Is Negative Dialectics a Radical Dialectics?

Adorno’s negative dialectics, with its pronounced anti-ontological orientation and thoroughgoing negation, is regarded as a radical discourse, and thus negative dialectics is taken as a new form of dialectics. This article, taking Adorno’s critique of conceptual dialectics as an example, attempts to grasp from several aspects the intellectual trajectory of Adorno’s negative dialectics and the intellectual tensions this trajectory presents. On this basis, it answers whether negative dialectics is a radical discourse, and through this answer attempts to present the contemporary resonance of the tradition of dialectical thought, reshaping the theoretical image of Adorno’s negative dialectics.

阿多诺的否定辩证法以其鲜明的反本体论指向和彻底的否定而被视为一种激进话语，进而将阿多诺的否定辩证法作为一种新的辩证法形态，本文仅以阿多诺对观念辩证法的批判为例，尝试从几个方面把握阿多诺否定辩证法的思想路线以及这种思想路线呈现的思想张力，在此基础上，对于否定辩证法是否是一种激进话语作出回答，并通过这一回答尝试呈现辩证法思想传统的当代回响，重塑阿多诺否定辩证法的理论形象。

I. The Non-Conceptual in the Concept and the Objectivity of the Concept

一、概念的非概念与概念的客观性

For Adorno, dialectics is not the essence of the world but a necessary conflict of thinking activity; dialectics points to what thinking activity cannot reach. “The name of dialectics says no more than that objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder, that they come to contradict the traditional norm of adequacy.” [1]1 Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973), 5. In Adorno’s view, a legitimate discussion of dialectics first concerns an examination of the immanence of consciousness. Consciousness inherently possesses an anti-dialectical impulse, that is, a tendency to transcend contradiction, while dialectics is devoted to presenting the finitude of thinking when it grasps being—that is, the problem of the limits of thinking itself. The ontological dilemma presented here is the context in which dialectics emerges. Thus, although Adorno refuses to construct an ontological foundation for dialectics, it is not difficult to see that negative dialectics is from the outset given in an ontological sense—more precisely, given in the sense of critiquing the ontological horizon of traditional subject philosophy. And the rut of this ontological horizon is concentratedly embodied in conceptual dialectics as represented by Hegel.

辩证法对于阿多诺来说不是世界的本质，而是思维活动的一种必然冲突，辩证法指向了思维活动所不能及，“辩证法的名称首先告诉（人们），对象不会完全进入概念中，它与传统的符合论规范处于矛盾中”。在阿多诺看来，对辩证法的合法讨论首先关涉对意识内在性的考察，意识内在地具有反辩证法的冲动，即超越矛盾的倾向，而辩证法致力于呈现思维把握存在时的有限性，即思维本身的限度问题，这里所呈现的本体论困境就是辩证法的出场语境。由此，阿多诺虽然拒绝为辩证法建构本体论基础，但不难看出，否定辩证法一开始就是在本体论的意义上给出的，确切地说，是在批判传统主体哲学的本体论视野的意义上给出的，而这种本体论视野的窠臼集中体现在以黑格尔为代表的观念辩证法中。

Specifically, in conceptual dialectics, the concept itself appears as a tyranny of identity. What Adorno seeks to do is to “disenchant” this concept. He acutely raises the non-conceptual aspect of the concept, pointing out that the “original sin” of the concept lies in its inability to shake off the existing “self.” In this sense, the concept is a “reified consciousness,” and once consciousness is reified, it loses fluidity and cannot grasp things in constant becoming and flux. In Adorno’s view, within the traditional ontological horizon, whether it is thinking subsuming being or being subsuming thinking, dialectics is brought into an essentialist predicament. Adorno reaffirms the opposition between thinking and being, pointing out that the unity of thinking and being is essentially an illusion of thinking. Dialectics, as a process of thinking, can hardly escape the primacy of the subject—this is the basic presupposition of idealism beginning with Fichte. When thinking activity attempts to subsume being within its own conceptual system, it kills “non-identity” with “identity.” Here, the order of existence presents a profound heterogeneity with the order of concepts; the totality produced by the identity of concepts is a false totality. On this basis, Adorno offers a profound critique of the ideological dimension of identity. In the development of dialectics, from the very beginning it has been linked with the categories of identity philosophy, which has subjected dialectics to various criticisms, making it a “logic of illusion.” The demand for identity is the original sin of thinking; thinking tends to avoid contradiction and construct an identity that makes the object subordinate to itself. This is the original form of ideology—or rather, ideology and the identity of thinking have a complicit relationship. In the above intellectual trajectory of Adorno, insofar as “objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder,” Adorno is clearly closer to Kant and farther from Hegel. Kant’s retention of the “thing-in-itself” leads precisely to non-identity. “Dialectics is not a mere operation of the spirit through which the spirit can escape the constraints of its object—in Hegel, the role dialectics plays is precisely the opposite: it is the permanent opposition between the object and its own concept.” [2]2 Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 153. The vitality of dialectics lies in the resistance of the other to identity; dialectics does not speak of reconciliation, and has no reconciliation. “Dialectics has no standpoint.” [3]3 Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 4.

具体来说，在观念辩证法中，概念本身呈现为一种同一性的暴虐，阿多诺要做的就是给这种概念“袪魅”。他敏锐地提出了概念的非概念性，指出概念的“原罪”在于它不能摆脱存在着的“自我”，在这个意义上，概念是一种“物化的意识”，而意识一旦被物化就丧失流动性，无法把握处于不断生成流变中的事物。在阿多诺看来，在传统的本体论视野中，无论是以思维来统摄存在，还是以存在统摄思维，都将辩证法带入一种本质性的困境中，阿多诺重申了思维与存在的对立性，指出思维与存在的统一本质上是一种思维的幻相，辩证法作为一种思维过程，也难以摆脱主体的首要性，这是自费希特开始的观念论的基本预设。当思维活动尝试将存在统摄在自己的概念体系中，就是以“同一性”扼杀“非同一性”，在这里，实存序列呈现出与概念序列深刻的异质性，概念的同一性所生产的总体性是一种虚假的总体性，在此基础上，阿多诺对同一性的意识形态之维进行了深刻批判。在辩证法的发展中，它从一开始就与同一性哲学的范畴关联在一起，这使辩证法遭受种种责难，成为一种“幻相的逻辑”。对同一性的诉求是思维的原罪，思维倾向于规避矛盾，而建构一种使客体服从于自身的同一性，这就是意识形态的原初形态，毋宁说，意识形态与思维的同一性具有共谋关系。在阿多诺的上述思想路线中，就“对象不会完全进入到概念中”而言，阿多诺显然更亲近康德而远离了黑格尔，康德对“自在之物”的保留通向的正是非同一性，“辩证法不是精神的一种单纯的运作，通过这种运作，精神就可以逃脱其对象的束缚——在黑格尔那里，辩证法所起的作用确切说恰好相反，是客体与自身概念之间的永久对立”。辩证法的生命力在于他者对同一性的抵抗，辩证法是不讲和解，没有和解的，“辩证法没有立场（Dialektik kein Standpunkt）”。

