Social Inequality in France as Refracted through Immigration

France was originally a Western country that placed considerable emphasis on social fairness. Compared with countries such as Britain that had long pursued liberalism, its gap between rich and poor was not large, and its Gini coefficient was relatively small. However, since the twenty-first century, the gap between rich and poor in French society has gradually widened, and people of different classes and different ethnicities have increasingly faced serious social inequality in areas such as employment, education, and medical care. The sudden outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic not only highlighted but also exacerbated these inequalities. Immigrants, who account for nearly 10% of France’s total population, centrally refract this social inequality and once again became victims of social inequality during the COVID-19 pandemic.

法国原本是一个较为重视社会公平的西方国家，和英国等长期奉行自由主义的国家相比，贫富差距不大，基尼系数较小。但是21世纪以来，法国社会的贫富差距逐步拉大，不同阶级、不同种族的人在就业、就学和就医等领域逐渐面临日益严重的社会不平等。突如其来的新冠肺炎疫情不仅凸显并且加剧了这些不平等。占法国总人口近10%的移民集中折射了这种社会不平等，并在新冠肺炎疫情中再度成为社会不平等的牺牲品。

Under the value orientation of neoliberalism, France’s economic and social policies have tilted toward capital, prioritizing efficiency over fairness and reducing protection for vulnerable groups such as labor, which is the root cause of the intensification of social inequality in France. French left-wing parties, for the sake of votes, have abandoned the middle and lower classes and instead represented the middle and upper classes, veering rightward in economic and social policy, thereby objectively tolerating and worsening social inequality.

在新自由主义的价值取向下，法国的经济、社会政策向资本倾斜，重效率轻公平，降低对劳工等弱势群体的保护，是法国社会不平等加剧的根源。法国左翼政党为选票计而抛弃中下阶层，转而代言中上阶层，在经济和社会政策上右倾，客观上纵容并恶化了社会不平等。

I. Immigration Refracts Social Inequality in France

一、移民折射着法国社会的不平等

The expansion of social inequality is a major problem currently facing France. Before the 1990s, due to the strength of left-wing parties and left-wing thought, France’s protection of vulnerable groups such as labor was relatively good, effectively preventing the polarization of rich and poor in society. However, from the 1990s onward, especially in recent years, with the rise of neoliberal thought, the phenomenon of inequality between rich and poor in France has gradually emerged and intensified, refracted through the prism of immigration.

社会不平等的扩大是法国目前面临的一大问题。在20世纪90年代之前，由于左翼政党和左翼思潮的强大，法国对劳工等弱势群体的保护相对较好，有效防止了社会的贫富分化。但是，从20世纪90年代起，特别是近些年，伴随着新自由主义思潮的上升，法国的贫富不均现象逐渐显现、加剧，并以移民为棱镜折射出来。

Approximately one-tenth of France’s population consists of immigrants, the majority of whom are of African origin. This large group, especially those of African descent, faces huge gaps compared with native French residents in areas such as employment, education, and medical care, and as a whole has fallen to the bottom of society. Data from the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies show that in 2015, the median per capita income of immigrant families in France was 1,152 euros, and their poverty rate was as high as 38.6%, far above the national average (table omitted); among them, the poverty rate of African immigrants was particularly high, reaching 44.6%, four times that of native residents. The Seine-Saint-Denis department in the Greater Paris region, which has the highest proportion of immigrants in France (30%), is the poorest region in the country.

法国人口的1/10左右由移民组成，其中以非洲籍移民为主。这个庞大的群体，特别是其中的非裔，在就业、就学和就医等方面均与法国本土居民存在巨大差距，整体上沦为社会底层。法国国家统计局的数据表明，2015年，法国移民家庭的人均收入中位数为1152欧元，贫困率高达38.6%,远在全国平均水平之上(表略),其中非裔移民的贫困率尤其高，是本土居民的4倍，达44.6%。法国移民占比最高(30%)的地区——大巴黎地区的塞纳-圣丹尼省(Seine-Saint-Denis),是全国最贫困的地区。

The main factors behind immigrants becoming the poorest group are as follows.

移民之所以沦为最贫困的群体，主要有如下因素。

(1) Deindustrialization Has Made Immigrants the Main Force of Structural Unemployment and Informal Employment

(一)去工业化导致移民成为结构性失业和非正规就业的主力

Immigrants were introduced as laborers after World War II for the purpose of economic recovery, and were mainly distributed in labor-intensive industrial enterprises with low technical content, such as mining, construction, metallurgy, textiles, and machinery manufacturing. From the 1970s and 1980s onward, France began to adjust its industrial structure, launching a large-scale process of deindustrialization. The share of the primary and secondary sectors in the national economy fell sharply, from 21% and 37% to 2.6% and 20.3% respectively; conversely, the tertiary sector rose sharply, from 21% to 75.9%, making France one of the EU member states with the highest share of the tertiary sector (4% higher than the EU average) and one of the lowest shares of industry (3.4% lower than the EU average). This industrial restructuring brought large-scale structural unemployment, with workers, especially unskilled workers, suffering the greatest impact: from 1970 to 1982, the share of industrial workers in total French employment fell from nearly 40% to 15%, and further to 7% in 2017; among them, skilled worker employment fell from 7% in 1982 to 4% today, and unskilled workers from 9% to 3%.

移民是第二次世界大战后法国出于恢复经济的目的作为劳工引进的，主要分布在采矿、建筑、冶金、纺织、机械制造等技术含量不高的劳动密集型工业企业。从20世纪七八十年代起，法国开始调整产业结构，开启了大规模的去工业化进程，第一和第二产业在国民经济中的占比大幅度下降，分别从21%和37%降至2.6%和20.3%;反之第三产业大幅度上升，从21%升至75.9%,成为欧盟成员国中第三产业占比最高(比欧盟平均水平高4%)、工业占比最低的国家之一(比欧盟平均水平低3.4%)。产业结构调整带来了大规模的结构性失业，工人特别是非技术工人受到的冲击最大：从1970年到1982年，产业工人在法国总就业中的占比从近40%降至15%,又降至2017年的7%;其中技术工人就业从1982年的7%降至如今的4%,非技术工人从9%降至3%。

Immigrants, who are predominantly unskilled workers, became the main victims of structural unemployment, with an unemployment rate that has long hovered between 15% and 20%, significantly higher than the national average (below 10%); among them, the unemployment rate for African immigrants is particularly high, lingering at around 20% for a long time. In some old industrial bases, due to the closure of factories and mines, the unemployment rate of African immigrants once approached 50%, and the unemployment rate of immigrant youth was even higher, close to two-thirds. To make a living, these immigrants, who lack specialized skills and have not received retraining, have had to enter the service sector, especially the part dominated by informal employment. These service jobs are low-income and unstable, and their risk of causing poverty is far higher than the national average.

