The Evolution of Historical Nihilist Discourse within the CPSU and Its Contemporary Lessons

Historical nihilism is not merely a cultural phenomenon and an academic topic; it is, more fundamentally, a political trend of thought. At present, the trend of historical nihilism has an extremely negative impact on China’s ideological sphere. Hostile forces at home and abroad attempt to use historical nihilism to deconstruct the mainstream socialist ideology and the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party’s ruling position. This should arouse our high vigilance and reflection. The painful historical lesson of the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of the 20th century is particularly worthy of our serious study. “Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? Why did the CPSU collapse? An important reason was the extremely fierce struggle in the ideological sphere, the comprehensive negation of Soviet history and CPSU history, the negation of Lenin, the negation of Stalin, the practice of historical nihilism, the confusion of thought, the near-total ineffectiveness of Party organizations at all levels, and the military no longer being under the leadership of the Party.” [1]1 This is a quotation from Xi Jinping, referring Therefore, drawing on the historical lessons of the Soviet Union’s disintegration and analyzing the evolution of historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU holds significant warning and reference value for us in effectively guiding social trends of thought in terms of discourse strategy, effectively blocking the penetration of Western ideology, and avoiding falling into the discourse traps set by the West.

历史虚无主义不仅是一种文化现象和学术话题，更是一种政治思潮。当前历史虚无主义思潮对我国社会思想领域产生了极其消极的影响，国内外敌对势力企图借用历史虚无主义解构社会主义主流意识形态和中国共产党执政地位正当性，应当引起我们的高度警惕和反思。20世纪末苏联解体的惨痛历史教训尤其值得我们认真汲取。“苏联为什么解体？苏共为什么垮台？一个重要原因就是意识形态领域的斗争十分激烈，全面否定苏联历史、苏共历史，否定列宁，否定斯大林，搞历史虚无主义，思想搞乱了，各级党组织几乎没任何作用了，军队都不在党的领导之下了。”[1] 因此，汲取苏联解体的历史教训，分析苏共党内历史虚无主义话语的演进，对于我们在话语策略上有效引领社会思潮、有效阻击西方意识形态的渗透、避免落入西方设置的话语陷阱等，具有重要的警示和借鉴意义。

The spread and prevalence of historical nihilism within the CPSU were closely related to the deviation of the CPSU leadership group’s theory, line, principles, and policies. In constructing its ideological discourse, the CPSU unconsciously introduced liberalism, realism, and destructionism, linking them with the historical evaluation of the Soviet model, the Soviet system, and CPSU leaders, thereby forming a system of historical nihilist discourse that dealt a fatal blow to the CPSU regime.

历史虚无主义在苏共党内的蔓延、盛行与苏共领导集团理论、路线、方针、政策走偏密切相关，苏共在意识形态话语建构中不自觉地引入了自由主义、现实主义、破坏主义，并与苏联模式、苏联制度、苏共领导人的历史评判相挂钩，形成一套历史虚无主义话语体系，给苏共政权带来了致命性打击。

I. The Evolution of Historical Nihilist Discourse within the CPSU

一、苏共党内历史虚无主义话语的演进

The evolution of historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU mainly went through three stages: the Khrushchev period, the Brezhnev period, and the Gorbachev period. In different periods, the historical nihilist discourse was both “different in form” and “constantly changing,” yet also “successive” and “of the same lineage.”

苏共党内历史虚无主义话语的演进主要经历了赫鲁晓夫时期、勃列日涅夫时期、戈尔巴乔夫时期三个阶段，不同时期历史虚无主义话语既“形态各异”“花样翻新”，又“前后相继”“一脉相承”。

1. Khrushchev’s “De-Stalinization” Movement Opened Pandora’s Box of Historical Nihilist Discourse within the CPSU

1.赫鲁晓夫的“非斯大林化”运动打开了苏共党内历史虚无主义话语的潘多拉魔盒

The initial emergence of historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU began with Khrushchev’s “de-Stalinization.” Khrushchev’s secret report at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956, which exposed Stalin’s personality cult, sparked a climax of the “de-Stalinization” movement within the CPSU. This was the root cause of the later emergence of the nihilist social trend of thought. In this movement, Khrushchev attributed the roots of the personality cult to Stalin’s personal character, launching a comprehensive critique and personal attack on Stalin, using extreme and harsh terms such as “paranoid,” “cruel,” “neurotic,” “hysterical,” and “abuse of power.” [2]2 “Two Ilyiches” – a reference to Lenin (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) and Brezhnev (Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev), whose patronymics are both “Ilyich,” used here to create a personality cult equating Brezhnev with Lenin. Stalin had become a spiritual symbol and cultural icon of the Soviet Union. The demonization of Stalin not only deconstructed the reasonable connotation that the concept of Stalin should have but also emasculated the national spirit of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev’s report exceeded the psychological capacity of the Soviet people, changed the direction of Soviet society, and caused ideological confusion and disorder. At the same time, to create a favorable public opinion atmosphere for breaking Stalin’s personality cult, Khrushchev used the “Thaw” in the cultural field to loosen policies towards intellectuals, thereby deconstructing the Stalin model. Driven by Khrushchev, the “Thaw” wave spread across the country, with exposing the dark side of history and promoting humanitarianism becoming the two main themes of Soviet literary creation.

苏共党内历史虚无主义话语的初现，是从赫鲁晓夫的“非斯大林化”开始的。赫鲁晓夫在1956年苏共二十大上作了揭露斯大林个人崇拜的秘密报告，在苏共党内掀起了“非斯大林化”运动的高潮，这是以后出现虚无主义社会思潮的总根源。在这场运动中，赫鲁晓夫将产生个人崇拜的根源归咎于斯大林的个人品质，对斯大林进行了全面批判和人身攻击，使用了诸如“偏执”“残忍”“神经质”和“歇斯底里”“滥用职权”[2] 等偏激、尖刻的词汇。斯大林已经成为苏联的精神象征和文化符号，对斯大林的妖魔化处理，不仅解构了斯大林这个概念应有的合理内涵，而且也阉割了苏联的民族精神。赫鲁晓夫的报告超出了苏联人的心理承受能力，改变了苏联社会的运转方向，造成了思想上的混乱和无序。同时，为打破斯大林的个人崇拜营造有利的舆论氛围，赫鲁晓夫借助文化领域的“解冻”，为知识分子政策松绑，以此来解构斯大林模式。在赫鲁晓夫的推动下，“解冻”浪潮遍布全国，揭露历史阴暗面、弘扬人道主义成为苏联文学创作的两大主题。

While opposing the “personality cult” and “autocratic dictatorship,” terms like “comprehensively launching the construction of communist society” and “communist education,” which did not conform to the stage of Soviet socialist development, were introduced into the CPSU’s ruling discourse system, realizing a humanitarian turn in the CPSU’s view of history, thereby affecting the people’s identification with the vision of communism. (WeChat public account: Ideological and Political Scholars) At the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1962, Khrushchev not only proposed the term “comprehensively building communism” but also declared the establishment of a “state of the whole people” and a “party of the whole people,” replacing terms from scientific socialism such as “meeting the needs of the people” and “realizing the free and comprehensive development of the individual” with humanitarian-colored signifiers like “everything for man, everything for the happiness of man.” [3]3 “Goatee,” “potbellies,” “night owls” – derogatory Soviet-era nicknames for Lenin, Party cadres, and Lenin’s followers, respectively. Through this code-switching, Khrushchev released a signal that a major change in the ideological connotation of the CPSU had occurred. Subsequently, humanitarianism began to permeate all aspects of Soviet social life and became the basic criterion for judging social and historical issues. Although Khrushchev did not intentionally negate CPSU history, the humanitarian turn in his guiding ideology inevitably opened the historical precedent of nihilizing CPSU leaders, declaring to the world the cognitive shift in ideology that the CPSU had made in response to changes in the domestic and international situation. The deeper significance of this shift lay in linking the CPSU’s political strategy with more fields and aspects of the Soviet Union, thereby achieving a questioning and negation of the pre-Khrushchev period.

在反对“个人崇拜”“专制独裁”的同时，把“全面展开共产主义社会建设”“共产主义教育”等不符合苏联社会主义发展阶段的词汇引入苏共执政话语体系，实现了苏共历史观的人道主义转向，从而影响了民众对共产主义愿景的认同。（微信公众号：思政学者）1962年苏共二十二大，赫鲁晓夫不仅提出了“全面建成共产主义”词汇，而且宣布建成“全民国家”“全民党”，用“一切为了人，一切为了人的幸福”[3] 等具有人道主义色彩的意素符码替换了科学社会主义中“满足人民的需要”“实现人的自由全面发展”等词汇。通过符码转换，赫鲁晓夫释放了苏共意识形态内涵发生重大变化的信号，之后人道主义开始渗透于苏联社会生活的方方面面，并成为评判社会历史问题的基本准则。虽然赫鲁晓夫并非有意否定苏共历史，但是其指导思想的人道主义转向不可避免地开启了虚无苏共领导人的历史先河，向世人宣示了苏共随国内外形势变化而对意识形态所作的认知转向，这种转向的深层意义在于通过把苏共的政治战略与苏联更多领域、更多方面挂钩，以实现对前赫鲁晓夫时期的质疑与否定。

With the advancement of the “Thaw,” relations between East and West eased, and the door to cultural exchange between the Soviet Union and the West opened. “Western books, paintings, films, and songs constantly appeared – controlled, censored, distorted, yet still present” [4]4 Quotation from a Soviet source, likely a Party document or speech, criticising the use of cultural products to slander Party and state history.. The screening of films from the US, France, Italy, etc., the holding of the Moscow International Youth Festival, and the introduction of works by Western thinkers opened a window for Soviet people to understand the Western world. The introduction of Western culture brought not only Western films, literature, and lifestyles but also the hidden political ideas, values, and lifestyles that impacted Soviet people’s overall societal cognition of capitalist countries. In the past, “Russian ideology was considered omniscient and omnipotent, the teachings of Lenin and Stalin were absolutely correct” [5]5 Similar to [4], referring to the distortion of history by critics.. However, there was a huge gap between the Western world constructed by humanitarianism, egoism, existentialism, Protestantism, and modern lifestyles like refrigerators and washing machines conveyed through Western films and literature, and the monotony and drabness of their daily lives. Some intellectuals developed an illusion of “liberalization,” and the critique of “the humanitarian disaster caused by Stalin” went to another extreme, leading to a tendency to completely negate Stalin and a humanitarian turn. For example, Ilya Ehrenburg once attacked Stalin for “long-term and systematic creation of this worship,” even borrowing Machiavelli’s words from the Renaissance to curse Stalin: “Any means are good – poison, denunciation, assassination,” “Be as wise as a man, and as ferocious as a beast.” [6]6 Reference to the growing criticism of Lenin during the Brezhnev period. The critique of the personality cult, the loosening of ideology, the humanitarian turn, enterprises’ pursuit of profit, and the diversification of Soviet social life, all promoted by Khrushchev, caused a fission in the values of Soviet society. “In the late 1950s, the monolithic rock of social consciousness was covered with deep cracks” [7]7 Quotation describing the loss of unifying faith in Soviet society., which also became the source of the later crisis of faith in the Soviet Union.

随着“解冻”的推进，东西方关系缓和，苏联与西方文化交流的大门打开，“西方的书籍、绘画、电影和歌曲不断出现——受到控制、审查、扭曲，但仍然是不变的”[4]，美法意等国电影的放映、莫斯科国际青年节的举办以及西方思想家作品的传入，打开了苏联人了解西方世界的窗口。西方文化的传入带来的不仅是西方电影和文学及生活方式，而且其隐藏的政治理念、价值观念及生活方式也冲击了苏联人对资本主义国家的社会整体认知。在过去“俄罗斯的意识形态被认为是全知全能的，列宁和斯大林的教诲是绝对正确的”[5]，但是由西方电影、文学所传递出来的人道主义、利己主义、存在主义、新教主义与电冰箱、洗衣机等现代生活方式构建起来的西方世界与他们日常生活的单调乏味之间存在着巨大的落差，部分知识分子产生了“自由化”错觉，对“斯大林造成的人道主义灾难”批判走向了另一个极端，出现了全盘否定斯大林的倾向和人道主义转向。例如，爱伦堡曾攻击“斯大林是长期地和有计划地在制造这种顶礼膜拜”，甚至借用文艺复兴时期马基雅维利的话咒骂斯大林：“任何手段都是好的——毒药，告密，暗杀”，“要像人那样英明，也要像野兽那样凶恶”[6]。赫鲁晓夫所推动的个人崇拜的批判、意识形态的松绑、人道主义的转向、企业对利润的追求以及苏联社会生活的多样化，所有这一切使得苏联社会的价值观发生了裂变，“五十年代末社会意识这块巨石布满了深深的裂痕”[7]，这也成了后来苏联信仰危机的源头。

2. The “Stagnation” of the Brezhnev Period Led to the Further Spread of Historical Nihilist Discourse within the Party

2.勃列日涅夫时期的“僵化”导致党内历史虚无主义话语的进一步蔓延

During the Brezhnev period, CPSU ideology and theory became increasingly rigid and dogmatic, and the nihilist trend of thought within the CPSU surged beneath the surface. During this period, historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU manifested in multiple forms: first, nihilization and demonization; second, sacralization, i.e., distorting people’s correct understanding of historical figures by infinitely elevating them; third, humanization, i.e., evaluating the history of the Soviet Union and the CPSU based on the standard of humanitarianism.

