The “New Material Deprivation” Crisis of Italian Welfare Capitalism

Italy was one of the first countries in Europe to establish welfare capitalism (also known as the welfare state). After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, Italy’s sharply worsening poverty problem attracted widespread attention. According to the well-known Italian newspaper *Il Sole 24 Ore*, the Fondazione Banco Alimentare provided relief to 2.1 million impoverished people struggling to obtain food due to the pandemic in the first half of 2020, an increase of 40% compared with the same period in 2019. In fact, however, since 2008, harsh realities such as Italy’s sluggish economic recovery, the increase in the number of impoverished people, and the widening gap between rich and poor and between regions had already greatly shattered the appearance of a materially affluent “affluent society” that had existed since the establishment of the welfare state. Italy’s worsening “new material deprivation” crisis stems not only from an unjust system of wealth distribution but is also closely related to the “democratic deficit” of representative democracy.

意大利是欧洲最早建成福利资本主义（也称福利国家）的国家之一。2020年新冠肺炎疫情发生后，意大利急剧恶化的贫困问题备受瞩目。据意大利著名的《24小时太阳报》报道，意大利粮行基金会（Fondazione Banco Alimentare）在2020年上半年，救济了210万因疫情难以果腹的贫困人口，比2019年同期增加了40%。但事实上，自2008年以来，意大利经济复苏乏力、贫困人口增加、贫富差距与地域差距扩大等严峻现实，就已大大打破了其自福利国家建成以来的物质富足的“丰裕社会”表象。意大利呈恶化态势的“新物质匮乏”危机，不仅源于不公正的财富分配制度，还与代议制民主的“民主赤字”密切相关。

I. The Intensification of Italy’s “New Material Deprivation” Crisis

一、意大利“新物质匮乏”危机加剧

Unlike the large-scale absolute material deprivation around the time of the Second World War and the “material affluence” of capitalism’s “golden age,” since the 1980s and 1990s, when neoliberalism dominated reforms in all economic and social fields, Italian society has gradually fallen into a predicament known as “new material deprivation.” The worsening of the poverty problem and the widening of the gap between rich and poor are two sides of the same coin of “new material deprivation.”

与第二次世界大战前后大规模绝对物质匮乏以及资本主义“黄金时代”的“物质丰裕”不同的是，自20世纪八九十年代新自由主义主导经济社会各领域改革以来，意大利社会逐步陷入了一种被称为“新物质匮乏”的困境。贫困问题的恶化与贫富差距的扩大是“新物质匮乏”的一体两面。

(1) A Large-Scale Increase in the Impoverished Population and Intensified Polarization between Rich and Poor

（一）贫困人口大规模增加，贫富分化加剧

Although the livelihood risks encountered by Italy’s middle and lower classes in 2020 were particularly striking, in fact, the worsening of Italy’s poverty problem began with the 2008 international financial crisis. The severe situation under the COVID-19 pandemic was, in a sense, a continuation of the previous trend. According to data published by the OECD, Italy’s relative poverty rate was 11.9% in 2008, rising to 13.9% in 2018, ranking fifth among the 19 eurozone countries, behind only Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Spain.

尽管意大利中下层民众在2020年遭遇的生计风险尤为引人瞩目，但事实上，意大利贫困问题的恶化，始于2008国际金融危机。新冠肺炎疫情下的严峻形势，某种意义上是此前趋势的延续。根据经合组织公布的数据，2008年意大利相对贫困率为11.9%，2018年增至13.9%，在欧元区19国中排名第五，仅低于拉脱维亚、爱沙尼亚、立陶宛和西班牙四国。

Italy’s absolute poverty [1]1 Absolute poverty refers to a situation in which, under given social production methods and lifestyles, individuals and families cannot maintain their basic survival needs through their labor income and other legal income; relative poverty refers to a situation in which, under specific social production methods and lifestyles, individuals or families can maintain food security through their labor income or other legal income but cannot meet other basic living needs considered essential under local conditions. ratio and population size have also shown a growing trend in recent years. According to OECD data, the proportion of Italy’s absolutely poor population relative to its relatively poor population rose from 33.2% in 2008 to 40.4% in 2017, an increase of as much as 21.6%, far higher than Germany (5.9%) and also higher than the United Kingdom (13.5%) and Spain (9.1%), where poverty has long been a concern. In reports from the past two years, the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) pointed out that Italy’s absolute poverty rate in 2018 was 7%, with 5 million people in absolute poverty; in 2019 it fell slightly to 6.4%, with a population size of 4.6 million. However, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic once again worsened Italy’s absolute poverty problem—according to preliminary estimates, the absolutely poor population in 2020 increased by 1 million compared with 2019, reaching its highest level since 2005.

意大利的绝对贫困绝对贫困，指在一定的社会生产方式和生活方式下，个人和家庭依靠其劳动所得和其他合法收入不能维持其基本的生存需要；相对贫困，指在特定的社会生产方式和生活方式下，依靠个人或家庭的劳动所得或其他合法收入虽能维持其食物保障，但无法满足在当地条件下被认为是最基本的其他生活需求的状态。比例和人口规模，近年来也呈增长态势。根据经合组织公布的数据，意大利绝对贫困人口占相对贫困人口的比例已经由2008年的332%增至2017年的404%，增长幅度高达21.6%，远高于德国（5.9%）以及贫困问题也长期备受关注的英国（13.5%）和西班牙（9.1%）。意大利国家统计局在近两年的报告中指出，意大利2018年绝对贫困率为7%，500万人处于绝对贫困中；2019年略降至6.4%，人口规模为460万。但新冠肺炎疫情的发生，再次恶化了意大利的绝对贫困问题——据初步估算，2020年绝对贫困人口比2019年增加了100万，达到了2005年以来的最高水平。

The intensification of the polarization between rich and poor is the other side of the “new material deprivation” crisis. Italy’s problem of polarization between rich and poor is the most severe among the traditional welfare states of Western Europe. According to OECD statistics, in 2017, the income of the richest 20% of Italy’s population was 6.1 times that of the poorest 20%, higher than Germany (4.5 times) and France (4.4 times), and higher still than Sweden (4.2 times) and Finland (3.8 times) in Northern Europe; only Spain (6 times) and the United Kingdom (6.2 times) were comparable. According to data published by the World Bank, over the past decade, Italy’s Gini coefficient and its rate of increase have both been far higher than those of other traditional European welfare states such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Sweden, and Finland. In 2008, Italy’s Gini coefficient was 0.338, rising to 0.359 by 2017, an increase of 6.2%. As shown in Table 1, the Gini coefficients of Germany, France, Sweden, Finland, and other countries are lower and have not shown a clear upward trend like Italy’s.

