The Idea of Totality

Since modern times, with the transformation of social development and the progress of knowledge, on the one hand, the system of social division of labor has become increasingly refined, and the advancement of knowledge has grown ever more specialized; on the other hand, within this division of labor and the specialization of knowledge, the totality of society and the totalizing picture of the world seem to have become increasingly blurred. It is precisely in this context that philosophy, on the one hand, always seeks to lay a legitimate foundation for this transformation and development, establishing the premises and basis for existence of the new history; on the other hand, it strives to rediscover a totality for this fragmented world, delineating the overall picture of social life and the genealogy of knowledge. An important aspect of the theoretical impulse of the young Lukács was his disappointment with the fragmented world and his pursuit of totality; Korsch returned to the inner connection between Marx’s philosophy, political economy, and scientific socialism, endeavoring to reinterpret Marx’s philosophy; Gramsci, for his part, made totality a key determination of his theory of hegemony. All of them took totality as an important entry point for reinterpreting Marx’s philosophy, thereby breaking with the research tradition of the Second International era, forging new lines of inquiry, and exerting a tremendous influence on later generations.

自近代以来，随着社会发展的转型和知识的进步，一方面，社会分工体系日益精细，知识的进展日益专业化；另一方面，在这种分工体系和知识的专业化中，社会的总体性以及世界的总体化图景，似乎日益模糊起来。正是在这样的情境中，哲学一方面总想为这种转型和发展奠定合法性的基础，确立新历史的前提和存在依据；另一方面又想为这个分离的世界重新寻找一种总体性，刻画社会生活的总体图景和知识谱系。青年卢卡奇的理论冲动，一个重要的方面就是对碎片化世界的失望和对总体性的追寻；柯尔施则重新回到马克思的哲学、政治经济学与科学社会主义的内在联系，力图重新理解马克思的哲学；葛兰西则将总体性作为领导权理论的重要规定性。他们都以总体性为重要入口来重新理解马克思的哲学，从而实现了与第二国际时代的研究传统的分离，形成了新的研究思路，对后来者产生了巨大的影响。

I. Totality: From Hegel to Marx

一、总体性：从黑格尔到马克思

“Free thought takes nothing for granted; its basis is not the authority of this or that, but the self-determination of the concept.” This means that the premises of any philosophy must be reflected upon. In his essay “With What Must the Science Begin?”, Hegel discusses this issue in greater detail. In his view, philosophical thinking must have a beginning or starting point; this beginning must be absolute, presupposing nothing, and is itself the ground of all science. But to avoid falling into dogmatism, this beginning or starting point must also be a proven endpoint; in this sense, the starting point and the endpoint form a circle. “What is essential for science is not so much that a pure immediate is the beginning, but that the whole of science is in itself a circle, in which the first is also the last and the last is also the first.” As a science, philosophy itself constitutes a totality. In the discussion of the three attitudes of thought toward objectivity in the *Encyclopedia Logic*, Hegel further articulates a philosophical theory of totality: First, philosophy should not internally divide itself into mutually unrelated regions; the continuity from starting point to endpoint means that, whatever different moments philosophical thinking passes through, these moments are interconnected and inseparable. Second, the objectivity of philosophical thought is embodied not only in the objective logic of thought itself but also in the grasp of things themselves; this implies an inner communication and coordination between thought and things. Proceeding from this idea, Hegel criticizes Kant’s practice of drawing an insurmountable gulf between the thing-in-itself and thought. In Kant’s demarcation, he emphasizes the universality and necessity of thought, distinguishing it from the contingency and particularity of sensation, thereby bringing about a split in philosophical thought. This split turns the thing-in-itself into an empty, negative existence. “The thing-in-itself (and here ‘thing’ includes spirit and God as well) expresses an abstract object — to abstract from an object all its connections with consciousness, all sense impressions, and all determinate thoughts yields the concept of the thing-in-itself. It is easy to see that what remains is merely an extreme abstraction, something completely empty, which can only be regarded as a beyond that negates representation, sensation, and determinate thinking. And it is equally simple to see that this leftover dross or corpse is still merely a product of thought, merely the empty self or the product of a constantly advancing abstract thought.” Third, philosophy implies a conception of totality, which is embodied not only in thinking but also in the identity of thinking and reality. The owl of Minerva takes flight only at dusk, thereby achieving a totalizing examination of spirit. In this process, pure thought itself is fluid; this movement of pure essentiality, “insofar as it concerns the connection of its content, is the necessary developmental movement of the expansion of its content into an organic whole. Through this movement, the path that leads to the concept of knowledge also becomes a necessarily complete path of formation.” Spirit, by externalizing itself into otherness and then returning to itself from otherness, reveals truth in this totality.

“自由的思想就是不接受未经考察过的前提的思想。”这意味着，任何哲学的前提都需要加以反思。在《必须用什么作为科学的开端?》一文中，黑格尔更为详细地讨论了这一问题。在他看来，哲学思考，必须有个开端或起点，这个开端必须是绝对的，不以任何东西为前提，它本身是全部科学的根据。但为了避免陷入独断主义，这个开端或起点又必须是作为论证过的终点，在这个意义上，起点和端点构成了一个圆圈。“对于科学说来，重要的东西倒并不很在乎一个纯粹的直接物作开端，而在乎科学的整体本身是一个圆圈，在这个圆圈中，最初的也将是最后的东西，最后的也将是最初的东西。”作为科学的哲学，它本身构成了一个总体。在《小逻辑》中关于思想对客观性的三种态度的讨论中，黑格尔进一步表达了一种总体性的哲学理论：第一，哲学不应该从内部将自己区分为互不相关的区域，从起点到终点的连续性，意味着不管哲学的思考经历了何种不同的环节，这些环节之间是相互联系不可分割的。第二，哲学思想的客观性，不仅体现为思想本身的客观逻辑，而且是对事物自身的把握，这意味着思想与事物之间的内在沟通与协调。从这一理念出发，黑格尔批评了康德在物自体与思想之间划出一条不可逾越的鸿沟的做法。在康德的这一界划中，他强调的是思想的普遍性和必然性，以区别于感觉的偶然性和特殊性的东西，从而带来了哲学思想的分裂。这种分裂使得物自体成为一个空洞的否定性存在。“物自体(这里所谓‘物’也包含精神和上帝在内)表示一种抽象的对象。——从一个对象抽出它对意识的一切联系、一切感觉印象，以及一切特定的思想，就得到物自体的概念。很容易看出，这里所剩余的只是一个极端抽象，完全空虚的东西，只可以认作否定了表象、感觉、特定思维等等的彼岸世界。而且同样简单地可以看到，这剩余的渣滓或僵尸，仍不过只是思想的产物，只是空虚的自我或不断趋向纯粹抽象思维的产物。”第三，哲学意味着一种总体性的观念，这种总体性不仅体现在思维上，而且体现在思维与现实的同一性上。密涅瓦的猫头鹰总在黄昏的时候才起飞，从而实现对精神的总体性考察。在这个过程中，纯粹思想本身是流动的，纯粹本质性的这种运动，“就其为它的内容的关联来看，乃是它的内容扩张为一个有机的整体的必然的发展运动。由于这种运动，到达知识的概念的那条道路也同样成了一条必然的完全的形成道路。”精神通过外化为他物，再从他物回归自身，真理就在这种总体性中呈现出来。