勃列日涅夫时期，苏共思想理论日趋僵化和教条化，苏共党内的虚无主义思潮暗流涌动。这一时期，苏共党内历史虚无主义话语表现为多种形式：其一是虚无化、妖魔化；其二是神圣化，即通过无限拔高历史人物，扭曲人们对历史人物的正确认知；其三是人道化，以人道主义为标准评判苏联苏共历史。

In the early years of Brezhnev’s rule, the momentum of the “Thaw” continued. Not only did he maintain the tone of Khrushchev’s “de-Stalinization,” but he also began a comprehensive settling of accounts with Khrushchev in terms of politics, economy, military, foreign policy, and relations with socialist countries. This not only fundamentally negated Khrushchev’s personal achievements but also stigmatized his personal character, declaring Khrushchev to be “extremely crude, capricious, willful, and narrow-minded.” [8]8 The “second generation” refers to the leadership under Khrushchev and Brezhnev; the “third generation” refers to the leadership under Gorbachev. Brezhnev’s “final verdict” on Khrushchev actually formed a tradition of “successive negation” of leaders in CPSU history, leading to the further spread of historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU.

勃列日涅夫执政前期，延续了“解冻”的势头，不仅继续维持了赫鲁晓夫时期“非斯大林化”的基调，而且从政治、经济、军事、外交和与社会主义国家之间的关系方面开始了对赫鲁晓夫的全面清算，不仅从根本上否定了赫鲁晓夫的个人功绩，而且对赫鲁晓夫的个人品质进行了污名化，宣称赫鲁晓夫“极端粗暴、出尔反尔、放荡任性、心胸狭窄”[8]。勃列日涅夫对赫鲁晓夫的“盖棺定论”，实际上形成了苏共历史上领导人“代代否定”的传统，导致了苏共党内历史虚无主义话语进一步蔓延。

In the middle and late period of Brezhnev’s rule, in order to build up his own personality cult, the ruling discourse within the CPSU began quietly to restore Stalin’s honour and historical status, rigidly interpreting Lenin and sanctifying his thought. As Brezhnev’s personal position became consolidated, the stance toward Stalin grew increasingly clear, shifting from the earlier criticism and negation to praise and affirmation; after the 1970s, Stalin’s errors began to be selectively ignored. Although this discursive construction by the CPSU did not in name overturn the resolutions of the 20th and 22nd Congresses of the CPSU, it in fact overturned Khrushchev’s appraisal of Stalin, further developing the discursive pattern in which a successor denies his predecessor and establishes a new personality cult, thereby deepening popular distrust of the regime. By the 1970s, the Soviet press’s eulogising of Brezhnev had reached a nauseating degree, calling him “the wise leader of the Party and the state” and “a truly Leninist leader”; the intellectual world even manufactured a personality cult of “the two Ilyiches” [2]2 “Two Ilyiches” – a reference to Lenin (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) and Brezhnev (Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev), whose patronymics are both “Ilyich,” used here to create a personality cult equating Brezhnev with Lenin.. During this period, Brezhnev not only restored the appraisal of Stalin and built up his own personality cult, but also achieved the sanctification of Lenin. Under the “praise” of the CPSU’s ideological experts, “Lenin gradually turned into an idol before whom people had to prostrate themselves,” and “Lenin’s name was involuntarily linked with ideological vacuity.” The CPSU leaders’ subjective and arbitrary treatment of historical figures and their “sanctifying” discourse, divorced from reality, deepened the intellectuals’ resistance and distrust: “more and more intellectuals began to treat Lenin with sarcasm,” “Lenin was called ‘the goatee,’ Party cadres were called ‘the potbellies,’ and those who believed in Lenin were ‘night owls’” [3]3 “Goatee,” “potbellies,” “night owls” – derogatory Soviet-era nicknames for Lenin, Party cadres, and Lenin’s followers, respectively..

勃列日涅夫执政中后期，为了树立自己的个人崇拜，苏共党内执政话语开始悄悄恢复斯大林的荣誉和历史地位，僵化理解列宁并将其思想神圣化。随着勃列日涅夫个人地位的巩固，对待斯大林的立场越来越清晰，由原来的批判否定改为颂扬肯定，20世纪70年代之后开始选择性忽略斯大林的错误。苏共这种话语建构虽然在名义上未推翻苏共20大、22大的决议，但是在实际上推翻了赫鲁晓夫对斯大林的评价，进一步发展了后任领导人否认前任、树立新的个人崇拜的话语模式，加深了人们对政权的不信任感。到了20世纪70年代，苏联报刊对勃列日涅夫的歌功颂德到了令人作呕的地步，称其为“党和国家的英明领袖”“真正列宁式的领导人”，思想界甚至制造出了“两个伊里奇”[9] 的个人迷信。这一时期，勃列日涅夫不仅恢复了对斯大林的评价，建立起对自身的个人崇拜，而且也实现了对列宁的神圣化。在苏共意识形态专家的“颂扬”下，“列宁渐渐变成了人们必须顶礼膜拜的偶像”，“列宁的名字便不由自主地与意识形态的空洞无物联系了起来”。苏共领导人对待历史人物的主观臆断和脱离实际的“神圣化”话语，加深了知识分子的抵触心理和不信任态度，“越来越多的知识分子开始以讥讽的态度对待列宁”，“列宁被称为‘山羊胡子’，党的干部被称为‘大肚皮’，相信列宁的人则是‘夜猫子’”[10]。

Furthermore, the characteristics of historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU took on a “humanitarian” colouring. In order to further consolidate his ruling position, Brezhnev twisted Party theory in a humanitarian direction, making humanitarianism the basic starting point for judging the history of the CPSU and the Party’s line, policies and principles. On many occasions Brezhnev further reinforced the humanitarian discourse of “everything for man, for the happiness of man.” For example, in 1964, at the celebration of the 47th anniversary of the October Revolution, Brezhnev proposed that “‘everything for man, for the happiness of man’ is the norm of our Party’s activity”; in 1968, in his speech at the Kremlin’s Soviet-Hungarian Friendship Rally, he again stressed that “everything for man, for the happiness of man” is the unshakable principle of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This seemingly “socialist discourse” construction carried the colouring of Western humanitarian discourse, causing Western countries to produce a certain halo effect in the eyes of a considerable portion of Party cadres and members; this effect made it easier for them to beautify Western countries while doubting or even belittling their own country’s beliefs and pursuits, thereby triggering an ideological faith crisis within the CPSU. Under the advocacy of the CPSU, humanitarianism became a banner in theoretical circles; some scholars studied and propagated humanitarianism divorced from concrete social and historical conditions, and combined humanitarianism with Western liberal democracy and human rights to criticise and attack the Soviet socialist system, thereby deconstructing the positive significance that Marxism had possessed in the Soviet Union.

此外，苏共党内历史虚无主义话语特点呈现“人道化”色彩。勃列日涅夫为了进一步巩固自己的执政地位，将党的理论扭向人道主义方向，人道主义成为评判苏共历史和党的路线方针政策的基本出发点。勃列日涅夫在多种场合进一步强化“一切为了人，为了人的幸福”的人道主义话语。例如，1964年勃列日涅夫在庆祝十月革命47周年时提出“‘一切为了人，为了人的幸福’是我党活动的准则”，1968年他在克里姆林宫苏匈友好大会上的讲话中再次强调“一切为了人，为了人的幸福”是苏联共产党坚定不移的原则。这种看似“社会主义话语”的建构携带着西方人道主义话语的色彩，使得西方国家在相当一部分党员干部眼中产生了一定程度的光环效应，这种效应使他们更容易美化西方国家，而怀疑甚至看轻本国的信仰追求，以致引发苏共的意识形态信仰危机。在苏共的倡导下，人道主义成为理论界的一面旗帜，部分学者脱离具体的社会历史条件来研究和宣传人道主义，并且将人道主义与西方自由民主人权相结合来批评和攻击苏联社会主义制度，从而使马克思主义在苏联所拥有的积极意义遭到解构。

The demonisation, sanctification and humanitarianisation of historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU accelerated the hollowing-out and nihilisation of CPSU ideology, ultimately causing it to lose its capacity to lead domestic social trends of thought and its capacity to critique and dissolve Western social trends of thought. With the détente in East-West relations in the 1970s and the further differentiation within the Soviet domestic ideological and cultural sphere, Soviet Marxist education grew increasingly dogmatic and formalistic, lacking a forceful response to the new situations emerging in the developed Western countries, which gave an opening to Western ideological infiltration. After the signing of the Helsinki Accords, as a backlash against prolonged ideological repression, people quickly turned to the advocacy of the freedom of thought, religious freedom and freedom of belief promoted by the West; the essence, dignity and status of man became the core issues discussed in the ideological and cultural sphere. Khrushchev’s “Thaw” did not give rise to a political subculture opposed to the Soviet mainstream culture, but under the infiltration of Western culture, during the Brezhnev period the Soviet Union formed a non-mainstream political subculture that sought Western liberal democracy in opposition to the mainstream culture, taking dissidents, “night people” and samizdat as its main forms of expression and attacking the history of the Soviet Union and the CPSU as its main content: “certain academic works, literary works, art, films, and newspapers and periodicals have been used among us to slander the history of our Party and our people” [4]4 Quotation from a Soviet source, likely a Party document or speech, criticising the use of cultural products to slander Party and state history.; “all sorts of ‘critics’ have been able to arbitrarily distort our history” [5]5 Similar to [4], referring to the distortion of history by critics.; for example, the shot fired by the *Aurora* was a blank, the heroic soldiers of the Panfilov Division were fabricated, and “all kinds of criticism began to be directed at Lenin from various sides” [6]6 Reference to the growing criticism of Lenin during the Brezhnev period.. This shows that the field of expression, the mode of narration and the content of dissemination of historical nihilist discourse were all changing; the focus of historical nihilist discourse had shifted not only to negating Stalin, but to questioning and criticising the inevitability of Soviet socialism and the legitimacy of CPSU rule, which to a certain extent led to chaos in the Soviet ideological and cultural sphere and the loss of control over ideological discourse. At this stage, the Soviet Union “lost the faith capable of unifying the masses’ thinking” [7]7 Quotation describing the loss of unifying faith in Soviet society..

苏共党内历史虚无主义话语的妖魔化、神圣化与人道化，加速了苏共意识形态的空心化与虚无化，使其最终丧失了对国内社会思潮的引领能力和对西方社会思潮的批判化解能力。随着20世纪70年代东西方关系缓和以及苏联国内思想文化领域的进一步分化，苏联马克思主义教育日趋教条化和形式化，对西方发达国家出现的新情况缺乏有力的回应，这给西方思想渗透以可乘之机。《赫尔辛基协议》签订之后，作为长时间的思想禁锢的反弹，人们迅速转向对西方倡导的思想自由、宗教自由和信仰自由的推崇，人的本质、尊严和地位成为思想文化领域讨论的核心问题。赫鲁晓夫的“解冻”并没有促成与苏联主流文化相对立的政治亚文化，但是在西方文化的渗透下，勃列日涅夫时期苏联形成了与主流文化相对立的寻求西方自由民主的非主流政治亚文化，以持不同政见者、夜间人、地下出版物为主要表现形式，以抨击苏联和苏共历史为主要内容，“某些学术著作、文学作品、艺术、电影，以及报刊，在我们这里竟被利用来污蔑我们党和我国人民的历史”[11]，“各种各样的‘批评家’得以任意篡改我们的历史”[12]，诸如“阿芙乐尔”号发射的是空炮弹，潘菲洛夫师的英雄战士是杜撰出来的，而且“种种批评开始从各个方面指向列宁了”[13]。这说明历史虚无主义话语表达场域、话语叙事方式和话语传播内容都在发生着改变，历史虚无主义话语指向的重点已经不仅仅在于否定斯大林，而是转向对苏联社会主义必然性和苏共执政合法性的质疑和批判，这在一定程度上导致苏联思想文化领域的混乱和意识形态话语权的失控，这一阶段苏联则是“丧失了能够统一群众思想的信仰”[14]。

3. Gorbachev’s “glasnost” and “democratisation” led to the proliferation of historical nihilist discourse within the Party

3.戈尔巴乔夫时期的“公开性”“民主化”导致党内历史虚无主义话语的泛滥

During the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods, although historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU appeared intermittently, on the whole Marxist ideological discourse still occupied a dominant position, and Soviet socialism did not deviate from the correct course. However, with the intensification of the Western powers’ democratic offensive against socialist countries in the 1980s, Gorbachev successively proposed “glasnost,” “democratisation” and “pluralism”; historical nihilist discourse achieved unprecedented development in terms of its subjects of dissemination, content of dissemination, mode of narration, vehicles of dissemination and struggle for discursive power, gradually replacing the dominant position of Marxist ideological discourse.