While critiquing the illusion of identity produced by the concept, Adorno does not dissolve the objectivity of the concept. In fact, reconstructing the objectivity of thought is the core predicament of conceptual dialectics in Adorno’s view, and also the task of the age for negative dialectics. So what is “objectivity”? In the horizon of negative dialectics, first, objectivity is not a mere immediacy, but a mediated immediacy—or rather, this immediacy is also the immediacy within conceptual grasping. Dialectics must pass through the mediation of consciousness; without consciousness as mediation, dialectics becomes impossible. “In absolutely simple, undifferentiated, total matter, there is no dialectics.” [4]4 Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 140. Specifically, on the one hand, Adorno maintains that the immanence of consciousness is inescapable. In this sense, he criticizes the category of “Being” in Heidegger’s horizon, pointing out that this category contains remnants of fundamental ontology. In essence, Heidegger’s mode of questioning still does not escape the paradigm of traditional metaphysics; the immediacy presented by the category of “Being” is itself also reflective. Heidegger’s ontology attempts to transcend the difference between subject and object, but within its ontological horizon, there is neither subjective spirit nor matter, which leads to the abstractness of his category of “Being.” This is an illegitimate escape from the immanence of consciousness. On the other hand, the reconstruction of the objectivity of thought must also break out of the fence of identity constructed by the immanence of consciousness. Philosophy is not to abolish the concept itself, because treating the concept as material is a basic characteristic of philosophy; the reification of the concept is unavoidable—it enables the concept to establish itself, and the combination of concept and non-concept can only be realized through this establishment. But Adorno also points out that the concept itself has not only a spiritual dimension but also a substantive, transcendent dimension; the real element of the concept itself is the basis of the objectivity of thought. In this sense, phenomenological discussion is insufficient “because it loses itself in the categories of signification, in mere subjectivity; for it, the non-identical state of affairs becomes a given of consciousness, a mere spiritual thing; the factual existence of this state of affairs becomes ideal being, becomes thought.” [5]5 Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 140. Adorno points out that philosophy need not retreat to some extreme empiricism, nor need it surrender to a highest principle, progressing through concepts to some universal total concept. For the reconstruction of the objectivity of thought, the primary task is to change the direction of conceptuality, turning it from a referential function toward non-identity, breaking the illusion of thought’s self-sufficiency, acknowledging that the object of thought is a heterogeneous thing to consciousness, and acknowledging that cognition cannot fully possess its object.

在批判概念所生产的同一性幻相的同时，阿多诺并没有消解概念的客观性，事实上，重建思想的客观性，这是阿多诺视野中观念辩证法的核心困境，也是否定辩证法的时代任务。那么何谓“客观性”？在否定辩证法的视野中，首先，客观性不是一种单纯的直接性，而是一种被中介的直接性，或说，这种直接性亦是概念把握中的直接性，辩证法必须要通过意识这一中介，没有意识作为中介，辩证法就成为不可能，“在绝对单一的、无差别的、总体的物质中，没有辩证法”。具体来说，一方面，阿多诺主张意识的内在性是无法逃遁的，在这个意义上，他批判海德格尔视野中的“存在”范畴，指出这一范畴中有基础本体论的残余。从本质上来看，海德格尔发问的方式仍然没有跳出传统形而上学的范式，“存在”范畴所呈现的直接性本身同时也是反思性的，海德格尔的存在论试图超越主体与客体的差异性，但是，在其存在论视野中，既没有主体精神，也没有物质，这导致他的“存在”范畴的抽象性，这是对于意识的内在性的一种不合法的逃遁。另一方面，思想客观性的重建又必须跳出意识的内在性所建构的同一性的藩篱，哲学要取消的不是概念本身，因为将概念视为质料是哲学的基本特质，概念的物化是不可避免的，它使概念确立自身，概念与非概念的结合只有通过这种确立才会得以实现。但阿多诺同时指出，概念本身不仅具有精神的维度，更具有实体的超验的维度，概念自身的现实的要素，这是思想的客观性的基础。在这个意义上，现象学的讨论之所以是不充分的，“是因为它自身迷失于意指范畴当中、迷失于单纯主观性当中；对于它来说，非同一的实事状态变成了意识的直接给予性、变成了单纯的精神之物，这种实事状态的事实性的此在变成了观念存在、变成了思维”。阿多诺指出，哲学无需退回到某种极端经验主义，亦不必交付于一个最高原则，通过概念进展为某种普遍的总概念，对于思想客观性的重建来说，首要的就是要改变概念性的方向，使之从一种指称性转向非同一，打破思维自足性的幻相，承认思维对象是作为意识的异质物，承认认识无法完全拥有它的对象。

Concretely speaking, the change in conceptual direction means acknowledging the two-way interaction between the synthetic function of thought and the facticity toward which this function is directed. In this interaction, the concept is not a self-sufficient totality; the non-conceptual within the concept is a mediating element between the concept and existence. The legitimacy of thought does not derive from the affirmation of identity, but from negation: “Before all particular content, thought itself is already negation, that is, resistance to what is imposed upon thought itself.” [n] In Hegel, by contrast, the object from which thought abstracts is already itself an object of thought, in which subject and object presuppose an identity a priori. Adorno points out that the starting point from which thought constructs its objectivity can only be non-identity; the essence of this non-identity is negation. Negation confers upon the concept itself a state of incompleteness: thought is both itself and not itself. Thus negation becomes the fundamental measure of the legitimacy of dialectics in Adorno’s view. Where in Hegel the “negation of the negation” is ultimately led toward affirmation, in Adorno it remains negation. If “determinate negation” in Hegel means that affirmative content arises from negation—negation is not total negation—then in Adorno the whole itself is negative, and the negation of the particular contained within the whole is still negation: “The negation of the negation does not make negation return to affirmation, but only proves that this negation is not sufficient negation.” [n] It is not difficult to see that, through the elaboration of non-identity, negative dialectics constructs a supremacy of negation itself, “freeing dialectics from those affirmative essences without reducing any determinacy.” [n] Hence “negative dialectics” necessarily leads to a “logic of collapse”; in this sense, negative dialectics presents the groundless state of dialectics. Here, by means of negative dialectics, Adorno traces back to the meta-questions of philosophy. Through his critique of conceptual dialectics, he seeks not only to rescue dialectics but also to rescue philosophy; more precisely, to rescue traditional philosophical thought and to devote himself to opening up a new philosophical standpoint. From this we can discern the thoroughness of Adorno’s critical consciousness, a thoroughness that reveals a latent and profound connection with postmodernist currents of thought.

具体来说，概念性的方向的改变意味着承认思想的综合功能与这种功能所指向的事实性之间的双向作用，在其中，概念不是某种自足的总体，概念中的非概念是介于概念与实存之间的中介物。思维的合法性不是来源于对同一性的肯定，而是否定，“在所有特殊内容之前，思维本身已经是否定，即抵制强加给思维本身的东西”。而在黑格尔那里，思维借以抽象的对象本身已经是作为思维的对象，在其中，主体与客体之间先天地预设了一种同一性。阿多诺指出，思维建构其客观性的出发点只能是非同一性，这种非同一性的本质就是否定，否定赋予了概念本身的待完成状态，思维既是它自身，又不是它自身。由此，否定成为阿多诺视野中辩证法合法性的基本尺度，在黑格尔那里，最终被导向肯定的“否定之否定”，在阿多诺这里，依然是否定。如果说“被规定的否定”在黑格尔那里是指从否定中产生肯定的内容，否定不是全盘否定，而在阿多诺这里，整体本身就是否定的，对于包括在整体中的特殊的否定，仍然是否定的，“否定之否定并非使否定回归肯定，而只证明这种否定不是充分的否定”。不难看出，通过对非同一性的阐释，否定辩证法建构的是一种否定本身的至上性，“使辩证法从那些肯定的本质中解放出来，而又不减少某种规定性”，由此，“否定辩证法”必然通向一种“崩溃的逻辑”，在这个意义上，否定辩证法呈现了辩证法的无根状态。在这里，阿多诺借助于否定辩证法，回溯到哲学的元问题，借助对观念辩证法的批判不仅要拯救辩证法，更要拯救哲学；确切地说，是要拯救传统哲学思维，并致力于开辟一种新的哲学立场，从中我们不难看出阿多诺批判意识的彻底性，这种彻底性使其与后现代主义思潮呈现出一种隐性的深刻关联。