以非技术工人为主的移民成为结构性失业的主要牺牲品，失业率长期在15%～20%之间，大大高于全国平均水平(低于10%);其中非裔移民失业率尤其高，长期在20%左右的高位徘徊。在某些老工业基地，由于工厂、矿山等的倒闭，非裔移民失业率一度接近50%,移民青年失业率更高，接近2/3。为了糊口，这些缺乏一技之长又得不到再就业培训的移民不得不进入服务业，特别是以非正规就业为主的服务业。这些服务业收入低且不稳定，致贫风险远高于全国平均水平。

(2) Immigrants Are Cut Off from High-Quality Educational Resources and Have Low Levels of Education

(二)移民被隔绝在优质教育资源之外，受教育程度低

Immigrant workers mostly live together in the suburbs, which isolates them from high-quality educational resources.

移民劳工大多聚居在郊区，这使他们被隔离在优质的教育资源之外。

When immigrant workers first arrived in France, they were concentrated in low-rent housing in the suburbs, and over time this formed highly封闭, isolated immigrant enclaves. In French, the word “suburb” (banlieue) in a specific context refers to “immigrant聚居区.” One major consequence of immigrants living together in the suburbs is their inability to access high-quality educational resources. “Suburban” schools, that is, “immigrant children’s” schools, generally have weak teaching staffs, incomparable to those in mainstream neighborhoods. Poor immigrants, lacking the financial means to move to mainstream neighborhoods, and limited by their own educational level, the importance they place on education, and their horizons, are unable to supervise their children’s studies or do not value education, ultimately causing the academic gap between their descendants and non-immigrant descendants to widen. Statistical results confirm this: compared with non-immigrant youth, immigrant youth have higher dropout rates and lower rates of progression to higher education; there are no illiterates among non-immigrants, but 4% of immigrants are illiterate; 9% of male immigrants and 17% of female immigrants have only a primary school education, both far higher than native residents (2% and 7% respectively); the number of immigrants without any diploma is also far higher than that of native residents.

移民劳工初到法国时被集中安置在郊区的廉租房里，久而久之便形成了高度封闭、与世隔绝的移民聚居区。法语中“郊区”(banlieue)一词在特定语境下便指“移民聚居区”。移民聚居于郊区的一大后果是无法享有优质的教育资源。“郊区”学校即“移民子弟”学校师资力量普遍薄弱，和主流街区无法相提并论。而贫困的移民既没有经济能力搬到主流街区，又受自身文化程度、对教育的重视程度和眼界所限，无力督导子女学习或不重视学习，最终其后代和非移民后代在学业上的差距越拉越大。统计结果证明了这一点：与非移民青少年相比，移民青少年有辍学率高、升学率低的特点；非移民中没有文盲，移民中有4%的文盲；9%的男性移民和17%的女性移民仅有小学文化程度，二者都远高于本土居民(分别是2%和7%);没有任何文凭的移民数量也远在本土居民之上。

Inequality in basic education is ultimately reflected in the field of higher education. Surveys show that the number of immigrant children who eventually enter prestigious universities and thereby obtain more high-quality employment opportunities is far lower than that of non-immigrant children, truly illustrating the saying, “A poor family finds it hard to produce a noble son!” [1]1 “A poor family finds it hard to produce a noble son” (寒门难出贵子): A Chinese proverb meaning that children from impoverished backgrounds rarely achieve elite status, here used to describe the situation of immigrant descendants in France.

基础教育的不平等最终体现在高等教育领域。调查表明，最终进入名牌大学，进而获得更多优质就业机会的移民子女要远低于非移民子女，正所谓“寒门难出贵子”!

Discrimination is another major factor making it difficult for immigrants to find employment. Although the French government explicitly prohibits all employment discrimination, including racial discrimination, implicit discrimination against immigrants, especially those of African descent, is ubiquitous in French society. Surveys show that job seekers with distinctly Arabic-sounding names have a 20% lower chance of getting an interview than those whose names appear “French”; surveys also show that five years after graduation, the unemployment rate of immigrant youth is nearly three times that of native youth, with the unemployment rate of African youth being particularly high, four times that of native youth; moreover, with the same educational level, it is much more difficult for immigrant youth to be recruited as civil servants, and they are more likely to end up in the informal employment sector.

歧视是移民难以就业的另一大重要因素。尽管法国政府明令禁止包括种族歧视在内的任何就业歧视，但是法国社会对移民特别是非裔移民的隐性歧视无处不在。调查表明，姓名带有明显阿拉伯色彩的求职者获得面试的机会比姓名看上去是“法国人”的低两成；调查还表明，毕业五年后，移民青年的失业率是本土青年的近三倍，其中非裔青年的失业率尤其高，是本土青年的四倍；此外在同等学历下，移民青年被录取为公务员的难度要大得多，他们更容易落入非正规就业部门。

The descendants of immigrants, with low education and low skills, are forced to repeat the path of their parents—making a living through low-skilled or even unskilled informal work, facing the risk of unemployment at any time, thus falling into a vicious cycle of intergenerational transmission of poverty and class固化.

低学历低技能的移民后代被迫重复父辈的老路——靠低技术甚至无技术含量的非正式工作糊口，随时面临失业风险，就此陷入贫困代际传递、阶级固化的恶性循环。

II. The COVID-19 Pandemic, Using Immigration as a Prism, Highlighted and Intensified Social Inequality in France

二、新冠肺炎疫情以移民为棱镜，凸显并加剧了法国社会的不平等

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic intensified social inequality in France. Immigrants, as the most vulnerable group in the economy and labor market, refracted this like a prism.

新冠肺炎疫情的发生加剧了法国社会的不平等。移民作为经济和劳动力市场最弱势的群体，如棱镜一般折射出了这一点。

(1) The COVID-19 Pandemic Intensified the Vulnerable Position of Immigrants in the Health Domain

(一)新冠肺炎疫情加剧了移民在健康领域的弱势地位

The COVID-19 pandemic hit immigrants the hardest. Statistics show that during the pandemic, immigrants, especially those of African origin, had the highest rates of confirmed cases, infections, and deaths: for example, during the most severe period of the epidemic in France in March–April 2020, the death rate increase among immigrants was twice that of the native-born population; the Greater Paris region, which concentrates nearly half of the country’s immigrants, had the highest excess death rate in the country; Seine-Saint-Denis, the department with the highest proportion of immigrants and the greatest poverty in all of France, had the highest excess death rate, reaching 134% during the epidemic peak from March 1 to April 19, 2020, far above the average for the Greater Paris region in which it is located; from March 1 to April 6, 2020, the number of deaths in that department was nearly double that of the same period in 2019. As the department’s president, Socialist Stéphane Troussel, pointed out, “If the COVID-19 epidemic kills, inequality does too… This crisis has clearly had a very serious impact on social inequality and regional inequality, and this is especially evident in a department like Seine-Saint-Denis, which is (demographically) young and heavily marked by poverty.” The main reasons immigrants were hit hardest are as follows.