Under this overarching idea, Hegel, taking the development of the concept as an example, further discusses the problem of totality at different moments. From the perspective of the developmental process of spirit, it passes through the stages of sense-certainty, understanding, and reason; these constitute different moments of the totality of spirit. At these three different stages of development — sense-certainty, understanding, and reason — each has its own totality, each passing through the three moments of immediate identity, distinction, and then dialectical unity. For instance, in the discussion of self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel confirms the formation of self-consciousness through labor: in the labor process, the slave, on the one hand, accepts the master’s consciousness out of fear, and on the other hand, through his own formative labor, feels his own consciousness in the process of objectification; only through this double reception can genuine self-consciousness be formed. This kind of self-consciousness is, in the final analysis, an intersubjectivity — that is, self-consciousness contains the recognition and acknowledgment of the consciousness of others and of one’s own consciousness. This is a thinking, free self-consciousness; in thinking, although the object appears as an object that is in-itself and distinct from consciousness, it is in fact not different from consciousness; it is grasped in the form of the concept. This means that in thinking I am free, because the self is no longer in an external object but in itself. When this freedom is elevated to the level of caprice, it implies a Stoic freedom, a freedom that “maintains a lifeless stillness, which constantly withdraws from the movement of existence, from the activity of influencing others and being influenced, back into the simple reality of thought.” This freedom is merely freedom in thought, only the concept of freedom, without living content, divorced from the multiplicity of things. When this freedom acquires content, since it itself has no content, this content can only be given; when what is implicit in the Stoic concept is realized, skepticism arises. What in the pure thinking of self-consciousness was merely abstract, differentiated things becomes here differentiated real things; when the formerly free self-consciousness feels itself to be free, it will feel things external to itself; at this point, freedom must be a freedom that can experience itself in the flux of things. But once it deals with present things, the original pure thinking will feel itself to be an accidental, individual consciousness; here consciousness falls into a state of vacillation: on the one hand, it holds that external individual things or all differentiated things are to be negated wholesale; on the other hand, it easily falls into individual consciousness. At this point, when you point out the identity of things, this skeptical self-consciousness will emphasize non-identity; when you emphasize the non-identity of things, it will instead point out that things are identical. “In Stoicism, self-consciousness is the simple freedom of itself. In Skepticism, freedom is realized; self-consciousness negates the other side, namely, determinate finite existence, but precisely thereby it doubles itself, and itself now becomes a two-sided thing.” Thus arises the unhappy consciousness. The development of this divided, unhappy consciousness ultimately leads to the unity of self-consciousness in its being-in-itself and being-for-itself, so that consciousness becomes certain that in its individuality it is in absolute being-in-itself; thus consciousness returns to itself once again. This is, of course, not a simple repetition but a return after passing through many mediations, forming a small cycle in the development of self-consciousness. This also shows that, in its developmental process, self-consciousness constructs itself as a total existence.

在这一大的理念下，黑格尔以概念发展为例，进一步讨论了不同环节的总体性问题。从精神的发展过程来看，经历着从感性、知性到理性的过程，它们构成了精神总体性的不同环节。在感性、知性与理性这三个不同发展阶段，又有着各自的总体性，都经历着从直接同一性、区别、再到辩证的统一这三个环节。比如在《精神现象学》中讨论到自我意识时，黑格尔通过劳动确证了自我意识的形成，即在劳动过程中，奴隶一方面由于恐惧而接受了主人的意识，另一方面通过自己的陶冶事物的劳动，在对象化过程中感受到了自己的意识，在这样一种双重接受中，才可能形成真正的自我意识。这样一种自我意识，说到底是一种交互的主体性，即自我意识中包含着对他人意识和对自身意识的认可与承认。这是一种能思维的自由的自我意识，在思维中虽然对象看起来是以异于意识的自在存在的身份作为对象，但实际上与意识没有差别，它以概念的方式被把握，这意味着，在思维中我是自由的，因为自我不再处于外在的对象中，而是在自身中。把这样一种自由上升到一种任性的层面时，这就意味着一种斯多葛主义的自由，这种自由“保持一种没有生命的宁静，这种没有生命的宁静使它经常脱离生存的运动、脱离影响他人与接受影响的活动而退回到单纯的思想实在性之中。”这种自由只是单纯思想中的自由，还只是自由的概念，而没有活生生的内容，脱离了事物的多样性。当这种自由具有内容时，由于它自身没有内容，这种内容就只能是被给予的，当斯多葛主义的概念中的东西实现时，就产生了怀疑主义。在自我意识的纯粹思维中仅仅是有差别的抽象的事物，在这里成为有差别的现实事物，当原先那个自由的自我意识感到自己是自由时，他会感受到外在于自身的事物，这时的自由就必须是在事物的变化之流中能够经验到自身的自由，而一旦与现在的事物打交道时，原来那纯粹的思维就会感到自己是一种偶然的个别的意识，在这里意识陷入到一种摇摆不定的状态：一方面认为外在的个别事物或一切有差别的所有事物是要全盘否定的，另一方面又易陷入到个别的意识中。在这时，当你指出事物的同一性，这种怀疑的自我意识就会强调不同一性，当你强调事物的非同一性时，它反而会指出事物是同一的。“在斯多葛主义里，自我意识是单纯的自身自由。在怀疑主义里，自由得到了实现，自我意识否定了另一方面即确定的有限存在这一面，但是这正所以双重化自身，而它自身现在就成为两面的东西。”从而形成苦恼意识。这种分裂的苦恼意识的发展，最终达到自我意识的自在与自为的统一，使意识确信在其个别里就是在绝对自在的存在中，这样意识再次返回到自身。当然这不是简单的重复，而是经历了诸多中介后的回归，形成了自我意识发展的一个小循环。这也表明，自我意识在其发展过程中将自身建构为一个总体性的存在。

Although Marx repeatedly criticized Hegel’s philosophy, the idea of totality within Hegel’s philosophy was carried forward and became an important feature of his critique of capitalist society. In the *Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx distinguishes between a method that proceeds from concrete reality and one that proceeds from the totality. In classical political economy, they start from concrete reality, such as population, which appears to be realistic and feasible. But Marx points out: if “we were to leave out the classes of which the population consists, population would be an abstraction. If I do not know, e.g., the factors on which classes depend, such as wage-labour, capital, etc., classes are an empty phrase.” Therefore, population is an aggregate number; a population counted up like so many potatoes appears concrete but is actually abstract, because it fails entirely to reveal the differences among different people within the social structure. The determinations abstracted from this kind of reality cannot achieve an understanding of the concrete. “The concrete is concrete because it is the synthesis of many determinations, hence the unity of diversity.” Combining Marx’s relevant discussions, we can see: first, social existence and social life constitute a totality, and any element within social existence can be understood only when placed within this totality. On the surface, population is a real existence, but if population is not placed within a specific structure of social relations, it cannot truly reflect the composition of population across different strata and becomes merely statistical data. Second, the totality is mediated. Hegel strongly emphasizes that the totality is a mediated totality; the moments of reason’s unfolding constitute reason’s self-mediation. Marx likewise emphasizes this: any concrete existence is the unity of numerous determinations, the unity of diversity, and an existence in relation to other things. Third, social existence as a totality has a dominant relational structure; in capitalist society, this is capital. It is precisely this dominant relational structure that draws everything into a constantly churning vortex, forming a total existence. Here, Marx’s idea of totality not only reveals the state of social construction under the logic of capital but also points the way for critiquing capitalist society: only when the totality of capital is criticized can the state of existence of concrete beings be truly seen clearly.

马克思虽然对黑格尔哲学进行了多次批判，但黑格尔哲学中的这种总体性思想却被继续下来，并成为他批判资本主义社会的一个重要特征。在《〈政治经济学批判〉导言》中，马克思区分了从具体的实在出发与从总体出发的研究方法。在古典政治经济学那里，他们从具体的实在如人口开始，看起来是合乎实际的，也是切实可行的。但马克思指出：如果“抛开构成人口的阶级，人口就是一个抽象。如果我不知道这些阶级所依据的因素，如雇佣劳动、资本等等，阶级又是一句空话”。因此，人口是一个集合数，一个个像数土豆那样加起来的人口，看来是具体的，但实际上是抽象的，因为这里根本看不出不同人在社会结构中的差别，从这种实在出发抽象出来的规定，是无法达到对具体的理解的。“具体之所以具体，因为它是许多规定的综合，因而是多样性的统一。”结合马克思的相关讨论可以看出：第一，社会存在与社会生活是一个总体，社会存在中的任何一个要素，都只有置于这个总体性中才能得到理解。表面看来，人口是一个真实的存在，但人口如果不置于特定的社会关系结构中，就不能真正地反映出不同阶层的人口构成情况，只会变成统计学意义上的数据。第二，总体是有中介的。黑格尔非常强调总体是有中介的总体，理性展开的环节就构成理性的自我中介。马克思同样强调这一点，任何一个具体的存在，都是众多规定性的统一，是多样性的统一，都是与他物的关系中的存在。第三，作为总体的社会存在，有着一个主导性的关系结构，在资本主义社会，这就是资本。正是这一主导性的关系结构，才将一切都拉到一个不断搅动的旋涡中，形成一个总体性的存在。在这里，马克思的总体性思想不仅揭示出资本逻辑的社会建构状态，同时也为批判资本主义社会指出了方向，即只有在对资本总体性进行批判时，才能真实地看清具体存在物的存在状态。