II. Materialist Dialectics and Non-Reflective Materialism

二、唯物论的辩证法与不反映的唯物论

Adorno’s critique of conceptual dialectics already exhibits a transition toward the priority of the object, presenting a posture of objective dialectics. Yet Adorno does not agree with the “objective dialectics” line of traditional materialism, because this line disregards human spontaneity. More precisely, it presupposes a “transmission” from object to subject; this “transmission” makes reflection possible. In it, the object is presupposed as a kind of prior condition, while the subject is inert, passive, and dependent on this reflection. The theory of reflection is the cornerstone of traditional materialist epistemology. In Adorno’s view, however, “reflective thought is unreflective, a non-dialectical contradiction.” [n] It is precisely this unreflectiveness that becomes the breeding ground for idealism, so that “the collection of ideas replaces the object of cognition.” [n] Here, reflection is not a bridge connecting subject and object, but a barrier—a “third term” inserted between subject and object. It imperceptibly becomes an accomplice of idealism, for reflection, by leading to the reproduction and aggregation of ideas, distances itself from the real object.

阿多诺对观念辩证法的批判展现了向客体优先性的过渡，已经呈现了一种客观辩证法的姿态，但阿多诺不同意传统唯物主义的“客观辩证法”路线，这源于这一路线漠视了人的自发性，确切地说，它预设一种客体向主体的“发射”，这一“发射”使反映得以可能，在其中，客体被预设为某种先在性的条件，主体是惰性的、被动的，是依附于这种反映的。反映论是传统唯物主义认识论的基石，而在阿多诺看来，“反映思维是非反思的，一种非辩证的矛盾”，正是这种非反思性成为观念论的温床，从而“观念的集合就会替代认识对象”。在这里，反映不是连接主体与客体的桥梁，而是一道屏障，是主体与客体之间插入的“第三者”，它无形之中会成为观念论的帮凶，反映由于通向观念的再生和汇聚而远离了真实的客体。

Adorno proposes the concept of “the ideology of phenomena,” pointing out that reflection itself is influenced by “the ideology of phenomena.” Thus reflection itself may become an instrument of ideology. Materialism based on such reflection can lead to subjective positivism, in which the supremacy of the category of reflection is purchased at the cost of the loss of subjective critical elements. Concretely speaking, the ideological dimension of reflection is mainly directed toward the following two domains: First, materialism under the domination of political power. In this case, “reflection” is subject to the practice of a certain objective spirit; the reflectiveness of consciousness is imprisoned. The paradox of this reflection lies in its essential non-reflectiveness, or limited reflectiveness: “The defect of materialism is the defect of the unreflected dominant condition.” [n] When this theory of reflection is reified into a theory, it is often combined with the terroristic state apparatus, causing materialism to degenerate into a kind of barbarism. It presents a rupture with the real life-world and a departure from the original intention of grasping the objective world. In it, the complete object is lost, replaced by the immediate object. This reflection leads to the subjective arbitrariness of ideas; reflection becomes a functional product constructed by a certain objective spirit, thus moving toward a new mythology. Dogmatic theoretical forms or closed systems of power are both embodiments of this mythology. Second, scientism. Contemporary materialism has already tilted toward scientism, or rather, contemporary science has increasingly acquired the implication of philosophical ontology. In this context, the supremacy of the category of reflection directly leads to “science as an ideology.” [n] Taking the computer system as an example, in it consciousness is not intuitively given but is a systematically functionalized abstraction, which to a certain extent leads to the weakening of consciousness.

阿多诺提出“现象的意识形态”，指出反映本身受到“现象的意识形态”的影响，由此，反映本身可能成为一种意识形态的工具，以这种反映为基础的唯物主义可以导向主观实证主义，在其中，反映范畴的至上性是以主观批判要素的丧失为代价的。具体来说，反映的意识形态维度主要指向以下两个领域：一是政治权力宰制下的唯物论。在其中，“反映”受制于某种客观精神的实践，意识的反映性是被禁锢的，这种反映的悖论就在于它本质上的非反映性，或者有限反映性，“唯物论的缺陷是占支配地位的状况未被反映的缺陷”。当这种反映论物化为一种理论时，它往往与恐怖的国家机器结合在一起，这使唯物论退化到某种野蛮之中，它呈现了与真实的生活世界的断裂和把握客观世界初衷的背离，在其中，完整的客体丧失了，取而代之的是直接的客体，这种反映通向观念的主观任意性，反映成为被某种客观精神建构的一种功能性的产物，从而走向了一种新的神话，教条的理论形态或封闭的权力体系都是这种神话的体现。二是科学主义。当代唯物主义已经倒向了科学主义，或者说，当代的科学已日益具有了哲学本体论的意蕴，在这一语境下，反映范畴的至上性直接导向了“作为一种意识形态的科学”。以计算机系统为例，在其中，意识不是直观给予的，而是被系统地功能化了的抽象物，这一定程度上导致了意识的弱化。

On the basis of the above discussion, Adorno proposes “non-reflective materialism.” Adorno points out that dialectics exists in things, but “the object is open only to the subjective surplus in thought.” [n] This “subjective surplus” is opposed to the subject’s attempt to dominate the object through the power of identity. In the process of becoming an object, the object loses itself; the enlightenment of thought must necessarily break through this reflectiveness of consciousness. Without being, there is no being; likewise, without beings, there is no being. Subject and object mediate each other; objectivity itself is mediated objectivity. A dialectics that completely tilts toward the objective standpoint is also an illusion, unable to accomplish the rescue of the priority of the object. However, once reflection is dissolved, how is the subject’s grasp of the object possible? Adorno points out that the subject’s grasp of the objective is not a “reflection” but an “orientation”: “Thought is not the reflection of things, but is directed toward the facts themselves.” [n] Only non-reflective theory can lead to the real, complete object. Adorno takes Lenin’s critique of traditional epistemology as an example, pointing out that Lenin acutely perceived the complicity between traditional materialist epistemology and power. Lenin’s critique was not only theoretical but also a political necessity; using power practice to dissolve idealism could lead to disastrous political consequences. In Adorno’s view, in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Lenin did not directly enter into a traditional epistemological perspective. His critique of Berkeley’s philosophy and Machism, and his materialist interpretation of the “thing-in-itself,” all present a certain anti-traditional epistemological dimension. Lenin emphasized that the object of cognition does not depend on our sensations for its existence; before the self-subsistence and self-determination of the objective object, traditional epistemology is nothing but a violence against the object. “Non-reflective materialism” seeks to dissolve this violence and reconstruct the objectivity of cognition. Concretely, “non-reflective materialism” enters into the “constellation” by means of concepts. The “constellation” is a group of concepts with a spatial dimension; things are located within it, and concepts revolve around the orbit centered on the object. The objectivity of concepts is precisely what this revolving grants: “As a constellation, theoretical thought revolves around the concept it wishes to open, hoping that the concept will spring open like the lock of a well-guarded safe—not through a single key or a single number, but through a combination of numbers.” [n] Here, the “constellation” leads to the particularity and difference of the object: “In the constellation of the object, knowledge of the object is knowledge of the object in its own process.” [n] Adorno attempts to use the “constellation” to rescue the priority of the object. The relationship between concept and thing is not “pointing to” but “orienting toward.” In it, subject and object mediate each other; it presents not a rigid, closed structure but a dynamic, open structure.