新冠肺炎疫情对移民的打击最大。统计表明，疫情期间，移民特别是非裔移民的确诊、感染和死亡率均居榜首：如在2020年3～4月法国疫情最严重的时期，移民死亡人数增长率是本土居民的两倍，集中了全国近半数移民的大巴黎地区，其超频死亡率(excess death rate)位居全国第一；全法移民占比最高且最贫困的塞纳-圣丹尼省超频死亡率最高，在2020年3月1日至4月19日疫情高峰期间为134%,远高于它所在的大巴黎地区的平均水平；2020年3月1日到4月6日，该省死亡人数是2019年同期的近两倍。正如该省省长、社会党人斯特凡纳·特鲁塞尔(Stéphane Troussel)指出的，“如果说新冠肺炎疫情是杀人的，不平等也一样……这场危机显然对社会不平等和地区不平等带来了十分严重的影响，这一点在塞纳-圣丹尼这样一个(人口)年轻、贫民色彩浓厚的省尤其明显”。移民之所以受到冲击最严重，主要有如下因素。

First, poor housing conditions.

第一，居住条件差。

Immigrants, especially those of African origin, generally live in poor housing conditions. Seine-Saint-Denis is a typical case: the population density of this department is 64 times the national average, per capita living space is small, and the housing overcrowding rate is as high as 20.6%, far above that of central Paris (12.7%).

移民特别是非裔移民普遍居住条件较差。塞纳-圣丹尼省就是典型，该地区的人口密度高，是全国平均水平的64倍，人均居住面积小，住房拥挤率高达20.6%,远高于巴黎市区(12.7%)。

Second, a low rate of lockdown compliance.

第二，禁足率低。

During the most severe period of the COVID-19 epidemic in 2020, the French government issued a lockdown order requiring citizens not to go out unless necessary. At that time, more than two-thirds of managerial staff could work from home, and could even leave large cities at will to take refuge in remote mountain forests or detached villas by the mountains or sea. In stark contrast, 96% of workers (in France, wage earners in the industrial sector) and 75% of employees (in France, mainly wage earners in the non-industrial service sector) still had to go out to work, thus becoming the groups with the lowest lockdown compliance. Employees and workers share a common situation: low income, low educational level, high work intensity with little flexibility, and little disposable time; the intermarriage rate between the two groups is also high—a considerable number of households consist of a male worker and a female employee.

在2020年新冠肺炎疫情最严重的时期，法国政府颁布禁足令，规定国民非必要不出门。当时2/3以上的管理人员可以居家办公，甚至可随时离开大城市，躲进深山老林、山间海边的独栋别墅。与之形成鲜明对照的是，96%的工人(在法国指工业部门的工资劳动者)和75%的雇员(在法国主要指以服务业为主的非工业部门的工资劳动者)仍需出门上班，从而成为禁足率最低的群体。雇员和工人一样有着共同的处境：收入低、学历低，工作强度大且缺乏弹性，可供自由支配的时间少；两者的通婚率也很高——相当一部分家庭是由男工人和女雇员组成的。

Among immigrants, the proportion of workers, employees, and especially low-end service workers is very high—for example, immigrants in Seine-Saint-Denis are mostly employed in occupations such as supermarket cashiers, cleaning and sanitation, courier delivery, hospital and nursing home care, domestic services, security, and maintenance. Not only can they not work from home, but they must also frequently use public transport to commute to make a living. Therefore, their risk of infection is far higher than that of non-immigrants. The “Inequality Observatory” [2]2 The “Inequality Observatory” (Observatoire des inégalités) is an independent French research organization that monitors and analyzes social and economic inequalities. points out: “Certain of the lowest-paid occupations, such as nursing assistants, couriers, or cashiers, are the most exposed (to risk during the epidemic).”

移民中，工人、雇员特别是低端服务业从业者的占比都很高——如塞纳-圣丹尼省的移民多从事超市收银、保洁环卫、快递送货、医院养老院看护、家政服务、安保维修等职业，不仅无法居家工作，而且还要为糊口而频繁搭乘公交工具通勤。因此，传染风险要远高于非移民。“不平等观察站”指出：“某些薪酬最低的职业，如护工、快递员或收银员等，暴露(在疫情下的)风险最高。”

Take nursing homes as an example. Nursing homes in France had the highest rates of COVID-19 infection and death, so high that the government at one point stopped publishing their mortality rates. Nursing home caregivers include a large number of immigrants. During the epidemic, not only could they not stop working due to staff shortages in nursing homes, but they also had to come into close, low-protection (due to shortages of protective equipment) contact with elderly people who might already be infected, greatly increasing their risk of infection; after returning to their cramped dwellings, they then transmitted the epidemic to their families…

以养老院为例。法国的养老院是新冠肺炎感染率和死亡率最高的地方，一度高到政府停止统计其病死率的地步。养老院护工中有大量移民，疫情期间，他们不仅因养老院人手短缺而无法停止工作，还要近距离、低防护(防疫物资短缺)地接触可能已被传染的老人，极大地增加了传染风险；回到逼仄的住所后，他们又把疫情传染给家人……

As the French Communist Party pointed out: “The health crisis has revealed the profound inequalities in our society and has exacerbated the inequalities of our millions of fellow citizens, the most vulnerable and the poorest… Inequalities remain very serious: the lockdown of a large poor family crowded into a small apartment and that of a wealthy family living in a large detached house are not comparable…”

正如法国共产党指出的：“健康危机揭示了我们社会中深刻的不平等，并加剧了我们数百万同胞、最脆弱的人和最贫穷的人……的不平等……不平等现象仍然十分严重：一个挤住在单元房里的人口众多的贫民大家庭和住在独栋大房子里的富裕家庭，两者的禁足不可同日而语……”

Third, poor health status and low access to medical resources.

第三，健康状况差、医疗资源占有率低。

As in all developed countries, influenced by factors such as occupation, income, and educational level, there is serious inequality in the field of health in France, and this is especially evident among immigrants. Relevant French research shows that people with higher education and higher incomes are generally healthier; while the lower-class population represented by immigrants has a greater risk of chronic disease, 10% higher than the national average, and the overall health status of immigrants is far worse than that of non-immigrants. The French “Inequality Observatory” points out: “People with chronic diseases are the most at risk (in the epidemic situation), partly because of social inequality.” In addition, medical resources are relatively scarce in immigrant neighborhoods; for example, Seine-Saint-Denis is the department with the lowest density of doctors in France and also the department with the worst hospital facilities in the Greater Paris region. After the COVID-19 epidemic broke out, hospitals quickly experienced “overcrowding,” and confirmed patients could not receive timely treatment.

