Critique of Digital Labour from the Perspective of Historical Materialism

As capitalist development enters the stage of digital capitalism and platform capitalism, Marxist researchers today must confront a real problem: how to understand the new type of “capital–labour” relation formed under the influence of new technologies such as digital technology and intelligent algorithms? This is the foundation for a political-economic critique of digital capitalism, and also a highly valuable path for re-examining the development of contemporary capitalism from the perspective of historical materialism. Before the question of how digital becomes capital, the first issue that needs to be addressed is whether digital labour constitutes a genuine form of productive labour. Is it a kind of “cultural labour” or “immaterial labour” as some traditional cultural studies theories or Marxist theories hold — a labour that does not directly produce any economic value? In contemporary Marxist studies and in the critique of new forms of capitalist development, the analysis and critique of digital labour has become an indispensable component.

随着资本主义发展进入数字资本主义和平台资本主义阶段，今天，马克思主义的研究者必须面对的一个现实问题是，如何理解资本主义在数字技术、智能算法等新技术的影响下，形成的新型“资本—劳动”关系？这是对数字资本主义进行政治经济学批判的基础，也是在历史唯物主义视野下重新审视当今资本主义发展的一条非常有价值的路径。在数字如何成为资本的问题之前，首先需要谈到的问题是，数字劳动是否构成一种真实的生产劳动。它是否是一些传统的文化研究理论或马克思主义理论中认为的“文化劳动”或“非物质劳动”，一种不直接生产任何经济价值的劳动。在当今的马克思主义研究以及对资本主义发展新形态的批判中，数字劳动的分析与批判成为其中不可或缺的内容。

I. Is Digital Labour Immaterial Labour?

一、数字劳动是非物质劳动吗？

An intuitive view of labour under digital production is that digital labour is a kind of “immaterial labour” or “cultural labour”. The concepts of so-called “immaterial labour” and “cultural labour” are in fact both defined in relation to labour that produces material commodities; only in concrete productive labour can value be produced that embodies undifferentiated human labour. However, in Marx’s *Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863* (a part of *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*), he also distinguished between productive labour and unproductive labour. Marx pointed out: “Wherever money is exchanged directly for labour which does not produce capital, i.e. for unproductive labour, this labour is bought as a service. This expression ‘service’ in general denotes nothing more than the particular use-value which this labour provides, like every other commodity also provides its own particular use-value; but it becomes the specific expression for labour because labour provides services not as a thing but as an activity (Tätigkeit).”[1]1 Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 29, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1972, p. 35. [Translator’s note: The English translation of the Marx quote is a rendering of the Chinese translation provided in the original text.](P865)

对于数字生产下的劳动，一个直观的看法是，数字劳动是一种“非物质劳动”或“文化劳动”。所谓的“非物质劳动”和“文化劳动”的概念，实际上都是相对于生产物质商品的劳动而言的，只有在具体的生产劳动中，才能生产出凝结了无差别人类劳动的价值。然而，在马克思的《政治经济学批判（1861—1863年手稿）》中，他也曾经区分了生产劳动和非生产劳动的区别，马克思指出：凡是货币直接同不生产资本的劳动即非生产劳动相交换的地方，这种劳动都是作为服务被购买的。服务这个词，一般地说，不过是指这种劳动所提供的特殊使用价值，就像其他一切商品也提供自己的特殊使用价值一样；但是，这种劳动的特殊使用价值在这里取得了“服务”这个特殊名称，是因为劳动不是作为物，而是作为活动（Tätigkeit）提供服务的。[1](P865)

Marx saw that, apart from the labour engaged in the actual production of products in the capitalist’s factory, other types of labour do indeed exist in capitalist society. Of course, the unproductive labour discussed here does not involve one’s own productive activity for oneself — for example, a tailor sewing clothes for himself — because when Marx discusses productive and unproductive labour, he does so at the level of social relations of production and relations of intercourse. So, at the level of social production, what exactly is unproductive labour? In the *Grundrisse* (the *Economic Manuscripts of 1857–1858*), Marx used the term “service” — a “service” that can be purchased. This service first of all has use-value; it produces a series of utility functions. However, this labour does not produce a “thing”, does not produce a thing as a “substance”, but only an activity. Marx used an example to illustrate this “unproductive labour”: “a singer who sings for her own living is an unproductive labourer.”[1]1 Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 29, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1972, p. 35. [Translator’s note: The English translation of the Marx quote is a rendering of the Chinese translation provided in the original text.](P862) Marx saw the singer’s singing, but this singing for a living does not have a product in the ordinary sense; that is, her performance exists in an “immaterial” form and exchanges for the coins of passers-by. The singer’s voice leaves behind no substantive product, but a relation is formed with the passer-by who stops to appreciate her — a specific social relation formed by the singing. The connection of this social relation in terms of use-value (the use-value relation between the singer and the listener is in fact an aesthetic relation) depends entirely on the process of singing. Therefore Marx stated very clearly: “The service a singer performs for me satisfies my aesthetic need; but what I enjoy is the activity itself, inseparable from the singer herself; as soon as her labour, the singing, stops, my enjoyment also ceases; what I enjoy is the activity itself, the auditory reaction it provokes in me.”[1]1 Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 29, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1972, p. 35. [Translator’s note: The English translation of the Marx quote is a rendering of the Chinese translation provided in the original text.](P866) The melody of this singing forms between the singer and the listener what Marx means by “service”; it depends on a temporarily existing relation in a specific time and space. In Marx’s view, doctors and lawyers also provide this kind of service; their value also produces a service relation between themselves and their patients or clients in a specific time and space. This specific social relation produced by service activity thus becomes Marx’s “unproductive labour”. However, Marx also keenly observed that “unproductive labour” is a dependent form of labour; it forms a certain relation of dependence with “productive labour”. Within a certain scope — perhaps a country or a region may be dominated by “unproductive labour” — but on a global scale, unproductive labour cannot shake the foundational position of productive labour. Therefore, within Marx’s framework of political economy, unproductive labour is merely a result of productive labour on a fairly developed basis, and cannot truly replace productive labour.

马克思看到，除了在资本家的工厂里从事实际产品生产的劳动之外，在资本主义社会中，的确存在着其他类型的劳动。当然，这里的非生产性劳动并不涉及为自己的生产活动，例如，裁缝为自己缝制的衣物等，因为马克思在这里谈到生产劳动和非生产劳动都是在社会的生产关系和交往关系层面上来讨论的。那么，在社会生产的层面上，究竟什么是非生产劳动。马克思在《政治经济学批判（1857—1858年手稿）》中使用的词是“服务”，一种可以用来购买的“服务”，这种服务首先具有使用价值，它能产生一系列的效用上的功能。但是，这些劳动并不生产出“物”，不生产作为“实体”的物，而只是一个活动。马克思用了一个例子来说明这种“非生产劳动”，即“一个自行卖唱的歌女是非生产劳动者”。[1](P862)马克思看到了歌女的歌唱，但这种卖唱并不具有一般意义上的产品，即她的演唱是以一种“非物质”的形式存在，并换取了路人的货币。歌女的歌声并没有留下任何实体性的产品，但是，在驻足欣赏歌女的过客那里形成了一种关系，一种由歌声形成的特定的社会关系，而这种社会关系具有使用价值上（在歌女和听众之间的使用价值的关系，实际上是一种审美关系）的联系完全依赖于歌唱的过程。因此马克思才十分明确地指出：“一个歌唱家为我提供的服务，满足了我的审美的需要；但是，我所享受的，只是同歌唱家本身分不开的活动，他的劳动即歌唱一停止，我的享受也就结束；我所享受的是活动本身，是它引起的我的听觉的反应。”[1](P866)这种歌唱的旋律在歌女和听众之间形成的就是马克思意义上的“服务”，它依赖于在一定的时间和空间中的临时存在的关系。在马克思看来，医生和律师也同样提供着这种服务，他们的价值也生产出他们在特定时间和空间中与病人和客户之间的服务性关系，而这种由服务活动产生的特定的社会关系就成了马克思的“非生产劳动”。不过，马克思也十分敏锐地看到，“非生产劳动”是一种依附性的劳动，它与“生产劳动”构成一定依赖关系，在一定范围内，或许一个国家、一个地区以“非生产劳动”为主，但在全球范围内，非生产劳动无法撼动生产劳动的基础性地位。因此，在马克思的政治经济学框架中，非生产劳动只是生产劳动在相当发达基础上的结果，而不可能真正取代生产劳动。