在上述探讨的基础上，阿多诺提出了“非反映的唯物主义”。阿多诺指出，辩证法存在于事物中，但“客体只对思想中的主观盈余开放”，这里的“主观盈余”是与主体尝试以同一性的力量来统摄客体相对的，客体在成为客体的过程中失去了自身，思想的启蒙必然要破除意识的这种反映性。没有存在，就没有存在者，同样，没有存在者，亦没有存在，主体与客体互为中介，客观性本身是被中介的客观性，完全倒向了客观立场的辩证法也是一种幻相，不能完成对客体优先性的拯救。然而，消解了反映，主体对客体的把握又是何以可能的呢？阿多诺指出，主体对客观的把握不是一种“反映”，而是一种朝向，“思想不是事物的反映，而是指向事实本身”。只有非反映论才能通向真实的完整客体。阿多诺以列宁对传统认识论的批判为例，指出列宁敏锐地洞见传统的唯物主义认识论与权力的共谋关系，列宁的批判不仅仅是理论向度的，更是政治上的需要，以权力实践来消解观念论可能导致灾难性的政治后果。在阿多诺看来，列宁在《唯物主义和经验批判主义》中没有直接进入某种传统认识论的视野，对贝克莱哲学和马赫主义的批判、对“自在之物”的唯物主义阐释都呈现了某种反传统认识论的维度，列宁强调认识对象不依赖我们的感觉而存在，在客观对象的自在自为性面前，传统认识论不过是一种对客体的暴力，而“非反映的唯物主义”就是要尝试消解这种暴力，重建认识的客观性。具体来说，“非反映的唯物主义”是依靠概念进入“星丛”，“星丛”是具有空间向度的概念群，事物位于其中，概念围绕以客体为中心的轨道转，而概念的客观性正是这种围绕所给予的，“作为星丛，理论化的思想围绕着它想开启的概念的轨道转，希望概念像妥善保管财物的保险箱的锁突然弹开一样，不是通过一把钥匙或一个密码，而是通过一个密码组合”。在这里，“星丛”通向的是客体的特殊性和差异性，“在对象的星丛中，关于对象的认识就是关于对象在自身过程中的认识”，阿多诺尝试用“星丛”实现对客体优先性的拯救，概念与事物的关系不是“指向”，而是“朝向”。在其中，主体与客体互为中介，它呈现的不是一个僵化的封闭结构，而是一个能动的开放结构。

It is not difficult to see that Adorno’s negative dialectics does not oppose concepts themselves, but opposes the primacy of the concept, dissolves the fetishism of the concept, and thereby negates the foundational philosophy, transcendental philosophy and philosophy of the subject that take the primacy of the concept as their basic presupposition, lifting the spell of subject-power and idealism. In this sense, conceptual dialectics uses concepts to accomplish the unity of thinking and being; it is essentially a dogmatic dialectics, while negative dialectics advocates proceeding from the things themselves, maintaining an orientation toward reality and the things themselves. Therefore, philosophy must abandon the expectation of totality, move toward facts, toward the ever-changing, toward individuality and difference. Here, the dialectics that is “forced to move toward facts” already possesses a certain implication of Marx’s practical dialectics.

不难看出，阿多诺的否定辩证法不是要反对概念本身，而是反对概念的首要性，消解对概念的崇拜，进而否定以概念的首要性为基本预设的基础哲学、先验哲学和主体哲学，解除主体权力和观念论膜拜。在这个意义上，观念辩证法用概念来完成思维和存在的统一，它本质上是一种独断论的辩证法，而否定辩证法就是主张从事物本身出发，保持对现实和事物本身的朝向，因此，哲学要放弃总体性的期待，走向事实，走向变动不居，走向个体性与差异性，在这里，“被迫走向事实”的辩证法已经具有了马克思实践辩证法的某种意蕴。

III. The Unfolding of “Non-identity” and the Mediated “Particular”

三、“非同一性”的展开与被中介的“个别”

Adorno replaces “identity” with “non-identity” as the core category of negative dialectics, and uses “non-identical” in the same sense as “beings” and “facticity.” Adorno reaffirms the authentic meaning of dialectics: to return to the things themselves; this is the mission of dialectics. “Non-identity” is open to all heterogeneity, individuality and particularity, opposes all totalizing grand narratives, and rejects identity, harmony and agreement. Adorno emphasizes the priority of non-identity over identity: “Thinking, according to its own meaning, is thinking of something.” [16]16 Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973), 135. “The non-identical, that which is not thinking, is what thinking wants to eliminate but cannot eliminate.” [17]17 Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 136. Logic takes the law of excluded middle as its core; therefore, logic treats qualitative difference as a contradiction that must be excluded, expelling the rupture between subject and object. If the “law of thinking” appeals to identity, then negative dialectics presents precisely the “non-identity within identity,” which leads to the “law of reality.” In this sense, Adorno criticizes Hegel’s absolute idealism. Hegel wanted to reconstruct “the reality of the structure of the object of philosophical knowledge” in order to transcend Kant’s and Fichte’s individual consciousness and transcendental consciousness. However, Hegel’s reconstruction did not fundamentally escape the rut of idealism, because in his system the inner attributes of the determined particular are still spirit, a “particular” governed by spirit, in which “non-identity” is dominated.

阿多诺用“非同一性”来取代“同一性”作为否定辩证法的核心范畴，并将“非同一”与“存在者”“事实性”在同等的意义上使用，阿多诺重申辩证法的本真意蕴，就是回到事情本身，这是辩证法的使命。“非同一性”对所有的异质性、个别性和特殊性开放，反对各种总体性的宏大叙事，拒斥同一、和谐和一致，阿多诺强调非同一性对于同一性的优先性，“思维，按其自身意义来说，就是对某物的思维”。“非同一，即不是思维的东西，乃是思维想清除而又清除不了的东西”。逻辑学将排中律作为核心，因此，逻辑学将质上的差异性视为必须要排除的矛盾，驱除主体与客体之间的断裂。如果说“思维的法则”诉诸同一性，那么，否定辩证法呈现的恰恰是“同一性中的非同一性”，它通向的是“现实的法则”。在这个意义上，阿多诺批判了黑格尔的绝对观念论，黑格尔想要重构“哲学认识对象的结构的现实性”，以超越康德和费希特的个人意识和先验意识，但是，黑格尔的重构没有从根本上走出观念论的窠臼，因为在他那里，被规定的个别的内在属性还是精神，是由精神所统摄的“个别”，在其中，“非同一性”是被宰制的。

Adorno criticizes the absence of “non-identity” in the horizon of traditional philosophy. The paradigm of identity philosophy is Hegel’s philosophy: “Hegel’s philosophy encounters the non-identity of the antagonistic thing and piles it together with extraordinary difficulty; this is precisely the non-identity of the whole, which is not real but unreal, the absolute opposite of justice (Gerechtigkeit).” [18]18 Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 148. Besides Hegel, the intellectual medium of identity philosophy exists powerfully in various philosophical discourses, from Schelling’s “absolute self” to Heidegger’s philosophy of Being: “Since Schelling, substantive philosophical thinking has been grounded in the proposition of identity.” [19]19 Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 149. In Schelling, things and concepts have identity in a higher spirit. Heidegger seems to have advanced a step further, reaching “the edge of the dialectical view that ‘non-identity exists within identity,’ but without resolving the contradiction in the concept of ‘Being’; on the contrary, he suppresses the contradiction.” [20]20 Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 149. Heidegger attempts to overturn traditional metaphysics but ultimately falls into the subjectivism of existential philosophy. The ontologization of the copula turns the category of “Being” into an abstract tautology; his pursuit of the immediacy and primacy that transcend subject and object overflows the horizon of dialectics. Adorno takes “non-identity” as the fundamental dimension of philosophical thinking. The elevation of “non-identity” simultaneously signifies the establishment of a new philosophical stance: “Dialectics is the consistent consciousness of non-identity,” [21]21 Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 5. “Dialectics tends toward the non-identical thing,” [22]22 Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 145. “In its subjective aspect, the result of dialectics is the assertion that forms of thought no longer turn their objects into something unchangeable.” [23]23 Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 147. “Non-identity” criticizes all pre-given theoretical positions and philosophical principles, rejects any form of ontological construction, and negative dialectics is precisely to replace “identity” with “non-identity,” thereby opening up a new form of dialectics.