But this does not mean that Marx’s idea of totality is no different from Hegel’s. First, for Hegel, the totality is a totality of spirit’s self-differentiation, self-deepening, and self-synthesis; this is thought’s understanding and grasp of the concrete. For Marx, social life itself manifests as a constantly developing and changing totality. Since the emergence of capitalist society, it has manifested as a transformation from local history into world history; hence the foundation of the totality is social existence, and the movement of categories is the intellectual expression of the production and reproduction process of real life. Society is both the field in which this production behavior occurs and the result of this behavior. Second, the conceptual totality is a reproduction of the totality of reality itself, a product of the thinking mind; this is the method by which thought grasps the world. The developmental process of the totality of thought is consistent with the developmental process of reality itself. Marx uses the category of “labor” as an example to illustrate this feature of concepts. The category of labor in classical political economy underwent a developmental process from mercantilism, through the physiocrats, to Smith. When Smith proposed the labor theory of value, this was likewise a total perspective on social life; in this perspective, Smith saw the integrative significance of industrial production for social life. Third, within the totality of capitalist society, what truly occupies the dominant position is capital and its logic of operation. Marx holds that in all social forms, there is one relation of production that determines the other relations of production and occupies a dominant and leading position. In capitalist society, what occupies this dominant and leading position is capital; it is like a special ether. Only by starting from capital can any concrete form of existence, such as agriculture and ground-rent, be understood. Hegel once discussed the starting point and endpoint of philosophy and unified the two. Inverted, within the totality of capitalist social existence, capital is the true starting point and endpoint. Fourth, although both emphasize totality, there is a fundamental difference in the theoretical aims of Marx and Hegel. Hegel’s totality, in the sense of social history, points to a totality of the relationship between capital and reason, regarding reason as a restrictive force capable of restraining the malignant development of capital; this is the practical orientation of his philosophical idea of totality. In Marx, however, there are irreconcilable fissures within the totality of capitalist society. On the level of general social structure, Marx describes this through the contradiction between productive forces and relations of production; in capitalist society, Marx describes it through contradictions in commodity production and exchange, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, etc., to demonstrate the transitory nature of capitalist society. Marx does not believe that capitalist society can repair itself, nor can it be reconciled by the power of reason. This is the fundamental difference between him and Hegel.

但这并不意味着马克思的总体性思想与黑格尔并无区别。第一，对于黑格尔来说，总体是精神自我区分、自我深化与自我综合的总体，这是思维对具体的理解与把握。对于马克思来说，社会生活本身表现为一个不断发展变化的总体，自资本主义社会产生之后，就表现为从地方性历史向世界性历史的转变，因而总体的根基是社会存在，范畴的运动是现实生活的生产与再生产过程在思想上的表现，社会既是这种生产行为得以发生的场域，也是这一行为的结果。第二，概念的总体性是对现实本身的总体性的再现，是思维着的头脑的产物，这是思维用来把握世界的方法。思维的总体性的发展过程，与现实本身的发展过程相一致。马克思以“劳动”范畴为例来说明概念的这一特征。作为古典政治经济学的劳动范畴，经历了自重商主义、重农学派再到斯密的发展过程，当斯密提出劳动价值论时，这同样是对社会生活的总体性透视，在这种透视中，斯密看到了工业生产对社会生活的整合性意义。第三，在资本主义社会的总体性中，真正占据主导地位的是资本及其运行逻辑。马克思认为，在一切社会形式中，都有一种生产关系决定着其他生产关系，处于支配和主导地位。在资本主义社会中，处于这种支配和主导地位的就是资本，它就像一种特殊的以太一样，只有从资本出发，才能理解任何一种具体的存在形式，如农业和地租。黑格尔曾讨论哲学的起点和终点，并将两者统一起来。颠倒过来看，资本主义社会存在的总体性中，资本才是真正的起点和终点。第四，虽然都强调总体性，但马克思与黑格尔的理论旨趣存在着根本的差别。黑格尔的总体性，从社会历史的意义上来说，指向的是资本与理性关系的总体性，将理性看作是能够制约资本恶性发展的限制性力量，这是其哲学总体性理念的现实指向。而在马克思那里，资本主义社会的总体性内部存在着无法弥合的裂缝，马克思从一般社会结构层面，曾以生产力与生产关系的矛盾来描述；在资本主义社会，马克思以商品生产与交换的矛盾、资本利润率递减的趋势等来描述，以展现资本主义社会的暂时性。马克思并不认为资本主义社会是能够自我修复的，更不能以理性的力量来进行调和。这是他和黑格尔的根本区别。

This idea of totality in Marx is an important concept and method for his study of the logic of capital, but in the direct presentation of his texts, the contradictory movement of social relations and the operation of capital and its internal contradictions become the explicit content. This is what traditional researchers have been most concerned with, while the idea of totality in Marx’s philosophy has not received genuine attention. Among Marxists of the Second International era, an excessive focus on the thinking of the contradictory movement between productive forces and relations of production caused the critical implications of the idea of totality in Marx’s philosophy to disappear. It was precisely in seeing this problem that Lukács’s *History and Class Consciousness* brought Marx’s idea of totality to light once again.

马克思的这一总体性思想是他研究资本逻辑的重要理念和方法，但在其文本的直接呈现中，社会关系的矛盾运动与资本的运行及其内在矛盾成为显性的内容，这是传统研究者最为关心的内容，马克思哲学中的总体性思想并没有得到真正的重视。在第二国际时代的马克思主义者那里，过于关注生产力与生产关系矛盾运动的思维，使得马克思哲学中总体性思想的批判意蕴消失不见了，正是看到这个问题，卢卡奇的《历史与阶级意识》使马克思的总体性思想再次呈现出来。

II. Lukács and the Restoration of the Idea of Totality in Marx’s Philosophy

二、卢卡奇与马克思哲学总体性思想的恢复

In the history of Marxist philosophy since the Second International, Lukács was the first to propose the concept of rethinking Marxist philosophy through totality, thereby opening up a line of thought different from the orthodox research of the time and forming a research tradition in Western Marxist philosophy.

在第二国际以来的马克思主义哲学发展史上，卢卡奇率先提出了以总体性来重新思考马克思主义哲学的理念，从而开启了与当时正统研究不同的思路，形成了国外马克思主义哲学的研究传统。

The young Lukács was initially deeply influenced by neo-Kantianism and completed the book *Soul and Form*. In this book, the young Lukács put forward a pessimistic philosophy of the existential predicament of modern people: in modern society, people are in a state of fragmentation; not only are they abandoned by God, but their very existence and soul are also in a state of division. At this time, Lukács sought, through literary and artistic criticism, to give new form to life and return to the eternal value of life.

青年卢卡奇一开始深受新康德主义影响，完成了《心灵与形式》一书。在这本书中，青年卢卡奇提出了一种现代人生存困境的悲观哲学，即在现代社会，人处于分裂状态，人不仅被上帝所抛弃，人本身的生存与灵魂也处于分裂之中。此时的卢卡奇想通过文艺批评的方式，对生活重新赋形，重回生命的永恒价值。

With the progression of his thought, in *The Theory of the Novel*, Lukács turned from neo-Kantianism to Hegel. Although he confronted the same theme—the fragmentation of the world and of existence—Lukács’s solution manifested a different dimension. Lukács took ancient Greece as a cultural model, considering it an age of plenitude, an age in which the individual and the world were in a state of total interconnection. “It is a homogeneous world, and even the separation between man and world, between I and you, does not disturb its homogeneity. Like every other part of this harmony, the soul stands at the center of the world.” [6]6 Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), 29. This is a life of completeness: “The completeness of this sphere constituted the transcendental nature of their lives, whereas for us this sphere has been breached; we can no longer breathe in a complete world.” [7]7 Ibid., 31. Modern society is a society that has stepped out of transcendental completeness. If ancient Greece was a world of plenitude, then modern society is a world that constantly extends into the distance, where man is forever on a road without end. In this new world, man has many forms of invention and creation, a mode of life that constantly breaks through boundaries, an external world that can be infinitely explored, and a rich variety of life forms. “Yet this very richness cancels the basic and positive meaning of its existence: totality.” [8]8 Ibid., 34. While also emphasizing the fission of life, unlike *Soul and Form*, Lukács here expresses the giving of form to life through the idea of totality, rather than through a purely formal concept.