However, Italian Autonomism [n1] clearly appropriated Marx’s “unproductive labour” in another sense, but they did not define it according to Marx’s usage in the *Grundrisse*; instead, they generalized it into “immaterial labour” in a broad sense. Nevertheless, this distorted appropriation still borrowed another concept from Marx’s so-called “Fragment on Machines” [n2]: “general intellect”. Marx’s original words are: “the general social knowledge has become a direct force of production, and hence the conditions of the social life process itself have come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it. It shows to what degree the social productive forces are produced, not only in the form of knowledge, but also as the direct organs of social practice, of the real life process.”[2]2 Nick Srnicek, *Platform Capitalism*, trans. Cheng Shuijing, Guangzhou: Guangdong People’s Publishing House, 2018, p. 46. [Translator’s note: The English translation of the Srnicek quote is a rendering of the Chinese translation provided in the original text.](P198) Marx here directly uses the English words “general intellect”. Clearly, Marx intended through the concept of general intellect to express general social knowledge, also representing the intangible aspects such as knowledge, language, and emotion that appear in the production process. That is to say, “general intellect” was from the outset distinct from the “unproductive labour” in the *Grundrisse*, because for Marx, productive labour and unproductive labour are two entirely different processes in social production and life, whereas in “general intellect”, Marx refers to two different types of product existing within the production link: one is the visible material product, the other is the invisible product. To use the later explanation of Paolo Virno: “It is not accidental that the social individual appears in the same section of the *Grundrisse* where we find the concept of general intellect constituting the universal (or pre-individual) premise and the common configuration of the labour and life of the ‘multitude’. The social aspect of the social individual is undoubtedly general intellect, which Frege called subjectless thought. Yet it is also the immediate inter-psychological, public aspect of human communication, recognized with great insight by Vygotsky.”[3](P231) Thus, this “general intellect” forms an intangible totality of language, emotion, wisdom, and cognition, and this totality has become a force more important than actual material production, also uniting workers and the multitude into a totality capable of opposing capitalism.

不过，意大利自治主义显然从另一种意义上挪用了马克思的“非生产劳动”，但是他们并没有按照马克思在《政治经济学批判（1857—1858年手稿）》中界定，而是将其泛化为一般意义上的“非物质劳动”。不过，他们这种扭曲式挪用，依然借用了马克思所谓“机器论片段”中的另一个概念“一般智力”。马克思的原话是：“一般社会知识，已经在多么大的程度上变成了直接的生产力，从而社会生活过程的条件本身在多么大的程度上受到一般智力（general intellect）的控制并按照这种智力得到改造。它表明，社会生产力已经在多么大的程度上，不仅以知识的形式，而且作为社会实践的直接器官，作为实际生活过程的直接器官被生产出来。”[2](P198)马克思仅在这里直接用“一般智力”的英文单词，显然，马克思希望通过一般智力概念表达出一般的社会知识，也代表着生产过程中出现的知识、语言、情感等无形的方面。也就是说，“一般智力”从一开始就区别于《政治经济学批判（1857—1858年手稿）》中“非生产劳动”，因为，马克思所谓的生产劳动和非生产劳动是社会生产和生活中的两个完全不同的过程，而在“一般智力”中，马克思所指的是生产环节中存在的两种不同的产品，一种是可见的物质性的产品，另一种不可见的产品，用后来的保罗·维尔诺（Paolo Virno）的解释，“社会个体出现在《政治经济学批判（1857—1858年手稿）》中同一个部分并不是偶然的，在那里我们发现一般智力的概念构成了普遍（或前个体）的前提和‘诸众’(multitude)的劳动和生活的共同配置，社会个体的社会方面无疑是一般智力，弗雷格称之为无主体的思想。然而，它也是人类交流的直接的心理间的、公共的方面，这一点被维果茨基（Vygosky）以极大的智慧所认识。”[3](P231)所以，这种“一般智力”形成了一种无形的语言、情感、智慧、认知的总体，而这种总体成了比实际的物质生产更重要的力量，也将工人和诸众凝聚起来，成为足以对抗资本主义的总体性。

It is precisely on this basis that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri put forward their famous concept of “immaterial labour”. Hardt and Negri point out: “In the production of surplus value, the labour force composed of workers engaged in large-scale production in factories once played a central role, but today this role is increasingly being replaced by the intellectualised, immaterial labour force in the sphere of communication and exchange. It is therefore necessary to develop a new theory of political value… The most immediate social dimension of the exploitation of living labour engaged in immaterial production integrates labour into all the factors that define social relations.” [4](P35) In the early 21st century, Hardt and Negri had already glimpsed the dawn brought by electronic communication and digital technologies. They saw that production in factories in the major Western developed countries was gradually giving way to a totality of intangible general intellect brought about by changes in communication and digital technologies. In this situation, immaterial production gradually replaced the position of material production, so that the capitalist’s exploitation was no longer the exploitation of material surplus value in substance, but the exploitation of an intangible, immaterial general intellect.

也正是在这个基础上，迈克尔·哈特和安东尼奥·奈格里才从中提出了著名的“非物质劳动”的概念。哈特和奈格里指出：“在剩余价值的生产中，由在工厂中从事大规模生产的工人组成的劳动力量原先起到了核心作用，可今天，这种作用已越来越被通讯交往领域的智力化、非物质化的劳动力量说取代。因此，就必须发展出一种新的政治价值理论……对活生生的，从事非物质生产的劳动的剥削，它的最直观的社会维度将劳动结合进一切界定着社会关系因素中。”[4](P35)哈特和奈格里在21世纪初期，已经看到了电子通信技术和数字化技术开启的黎明，他们看到了在西方主要发达国家工厂里的生产已经逐渐让位于由通信技术和数字化技术变革带来的无形的一般智力的总体，在这个情况下，非物质生产逐渐取代了物质生产的地位，那么资本家的剥削就不再是剥削实质的物质上的剩余价值，而是剥削一种无形的非物质性的一般智力。

Thus, we can understand the problem with interpreting labour in the digital age as “immaterial labour”. When we use certain social media or video applications, the key point is not how many videos we upload, how many articles we forward, or how many likes or comments we give to certain posts. Rather, it is that all these behaviours belong to a unified “general intellect”. Hardt, Negri and others believe that what makes these activities constitute immaterial labour or digital labour is simply that, above the actual process of material production, we have formed a production of general intellect, which they also call “biopolitical production”. This production is immaterial because digital labour fundamentally becomes immaterial productive labour that produces “general intellect”. The problem with Hardt and Negri lies not only in their assertion that production in the digital age is immaterial production, but also in their belief that this immaterial labour has completely replaced the political economy of material production that Marx discussed in *Capital*. They state: “The first tendency is the hegemony or dominant position of immaterial production in the valorisation process of capital… For example, images, information, knowledge, affects, codes, and social relations, in the valorisation of capital, all surpass tangible commodities or the material factors and materiality of commodities.” [5](P105) That is to say, Hardt and Negri believe that in the context of digital capitalism, the driving force of political economy has become the production of a series of images, information, cognition, and affects, and material production has become unimportant beneath this immaterial production. Consequently, Marx’s critique of material commodities and capital gradually gives way to a critique of immaterial general intellect.