和所有发达国家一样，受职业、收入、受教育程度等因素影响，法国在健康领域存在严重的不平等，这一点尤其体现在移民身上。法国相关研究表明，高学历和富裕人群整体上更健康；而以移民为代表的底层人群患慢性病的风险更大，比全国平均水平高10%,移民的总体健康状况远逊于非移民。法国“不平等观察站”指出：“患慢性病的人(在疫情中的处境)最危险，部分原因在于社会不平等。”此外，移民街区的医疗资源也相对较少，如塞纳-圣丹尼省是法国医生密度最低的省，也是大巴黎地区医院设施最差的省。新冠肺炎疫情发生后，医院很快便发生“挤兑”现象，确诊者无法得到及时救治。

For immigrants, occupational factors make it impossible to comply with lockdown and necessitate frequent use of public transport; remote residences (immigrants mostly live in suburbs) lead to long commuting times; poor housing conditions make it impossible to maintain effective social distancing and isolation; poverty leads to generally poor health; and low per capita access to medical resources means they cannot receive timely treatment. The combination of these factors ultimately results in immigrants’ risk of infection and death being several times higher than that of non-immigrants.

对于移民而言，职业因素导致无法禁足和频繁借助公共交通，居住地遥远(移民多住在郊区)导致通勤时间长，居住条件差导致无法保持有效的社交和隔离距离，贫困导致健康状况的普遍低下，人均医疗资源占有少导致无法得到及时的救治，种种因素叠加，最终导致移民的感染和死亡风险均数倍于非移民。

(2) The epidemic exacerbated immigrant poverty

(二)疫情加剧了移民的贫困

The epidemic also exacerbated immigrant poverty. Affected by the epidemic, French household incomes plummeted, with the largest decline since 1949, and immigrant households experienced the largest decline. This is closely related to immigrants’ vulnerable position in the job market. The French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) pointed out that in the most dangerous period of the first quarter of 2020, France lost 715,000 jobs, with informal employment hit hardest. The “Inequality Observatory” also pointed out: “Unemployment first hits those on short-term contracts, especially low-skilled short-term contract workers.” During the epidemic, to avoid large-scale layoffs, France introduced a “partial unemployment” measure, allowing companies to appropriately reduce working hours and pay part of the salary—for example, changing a five-day workweek to three days and paying three days’ wages, with the government partially compensating for the other two days’ wages through unemployment benefits. This measure mainly affected workers (54%) and employees (36%), while the managerial class was almost unaffected. Because immigrants have a large proportion of employment in the informal sector and also a large number of blue-collar workers, they were hit harder. As the International Labour Organization pointed out, during the COVID-19 epidemic, workers in the informal sector either die from the virus or from hunger.

疫情同时加剧了移民的贫困。受疫情影响，法国的家庭收入骤降，降幅是1949年以来最大的一次，其中移民家庭的降幅最大，这和移民在就业领域的弱势地位息息相关。法国国家统计局(INSEE)指出，在2020年第一季度新冠肺炎疫情最凶险的时期，法国丧失了71.5万个就业岗位，其中非正规就业受到的冲击最大。“不平等观察站”也指出：“失业首先冲击的是短期合同工，特别是低技能的短期合同工。”在疫情期间，为避免大规模裁员，法国出台了“半失业”措施，即允许企业适当缩减工时并支付部分薪酬，如将5天工时改为3天并支付3天薪资，其余2天薪资由政府以失业救济的方式予以部分补偿。这项措施主要涉及工人(54%)和雇员(36%),管理阶层几乎不受影响。由于移民在非正规部门就业的比例大，蓝领工人也较多，因此受到的冲击也更大。正如国际劳工组织指出的，新冠肺炎疫情下的非正规就业部门劳工，不是死于病毒，就是死于饥饿。

(3) The epidemic widened the educational gap between immigrant and non-immigrant children

(三)疫情拉大了移民和非移民子女的教育差距

The switch to online teaching for primary and secondary schools during the lockdown also had a non-negligible negative impact on immigrant families. Immigrant families are either too poor to provide their children with internet access devices; or have poor housing conditions unsuitable for online classes; or have low educational levels and are exhausted by making a living, unable to help their children with schoolwork; or have a combination of the above problems. All these factors further widened the academic gap between their children and those of non-immigrants. Although these phenomena also exist among non-immigrant families, they are more prominent among immigrant families, especially those of African origin.

中小学在禁足期间改为线上授课也对移民家庭带来了不容忽视的负面影响。移民家庭要么贫困，无法为子女提供上网设备；要么居住条件差，不具备上网课的环境；要么文化水平低且疲于生计，无力辅导子女功课；要么上述问题兼具。凡此种种，进一步拉大了其子女和非移民子女的学业差距。尽管这些现象在非移民家庭中也存在，但在移民特别是非裔移民家庭中更为突出。

In summary, while the epidemic has acted as a catalyst in exacerbating social inequality in France, it has also, like a magnifying glass, highlighted the institutional and structural inequalities faced by people of different classes, strata, and ethnicities in France in various fields such as employment, housing, healthcare, and education. As the French “Inequality Observatory” observed during the epidemic: “Social inequalities are increasingly worsening; capitalism seems never to have been so powerful.” French journalist Denis Lafay also pointed out: “The lockdown has strikingly exposed (French society’s) inequalities. For example, inequalities arising from quarantine locations and material conditions. Imagine the Parisians on the beaches of Cap Ferrat and the anonymous masses crammed into social housing in Seine-Saint-Denis (can they be equal?); inequalities in access to guaranteed material conditions and digital levels (digital illiteracy)… In what form will these ‘silent’ inequalities erupt? What other inequalities will the lockdown reveal?” French Interior Minister and former Socialist Christophe Castaner also acknowledged: “The economic and social crisis has worsened hardship and inequality.” Immigrants, as the bottom of society, embody almost all social inequalities in their experience under the epidemic.

