制度改革

Before the Đổi Mới (reform and opening up) in 1986, although the Vietnamese National Assembly had statutory supervisory powers, these powers lacked an effective operational mechanism, rendering them virtually nominal. The Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, held in December 1986, pointed out the above problems incisively, emphasizing the need to separate Party and government functions, enhance the status and role of the National Assembly, and strengthen the effectiveness of National Assembly supervision. Since the 21st century, although the status of the National Assembly has been continuously elevated, the effectiveness of its supervision has remained poor, and the National Assembly has lacked strong supervisory measures in performing its supervisory functions. For example, in reviewing work reports, the National Assembly has paid excessive attention to the achievements of state organs such as the National Assembly’s specialized committees and the “government, Supreme People’s Court, and Supreme People’s Procuratorate” in performing their duties, while neglecting their problems and shortcomings. In terms of interpellation and responses to interpellation, the time for National Assembly interpellation sessions has been relatively short; many National Assembly deputies who registered to submit interpellations have been unable to do so; and the responses of those being interpellated to the questions have been insufficiently in-depth, failing to propose concrete and feasible measures to resolve the issues raised. In thematic supervision, the tasks of the National Assembly’s Ethnic Council and specialized committees have been heavy, and the “post-supervision” mechanism has been relatively imperfect. In confidence voting, the procedures for National Assembly confidence voting have been cumbersome and the tasks heavy. In practice, to enhance the effectiveness of National Assembly supervision, the Vietnamese National Assembly has mainly adopted the following measures.

在1986年革新开放之前，越南国会虽然有法定的监督职权，但这一职权却缺少有效的运行机制，以致于形同虚设。1986年12月召开的越南共产党六大一针见血地指出了上述问题，强调要实行党政分开，提高国会的地位和作用，强化国会监督的效果。21世纪以来，虽然国会的地位不断提升，但国会监督效果仍然不佳，国会在履行监督职能时缺乏强有力的监督措施。例如，在审议工作报告方面，国会过多关注国会专门委员会和“一府两院”等国家机关在履行职责过程中取得的成就，忽略了它们的问题和不足。在质询和答复质询方面，国会质询会议时间较短，许多登记申请质询的国会代表无法提出质询，被质询人员对质询问题的答复也不够深入，无法提出具体可行的措施来解决质询问题。在专题监督方面，国会民族委员会和专门委员会的专题监督任务繁重，“后期监督”机制不太完善。在信任测评方面，国会信任测评程序繁杂、任务繁重。在实践中，为了提高国会监督的效果，越南国会主要采取了以下措施。

First, actively promote flexible and efficient interactive forms of supervision. In terms of interpellation, in November 2010, the National Assembly changed its previous practice of interpellating on individual questions, instead categorizing interpellation questions by nature and conducting interpellation in the form of different groups of questions. In November 2016, the National Assembly introduced a debate format in interpellation activities, allowing National Assembly deputies and those being interpellated to engage in on-site debates on interpellation questions. In June 2018, the National Assembly implemented a “quick question – brief answer” interpellation method, emphasizing that “asking” is a form of urging and focusing on the quality of “questions,” while “answering” represents the commitments, accountability, and responsibility of leading cadres. It stipulated that each National Assembly deputy’s time for posing an interpellation question should not exceed one minute, and the time for the person being interpellated to respond was three minutes. In 2019, the National Assembly introduced online voice-to-text conversion software in interpellation activities to quickly summarize interpellation results. In reviewing work reports, in 2009, the National Assembly changed the traditional review format in which National Assembly deputies discussed work reports and offered opinions and suggestions, allowing National Assembly deputies to engage in direct debate and dialogue with the heads of relevant state organs on the content of the work reports. For example, on the morning of May 28, 2020, during the National Assembly’s review of work reports, 14 National Assembly deputies offered opinions and suggestions on the report on the Investment Law (draft) submitted by the National Assembly’s Economic Committee; the Minister of Planning and Investment explained the relevant issues, and seven National Assembly deputies engaged in on-site debate. In thematic supervision, as thematic supervision affairs have become increasingly complex, the National Assembly has actively dispatched thematic supervision delegations and supervision teams to conduct on-site research and in-depth investigations in the departments, institutions, or localities of the subjects under supervision, seeking advice from the people and listening extensively to evaluations of the subjects under supervision from grassroots public officials and the public. In practice, the use of interactive forms of supervision such as discussion, debate, dialogue, and research has created an open, democratic, and innovative supervisory atmosphere, helping the National Assembly to “prescribe the right remedy for the illness” and thus reach comprehensive, scientific, and realistic supervisory conclusions.