这样，我们可以理解在数字时代的劳动被解读为“非物质劳动”的问题所在。我们在使用一些社交、视频软件时，关键不在于我们上传了多少视频，转发了多少文章，或者对某些推送点赞或评论，而是在于，我们这些行为都属于一个统一的“一般智力”，而哈特和奈格里等人认为，我们这些活动之所以构成了非物质劳动或数字劳动，仅仅在于我们在现实的物质生产过程之上，形成了一种一般智力的生产，这种生产也被哈特和奈格里称为“生命政治生产”（biopolitical production），这种生产是非物质性的，因为数字劳动从根本变成了生产“一般智力”的非物质生产劳动。哈特和奈格里的问题不仅在于他们指出数字时代的生产是非物质生产，而且认为这种非物质生产的劳动已经彻底取代了马克思在《资本论》中论及物质生产的政治经济学。他们提出：“第一个趋势就是在资本主义价值增殖过程中非物质生产的霸权或者主导地位……例如，图像、信息、知识、感受、符码以及社会关系在资本主义的价值增殖中，都超越了有形商品或者商品的物质性因素和商品。”[5](P105)也就是说，哈特和奈格里认为在数字资本主义的背景下，政治经济学的动力已经是一系列图像、信息、认知、感受的生产，而物质生产在这种非物质生产之下变得不再重要，从而马克思对物质商品和资本的批判，也逐渐让位于非物质的一般智力的批判。

It is not difficult to see that Marx’s “unproductive labour” and Hardt and Negri’s “immaterial labour” are fundamentally different. Marx’s “unproductive labour” is fundamentally a political-economic analysis at the level of capitalist reality. Marx discovered that, outside the specific process of material production, within social life, there exist specific types of labour that do not produce material products but produce feelings, relations, cognition, services, and so on. However, the basis of Marx’s analysis of “unproductive labour” remains the critique of political economy at the level of capitalist reality; its philosophical foundation is historical materialism, meaning that theoretical analysis is strictly grounded in actual social production. Although we cannot say that Hardt and Negri have detached themselves from social reality, when they assign a new dominant position to “immaterial labour”, they forget that today’s digitalisation is not simply a matter of us opening a music app on our smartphones to find a song we like, or browsing videos uploaded by different people. Rather, it is the full networking and digitalisation of factories, ports, logistics, and other material environments that allows us to “virtually” experience convenience and enjoyment on the immaterial level. In other words, behind the immaterial digital labour that Hardt and Negri see, there is still a vast foundation of actual material production, exchange, distribution, and transportation. The political economy of material production has not disappeared in the digital age; it has merely retreated behind our computer and phone screens, leading us to mistakenly believe that we are facing a digital, immaterial interface. In other words, production in the digital age still possesses a huge foundation of material labour. Simply viewing digital labour as immaterial labour, or insisting on an abstract distinction between material labour and immaterial labour, will prevent us from truly understanding the essence of the changes in capitalism. Digital capitalism is by no means a “costume change” where the cloak of capitalism shifts from material production to the production of immaterial information, data, images, and so on. We need to return to Marx’s historical materialism to re-understand the truth of labour under digital capitalism.

不难发现，马克思的“非生产劳动”和哈特、奈格里的“非物质劳动”有着根本的区别。马克思的“非生产劳动”从根本上是对资本主义现实层面的政治经济学分析，马克思发现了在具体的物质生产过程之外，在社会生活中，还存在着特定的劳动类型，这种劳动类型不生产物质产品，而是生产一种感觉、关系、认知、服务等。但马克思的“非生产劳动”的分析的基础仍然是现实层面的资本主义政治经济学批判，其哲学根基是历史唯物主义的，即将理论分析严格以现实的社会生产为基础。虽然我们不能说哈特、奈格里脱离了社会现实，但是，在他们为“非物质劳动”赋予新的支配性地位时，却忘却了今天的数字化不仅仅是我们在智能手机上点开音乐的应用，来找一首自己感兴趣的歌曲，或者浏览不同人上传的视频那样简单的事情，而是工厂、港口、物流等各个物质环境的充分联网和数字化，才让我们可以“虚拟”地感受到非物质层面上的便捷和享受。换言之，哈特、奈格里看到的非物质化的数字劳动的背面，仍然是以大量的现实物质生产、交换、分配、运输为基础的，而物质生产的政治经济学并非在数字时代消亡了，而只是退居到了人们的电脑屏幕和手机屏幕之后，让我们误以为我们面对的是一个数字化的非物质界面。换言之，数字时代的生产仍然存在着巨大的物质劳动的根基，而且将数字劳动简单地视为非物质劳动，或者坚持一个抽象的物质劳动和非物质化劳动的区分，都会让我们不能真正理解资本主义变化的根本，因为数字资本主义绝不是将资本主义的外衣从物质生产变成了非物质的信息、数字、图像等的生产的“换装秀”，我们需要回到马克思的历史唯物主义，来重新理解数字资本主义下劳动的真相。

II. Labour as a Historical Concept

二、作为历史概念的劳动

In Marx’s *The German Ideology*, there is this famous passage: “Each person has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood. While in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic.” [6](P165) This passage is often used to demonstrate Marx’s early description and vision of future communist society. However, many people do not actually understand why communist society means “to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner”. What is its connection with the communist principle of “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” mentioned later by Marx in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*? The answer to this question directly involves how to understand labour from the perspective of historical materialism.

在马克思的《德意志意识形态》中，有这样一段名言：“任何人都有自己一定的特殊的活动范围，这个范围是强加于他的，他不能超出这个范围：他是一个猎人、渔夫或牧人，或者是一个批判的批判者，只要他不想失去生活资料，他就始终应该是这样的人。而在共产主义社会里，任何人都没有特殊的活动范围，而是都可以在任何部门内发展，社会调节着整个生产，因而使我有可能随自己的兴趣今天干这事，明天干那事，上午打猎，下午捕鱼，傍晚从事畜牧，晚饭后从事批判，这样就不会使我老是一个猎人、渔夫、牧人或批判者。”[6](P165)这段话经常被人们用来论证马克思早年对未来共产主义社会的描述和憧憬。然而，很多人实际上并不了解，为什么共产主义社会就是“今天干这事，明天干那事，上午打猎，下午捕鱼，傍晚从事畜牧，晚饭后从事批判”？这与后来马克思在《哥达纲领批判》中提到的“各尽所能、按需分配”的共产主义原则有什么关联呢？对这个问题回答，也直接涉及从历史唯物主义角度如何来理解劳动的问题。