贫富分化加剧，是“新物质匮乏”危机的另一面。意大利的贫富分化问题，在西欧传统福利国家中最为严峻。据经合组织统计，2017年，意大利人口前20%的最富有群体收入是同样占人口20%的最贫困群体收入的6.1倍，高于德国（4.5倍）和法国（4.4倍），更高于北欧的瑞典（4.2倍）和芬兰（3.8倍），仅西班牙（6倍）和英国（6.2倍）与之不相上下。据世界银行公布的数据，近十年来，意大利的基尼系数及其增长幅度，都远高于英国、德国、法国、瑞典和芬兰等其他欧洲传统福利国家。2008年，意大利的基尼系数为0.338，及至2017年增至0.359，增幅达6.2%。如表1所示，德国、法国、瑞典、芬兰等国基尼系数较低，且尚未像意大利那样呈现明显的上涨趋势。

(2) The Worsening Living Conditions of Young People and Immigrants

（二）青少年和移民生存境遇的恶化

Young people and immigrants in Italy are marginalized groups within the Italian welfare system, experiencing a more severe predicament of “new material deprivation.” According to the OECD database, Italy’s youth unemployment rate was 18.9% in 2008, then rose sharply, reaching a peak of 41.3% in 2014 before falling to 27.8% by 2019.

意大利青少年和移民，是意大利福利制度中的边缘化群体，遭遇着更为严峻的“新物质匮乏”困境。据经合组织数据库显示，2008年意大利青年失业率为18.9%，此后不断大幅攀升，至2014年达到41.3%的峰值后回落，到2019年降至27.8%。

The poverty problem among Italian minors is the most severe of any age group. According to ISTAT statistics, from 2008 to 2017, the relative poverty rate for the population aged 18–65 rose from 10.3% to 14%; while the relative poverty rate for minors rose from 16.1% to 18.7%, far higher than for those over 66—whose poverty rate fell from 13.3% to 9.7%. Due to the intensification of economic inequality, ISTAT has focused its analysis on absolute poverty data in recent years. According to statistics, in 2018, as many as 1.26 million Italian minors fell into absolute poverty, a rate as high as 12.6%, while the absolute poverty rate for Italian citizens was 6.4%. Of Italy’s 4.6 million absolutely poor people in 2019, 1.137 million were minors. After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, as many as 1.346 million minors fell into absolute poverty. The absolute poverty rate for Italian minors rose by 2 percentage points compared with 2019, reaching 13.6%.

意大利未成年人的贫困问题，是各年龄段人群中最严峻的。据意大利国家统计局统计，2008~2017年，18~65岁人口相对贫困率从10.3%增至14%；而未成年人相对贫困率则从16.1%增至18.7%，远高于66岁以上老人——该群体贫困率从13.3%降至9.7%。由于经济不平等问题的加剧，意大利国家统计局近两年着重分析绝对贫困的数据。据统计，2018年，多达126万意大利未成年人陷入了绝对贫困，比率高达12.6%，而意大利公民的绝对贫困率为6.4%。2019年意大利多达460万的绝对贫困人口中，有113.7万为未成年人。2020年新冠肺炎疫情发生后，高达134.6万未成年人陷入绝对贫困。意大利未成年人绝对贫困率较2019年攀升了2个百分点，增至13.6%。

Furthermore, the problem of “material deprivation” among immigrants in Italy is far more serious than among Italian citizens. According to data published by ISTAT, in 2014, the absolute poverty rate for immigrant families was 23.9%, while for Italian families it was 4.3%. As Italy’s poverty problem continued to worsen, by 2019 the absolute poverty rate for immigrants had reached 30.3%, far higher than the 6.4% for Italian citizens.

此外，移民在意大利的“物质匮乏”问题，要比意大利公民严重得多。据意大利国家统计局公布的数据，2014年，移民家庭的绝对贫困率为23.9%，而意大利家庭为4.3%。随着意大利贫困问题的不断恶化，及至2019年，移民的绝对贫困率高达30.3%，远高于意大利公民的6.4%。

(3) The “New Material Deprivation” Problem Is More Severe in Southern Italy

（三）意大利南部的“新物质匮乏”问题更为严重

In southern Italy, where economic development and welfare system construction are relatively backward, a higher proportion of the population has fallen into the predicament of “new material deprivation.” For example, although Italy’s national health system was built on the principle of universalism, due to marketization and regionalization reforms since the 1990s, the southern healthcare system faces a more severe shortage of medical resources. In 2017, public healthcare expenditure in the northern regions of Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna accounted for 4.98% and 5.40% of their respective GDPs, but per capita expenditure reached 1,904 euros and 1,940 euros respectively, still higher than the national average of 1,866 euros, and higher still than the per capita level in most southern regions—below 1,800 euros. Due to the relative scarcity of medical resources, for many years it has been common for people in the south to travel north for medical treatment.

在经济发展和福利制度建设相对落后的意大利南部，有更高比例的民众陷入了“新物质匮乏”困境。例如，意大利的国民医疗体系，虽然基于普救主义原则而构建，但因自20世纪90年代以来经历了市场化和地区化改革，南部医疗体系面临更严重的医疗资源匮乏问题。2017年，北部伦巴第和艾米莉亚罗马涅两大区的公共医疗支出占各自GDP的比重分别为4.98%和5.40%，但人均支出分别达到了1904欧元和1940欧元，仍高于全国的平均水平1866欧元，更高于南部多数大区的人均水平——不足1800欧元。由于医疗资源相对匮乏，多年来意大利南部民众北上跨区就医盛行。

At the same time, the poverty problem in southern Italy became more prominent after the 2008 international financial crisis. In 2008, the absolute poverty rate for Italian families was 4.6%; for the south it was 7.9%, for the center 2.9%, and for the north only 3.2%. By 2019, the absolute poverty rate for families in southern Italy was 8.6%, significantly higher than the 4.5% in the center and 5.8% in the north. In 2020, the absolute poverty rate for families in southern Italy rose to 9.3%, while for northern families it rose to 7.6%.