赫鲁晓夫时期、勃列日涅夫时期苏共党内的历史虚无主义话语虽然时隐时现，但是从总体上来看，马克思主义意识形态话语仍居于主导地位，苏联社会主义并未偏离正确的航道。但是随着20世纪80年代西方国家对社会主义国家民主攻势的加强，戈尔巴乔夫相继提出“公开性”“民主化”“多元性”，历史虚无主义话语在传播主体、传播内容、叙事方式、传播载体、话语权争夺上获得了前所未有的发展，逐渐取代了马克思主义意识形态话语的主导地位。

Under the impact of Western liberal thought, the second and third generations of the CPSU leadership became the subjects shaping and disseminating historical nihilist discourse. “The Party and state elite of the Soviet Union accomplished in their own consciousness the transformation that Western left-wing intellectual elites had already completed,” and “this transformation meant abandoning support for the Soviet system and openly siding with the enemies of the Soviet Union in the Cold War.”[15]15 The "Helsinki Accords" (1975) were a series of agreements signed by 35 nations, including the Soviet Union and the United States, aimed at improving relations between the Communist bloc and the West. Western countries used the human rights provisions of "Basket Three" to pressure the Soviet Union and support dissidents. Although Gorbachev “sincerely wanted to renovate socialism, not to replace it with capitalism,” his reforms “created a new group and class alliance that preferred to replace socialism with capitalism.”[16]16 The "National Endowment for Democracy Act" (1983) was a U.S. law establishing the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), an organization that provides funding to pro-democracy groups abroad, including in the Soviet bloc. This “new group and class alliance” included high-level degenerates, political commentators, dissidents, and writers such as Yakovlev, Yeltsin, Korotich, Afanasyev, Pomerants, and others. They launched a political movement that negated the revolutionary history of the CPSU and the Soviet Union, becoming the constructing subjects of historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU. After Gorbachev assumed the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in 1985, Reagan and Bush successively proposed the “Promotion of Democracy” strategy and the “Beyond Containment” strategy, “striving to integrate the Soviet Union into the international community,” inducing democratic and liberalizing changes within the Soviet Union. Under the inducement of Western countries, Gorbachev proposed “democratization, glasnost, and pluralism” to cater to Western demands for democratization, loudly advocating that “history has no forbidden zones, and glasnost has no limits,” thereby causing historical nihilist discourse to spiral out of control. In 1987, he systematically expounded the issue of glasnost in his book *Perestroika and New Thinking*, emphasizing the implementation of thorough “glasnost,” that historical issues should leave no blank spots or forbidden zones, and that “workers should have full and accurate information.”[17]17 Roy Medvedev and Andrei Sakharov were prominent Soviet dissidents. Medvedev was a Marxist historian and critic of Stalinism; Sakharov was a nuclear physicist and human rights activist who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975. Driven by Gorbachev, policies toward intellectuals were relaxed, the “censorship system” was abolished, “dissidents” and their works were legalized, and Yakovlev and liberal figures took control of the mass media, thus forming a radical democratic faction pushing for reform. Under the impetus of this faction, radical intellectuals represented by Afanasyev, Vasily Selyunin, Sakharov, and Medvedev gradually seized the initiative in reform. The stance of the intellectuals gradually changed, and their political views became increasingly extreme. “A considerable portion of the newly freed Soviet intellectuals ultimately ended up on a path contrary to Gorbachev’s central goal of establishing a reformed socialism.”[18]18 Nikolai Berdyaev (1874-1948) was a Russian religious and political philosopher, known for his existentialist and Christian thought, who was critical of both communism and capitalism.

在西方自由主义思潮的冲击下，苏共第二代、第三代领导集体成为历史虚无主义话语的塑造主体和传播主体。“苏联的党政精英在自己的意识中实现了那场西方左派知识分子精英已经完成的转变”，“这种转变意味着放弃支持苏联体制，在冷战中公开转到苏联的敌人一方”[15]。虽然戈尔巴乔夫“诚心诚意地想要革新社会主义，而不是用资本主义来取代它”，但是戈尔巴乔夫改革“创造了一个新的集团和阶级联盟，这个联盟喜欢的，却是用资本主义取代社会主义”[16]。这个“新的集团和阶级联盟”，包含雅科夫列夫、叶利钦、科罗季奇、阿法纳西耶夫、波梅兰茨等高层蜕变分子、政论家、持不同政见者、作家等人，掀起了一场否定苏共和苏联革命历史的政治运动，成为苏共党内历史虚无主义话语的建构主体。自戈尔巴乔夫1985年就任苏共中央总书记之后，里根和布什相继提出“促进民主运动”战略和超越遏制战略，“努力谋求把苏联融合到国际社会中来”，诱导苏联国内的民主化和自由化变革。在西方国家的诱导下，戈尔巴乔夫提出了“民主化、公开性、多元性”以迎合西方国家的民主化诉求，大肆鼓吹“历史无禁区，公开无限制”，由此导致了历史虚无主义话语走向失控状态。1987年他在《改革与新思维》一书中系统阐述了公开性问题，强调实行彻底的“公开性”，历史问题不应该留下空白点和禁区，“劳动者都应该有充分而准确的信息”[17]。在戈尔巴乔夫的推动下，知识分子政策松绑，“书报检查制度”被废除，“持不同政见者”及其著作合法化，雅科夫列夫及自由派人士掌握了大众媒体，由此形成了一个推动改革的激进民主派。在这一集团的推动下，以阿法纳西耶夫、瓦西里·谢柳宁、萨哈罗夫、麦德维杰夫为代表的激进的知识分子逐渐掌握改革的主导权，知识分子立场逐渐发生了变化，政治观点越来越偏激，“相当大一部分新获自由的苏联知识分子，最终走向了与戈尔巴乔夫建立改良的社会主义的中心目标相反的道路”[18]。

Driven by the CPSU leadership, the Party’s newspapers and media became the transmission vehicles of historical nihilist discourse. Not only were a large number of newspapers and media outlets within the Soviet Union extensively privatized, but they were also mostly controlled by liberal figures, becoming ideological positions opposing Soviet socialism. Among them, the magazine *Ogonyok* published an article titled “Farewell to God,” openly spreading the claims that Tsarist Russia was very wealthy, that Lenin was brutal, and that the October Revolution was mistaken; the weekly *Novoye Vremya* published “The Second Revolution,” which argued that the October Revolution was a reactionary social regression; *Pravda* reiterated Gorbachev’s view of the “state of the whole people,” further arguing that “the core of socialist ideology is the human being, the comprehensive development of the human being.”[19]19 Pyotr Chaadaev (1794-1856) was a Russian philosopher who wrote the "Philosophical Letters," which were highly critical of Russia's historical development and culture, leading to his being declared insane by the Tsarist authorities. In April 1991, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* published a conversation between Burlatsky and Shatalin, members of the Supreme Soviet. Burlatsky said: “Socialism throughout the world, socialism in the new states, is a dangerous utopia,” and “a two-party system like that of the United States is the most ideal.” Shatalin believed that “modern social democracy based on Marxism is meaningless; such a party would be a non-constructive party with no future.”[20]20 Pavel Annenkov (1813-1887), Vissarion Belinsky (1811-1848), and Alexander Herzen (1812-1870) were prominent Russian literary critics, publicists, and Westernizer intellectuals. Under Gorbachev’s advocacy, Soviet political and theoretical circles broke through forbidden zones, launching a great revolution of making historical facts public and exposing the dark side of the Soviet Union. Various statements vilifying Soviet leaders, negating the socialist system, and attacking socialist beliefs flooded newspapers and media. The Party’s newspapers and media transformed from the original main ideological positions of the Party into transmission vehicles for historical nihilism.

在苏共领导集团的推动下，党报党媒成为历史虚无主义话语的传播载体。苏联境内的报刊媒体不仅大量地私有化，而且大多由自由派人士把持，成为反对苏联社会主义的思想阵地。其中《星火》报刊登《告别上帝》一文，公开散布沙俄很富有，列宁是残暴的，十月革命是错误的；《新时代》周刊中的《第二次革命》认为十月革命是反动的社会倒退；《真理报》重申了戈尔巴乔夫的全民国家的观点，进一步论证了“社会主义思想的核心是人，是人的全面发展”[19]。1991年4月，《文学报》第4期刊登最高苏维埃成员布尔拉茨基和沙塔林的谈话。布尔拉茨基说：“全世界的社会主义，新国家中的社会主义都是危险的空想”，“像美国那样实行两党制是最理想的”。沙塔林认为，“以马克思主义为基础的现代社会民主是没有意义的，这样的党将是一个非建设性的政党，它没有前途”[20]。在戈尔巴乔夫的倡导下，苏联政界、理论界突破禁区，掀起了一场公开历史事实和揭露苏联阴暗面的大革命，各种丑化苏联领导人、否定社会主义制度和攻击社会主义信仰的言论充斥报刊媒体，党报党媒由原来党的意识形态主阵地转变为历史虚无主义的传播载体。

Starting from an abstract humanitarian standpoint, historical nihilists judged Soviet historical figures and the Soviet socialist system. They believed that the center of Soviet socialist development was things, not people, and that the way out for Soviet reform lay in Western freedom, democracy, human rights, the market economy, and a multi-party system. Thus, a nihilist trend of thought that completely negated the Soviet socialist system was formed. The historical nihilist discourse system at this stage not only emphasized negating history but also expanded the connotation of historical nihilism, making the discourse content more systematic. In the pre-Gorbachev period, explanations were often vaguely made from the perspective of negating history, with few concentrated expositions. During the Gorbachev period, expositions on historical nihilist discourse gradually increased, covering aspects such as negating history, negating politics, negating morality, negating values, and epistemological nihilism. The discourse consciousness gradually shifted from reconstructing Soviet history and maintaining the Soviet status quo to what should be done with the Soviet future, to the point where words reflecting the socialist nature of the Soviet Union, such as “working people,” “socialism,” and “communism,” were deleted from the Soviet Constitution. These discourses further disintegrated the ideological foundation of Soviet socialism and ultimately shook the foundation of the legitimacy of Soviet ideology. In July 1990, the 28th Congress of the CPSU passed a program for “moving towards a humane, democratic socialism,” arguing that the CPSU’s “fundamental crisis is the crisis of communist ideology,” that “the principle of democratic centralism is the main link causing the non-democratic nature of the Party itself and the entire political system,” and advocating that reform should “abandon dogmatic interpretations of Marxism,” “completely eliminate the totalitarian system,” and realize “political and ideological pluralism within the Party.”[21]21 Ivan Turgenev (1818-1883) was a Russian novelist, poet, and playwright. His novel "Fathers and Sons" (1862) famously introduced the term "nihilist" into Russian literary and political discourse. The 28th Congress of the CPSU, in terms of discourse, achieved the deconstruction of the legitimacy of Soviet socialism and the CPSU’s governance, ultimately establishing the dominant position of Western democratic discourse.

历史虚无主义者从抽象的人道主义观念出发，来评判苏联历史人物和苏联社会主义制度，认为苏联社会主义发展的中心在于物，而不是人，苏联改革的出路在于西方的自由、民主、人权、市场经济与多党制，这样就形成了一股全盘否定苏联社会主义制度的虚无主义思潮。这个阶段的历史虚无主义话语体系不仅强调虚无历史，而且拓展了历史虚无主义的内涵，话语内容变得更加系统。前戈尔巴乔夫时期往往从虚无历史的角度隐隐约约进行阐释，很少有集中性的论述，戈尔巴乔夫时期关于历史虚无主义话语的论述逐步增多，涉及虚无历史、虚无政治、虚无道德、虚无价值和认识论虚无主义等各方面，话语意识从重构苏联历史、维护苏联现状逐渐走向苏联未来应该怎么办，以致苏联宪法中“劳动人民、社会主义、共产主义”等体现社会主义性质的词语都被删除了。这些话语进一步瓦解了苏联社会主义的思想基础，最终动摇了苏联意识形态合法性的根基。1990年7月苏共28大通过了“走向人道的民主的社会主义”纲领，认为苏共“根本的危机是共产主义思想的危机”，“民主集中制原则是造成党本身以及整个政治体制的非民主性质的主要环节”，主张改革应该“抛弃对马克思主义的教条式理解”，“彻底消除极权制度”，实现“党内政治和思想多元化”[21]。苏共28大，从话语上实现了对苏联社会主义和苏共执政正当性的话语解构，最终确立了西方民主话语的主导地位。

The more than 90-year history of the CPSU itself carried the values and order of Soviet socialism and the legitimacy of the CPSU’s governance. Over the nearly 40 years from Khrushchev to Gorbachev, inner-Party democratic life within the CPSU was continuously undermined. Organizationally, it completed a bureaucratic degeneration; politically, it moved towards an extreme democratization process, abandoning the development direction of scientific socialism, negating historical materialism, negating the logic of revolution and reform, and moving onto a track of nihilism in culture and history. A profound crisis emerged in the Soviet Union’s historical identity, Marxist identity, and national identity. Ultimately, the CPSU lost its ability to lead and shape ideological discourse. Whether it was Khrushchev’s “de-Stalinization,” Brezhnev’s “stagnation,” or Gorbachev’s “glasnost,” although subjectively they did not intend to negate the history of the CPSU and Soviet socialism, their measures of negating Stalin, deifying Lenin, and dogmatizing Marxism objectively led to the hollowing out and pluralization of the Soviet Union’s core values, promoted the spread of historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU and the emergence of a crisis of faith, and ultimately resulted in the loss of direction in people’s thinking and a drastic change in social consciousness.