First, the main problem described in this passage by Marx is the division of labour. Prior to this passage, Marx mentions a limiting condition: “once the division of labour emerges,” our various human activities are divided into different types, such as hunting, fishing, animal husbandry, or engaging in criticism. If we reason backwards, does this imply that there existed a state before the division of labour, in which none of our human activities had yet become an “alien,” “independent” force? The German word Marx uses here is not “labour” (Arbeit) but “activity” (Tätigkeit). That is to say, before the division of labour, our various human “activities” had not been fixed into concrete labour. In this sense, activity is not labour; it has not been fixed, but can manifest in flexible and changeable forms. This is the fundamental reason why one could hunt in the morning and fish in the afternoon. However, the social division of labour completely changed this: our activities become fixed into a specific form of divided labour. Marx points out: “This fixation of social activity (Tätigkeit), this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now.” [6](p.165) How should we understand this statement by Marx? For example, when a girl picks flowers to make a garland and places it on her own head, at that moment she has not entered the division of labour; she exists merely as a self-for-itself (für sich selbst). At this time, the girl’s act of picking flowers and making a garland is difficult to distinguish from her other daily activities. Her action is her activity; the act of making has not separated itself into a unique action opposed to other actions. Conversely, once the girl becomes a female worker in a garland workshop, her act of making is no longer part of her activity-for-itself. A specific action is isolated from her other activities and, as an “alien” force, dominates her other activities. In this sense, it can be said that the girl has been incorporated into the system of division of labour. Her “activity” (Tätigkeit) is forcibly split into two parts: one part becomes “labour” (Arbeit), a material force that dominates the girl and thwarts any of her pleasant or romantic wishes; the remaining activity becomes leisure or entertainment, a “non-productive” part. That is to say, the social division of labour not only creates various trades such as hunter, farmer, herdsman, fisherman, and critic, but also makes a distinction within each individual person, dividing a concrete person’s activities into labour and other non-productive parts (or leisure parts). The part divided as labour, under the social relations of the division of labour, becomes a material force that dominates the individual itself, and also becomes an “alien” force that fixes flexible and changeable activities into labour.

首先，马克思这段话描述的主要问题是劳动的分工。在这段话之前，马克思提到了一个限定条件“当分工一出现之后”，我们人类的不同活动便被划分成不同的类型：如打猎、捕鱼、畜牧或从事批判。如果我们做一个反推，是否意味着还存在着一个分工之前的状态，在这种状态下，我们人类的一切活动还没有成为“异己的”“不依赖于”的力量，而马克思在这里的德文词不是“劳动”（Arbeit），而是“活动”（Tätigkeit），也就是说，在分工之前，我们人类的各种“活动”并没有被固定化为具体的劳动，在这个意义上，活动并不是劳动，它没有被固定，而是可以呈现出灵活多变的类型，这正是早上可以打猎，下午可以捕鱼的根本原因所在。但是社会分工彻底地改变了这一切，即我们的活动被固化为某种分工的劳动。马克思指出：“社会活动（Tätigkeit）的这种固定化，我们本身的产物聚合为一种统治我们、不受我们控制、使我们的愿望不能实现并使我们的打算落空的物质力量，这是迄今为止历史发展中的主要因素之一。”[6](P165)怎样来理解马克思的这句话呢？譬如，当一个女孩用采摘来的花朵制作了一个花冠，并戴在自己头上，这个时候她没有参与分工，仅仅作为自为（für sich selbst）的自我存在，在这个时候，少女采花制作花冠的行为很难与她的其他日常行为区别开来，她的行为就是她的活动，制作的行为没有将自己独立为一个独特的行为与其他行为相对立。相反，一旦少女变成一位花冠作坊的制作女工，她的制作行为不再是她自为行为的一部分，因为某一个特定性的行为从她的其他活动中被单独分离出来，作为一种“异己性”的力量统治着她的其他活动，在这个意义上，可以说少女被纳入分工体系之中，她的“活动”（Tätigkeit）被强行分割成两个部分，一个是作为统治着少女的物质力量，一种让少女任何惬意和浪漫的愿望落空的“劳动”（Arbeit），而剩下的活动成为了休闲或娱乐，成为了“非生产”的部分。也就是说，社会分工不仅仅造就了猎人、农夫、牧民、渔民、批判家等各个行业，也同时在每个人身上进行了区分，将具体的人的活动区分成劳动和其他非生产性的部分（或休闲的部分），被区分为劳动的部分在分工的社会关系下成为了一种统治者本身的物质力量，也成为将灵活多变的活动固化为劳动的“异己”的力量。

Interestingly, Marx then discusses the state under communist society. Once the existing state of the division of labour is transcended and communist society is entered, Marx points out that communist society possesses a unique common “activity” (Tätigkeit). It seems we can understand it this way: for Marx in the period of *The German Ideology*, once the division of labour and the unequal social relations corresponding to it are abolished, then that alien material force dominating people will disappear. People will no longer be the product of labour fixed by the division of labour, but will regain a world-historical universal power, that is, they will regain the vitality of “activity.” This is also the materialist connotation of communism. It is precisely in this sense that Marx points out: “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence.” [6](p.165) The “real movement which abolishes the present state of things” that Marx refers to here does not mean abolishing activities such as hunting, fishing, animal husbandry, or criticism. Rather, it means that these activities will still exist in communist society, but unlike in the previous class society of unequal division of labour, these activities will no longer be a fixed form of labour, no longer an alien material force of people’s activities. In communist society, these activities will once again be integrated with people’s other activities, no longer standing above people’s other activities, no longer being a real force that enslaves people.

有趣的是，随后，马克思谈到了共产主义社会下的状态，一旦超越了现有的分工状态，进入共产主义社会之后，马克思指出共产主义社会下有着特有的共同“活动”（Tätigkeit）。似乎可以这样来理解，在《德意志意识形态》时期的马克思那里，一旦消灭了分工，以及分工对应的不平等的社会关系，那么那种异己性的支配着人们的物质性力量就会消失，人们不再是分工固化的劳动的产物，而是重新具有一种世界历史性的普遍力量，即重新获得了“活动”的生命力，这也是共产主义的唯物主义内涵。也正是在这个意义上，马克思指出了：“共产主义对我们来说不是应当确立的状况，不是现实应当与之相适应的理想。我们所称为共产主义的是那种消灭现存状况的现实的运动。这个运动的条件是由现有的前提产生的。”[6](P165)马克思在这里所指出的“消灭现存状态的现实的运动”，并不是指消灭打猎、捕鱼、畜牧、批判等活动，而是说，这些活动仍然存在于共产主义社会之中，但是与之前的分工不平等的阶级社会不同的是，这些活动不再是一种固化的劳动，不再是人们活动的异己性的物质力量，在共产主义社会之中，这些活动再次与人的其他活动融合在一起，不再凌驾于人的其他活动之上，不再是奴役着人们的现实的力量。

So, we can seem to draw a conclusion: so-called labour is not a naturally given concept, nor is it an a priori concept; it is a historical concept. It is a product of a certain stage in the development of human society. Only through the division of labour at a certain stage can we separate certain specific activities with productive significance from other human activities within concrete social relations of production and relations of intercourse, making them an independent category. A child who shoots a rabbit with a bow and arrow for the purpose of play is not engaging in labour, but in activity under the state of no division of labour. This is because the child has not yet entered the division of labour. Conversely, once the division of labour appears in human society, it is as if a force splits people in two, dividing their time into time for work or labour and time for rest and entertainment, or separating a certain space to make it an independent space for labour, thereby allowing the time and space of labour to dominate over other times and spaces. In this sense, the human activity separated out in terms of time and space acquires a new concept — “labour” (Arbeit). Once labour emerges, it is abstract, because it does not naturally treat hunting, fishing, animal husbandry, and criticism as human activities; rather, under a certain measure of the division of labour, specific human activities are fixed as “labour.” From the perspective of Marx’s historical materialism, the definition and distinction of labour are not determined by natural human activities, but by the social mode of production and relations of intercourse at a specific historical stage. To be precise, the reason labour becomes labour lies not only in its ability to create value, but more importantly in its causing humans to subordinate themselves to a system of division of labour, thereby forming unequal class relations.