同时，意大利南部的贫困问题在2008年国际金融危机后进一步突出。2008年，意大利家庭绝对贫困率为4.6%，南部为7.9%，中部为2.9%，而北部地区仅为3.2%。及至2019年，意大利南部家庭绝对贫困率为8.6%，大大高于中部的4.5%和北部的5.8%。2020年，意大利南部家庭绝对贫困率增至9.3%，北部家庭绝对贫困率增至7.6%。

II. “New Material Deprivation” Originates from an Unjust System of Wealth Distribution

二、“新物质匮乏”源于不公正的财富分配制度

The increase in Italy’s impoverished population, the intensification of wealth polarization—especially the worsening living conditions of youth and immigrants—and the further prominence of the “Southern Question” are closely related to its unjust wealth distribution system. As the French economist Thomas Piketty and the American political economist Anwar Shaikh have pointed out in their respective works, the rate of profit exceeding the rate of economic growth causes groups living on property income to accumulate wealth far faster than those living by labor. The so-called rate of profit exceeding the rate of economic growth is closely linked to the financialization of capitalism—precisely the key mechanism behind the intensification of inequality in capitalist societies in recent years. Moreover, as in other Western developed countries, Italy’s tax system, which “robs the poor to give to the rich,” and its welfare system with weakened redistributive functions have also contributed to its “new material deprivation” crisis.

意大利贫困人口的增加、贫富分化的加剧，尤其青少年和移民生存境遇的恶化以及“南方问题”进一步凸显，与其不公正的财富分配制度密切相关。正如法国经济学家皮凯蒂（Thomas Piketty）和美国政治经济学家安瓦尔·谢克（Anwar Shaikh）在各自著作中所指出的那样，利润率超过经济增长率使得以财产性收入为生的群体积累财富的速度远远快于以劳动谋生的群体。而所谓利润率超过经济增长率，与资本主义金融化密切相关——这正是近年来资本主义社会不平等加剧的关键机制。此外，如其他西方发达国家一样，意大利“劫贫济富”的税收制度和再分配功能虚弱的福利制度，也对其“新物质匮乏”危机起到了推波助澜作用。

(I) The Financialization of Italian Capitalism and the “Rob-the-Poor-to-Give-to-the-Rich” Character of the Tax System

（一）意大利资本主义金融化与税收制度的“劫贫济富”特性

The Anglo-Saxon financial culture (i.e., the neoliberal financial model) has had a significant impact on Italy, with the principle of shareholder value maximization gradually being adopted by large and medium-sized Italian enterprises since the 1970s. In the mid-1980s, Italy carried out a so-called “necessary financial restructuring” of its domestic enterprises, thereby initiating a strategic transformation of capital accumulation. Italian enterprises increasingly tended to pursue short-term financial asset returns rather than industrial production profits. As early as 1988, some Italian scholars pointed out: “In recent years, the revenue expectations of Italian industrial enterprises have shown an unusual growth trend… Investment in liquid financial assets is inconsistent with the nature of industrial enterprises that should be devoted to production.” At the same time, major Italian banks implemented securitization reforms for accounts receivable. These two major changes quickly led Italy, like the United Kingdom and the United States, to develop a vast financial trading market. In addition, since the 1990s, Italy has implemented neoliberal reform measures in conjunction with the financialization process, such as cutting labor costs, relaxing employment protections, and privatizing large state-owned enterprises. According to calculations by the Italian financial advisory firm Mediobanca, the financial income—including dividends, bonuses, and interest—of the 980 Italian companies it selected, calculated at constant 2000 prices, rose from 2.6 billion euros in 1974 to 10.6 billion euros in 2002; almost simultaneously, the labor cost share of turnover for these 980 companies fell from 26% in 1971 to 15% in 1985, and after the reforms of the 1990s, plummeted to 11% in 2001.

盎格鲁-撒克逊的金融文化（即新自由主义金融模式）对意大利影响显著，股东权益最大化准则在20世纪70年代以来逐步被意大利大中企业奉为圭臬。20世纪80年代中期，意大利对本国企业进行了所谓“必要的金融重构”，由此开启了资本积累的战略转型。意大利企业越发倾向于追求短期的金融资产收益，而非工业生产利润。早在1988年，就有意大利学者指出：“近年来，意大利工业企业的营收预期呈现出异乎寻常的增长态势……对流动性金融资产的投资与本应致力于生产的工业企业的性质不符。与此同时，意大利各大银行实施应收款证券化改革。这两大变化，促使意大利很快如英美等国，发展出了庞大的金融交易市场。除此之外，自20世纪90年代以来，意大利还配合金融化进程实施了削减劳动成本，放宽就业保护、大型国有企业私有化等新自由主义改革措施。据意大利金融咨询机构米兰投资银行（Mediobanca）的核算，其所遴选的意大利980家公司的股息、红利和利息等金融收入，按2000年的不变价格计算，从1974年的26亿欧元增至2002年106亿欧元；而几乎与此同时，这980家公司的劳动力成本占营业额的百分比，从1971年的26%降至1985年的15%，并在20世纪90年代的改革后极速降至2001年的11%。

Over the past 20 years, the financialization of the Italian economy under capitalism has further developed. According to a statistical analysis by Mediobanca of 2,032 Italian enterprises, the ratio of financial investment to capital expenditure in Italy has shown a significant upward trend: this ratio was 0.3 in 1990, surged to 1.8 by 2000, then declined somewhat to 1.38 by 2007. Furthermore, shareholder interests have been continuously strengthened—the ratio of dividends to gross operating profit also rose from 28.8% in 2002 to 41.5% in 2007. At the same time, the number of employees decreased by 6%. The acceleration of financialization has, to some extent, led Italy to gradually move toward a rentier economy. After the 2008 financial crisis, the neoliberal measures adopted by successive Italian governments—such as reducing employment protections and weakening collective bargaining—further curbed real wage growth and reduced the wage share; meanwhile, the fiscal austerity policies they implemented worsened the employment situation. Italy’s neoliberal-style financialization has produced a “Matthew effect” [2]2 The “Matthew effect” is a term derived from the Gospel of Matthew, used in sociology and economics to describe a phenomenon where “the rich get richer and the poor get poorer,” i.e., accumulated advantage leads to further advantage.: groups living on property income can maintain their accumulation advantages over the long term, while those who earn a living through labor are continuously dispossessed and find themselves in increasingly difficult circumstances.