随着思想的进展，在《小说理论》中，卢卡奇从新康德主义转向了黑格尔。虽然面对的是同样的主题，即世界与生存的破碎化问题，但卢卡奇的解决方案却体现出不同的维度。卢卡奇以古希腊作为文化范本，认为这是一个圆满的时代，一个个体与世界处于总体关联的时代。“这是一个同质的世界，而且，即使把人和世界、我和你分离开来，也不会妨碍其同质性。如同这一和谐的每一其他部分一样，心灵处于世界的中心”。这是一种完整性的生活，“这个领域的完整性构成了他们生活的先验本性，而对我们来说这个领域已被突破了；我们再也不会在一个完整的世界里呼吸了。”现代社会是一个走出先验完整性的社会，如果说古希腊是一个圆满的世界，那么现代社会则是一个不断延伸到远方的世界，人永远处在没有终点的路上。在这个新世界里，人有很多形式的发明与创造，有着不断突破边界的生活模式，有着可以无限探索的外部世界，有着丰富多彩的生活形式，“然而，这种丰富多彩却扬弃了它生存的基本的和积极的意义：总体。”同样是强调生活的裂变，但与《心灵与形式》不同的是，卢卡奇将生活的赋形以总体性这个理念表达出来，而不是纯粹的形式概念。

In *The Theory of the Novel*, Lukács’s idea of totality is mainly embodied in the following: First, totality means that what exists within itself is complete. Lukács’s imagination of ancient Greek culture belongs to this content; in his view, in the ancient Greek era, man and the external world were fused into one, constituting a complete world. Second, totality is the fundamental reality of every individual phenomenon. Everything develops within the totality toward its own perfect form and realizes its connection with the totality. Third, the reason totality is totality is that everything occurs within it. This totality of ancient Greek culture, oriented toward the unity of the human soul and the world, has in the depths of the human soul neither interior nor exterior; it neither loses itself nor thinks of seeking itself. Fourth, totality is an existence tending toward perfection. “The totality of existence is possible only where everything is already homogeneous before it is encompassed by forms; where forms are not a constraint but only a conscious expression, only the surfacing of what in the interior of what is to be given form was latent as a vague longing; where knowledge is virtue and virtue is happiness; where beauty makes the meaning of the world visible.” [9]9 Ibid., 34. Although these discussions of Lukács bear the character of a cultural utopia, the longing for a beautiful totality and the critique of fragmented life became the driving force of his philosophical reflection at this time. Such an idea of totality became, in *History and Class Consciousness*, the entry point for Lukács’s re-understanding of Marx’s philosophy.

在《小说理论》中，卢卡奇的总体性思想主要体现为：第一，总体性意味着存在于它自身之内的东西是完整的。卢卡奇关于古希腊文化的想象就属于这一内容，在他看来，古希腊时代人和外部世界浑然一体，构成了一个完整的世界。第二，总体性是每个个别现象的根本实在。一切东西都在总体内部向着自身的完美形式发展起来，并实现着与总体的联系。第三，总体之所以为总体，是因为一切都发生在其内部。古希腊文化的这种总体性，以人的心灵与世界的一体为取向，在人的心灵深处，既没有内部，也没有外部，既不会迷失自我，也不会想到要去寻找自我。第四，总体性是趋向完美的存在。“只有在一切东西被诸形式包容进去之前就已经是同质的地方，只有在诸形式不是一种强制而只是有所意识，只是万物(它们在应被赋形者的内部作为模糊的渴望尚未显示出来)趋向表面的地方，只有在知识就是美德、美德就是幸福的地方，只有在美使世界的意义变得显而易见的地方，存在的总体才是可能的。”虽然卢卡奇的这些讨论具有文化乌托邦的性质，但对美好总体性的向往，对碎片化生活的批判，成为他此时哲学思考的冲动力。这样一种总体性的理念，在《历史与阶级意识》中成为卢卡奇重新理解马克思哲学的切入点。

In the essay “What Is Orthodox Marxism?”, Lukács points out: “Let us assume for the sake of argument that recent research had disproved once and for all every one of Marx’s individual theses. Even if this were to be proved, every ‘orthodox’ Marxist would still be able to accept all such modern findings without reservation and hence dismiss all of Marx’s theses in toto—without having to renounce his Marxist orthodoxy for a single moment. Orthodox Marxism, therefore, does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx’s investigations… On the contrary, the orthodox in matters of Marxism refers exclusively to method. It is the scientific conviction that dialectical Marxism is the correct method of investigation; that this method can only be developed, expanded and deepened in the direction laid down by its founders.” [10]10 Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), 1. Here, Lukács indicates that orthodox Marxism actually grasps the soul and essence of Marx’s thought, namely the dialectical method. How is the dialectical method to be understood? At this time, Lukács had not yet seen the *Grundrisse* (1857–1858), but his line of argument is very similar to Marx’s introduction on method in the “Introduction” to the *Grundrisse*. [11]11 The “Introduction” refers to the 1857 “Introduction” to Marx’s *Grundrisse*, where Marx discusses the method of political economy, including the relation between the abstract and the concrete. Lukács likewise starts from the then-popular empirical, positivist method, but he then points out that this method, which appears to grasp pure facts, is not scientific, because any empirical fact does not exist in isolation but exists within a specific objective structure; in capitalist society, these facts are existences within the structure of capitalist society. “Only when the core of existence stands revealed as a social process can existence be seen as the product, albeit the hitherto unconscious product, of human activity. This activity, in its turn, appears as the element that is decisive for the ultimate form of the object. Only in this context, which sees the isolated facts of social life as aspects of the historical process and integrates them into a totality, can knowledge of facts hope to become knowledge of reality.” [12]12 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, 8. Here it can be seen that Lukács considers the method of totality to be the fundamental method in Marx’s dialectics, and this is also the methodological basis for his critical examination of the reified society of capitalism.

在《什么是正统的马克思主义?》一文中，卢卡奇指出：“我们姑且假定新的研究完全驳倒了马克思的每一个个别的论点。即使这点得到证明，每个严肃的‘正统’马克思主义者仍然可以毫无保留地接受所有这种新结论，放弃马克思的全部所有论点，而无须片刻放弃他的马克思主义正统。所以，正统马克思主义并不意味着毫无批判地接受马克思研究的成果……恰恰相反，马克思主义问题中的正统仅仅是指方法。它是这样一种科学的信念，即辩证的马克思主义是正确的研究方法，这种方法只能按其创始人奠定的方向发展、扩大和深化。”在这里，卢卡奇指出，正统的马克思主义实际上抓住的是马克思思想的灵魂与精髓，即辩证的方法。怎么理解辩证的方法呢?此时的卢卡奇并没有看到《1857—1858年经济学手稿》,但其论证思路与“导言”中马克思关于研究方法的导论是非常相似的。卢卡奇同样从当时流行的那种实证的、经验的方法入手，但他接着指出，这种看似掌握了纯粹事实的方法并不是科学的，因为任何经验的事实并不是孤立的存在，而是特定的客观结构中的存在，在资本主义社会，这些事实就是资本主义社会结构中的存在。“只有在这种把社会生活中的孤立事实作为历史发展的环节并把它归结为一个总体的情况下，对事实的认识才能成为对现实的认识。”)在这里可以看到，卢卡奇认为，总体的方法才是马克思辩证法中的根本方法，这也是他批判考察资本主义物化社会的方法论基础。

In *History and Class Consciousness*, totality has two meanings: first, totality as methodology. Lukács regards totality as the core of the dialectical method. From the perspective of totality, things are interconnected with one another, mutually mediating, constituting a totality with internal relations. This means that concrete research is to study social relations as a whole; this is not only reflected in the relational constitution at the level of social existence, but also means that people’s consciousness and existence together constitute a total connection. However, this does not mean that any elements within the totality are undifferentiatedly identical; on the contrary, the relations among them are dynamic, developing dialectical relations. Any concrete total society is not only a static structure but also a historical process of change. In this process, there is a dominant factor that plays a unifying role over the totality. For example, in capitalist society, this dominant factor is capital. The perspective of totality became the basic principle of Lukács’s investigation of problems.