那么，我们似乎可以得出一个结论，所谓的劳动并不是一个天然给定的概念，或者不是一个先验的概念，而是一个历史的概念。它是在人类社会发展到一定阶段上的产物，只有通过一定阶段的分工，我们才能在具体的社会生产关系和交往关系中，将某些特定的具有生产意义的活动从人类的其他活动中分离开来，成为一个独立的范畴。一个孩子拿着弓箭出于游戏的目的射死了一只兔子，这不是劳动，而是未被分工状态下的活动。因为孩子还尚未进入分工之中。相反，一旦人类社会一旦出现分工，仿佛有一种力量将人们一分为二，将人的时间区分成工作或劳动的时间和休息娱乐的时间，或者将一定的空间分离开来，将其作为独立的劳动空间，从而让劳动的时间和空间凌驾在其他时间和空间之上。在这个意义上，从时间和空间上分离出来的人的活动，便获得了新的概念——“劳动”（Arbeit）。劳动一经产生，它就是抽象的，因为它并非天然地将打猎、捕鱼、畜牧和批判作为人类活动，而是在一定的分工的尺度下，特定的人类活动被固化为“劳动”。从马克思的历史唯物主义角度来看，劳动的界定和区分并不是由天然的人类活动来决定的，而是由一定历史阶段上的社会生产方式和交往关系来决定的，准确地说，劳动之所以成为劳动，不仅在于它能创造出价值，更在于它让人类从属于一个分工系统，从而形成了不平等的阶级关系。

Capitalist society is the most distinctive historical stage within this unequal division of labor. In ancient and feudal societies, rulers occupied the products of the labor division in the most direct and violent manner, completely reducing those engaged in labor to slaves and peasants. The specificity of capitalist society lies in its invention of a universal concept and quantity, allowing various different types of labor—whether hunting, fishing, animal husbandry, making pottery, or even creating art—to be measured on a unified scale, and this scale is money. Thus, in capitalist society, labor is not merely a material force distinguishing human activity from other activities; more importantly, this material force is measured through the abstract universal quantity of money, enabling all labor to be incorporated into a vast system under the framework of a universal abstract quantity. This scale, which can measure all labor and its products, becomes a god in this society, before which people prostrate themselves, forming fetishism. Whether commodity fetishism, money fetishism, or capital fetishism, their essence is the consequence of measuring concretely divided labor on a single scale. As the Canadian Marxist theorist Moishe Postone points out, Marx’s analysis of capitalism “is not carried out from the perspective of labor; on the contrary, it is based on a critique of capitalist labor. Marx’s critical theory attempts to point out that capitalist labor plays a unique historical role in mediating social relations, and it also elucidates the consequences of this form of mediation. His focus on capitalist labor does not necessarily imply that the material production process is more important than other spheres of social life. On the contrary, his analysis of the specificity of labor in capitalism shows that capitalist production is not a purely technical process; it is inevitably linked to and shaped by the basic social relations of this society.”[7](P18) Thus, the question of what labor is is a concept formed under specific historical mechanisms. Under different social systems, especially in capitalist society, due to specific production and division-of-labor mechanisms, certain human activities (mainly those related to production) are regarded as labor, while others are not. It is precisely through an abstract relationship of measurement that productive labor comes to dominate other human social activities, becoming a ruling material force. The reason productive labor or capitalist labor can gain the power of social domination is fundamentally the result of the development of historical social relations.

而资本主义社会是这个不平等分工中最特殊的一个历史阶段。在古代社会和封建社会中，统治者以最直接和暴力的方式占据了劳动分工生产的产品，并彻底将从事劳动的人变成奴隶和农民，而资本主义社会的特殊性在于，它发明了一个普遍性的概念和量，让各种不同类型的劳动，无论是打猎、捕鱼、还是畜牧、制作陶罐、甚至创作艺术，都可以放在统一的尺度下进行衡量，而这个尺度就是货币。这样，在资本主义社会中，劳动不仅仅是一种区别于人类其他活动的物质力量，更重要的是，这种物质力量通过货币这种抽象化的普遍的量来进行度量，从而让所有的劳动都可以在一个普遍性的抽象量的架构下被纳入一个庞大的系统之中，而这个可以度量一切劳动及其产品的尺度，成为这个社会中的神，人们在它面前膜拜，形成了拜物教，无论是商品拜物教、货币拜物教还是资本拜物教，其本质都是将具体被分工的劳动放在一个尺度上衡量的后果。正如加拿大马克思主义理论家莫伊舍·普殊同（Moishe Postone）指出的，马克思对资本主义的分析“并非从劳动的角度出发进行的，相反，它基于一种对资本主义劳动的批判。马克思的批判理论试图指出，资本主义劳动在中介社会关系时扮演了一种独一无二的历史角色，同时，它也阐明了这一中介形式的后果。他对资本主义劳动的关注并不意味着物质生产过程必然比其他社会生活领域更为重要。相反，他对劳动在资本主义中的特殊性的分析表明，资本主义生产并非一个单纯的技术过程，它不可避免地联系着这一社会的基本社会关系，并为后者所塑造”。[7](P18)由此可见，对于什么是劳动的问题，是在一定历史机制下形成的概念，在不同的社会制度下，尤其在资本主义社会中，由于具体的生产和分工机制，人类的某些活动（主要与生产有关的活动）被视为劳动，而另一些活动则不被视为劳动。在其中正是通过一种抽象的度量关系才让生产劳动凌驾于人类的其他社会活动之上，成为统治性的物质力量，而生产劳动或资本主义劳动之所以能获得社会统治的力量，其根本仍然是历史的社会关系发展的结果。

If we reread Marx’s famous statement on communism in *The German Ideology* from this perspective, it is not difficult to see that Marx’s core point is the elimination of the division between various types of labor—that is, reunifying solidified labor into a common “activity.” Hunting and fishing, animal husbandry and criticism disappear as labor, but the totality of human activity does not disappear. People can continuously revitalize various human activities within a structure that breaks the solidified historical division of labor, thereby escaping the fetters of capital and social domination, and not falling into the trap of empty abstract criticism. Only at that moment, although humans still engage in hunting, fishing, production, and criticism, these activities themselves will not constitute an alienating force opposing humans; on the contrary, they merge with human activity itself, becoming conditions for the comprehensive development of humanity itself.

那么，如果从这个角度重新阅读马克思在《德意志意识形态》中关于共产主义的名言，我们不难看出，马克思的核心在于，消除各种劳动之间的分工，也就是说，将固化的劳动重新统一为共同的“活动”，打猎和捕鱼、畜牧与批判作为劳动消失了，但作为总体的人类活动没有消失，人们可以在打破固化的历史分工的结构中不断地重新恢复各种人类活动的活力，从而摆脱资本和社会统治的羁绊，也不会堕入空洞的抽象批判的藩篱。也只有在那一刻，尽管人类仍然从事着打猎、捕鱼、从事着生产和批判，但这些活动本身不会构成人的异己性的力量，相反它们与人类活动本身合而为一，成为人类自身全面发展的条件。

Therefore, Marx’s perspective of historical materialism provides us with the best theoretical weapon for understanding contemporary digital labor. Whether material labor or immaterial labor, both are products of specific historical conditions. To be precise, Negri did not propose the concept of immaterial labor in the digital age, but in the 1960s and 1970s in the Fiat automobile factories in Italy, on automated assembly lines. Thus, although the concept of immaterial labor appears in 21st-century works such as *Empire*, *Multitude*, and *Commonwealth*, this concept belongs to the 20th century—the era of reflexive and automated capitalist production—and is also closely related to the proletarian struggles of the neoliberal era that emerged in the 1980s. However, the rise of the digital age, and the digital capitalism formed alongside it, may be producing new types of labor. In short, the advent of the digital age may be redefining certain human activities as no longer labor, while also turning some previously considered leisure and entertainment activities into digital labor. Digital labor is concrete; not all digital labor is cultural and immaterial. According to the method of historical materialism, understanding digital labor can only be achieved within the framework of new digital labor. Digital labor re-extracts the labor component from various human activities. Activities that could not create value within the monetary framework may shine under the data and algorithmic environment, becoming the most important digital labor. What we need to understand is no longer simple assembly line operations, but the totality of various human activities integrated by data and algorithmic structures.