近20年来，意大利经济的资本主义金融化进一步发展。根据米兰投资银行对意大利2032家企业的统计分析，意大利金融投资与资本支出之比呈显著增长趋势：1990年该比值为0.3，到2000年激增至1.8，之后有所回落，到2007年降至1.38。此外，股东利益不断得到强化——股息占毛营业利润的比例也从2002年的28.8%增至2007年的41.5%。与此同时，雇员的数量却减少了6%。金融化的加速，一定程度上导致意大利逐步走向食利经济。2008年金融危机后，意大利历届政府采取的降低就业保护、削弱集体谈判等新自由主义措施，进一步遏制了实际工资的增长，降低了工资份额；与此同时，所采取的财政紧缩政策，恶化了就业形势。意大利富有新自由主义色彩的金融化产生了“马太效应”，即以财产性收入为生的人群，能够长期保持其积累优势，而通过劳动谋生者则不断被剥夺，处境愈发艰难。

The continuous increase in the Gini coefficient of income distribution is closely related to the substantial rise in property income relative to labor income. From the perspectives of fairness and efficiency, a reasonable tax system arrangement is more effective in regulating wealth distribution than issuing public debt or implementing fiscal austerity. However, against the backdrop of accelerated global capital mobility, many countries have joined a “race to the bottom” in taxation. For top earners in most capitalist countries, the tax burden they bear is relatively smaller than that of the middle and lower classes. Italy is no exception. In 2014, to alleviate fiscal expenditure pressures, the Italian government, although raising the tax rate on financial income such as dividends and bonds from 20% to 26%, also made a series of commitments to reduce taxes on related income to attract capital investment. Additionally, the tax rate on Italian government bond yields is only 12.5%. The income tax for Italian wage earners is fully progressive, ranging from 23% to 46%. According to 2019 data published by the OECD, Italy’s social security tax rate is 31.23%. Nominally, employers pay more than two-thirds of social security taxes, and employees bear less than one-third, but in fact, given that the elasticity of labor supply in Italy is very low and there is a labor surplus, social security taxes are ultimately borne by workers. That is, in a situation where full employment has never been achieved and a large amount of surplus labor has always existed, Italy’s labor supply does not shrink due to a decline in wage rates; therefore, there has always been a phenomenon of employers shifting social security taxes onto employees. It can be seen that the tax rate on property income in Italy is generally lower than the tax rate on labor income. This arrangement, which “robs the poor to give to the rich,” has exacerbated the already existing problem of wealth polarization.

收入分布基尼系数的不断提高，与财产性收入相对于劳动收入的大幅增加密切相关。从公平和效率角度，合理的税制安排对财富分配的调节，要胜于发行公共债务和财政紧缩。然而在资本的全球化流动加速背景下，世界多国加入了税收的“逐底竞争”。对于大多数资本主义国家的顶层收入者而言，其所承担的税收负担相对而言是小于中下层民众的。意大利也不例外。2014年，意大利政府为缓解财政支出压力，尽管将股息、债券等金融收益的税率从20%提至26%，但也为吸引资本投资作出了系列减免相关收益税负承诺。此外，意大利国债收益的税率仅为12.5%。意大利工薪阶层所得税实施完全累进制，从23%到46%不等。根据经合组织公布的2019年数据，意大利社保税率为31.23%。名义上雇主缴纳社保税的2/3多，受雇者的负担不足1/3，但事实上，在意大利劳动力供给弹性很小，又存在劳动力过剩的情况下，社保税最终是由劳动者承担的意即在从未实现过充分就业且始终存在大量剩余劳动的情况下，意大利的劳动力供给不会因工资率的降低而萎缩，因此，就始终存在雇主向雇员转嫁社保税的现象。。可见，意大利财产性收入税率总体低于劳动所得税率。这种具有“劫贫济富”性的安排，加剧了本就存在的贫富分化问题。

Italy’s public debt and fiscal deficit problems began to worsen in the 1980s. However, Italy’s wealthy classes did not balance the government budget by paying more taxes; instead, they lent money to the government by purchasing government bonds and public assets. Between 1970 and 2010, the private wealth of Italy’s upper class experienced an extraordinary growth process—rising from the equivalent of 2.5 years of national income to nearly 7 years. Nearly a quarter of this increase came from an increase in debt owed by one part of the Italian population to another. Since 2001, the annual interest payments on Italy’s public debt as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) once reached as high as 13%, and since 2016, it has been close to 4%. This is comparable to Italy’s public spending on education, higher than spending on unemployment and family allowances—which account for about 3% of GDP—and even higher than spending on housing and social exclusion [3]3 Social exclusion refers to a situation where individuals become marginalized in society due to a combination of intersecting problems such as unemployment, lack of skills, low income, housing difficulties, a high-crime environment, loss of health, and family breakdown.. Therefore, Italian middle- and lower-class taxpayers in fact bear the consequences of cuts in public expenditure resulting from the burden of public debt interest, which severely limits the quality of welfare programs they are entitled to, such as education, social services, and social assistance. This inevitably exacerbates the regression of Italian education, the worsening living conditions of youth, and the further differentiation of regional development.