阿多诺批判“非同一性”在传统哲学视野中的缺位，同一性哲学的典范是黑格尔哲学，“黑格尔哲学遭遇到对抗之物的非同一性，并异常艰辛地将其堆积在一起，这乃是那整体的非同一性，这个整体并不是真实的，而是非真实的，是公正性（Gerechtigkeit）的绝对对立者”。除了黑格尔，同一性哲学的思想介质强有力地存在于诸种哲学话语中，从谢林的“绝对自我”到海德格尔的存在哲学，“自谢林以来，实质性的哲学思维都奠基于同一性命题”。在谢林那里，事物与概念在较高的精神中具有同一性，海德格尔似乎向前推进了一步，抵达了“‘非同一性存在于同一性中’这一辩证观点的边缘，但没有解决‘存在’概念中的矛盾，反而压制了矛盾”。海德格尔试图颠覆传统形而上学，但最终却陷入了生存哲学的主体主义，系动词的本体论化使“存在”范畴成为一种抽象的同义反复，他对超越主体与客体的直接性和第一性的追逐，使其溢出了辩证法的视野。阿多诺将“非同一性”作为哲学思维的根本维度，对“非同一性”的推崇同时意味着一种新的哲学立场的确立，“辩证法是一以贯之的非同一性意识”，“辩证法倾向于不同一的东西”，“在其主观方面，辩证法的结果是主张思想形式不再把它的对象变成不可改变的东西”。“非同一性”批判所有先在的理论立场和哲学原则，拒斥任何形式的本体论建构，而否定辩证法就是要通过“非同一性”来取代“同一性”，进而开启一种新的辩证法形态。

While exalting “non-identity,” Adorno does not treat the “particular” as the terminal object of thinking activity. Negative dialectics rejects any form of “termination”; submission to the particular itself also possesses an ideological dimension, and therefore is not the theoretical posture of negative dialectics. Although the particular itself is what is indissoluble for identity, it is not an abstraction but something mediated in itself, a unity of the thing-in-itself and the thing-for-others. By means of this mediation, it can be interpreted. In this sense, “the particular existent is more than what it is. This ‘more’ is not imposed on it from outside, but is something excluded from itself yet immanent in it.” [24]24 Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 162. As a mediated thing, the particular points not only to other particulars but also to the universal; the so-called universal resides in the particular, just as in the field of art, the most transcendent artworks conceal universal elements. The universal does not need to be presented through the comparison of many particulars; rather, the universal is deeply rooted in the core of the particular. Here, the resistance of “non-identity” to “identity” must rely on achieving identity with its concept, and this is precisely what Husserl neglects: “The object given in the act—according to Husserl’s own terminology and that of Hegel, which he neglects—is ‘mediated’: it is ‘thought,’ and even when it is thought as objective, it still bears within itself categorical factors that cannot remove the operation of its ‘self.’” [25]25 Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 163. Particularity is presented in the abstract thinking activity of the universal; opposition to this identity is not external but must rely on entering into this identity, or more precisely, sublating identity through identity. In this sense, it is inappropriate to regard Adorno as an advocate of absolute difference and particularity. Negative dialectics also exhibits a certain theoretical character of reconciliation, which also makes Adorno’s negative dialectics essentially different from postmodernism. The latter rejects the philosophy of reconciliation, while negative dialectics still retains the imprint of the philosophy of reconciliation. Rather than saying Adorno is committed to criticizing the rational totality based on identity, it is more accurate to say he criticizes an illegitimate and insufficient use of reason. Adorno takes the principle of exchange as an example to explore the social model of the law of identity. The principle of exchange, as the law of identity in the sphere of exchange, makes the labor activities of individual persons, which are non-identical, commensurable. Although their respective labors are multiply heterogeneous, they can follow the principle of equivalent exchange to exchange. If this identity is negated, exchange activity would regress into barbaric disorder and violence. But the principle of exchange as identity is itself a negation; more precisely, the equality promised by this principle is only an illusion, or rather, this exchange is “equal and yet unequal,” because it dissolves the differences among non-identical individuals and their labors. To rescue the multiple heterogeneous and differentiated labors, one must first dissolve the legitimacy of the principle of identity represented by universal exchange, transcending the principle of exchange through the principle of exchange.

在高扬“非同一性”的同时，阿多诺并没有把“个别”作为思维活动的终结之物，否定辩证法拒斥任何形式的“终结”，向个别之物的屈从本身亦具有意识形态之维，因此，不是否定辩证法的理论姿态。个别本身虽然是作为同一性的不可消解之物，但它并不是一个抽象物，而是自身被中介之物，是自在之物和为他之物的统一，借助于这种中介，它可以被阐释，在这个意义上，“个别生存者是比他是其所是‘多’的东西。这个‘多’不是从外面强令他接受的，而是作为从他自身中被排除的、内在于它自身的东西”。作为中介之物的个别，除了指向其他个别，更指向了一般，所谓一般寓于个别之中，正如在艺术领域，最超然的艺术作品中隐藏着一般的要素。一般并不需要通过诸多个别的比较才能呈现，毋宁说，一般就深植于个别的核心地带。在这里，“非同一性”对“同一性”的反抗必须借助于达到与其概念的同一性，而这正是胡塞尔忽视的，“在行为中被给予的对象——按照胡塞尔自己以及他所忽视的黑格尔的术语——是‘被中介的’：它是被‘思考的’，并且，即便它被思考为客观之物，它在其自身当中依然承担着范畴因素，这些因素不能移除对它的‘自身’的操作”。个别性是在一般的抽象思维活动中得以呈现的，对这种同一性的反对不是外在的，而必须借助于进入这种同一性，确切地说，通过同一性扬弃同一性。在这个意义上，将阿多诺视为绝对的差异和个别的鼓吹者是不妥的，否定辩证法还呈现出某种理论的调和特征，这也使阿多诺的否定辩证法与后现代主义表现出本质的不同，后者拒绝了和解哲学，而否定辩证法依然保存着和解哲学的烙印。与其说阿多诺致力于批判的是以同一性为基础的理性总性，不如说，他批判的是一种理性的非法和不充分的运用。阿多诺以交换原则为例，探讨了同一性法则的社会模型，交换原则作为交换领域的同一性法则，它使作为非同一性的单个个人的劳动活动具有可通约性，虽然他们各自的劳动具有多元的异质性，他们却可以遵循等价交换的原则进行交换，如果否定这种同一性，交换活动就会回到野蛮的无序和暴力中。但作为同一性的交换原则本身又是一种否定，确切地说，这一原则所承诺的平等只是一种幻相，或者说，这种交换“平等而又不平等”，因为它消解了非同一性的个体及其劳动之间的差异性。要拯救多元异质的差异化劳动，首先要消解这种普遍交换所代表的同一性原则的合法性，通过交换原则来超越交换原则。

IV. The Presupposition of Language and the Linguistic Absence of Conceptual Dialectics

四、语言的预设与观念辩证法的语言缺位

On the basis of the above three dimensions, the intellectual path of negative dialectics ascends to the linguistic dimension of dialectics, the linguistic dimension of philosophy. On the surface, the debate on the language of dialectics provides a justification for the “constellation,” but this justification itself has already touched the core zone of the dialectical tradition. In this sense, this is an “ascent” in the intellectual path.