所以，马克思的历史唯物主义视角为我们理解当下的数字劳动提供了最好的理论武器。无论是物质劳动还是非物质劳动，实际上都是一定历史条件下的产物，准确来说，奈格里并不是在数字时代提出非物质劳动概念的，而是在20世纪六七十年代意大利菲亚特汽车工厂里，在自动化的流水线上提出的非物质劳动的概念，因此，非物质劳动虽然出现在21世纪的《帝国》《诸众》《大同世界》等著作中，但这个概念属于20世纪，即自反性和自动化资本主义生产的时代，也同样与20世纪80年代兴起的新自由主义时代的无产阶级斗争密切相关。但是，数字时代的兴起，以及随之形成的数字资本主义或许正在生产新的劳动类型，简言之，数字时代的来临，或许正在将某些人类活动不再视为劳动，也同样将某些之前视为休闲和娱乐的活动，变成了数字劳动。数字劳动是具体的，并非所有的数字劳动都是文化的和非物质的。按照历史唯物主义的方法，理解数字劳动只有在新的数字劳动的框架中才能理解，数字劳动重新从人类的各种活动中分离出劳动的成分，原先不能在货币框架创造价值的活动或许在数据和算法环境下能够大放异彩，成为最重要的数字劳动。而我们需要理解的不再是简单的流水线操作，而是被数据和算法结构整合起来的各种人类活动的总体。

III. Critique of Digital Labor under the General Data Structure

三、一般数据结构下的数字劳动批判

After entering the digital age, people’s understanding of labor has undergone tremendous changes. Making short videos and uploading them to websites is labor; posting one’s photos on WeChat Moments is also labor; even clicking on a push notification on social software, liking (or disliking), and sharing have become labor. Some gamers, galloping across battlefields in electronic games and fighting fiercely, have also become a form of labor. Digital labor seems to have become a very broad concept. It seems that as soon as we pick up our phones or turn on our computers, we are engaged in digital labor. The usual dichotomy between entertainment and labor seems to have disappeared in the digital age; the digital traces we leave in the interconnected digital world can all be regarded as labor. Therefore, the British Marxist communication scholar Christian Fuchs points out the current situation where play and labor in digital labor are difficult to distinguish: “Traditionally, play and labor are two separate spheres of activity; the former occurs in private leisure time and public time, the latter in factories and offices during working hours. ‘Play’ labor means the boundary between play and labor becomes blurred: labor appears as play, and play becomes a form of value generation. Play is a new management concept. For example, working in a ‘Google’ office looks like working in a playground, but it involves high-pressure workspaces and long overtime hours. The use of corporate social media (‘Facebook,’ ‘Google,’ ‘Twitter,’ etc.) is all very fun; using these platforms in ‘play’ hides the fact that these platforms are operated by companies to make more profit and exploit users’ labor.”[8](P465) Indeed, the boundary between ordinary leisure or play and work or labor has been broken by the new mediation of digital technology and algorithmic technology. However, we cannot simply assume that the essence of digital labor is “play” or “immateriality”; rather, we need to consider this issue at the level of a new mode of production.

在进入数字时代之后，人们关于劳动的理解发生了巨大变化。制作短视频上传到网站上是劳动，将自己的照片发在微信朋友圈上，也是劳动，甚至我们点开社交软件上的一篇推送、点赞（或者倒踩）、转发也成为了劳动。一些游戏玩家，在电子游戏中驰骋疆场，勠力拼杀也成为了一种劳动。数字劳动似乎成为了一个很宽泛的概念，似乎我们拿起手机，打开电脑，就在从事一种数字劳动，似乎我们通常意义上的娱乐和劳动的二分，在数字时代似乎不存在了，我们一些在互联的数字世界中留下的数字痕迹都可以视为劳动。因此，英国马克思主义传播学者克里斯蒂安·福克斯（Christian Fuchs）指出了今天数字劳动这种玩与劳动难分彼此的局面：“传统上，玩和劳动是两个分开的活动领域，前者发生在私人业余时间和公共时间，后者发生于工作期间的工厂和办公室里。‘玩’劳动意味着玩和劳动之间的界限区域模糊：劳动呈现为玩，而玩则成了一种价值生成形式。玩是一种新的管理理念，例如，在‘谷歌’办公室工作看起来像在游乐场工作，但是高压力的工作空间与长期的加班工作。公司社交媒体的使用（‘脸书’‘谷歌’‘推特’等）都很有趣，在‘玩’中使用这些平台就隐藏了这一情况：这些平台是由公司经营的以便赚取更多利润并剥削用户的劳动。”[8](P465)的确，通常的休闲或玩，与工作或劳动之间的界限被数字技术、算法技术的新中介打破了，不过，我们不能简单地认为，数字劳动的本质是“玩”或“非物质性”，而是需要在一个新的生产方式的层面上来思考这个问题。

According to the theory of historical materialism analyzed above, the scale by which human activities can be distinguished into labor and leisure lies not in the activity itself but in a historical standard, namely, the division of labor resulting from the mode of production at different historical stages. In the early period of capitalist development, or the stage of civil society, this scale transformed from a concealed scale of master-slave relations into an explicit scale of value, i.e., labor is always an activity under a certain “form of value generation.” In other words, once human activity is reduced to a measurable quantity within the form of value, then this activity can be regarded as labor. Therefore, in this sense, labor is the undifferentiated human labor congealed in commodities, i.e., general abstract labor measured by the form of value. It is precisely in this sense that the form of abstract value is imposed upon our concrete activities, forcibly dividing human activities into two parts: those that can produce value become labor. It is also in this sense that Marx very clearly points out: “Exchange value expressed in money; thus the principle is reduced to the value of commodities being determined by the value of labor, or the value of labor being the general measure of value.” [1]1 Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 29, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1972, p. 35. [Translator’s note: The English translation of the Marx quote is a rendering of the Chinese translation provided in the original text.](P35) Conversely, those human activities that cannot be measured by the general measure of value become leisure or entertainment. The human life-world is forcibly divided into two different parts: one part is the labor world of production, and the other part is the leisure part that cannot be measured by the general measure of value. Only the former creates value, while the latter is the part of leisure and entertainment. In this latter part, what Marx called “unproductive labor” is also formed, i.e., the value created through productive labor is redistributed in the leisure and entertainment part, forming entertainment-based commercial activities and service activities that can also generate consumption and distribution. However, from the overall perspective of capitalist society, the labor that plays a dominant role remains productive labor that produces value. The high-speed train of capitalist operation runs on labor measured by the general measure of value, and its radiance also shines into the life-world of consumption and entertainment, bringing immense power to that world.