意大利的公共债务和财政赤字问题在20世纪80年代开始恶化。但意大利的富裕阶层并没有通过多缴税来平衡政府预算，而是通过购买政府债券和公共资产借钱给政府。在1970~2010年间，意大利上层的私人财富经历了一个超常的增长过程——从相当于2.5年的国民收入提高至近7年。而增幅的近1/4是一部分意大利人对另一部分意大利人债务的增加。2001年以来，意大利政府支付的年度公共债务利息占国内生产总值（GDP）的比重一度高达13%，2016年以来接近4%。而这与意大利投入于教育的公共支出相当，高于失业和家庭津贴的支出——占国内生产总值的3%左右，更高于住房与社会排斥即有些人因遭遇失业、技能缺乏、收入低下、住房困难、罪案高发环境、丧失健康以及家庭破裂等交织在一起的综合性问题时，而沦为社会边缘人的现象。因此，意大利中下层纳税人事实上承受着公共债务利息负担带来的公共支出削减的恶果，严重限制了其应得的教育、社会服务和社会救助等福利项目的质量。这不可避免地加剧了意大利教育的退步、青少年生存境遇的恶化以及地域发展的进一步分化。

(II) The Dual Imbalance of the Welfare System and the Weakness of Its Redistributive Function

（二）福利制度的双重失衡与再分配功能的虚弱性

As mentioned above, social security taxes essentially originate from the labor income of workers themselves. Therefore, pensions, public healthcare, unemployment assistance, and social services within Italy’s welfare system represent a horizontal redistribution among employed workers, rather than a vertical redistribution between the top and the middle and lower classes. However, the structural imbalance and regional imbalance of Italy’s welfare system further weaken its horizontal redistributive function.

如前所述，社保税本质上源自劳动者自身的劳动所得。因此，意大利福利制度中的养老、公共医疗、失业救助和社会服务等，是一种在雇佣劳动者内部的横向再分配，而非顶层与中下层的纵向再分配。但是，意大利福利制度的结构失衡和地域失衡，又进一步弱化了其横向再分配的功能。

The structural imbalance of the Italian welfare system refers to the fact that, compared with the more mature and complete welfare systems of Germany, France, and the Nordic countries, Italy’s public pension expenditure accounts for an excessively high proportion of total social welfare expenditure, while spending on non-elderly groups—such as unemployment, social assistance, and family allowances—is too low, and there are even gaps. Scholars in the United States, Italy, and elsewhere use the ENSR (Elderly/Non Elderly Spending Ratio) index—that is, the ratio of per capita public expenditure on the elderly to per capita public expenditure on the non-elderly—to express this imbalance in welfare spending. In 1955, Italy’s ENSR index was less than 7, but from the 1980s to 2008 it averaged as high as 28.9, far exceeding that of Nordic welfare states such as Denmark (5.75) and Sweden (6.50) over the same period, as well as continental European countries like France (12.9) and Germany (16).

意大利福利制度的结构失衡，是指相较于欧洲福利制度更为成熟完备的德国、法国和北欧诸国，意大利公共养老金支出占总社会福利支出的比例过高，而用于非老年群体的失业、社会救助、家庭津贴等项目过少，甚至存在空白点。美国、意大利等国学者通过ENSR（Elderly/Non Elderly Spending Ratio）指数，即老年人均公共支出与非老年人均公共支出比率，来表现其福利支出的失衡。1955年，意大利ENSR指数尚不足7，但自20世纪80年代至2008年前平均高达28.9，远高于同期的北欧福利国家如丹麦（5.75）、瑞典（6.50），以及欧陆国家法国（12.9）、德国（16）。

Regional imbalance refers to the persistent large disparities in welfare items such as healthcare, social assistance, and childcare and elderly care, which have been devolved to local governments and vary due to differences in economic and social development levels. In 1990, only 59.9% of Italian municipalities provided a “minimum subsistence allowance” (Minimo Vitale) to low-income families, and cities such as Rome and Bari were not among them. In 2008, per capita social service spending in the autonomous province of Trento in northern Italy was 280 euros, while in the Calabria region it was only 30 euros.

地域失衡，是指医疗、社会救助以及幼儿和老年照护等被下放至地方的福利项目，因经济社会发展水平差异而一直存在较大差距。1990年，意大利仅59.9%的市政府向低收入家庭提供“最低生存津贴”（MinimoVitale），但罗马、巴里等城市都不在其中2008年，意大利北部特兰托自治省的人均社会服务支出280欧元，而卡拉布里亚大区仅为30欧元。

Faced with the structural imbalance and regional differentiation of the Italian welfare system, the neoliberal “recalibration” reforms promoted by the Italian government did not first address the shortcomings in areas such as social relief but instead cut so-called “excessively generous” welfare expenditures. Since the mid-to-late 1990s, Italy has reduced public pension expenditure by modifying the pension calculation method—shifting from a “defined-benefit” to a “defined-contribution” model, introducing notional individual accounts, raising contribution levels, and extending the retirement age and contribution period. Under the new system, macroeconomic growth rates, inflation rates, the continuity of workers’ careers, and population life expectancy have all become important factors constraining pension payment levels. After the 2008 international financial crisis, Italian regions cut public healthcare expenditure to varying degrees. In addition, the central government sharply reduced fiscal transfers supporting the development of social assistance services across regions—compared with 2009, transfers in 2011 were cut by more than two-thirds. The specific reductions varied greatly by region: for example, the southern Campania region saw a cut of 33.9%, the northern Lombardy region a cut of 48%, and the central Umbria region a reduction of 5.6%.

面对意大利福利制度的结构失衡与地域分化，意大利政府所推行的新自由主义“再校准”改革，不是首先补齐社会救济等领域存在的短板，而是削减所谓“过度慷慨”的福利支出。自20世纪90年代中后期以来，意大利通过修改养老金计算方式——由“收益确定型”转变为“缴费确定型”，引入个人名义账户，调高缴费水平，延长退休年龄和缴费年限等措施削减公共养老支出。在新制度下，宏观经济增长率、通货膨胀率、劳动者职业生涯的连贯性及人口预期寿命等都成为制约养老金给付水平的重要因素。2008年国际金融危机后，意大利各大区不同幅度地削减了公共医疗支出。此外，意大利中央政府还大幅削减了支持各地社会救助服务发展的财政转移支付力度——相较于2009年，2011年减少了2/3之多。具体到各大区差异很大，如南部坎帕尼亚大区被削减33.9%，北部伦巴第大区削减了48%，中部翁布里亚大区减少了5.6%。