一是积极推行灵活高效的交流互动型监督形式。在质询方面，2010年11月，国会改变了以往以单个问题进行质询的做法，将质询问题按照性质进行归类，以不同问题组的形式进行质询。2016年11月，国会在质询活动中引入了辩论形式，允许国会代表与被质询人员就质询问题进行现场辩论。2018年6月，国会又实施了“快问-简答”的质询方式，强调“问”就是督促，要注重“问”的质量，“答”代表的是领导干部的承诺、担当和责任，规定每位国会代表提出质询的时间不得超过1分钟，被质询人员答复质询的时间为3分钟。2019年，国会又在质询活动中推行在线语音转换文字软件以快速汇总质询结果。在审议工作报告方面，国会在2009年改变了由国会代表对工作报告进行讨论并提出意见建议的传统审议形式，允许国会代表与相关国家机关负责人就工作报告的内容进行直接辩论和对话。例如，2020年5月28日上午，在国会审议工作报告过程中，14名国会代表对国会经济委员会提交的关于投资法（草案）的报告提出意见建议，计划与投资部部长解释了相关问题，7名国会代表进行了现场辩论。在专题监督方面，伴随着专题监督事务越来越复杂化，国会积极派遣专题监督团和监督小组到监督对象所在的部门、机构或地方进行实地调研和深入考察，问策于民，多方面听取基层公职人员和民众对监督对象的评价。在实践中，讨论、辩论、对话、调研等交流互动型监督形式的运用，营造了开放、民主和创新的监督氛围，有助于国会“对症下药”，从而作出全面、科学和符合实际的监督结论。

Second, continuously specify and refine the operational procedures of supervision activities to remedy and improve the loopholes and deficiencies of the supervision mechanism. In terms of National Assembly interpellation, the basic operational procedure has long been that National Assembly deputies raise interpellation questions and those being interpellated respond to them. To enhance the sense of responsibility of the government and its organizational institutions and thoroughly clarify the interpellation questions raised by National Assembly deputies, in November 2009, the National Assembly for the first time arranged a segment in interpellation activities in which the Prime Minister explained interpellation questions and accepted interpellation from National Assembly deputies after all those being interpellated had finished their responses. In November 2010, the National Assembly added a segment in which the heads of government departments and institutions related to the interpellation questions further explained the issues and participated in responding to interpellation. In October 2018, the National Assembly again arranged a segment in which the Chairperson of the National Assembly accepted interpellation from National Assembly deputies after the Prime Minister had finished responding to interpellation. In terms of National Assembly confidence voting, to clarify issues related to confidence voting, enable National Assembly deputies to express their confidence levels in the persons subject to confidence voting more objectively and fairly, and ensure the objectivity and persuasiveness of confidence voting results, in November 2014, the National Assembly arranged a segment in which National Assembly delegations discussed relevant issues with the persons subject to confidence voting after the National Assembly voted to approve the list of persons subject to confidence voting but before National Assembly deputies cast their votes. In practice, these measures of the Vietnamese National Assembly have made supervisory procedures and mechanisms increasingly specific and scientific, made supervisory activities increasingly democratic, standardized, and aligned with the laws of supervision, and have to a large extent improved the effectiveness and quality of supervisory activities.