根据前文分析的历史唯物主义的理论，人类的活动可以区分为劳动和休闲的尺度，并不在于活动本身，而是一种历史的标准，即在不同历史阶段上的生产方式导致的分工。在资本主义发展初期，或者说市民社会阶段，这种尺度从隐秘的主奴关系的尺度，变成了显性的价值尺度，即劳动总是一定的“价值生成形式”下的活动。换言之，一旦人类的活动被还原为价值形式上的某一种可以度量的量，那么，这项活动就可以被视为劳动，所以在这个意义上，劳动是凝结在商品中无差别的人类劳动，即经过价值形式所衡量的一般性的抽象劳动，也就在这个意义上，抽象的价值形式凌驾在我们具体的活动之上，强制性地将人类的活动一分为二，一部分能够生产价值的活动成为了劳动。也正是在这个意义上，马克思十分明确地指出：“用货币来表现的交换价值，于是这一原理就归结为商品的价值是由劳动的价值决定的，或劳动的价值是价值的一般尺度。”[1](P35)与之相反，那些不能被价值的一般尺度衡量的人类活动就变成了休闲或娱乐，人的生活世界被强行地分为两个不同一部分，一个部分是进行生产的劳动世界，另一个部分是不能被价值的一般尺度衡量的休闲的部分，只有前者创造出价值，而后者是休闲和娱乐的部分，在后一个部分中也形成了马克思所谓的“非生产劳动”，即经过生产劳动创造出来的价值在休闲和娱乐的部分重新分配，形成了也能产生消费和分配的娱乐性商业活动和服务活动。但从资本主义社会总体而言，起到支配作用的劳动仍然是生产价值的生产劳动，资本主义的高速运行的列车是在被价值的一般尺度衡量的劳动下运行的，它的光芒也射入了消费和娱乐的生活世界，并为那个世界带来了巨大的动力。

Although, after entering the digital age, the situation where the value of labor serves as the general measure still exists, within the interconnected digital world, another principle of distinction or division of labor has indeed emerged: the principle of production based on data. For Nick Srnicek, the founder of Canadian left-wing accelerationism, he sees the formation of a data layer beneath the value dimension of labor. He argues: “Simply put, we should treat data as raw material that must be extracted, with user activity being the natural source of this raw material. Like oil, data is a substance that is extracted, refined, and used in various ways. The more data, the more uses.” [9](P46) Therefore, in the digital age, data is a completely new way of distinguishing. Previously, in the stage of civil society, all activities were distinguished into labor that generates value and leisure that cannot generate value. Correspondingly, in the stage of digital capitalism, this distinction has transformed into activities that can produce data and activities that cannot leave data. For example, for the Siri software on an Apple iPhone, it is not only a phone assistant that engages in intelligent dialogue with us, but also, when conversing with us, it extracts data from our interactions, distinguishing activities from our daily life from which data can be extracted (such as driving, searching for restaurants, online shopping, foreign language translation, etc.) from other activities from which data cannot be extracted (such as accidentally sneezing). It is precisely because our searches on shopping platforms or applications can create valuable data, data that can be analyzed and positioned by the platform’s backend, that our search behavior is no longer leisure but is reincorporated into the framework of labor. This kind of labor, by definition, differs from the definition of labor in the stage of industrial labor because they belong to two different systems of distinction: one is based on the general form of value, and the other is based on data that can be analyzed and extracted. If in the era of industrial capitalism we had the concept of general value, then in the era of digital capitalism, this concept has become general data. Therefore, although our activities have not changed much compared to before—for example, buying vegetables at a market in the 1980s and 1990s was a pure consumption activity and could not be defined as productive labor because the act of buying vegetables at the market did not produce specific value—today, in the digital age, our act of ordering vegetables on an online platform actually generates a large amount of data. This data is not only used to analyze specific user information, but the aggregation of thousands or millions of data points can effectively guide agricultural production departments. That is, knowing the consumption volume of white radish among citizens in a certain area today allows for the presupposition in the production process of the total number of white radishes that can be planted in the next production cycle, thereby avoiding overproduction. At the same time, during the production process, the production of each white radish can also be monitored for data in a specific environment: the amount of sunlight, rainfall, and soil nutrient conditions for white radishes on one mu of land are all collected, analyzed, and classified as data. Thus, the production and labor of the digital age, based on data, are by no means the “immaterial labor” that Negri and others speak of, but rather a new type of labor closely integrated with actual material production. In the case of digital labor, the distinction between material and immaterial is no longer important. The collection and analysis of data have already crossed the boundaries between leisure and production, material and immaterial, directly adopting the ability to be datafied or not as a new standard of distinction. Being datafiable also represents the standard of datafication, i.e., conforming to the corresponding data exchange protocols in the network. Then, an activity on the surface is valuable only if, through a digital interface and under the parameters of certain digital protocols, it is transformed into data exchanged in digital space. The activity that can create this standardized datafication is digital labor. In other words, the most fundamental criterion for digital labor lies not in the activity itself, but in whether this activity can be incorporated into a vast network of data collection, analysis, and exchange. This big data and algorithmic system constructed within the interconnected digital world once again becomes an alien material force imposed upon our activities. This time, it is no longer simply the general form of value distinguishing our activities, but a vast data network is turning us into marionettes on that impenetrable data apparatus. Through digital labor, we become appendages of this data apparatus, coexisting and co-evolving with it. Those activities that cannot enter the data apparatus are gradually eliminated, and we gradually cease to feel the existence of those activities. That is to say, to escape this alienated digital material force, it does not lie in our becoming beings that cannot be datafied. Rather, the fundamental critique of digital labor lies in uncovering the data apparatus hidden behind all distinctions of activities. It is this data apparatus that turns datafiable humans into data persons, and data persons continuously leave data on the digital interface, forming digital labor.