Alongside cuts in welfare spending, Italy also implemented labor market “flexibilization” reforms under the banner of promoting employment. These reforms created various forms of non-standard employment, such as part-time work, project-based employment, and temporary agency work, but the corresponding reforms to unemployment income support lagged far behind. It was not until reforms after 2007 that the Italian government, while further reducing the level of labor market protection and relaxing dismissal standards, increased the unemployment insurance replacement rate and introduced, under quite stringent conditions, a six-month unemployment benefit. However, Italy still failed to establish corresponding relief systems for the long-term unemployed, first-time job seekers, and the self-employed, continuing to rely on the family as the mainstay for coping with poverty risks. Yet Italy’s family allowances are not as generous as those in France, Germany, and other countries; generally, a qualifying family of three can receive about 140 euros per month in family allowances. At the same time, the social assistance system—a touchstone of the level of welfare state construction and redistribution—has never received serious attention from Italy’s political elites and has lacked substantive reform. In March 2019, under public pressure, mainstream Italian political elites launched a highly publicized but misnamed universal basic income scheme. Although this income support scheme claimed to have universalist characteristics, it actually had many restrictive conditions. First, the scheme only supports individuals with a monthly income below 780 euros or families with a monthly income below 1,380 euros, but only one person per family is supported. Second, primary family members must commit to participating in training or re-employment (except for minors, persons with confirmed disability, or those over 65). Third, the time limit is 18 months. Fourth, basic income expenditure is limited to areas such as housing, daily consumption, and healthcare. Finally, non-EU immigrants must have legally resided in Italy for ten years before they can apply for this assistance. From April 2019 to October 2020, Italy issued 832,000 universal basic income supports, of which 99% went to Italian citizens. The average per capita allowance for Italian citizens was 490 euros, while for non-EU immigrants it was 471 euros. Therefore, in terms of eligibility conditions, Italy’s universal basic income scheme merely fills, to some extent, the income support gap for employed workers, and is more like a disguised form of unemployment benefit. Given the scale of the population covered and the amount of assistance, the redistributive or poverty-reducing effect of this scheme is minimal.

在削减福利支出的同时，意大利还进行了以促进就业为名的劳动力市场“灵活化”改革。这场改革造就了多种兼职、按项目就业、派遣等非正规就业形式，但相应的失业收入支持制度改革却滞后很多。直到2007年后的改革中，意大利政府才在进一步降低劳动力市场保护水平、放宽解雇标准的同时，提高失业保险替代率，并在相当苛刻的条件下引入了为期6个月的失业救济。然而，意大利依然没有为长期失业者、初次求职者和自雇群体建立相应的救济制度，仍然将家庭作为应对贫困风险的中流砥柱。但是，意大利的家庭津贴也不像法国、德国等国那么慷慨，一般符合条件的三口之家每月可领取140欧元左右的家庭津贴。同时，作为福利国家建设水平和再分配水平试金石的社会救助制度，始终未得到意大利政治精英的重视，缺乏实质性改革。2019年3月，意大利主流政治精英迫于民众压力推出了一项备受瞩目但却名不副实的全民基本收入计划。这项收入支持计划，尽管声称具有普救主义特性，但实际上有诸多限制条件。首先，该项收入支持计划仅支持月收入780欧元以下的个人或月收入1380欧元以下的家庭，但每个家庭仅资助一人；其次，主要家庭成员需要作出参加培训或再就业承诺（未成年人、已确认丧失劳动能力的残障人士或65岁以上老人等群体除外）；第三，时限为18个月；第四，基本收入的支出限定在住房、日常消费、医疗等领域；最后，欧盟外移民须在意大利合法居留满十年方可申请该项救助。从2019年4月到2020年10月，意大利共发放83.2万份全民基本收入支持，其中99%的救助对象为意大利公民。意大利公民人均津贴490欧元，非欧盟移民人均津贴471欧元。因此，意大利全民基本收入计划，从其申领资格条件来看，不过是在一定程度上弥补了对雇佣劳动者的收入支持漏洞，更像是一种变相的失业救济。而从救济的人口规模和救济的额度来看，该计划所能发挥的再分配或减贫作用是微乎其微的。

III. “New Material Scarcity” Originates from the “Democratic Deficit” of Representative Democracy

三、“新物质匮乏”源于代议制民主的“民主赤字”

Regarding Piketty’s expressed hope in *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* that “it is possible to regulate the global inherited capitalism of today in a just and efficient manner,” Anwar Shaikh offered a merciless rebuttal: “Global inequality and the lack of democracy are abetted and assisted by these political systems and the ‘democratic’ interests that inherit capitalism.” [4]4 Anwar Shaikh, *Capitalism: Competition, Conflict, Crises* (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 801. Clearly, Italy is no exception. Due to the representation deficit of mainstream political parties—the vested interests of current representative democracy—and the marginalization and voicelessness of left-wing forces such as the Communist Party, the middle and lower classes lack genuine spokespersons in political life. The expansion of the EU’s economic powers, along with the strategy of Italian political elites frequently resorting to “technocratic” reforms, have both widened the “democratic deficit” in Italy’s economic and social policy fields.

对于皮凯蒂在《21世纪资本论》中对西方民主制度表达的期望——“有可能对如今全球承袭的资本主义进行公正而有效的调节”，安瓦尔·谢克进行了毫不留情的反驳——“全球范围内的不平等和民主缺失问题，就是由这些政治制度与承袭资本主义的‘民主’利益协助和教唆的”。显然，意大利也不例外。由于当前代议制民主的既得利益者——主流政党的代表性赤字，及共产党等左翼力量的边缘化和失语，中下层民众在政治生活中缺乏真正的代言人。欧盟经济权能的扩张，及意大利政治精英频频借助“技术官僚”推动改革的策略，都扩大了意大利在经济社会政策领域的“民主赤字”。

(1) The Representation Deficit of Mainstream Political Parties and the Voicelessness of the Left

（一）主流政党的代表性赤字与左翼的失语

After World War II, Italy became a “republic of parties.” The flourishing of mass-type parties and their affiliated organizations—trade unions, youth organizations, and women’s organizations—established close ties with the public. Until the 1970s, due to the formation of a so-called “polarized multiparty system”—where the ideologies and voter bases of the Italian Communist Party, the Italian Socialist Party, the Christian Democracy, and the Italian Social Democratic Party showed high stability—representative democracy in Italy seemed to have achieved “full” development. Since the 1990s, when the Italian Socialist Party, the Christian Democracy, and their governing allies collapsed in the anti-corruption “Clean Hands” campaign, [5]5 The “Clean Hands” (Mani Pulite) campaign was a major judicial investigation into political corruption in Italy in the early 1990s, which led to the collapse of the Christian Democracy and the Italian Socialist Party, among others. Italian citizens’ loyalty to and trust in political parties, as well as their enthusiasm for political elections, declined sharply. In the process of restructuring the party system, the center-left Democratic Party and the center-right Forza Italia, among others, have consistently sought to achieve alternating rule between the left and right blocs through electoral reform—a political ecology criticized by the new Italian Communist Party as “Americanization.” This political ecology encourages small parties to ally with large ones but is particularly unfavorable to the political participation and development of traditional left-wing parties representing the interests of middle- and lower-class workers. Especially after the Party of the Italian Communists and others failed to re-enter parliament in 2008, no left-wing party has been able to prevent major parties from implementing neoliberal reforms that harm the rights and interests of employed workers, as they did in the 1990s. The pluralistic interest expression and coordination functions of Italy’s traditional multiparty system have been substantially weakened.