苏共建党90余年的历史本身就承载着苏联社会主义的价值、秩序及苏共的执政正当性。从赫鲁晓夫至戈尔巴乔夫近40年时间，苏共党内民主生活不断被破坏，在组织上完成了官僚化蜕变，在政治上走向了极端民主化进程，放弃了科学社会主义的发展方向，否定了唯物史观，否定了革命和改革的逻辑，在文化和历史上走向了虚无化的轨道，苏联的历史认同、马克思主义认同和国家认同产生了深刻的危机，最终苏共失去了对意识形态话语的引领能力和塑造能力。不论是赫鲁晓夫的“非斯大林化”，还是勃列日涅夫的“僵化”，抑或是戈尔巴乔夫的“公开性”，虽然在主观意志上并不想否定苏共和苏联社会主义的历史，但是他们采取的否定斯大林、神化列宁、把马克思主义教条化的措施，在客观上导致苏联核心价值观的空心化与多元化，促成了苏共历史虚无主义话语的蔓延和信仰危机的产生，最终导致了人的思想方向的迷失和社会意识的剧变。

II. An Exploration of the Reasons for the Evolution of Historical Nihilist Discourse within the CPSU

二、苏共党内历史虚无主义话语演进原因探讨

The generation of historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU was not accidental but had profound social-historical roots and cultural causes. The insufficiency in the consciousness and capacity for the autonomous construction of the CPSU’s mainstream ideological discourse was the main reason for its generation. Western ideological propaganda and infiltration in the Soviet Union provided material support for its generation. The Soviet Union’s unique historical and cultural traditions provided cultural soil for its generation. The recognition and support of historical nihilism by Soviet academic, literary-artistic, and media circles provided a social atmosphere for the maturation and flourishing of historical nihilist discourse.

苏共党内历史虚无主义话语的生成并不是偶然的，而是有着深刻的社会历史根源和文化成因的。苏共主流意识形态话语自主性建构的意识和能力不足是其生成的主要原因，西方在苏联的意识形态宣传和渗透为其生成提供了材料支撑，苏联独特的历史文化传统为其生成提供了文化土壤，苏联学界、文艺界和媒体界对历史虚无主义的认同支持为历史虚无主义话语的成熟兴盛提供了社会氛围。

1. The Insufficiency in the Consciousness and Capacity for the Autonomous Construction of the CPSU’s Mainstream Ideological Discourse Provided an Opportunity for Its Generation

1.苏共主流意识形态话语自主性建构的意识和能力不足为其生成提供了可乘之机

Adhering to the autonomous construction of ideology is a fundamental principle of Marxism. To uphold the principle of autonomy in mainstream ideology, it is necessary, on the basis of grasping the basic tenets of Marxism, to stand on the specific national conditions and actual development needs of one’s own country and to realize the localized development of Marxism. The discursive construction of mainstream ideology must seek available resources from the intersection of Soviet history and culture, specific national conditions, and human civilization, but it must also adhere to the socialist orientation of the discourse system. However, the CPSU’s awareness and capacity for the autonomous construction of mainstream ideological discourse were relatively insufficient. On the one hand, the CPSU vigorously introduced Western humanitarian discourse, diluting faith in Marxism. From Khrushchev’s establishment of humanitarianism’s guiding status in official form, negating Marx’s theory of class struggle, to Gorbachev’s making “humanization” and “liberalization” the core of his new thinking, the target of criticism was directed not only at Stalin but also at Lenin and Marxism, ultimately falling unconsciously into the Western discursive trap. First, “man was abstracted,” and then “this abstracted man was used to fit the development of history and to conceive of the ideal future society they yearned for” [22]22 John Foster Dulles (1888–1959), U.S. Secretary of State (1953–1959), a key architect of Cold War containment strategy..

坚持意识形态的自主性建构是马克思主义的一个基本原则。坚持主流意识形态的自主性原则，必须在把握马克思主义基本原理的基础上，立足于本国具体国情和实际发展需要，实现马克思主义的本土化发展。主流意识形态的话语建构既要从苏联历史文化、具体国情和人类文明的交集中寻找可用资源，更要坚持话语体系的社会主义方向。但是苏共主流意识形态话语自主性建构的意识和能力相对不足，一方面，苏共大力引入西方人道主义话语稀释了对马克思主义的信仰。从赫鲁晓夫以官方形式确立了人道主义的指导地位，否定马克思的阶级斗争学说，到戈尔巴乔夫把“人道化”和“自由化”作为新思维的核心，不仅把批判矛头指向了斯大林，而且指向了列宁、马克思主义，最终不自觉地落入西方的话语陷阱之中，先是“把人抽象化”，然后又用“这个抽象化了的人去附会历史的发展，构思他们向往的未来的理想社会”[22]。

On the other hand, the CPSU’s dogmatic understanding of Marxism-Leninism led to an insufficient awareness of the proactive construction of core values discourse. During the revolutionary war years, the Soviet Union formed a mainstream value of “the state above all.” This value needed to be maintained and strengthened in a closed environment through constant political movements and political indoctrination. In the short term, it could play a dominant role in uniting popular sentiment and guiding society. However, with the launch of the “de-Stalinization” movement in the Khrushchev period, the dismantling of the personality cult, and the diversification and complication of social life, this value gradually lost its commanding and guiding functions for social development. “By the end of Khrushchev’s rule, the utopian energy that nourished Soviet patriotic spirit had been exhausted. The identification with the Soviet Union, which had been sustained by this energy in a final flicker, also began to disintegrate under the powerful influence of domestic and foreign factors” [23]23 Alexander Yakovlev (1923–2005), a Soviet politician and ideologue under Gorbachev, often credited with promoting glasnost and perestroika; later became a critic of the Soviet system.. During the Brezhnev period, personal centralization of power took shape, inner-Party democracy was lacking, and long-standing dogmatism and bureaucratism led to insufficient innovation capacity in mainstream ideological discourse. The CPSU’s ideological work had degenerated to the point of judging right and wrong by quoting the classics, lacking the capacity to respond to real problems and to criticize and resolve erroneous trends of thought. (WeChat public account: Ideological and Political Scholars) The officially propagated ideology grew increasingly distant from the people. According to the “Report of the KGB to the CPSU Central Committee on the Mood of Young Students” (November 5, 1968), Marxism was a “dogmatic, rigid science” that “cannot explain, nor can it foresee the course of events” [24]24 Liang Qichao (1873–1929), a Chinese scholar, journalist, and reformist thinker of the late Qing and early Republican periods.. “Social and national problems, ecological threats, the deterioration of education and healthcare, the poverty of a large part of the social members—all these problems seemed not to exist, and in their place, discussions were replaced by superficial propaganda clichés like ‘the new social community—the Soviet people’” [25]25 Zhang Taiyan (1868–1936), a Chinese philologist, philosopher, and revolutionary nationalist.. By the Gorbachev period, the Soviet value of “the state above all” had completed its own fission. Marxism had been stripped from the core of socialist values. “Humane, democratic socialism” formally became the CPSU’s ideological and political line. Socialism had evolved into a “humane” socialism conforming to an abstract “human nature” and the interests of “all people,” fundamentally deviating from the socialist orientation of the discourse system.

另一方面，苏共对马克思列宁主义的教条化理解导致核心价值观话语的主动建构意识不足。在革命战争年代苏联形成了“国家至上”的主流价值观，这种价值观需要在封闭的环境中通过不断的政治运动和政治灌输来维护和加强，短时间之内可以起到凝聚民心、引领社会的支配作用。但是随着赫鲁晓夫时期“非斯大林化”运动的开展，个人崇拜的破除，社会生活的多样化和复杂化，这种价值观逐渐丧失了对社会发展的统领功能和引导能力，“到了赫鲁晓夫统治的末期，那种滋养着苏维埃爱国主义精神的乌托邦能量已经耗尽。靠着这些能量而回光返照的对苏联的认同，也在国内外因素的强大影响下开始瓦解”[23]。勃列日涅夫时期，个人集权形成，党内民主缺乏，长期存在的教条主义和官僚主义导致主流意识形态话语创新能力不足，苏共的意识形态工作已经蜕化到借助经典作家语录来裁决是非的程度，缺乏回应现实问题的能力和对错误思潮的批判化解能力。（微信公众号：思政学者）官方宣传的意识形态与人们渐行渐远，根据《国家安全委员会就青年学生的情绪呈苏共中央的报告》（1968年11月5日）显示，马克思主义是“教条式僵硬的科学”，“不能解释，也不能预见事件的过程”[24]。“社会问题和民族问题、生态威胁、教育和保健状况的恶化、很大一部分社会成员的贫困状态——所有这些问题似乎都不存在了，而用来代替这些问题的讨论的则是类似于‘新社会共同体--苏联人民’这类肤浅的宣传八股。”[25] 到了戈尔巴乔夫时期，苏联的“国家至上”的价值观完成了自身的裂变，马克思主义已经从社会主义价值观的内核中剥离出来，“人道的民主的社会主义”正式成为苏共的思想政治路线，社会主义演变成符合抽象的“人性”和“一切人”利益的“人道的”社会主义，从根本上偏离了话语体系的社会主义方向。

2. Western ideological propaganda and infiltration of the Soviet Union provided material support for its generation

2.西方对苏联的意识形态宣传和渗透为其生成提供了材料支撑

The fundamental cause of the generation and evolution of historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU lay internally, but Western ideological propaganda and infiltration of the Soviet Union disrupted communist faith within the CPSU and played a role in fueling the spread of historical nihilist discourse within the Party. Against the backdrop of the Cold War, the purpose of Western countries, led by the United States, in their ideological propaganda against the Soviet Union was very clear: to change the historical consciousness and socialist beliefs of the Soviet public through psychological warfare, making people in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe unconsciously become people with Western thinking. This was the “peaceful evolution” strategy. The concept of “peaceful evolution” was first proposed by George Kennan in February 1947. In August 1948, the U.S. National Security Council passed document NSC 20/1, “U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR,” which also marked the beginning of the U.S. psychological war against the Soviet Union. According to document NSC 20/4, “U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security,” approved by President Truman, the United States would use “means other than war” to strengthen pro-American tendencies in countries outside the Soviet Union. It also formulated a “dripping water wears through stone” plan, including large-scale psychological warfare to “eliminate popular support for the Soviet Union” and “spread among the peoples of the Soviet Union the awareness that overthrowing the Politburo could become a reality” [26]26 Qian Mu (1895–1990), a prominent Chinese historian and educator..

苏共党内历史虚无主义话语的生成演变，根本原因在于内部，但是西方对苏联的意识形态宣传和渗透则扰乱了苏共党内的共产主义信仰，为苏共党内历史虚无主义话语的泛滥起了推波助澜的作用。在冷战背景下，以美国为首的西方国家对苏联意识形态宣传的宗旨非常明确，通过心理战手段改变苏联公众的历史意识和社会主义信念，使苏东国家的人们不自觉地变成具有西方思维的人，这就是“和平演变”战略。“和平演变”概念最早由乔治·凯南在1947年2月提出。1948年8月，美国国家安全委员会通过了NSC20/1号文件《美国对苏关系所要达到的目的》，这也标志着美国对苏联心理战的开始。根据杜鲁门总统批准的NSC20/4号文件《美国对苏目标——反击苏联对美国安全的威胁》，美国将使用“战争以外的手段”以加强苏联以外国家的亲美倾向，还制定了“滴水穿石”计划，包括大规模的心理战“消除人民对苏联的支持”，“在苏联各族人民中散布推翻政治局可以成为现实的意识”[26]。

Under the offensive of the “peaceful evolution” strategy, Western countries used radio propaganda to wage a “war of hearts and minds,” such as Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty. Among these, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty focused on issues of human rights and democracy, while Voice of America mainly introduced U.S. domestic politics, social conditions, and lifestyles. Localized programs focused on political struggles within the Soviet leadership. In 1982, the Reagan administration invested $1.3 billion and launched the “Voice of America Modernization Project,” i.e., the “Radio Star Wars Plan,” to promote its “peaceful political offensive.” During the Cold War, the West continuously strengthened the international communication capacity of its own radio stations. The United States set up more than 20 news centers around the Soviet Union, nearly 2,000 television stations, radio stations, and radio relay stations. Spending $1 on propaganda indeed had the effect of equaling $5 spent on national defense. According to the “Report of the KGB to the CPSU Central Committee on the Mood of Young Students” (November 5, 1968): “University students listen to the radio regularly, but they prefer Western radio stations,” and “Voice of America and Radio France Internationale are the most popular stations” [27]27 The “Two Establishes” (两个确立) refers to establishing Xi Jinping’s core position on the Party Central Committee and in the Party as a whole, and establishing the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.. By the 1970s, “80% of Moscow university students and 90% of high school and technical school students” listened to foreign radio broadcasts [28]28 The “Two Upholds” (两个维护) refers to upholding General Secretary Xi Jinping’s core position on the Party Central Committee and in the Party as a whole, and upholding the authority and centralized, unified leadership of the Party Central Committee.. In 1980, Nixon wrote in his book *The Real War*: “Channels such as visits, books, and radio allow Western information to cross the barrier of dictatorship, bringing hope to the people behind the barrier. Accumulating day by day, dripping water wears through stone, the foundations of the Soviet system will gradually be eroded” [29]29 The “Four Consciousnesses” (四个意识) refers to the consciousness of the need to maintain political integrity, think in big-picture terms, follow the leadership core, and keep in alignment with the central Party leadership.. After the August 1991 coup attempt, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and ABC broadcast a large amount of Western viewpoints and positions, influencing and guiding public opinion within the Soviet Union. These radio stations exploited the historical mistakes of the CPSU, violently attacking the “failure” and “bankruptcy” of the Soviet Communist Party and the socialist system, exaggerating and magnifying the problems and difficulties within the Soviet Union, and shaping the myth of the “civilized nation,” the myth of “primitive accumulation” (beautifying Western primitive accumulation), and the “sawdust and sausage” myth. “The function of myth is that it cuts off Russia’s independent thinking, causing it to lose its capacity for autonomous evaluation and to follow the West step by step” [30]30 The “Four Confidences” (四个自信) refers to confidence in the path, theory, system, and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics., falling into a vicious cycle of self-negation. This provided material support for the generation of nihilist discourse within the CPSU and provided a convenient channel for its spread.