在以上三重维度的基础上，否定辩证法的思想进路攀升至辩证法的语言之维、哲学的语言之维，表面上来看，关于辩证法的语言之辩是为“星丛”提供论证，但这一论证本身已触及辩证法传统中的核心地带，在这个意义上，这是一种思想进路上的“攀升”。

In Adorno’s view, dialectics presupposes language, and language has a cognitive function, but language is not a “pure system of signs” concerning things; the essence of language does not lie in the definition of concepts, and the demand for precision in conceptual description is precisely anti-linguistic. The language presupposed by negative dialectics is what Adorno calls “linguistic behavior” (Sprachverhalten), in which discursive reason is linked to the communicativity of language itself, and this communicativity is opposed to the compulsion of formal logic and the order of identity. Therefore, individual concepts are limited; linguistic behavior leads to a field of concepts. Concepts exist within linguistic behavior, but concepts are not equivalent to linguistic behavior, for linguistic behavior also includes what is indissoluble in those individual concepts. The basic intention of linguistic behavior is not to express concepts, but to express what concepts mean. In it, concepts truly attain their objectivity, and language completes itself. Here, linguistic behavior points to the intentionality of concepts themselves, shifting dialectics from a linguistic dimension to a semantic dimension. This is negative dialectics’ reconstruction of the legitimacy of concepts.

在阿多诺看来，辩证法预设了语言，语言具有认识功能，但语言不是一种关于事物的“纯粹标记体系”，语言的本质不在于对概念的定义，对概念描述精准性的诉求恰恰是反语言的。否定辩证法预设的语言被阿多诺称之为“语言行为”，在其中，话语理性关联着语言本身的交往性，这种交往性是与形式逻辑和同一性的秩序强迫相对的。因此，个别的概念是有限的，语言行为通向的是一个概念的场阈，概念在语言行为之中，但概念不等同于语言行为，语言行为还包括那些个别概念所不可分解之物。语言行为的基本旨趣不是表达概念，而是表达概念所意指的东西，在其中，概念真正获得了它的客观性，语言完成了它自身。在这里，语言行为指向了概念本身的意向性，使辩证法从一种语言学的维度转向一种语义学的维度，这是否定辩证法对概念合法性的重构。

Adorno also criticizes, in the above sense, the dialectics of idealism represented by Hegel, which recognizes only concepts with a clear referential dimension and has no language. Specifically, Hegel’s dialectics subsumes language itself (including non-linguistic things) within the system of its absolute spirit. This system epitomizes the totalizing demand for identity in Hegel’s dialectics, a demand that presupposes nothing indissoluble by this identity. In Adorno’s view, however, only what is indissoluble in concepts and the non-identity it represents are the growth points of dialectics. The externalization of concepts comes precisely from this non-identity; only this indissoluble thing can transcend the closure of the system itself, while Hegel suppresses this transcendence with the identity of the system. In this sense, Adorno points out that “Hegel’s dialectics is a dialectics without language,” and “Hegel does not need language, because for him everything, even the speechless and the opaque, should be spirit, and indeed spirit in relation.” Adorno attempts to transcend language as a mere system of signs and enter the horizon of language as an intentional activity, in which concepts must give complete expression to the intention of language. Thus, such concepts are not merely individual concepts themselves, but a constellation of concepts, which constructs a space of meaning. This space, to a certain extent, overcomes the subjective tailoring of things by concepts in the process of abstraction. The relation of this constellation of concepts to things is no longer a unidirectional reference, but rather, by gathering around the object to be known, it achieves an element of identity without needing to entrust itself, through Hegel’s negation of the negation, to a supreme abstract principle.

阿多诺也在上述意义上批判了黑格尔为代表的观念辩证法，观念辩证法只承认具有明确指称维度的概念，而没有语言。具体来说，黑格尔的辩证法将语言本身（包括非语言的东西）都统摄在它的绝对精神的体系中，这一体系集中体现了黑格尔辩证法中对同一性的总体性诉求，这一诉求预设了没有这种同一性不可分解之物。而在阿多诺看来，只有概念不可分解之物及其代表的非同一性，才是辩证法的生长点，概念的外化恰恰来自于这种非同一性，只有这种不可分解之物才能超越体系本身的封闭性，而黑格尔以体系的同一性压制了这种超越。在这个意义上，阿多诺指出“黑格尔的辩证法是没有语言的辩证法”，“黑格尔并不需要语言，因为在他那里，所有的东西，即使无语言的东西和不透明的东西，都应该是精神，而且是关联的精神”。阿多诺尝试超越作为单纯标识系统的语言，而进入作为一种意向活动的语言的视野，在其中，概念需要使语言的意向得到完整表达。由此，这种概念就不只是单个的概念自身，而是一个概念群，后者建构了一个意义空间，这个空间在一定程度上克服了概念在抽象的过程中对事物的主观裁剪，这个概念群对事物的关系，也不再是单向度的指称，而是通过聚集在被认识之物周围达到一种同一性的要素，而不需通过黑格尔的否定之否定，托付给一个最高的抽象原则。

On the basis of the above discussion, Adorno reaffirms the linguistic dimension of philosophy, although this has been disparaged by the philosophical tradition since Plato. On the one hand, the language of philosophy differs from the language of science. Science clings to the definite referentiality of language, crudely excluding what description cannot directly provide to thought. This highly systematized reified language is essentially anti-linguistic, presenting a “delinguistification.” In this sense, we can say that scientism, which flaunts objectivity, is in essence a philosophy of the subject. Taking physics as an example, “physics, as objectifying practice, cannot see its own non-objectifiable foundation, cannot see its process of being grounded in historical practice. Just as formal logic is detached from the existence of linguistic meaning, physics is also detached from the communicative practice of human beings. In a sense, physics cognizes reality from the perspective of a single subject, and thus plays a leading role in modern philosophy of the subject.” The reification of language is something the language of philosophy must guard against. “The alliance of philosophy with science may lead to the dethronement of language, and thereby to the dethronement of philosophy itself, for without the effort of philosophical language, philosophy cannot survive.” On the other hand, the language of philosophy also differs from rhetoric (Rhetorik), a form in which language has been degraded under the methodological horizon in modern philosophical history, a product of the technologization of thought. It is opposed to the expressive element of thought, and the risk of the loss of the object is always what rhetoric must face. On the basis of this double critique, Adorno points out the essence of the linguistic dimension of philosophy: language is not a means of philosophical expression; rather, philosophy is a reflection on language itself. Specifically, how is philosophical expression and description possible? When we speak of “this one,” “this one” already implies the mediation of the concept itself. Thus, philosophical expression concerns both the conceptual and the non-conceptual, i.e., the limit of naming facts with particular words. When we try to express the self-sameness of facts with the precision of concepts, the presentation of facts is limited. The illusion of fetishism lies precisely in the flight from the indissoluble that cannot be incorporated into concepts, fixing beings in the determinacy of a concept. The effort to dissolve fetishism is to treat beings no longer as “finished things” (Gewordenes) but as “becoming things” (Werdendes). Philosophical language is to approach the name by negating the name. The bridging of the gap between “concept” and “fact” is possible only by introducing the non-conceptual into the concept. It is in this sense that Adorno gives the concept of “constellation” (Konstellation), which is also the basic epistemological presupposition of negative dialectics. In this sense, philosophy is not to disparage “rhetoric,” but to strive for “the critical rescue of the elements of rhetoric.” By bringing expression and fact into constant mutual approximation, it rebuilds the confidence of philosophical expression. And when thought, in the analysis of words, seeks the truth of expression, traditional epistemology is necessarily obstructed. “Adorno has seen and always emphasized that, in order to express the critique of conceptual thinking, philosophy can have no other foothold than language. Yet the very idea of criticizing identity concepts must seek its presupposition outside language. Adorno’s philosophy is an assault on the limits of language (the philosophy of the subject); it speaks the secret of the philosophy of the subject without needing to understand that secret.” Here, Adorno’s discussion of the linguistic foundation of philosophy involves the non-essentiality of philosophical language. The path indicated by this non-essentiality is opposed to the emphasis on the objectifying task of language. This does not mean that philosophical language itself is a subjective tailoring without objectivity, but rather that the basic intention of philosophical language is to construct a path of understanding, and understanding itself is linked to the construction of linguistic meaning. Here, “as Adorno believes, in philosophy we indeed encounter the limits of concepts, and the reason for this is precisely that we move and think at the limits of language, neither completely within language nor, as we might wish, on the other side of language.”