概言之，疫情在作为催化剂加剧法国社会不平等的同时，也像放大镜一样凸显了法国社会不同阶级、不同阶层、不同种族的人们在就业、住房、医疗、教育等各个领域的制度性、结构性的不平等。正如法国“不平等观察站”在疫情期间观察到的：“社会不平等现象日益加剧，资本主义似乎从未如此强大。”法国记者丹尼斯·拉费(Denis Lafay)也指出：“禁足惊人地暴露了(法国社会)的不平等。比如隔离地点及物质条件所导致的不平等。试想费拉角海滩上的巴黎人和蜗居在塞纳-圣丹尼的社会保障房中默默无闻的群体(能平等吗?);比如获得保障的物质条件和数字化水平(数字文盲)的不平等……这些‘无声的’不平等会以何种形式爆发?禁足还将揭示哪些不平等?”法国内政部长、前社会党人克里斯多夫·卡斯塔纳(Christophe Castaner)也承认：“经济和社会危机加重了困难和不平等”。移民作为社会底层，他们在疫情下的遭遇集中体现了几乎所有的社会不平等。

III. The Prevalence of Neoliberalism Is the Root of Social Inequality in France

三、新自由主义盛行是法国社会不平等的根源

The social inequality refracted through the prism of immigration is a microcosm of French society in recent years. As the “Inequality Observatory” points out, for a long time, France’s social problems were identified as the hardships of the working class and wage laborers, but the focus of inequality has now shifted, from being concentrated in the suffering of workers to immigrant poverty, “difficult neighborhoods,” youth unemployment, and the formation of a “new dangerous class” (i.e., groups in precarious employment). In fact, all these inequalities are prominently manifested among immigrants—difficult neighborhoods are mainly immigrant聚居区; youth unemployment rates are highest among immigrant youth; precarious employment is most typical among immigrants. Therefore, immigrants are also the main force of the so-called “new dangerous class.” In summary, immigrants act like a prism, refracting all inequalities.

以移民为棱镜折射出的社会不平等是近些年法国社会的缩影。正如“不平等观察站”指出的，长期以来，法国的社会问题被确定为工人阶级和工资劳动者的劳苦问题，但目前不平等问题的重心已经发生转变，从集中表现为工人的困苦转向移民贫困、“困难街区”、青年失业以及“新危险阶级”(即非正规就业群体)的形成等。实际上，所有这些不平等在移民身上都有着突出的体现——困难街区以移民聚居区为主；青年失业率以移民青年为最高；非正规就业以移民最为典型。因此，移民也是所谓“新危险阶级”的主力。概言之，移民像一面棱镜，折射着所有的不平等。

The primary root of growing social inequality in France lies in the prevalence of neoliberalism. Over the past two to three decades, the widespread dominance of neoliberalism in the Western world has dealt a major blow to France, which originally valued fairness and labor protection. Under the dominance of neoliberal values, France’s relevant policies have gradually tilted toward capital, with the balance increasingly leaning toward efficiency, weakening protections for vulnerable groups such as labor. This is particularly evident in the following aspects.

法国社会日益不平等的根源首要在于新自由主义的盛行。近二三十年来，新自由主义在西方世界的大行其道对原本重视公平和劳工保护的法国造成了重大冲击。在新自由主义价值观的支配下，法国的相关政策逐步向资本倾斜，天平日益倒向效率，削弱了对劳工等弱势群体的保护，这尤其表现在如下方面。

(1) Drastic Cuts in Public Spending in Areas Such as Healthcare

(一)大力压缩医疗健康等领域的公共开支

After World War II, driven by left-wing forces such as the French Communist Party and the French Socialist Party, France gradually established a globally recognized first-class healthcare system. However, in the past two to three decades, in order to reduce fiscal deficits and stimulate the economy, France has embarked on a path of fiscal austerity, such as reducing medical investment and drastically cutting hospital beds. This has not only led to the closure of small medical institutions and made it difficult for people in remote areas to access medical care, but has also resulted in a severe shortage of hospital capacity in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, as exemplified by the Seine-Saint-Denis department.

第二次世界大战后，在法国共产党、法国社会党等左翼力量的大力推动下，法国逐步建立了全球公认的一流的医疗卫生保健体系。但最近二三十年来，为削减财政赤字，刺激经济，法国走上了财政紧缩的道路，如减少医疗投入，大力削减病床等，不仅导致小的医疗机构纷纷倒闭，偏远地区民众看病成为难题，更导致在新冠肺炎疫情面前，医院收治能力严重不足，塞纳-圣丹尼省就是例子。

Since 2019, French healthcare workers have repeatedly protested against the government’s cuts in medical spending. They stated that they have witnessed the gradual collapse of the medical system over the past 20 years and warned that if the government continues to cut spending, France’s health system will completely collapse, and patients will face life-threatening risks due to lack of treatment. Unfortunately, this prediction came true. This is also why President Macron pointed out during the epidemic that “what this pandemic reveals is that some goods and services must be placed outside market rules” and indicated that lessons should be learned to regain state control over the people’s livelihood and medical industry.

2019年以来，法国医护人员曾多次为反对政府削减医疗支出而游行抗议，他们称20年来目睹了医疗系统的逐步坍塌，警告政府如果继续削减开支，法国的卫生系统将彻底崩溃，届时患者将因无法得到救治而面临生命危险。不幸的是一语成谶。这也是马克龙总统在疫情期间指出“这场大流行病所揭示的是，有些商品和服务必须置于市场规则之外”,并表示要汲取教训，夺回国家对民生医疗行业的控制权的原因。

In recent years, other social spending in France has also been shrinking, such as reductions in family allowances, cuts in housing subsidies, and declines in both the duration of unemployment benefits and the level of unemployment payments. In summary, protections for vulnerable groups such as labor have been continuously weakened. The French government claims this is to improve efficiency and promote growth. However, studies by Thomas Piketty and others show that economic growth has not benefited the general public; instead, wealth has increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small minority, and the gap between rich and poor in society has grown. France was originally a Western country that placed greater emphasis on social fairness, with a relatively small wealth gap, but in recent years, the wealth gap has also shown a widening trend. For example, 2018 statistics show that the difference in living standards between the richest 10% and the poorest 10% of the French population is at least 3.5 times. The richest 10% of the population own 46% of total social assets. The gap between the median living standard and that of the richest 10% is continuously widening. During the same period, thanks to increased asset income, the living standards of the wealthiest families rose sharply, while the living standards of the poorest families declined due to reductions in housing subsidies, and the poverty rate also rose. Statistics also show that the wealthy class is mainly composed of financial sector workers, freelancers, and management; the poor class is mainly workers and employees; from an ethnic perspective, immigrants are poorer; from a gender perspective, women are poorer (due to higher female unemployment rates and higher proportions of women working in the informal sector, such as low-end services).