在“和平演变”战略攻势下，西方国家利用广播宣传进行“攻心战”，如“美国之音”“自由欧洲电台”“自由电台”等，其中“自由欧洲电台”和“自由电台”重点讨论人权、民主问题，“美国之音”则主要介绍美国国内政治、社会状况以及生活方式，本土化节目则关注苏共领导层之间的政治斗争。1982年里根政府投资13亿美元，出台了“美国之音现代化项目”，即“广播星球大战计划”，以推动其“和平政治攻势”。在冷战进程中，西方不断加强本国电台的国际传播能力，其中美国在苏联周边设立20多个新闻中心，近2000家电视台、广播电台、无线电转播台，在宣传上花1美元确实起到了等于国防上花5美元的效果。根据《国家安全委员会就青年学生的情绪呈苏共中央的报告》（1968年11月5日）记载：“大学生定时收听广播，但他们偏爱西方广播电台”，“《美国之音》和《法国浪潮》是最受欢迎的电台”[27]。到了20世纪70年代，“80%的莫斯科的大学生和90%的高中生和技校学生”都收听了国外无线电广播[28]。1980年尼克松在其著作《真正的战争》一书中提出：“互访、书籍和广播等渠道使西方的信息越过独裁的屏障，给屏障之后的人民带去希望。日积月累，滴水穿石，苏联体制的基础会渐渐地遭到侵蚀。”[29] 1991年“八一九”事件之后，“美国之音”“自由欧洲电台”“自由电台”、美国广播公司大量传播西方观点和立场，影响引导苏联国内的舆论导向。这些电台利用苏共历史上的错误，大肆攻击苏联共产党和社会主义制度的“失败”“破产”，渲染和夸大苏联国内的问题和困难，塑造了“文明国家”神话、“原始积累”神话（美化西方原始积累）、“木屑刨花香肠”神话，“神话的作用在于它断绝了俄罗斯的独立思维，让它丧失了自主评价能力，跟着西方亦步亦趋”[30]，陷入自我否定的恶性循环，为苏共党内虚无主义话语的产生提供了材料支撑，为其传播提供了便捷渠道。

In addition to strengthening radio broadcasting, Western countries also used educational exchanges, human rights issues, political asylum, religious propagation, and other means to support opposition forces within the Soviet Union and cultivate pro-Western individuals. According to NSC 86/1 issued by the U.S. National Security Council in 1951, a "Defector Program" was to be implemented in the Soviet and Eastern European countries, and President Truman approved the program in 1952. The "Defector Program," also known as the "Far East Refugee Program," primarily aimed to strengthen the non-communist world by suborning individuals who were useful, charismatic, and willing to cooperate with the United States. While rescuing and resettling "valuable refugees," it also instigated them to criticize the Soviet system and its leaders, and sent materials concerning the reasons for their flight from the Soviet Union, the measures taken by the Soviet Union to prevent their escape, and especially the humanitarian aid provided by Western countries, to world-renowned media such as Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, the BBC, and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. This was done to incite more discontent, subvert more Soviet citizens, and establish a terrifying image of the Soviet Union worldwide. After the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975, Western countries invoked the "human rights" clauses therein to fund Soviet "dissidents" and political opposition, making them an internal force for peaceful evolution. In 1983, the U.S. Congress passed the "National Endowment for Democracy Act," with funds primarily used to support the "development of democracy" and domestic opposition in the Soviet and Eastern European countries. If dissidents externally induced Soviet reforms, then liberal-minded intellectuals internally revised the official ideology of the Soviet Union, profoundly influencing the governing thoughts of CPSU leaders [31]31 The “Four-Pronged Comprehensive Strategy” (四个全面) refers to comprehensively building a modern socialist country, comprehensively deepening reform, comprehensively governing the country according to law, and comprehensively and strictly governing the Party.. The reform program proposed by Gorbachev in the 1980s was almost entirely consistent with the reform measures proposed by dissidents like Medvedev and Sakharov in their "Letter to the Leaders of the Soviet Union." Under the influence of the Western strategy of peaceful evolution, the ideological foundation of CPSU governance was continuously eroded, the Marxist faith of the Soviet people was steadily weakened, and the belief took hold that "the Soviet path is not the correct path of civilized development; 'civilized countries' are the model for social development, and one should follow them in all respects" [32]32 The “Five-Sphere Integrated Plan” (五位一体) refers to China’s overall plan for promoting economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological progress..

除了加强电台广播外，西方国家还利用教育交流、人权问题、政治避难、宗教传播等多种方式支持苏联境内的反对势力，培养亲西方人士。根据1951年美国国家安全委员会出台的NSC86/1号文件，要求在苏东国家实施“叛逃者项目”，1952年杜鲁门总统批准该项目。“叛逃者项目”又被称为“远东难民项目”，主要通过策反那些有利用价值的、有号召力的、愿意与美国合作的人员来达到增强非共产主义世界力量的目的。在救助并安置“有价值难民”的同时唆使他们批评苏联的体制和领导人，并把他们逃亡苏联的原因、苏联为阻止他们逃亡采取的措施，特别是西方国家实施人道主义救助的相关材料发给“美国之音”“自由欧洲电台”“英国广播公司”和“加拿大广播公司”等世界知名媒体，以煽动更多的不满情绪，策反更多的苏联民众，并在全世界树立恐怖的苏联形象。1975年《赫尔辛基协议》签订后，西方国家援引其中的“人权”条款对苏联的“持不同政见者”和政治反对派进行资助，让他们充当和平演变的内部力量。1983年美国国会通过了《争取民主赠款法》，资金主要用于支持苏联东欧国家“发展民主”和国内反对派。如果说持不同政见者从外部诱导了苏联改革，那么信奉自由主义的知识分子则从内部修正了苏联的官方意识形态，深深地影响了苏共领导人的执政思想[31]。20世纪80年代戈尔巴乔夫提出的改革纲领与麦德维杰夫、萨哈罗夫等持不同政见者在《致苏联领导人的一封信》提出的改革措施几乎完全一致。在西方和平演变战略影响下，苏共执政的思想基础不断遭到侵蚀，苏联人民的马克思主义信仰不断削弱，“苏联的道路不是文明发展的正路；‘文明国家’才是社会发展的榜样，应该在各方面都跟着它们走”[32]。

3. The unique historical and cultural traditions of the Soviet Union provided the cultural soil for its emergence

3.苏联独特的历史文化传统为其生成提供了文化土壤

Nihilism, as a social trend of thought, has a profound historical and cultural background in Russia. Russia is like a huge cultural pendulum, swinging indecisively between the two major cultural blocs of East and West, lacking a sense of cultural identity and belonging, which has caused a split in national consciousness and a cultural confrontation between East and West. Since ancient times, the Russian nation has developed an important characteristic: it both fears authority, possessing a servile and submissive side, and despises traditional customs, often openly hostile to accepted moral precepts, constantly excavating and persistently seeking "truth." The philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev said: "In the Russian spirit, Eastern and Western elements are forever in conflict," and "Russia is the most stateless, most anarchistic country in the world... Anarchism is a spiritual phenomenon of Russia, manifesting in various forms, belonging to both our left and our right" [33]33 The “14th Five-Year Plan” (十四五) refers to China’s 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (2021–2025).. Russia both advocates spiritual freedom, pursuing a universal human spirit with a quasi-religious purity, and promotes narrow nationalism, believing that only a Russified Christianity is the most Christian religion.

虚无主义作为一种社会思潮，在俄国有着深厚的历史文化背景，俄罗斯像一个巨大的文化钟摆，在东西方两大文化板块之间摇摆不定，缺乏文化上的认同感和归属感，造成了民族意识中的分裂和文化上的东西对峙。自古以来，俄罗斯民族形成一个重要的特点：既害怕权威，有奴性和服从的一面，又蔑视传统习俗，经常公开敌视公认的道德信条，不断挖掘并执着寻求着“真理”。哲学家尼·别尔嘉耶夫说：“在俄罗斯精神中，东方与西方两种因素永远在相互角力”，“俄罗斯是世界上最无国家组织、最无政府主义的国家……无政府主义是俄罗斯的精神现象，它表现为各种不同的形式，既属于我们的左派，也属于我们的右派”[33]。俄罗斯既崇尚精神自由，以一种近似宗教纯洁的精神去追求全人类精神，又鼓吹狭隘的民族主义，认为只有俄罗斯化的基督教才是最基督教化的宗教。

In the 1830s, Russian intellectuals split into two major factions based on their political positions: the Westernizers and the Slavophiles. The Westernizers advocated abolishing tradition, expanding political, economic, and cultural exchanges with Western European countries, and following the same development path as Western Europe. Their representatives included Chaadaev, Annenkov, Belinsky, and Herzen. The earliest voice of nihilism came from Chaadaev, a "negative patriot," what today would be called a national nihilist. As a staunch Westernizer, Chaadaev admired the West, insisted that Russia's出路 [way out] lay in unification with Western Europe, believed that taking the Western European path was the easiest and most ready-made path for Russia, and preached "negative patriotism." The main proposition in his "Philosophical Letter" of 1836 was that Russia had no history worthy of pride, no "tempting stages" or "eras of fullest development," no "charming memories" or "beautiful images," and that "we live only in a very narrow present, without past or future, immersed in rigid stagnation" [34]34 The “20th National Congress of the CPC” (二十大) refers to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, held in October 2022.. Chaadaev's reflection on Russian history, on the one hand, expressed a pessimistic mood about Russia's fate and a tendency towards national nihilism; on the other hand, it sought unification with Europe from religious, spiritual, and cultural perspectives, because in the East, "the humble knee bends before the authority of history," while the West "has mastered the fruits of human wisdom," and "people there advance proudly and freely, bowing only to reason and heavenly authority, stopping only before the unknown, forever gazing towards the infinite future" [35]35 The “Eight-Point Regulations” (八项规定) refers to the eight rules on improving Party and government conduct issued by the CPC Central Committee in 2012.. Therefore, "the more we strive to integrate into European society, the better it will be for us" [36]36 The “Two Integrations” (两个结合) refers to integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with China’s specific realities and with the best of traditional Chinese culture..

19世纪30年代俄国知识分子根据政治立场不同分化成为两大派别--西欧派和斯拉夫派，其中西欧派主张废除传统，扩大与西欧国家政治、经济、文化交往，走与西欧国家一样的发展道路，以恰达耶夫、安年科夫、别林斯基、赫尔岑为代表。最早发出虚无主义先声的是恰达耶夫，恰达耶夫是“否定的爱国主义者”，用今天的话来说是一个民族虚无主义者。作为一个坚定的西欧派，恰达耶夫崇尚西方，坚持俄国的出路是与西欧相统一的，认为俄国走西欧的路是最省力又现成的路，宣扬“否定式的爱国主义”。他在1836年的《哲学书简》中提出的主要命题就是俄罗斯没有自己值得炫耀的历史，没有“诱人的阶段”和“最充分发展的时代”，没有“迷人的回忆”和“优美形象”，“我们仅仅生活在界限非常狭隘的现在，没有过去和未来，置身于僵死的停滞”[34]。恰达耶夫对俄国历史的反思，一方面表现出了对俄国命运的悲观主义情绪和民族虚无主义倾向，另一方面从宗教、精神、文化上追求与欧洲的统一，因为在东方，“恭顺的智慧跪在历史权威面前”，而西方“掌握了人类智慧的成果”“人们却在高傲、自由地前进，他们只对理性和天国的权威俯首，他们只在未知东西的面前停步，他们永不停息地将目光投向无限的未来”[35]，所以“我们越是努力地与欧洲社会融为一体，这对于我们来说就会越好”[36]。

In the 1860s, nihilism became prevalent in Russia as a social trend of thought. The writer Turgenev's novel "Fathers and Sons," published in 1862, popularized the term nihilism in Russia. The novel defined nihilism as "a critical attitude towards everything," "bowing to no authority," and "taking no principle on faith" [37]37 The “Second Integration” (第二个结合) refers specifically to integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with the best of traditional Chinese culture.. With the novel's popularity, nihilism became a household word and was associated with terrorist assassinations. The foundation of nihilism lies in the Orthodox negation of the world. Although "Russian nihilists deny God, spirit, soul, norms, and highest values," nihilism possesses the typical characteristics of Russian Orthodoxy; it is "the external manifestation of Orthodox asceticism, the asceticism that renounces all happiness." "Ascetic Orthodoxy doubts the positive significance of culture and tends to view cultural creation as sin" [38]38 “Original aspiration and founding mission” (初心使命) refers to the original aspiration and founding mission of the Communist Party of China: to seek happiness for the Chinese people and rejuvenation for the Chinese nation.. Rooted in Russia's special soil, Orthodoxy retained more of early Christianity's humanitarian tradition, emphasizing that "God is the Father, and all people are brothers." The intellectual groups that grew up in this soil also possessed a strong humanitarian spirit, worshipped sublime love for humanity, believed that all suffering, ugliness, and privilege should be eliminated, and displayed a relatively strong spirit of resistance against social injustice. Later, the nihilist movement in Russia placed greater emphasis on achieving an anarchic state through destruction. In this sense, the prevalence of nihilism within the CPSU is closely related to the nihilist movement in the Russian period, which primarily aimed at pure negation or destruction.