二是不断具体和细化监督活动的运作程序，弥补和完善监督机制的漏洞和缺陷。在国会质询方面，国会代表提出质询问题，被质询人员回答质询问题，一直以来是国会质询的基本运作程序。为了提高政府及其组织机构的责任意识，彻底澄清国会代表提出的质询问题，2009年11月，国会首次在质询活动中安排了政府总理在所有被质询人员结束答复质询之后解释质询问题并接受国会代表质询的环节。2010年11月，国会又增加了与质询问题有关的政府部门机构负责人进一步解释质询问题并参与答复质询的环节。2018年10月，国会再次在政府总理结束答复质询之后安排了国会主席接受国会代表质询的环节。在国会信任测评方面，为了澄清与信任测评有关的问题，使国会代表更加客观和公正地表达对被信任测评人员的信任等级，确保信任测评结果的客观性和说服力，国会在2014年11月安排了国会代表团在国会表决通过被信任测评人员名单之后、国会代表进行投票之前，与被信任测评人员就相关问题进行讨论的环节。在实践中，越南国会的这些做法使监督程序和机制越来越具体化和科学化，使监督活动越来越民主化、规范化和符合监督规律，在很大程度上提高了监督活动的效果和质量。

V. Lessons from the Reform of the Vietnamese National Assembly Supervision System

五、越南国会监督制度改革的启示

After more than 30 years of reform, although the above-mentioned problems have not been completely resolved, the supervision of the Vietnamese National Assembly has played a very important role, and the National Assembly supervision system has become increasingly perfected, forming an indispensable component of the power supervision system of the Vietnamese Party and state. As an important part of the world socialist movement, the practice of reforming the Vietnamese National Assembly supervision system shows that, under the current complex international and domestic situation, socialist countries should, while adhering to the Marxist theory of the state and on the basis of following the general and specific laws of the operation of socialist democratic politics, gradually reform the supervision system of state power organs. Specifically, the following points should be achieved.

经过30多年的改革，虽然上述几个问题没有得到彻底解决，但越南国会监督发挥了非常重要的作用，国会监督制度也越来越完善，已成为越南党和国家权力监督体系不可或缺的组成部分。作为世界社会主义运动的重要组成部分，越南国会监督制度改革实践表明，在当前纷繁复杂的国际国内形势下，社会主义国家应在坚持马克思主义国家学说的前提下，在遵循社会主义民主政治运行的一般规律和特殊规律的基础上，逐步改革国家权力机关的监督制度。具体来说，应该做到以下几点。

(I) The role of people’s representatives must be valued and tapped, and their enthusiasm, initiative, and creativity in the supervisory activities of state power organs must be fully brought into play. As members of state power organs, the participation of people’s representatives directly determines the effectiveness of supervision by state power organs. In addition, as a bridge connecting the people with state organs such as the government, courts, and procuratorates, people’s representatives can promptly learn from the people about problems existing in the performance of duties by state organs such as the government, courts, and procuratorates, and then conduct targeted supervision over them, urging them to solve problems as soon as possible. Therefore, people’s representatives occupy an important position in the supervisory activities of state power organs, and their active role must be fully tapped and brought into play. In the process of implementing supervisory activities, the Vietnamese National Assembly encourages and supports National Assembly deputies to engage in dialogue, discussion, and debate with the subjects of supervision. For example, at the 7th and 8th sessions of the 14th National Assembly held in June and October 2019, as many as 230 and 250 National Assembly deputies submitted interpellations, accounting for half of the total number of National Assembly deputies. The Vietnamese National Assembly’s approach has greatly enhanced the democratic, open, and professional nature of supervisory activities. Our country’s people’s congress deputies can also play a greater role in supervisory activities, and better bring into play the enthusiasm, initiative, and creativity of people’s congress deputies in supervisory activities when conditions permit.

（一）要重视和挖掘人民代表的作用，充分发挥他们在国家权力机关监督活动中的积极性、主动性和创造性作为国家权力机关的组成人员，人民代表的参与状况将直接决定国家权力机关进行监督的效果。另外，作为沟通民众和政府、法院和检察院等国家机关的桥梁，人民代表能够通过民众及时了解政府、法院和检察院等国家机关在履行职责方面存在的问题，然后对它们进行有针对性的监督，促使它们尽快解决问题。因此，人民代表在国家权力机关监督活动中具有重要地位，要充分挖掘和发挥人民代表的能动作用。越南国会在实施监督活动过程中，鼓励和支持国会代表与监督对象进行对话、讨论和辩论等。例如，在2019年6月和10月召开的第十四届国会第七次和第八次会议上，提出质询的国会代表多达230人次和250人次，占国会代表总数的一半。越南国会的做法极大提高了监督活动的民主性、开放性和专业性。我国的人大代表也可以在监督活动中发挥更大的作用，在条件具备的情况下更好地发挥人大代表在监督活动中的积极性、主动性和创造性。