近些年法国的其他社会投入也呈缩减态势，如家庭津贴缩水、住房补贴降低、失业保障时间和失业金水平均下降等，概言之，对劳工等弱势群体的保护不断减弱，法国政府宣称这是为了提高效率，促进增长。然而托马斯·皮凯蒂(Thomas Piketty)等人的研究表明，经济增长并没有惠及普罗大众，相反财富日益集中到一小撮人手里，社会的贫富差距越来越大。法国本是西方国家中较为重视社会公平的，贫富差距不大，但是近年来贫富差距也出现加大趋势，如2018年的统计表明，法国最富裕的10%人口和最贫穷的10%人口的生活水平差最少为3.5。最富有的10%人口拥有社会总资产的46%。居民生活水平中位数与最富有的10%人口之间的差距不断拉大。同期，得益于资产收入的增加，最富裕家庭的生活水平急剧上升，而最贫困家庭的生活水平由于住房补贴的降低呈现下滑趋势，贫困率也随之上升。统计同时表明：富裕阶层主要是金融业从业者、自由职业者和管理阶层；贫困阶层则以工人和雇员为主；从种族来看，移民更贫困；从性别来看，女性更贫困(因女性失业率和就业于非正规部门如低端服务业的比例更高)。

(2) Replacing Formal Employment with Precarious Employment in Pursuit of Profit Maximization

(二)为追求利润最大化而用非正规就业取代正规就业

Since the 21st century, in order to gain a comparative advantage in economic globalization by cutting production costs including wages and social welfare, enterprises have increasingly replaced long-term, permanent contracts with short-term, temporary contracts, and even outsourced part of their business. This has become a common practice among Western governments that embrace neoliberalism. To improve employment (the decline of manufacturing has led to rising unemployment), governments have also encouraged the development of this so-called “flexible employment,” especially in the service sector. France is no exception; for example, the government has encouraged such employment through measures such as reducing social security contributions. The result is an increasingly polarized labor market, with a continuous decline in the number of formal employees and a corresponding increase in precarious employment such as temporary workers, contract workers, and hourly workers. Precarious workers lack security in all aspects—their wages are low and unstable; they are excluded from the social security system or find it difficult to be covered by certain social insurance programs, facing a higher overall risk of poverty; moreover, compared with formal employees, precarious workers are dispersed and fragmented, making it difficult to organize through trade unions for collective bargaining, and their legitimate interests and demands are hard to assert. Immigrants, as a seemingly “inexhaustible” reservoir of low-end labor, have become typical representatives of precarious employment.

21世纪以来，企业为在经济全球化中获得比较优势而削减包括工资和社会福利在内的生产成本，用短期、临时性合同取代长期、固定合同，甚至将部分业务外包，日益成为信奉新自由主义的西方各国政府的普遍做法。为改善就业(制造业的萎缩导致失业攀升),政府也鼓励发展这种所谓的“灵活就业”,特别是在服务业领域。法国也不例外，如政府曾通过减免社保缴费等方式来鼓励这类就业。其结果是劳动力市场日益两极分化，正规就业者人数不断减少，反之，临时工、合同工、小时工等非正规就业不断增加。非正规就业者在各方面都缺乏保障——薪资水平低且不稳定；被排斥在社会保障体系之外，或难以被某些社保项目所覆盖，整体上面临更高的致贫风险；此外，与正规就业者相比，非正规就业者分散、碎片化，难以以工会的形式组织起来进行集体谈判，正当利益诉求难以伸张。而移民作为看上去“取之不尽、用之不竭”的低端劳动力蓄水池，成为非正规就业的典型代表。

In response to the above phenomenon, the renowned French left-wing scholar André Gorz once pointed out: “Stable full-time employment, that is, employment that can last throughout the year and throughout a person’s entire working life, has become the privilege of a small minority; conversely, nearly half of the economically active population can no longer integrate into a productive group through labor, and thereby determine their position in society through professional activities within that group.” “In the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States, 35% to 50% of the economically active population lives on the margins of what we call ‘labor civilization’ and its value hierarchy and ethics of profit. The social system is split in two, forming what is commonly called a ‘dual society’ or ‘two-speed society.’ The result is the rapid disintegration of social organization and structure. At the top of the pyramid is regulated competition, leading to those very rare jobs that are both stable and offer opportunities for advancement… Society moves toward a sports competition model, and social relations move toward a life-and-death struggle model… Those men and women who are not winners are cast to the margins of society…”

针对上述现象，法国知名左翼学者安德烈·高兹(André Gorz)曾指出：“稳定的全职就业，即能持续全年和(一个人)整个有劳动能力的生涯的就业成了一小部分人的专利；反之近乎一半的经济活动人口无法再经由劳动融入一个生产性的团体、进而经过在该团体的职业活动来确定自己在社会中的位置。”“在英国、法国、德国和美国，35%～50%的经济活动人口生活在我们所谓的‘劳动文明’及其价值等级和美德与利润伦理的边缘。社会体系被一劈为二，形成了人们通常所说的‘双面社会’或‘双速社会’。结果是社会的组织与结构快速解体。在金字塔的顶端是有节制的竞争，它通向那些十分稀有、既稳定又有上升机会的就业……社会走向竞技体育模式，社会关系走向你死我活的斗争模式……那些不是赢家的男女被抛到了社会的边缘……”

A large number of domestic service jobs exist in informal employment, and this is also a common situation for immigrants in France, especially female immigrants. Regarding this phenomenon, André Gorz also made an incisive exposition, pointing out: “Under the conditions of a free-market economy, the only activity that might create a large number of jobs in the future is personal services. If the (household) activities (etc.) that until now have been undertaken by each person themselves could be transformed into the supply of paid services, employment would develop without limit, which economists call ‘new growth that creates more jobs,’ that is, the ‘tertiarization’ of the economy and the replacement of ‘industrial society’ by a ‘service society.’” “Yet we see that saving the wage-earning society in this way will give rise to a series of problems and contradictions… Personal services… might create a large number of jobs, because in most cases the men and women who do an hour of housework for you are paid far less than you earn for an hour of your own work. The development of personal services relies on the impoverishment of the common people, and this group is constantly increasing, as we have observed in North America and Western Europe. On one side are those who provide personal services, on the other those who purchase them; the social and economic inequality between the two has become a new engine of employment growth, an engine built on the dual nature of society and a certain South Africanization, as if the colonial model were taking root in the heart of the metropolis!”

非正规就业中有大量家政服务业，这也是法国移民特别是女性移民的普遍处境。针对该现象，高兹也作出了精辟论述，他指出：“在自由经济条件下，未来唯一有可能创造大量就业的活动是人员服务。如果能把迄今为止由每个人自己承担的(家务)活动(等)转变为有偿服务供给，就业就会无限发展，按照经济学家们的说法这就是‘创造更多就业的新增长’,即经济‘三产化’和以‘服务社会’取代‘工业社会’。”“然而我们看到，以这种方式挽救工薪社会将引发一系列问题和矛盾……人员服务……有可能创造大量就业，因为在大多数情况下，那些替您从事一小时家务劳动的男男女女的薪酬比您本人工作一小时的所得要少得多。人员服务的发展靠的是普罗众生的贫困化，而这部分人在不断增加，我们在北美和西欧都发现了这一点。一边是为个人提供服务者，一边是购买服务者，两者之间在社会和经济领域的不平等变成了就业发展的新引擎，该引擎建立在社会的双面性和某种南非化之上，就像殖民模式正在大都市的心脏生根发芽!”