19世纪60年代，虚无主义作为一股社会思潮在俄国流行开来。作家屠格涅夫在1862年出版的《父与子》使得虚无主义这一术语在俄国开始流行，这本小说将虚无主义解释为“用批评的观点对待一切”“不向任何权威折腰”“不把任何原则当信仰”[37]。随着该小说的流行，虚无主义变得家喻户晓并与恐怖暗杀活动挂钩。虚无主义的基础在于东正教对世界的否定，虽然“俄罗斯虚无主义者否定上帝、精神、心灵、规范和最高价值”，但是虚无主义具有俄罗斯东正教的典型特点，“是东正教禁欲生活、弃绝任何幸福的禁欲生活的外在体现”，“禁欲的东正教怀疑文化的积极意义，倾向于把文化创造看成罪孽”[38]。植根于俄国特殊土壤的东正教较多地保留了早期基督教的人道主义传统，强调“上帝是父亲，人人皆为兄弟”。在这种土壤中成长起来的知识分子群体也有强烈的人道主义精神，崇拜崇高的人类之爱，认为应该消灭一切苦难、丑恶与特权，对社会不公表现出较为强烈的反抗精神。后来虚无主义运动在俄国更强调通过破坏以达到一种无政府状态。在这个意义上，苏联党内虚无主义的盛行与俄国时期以纯粹的否定或破坏为主要目标的虚无主义运动密切相关。

4. The endorsement and support of historical nihilism by Soviet academia, literary and artistic circles, and the media provided a social atmosphere for the maturation and flourishing of historical nihilist discourse

4.苏联学界、文艺界和媒体界对历史虚无主义的认同支持为历史虚无主义话语的成熟兴盛提供了社会氛围

Historical nihilism often relies on academic research, literary and artistic creation, and news media to willfully distort historical facts, even fabricating rumors and forging history, creating ideological confusion, and reshaping value coordinates, modes of thinking, and national culture. The literary field is a major site where historical nihilism runs rampant and also the main front for Western ideological infiltration and inducement; literary creation, literary criticism, and the writing of literary history all exhibit, to varying degrees, a tendency to “nihilize” history. Dulles once said: “We must find people inside Russia who agree with our ideology, find our allies,” and “support and promote a group of so-called artists to instill into human consciousness the worship of sex, the worship of violence, the worship of sadism, the worship of betrayal” [39]39 “Seeking truth from facts” (实事求是) is a core principle of the CPC’s ideological line, derived from Mao Zedong’s interpretation of a classical Chinese phrase, meaning to proceed from reality and base oneself on facts.. The shift and radicalization of the political stance of intellectuals are closely related to the Soviet Union’s unsuccessful policy toward intellectuals. During the more than 70 years of CPSU rule, intellectuals, as a “special social group” in the Soviet Union, played an extremely important role in the process of Soviet revolution and construction. Yet intellectuals never attained a status equal to that of the working class and were repeatedly criticized and suppressed in numerous political movements. This policy of belittlement and distrust led to increasingly tense relations between the CPSU leadership group and the intellectual community, ultimately producing a group of radical intellectuals. By the time of Gorbachev, these intellectuals had placed themselves in opposition to the CPSU and Soviet socialism. In the 1950s, Khrushchev’s “Thaw” opened the floodgates for nihilist trends in the literary field. This was followed by Brezhnev’s “Samizdat” (underground publications) and Gorbachev’s period of “resolutely abandoning ideological monopolism.” The literary and artistic circles published a large number of articles attacking and vilifying Stalin and the socialist system, using the names of “writing the truth” and “glasnost” to carry out the reality of vilifying CPSU leaders and dismantling the history of the CPSU. During the Soviet period, a total of five writers won the Nobel Prize in Literature, four of whom were dissidents, including Solzhenitsyn, Pasternak, Ivan Bunin, and Joseph Brodsky. These dissidents established direct contact with the West, sending underground publications to be published there. Literary works such as *The Gulag Archipelago*, *Doctor Zhivago*, and *The End of a Beautiful Era* were all, without exception, underground publications that opposed the existing system and vilified Soviet leaders. According to an American scholar’s sample analysis of 392 underground publications from that period, 366 articles, or 93.37%, concerned political democracy, national rights, human rights and the rule of law, the rationality of development, religious freedom, and creative freedom. This indicates that the political-oriented thinking of the dissidents was dominant, proving their focus on the fundamental systemic legitimacy defects of the Soviet system [40]40 “Discipline inspection and supervision” (纪检监察) refers to the Party’s internal disciplinary inspection system and the state supervision system, which oversee Party members and public officials.. The United States and other Western countries, using the Nobel Prize in Literature, co-opted the direction of Soviet literature, turning Soviet literature into an important platform for cultural infiltration of the Soviet Union, and using the influence of native Soviet writers to change the political beliefs of Soviet youth.

历史虚无主义往往借助于学术研究、文艺创作和新闻传媒恣意歪曲历史史实，甚至编造谣言、伪造历史，制造思想混乱，重塑价值坐标、思维方式和民族文化，其中文学领域是历史虚无主义泛滥的重地，也是西方意识形态渗透和诱导的主阵地，文学创作、文学批评、文学史写作都不同程度地存在着“虚无”历史的趋向。杜勒斯曾说过：“我们一定要在俄罗斯内部找到同意我们思想意识的人，找到我们的同盟军”，“支持和抬举一批所谓的艺术家，让他们往人类的意识中灌输性崇拜、暴力崇拜、暴虐狂崇拜、背叛行为崇拜”[39]。知识分子政治立场的转变和激进化，这与苏联并不成功的知识分子政策密切相关，在苏共执政的70余年中，知识分子作为苏联一个“特殊的社会集团”，在苏联革命建设过程中发挥了极其重要的作用，然而知识分子始终没有取得同工人阶级同等重要的地位，并且在多次政治运动中遭到批判和打压。这种贬低的、不信任的政策，导致苏共领导集团和知识分子群体关系越来越紧张，最终制造出了一批激进的知识分子群体，以至于到了戈尔巴乔夫时期，这批知识分子站到了苏共和苏联社会主义的对立面。20世纪50年代赫鲁晓夫的“解冻”为文学领域的虚无主义思潮打开了闸门，之后经历了勃列日涅夫的“萨米兹达特”（地下出版物）和戈尔巴乔夫时期的“坚决放弃意识形态的垄断主义”，文艺界发表了大量攻击、丑化斯大林和社会主义制度的文章，以“写真实”“公开性”之名，行丑化苏共领导人、拆解苏共党史之实。苏联时期共有5位作家获得诺贝尔文学奖，其中有4位是持不同政见者，包括索尔仁尼琴、帕斯捷尔纳克、伊万·布宁、约瑟夫·布罗茨基。这些持不同政见者同西方取得直接联系，把地下出版物送到西方出版，如《古拉格群岛》《日瓦戈医生》《一个美丽纪元的结束》等文学作品，无一例外都是反对现行体制、丑化苏联领导人的地下出版物。根据美国学者对该时期392篇地下出版物抽样分析显示，关于政治民主、民族权利、人权—法制、发展合理性、宗教自由、创作自由的有366篇，占比为93.37%，这表明了持不同政见者以政治为导向的思想占据主导地位，证明了他们对苏联体制的根本系统合法性缺陷的关注[40]。以美国为首的西方国家正是借助于诺贝尔文学奖裹挟了苏联文学发展方向，把苏联文学打造成对苏进行文化渗透的重要平台，借助苏联本土作家的影响力改变苏联青年群体的政治信仰。

Later, the “Thaw” trend spread to academia, bringing extreme liberalism. The Soviet historical field formed a “New Direction” movement, “striving to re-examine the outdated stereotypes of historical research formed under the extremely harsh conditions of ideological suppression in the 1930s and 1940s” [41]41 “Intra-Party regulations” (党内法规) are the rules and norms formulated by the CPC to regulate the conduct of its organizations and members.. Under the guise of academic research, it touched upon the most acute political issues of the Soviet Union, attempting to argue that the Russian October Revolution was not a historical necessity, denying the proletarian nature of the October Revolution, and asserting that the Soviet socialist path was atypical [42]42 “Outlook on political performance” (政绩观) refers to the views and standards by which Party officials evaluate their own achievements and performance in office.. With Gorbachev coming to power, Yakovlev was appointed head of the CPSU Central Committee’s Propaganda Department, in charge of mass media. Soviet cultural positions fell one after another. Mainstream newspapers and periodicals such as *Izvestia*, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, and *Moskovskaya Pravda* were successively controlled by liberal elements, becoming ideological positions against socialism. From 1985 to 1987, the focus of criticism in these newspapers was on Brezhnev’s “stagnation and ossification.” In 1988, they began to comprehensively attack Stalin and the “socialist model” formed during his leadership. Misled by the mass media, the planned system was declared the chief culprit for economic chaos. Glasnost was transformed into “a denigration of the entire Soviet past, concentrated on various true and false ‘historical stains’,” while “those who advocated preserving the Soviet Union” were portrayed as “conservative” forces, and demands were made for their thorough suppression [43]43 “Clean governance” (廉政) refers to the principle of honest, incorruptible, and clean government, a key goal of the CPC’s anti-corruption efforts.. This nihilization of Soviet history and CPSU leaders, on the one hand, caused the Soviet people to gradually lose confidence in the CPSU and Soviet socialism. In particular, university student groups began to “form a negative comprehensive evaluation of certain aspects of Soviet reality, understanding concepts like freedom, speech, press, and creation without a class perspective; the multi-party system actively promoted by bourgeois propaganda tools gained support; and a negative attitude was taken towards the vast amount of Soviet information means” [44]44 “Party spirit” (党性) refers to the political nature, principles, and discipline that a member of the Communist Party of China is expected to embody.. On the other hand, it echoed the nihilist discourse within the Party, providing a social atmosphere for the maturation and flourishing of historical nihilist discourse within the Party.

后来“解冻”思潮蔓延至学术界，带来了极端自由主义，苏联历史学界形成了“新方向”运动，“力图重新审视30-40年代在极其严酷的思想压制条件下形成的史学研究的陈规旧套”[41]，以学术研究的名义触及了苏联最为尖锐的政治问题，力图论证俄国十月革命并非历史的必然，否定十月革命的无产阶级性质，认为苏联社会主义道路是非典型的[42]。随着戈尔巴乔夫上台，雅科夫列夫被提名为苏共中央宣传部部长，分管大众传媒，苏联文化阵地相继失守，《消息报》《共青团真理报》和《莫斯科真理报》等主流报刊先后被自由派人士所控制，成为反社会主义的思想阵地。1985-1987年这些报刊批评的焦点集中在勃列日涅夫的“僵化和停滞”上，1988年它们开始全面抨击斯大林和他领导时期形成的“社会主义模式”。在大众传媒的误导下，计划体制被宣布为经济混乱的罪魁祸首，公开性转化成“对于整个苏联过去的诋毁，它集中在各种真真假假的‘历史污点’上”，而“主张保存苏联的人”则被树立为“保守”势力并要求对这些人进行彻底镇压[43]。这些对苏联历史和苏共领导人的虚无，一方面使得苏联人民对苏共、苏联社会主义逐渐丧失了信心，特别是大学生群体开始对苏联“现实的某些方面形成一个否定的综合性评价，不用阶级观点来理解自由、言论、出版、创作这样一些概念，资产阶级宣传工具积极宣传的多党制得到支持，对苏联大量的信息手段持否定的态度”[44]，另一方面也与党内虚无主义话语遥相呼应，为党内历史虚无主义话语的成熟兴盛提供了社会氛围。

III. The Lessons of the Evolution of Historical Nihilist Discourse within the CPSU for Our Country

三、苏共党内历史虚无主义话语的演进对我国的启示

Currently, the trend of historical nihilism is resurging in our country. Examining the evolution of historical nihilist discourse within the Soviet Party in the 20th century is of great significance for understanding the essence of historical nihilist discourse and for responding to the current trend of historical nihilism.

当前，历史虚无主义思潮在我国沉渣泛起，考察20世纪苏联党内历史虚无主义话语的流变，对认识历史虚无主义话语的本质以及应对现阶段历史虚无主义思潮都具有十分重要的意义。

1. Constructing Historical Identity is the Prerequisite for Responding to Historical Nihilism

1.建构历史认同是应对历史虚无主义的前提

Historical identity is the prerequisite and foundation for achieving national identity. Historical identity plays an important role in cultivating citizens’ political identity and national identity. Once historical identity is formed, it can evoke the group consciousness of social members, activate the national spirit, and form a political identity with the country. Whether it is Liang Qichao’s view that historiography is “the mirror of the people, the source of patriotism” [45]45 “The Party Central Committee” (党中央) refers to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the highest authority between Party congresses., Zhang Taiyan’s assertion that “without reading history books, one cannot love one’s country” [46]46 “The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (中华民族伟大复兴) is the overarching goal of the Chinese Dream, often referred to as the “Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation.”, or Qian Mu’s proposition that “to make citizens have a deep love for their country, they must first have a deep understanding of their country’s past history” [47]47 “Changes unseen in a century” (百年未有之大变局) is a phrase used by Xi Jinping to describe the profound and complex transformations occurring in the contemporary international landscape., all indicate that historical identity is an important driving force for promoting national identity. That is, only on the premise of distinguishing “this is our history” or “this is their history” can historical memory activate the national spirit and unite the people’s strength.