在《历史与阶级意识》中，总体性具有两方面的含义：一是作为方法论的总体性。卢卡奇将总体性看作是辩证方法的核心。在总体性的视野中，事物与事物之间相互联系，互为中介，它们构成具有内在关系的总体。这意味着，具体的研究就是要研究作为整体的社会关系，这不仅体现在社会存在层面的关系构成，而且意味着人们的意识与存在之间同样构成一种总体性的关联。但这并不是说在总体之内的任何要素之间是无差别的同一性，相反，它们之间的关系是一种动态的、发展的辩证关系，任何一个具体总体的社会不仅是一个静态的结构，而且是一个历史性的变化过程。在这个过程中，存在着一种主导性的因素，起着统摄总体的作用。比如在资本主义社会，这种主导性的因素就是资本。总体性视野成为卢卡奇考察问题的基本原则。

The other meaning of totality is embodied as the ideal state of social existence. On this point, Lukács continued his earlier thought. Starting from the ideal totality, present social life is non-total; this non-totality is mainly manifested in two aspects: the reified and fragmented reality of existence, and the antinomies in thought and ideas driven by this reification and fragmentation.

总体性的另一种含义则体现为社会存在的理想状态，在这一点，卢卡奇延续了早期的思想。从理想的总体性出发，当下的社会生活就是非总体性的，这种非总体性主要体现在两个方面：即物化和碎片化的现实存在，以及由这种物化和碎片化推动的思想观念上的二律背反。

In *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukács’s discussion of reification is undoubtedly a brilliant chapter, often compared with the young Marx’s discussion of alienation. Lukács’s critique of reification focuses on two levels. First, starting from Marx’s *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* and *Capital*, he points out that relations between people in society degenerate into relations between things. In *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx had already stated: “A social relation of production appears as something existing outside individuals, and the definite relations that occur in the production process of these individuals’ social life appear as the specific properties of a thing; this inversion, this mystification that is not imaginary but prosaically real, characterizes all social forms of labor that produce exchange value.” [13]13 Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 29, p. 290. [Translator’s note: The Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English edition.] Here Marx points out the reified character of the era of generalized commodity production and exchange in capitalist society, a reification that in *Capital* is directly expressed as commodity fetishism. Lukács cites Marx’s discussion of commodity fetishism in *Capital*, and absorbs Simmel’s critique of social reification as well as Weber’s discussion of rationalization, pointing out that “this rational objectification conceals above all the immediate—qualitative and material—thing-character of all things. When use values appear universally as commodities, they acquire a new objectivity, a new thing-character—which they do not possess in the era of their merely occasional exchange, and which destroys their original, genuine thing-character.” [14]14 Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), p. 92. [Translator’s note: The Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English edition.] Here Lukács distinguishes two kinds of thing-character: one is the original thing-character of things, the other is the thing-character of things after they become commodities—a new thing-character. It is this latter thing-character that constitutes the core of present-day social relations, and reification also occurs at this level. In commodity fetishism, Marx mainly reveals how the society of people is inverted and appears as a relation between things; Lukács, for his part, further reveals the specific features of reification, such as rationalization, calculability, and the resulting mental enslavement to things. It is precisely because of rationalization and calculability that social existence and human existence are decomposed into manipulable, quantifiable existences—a way of fragmenting the total picture. Second, because of the reification and fragmentation of social existence and the mode of human existence, the total picture disappears. Therefore, returning to totality becomes the inner pursuit of modern philosophy, especially the development of classical German philosophy. Modern philosophy arises from the reified structure of consciousness, and antinomies are an important expression of this reified consciousness. Kantian philosophy holds that the relation between cognition and the object is oriented toward whether the object conforms to cognition, rather than, as previously thought, taking the object as the standard. This is the philosophical reversal marked by Kant’s Copernican Revolution. Hence, the cognition of the rational subject becomes the core content of philosophy; the world we cognize should be the product and object of reason. Of course, Kant did not push this to the extreme; he posited the thing-in-itself as the limit of reason, so that reason can only cognize the phenomenal world, while the thing-in-itself is beyond reason’s grasp. On this, Lukács explains that the thing-in-itself is like Smith’s “invisible hand”—a world that philosophy at that time could not reach. Thus the world is split into a knowable world and an unknowable world; totality is in this sense split, and this split is also something Kantian philosophy cannot mend.

在《历史与阶级意识》中，卢卡奇对物化的讨论无疑是非常精彩的一章，人们常将之与青年马克思关于异化的讨论相比较。卢卡奇的物化批判主要集中在两个层面：第一，他从马克思的《政治经济学批判》和《资本论》出发，指出人与人在社会中的关系蜕化为物的关系。在《政治经济学批判》中，马克思就曾指出：“一种社会生产关系表现为一个存在于个人之外的物，这些个人的社会生活的生产过程中所发生的一定关系表现为一个物品的特有属性，这种颠倒，这种不是想象的而是平凡实在的神秘化，是生产交换价值的劳动的一切社会形式的特点。”在这里马克思指出了资本主义社会商品生产与交换普遍化时代的物化特征，这种物化在《资本论》中则直接以商品拜物教表现出来。卢卡奇援引了《资本论》中马克思关于商品拜物教的讨论，并吸收了席美尔对社会物化的批判，以及韦伯关于合理化的讨论，指出“这种合理的客体化首先掩盖了一切物的——质的和物质的——直接物性。当各种使用价值都毫无例外地表现为商品时，它们就获得了一种新的客观性，即一种新的物性——它仅仅在它们偶然进行交换的时代才不具有，它消灭了它们原来的、真正的物性。”在这里，卢卡奇区分了两种物性：一是事物的原本物性，一是事物商品化后的物性，这是一种新的物性，正是后一种物性构成当下社会关系的内核，物化也发生于这个层面。在商品拜物教中，马克思主要揭示了人与人的社会是如何颠倒地表现为物与物之间的关系的，在卢卡奇这里，他进一步揭示了物化的具体特征，如合理化、计算化以及由此产生的对心灵的物役等。正是由于合理化和计算化，社会存在以及人的存在被分解为可操控的、可量化的存在，这是将总体图景碎片化的方式。第二，由于社会存在与人的存在方式的物化和碎片化，导致了总体性图景的消失，因此重归总体性，成为近代以来的哲学、特别是德国古典哲学发展的内在追求。近代以来的哲学是从意识的物化结构中产生的，二律背反就是这一物化意识的重要表现。康德哲学认为认识与对象的关系，是以对象是否符合于认识为指向，而不是像过去所认为的那样以对象为标准，这就是康德的哥白尼革命所标识的哲学反转，由此，理性主体的认识成为哲学的核心内容，我们所认知的世界应该是理性的产物和对象。当然，康德并没有将这一点极致化，他将物自体作为理性的界限提出来，理性只能认识现象界，物自体是理性无法把握的。对此，卢卡奇解释说，物自体就像斯密的“看不见的手”,这是当时的哲学所无法达及的世界，由此世界分裂为可知的世界和不可知的世界，总体在这个意义上是分裂的，这种分裂也是康德哲学无法弥合的。

If Kant’s approach starting from the subject could not resolve the problem of antinomy, then French materialism starting from the object likewise failed to resolve it. French materialism merely directly stated that the present-day capitalism had become an existence independent of human will, like nature itself. This means that eighteenth-century French materialism is likewise an expression of reified consciousness.