第二次世界大战后，意大利成为“政党的共和国”。群众型政党及其附属组织——工会、青年组织和妇女组织等的蓬勃发展，与民众建立了紧密的联系。直到20世纪70年代，由于所谓“极化多党制”的形成——意大利共产党、意大利社会党、天主教民主党、意大利社会民主党等的意识形态及其选民基础都表现出了高度稳定性，代议制民主在意大利似乎得到了“充分”的发展。自20世纪90年代意大利社会党、天民党及其执政盟友在肃贪反腐的“净手运动”中土崩瓦解后，意大利民众对政党的忠诚度、信任度及对政治选举的热情急速下降。在政党格局重构的进程中，中左阵营的民主党和中右阵营的意大利力量党等，始终力图通过选举制度的改革实现左右两大阵营轮流执政，即被新意大利共产党所批判的政治生态“美国化”。这种政治生态，鼓励小党与大党结盟，却尤其不利于代表中下层劳动者利益的传统左翼政党的政治参与和力量发展。尤其在2008年意大利重建共产党等未能再进入议会后，再无左翼政党能如20世纪90年代那样阻止大党实施损害雇佣劳动者权益的新自由主义改革。意大利传统多党制的多元利益表达与协调功能，遭到实质性削弱。

Under conditions where left-right alternation in government had once been achieved, the Democratic Party gradually showed a high degree of convergence with the centre-right in the field of economic and social reform—ignoring the basic demands of the lower and middle strata for welfare items such as employment protection, social services and income support, insisting on fiscal austerity, and pushing forward structural and parametric reforms that reduced labour protection and cut welfare (such as raising social insurance contribution rates, delaying retirement, etc.). These reforms were, without doubt, catalysts that intensified the “new material deprivation” crisis. At the 2018 parliamentary election, the Democratic Party, which styled itself as centre-left, was criticised for having, like Forza Italia, degenerated into an “elite party” of business owners and managers, with support rates among the working class and the unemployed of only 11.3% and 10.3% respectively.

在一度实现左右轮替执政的情况下，民主党逐渐在经济社会改革领域与中右翼表现出了高度趋同——忽视中下层民众对就业保护、社会服务和收入支持等福利项目的基本诉求，坚持财政紧缩，并推进降低劳动保护和削减福利的结构改革与参数改革（如提高社保费率、延迟退休等）。这些改革，毫无疑问是“新物质匮乏”危机加剧的催化剂。在2018年议会选举时，以中左翼自居的民主党被批与意大利力量党一样，已经沦为企业主和经理人的“精英党”，在工人阶级和失业者中的支持率分别仅为11.3%和10.3%。

Economic distributive injustice and the loss of political voice gave birth to a widespread sense of discontent and hopelessness in Italy. The lower and middle strata, who longed for change, responded to the call of anti-establishment elites and took protest action. Since 2013, the populist Five Star Movement, which claims to uphold direct democracy and represent the interests of the grassroots at the bottom, has won the support of the people of southern Italy by a huge margin. Although the Five Star Movement’s positions on anti-elitism, empowerment, morality and welfarism make it at first glance resemble the radical left, its refusal of the traditional left-right ideological positioning readily calls to mind the famous aphorism proposed by Alain (Alain, 1868–1951, French philosopher, educator, essayist; original name Émile-Auguste Chartier, known by the pen name Alain) in 1930: “When someone asks me whether the distinction between left and right still has meaning, the first thought that comes to my mind is that the person asking me the question is not left-wing.” In other words, the rise of the Five Star Movement did not fundamentally improve the representation deficit of mainstream Italian politics vis-à-vis the lower and middle strata.

经济上的分配不公和政治上话语权的缺失，在意大利孕育出了普遍的不满和绝望感。期待改变的中下层民众，响应反建制精英的号召，采取抗议行动。2013年以来，声称坚持直接民主并代表底层草根利益的民粹主义五星运动党，以极大优势赢得了意大利南部民众的支持。尽管五星运动党所持有的反精英主义、赋权、道德和福利主义等主张，使其乍看起来像激进左翼。但面对其拒绝传统左与右的意识形态定位，让人很容易回想起阿兰（Alain）阿兰（Alain，1868~1951），法国哲学家、教育家、散文家。原名埃米尔-奥古斯特·沙尔捷（EmileAuguste Chartier），以笔名阿兰闻名于世。在1930年提出的著名警言：“当有人问我左翼和右翼的区分是否还有意义的时候，我脑海中的第一个想法就是，向我提问的人不是左翼。”换言之，五星运动党的兴起，并没有从根本上改善意大利主流政治之于中下层民众的代表性赤字。

(2) The “Democratic Deficit” of Economic and Social Reform

（二）经济社会改革的“民主赤字”

The “democratic deficit” of Italian economic and social reform is mainly manifested in the transformation of EU-level economic and social laws and regulations into domestic law without effective supervision by the people, and in the way mainstream political parties, in order to evade voter blame, rely on technocrats to push forward reforms.