(II) Attention must be paid to and coordination and cooperation among various supervisory subjects and supervisory mechanisms must be strengthened, forming a “joint supervisory force”

（二）要注重和加强各种监督主体和监督机制之间的协同配合，形成“监督合力”

The interconnections among things make the entire world a dynamic and complex large system, within which the various elements are organically linked together, driving the realization of the system’s functions. The state power organ supervision system is an organic and open system composed of multiple relatively independent yet mutually influencing and interacting elements such as supervisory institutions, people’s representatives, and supervisory mechanisms. Therefore, the maximization of the supervisory function of the state power organ supervision system depends not only on relatively independent and diversified supervisory subjects and mechanisms but also on mutual coordination and cooperation among the various supervisory subjects and mechanisms. In the process of implementing supervisory activities, the Vietnamese National Assembly places great emphasis on coordination and cooperation among the various supervisory institutions of the National Assembly, National Assembly deputies, and supervisory mechanisms. For example, in the process of the National Assembly reviewing work reports, the work reports of relevant state organs must first be reviewed by the National Assembly’s Ethnic Council or relevant specialized committees, then reviewed by the National Assembly Standing Committee, and finally reviewed by the National Assembly. In addition, to communicate and coordinate supervisory work, a network for sharing supervisory information and resources has been established among the various specialized committees of the National Assembly. Currently, we should adhere to the principle of “both unified and divided, combining unification and division” to promote the reform of the supervision system of the National People’s Congress. On the one hand, the powers, responsibilities, and functional divisions among supervisory subjects such as the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and the various specialized committees must be clarified, avoiding situations such as duplicate supervision and gaps in supervision; on the other hand, collaborative governance and integrated interembedding among the various supervisory subjects must be strengthened, and organic interaction and coordinated cooperation among the various supervisory mechanisms must be enhanced, achieving complementary advantages and coordinated linkage among them, forming a normalized and multi-level supervisory network, and improving the supervisory effectiveness of the National People’s Congress.

事物之间的相互联系使整个世界成为一个动态复杂的大系统，系统内的各个要素有机联系在一起，推动着系统功能的实现。国家权力机关监督制度体系是由多个相对独立又相互影响和相互作用的监督机构、人民代表、监督机制等要素构成的一个有机和开放的系统。因此，国家权力机关监督制度体系监督功能的最大化实现，既离不开相对独立的多元化的监督主体和监督机制，也离不开各个监督主体和监督机制之间的相互协调和相互配合。越南国会在实施监督活动过程中，十分注重国会各种监督机构、国会代表、监督机制之间的协同配合。例如，在国会审议工作报告过程中，相关国家机关的工作报告须先经过国会民族委员会或者相关专门委员会的审核，再由国会常务委员会进行审议，最后由国会审议。另外，为了沟通和协调监督工作，国会各个专门委员会之间还建立了可以共享监督信息和资源的网络。当前，我们应该坚持“又统又分、统分结合”原则推动全国人民代表大会的监督制度改革工作。一方面，要明确全国人民代表大会常务委员会、各个专门委员会等监督主体之间的权责关系和职能分工，避免出现重复监督和漏监等情况；另一方面，要加强各个监督主体之间的协同共治和融合互嵌，加强各种监督机制之间的有机互动和协同配合，实现它们之间的优势互补和协同联动，形成常态化和多层次的监督网络，提高全国人大的监督效果。

(III) The supervisory system and mechanisms must be optimized and improved, so that the state power organ supervision system truly becomes a “sharp sword” for combating corruption

（三）要优化和完善监督体制机制，使国家权力机关监督制度真正成为打击贪污腐败的“利剑”