如果说康德从主体出发的思路不能解决二律背反问题，那么从客体出发的法国唯物主义同样也没有解决这一问题。法国的唯物主义只是直接说出了当下的资本主义已成为不以人的意志为转移的存在，就像自然一样。这意味着，18世纪的法国唯物主义同样是物化意识的表现。

This antinomy drove the development of classical German philosophy. Logically, to resolve this problem, one must resolve the opposition between subject and object, form and content, thereby achieving the unity of opposites in logical fluidity—this is precisely the way Hegelian philosophy resolves the problem. For example, the unity of subject and object implies an inner reciprocity between subject and object: the subject’s consciousness of the object is at the same time the object’s own consciousness; subject and object mutually construct each other in historical development. Hence history becomes an important field for the development of Hegelian philosophy. According to theoretical logic, Hegel should have turned here to the study of history itself, rather than treating it as a footnote to reason, but Hegel did not do so; he merely regarded history as the stage for reason’s performance. The most important step here was taken by Marx. The crucial change in Marx’s philosophy lies in shifting from the center of thought to social-historical life, thereby discussing the structure of social existence itself and its historical changes, revealing the foundation from which reified consciousness arises. This provides a way out for fundamentally resolving the problem of antinomy.

这一二律背反推动着德国古典哲学的发展。从逻辑上来说，要解决这一问题，就要解决主体与客体、形式与内容的对立，从而在逻辑的流动性中实现对立面的统一，这正是黑格尔哲学解决这一问题的方式。比如主体与客体的统一，意味着主体与客体有着内在相互性，主体对对象的意识同时也是对象自身的意识，主体与客体在历史的发展相互建构，因此历史成为黑格尔哲学发展的重要场域。按照理论的逻辑，黑格尔这里应该转向对历史本身的研究，而不是将之当作理性的注脚，但黑格尔没有这么做，只是把历史看作理性表演的场所。这里最重要的一步是由马克思跨出来的。马克思哲学的重要改变在于，从思想中心转向社会历史生活，从而讨论社会存在本身的结构及其历史变化，展现物化意识得以产生的根基，这为从根本上解决二律背反问题提供了出路。

Every philosophical critique presupposes a certain ideal state. Lukács’s critique of reification and antinomy is likewise based on an ideal totality; in this sense, totality for Lukács has a certain ontological significance. If this ideal totality is not yet more clearly delineated in *History and Class Consciousness*, it is discussed more in later works such as *The Ontology of Social Being*. In *The Ontology of Social Being*, Lukács establishes an ontology of social being based on labor, arguing that this ontology constitutes the foundation of all Marx’s economic research. “Marx’s economics always proceeds from the totality of social being and always returns again to this totality.” [15]15 Georg Lukács, *The Ontology of Social Being*, vol. 2, *Marx*, trans. David Fernbach (London: Merlin Press, 1978), p. 47. [Translator’s note: The Chinese text cites a Chinese edition; the English rendering here follows the standard English edition.] This totality, based on purposive labor, promotes the formation of social totality through reproduction. This totality means not only the totality of social being at the material level, but also the total connection between ideology and social production; the totality in thought is a reproduction of the totality of social being. “What we acknowledge as the consciously developed system critique found in Marx proceeds from the totality of being by means of the connections sought themselves, and attempts to understand it as closely as possible in all its complex and many-sided relations. But here totality is by no means a formal and ideal totality; rather, it is a reproduction of what really exists. Categories are not the building materials of a hierarchical system structure, but are actually ‘forms of being, determinations of existence,’ constituent elements of relatively complete, real and moving complexes, whose dynamic interaction produces complexes that are increasingly extensive in breadth and depth.” [16]16 Ibid., p. 48.

任何哲学批判都是以一定的理想性状态为前提的，卢卡奇对物化与二律背反的批评，同样以理想的总体性为基础，在这个意义上，总体性对于卢卡奇而言具有一定的本体论意味。如果说这种理想的总体性在《历史与阶级意识》中还没有得到更为清晰的刻画，那么在《关于社会存在的本体论》等后期著作中则讨论得较多。在《关于社会存在的本体论》中，卢卡奇确立了以劳动为基础的社会存在本体论，认为这种本体论构成了马克思所有经济学研究的基础。“马克思的经济学总是从社会存在的总体出发，并且总是再次返回到这种总体性之中。”这种总体性以有目的的劳动为基础，通过再生产推动着社会总体性的形成，这种总体性不仅意味着社会存在在物质性层面的总体性，而且意味着意识形态与社会生产之间的总体性关联，思想中的总体性是社会存在的总体性的再现。“我们所承认的在马克思那里所发现的自觉发展了的体系批判是借助所寻求的联系本身从存在的总体性出发的，并且试图在这种总体性的所有复杂的和多方面的关系中，尽可能接近地理解它。但是，这里的总体性决不是形式上的和思想上的总体性，而毋宁说是现实存在的东西的再现，范畴不是等级制体系结构的建筑材料，而实际上是‘存在形式、存在规定’,是相对完整的现实的和运动着的复合体的构成要素，这些复合体动态的相互作用产生了广度和深度上都越来越广泛的复合体。”

Here totality, on the one hand, has the character of the methodology under discussion; on the other hand, totality expresses an ideal state of social being. In Lukács’s discussion, the totality of social being is based on labor, because only in labor can people truly establish relations with nature, with others, and with themselves; only in labor can social being be endowed with purposiveness; only at this level can freedom and human development be manifested. Therefore, the ontology based on labor is fundamentally an anthropological justification for the free development of human beings. Social being as totality, precisely in this sense, is an expression of an ideal society. It is precisely because of this ideal state of totality that Lukács can criticize the alienation of capitalist society.

这里的总体性一方面具有所讨论的方法论的特征，另一方面，总体性又体现了理想的社会存在状态。在卢卡奇的讨论中，社会存在的总体性以劳动为基础，因为只有在劳动中，人与自然、人与人、人与自身才能真正地建立联系，也只有在劳动中，社会存在才能被赋予目的性，只有在这个层面，自由和人的发展才能展现出来。因此，以劳动为基础的本体论，从根本上来说是为人的自由发展提供人类学意义上的论证。作为总体性的社会存在，也正是在这个意义上，是理想社会的一种表达。正是有了总体性的这一理想状态，卢卡奇才能对资本主义社会的异化提出批判。

III. Totality: Korsch and Gramsci

三、总体性：柯尔施与葛兰西

Korsch’s discussion of Marxism is likewise directed against the orthodox interpretations of the Second International era. In *Marxism and Philosophy*, targeting the then-prevalent neglect of the philosophical content of Marxism, Korsch emphasizes that Marx’s philosophy is consistent with his scientific socialism, just as German idealism was the philosophical expression of the German bourgeois revolution, so Marx’s philosophy is the theoretical expression of the proletarian revolution. Hence, the unity of theory and practice is the fundamental characteristic of Marx’s philosophy. This also means that Marx’s philosophy permeates his thought and guides practice. What is a theory permeated by philosophical thought? “It is a theory which conceives and comprehends social development as a living totality; or, more precisely, it is a theory which conceives social revolution as a living totality of theory and practice. At this stage, any division of this totality into separate branches of knowledge—economic, political, and ideological—is, without doubt, even when each isolated element is grasped in its concrete specificity, to be analyzed and criticized from the standpoint of historical fidelity. Of course, not only economics, politics, and ideology, but also the historical process and conscious social action, constantly constitute the living unity of ‘revolutionary practice.’ The *Communist Manifesto* is the best example of Marxist theory in its early, youthful vigor.”