尽管，在进入数字时代之后，劳动的价值作为一般尺度的状况仍然存在，但是，在互联的数字世界中，的确产生了另一种区分或分工原则，即以数据为基底的生产原则。在加拿大左翼加速主义的创始人尼克·斯尔尼塞克（Nick Srnicek）那里，他看到了在劳动的价值层面下，形成了一个数据层。他认为：“简单来说，我们应该把数据作为必须提取的原材料，用户的活动是这种原料的天然来源。就像石油一样，数据是一种被提取、被精炼并以各种方式被使用的无知。数据越多，用途越多。”[9](P46)那么，在数字时代，数据是一种全新的区分方式，以往在市民社会阶段，所有的活动被区分成生成价值的劳动和不能生成价值的休闲。与之相对应，在数字资本主义阶段，这种区分变成了可以生产数据的活动和不能留下数据的活动。比如对于苹果手机的Siri软件来说，它不仅是一个与我们进行智能对话的手机管家，而且在与我们对话的时候，也提取了我们交往的数据，将我们的日常生活中可以被提取数据的活动（如驾车出行、搜索餐饮、网络购物、外语翻译等）与其他不能提取数据的活动（如无意间打一个喷嚏）区分开来，也正是因为我们在购物平台或应用上的搜索能够创造有价值的数据，可以供平台的后台分析和定位的数据，所以，我们的搜索行为不再是休闲，而是重新被纳入劳动框架下。这种劳动从定义上，不同于产业劳动阶段上的劳动定义，因为它们分属于两个不同的区分系统，一个是以价值的一般形式为尺度，另一个以可以分析和提取的数据为尺度，如果我们在产业资本主义时代有价值一般的概念，那么在数字资本主义时代，这个概念变成了一般数据（general data）。所以，尽管我们的活动相比于以前并没有发生太多变化，比如在20世纪八九十年代的菜场买菜是一种纯粹的消费活动，不能作为生产劳动来定义，因为菜场买菜的行为不生产具体的价值。但是，在数字时代的今天，我们在网络平台上订菜的行为，事实上会产生大量的数据，这些数据不仅仅是用来分析具体的用户信息，而且成千上万的数据汇总之后，能够对农业生产部门进行有效的指导，即今天某个地区的市民有多大的关于白萝卜的消费量，那么在生产过程中预设了下一个生产环节可以种植的白萝卜的总数，从而避免了生产过剩。同时，生产过程中，每一个白萝卜生产也可以在具体的环境中进行数据监控，一亩地的白萝卜的光照多少，雨水多少，土壤的营养情况都作为数据被收集、被分析、被分类。这样，以数据为基底的数字时代的生产和劳动，绝不是奈格里等人所说的“非物质劳动”，而是与现实的物质生产密切结合在一起的新型劳动。在数字劳动这里，物质与非物质的区分不再重要，数字的收集与分析已经跨越了休闲与生产、物质与非物质的分界，而是直接将可以数据化和不可数据化作为全新的区分标准，可以数据化也代表着数据化的标准，即符合相对应的网络中的数据交换协议，那么表面上的活动，只有通过数字化界面，在一定的数字协议的参数下，被转化为数字空间交换的数据，这个活动才是有价值，那么能够创造出这种规范的数据化的活动就是数字劳动。换言之，数字劳动最根本的标准不在于这个活动本身，而是在于这个活动是否能被纳入一个巨大的数据收集、分析和交换的网络之中，这个在互联的数字世界里构造出来的大数据和算法系统，反过来再次成为凌驾在我们活动之上的异己性的物质力量。这次不再单纯是价值的一般形式对我们的活动进行区分，而是巨大的数据网络正在将我们变成那个密不透风的数据装置上的提线木偶，我们通过数字劳动变成了这个数据装置的附属物，并与之相生相伴。而那些不能进入数据装置的活动逐渐被替除，我们逐渐感觉不到那些活动的存在。也就是说，如果要摆脱这种数字化的异己的物质力量，并不在于我们变成无法数据化的存在者，而是说数字劳动批判的根本在于发觉那个隐藏在所有活动区分背后的数据装置，正是这个数据装置将可以被数据化的人类变成了数据人，而数据人在数字界面上不断地留下数据，形成了数字劳动。

However, this is not the whole of the critique of digital labour, because digital labour is not individual in nature; the mystery of digital labour does not lie in the simple fact that we click a link on a shopping website, and the next day a cardboard-boxed parcel is placed at our doorstep waiting for us to open it. The British scholar David W. Hill, through his analysis of Amazon, has discovered that behind this seemingly simple digital operation, many layers of digital labour are actually concealed. Hill states: “The danger lies in our inability to see the material things behind online shopping; we only see our consumption experience, only the clicks and sweeping purchases on the screen. With a click of your mouse, the goods arrive at your door. Online retailers like Amazon, rather than transcending the production interface, actually conceal it.” [10](P521-536) Hill sees that behind our clicks, there are also a large number of producers, warehousing enterprises, and logistics enterprises controlled by the sellers; they too are engaged in labour, and their activities are likewise datafied by the enormous algorithmic structure. Every instance of their production, every instance of warehousing, every instance of logistics leaves traces in the digital network, but these traces are only open to the interface of the Internet of Things. We, sitting in front of the screen, actually have little perception of these activities.

然而，这还不是数字劳动批判的全部，因为数字劳动不是个体性的，数字劳动的奥秘并不在于我们在购物网站上点取了一个链接，然后第二天一个用瓦楞纸箱装好的货物就摆在家门口等待我们的开启这样简单。英国学者大卫·W.希尔（David W.Hill）通过对亚马逊的分析，发现了在这个看似简单的数字化操作背后实际上掩盖了数字劳动的许多层面，希尔谈道：“危险在于我们看不到在线购物的背后的物质性的东西，我们只看到了我们的消费体验，只看到了在屏幕上的点击和扫货。你鼠标一点，货物就到门口，像亚马逊这样网络零售商与其说超越了，不如说掩盖了生产界面。”[10](P521-536)希尔看到，在我们点击背后，还有大量的被销售商控制的生产商、仓储企业、物流企业，他们也在从事着劳动，他们的活动同样被巨大的算法结构数据化，他们每一次生产、每一次仓储、每一次物流都在数字网络中留下的痕迹，但这些痕迹只对物联网的界面开放，坐在屏幕前的我们实际上对这些活动没有太多的感知。

Therefore, we need to reconceptualise the notion of digital labour from the perspective of the entire huge datafied interface. That is to say, the clicks and browsing behind the screens of smartphones and computers are merely the manifestation of the digital labour system at the individual level. What supports this manifestation from behind are the specific material links of production, warehousing, exchange, logistics, and sales that have been datafied. Data connects these links with each of us behind the screen. We share our data on reading, browsing, and purchasing, while production enterprises, warehousing enterprises, and logistics enterprises contribute the material connections that support the data network. The goods we purchase do not come from nothing; they belong to a production system that is highly orchestrated by data and algorithms, and this production system is far superior in efficiency and control to the productive capacity mobilised by currency and finance. This is the material reality hidden behind digital labour, while the digital platform transforms these things into mere clicks on a computer screen for ordinary people. Marx once criticised vulgar political economists for “turning people into hats.” Today, some vulgar digital political economists go a step further, “turning hats into data on clicks or browsing.” If vulgar political economists used the hat to obscure the unequal social reality of capitalism, then today’s vulgar digital political economy is using the superficial data of clicks or browsing to obscure the material aspect of today’s digital capitalism, that is, the new unequal relations of production structured within the big data framework. Therefore, from the perspective of historical materialism, the critique of digital labour in the digital age does not focus on the number of clicks and page views on the screen, but rather on the material aspects of production and circulation that are concealed behind this data. Only in this way can we establish a true critique of the political economy of digital labour in the digital age. (Notes omitted)

所以，我们从一个巨大的数据化的界面整体来重新理解数字劳动的概念，也就是说，对于智能手机和电脑屏幕后面的点击和浏览，只是数字劳动体系在个体身上的表象，而在这个表象背后支撑的是被数据化的物质生产、仓储、交换、物流、销售的等具体环节，而数据将这些环节与每一个屏幕背后的我们联系在一起，我们分享了我们的阅读、浏览、购买的数据，而生产企业、仓储企业、物流企业则贡献了支撑数据网络的物质性连接。我们购买的货物不是无中生有，而是隶属于被数据和算法高度调度起来的生产体系，而这个生产体系在效率上和控制上远远高于由货币和金融调动起来的生产能力。这才是隐藏在数字劳动背后的物质性现实，而数字平台则在普通人面前将这些东西变成了电脑屏幕前的一次次点击。马克思曾经批判庸俗的政治经济学家“将人变成了帽子”，而今天的一些庸俗的数字政治经济学家则进一步“将帽子变成了点击或浏览的数据”。倘若说庸俗政治经济学家用帽子遮蔽了资本主义不平等的社会现实，那么今天的庸俗的数字政治经济学正在用表面上的点击或浏览的数据，遮蔽了今天的数字资本主义的物质性方面，即架构在大数据结构中新的不平等的生产关系。那么，数字时代的数字劳动批判，从历史唯物主义角度来看，不是关注屏幕上的点击和浏览量，而是关注在这些数据背后被遮蔽的生产和流通的物质性方面，唯有如此，我们才能在数字时代建立真正的数字劳动的政治经济学批判。（注释略）

Online Editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