Based on its significant function in purifying the political ecosystem, the state power organ supervision system has become an important tool for socialist countries to prevent and combat corruption. Therefore, an authoritative and complete supervisory system and mechanism is an important guarantee for state power organs to improve the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts. In practice, state power organs should observe and summarize new changes in corruption phenomena in real time, and according to the stage-specific characteristics of corruption phenomena, promptly optimize and improve preventive mechanisms such as pre-review mechanisms and investigation mechanisms for preventing corruption, corrective mechanisms during the process such as supervisory mechanisms and criticism mechanisms, and punitive mechanisms after the fact such as accountability mechanisms and recall mechanisms, repairing loopholes and deficiencies in the supervisory system and mechanisms, thereby improving the procedural, standardized, and institutionalized level of state power organs in combating corruption. As mentioned earlier, in implementing supervisory activities, the Vietnamese National Assembly has continuously improved the National Assembly’s interpellation mechanism, thematic supervision mechanism, etc., and the National Assembly’s supervisory system and mechanisms have become increasingly scientific.

基于其在净化政治生态方面的显著功能，国家权力机关监督制度成为社会主义国家预防和打击贪污腐败的重要工具，因此，权威完善的监督体制机制是国家权力机关提高反腐成效的重要保障。在实践中，国家权力机关应实时观察和总结贪污腐败现象的新变化，根据贪污腐败现象的阶段性特点，随时优化和完善防范贪污腐败的事前审查机制和调查机制等预防机制，事中的督促机制和批评机制等纠偏机制，事后的追责机制和罢免机制等惩处机制，修补监督体制机制的漏洞和缺陷，从而提高国家权力机关打击贪污腐败的程序化、规范化和制度化水平。如前所述，越南国会在实施监督活动中，不断完善国会的质询机制、专题监督机制等，国会监督体制机制越来越科学化。

Currently, our country has provided comprehensive institutional guarantees for the National People’s Congress to combat corruption from the aspects of fundamental systems, basic systems, and important systems. However, in response to complex situations such as major and important cases and corruption cases where political and economic issues are intertwined, we need to, on the basis of leveraging institutional advantages, “build systems and mechanisms that simultaneously ensure that people dare not, cannot, and do not want to engage in corruption,” [9]9 This refers to a formulation from the 19th National Congress of the CPC (2017) and subsequent Party documents, aiming to build a comprehensive anti-corruption framework combining deterrence, prevention, and moral education. continue to improve the procedures and mechanisms for the operation of the National People’s Congress’s supervisory systems such as the interpellation system, the work report review system, and the punishment system, and ultimately enhance the effectiveness of the National People’s Congress supervision system in combating corruption.

当前，我国已从根本制度、基本制度和重要制度方面为全国人民代表大会打击贪污腐败提供了全面的制度保障，但针对大案要案、政治问题和经济问题交织的腐败案件等复杂情况，我们需要在发挥制度优势的基础上，“构建一体推进不敢腐、不能腐、不想腐体制机制”，继续完善全国人大的质询制度、审议工作报告制度、惩处制度等监督制度运行的程序和机制，最终提高全国人大监督制度在打击贪污腐败方面的效能。

In summary, after more than 30 years of reform, the supervisory effectiveness of the Vietnamese National Assembly has been increasingly improved, the National Assembly’s supervision system has become increasingly complete, and it has played an increasingly important role in preventing the spread of bourgeois liberalization trends, curbing corruption, implementing important resolutions and major strategic decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee and the state, as well as the spirit of important instructions and directives of the Party General Secretary. As fellow socialist countries, the main measures of the Vietnamese National Assembly’s supervision system reform are worthy of our consideration and study.

综上所述，经过30多年的改革，越南国会监督效果越来越好，国会监督制度越来越完善，在防止资产阶级自由化思潮蔓延、遏制贪污腐败、贯彻落实党中央和国家的重要决议和重大战略决策部署以及党的总书记的重要指示批示精神等方面发挥了越来越重要的作用。同为社会主义国家，越南国会监督制度改革的主要举措值得我们思考和研究。

(The author is a lecturer at the School of Marxism, Zhengzhou University)

（作者系郑州大学马克思主义学院讲师）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑:同心