Gorz exposed the essence of the problem in a single penetrating stroke: the large number of low-skill or no-skill service jobs that have emerged with the decline of manufacturing has caused a polarization of society. On the one hand, more and more people deprived of formal employment opportunities have to make a living by selling services; on the other hand, the cheapness of services enables the wealthy class to purchase more services, thereby freeing up more time to earn more money. The result is that wealth is increasingly concentrated in the hands of a tiny minority, while ordinary people are increasingly trapped in cheap, low-end jobs. The income gap between the two is widening, and the latter are becoming increasingly impoverished.

高兹一针见血地揭露了问题的实质，即随着制造业的衰落而出现的大量低技术或无技术含量的服务业造成了社会的两极分化：一方面越来越多被剥夺了正规就业机会的人不得不靠出卖服务为生；另一方面服务的廉价使富裕阶层得以购买更多的服务，从而腾出更多时间去挣更多的钱；结果是财富日益集中到一小撮人手中，而普通人则日益被困在廉价的低端就业中。两者的收入差距日益拉大，后者日益贫困。

The French “Observatoire des inégalités” [Inequality Observatory] reached the same conclusion: “In fact, gradually rising through the ranks at work by progressively improving (personal) qualifications is no longer an inevitable process as it was in the 1980s and 1990s. The growth of low-end services meets the needs of the unequal service society that is being established. On the one hand, the widening income gap means that the wealthy class can afford to use low-wage labor; on the other hand, the increase in unskilled employment is supported by public subsidies… These public subsidies include reducing social security contributions for low-wage (employment) and tax cuts for employers of domestic workers. (As a result,) some people who might have expected to rise in the social hierarchy, especially given their educational background, find themselves trapped in low-skill, low-paid menial work. This breeds social tension.”

法国“社会观察研究中心”得出了同样结论：“事实上，通过逐步提升(个人)资质而在工作岗位上节节提升已不再像20世纪八九十年代那样是个不可避免的过程。低端服务业的增长满足了正在建立的不平等的服务社会的需求，一方面收入差距的扩大意味着富裕阶层有条件使用低薪劳动力；另一方面，无技术含量的就业的增加得到了公共补贴的支持……这些公共补贴包括削减低薪(就业)的社保缴费和为家政服务的雇佣者减税。(结果导致)一些原本有望提升社会阶层的人，特别是鉴于自身的教育背景，发现自己陷入了低技能、低报酬的琐碎工作。这滋生了社会的紧张。”

In other words, under the influence of neoliberal thought, encouraging the development of informal employment represented by the service sector through measures such as reducing social security contributions and personal income taxes to promote employment and growth is purely putting the cart before the horse. In reality, economic growth has not benefited the working masses; on the contrary, even some people who might have improved their situation through education are permanently trapped at the bottom of the job market, and the channels for upward social mobility have been blocked. The correct approach to improving employment and reducing unemployment, as Gorz pointed out, should be to create high-quality jobs and provide comprehensive vocational skills training, enabling people to obtain and retain stable, high-quality employment, rather than being nailed to low-quality, low-paid positions from which they cannot escape.

换言之，在新自由主义思想影响下，为促进就业与增长，通过减免社保缴费和个税等方式来鼓励发展以服务业为代表的非正规就业，纯粹是本末倒置。实际上经济增长并未惠及劳苦大众，相反连一些原本有望通过教育来改善处境的人们也被永远困在就业市场的底端，社会上升的通道被堵死。改善就业、降低失业的正确做法，正如高兹指出的，应是创造高质量就业并提供完善的职业技能培训，使人们有能力获得并保有稳定优质的就业，而不是被钉在低质低薪的岗位上翻不了身。

IV. The Transformation of the Left-Wing Party—the Socialist Party—Objectively Facilitated Social Inequality

四、左翼政党——社会党的蜕变客观上纵容了社会不平等

The Socialist Party, France’s largest left-wing party, claims to be a party of the working class and, in theory, takes it as its mission to defend the interests of the middle and lower strata of society and uphold social justice. However, with the changes of the times, the Socialist Party has gradually undergone a transformation and no longer represents the middle and lower strata. This fact has objectively facilitated or even exacerbated social inequality.

法国最大的左翼政党——社会党自称工人阶级政党，理论上以捍卫社会中下层利益、维护社会公正为己任。但随着时代的变化，社会党逐渐发生蜕变，不再代言中下阶层，这一事实客观上纵容甚至加剧了社会不平等。

Since the 1970s and 1980s, with the adjustment of the industrial structure, France’s employment structure has undergone tremendous changes. From 1982 to 2018, “senior managers and intermediate occupations” (most of whom are general managers, belonging to the upper stratum of workers—‘white-collar’ workers or the petty bourgeoisie, with a minority being top managers such as CEOs who are capitalists) increased from 28% to 44% of the employed population, while the number of the middle and lower strata of the working class has shrunk somewhat. Class differentiation has led to changes in the Socialist Party: under the electoral system, in order to win more voters and achieve the goal of coming to power, the Socialist Party gradually distanced itself from the middle and lower social strata represented by workers and employees, instead courting the votes of the upper-middle strata. After coming to power, it also implemented policies that to a certain extent represented the interests of big capital. Research shows that as early as 1985, the Socialist Party’s “populist” hue had already faded—in 1985, the proportion of workers and employees among Socialist Party members was 22% (workers 10%, employees 11%), which further fell to 12% in 2011 (workers 3%, employees 9%); conversely, the proportion of senior managers doubled, from 19% to 38%. In terms of educational background, the Socialist Party’s elitist character has also become increasingly pronounced: in 1985, the proportion of Socialist Party members with a university degree or above was 39%; in 2011, it rose to 64%, several times the national average (14%). While distancing itself from the middle and lower strata, the Socialist Party’s economic and social policies have continuously shifted to the right, moving closer to the center-right, and in some respects even converging with it. So we see that when the Socialist Party returned to power after 17 years out of French politics (in 2012), it not only failed to correct the social injustices caused by the right-wing during its tenure but actually contributed to social injustice.