柯尔施关于马克思主义的讨论同样针对的是第二国际时代的正统解释。针对当时忽视马克思主义哲学内容的做法，在《马克思主义和哲学》中，柯尔施强调，马克思的哲学与其科学社会主义思想是一致的，正如德国唯心主义是德国资产阶级革命的哲学表达一样，马克思的哲学就是无产阶级革命的理论表达。因此，理论与实践的一致，这是马克思主义哲学的根本特征。这也意味着，马克思的哲学渗透在其思想之中，并指导着实践。什么是被哲学思想渗透的理论呢?“它是一种把社会发展看作和理解为一个活生生的总体的理论；或者更确切地说，它是一种把社会革命看作理论与实践的活生生的总体的理论。在这一阶段，毫无疑问，任何把这一总体划分为经济的、政治的和思想的知识分支的作法，即使在每一个分离的要素的具体特征被把握时，它都从历史的忠实性出发来分析和批判。当然，不仅经济、政治和意识形态，而且历史过程和有意识的社会行动，都不断构成‘革命的实践’的活的统一体。《共产党宣言》就是马克思主义理论在早期时，充满青春活力的最好的例子。”

From Korsch’s discussion, it can be seen that an important characteristic of Marxist philosophy is totality. In the process of creating his thought, although Marx absorbed many different ideas, it was only through their creative integration that he formed a social theory capable of a total investigation and critique of social life, and he emphasized combining this theory with practice; this combination is precisely the living totality of revolutionary theory. Even in the later period of Marx’s thought, although this total revolutionary theory was sometimes demonstrated through different aspects, this did not alter the totalistic character of Marxist philosophy. With the development of society and the evolution of knowledge itself, in the later expressions of Marx and Engels, Marxism as a total intellectual picture increasingly seemed to decompose into different branches of knowledge—for example, philosophy, political economy, dialectics of nature, scientific socialism, etc. The umbilical cord of the natural connection between these different knowledges appeared to have been severed. This phenomenon led later scholars to decompose Marx’s thought into different objects of knowledge. Korsch believes this is a misunderstanding; in Marx and Engels, the independent elements of theory were never used to replace the total theory, and especially the connection between its philosophy and other parts constitutes an important characteristic of Marxism. When its philosophical thought is not taken seriously, this is precisely the vulgarization of Marxism. This is also an important reason why he emphasizes the need to re-discuss Marx’s “philosophy.” Therefore, Korsch strongly opposes dividing Marxist philosophy into different factors and then conducting empirical analyses of these factors to increase the “scientificity” of Marxism. Doing so not only fails to deepen the understanding of Marxism but, in the manner of modern capitalism, restricts the totalistic and critical character of Marxist philosophy.

从柯尔施的这个讨论中可以看出，马克思主义哲学的一个重要特征就是总体性。在马克思的思想创立过程中，虽然他吸收了诸多不同的思想，但这些思想经过创造性整合，才形成了对社会生活进行总体考察与批判的社会理论，并强调将这种理论与实践结合起来，这种结合才是活生生的总体性革命理论。即使在马克思思想的后期，虽然这种总体的革命理论有时通过不同的侧面来进行论证，但这并没有改变马克思主义哲学的总体性特征。随着社会的发展和知识本身的进化，在马克思恩格斯的后期表述中，作为总体性知识图景的马克思主义似乎越来越分解为不同的知识门类，比如哲学、政治经济学、自然辩证法、科学社会主义等，这些不同知识之间的自然联系的脐带似乎已经断裂，这种现象造成了后来者将马克思的思想分解为不同的知识对象。柯尔施认为，这是一种误解，在马克思和恩格斯那里从来就不会以理论的各个独立要素来取代总体性的理论，特别是其哲学与其他部分之间的联系，构成了马克思主义的重要特征。当其哲学思想不被重视时，恰恰是对马克思主义的庸俗化。这也是他为什么强调要重新讨论马克思的“哲学”的一个重要原因。因此，柯尔施非常反对将马克思主义哲学划分为不同的因素，然后对这些因素进行实证性的分析，以增加马克思主义的“科学性”。在这样做时，不仅没有加深对马克思主义的理解，而是以现代资本主义的方式，限制了马克思主义哲学的总体性与批判性特征。

Korsch’s thought is even more evident in *Karl Marx: Marxist Theory and the Class Movement*. This book is divided into three parts: the first part discusses the relationship between Marxist revolutionary theory and the then-emerging sociology; the second part discusses the relationship between Marxist revolutionary theory and the critique of political economy; the third part discusses the philosophical connotations of Marxist revolutionary theory. In the concrete discussion, Korsch focuses on the totalistic connection between these ideas and Marxist theory, especially the internal connections among the various components of Marxism. For example, when discussing the critique of political economy, Korsch emphasizes: Marx’s critique of political economy proceeds from a revolutionary standpoint. Linking this to the earlier discussion of revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice means that Marx’s critique of political economy has an internal connection with his philosophical thought. Only by achieving the transformation from “philosophical idealism” to “materialist science” could Marx transcend the limits of classical political economy and form an original critical theory of political economy. He believes that it was only after the 1850s that Marx formulated the fully developed form of his materialist theory, “which is at once political economy and the critique of political economy. … It reveals that all concepts and fundamental principles of economics, including its most general ones, are expressions of the ‘fetishistic’ disguise of existing social relations, merely historically valid laws of a certain epoch of the socio-economic formation.” In the critique of political economy, although Marx’s direct object is capital, the actual object is “labor.” This labor is no longer the labor of early capitalism that still possessed its own actual means of production and exchanged its products as commodities with other labor, but specifically refers to “wage labor” separated from the material means of production—that is, labor under the oppression of capital. The fundamental purpose of the critique of political economy lies in the realization of socialism, which determines the connection between Marx’s critique of political economy and scientific socialism. If this connection is abandoned, it is impossible to grasp Marxism in its totality. The methodological totality that Korsch emphasizes is actually the key point we should focus on when rereading Korsch today.

柯尔施的这一思想，在《卡尔·马克思——马克思主义理论与阶级运动》中表现得更为明显。本书分三个部分：第一部分讨论马克思主义革命理论与当时正在兴起的社会学的关系，第二部分讨论马克思主义革命理论与政治经济学批判的关系，第三部分讨论马克思主义革命理论的哲学内涵。在具体讨论中，柯尔施关注的都是这些思想与马克思主义理论的总体性联系，特别是马克思主义各组成部分之间的内在联系。比如在谈到政治经济学批判时，柯尔施就强调：马克思的政治经济学批判是从革命的立场出发的，联系到前面关于革命理论与革命实践的讨论，这意味着马克思的政治经济学批判与其哲学思想有着内在的联系，马克思只有实现了从“哲学唯心主义”向“唯物主义科学”的转变，才能超越古典政治经济学的界限，形成独创的政治经济学批判理论。他认为，自19世纪50年代以后，马克思才制定出其唯物主义理论的充分发展的形式，“它既是政治经济学，同时也是政治经济学批判。……它揭示经济学的、包括其最一般的所有概念和基本原理，是现存社会关系‘拜物教式’掩饰的表达方式，仅仅是社会经济形态一定时代历史地有效的规律。”在政治经济学批判中，马克思直接的对象虽然是资本，但实际的对象是“劳动”,这种劳动不再是资本主义早期那种还拥有自己的实际的生产资料，并将劳动产品作为商品与其他劳动相交换的劳动，而是特指与物质生产资料相分离的“雇佣劳动”,即处于资本压迫下的劳动，政治经济学批判的根本意旨在于社会主义的实现，这决定了马克思的政治经济学批判与科学社会主义的关联，如果离开了这种联系，就无法从总体上把握马克思主义。柯尔施所强调的方法论意义上的总体性，实际上也是我们今天重读柯尔施时应该关注的要点。

Similar to Korsch, Gramsci likewise emphasizes the idea of totality in the study of Marxism. When discussing what constitutes the orthodoxy of Marxism, Gramsci points out: the orthodoxy of Marxism is not guaranteed by any particular adherent of Marxism, nor is it to seek evidence from some external, non-Marxist trend of thought. Marxism is “self-sufficient.” “This concept of ‘self-sufficiency’ not only constructs all the basic elements necessary for a comprehensive, complete worldview and a comprehensive philosophy and natural science theory, but also contains all the elements necessary to activate a complete actual social organization and turn it into a fully comprehensive and complete civilization.”

与柯尔施相近，葛兰西同样强调马克思主义研究中的总体性理念。葛兰西在谈到什么是马克思主义的正统时指出：马克思主义的正统并不以某个马克思主义拥护者为保证，也不是要从某个非马克思主义的外在思潮中去寻找证据，马克思主义是“自足”的，“这个‘自足’概念不仅构建了一种全面的、完整的世界观以及一种全面的哲学和自然科学理论所需要的一切基本要素，而且也包含有使一个完整的实际社会组织活跃起来，变成一种全面完整的文明所需要的一切要素。”

Gramsci emphasizes that Marxism is a totality, which is reflected in two aspects: First, from the fundamental characteristics of Marxism, philosophy and politics, or theory and practice, form a whole. For example, he believes that Marx and Lenin respectively represent two stages: Marx created a new worldview, while Lenin put this worldview into practice. Marx and Lenin embody the most fundamental unity of theory and practice in history, a unity that is the result of the development of Western civilization. “The Renaissance and the Reformation, German philosophy and the French Revolution, Darwinism and British classical political economy, the liberalism of giants and this historicism rooted in the entire modern conception of life. The philosophy of praxis is the culmination of this entire spiritual and moral reform movement, forming a dialectic between opposing mass culture and high culture. It achieves the synthesis of the Protestant Reformation and the French Revolution: it is both a politics that is philosophy and a philosophy that is politics.”