在上述探讨的基础上，阿多诺重申了哲学的语言之维，尽管这是从柏拉图以来的哲学传统所贬抑的东西，一方面，哲学的语言不同于科学的语言，科学执着于语言确定的指称性，它粗暴地排斥着描述所不能直接提供给思想的东西，而这种高度系统化的物化语言本质上是反语言的，呈现了一种“去语言化”。在这个意义上，我们可以说，标榜客观性的唯科学主义在本质上是主体哲学。以物理学为例，“作为客观化实践的物理学看不到其自身无法客观化的基础，看不到其在历史实践中奠定基础的过程。如同形式逻辑脱离了语言意义的存在一样，物理学也脱离了人类的交往实践。从某种意义上讲，物理学是从单一主体的视角来认识现实的，因而在近代主体哲学中扮演着主角”。语言的物化是哲学语言需要警惕的，“哲学与科学的联盟可能导致语言的废黜，由此导致哲学本身的废黜，因为没有哲学语言的努力，哲学就不能存在下来”。另一方面，哲学的语言亦不同于修辞学（Rhetorik），这是近代哲学史上语言在方法论视阈下被矮化的一种形态，一种思维技术化的产物，它是与思维的表达要素相对的，客体丧失的风险始终是修辞学要面对的。在以上双重批判的基础上，阿多诺指出了哲学的语言之维之要义，语言不是哲学表达的手段，毋宁说，哲学是对语言本身进行反映。具体来说，哲学表达与描述是何以可能的？当我们言说“这一个”时，“这一个”本身已内涵了概念本身的中介性，由此，哲学表达既关涉概念，又关涉非概念，即：特定语词对事实命名的限度，当我们试图用概念的准确性来表达事实的自身性时，事实的呈现是受限的，拜物教的幻象恰恰在于对于无法纳入概念的不可消解之物的逃离，将存在者固化在一个概念的确定性中，而消解拜物教的努力就是将存在者不再作为“既成之物”，而是作为“生成之物”。哲学语言就是要通过否定名称而接近名称，“概念”与“事实”之间鸿沟的消弭只有通过在概念中引入非概念才是可能的，阿多诺也是在这个意义上给出“星丛”这一概念的，这亦是否定辩证法关于认识论的基本预设。在这个意义上，哲学不是要贬抑“修辞学”，而是要致力于“批判地拯救修辞学的要素”，通过使表达与事实之间不断相互接近，重建哲学表达的信心，而当思维在语词的分析中探寻表达的真理性时，传统认识论必然受阻，“阿多诺已经看到并且一直强调，为了表达对概念思考的批判，除了语言之外哲学不可能有其他的立足点。可是仅仅是批判同一性的概念这一想法就必须在语言之外寻找前提。阿多诺的哲学就是对语言界限（主体哲学）的冲击，它说出了主体哲学的隐秘，而无须去理解这一隐秘”。在这里，阿多诺对哲学的语言基础的探讨涉及哲学语言的非本质性，这种非本质性所指引的路径是与强调语言的客观化任务相对的，这并不意味着哲学语言本身是无客观性的主观裁剪，而是强调哲学语言的基本旨趣是建构理解之路，而理解本身是与语言意义的建构关联在一起的。在这里，“正如阿多诺认为的那样，在哲学上我们确实碰到了概念的界限，而之所以这样，正是由于我们在语言的界限处运动、思索，既不是完全置身于语言之中，也不是像我们期望的那样身处于语言的彼岸”。

V. Negative Dialectics and the Tradition of Dialectics

五、否定辩证法与辩证法的传统

Returning to the title of this article: Is negative dialectics a radical dialectics? It must be said that, on the whole, radicalism is only the appearance of negative dialectics. Adorno’s perplexity concerns the authenticity of concreteness and, deeply linked to this, the objectivity of thought within consciousness. This is essentially an ancient perplexity about dialectics, although Adorno has infused it with the content of his era. The predicament of dialectics in Adorno’s view is essentially the predicament of all abstract activity of thought. Moreover, Adorno’s solution to this predicament is itself a derivative of the dialectics of idealism he criticizes; he has not substantially completed the reconstruction and advancement of dialectics. His critique of Hegel’s idealist dialectics also contains a misreading of Hegel, and therefore fails to hit the mark.

回到本文的标题，否定辩证法是一种激进的辩证法吗？不得不说，总体而言，激进只是否定辩证法的表象，阿多诺的困惑涉及具体性的本真性以及与此深刻关联的意识之内思想的客观性，这本质上是关于辩证法的古老困惑，虽然他为这种困惑注入了时代的内涵。阿多诺视野中的辩证法的困境本质上就是所有思维抽象活动的困境。不仅如此，阿多诺对于这种困境的解决之道亦是他所批判的观念辩证法的衍生物，他并没有在实质上完成对辩证法的重构和推进，他对黑格尔观念辩证法的批判中亦包含了对黑格尔的误读，因此，难以击中要害。