20世纪七八十年代以来，随着产业结构的调整，法国就业结构发生巨变。1982～2018年，“高级管理人员和中间职业者”(其中大部分为一般管理人员，属于工人上层——“白领”或小资产阶级，少数是作为资本家的顶尖管理者如首席执行官等)从占就业人口的28%增至44 %,工人阶级的中下阶层数量则有所缩减。阶层分化导致了社会党的变化：在选举制度下，为争取更多选民，实现上台执政的目的，社会党逐渐疏远了以工人和雇员为代表的社会中下阶层，转而争取中上阶层选票，上台后又在一定程度上实施了代表大资本利益的政策。研究表明，早在1985年社会党的“平民”色彩就已经淡化——1985年，社会党党员中工人和雇员的占比是22%(工人10%、雇员11%),后进一步降至2011年的12%(工人3%,雇员9%);相反，高管的占比则翻番，从19%升至38%;从学历上看，社会党的精英色彩也越来越浓：1985年，社会党党员中有大学及以上学历者的占比是39%,2011年升至64%,数倍于全国平均水平(14%)。在疏远中下阶层的同时，社会党的经济社会政策不断右倾，向中右靠拢，在某些方面甚至和后者趋同。所以我们看到，社会党在阔别法国政坛17年后再次执政时(2012年),非但没有纠正右翼执政时造成的社会不公平，反而助长了社会不公平。

On the other hand, some of the lower-class people abandoned by the Socialist Party turned to support the anti-elite, anti-globalization right-wing populist party—the National Rally (renamed from the “National Front”)—causing this party to grow and develop continuously, and it has now become one of the top political forces in France. The National Rally is also known for being anti-immigration; it constantly incites hostility and antagonism in French society toward immigrants, attributing all of France’s current “misfortunes” to immigrants, such as loudly proclaiming that immigrants are stealing French people’s jobs, when in fact immigrants mostly do the dirty, difficult, and dangerous jobs that native French residents are unwilling to do. We even see the following paradox: on the one hand, there is a large number of unemployed people in French society; on the other hand, a large number of low-end jobs go unfilled and can only rely on immigrants. This is why the French government still needs to import a certain number of immigrants from Africa—to supplement the shortage of “low-end labor.”

另一方面，一部分被社会党抛弃的底层民众转去支持反精英、反全球化的右翼民粹主义政党——国民联盟(由“国民阵线”更名而来),致使该党不断发展壮大，目前已经成为法国政坛数一数二的力量。国民联盟同时以反移民著称，它不断煽动法国社会对移民的敌视和对立情绪，将法国今日的种种“不幸”都归咎于移民，如大肆宣扬移民抢法国人的饭碗，实则移民所从事的大多是法国本土居民所不愿从事的脏乱差工作。我们甚至看到下列悖论：一方面法国社会存在大量失业人口；另一方面大量低端工作没人干，只能依靠移民。这就是为什么法国政府迄今仍需从非洲引进一定数量移民的原因——以补充“低端劳动力”的不足。

Furthermore, under the so-called “competitive pressure” of the National Rally’s continuous growth and development, the center-right parties, in order to compete with the National Rally for voters, have also continuously shifted to the right, showing a certain degree of “far-rightization.” Every time elections approach, they use immigration to create topics.

此外，在国民联盟不断发展壮大的所谓“竞争压力”下，中右政党为和国民联盟争夺选民，也不断右倾，表现出一定程度的“极右化”,每到大选前夕，便拿移民来制造话题。

The collective rightward shift of French politics not only makes it difficult for the various social injustices faced by immigrants to be comprehensively, objectively, and fairly understood by French society, let alone addressed, but it further worsens the disadvantaged situation of immigrants.

法国政坛的集体右倾，不仅使移民所面临的种种社会不公难以得到法国社会全面、客观和公正的认识，更得不到治理，反而进一步恶化了移民的不利处境。

V. Conclusion

五、结 论

The increasing social inequality in France, as reflected through the prism of immigration during the COVID-19 pandemic, is the result of neoliberalism gradually gaining the upper hand in France in recent years. Under the dominance of neoliberal thought, the defense of capital and the market increasingly prevails over the defense of labor and social equity. Secure, high-quality employment is continuously shrinking; insecure, temporary employment is constantly increasing; the social security systems for the working class—such as healthcare and pensions—established after the war under the impetus of powerful left-wing political forces like the French Communist Party and the Socialist Party, are being continuously compressed; and the gap between the rich and the poor in French society is widening.

新冠肺炎疫情下，以移民为棱镜折射出的法国社会日益加剧的不平等，是近些年新自由主义在法国逐渐占上风的结果。在新自由主义思想支配下，对资方和市场的维护日益压倒对劳方和社会公平的维护。有保障的优质就业不断缩减；无保障的临时性就业不断增加；战后在法国共产党和社会党等强大左翼政治力量推动下建立的劳工阶层的医疗、养老等社会保障被不断压缩，法国社会贫富两极的差距不断拉大。

As Denis Laffaille points out: “After Thomas Piketty, social science researchers, think tanks and economists have all rightly emphasised the ever-increasing inequality of the past thirty years. The inequality they have discovered and exposed is in fact very great inequality, the inequality that sets 5%, 1%, 0.1% or even 0.01% of the population against the rest. They are right, because the concentration of wealth in the hands of a tiny minority creates economic problems as well as social and fiscal problems, and this is not merely a matter of justice, since a part of society thereby escapes ‘everyday’ social life and the control of the state.” Laffaille’s last sentence means that, under neoliberal economic and social policies, the wealthy propertied class can do almost anything it pleases. In fact, while France has weakened protections for the working class, its policies have increasingly tilted in favour of capital. For example, immediately after coming to power Macron abolished the “wealth tax on the very rich” [7]7 The “wealth tax on the very rich” (impôt de solidarité sur la fortune, ISF) was a French tax on assets exceeding a certain threshold, replaced under President Emmanuel Macron in 2018 by a narrower tax on real estate wealth only (impôt sur la fortune immobilière, IFI)., which the public had long called for and which had only been introduced when the Socialist Party returned to government; conversely, he did not forget to impose a “fuel tax”. In summary, as long as the neoliberal policy orientation remains unchanged, the injustice of wealth inequality in French society will not change; on the contrary, it will only worsen and intensify social contradictions. (Notes omitted)

正如丹尼斯·拉费指出的：“在托马斯·皮凯蒂之后，社会科学工作者、智库和经济学家都正确地强调了过去30年来不平等现象的不断增加。他们发现并揭露的不平等实际上是非常大的不平等，是使5%、1%、0.1%甚至0.01%的人口与其他人口相对立的不平等。他们是对的，因为财富集中在极少数人手里，这带来了经济问题以及社会和财政问题，这不仅仅事关正义，因为一部分社会成员因此逃脱了‘日常的’社会生活和国家的管控。”拉费的最后一句话意指，在新自由主义的经济社会政策下，富裕的有产阶级几乎可以为所欲为。事实上，法国在削弱对劳工阶层保护的同时，相关政策日益向有利于资本的方向倾斜，如马克龙上台后立刻取消了民众千呼万唤、借社会党再度执政之际始出台的“巨富税”,相反他没有忘记开征“燃油税”。概括而言，只要新自由主义的政策取向不变，法国社会的贫富不公就不会改变，相反只会进一步恶化并激化社会矛盾。（注释略）

Online editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