意大利经济社会改革的“民主赤字”，主要表现在欧盟层面经济社会法律法规在缺乏民众有力监督的情况下向国内法转化，以及主流政党为逃避选民责难而借助技术官僚推进改革等方面。

The main tools through which the EU influences reform in the field of economic and social policy in member states are legal regulation, policy coordination and structural funds. Given the preeminent influence of specialised committees in EU affairs and the limited constraining role of the European Parliament, it is very difficult for the citizens of member states to exercise genuine supervision over the EU. For example, after the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU’s influence over labour market reform in member states increased. In 1997 and 1999, Italy received two EU directives on part-time employment and fixed-term contracts—the former aimed at achieving maximum flexibility in part-time employment, the latter at limiting trade unions’ right to intervene in fixed-term contracts. Despite trade union opposition, the Italian right-wing government, invoking the name of the EU, forcefully pushed parliament to transpose them into domestic law. In addition, through legal regulation creating a common market and policy coordination under the Stability and Growth Pact, the EU exerts “race to the bottom” and austerity pressures on member states’ social spending. These matters are often difficult for the lower and middle strata to supervise effectively through so-called representative democracy.

欧盟对成员国经济社会政策领域改革发挥影响的主要工具有法律规制、政策协调和结构基金。考虑到专业委员会在欧盟各项事务中的卓越影响力以及欧洲议会的有限约束作用，成员国民众很难对欧盟实施真正的监督。例如，在《阿姆斯特丹条约》签署后，欧盟对成员国劳动市场改革的影响力增强。1997年和1999年，意大利在兼职就业和固定期合同问题上，收到了欧盟的两份指令——前者旨在实现兼职就业的最大灵活性，后者旨在限制工会对固定期合同的干预权。尽管面临工会抵制，意大利右翼政府依然假托欧盟之名强力推动议会将之转化为国内法。此外，欧盟还通过创造共同市场的法律规制、《稳定与增长公约》下的政策协调，对成员国社会支出产生“逐底竞争”和紧缩压力。而这些内容，往往都是中下层民众难以通过所谓代议制民主进行有效监督的。

Since the 1990s, mainstream Italian political parties, which have frequently fallen into political crisis due to neoliberal reforms, have often formed technocratic cabinets to continue pushing reforms under the pretext of EU pressure while as far as possible evading voter blame and electoral losses. For example, in 1995, after the Berlusconi (Silvio Berlusconi) government’s pension-cutting reforms met with strong trade union opposition, the centre-left and centre-right unanimously supported Lamberto Dini, a former governor of the Bank of Italy, in forming a technocratic cabinet to reform the pension system, shifting it from an “earnings-related” to a “defined-contribution” model. Another example: in 1996, the Prodi (Romano Prodi) government established the “Onofri Commission”, tasked with assessing “the macroeconomic affordability of social expenditure” and pushing Italy towards early entry into the eurozone. In recent years, the most influential case has been the structural and parametric reforms of pensions and the further liberalisation of the labour market implemented by the Mario Monti government after the dissolution of the centre-right government in 2010. This phenomenon of “depoliticisation” formed in the field of economic and social policy through “rule by experts” in Italy is essentially a substitution of its democratic procedures with an elitist model of authoritative decision-making.

自20世纪90年代以来，频频因新自由主义改革而陷入政治危机的意大利主流政党，往往通过组建技术专家内阁，在受到欧盟压力的名义下继续推进改革的同时，尽可能逃避选民的责难和选票的损失。例如，1995年，贝卢斯科尼（Silvio Berlusconi）政府在其削减养老金改革遭到工会强烈抵制后，中左翼和中右翼一致支持曾任意大利央行行长的兰贝托·迪尼（Lamberto Dini）组建技术内阁，对养老金制度进行由“收入关联型”向“缴费确定型”转变的改革。再如，1996年普罗迪（RomanoProdi）政府组建的“奥诺弗里委员会”，致力于评估“宏观经济对社会支出的承受度”，并推动意大利早日加入欧元区。近年来，最有影响的莫过于马里奥·蒙蒂（Mario Monti）政府在2010年中右翼政府解散后对养老金实施的结构与参数改革以及劳动市场的进一步自由化改革。意大利这种通过“专家治国”在经济社会政策领域形成的“去政治化”现象，本质上是以一种精英主义的权威决策模式对其民主程序的置换。

4. Conclusion

四、结语

The “new material deprivation” crisis of Italian welfare capitalism has deep institutional roots. The financialisation of Italian capitalism and the “robbing the poor to give to the rich” tax system have further widened the gap between rich and poor. Moreover, Italy’s welfare system, built on the basis of regular employment and nationality or long-term legal residence status, carries out horizontal redistribution among employed workers, which has little effect on poverty reduction. The centrist shift of the centre-left Democratic Party, and the long-term voicelessness in the political arena of progressive parties such as the Party of the Communist Refoundation, have further encouraged the de-welfarisation trend in the field of economic and social policy. The habitual strategy of “rule by technocrats” used by mainstream Italian parties to evade voter blame has further weakened the lower and middle strata’s power to supervise the country’s economic and social reform process.

意大利福利资本主义的“新物质匮乏”危机，有着深刻的制度性根源。意大利资本主义金融化和“劫贫济富”的税收制度，进一步拉大了贫富差距。而意大利基于正规就业和国民资格或长期合法居留资格而构建的福利体系，在雇佣劳动者内部实施的横向再分配，并无太大减贫作用。中左翼民主党的中间化，以及意大利重建共等进步政党在政坛的长期失语，进一步助长了经济社会政策领域的去福利化趋势。意大利主流政党为逃避选民责难而惯常使用的“技术官僚”治国策略，进一步弱化了中下层民众对国家经济社会改革进程的监督权。

The widening of economic inequality and the loss of political voice have stirred protest actions among Italy’s lower and middle strata, and once pushed political elites to implement fine-tuning of the social assistance system. However, as long as left-wing forces advocating the replacement of capitalism, such as the Party of the Communist Refoundation, remain voiceless in the political arena for a long time and the socialist movement fails to revive, then merely relying on political mobilisation that appeals to populism cannot effectively improve the “new material deprivation” predicament of Italy’s lower and middle strata.

经济不平等的扩大和政治话语权的丧失，激起了意大利中下层民众的抗议行动，一度推动政治精英对社会救助制度实施了微调。但是，只要意大利重建共等主张替代资本主义的左翼力量在政坛长期失语且社会主义运动未能走向复兴，那么，仅仅凭借诉诸民粹主义的政治动员，并不能有力地改善意大利中下层民众的“新物质匮乏”困境。

(The author is an Associate Research Fellow at the Academy of Marxism, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

（作者系中国社会科学院马克思主义研究院副研究员）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心