葛兰西强调马克思主义是一个总体，这种总体体现在两个方面：第一，从马克思主义的根本特征来说，哲学与政治，或者说理论与实践是一个整体。比如他认为，马克思与列宁分别代表了两个阶段：即马克思创立了一种新的世界观，而列宁则将这一世界观付诸实践，马克思和列宁体现了历史上理论与实践的最根本的统一，这种统一是西方文明发展的结果。“文艺复兴和宗教改革，德国哲学和法国革命，达尔文主义和英国古典政治经济学，巨人的自由主义和植根于整个现代生活观的这种历史主义。实践哲学是这整个精神和道德改革运动的顶峰，它在对立的大众文化和高级文化之间形成了辩证法。它实现了新教改革与法国革命的结合：它既是一种政治的哲学，又是一种哲学的政治。”

Second, Gramsci emphasizes that among the important constituent elements of Marxism, there exists a totality-related connection. In response to the tendency at the time to divide Marxism into philosophy, political economy, and politics, Gramsci pointed out that dividing Marx’s thought into three components reflects a genetic inquiry into historical sources, but in reality, it is impossible to separate these contents from the philosophy of praxis and emphasize their respective values; in fact, these elements are interwoven into an organic totality. If philosophy, economics, and politics constitute the constituent elements of the philosophy of praxis, then “in their theoretical principles, there must necessarily be contained a transformability from one activity to another, and the possibility of translating each into the special language appropriate to each constituent element. Each element is contained in the other two, and the three together form a homogeneous cycle.” [21]21 Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 403. For example, when discussing Ricardo, Gramsci emphasizes the need to establish an internal connection between Ricardo, Hegel, and Robespierre. These are three different currents of thought; to establish a connection between them, one must break any kind of transcendental presupposition and, within the historical context, demonstrate the similarity of their problems. This is the historicism of the philosophy of praxis that Gramsci emphasizes.

第二，葛兰西强调在马克思主义的重要组成要素之间，存在着一种总体性的关联。针对当时将马克思主义划分为哲学、政治经济学和政治学的倾向，葛兰西指出，将马克思的思想划分为三个组成部分，这体现了一种历史源泉的发生学探讨，但实际上，不可能将这些内容从实践哲学中分离出来并强调各自的价值，实际上这些要素交织在一个有机的总体之中。如果说哲学、经济学、政治学构成了实践哲学的组成要素的话，那么在“它们的理论原则中，就必然包含有从一种活动到另一种活动的可转变性，以及彼此转译成适合于每一种组成要素的特殊语言的可能性。任何一种要素都包含在另外两种之中，这三种要素一起构成为一个同质的循环。”比如，在谈到李嘉图时，葛兰西就强调，要在李嘉图与黑格尔、罗伯斯庇尔之间建立起内在的联系。这是三种不同的思潮，要想在它们之间建立联系，就必须打破任何一种先验性的设定，在历史的情境中去展现他们问题的相似性，这就是葛兰西所强调的实践哲学的历史主义。

Third, starting from Marx’s perspective of totality, Gramsci, when discussing hegemony, emphasizes that hegemony is a theory integrating politics, economy, and culture. In the understanding of hegemony, people often simplify it into a theory of cultural hegemony, which is actually a misunderstanding. Gramsci believed that if workers could achieve economic hegemony, it would be of great significance for the revolution and liberation of the workers. In his early years, he launched factory councils and organized workers to study technology, all of which were actually aimed at enabling workers to master the production process through mastering technology, thereby achieving a kind of economic hegemony. He also attached importance to political hegemony. Although he joined the Italian Communist Party, unlike the ultra-leftist ideas that existed within the Italian Communist Party at the time, Gramsci did not ignore the struggle in the sense of political legitimacy. These reflections are not contradictory to his emphasis on cultural hegemony; it can even be said that when the proletariat is unable to achieve economic and political hegemony, strengthening cultural hegemony becomes a possible path for the proletariat to change itself and the world.

第三，从马克思的总体性视角出发，葛兰西在谈到领导权时强调，领导权是一种集政治、经济与文化为一体的理论。在对领导权的理解中，人们常常将之简化为一种文化领导权理论，这实际上是一种误解。葛兰西认为，如果工人能够在经济上获得领导权，这对于工人的革命和解放来说意义重大，他早年发动工厂委员会，组织工人学习技术，实际上都是想让工人通过掌握技术来掌握生产过程，从而获得一种经济上的领导权。政治上的领导权他同样重视，虽然他加入了意大利共产党，但与当时意大利共产党内存在的极左思想不同，葛兰西并不无视政治合法性意义上的斗争。这些思考与他强调文化上的领导权并不矛盾，甚至可以说，当无产阶级在无法获得经济、政治上的领导权时，加强文化上的领导权成为无产阶级改变自身与世界的可能途径。

Lukács, Korsch, and Gramsci, as the first generation of overseas Marxists, seized the most important content in Marxist philosophy, namely the totality-related examination of social life, in order to reconstruct the theoretical tradition and important content of Marxist philosophy. This played a positive role in getting rid of the mechanized Marxism of the Second International era and restoring the vitality of Marxist philosophy. By re-discussing the relationship between Marx and Hegel, they introduced the issue of subjectivity in Marx’s philosophy into the discussion of totality, forming different interpretive approaches. Although the three of them have many commonalities, the differences between them are also very obvious: comparatively speaking, Lukács is more like a philosopher, full of theoretical radicalism and imagination, and his critique of reification derived from philosophy has a very strong penetrating power into reality; Korsch, although also emphasizing the philosophical content of Marx, is more willing to explore the connections between philosophy, political economy, and socialism in Marx’s thought, especially in the book *Karl Marx*, where this is more evident; Gramsci, starting from the reality of Italy, pays more attention to the connection between Marx’s thought and reality, emphasizes the integration of politics, economy, and culture, and presents the image of a revolutionary rich in theory. Together, the three of them restored and reconstructed the totality theory of Marxist philosophy, thus forming a line of thought different from the orthodox research of the time, which had a relatively profound influence on later generations, especially in the 1930s–1960s, directly influencing the Frankfurt School and promoting the theoretical development of overseas Marxism.

卢卡奇、柯尔施与葛兰西作为第一代国外马克思主义者，抓住了马克思主义哲学中最为重要的一个内容，即对社会生活的总体性考察，以重新建构马克思主义哲学的理论传统和重要内容，这对于摆脱第二国际时代的机械化的马克思主义、恢复马克思主义哲学的活力起着积极的推动作用。通过重新讨论马克思与黑格尔的关系，他们在对总体性的讨论中引入了马克思哲学中的主体性问题，形成了不同的解释思路。尽管他们三人有着诸多的共同点，但彼此之间的差异也是非常明显的：相比较而言，卢卡奇更像哲学家，充满着理论的激进与想象力，从哲学而来的物化批判有着非常强的现实穿透力；柯尔施虽然也强调马克思的哲学内容，但他更愿意探讨马克思思想中哲学、政治经济学与社会主义之间的联系，特别是《卡尔·马克思》这本书，这一点更为明显；葛兰西从意大利现实出发，更关注马克思的思想与现实的联系，强调政治、经济与文化的一体化，展现给人的是一个富有理论的革命家的形象。他们三人共同恢复和重构了马克思主义哲学的总体性理论，从而形成了不同于当时正统研究的另一种思路，对后来者产生了较为深远的影响，特别是在20世纪30—60年代，直接影响到法兰克福学派，推动着国外马克思主义的理论发展。

(The author is Dean of the School of Marxism, Director of the Department of Philosophy, Professor, and Doctoral Supervisor at Peking University)

（作者系北京大学马克思主义学院院长、哲学系主任、教授、博士生导师）

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