Specifically, Hegel from the very beginning presents his dialectics within a horizon that dissolves the binary opposition between subject and object; therefore, for him, the starting point of dialectics “is to undertake an objective examination of the existence and process of the thing itself.” Hegel does not treat dialectics merely as a process of thought, but rather as a real process presented within the process of thought, as the self-unfolding of “substance” as “subject.” This means that the concept in Hegel’s vision is essentially not the concept that Adorno criticizes; his concept “is not an ‘abstract concept’ that signifies a separation from the real substance to which it is linked, but rather means ‘the real thing comprehended in the concept.’” “Language and thought themselves are dialectical only because and only when they reveal or describe the dialectics of being and of real things.” In fact, when evaluating Hegel, Adorno himself has to admit: “This absolute idealist is likewise a great realist, and he possesses an especially sharp historical insight.” “The real principle of becoming (through which things are not merely their positivity), or the core engine of Hegelian idealism, is at the same time anti-idealistic.” Moreover, the concept itself is not “the reification of thought” in Hegel’s case; in fact, Hegel does not cling to the determinacy of any single concept. Compared with the establishment of the determinacy of a single concept, Hegel is more concerned with the dissolution of every determinacy and the necessity of this dissolution. Through the self-evolution and self-development of concepts, he presents precisely the finitude of the concept as “the reification of thought.” Within this, each independent concept is merely a moment in the continuously unfolding sequence of concepts. Adorno himself acknowledges: “Insofar as he tolerates no limit and is determined to eliminate every differential determination, Hegel completely surpasses Fichte’s idealism.” Correspondingly, in Hegel’s case, the negation of the negation does not return negation to affirmation; rather, it is merely an insufficient negation, and every reconciliation in the self-evolution of concepts should also be understood as a temporary reconciliation. Adorno fiercely criticizes the violence of identity in Hegelian dialectics. However, “in Hegel, especially in his *Science of Logic*, the question of whether identity is superior to difference (or vice versa) seems less important than the inevitable mutual transformation between them, as long as you focus on either one for a sufficient length of time.” Adorno wants to present a meta-critique of the philosophy of identity, yet this meta-critique is still permeated by a reconciliation with the philosophy of identity that is difficult to strip away from it. “Adorno certainly resolutely denies any ontology, but deconstructing the positivity described by the external side of dialectics and constructing a concrete positivity based on negativity is Adorno’s overall theoretical aim. This may also be the origin of the theoretical predicament from which he later could not extricate himself.” Overall, negative dialectics still remains within the field of conceptual dialectics, failing to find a real path from concepts to things. In criticizing Hegelian dialectics, Marx takes a completely different path. By introducing historicity into dialectics, Marx creatively opens up a broad highway for dialectics. In summary, the argument for treating negative dialectics as a radical dialectics is insufficient; rather, negative dialectics is merely a contemporary echo of the dialectical tradition. This echo itself exhibits an extremely strong concern with reality, which may partly explain why the paradigm of thought represented by negative dialectics is not isolated in the intellectual process of the 20th century, but rather merges, in either explicit or implicit ways, into a confluence of thought that takes non-identity as its practical aim.

具体来说，黑格尔一开始就是在消解主客体二元对立的视野中呈现其辩证法的，因此，对于他而言，辩证法的出发点“是就事物本身的存在和过程加以客观的考察”。黑格尔没有把辩证法仅仅作为一种思想进程，而是在思想进程中呈现的现实进程，是作为“主体”的“实体”的自我展开，这意味着黑格尔视野中的概念本质上并不是阿多诺所批判的概念，他的概念“不是表示与它所联系的真实的实体分离的‘抽象概念’，而是意味着‘在概念上被理解的现实事物’”。“语言和思维本身是辩证的，仅仅是因为和仅仅当它们揭示或描述存在和实在事物的辩证法”。事实上，在评价黑格尔时，阿多诺自己也不得不承认：“这个绝对唯心论者同样是一个伟大的实在论者，而且他尤其具有锐利的历史洞察力。”“现实的生成原则（通过它事物就不仅仅是它的实证性），或者说黑格尔唯心主义的核心引擎，同时也是反唯心主义的”。不仅如此，概念本身在黑格尔这里亦不是“思维的物化”，事实上，黑格尔并不执着于单个概念的规定性，与单个概念的规定性的建立相比，黑格尔更为关切的是每一种规定性的瓦解以及这种瓦解的必然性，他通过概念的自我演进和自我发展，呈现的正是作为“思维的物化”的概念的有限性。在其中，每个独立的概念不过是不断展开的概念序列的诸环节。阿多诺自己也承认：“就不忍受任何界限，消除每个差异规定的决心而言，黑格尔完全超过了费希特的唯心主义。”相应地，在黑格尔那里，否定之否定并非使否定回归肯定，毋宁说，这只是不充分的否定，而概念的自我演进中的每一次和解，也应被理解为暂时的和解。阿多诺猛烈地批判了黑格尔辩证法中的同一性的暴力，然而，“在黑格尔那里，尤其在他的《逻辑学》中，同一性优于差异（或反过来）这个问题似乎不如它们之间不可避免的相互转化那么重要，只要你长时间地关注它们其中的任何一个”。阿多诺想呈现对于同一性哲学的元批判，但是，这种元批判中依然渗透着自身难以剥离的与同一性哲学的和解，“固然，阿多诺坚决否定任何本体论，但解构辩证法外部描述的肯定性，建构一种立基于否定性的具体的肯定性，这是阿多诺总的理论目的。这可能也是他后来无法解脱的理论困窘之缘起”。总体而言，否定辩证法还是停留在观念辩证法的场阈中，没有找到一条由概念通达事物的现实道路，同样是对黑格尔辩证法的批判，马克思走的是一条完全不同的路，通过将历史性引入辩证法，马克思独创性地开辟了一条辩证法的康庄大道。综上所述，将否定辩证法作为一种激进的辩证法，其论据并不充分，毋宁说，否定辩证法不过是辩证法传统的一次当代回响，这一回响本身呈现出极强的现实关切，这或许可以部分地解释为什么否定辩证法所代表的思想范式在20世纪的思想进程中并不孤立，而是以或显性或隐性的方式融入一种以非同一性为实践旨趣的思想合流。

Nevertheless, Adorno’s effort to steer negative dialectics toward individuality and difference is outstanding. It prevents dialectics from becoming a tyranny of reason or a straitjacket of dogmatism. The original theoretical intention of attempting to transcend the rupture between philosophy and factual science through negative dialectics is positive. Adorno’s reflection on the limits of dialectical thought and the limits of action directly points to the contemporary predicament of dialectics and resonates with the spirit of the times. “No other Marxist theorist has ever highlighted the relationship between the universal and the particular, between system and detail, with such single-minded and extensive attention.” Adorno’s reflection on enlightenment in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is his real-world critique of conceptual dialectics. In this sense, *Negative Dialectics* and *Dialectic of Enlightenment* mutually corroborate each other; the critique of enlightenment is truly completed only with negative dialectics. Furthermore, negative dialectics opens up enormous theoretical and practical space in cultural critique (for example, the “dialectics of freedom” in the reconstruction of traditional moral philosophy). Although Adorno’s ontological reconstruction of dialectics is fraught with difficulties, he unexpectedly opens up a broad horizon of cultural critique. Within this horizon, negative dialectics points to the suppression of individuals by various abstract totalities created by capital, which become a force of identity that dominates people. These abstract totalities range from one-dimensional moral orders and political ideologies to the state bureaucratic system. What Adorno seeks to do is to reconstruct the critical character of dialectics within the socio-historical process. Here, Adorno’s position coincides with Marx’s, and these constitute the rational kernel of negative dialectics. (Notes omitted)

尽管如此，阿多诺将否定辩证法导向个体性和差异性的努力是卓越的，避免辩证法成为一种理性的暴虐、一种教条主义的窠臼，通过否定辩证法尝试超越哲学与事实科学之间的断裂，这一理论初衷是积极的。阿多诺对辩证法思想限度和行动限度的思考直指辩证法的当代困境，契合了时代精神，“没有其他的马克思主义理论家曾经以这种专一而又广泛的注意力突出这种普遍与特殊、体系与细节之间的关系”。阿多诺在《启蒙辩证法》中对启蒙的反思就是他对观念辩证法的现实批判，在这个意义上，《否定辩证法》与《启蒙辩证法》是相互印证的，对启蒙的批判到否定辩证法才真正完成。除此以外，否定辩证法在文化批判上展现出巨大的理论和实践空间（如“自由的辩证法”对传统道德哲学的重构）。尽管阿多诺对辩证法的本体论重构困难重重，但他却意外地开辟了一个广阔的文化批判视阈。在其中，否定辩证法指向了资本创造出来的各种抽象总体对人的压制，这些抽象总体成为宰制人的一种同一性力量，这种抽象总体从单向度的道德秩序、政治意识形态到国家官僚体系，而阿多诺所要做的就是重建辩证法在社会历史进程中的批判性。在这里，阿多诺与马克思的立场已经不谋而合，这些都是否定辩证法的合理内核。（注释略）

Web editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