历史认同是实现国家认同的前提和基础。历史认同对培养国民的政治认同和国家认同有着重要的作用，历史认同一旦形成就可以唤起社会成员的群体意识，激活民族精神，形成对国家的政治认同。无论是梁启超的史学乃“国民之明镜也，爱国心之源泉也”[45] 的观点，还是章太炎所言“不读史书，则无从爱其国家”[46] 的高论，抑或钱穆先生的“故欲其国民对国家有深厚之爱情，必先使其国民对国家已往历史有深厚的认识”[47] 的主张，都表明历史认同是推进国家认同的重要动力，即只有在区分“这是我们的历史”或“这是他们的历史”的前提下，历史记忆才可以激活民族精神、凝聚国民力量。

The dissolution of historical identity implies a change in political identity. The reasons for the disintegration of the Soviet Union are manifold, among which the collapse of historical identity was an extremely important factor. Soviet historical nihilists, using an anti-historical method, did not examine historical figures under specific social and historical conditions, but instead measured and harshly criticized past leaders based on present circumstances and today’s level of understanding. By analyzing the mistakes that appeared in certain stages of Soviet revolution and construction, they comprehensively obliterated the history of the Soviet revolution and socialist construction, ultimately leading to the dissolution of the identity with the ideological and theoretical foundation and the socio-political foundation upon which the CPSU relied to establish the state.

历史认同的消解意味着政治认同之改变。苏联解体的原因是多方面的，其中历史认同的瓦解是极其重要的因素。苏联历史虚无主义者以反历史的方法，不是把历史人物放到特定的社会历史条件下进行考察，而是以现在的情况与今天的认识水平去衡量、苛求昔日领袖，通过对苏联革命和建设一些阶段性发展出现的错误的分析，全面抹杀苏联革命和社会主义建设的历史，最终造成了苏联共产党赖以立国的思想理论基础和社会政治基础的认同的消解。

General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out at the symposium commemorating the 120th anniversary of Comrade Mao Zedong’s birth: “History is history; history cannot be arbitrarily chosen. The history of a nation is the foundation on which that nation settles down and gets on with its work.”[48]48 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Symposium Commemorating the 120th Anniversary of Comrade Mao Zedong’s Birth” (December 26, 2013), in *Xi Jinping: The Governance of China*, vol. 1, Foreign Languages Press, 2014, p. 44. History cannot be nihilized, nor can it be tampered with. It is precisely because a historical consensus exists that it constitutes the cornerstone of the Chinese nation’s national and political identity. The prerequisite for realizing our socialist identity is to preserve historical memory. Historical memory is produced within a specific social system and cultural tradition. Using historical memory can shape the thinking patterns and behavioral modes of the citizenry and interpret the legitimacy of governance. History, especially the revolutionary history of modern China, the history of the Party, and the history of the nation, is an important ideological and cultural resource for constructing national and ethnic identity. It exerts a strong integrative and cohesive effect on contemporary citizens and is the foundation for advancing socialist identity. If the state is to shape citizens’ correct understanding of history, it must employ materialist dialectics and scientific historical thinking. As General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out: construct a correct “grand view of history” and “view of Party history,” “accurately grasp the main theme, main line, mainstream and essence of the Party’s historical development, correctly understand and scientifically evaluate major events, important meetings, and important figures in Party history,”[49]49 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Party History Study and Education Mobilization Conference” (February 20, 2021), in *Xi Jinping: The Governance of China*, vol. 4, Foreign Languages Press, 2022, p. 514. “do not completely negate them because of their mistakes and errors, erase their historical achievements, and fall into the quagmire of nihilism”;[50]50 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Symposium Commemorating the 120th Anniversary of Comrade Mao Zedong’s Birth” (December 26, 2013), in *Xi Jinping: The Governance of China*, vol. 1, Foreign Languages Press, 2014, p. 45. cultivate historical consciousness and cultural self-awareness, “that is, when thinking about problems and making decisions, one must have historical perspective, be able to draw experience and wisdom from past history, and consciously act in accordance with historical laws and the dialectics of historical development”;[51]51 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the First Phase of the Seminar on the Study and Implementation of the Spirit of the 18th CPC National Congress for Principal Leading Cadres at the Provincial and Ministerial Level” (January 5, 2013), in *Xi Jinping: The Governance of China*, vol. 1, Foreign Languages Press, 2014, p. 10. through education in Party history, national history, the history of reform and opening up, and the history of socialist development, recognize the historical inevitability of the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, recognize that the leadership position of the Communist Party of China is the choice of history and the people, gradually establish political identity with socialism with Chinese characteristics, and strengthen emotional identity with the nation and the people.

习近平总书记在纪念毛泽东同志诞辰120周年座谈会上指出：“历史就是历史，历史不能任意选择，一个民族的历史是一个民族安身立命的基础。”[48] 历史不容虚无，历史也不容篡改，正是由于历史共识的存在，才构成中华民族的国家和政治认同的基石，实现我国社会主义认同的前提就是保留历史记忆。历史记忆是在特定的社会体制和文化传统中产生的，利用历史记忆可以塑造国民的思维方式和行为方式，诠释执政合法性。历史，尤其是近代中国的革命史、党史、国史，是建构国家和民族认同的重要思想文化资源，对当代国民具有一种强烈的整合和凝聚作用，是推进社会主义认同的基础。国家若要塑造国民对历史的正确认知，就必须运用唯物辩证法和科学的历史思维，正如习近平总书记所指出的：建构正确的“大历史观”和“党史观”，“准确把握党的历史发展的主题主线、主流本质，正确认识和科学评价党史上的重大事件、重要会议、重要人物”[49]，“不能因为他们有失误和错误就全盘否定，抹杀他们的历史功绩，陷入虚无主义的泥潭”[50]；要培养历史意识和文化自觉，“即想问题、作决策要有历史眼光，能够从以往的历史中汲取经验和智慧，自觉按照历史规律和历史发展的辩证法办事”[51]；通过党史、国史、改革开放史和社会主义发展史教育，认识中国特色社会主义道路的历史必然性，认识中国共产党领导地位是历史和人民的选择，逐步确立起对中国特色社会主义的政治认同，增强对国家和人民的情感认同。

2. Mastering the Discourse Power of Marxist Ideology Is the Key to Opposing Historical Nihilism

2.掌握马克思主义意识形态话语权是反对历史虚无主义的关键

Discourse power is essentially a soft power that dominates and controls discourse, embodying power and values. The discourse power of ideology is a “power” that reflects class interest relations and is an important force for enhancing the appeal of mainstream ideology and achieving the governance and management of society. (WeChat public account: Ideological and Political Scholars) The deep-seated reason for the disintegration of the Soviet Union lies in the fact that while historical nihilism nihilized and subverted Soviet history, it also reconstructed a new ideological discourse. Soviet citizens began to use Western-style discourse to think and to evaluate the existing Soviet political system, ultimately leading to the loss of the mainstream ideological discourse power of the Soviet Union. For a political party, losing the discourse power of ideology inevitably means losing the people’s support and losing the foundation of governance. During the Soviet period, the construction of the Marxist ideological discourse system, as the mainstream ideology, encountered difficulties of varying degrees in terms of theoretical explanatory power and the persuasiveness of practical problems: on the one hand, “Stalinization” formed a distorted situation of monolithic rule over Marxist discourse power, “causing Marxism-Leninism to enter a state of stagnation and ossification, divorcing it from reality, from concrete science, and gradually turning it into a dogma,”[52]52 Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism*, rev. and expanded ed., Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 843. distorting the Soviet people’s correct understanding of Marxism, and damaging the scientific nature and truth of Marxism to varying degrees; on the other hand, “de-Stalinization” plunged Soviet socialist ideology into a crisis of legitimacy and discourse power, leading to the loss of Marxism’s guiding position and the collapse of the CPSU regime.

话语权本质上是支配和控制话语的软性权力，体现了权力和价值观。意识形态话语权是体现阶级利益关系的“权力”，是增强主流意识形态的吸引力、实现统治和管理社会的重要力量。（微信公众号：思政学者）苏联解体的深层次原因在于历史虚无主义对苏联历史进行虚无和颠覆的同时，再造了意识形态新话语，苏联民众开始利用西式话语思考并以此评价苏联现行政治体制，最终导致苏联主流意识形态话语权的旁落。对于一个政党来说，失去了意识形态话语权，必然失去民心，失去执政根基。在苏联时期，作为主流意识形态的马克思主义意识形态话语体系建设在理论解释力和现实问题说服力方面陷入了不同程度的困境：一方面，“斯大林主义化”形成了马克思主义话语权一言堂的畸形局面，“使马克思列宁主义进入停滞和僵化状态，让它脱离现实，脱离具体科学并逐渐变成一种教义”[52]，扭曲了苏联人民对马克思主义的正确认知，马克思主义的科学性和真理性遭到不同程度的损害；另一方面，“去斯大林化”使苏联社会主义意识形态遭遇合法性、话语权危机，导致马克思主义指导地位的丧失和苏共政权的垮台。

Over more than 40 years of reform and opening up, China has formed a relatively complete socialist ideological discourse system. However, it has also been impacted to a certain extent by historical nihilist discourse. The “emptiness” and “negation” of historical nihilist discourse attempt to reconstruct modern Chinese history, aiming to deny the justice and necessity of the New Democratic Revolution and the Socialist Revolution, and to dissolve the inevitability of the CPC’s rule. This poses a real challenge to the discourse power of Marxist ideology. The discourse power of ideology is of extreme importance. Mastering the discourse power of Marxist ideology is an inherent requirement for upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics. The discourse power of Marxist ideology comes both from the logical self-consistency of the theory and from its ability to answer practical questions. On the one hand, we must take China’s problems as the orientation and enhance the factual persuasiveness of Marxist ideological discourse. General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: “Adhering to a problem-oriented approach is a distinctive feature of Marxism.”[53]53 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Seminar on the Study and Implementation of the Spirit of the 19th CPC National Congress for Principal Leading Cadres at the Provincial and Ministerial Level” (January 5, 2018), in *Xi Jinping: The Governance of China*, vol. 3, Foreign Languages Press, 2020, p. 74. This requires us to grasp and base ourselves on the historical juncture of the New Era of socialism with Chinese characteristics, use the Marxist stance, viewpoint, and method to solve practical problems in the process of building socialism with Chinese characteristics in the New Era, promote ideological identity by enhancing interest identity, and properly respond to the people’s concerns. Only in this way can we resonate, build consensus, and continuously enhance the factual persuasiveness of Marxist ideological discourse. On the other hand, we must make new interpretations of the basic principles of Marxism and enhance the theoretical explanatory power of ideological discourse. Adhering to the principle of “never forgetting the original, absorbing from the outside, and facing the future,” we should conduct academic refinement of China’s experience, continuously enrich the content of Marxist ideological discourse, create new concepts, new categories, and new expressions that integrate Chinese and foreign elements, reshape the discourse of “reform” and “development,” and explain well discourses such as the “Chinese Dream,” “New Era,” “Chinese characteristics,” and “a community with a shared future for mankind,” making them fit the cognitive psychology and knowledge structure of the people. Furthermore, we must innovate forms of discourse expression to enhance the appeal and communicability of Marxist ideology. By telling China’s stories well, we can achieve a “life-oriented” discourse expression. “We must tell well the stories of the Party, the stories of the revolution, the stories of the base areas, and the stories of heroes and martyrs,”[54]54 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Party History Study and Education Mobilization Conference” (February 20, 2021), in *Xi Jinping: The Governance of China*, vol. 4, Foreign Languages Press, 2022, p. 517. “we must tell well the stories of socialism with Chinese characteristics, tell well the stories of the Chinese Dream, tell well the stories of the Chinese people, tell well the stories of excellent Chinese culture, and tell well the stories of China’s peaceful development.”[55]55 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the National Conference on Propaganda and Ideological Work” (August 19, 2013), in *Xi Jinping: The Governance of China*, vol. 1, Foreign Languages Press, 2014, p. 156. Only in this way can we enhance the leading power and cohesive force of Marxist ideological discourse.

改革开放40多年来，中国已形成了较为完善的社会主义意识形态话语体系，但是在一定程度上也受到了历史虚无主义话语的冲击。历史虚无主义话语之“虚”“无”试图重构中国近现代史，以达到否定新民主主义革命和社会主义革命的正义性和必要性，并消解中共执政必然性的目的，这对马克思主义意识形态话语权带来现实的挑战。意识形态话语权具有极端重要性，掌握马克思主义意识形态话语权是坚持和发展中国特色社会主义的内在要求。马克思主义意识形态话语权既来自理论的逻辑自洽性，也来自其现实问题解答力。一方面要以中国问题为导向，增强马克思主义意识形态话语的事实说服力。习近平总书记指出：“坚持问题导向是马克思主义的鲜明特点”[53]。这就要求我们把握和立足于中国特色社会主义新时代的历史方位，用马克思主义的立场观点方法解决新时代中国特色社会主义建设过程中的实际问题，通过增进利益认同的方式推进意识形态认同，妥善回应人民关切。只有这样，才能引起共鸣、凝聚共识，才能不断增强马克思主义意识形态话语的事实说服力。另一方面，对马克思主义基本原理作出新的阐释，提升意识形态话语的理论阐释力。坚持“不忘本来、吸收外来、面向未来”的原则，把中国经验进行学术提炼，不断丰富马克思主义意识形态话语内容，打造融通中外的新概念、新范畴、新表述，重塑“改革”“发展”话语，阐释好“中国梦”“新时代”“中国特色”“人类命运共同体”等话语，使之契合民众的认知心理和知识结构。此外，要创新话语表达形式，增强马克思主义意识形态的感染力和传播力。通过讲好中国故事实现“生活化”的话语表达，“要讲好党的故事、革命的故事、根据地的故事、英雄和烈士的故事”[54]，“要讲好中国特色社会主义的故事，讲好中国梦的故事，讲好中国人的故事，讲好中华优秀文化的故事，讲好中国和平发展的故事”[55]。只有这样，才能增强马克思主义意识形态话语的主导力和凝聚力。

3. Consolidating the Governance Foundation of the Communist Party of China Is the Fundamental Response to Historical Nihilism

3.厚植中国共产党执政基础是应对历史虚无主义的根本

The governance foundation mainly refers to the forces the Party relies on for governance, including the political foundation, class foundation, organizational foundation, and performance foundation, among which the core element is the people, that is, the will of the people. The will of the people is the key factor determining whether a ruling party has legitimacy. Loss of the people’s will may lead to a crisis of legitimacy for the ruling party, or even the collapse of the ruling party. Consolidating the Party’s governance foundation is conducive to shaping the Party’s governing authority and enhancing its self-identity awareness. The reason historical nihilism was able to succeed in the Soviet Union was largely because a series of problems emerged in the CPSU’s political construction, ideological construction, organizational construction, and work style construction, giving historical nihilism an opportunity to exploit. From Khrushchev’s rise to power in 1953 to Gorbachev’s peaceful loss of power in 1991, this period was not only 40 years of the spread of historical nihilism in the Soviet Union but also 40 years of continuous erosion of the CPSU’s governance foundation: the highly centralized planned economic system caused economic stagnation; the long-term failure to realize democratic centralism led to estrangement between Party cadres and the masses; the huge gap between theoretical propaganda and actual development led to the weakening of socialist beliefs; the formation of a privileged stratum meant the Party completed its bureaucratic transformation organizationally; the lack of intra-Party democracy blocked channels for the free expression of opinions within the Party, causing ideological ossification, “the ‘Marxism-Leninism’ propagated by the thinkers, including ‘scientific communism,’ was understood by many people by the early 1980s as a kind of cliché that could never be realized but had to be paid lip service to.”[56]56 Alexander Yakovlev, *The Fate of Marxism in Russia*, Yale University Press, 2004, p. 112. As the Cold War progressed, these problems not only failed to be effectively resolved but intensified. The economic foundation, class foundation, ideological foundation, and organizational foundation of the CPSU’s governance continuously weakened. “By the beginning of 1991, the Party was left with only a shell; it had itself disintegrated and was paralyzed.”[57]57 Roy Medvedev, *The Last Years of the Soviet Union: From Brezhnev to Gorbachev*, Pantheon Books, 1990, p. 345.

执政基础主要是指党执政的依靠力量，包含政治基础、阶级基础、组织基础和绩效基础等，其中最核心的是人民这个要素，即民心向背。民心向背是决定执政党是否具有正当性的关键因素，民心丧失则可能导致执政党的合法性危机，甚至带来执政党的垮台。厚植党的执政基础有利于党的执政权威的塑造与自我身份认同意识的提升。历史虚无主义之所以能够在苏联得逞，很大程度上在于苏共的政治建设、思想建设、组织建设、作风建设出了一系列问题，给历史虚无主义以可乘之机。苏联从1953年赫鲁晓夫上台执政至1991年戈尔巴乔夫通过和平方式丧失政权，既是历史虚无主义在苏联蔓延的40年，也是苏共执政基础不断遭到侵蚀的40年：高度集中的计划经济体制造成经济停滞；长期未能实现民主集中制导致党内干群关系疏远；理论宣传与现实发展的巨大反差导致社会主义信仰的弱化；特权阶层形成，党在组织上完成了官僚化的蜕变；党内民主的缺乏堵塞了党内言论自主表达的通道，造成了思想上的僵化，“思想家们所宣传的‘马克思列宁主义’，包括‘科学共产主义’在内，到80年代初被许多人理解为一种根本就无法实现但又必须挂在嘴上的套话”[56]。随着冷战推进，这些问题不仅未能得到有效解决，反而愈演愈烈，苏共执政的经济基础、阶级基础、思想基础和组织基础不断弱化，“到1991年初，党已经只剩下了一个外壳，其本身则已瓦解和瘫痪”[57]。

The ruling foundation is the basic condition for maintaining the ruling status of a ruling party. The Party’s ruling status is neither innate nor permanent; therefore, it is necessary to continuously strengthen and expand the Party’s class foundation, ideological foundation, organizational foundation, and performance foundation as social and historical conditions change. In recent years, the reason historical nihilism still has a certain market in China is largely because historical nihilists link

执政基础是执政党执政地位得以维持的基本条件。党的执政地位不是与生俱来的，也不是一劳永逸的，这就需要随着社会历史条件的变化而不断加强和扩大党执政的阶级基础、思想基础、组织基础、绩效基础。近些年来，历史虚无主义之所以在我国还有一定的市场，很大程度上是因为历史虚无主义者把改革开放以来的腐败现象、道德滑坡、贫富分化等社会现实问题与党的执政资格和领导地位联系起来，在“批判现实”的同时将斗争矛头指向了社会主义制度。“江山就是人民，人民就是江山，人心向背关系党的生死存亡”[58]。因此，应对历史虚无主义的根本就是赢得民心，并在此基础上厚植中国共产党的执政基础：既要贯彻创新、协调、绿色、开放和共享的新发展理念，优化产业结构，大力发展生产力，提升发展质量和效益，又要推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化，发展社会主义民主政治，促进社会公平正义，不仅满足人民对美好物质文化生活的新需求，也要满足人民对民主、法治、公平、正义的新需求，以巩固党执政的绩效基础；强化党员自我身份认同，增强党员政治身份意识、组织身份意识和行为身份意识，坚决维护党中央权威和集中统一领导。从“党内民主是党的生命”的认识高度出发，健全党内民主制度，尊重和保障党员民主权利，把发展党内民主与推进基层民主和协商民主紧密结合起来，以巩固党执政的组织基础；不断坚持和完善党的知识分子政策，坚持“尊重知识、尊重人才”的方针，贯彻“党管人才”原则，对待知识分子要“做到政治上充分信任、思想上主动引导、工作上创造条件、生活上关心照顾”[59]，以巩固党执政的阶级基础。

4. Upholding the High Degree of Unity between Patriotism, Love for the Party, and Love for Socialism Is an Important Safeguard against Historical Nihilism

4.坚持爱国、爱党和爱社会主义的高度统一是反对历史虚无主义的重要保障

Patriotism, love for the Party, and love for socialism form a unified and closely linked whole. In his important speech at the ceremony marking the centenary of the May Fourth Movement, General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: "In contemporary China, the essence of patriotism is to uphold the high degree of unity between patriotism and love for the Party and love for socialism." [60]60 "Humane, democratic socialism" and "new thinking" were key slogans of Mikhail Gorbachev's reform program (perestroika and glasnost) in the late 1980s, which the CPC criticizes as having abandoned Marxist-Leninist principles and contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Communist Party of China stepped onto the historical stage at a time when China was beset by internal and external troubles, rooted in a 5,000-year cultural tradition. It first united and led the Chinese people in founding New China, achieving national independence and national liberation; then it broke the stranglehold of traditional feudal forces and capitalist forces over state power, established the basic system of socialism, and opened up the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, enabling the Chinese nation to achieve a great leap from standing up and growing prosperous to becoming strong.

爱国、爱党、爱社会主义是统一而紧密联系的整体。习近平总书记在纪念五四运动100周年大会上的重要讲话中指出：“当代中国，爱国主义的本质就是坚持爱国和爱党、爱社会主义高度统一。”[60] 中国共产党是在中国内忧外患之际走上历史舞台的，扎根于5000年的文化传统，先是团结带领中国人民建立了新中国，实现了国家独立和民族解放，然后打破了传统封建势力和资本主义势力对国家政权的掣肘，确立了社会主义基本制度，而且开辟了中国特色社会主义道路，使中华民族迎来了从站起来、富起来到强起来的伟大飞跃。

Historical nihilists repeatedly assert that patriotism does not equal "love for the Party" and does not equal love for "socialism." The essence of their approach is to sever the high degree of unity among patriotism, love for the Party, and love for socialism, thereby dissolving the legitimacy of the Party's governance and the historical inevitability of socialism. General Secretary Xi Jinping points out: "The crux of historical nihilism is to fundamentally negate the guiding position of Marxism and the historical inevitability of China's path toward socialism, and to negate the leadership of the Communist Party of China." [61] Patriotism, love for the Party, and love for socialism are unified. Historical nihilists, borrowing postmodern narrative methods, adopt a mindset of "peeking at the truth" to "re-evaluate" history, deny the objectivity of "historical choice," and attempt to strip the Party's leading position from the process of national rejuvenation. They use historical contingency to negate the inevitability of socialism in China, fundamentally denying the consistency of patriotism, love for the Party, and love for socialism. Since the founding of New China in 1949, the Communist Party of China has been in power for 72 years, with 4.864 million primary-level Party organizations and a Party membership exceeding 95.148 million people, its influence extending to every aspect of Chinese society. In contemporary China, the connotation of the Communist Party has long transcended the scope defined by Western "political parties." The Communist Party of China is not only the leading core of the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the dominant force comprehensively advancing China's modernization movement and the process of national rejuvenation, but also the explorer of socialism and the pioneer of the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Together with the state and socialism, it forms a tripartite logical implication — a community of shared destiny where one prospers and all prosper, one suffers and all suffer. In the historical process of revolution, construction, and reform, the leading position of the Communist Party of China and the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics have been tightly bound together with the future and destiny of the nation, gaining broad recognition from hundreds of millions of people, and on this basis a stable political conviction has been formed. The report of the 19th National Congress of the CPC clearly states: "The most essential characteristic of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Communist Party of China; the greatest strength of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Communist Party of China." [62] In China, not only are the Party and the state consistent — love for the Party equals patriotism — but socialism and the state are also unified; socialism is the inevitable choice of China's historical development. Only by adhering to a historical and political outlook that unifies these three can we deeply grasp the historical laws of China's development, uphold the spiritual tradition of patriotism, and clearly understand the most essential characteristic of the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the historical inevitability of socialism. General Secretary Xi Jinping points out: "For thousands of years, the Chinese nation has followed a path of civilizational development different from that of other countries and nations. The path of socialism with Chinese characteristics we have opened up is no accident; it is determined by our country's historical heritage and cultural traditions." [63]

历史虚无主义者反复强调爱国不等于“爱党”、不等于爱“社会主义”，其实质做法就是要割裂爱国、爱党和爱社会主义的高度统一，消解党的执政正当性和社会主义的历史必然性。习近平总书记指出：“历史虚无主义的要害，是从根本上否定马克思主义指导地位和中国走向社会主义的历史必然性，否定中国共产党的领导。”[61] 爱国、爱党和爱社会主义是统一的。历史虚无主义者借用后现代叙事方式，以“管窥真相”的心态对历史“重新评价”，否认“历史选择”的客观性，妄图将党的领导地位从国家的复兴进程中剥离出来，以历史的偶然性来否定社会主义在中国的必然性，从根本上否认爱国、爱党和爱社会主义的一致性。自1949年新中国成立以来，中国共产党已经执政72年，有486.4万个基层党组织，党员规模超过9514.8万人，影响力遍及中国社会的方方面面。在当代中国，共产党的内涵早已超越了西方“政党”所界定的范畴。中国共产党不仅是中国特色社会主义事业的领导核心，是全面推动中国现代化运动和民族复兴进程的主导力量，而且是社会主义探索者和中国特色社会主义道路的开创者，与国家、社会主义形成了三位一体的逻辑意蕴，是一荣俱荣一损俱损的命运共同体。在革命、建设和改革历史进程中，中国共产党领导地位、中国特色社会主义道路与国家的前途命运紧紧结合在一起，得到了亿万人民的广泛认同，并以此形成了稳定的政治信念。党的十九大报告明确指出，“中国特色社会主义最本质的特征是中国共产党领导，中国特色社会主义制度的最大优势是中国共产党领导。”[62] 在中国，不仅党和国家是一致的，爱党等于爱国，而且社会主义与国家也是统一的，社会主义是中国历史发展的必然选择。只有坚持三者相统一的历史观、政治观，才能深刻把握中国发展的历史规律，坚持爱国主义的精神传统，明确中国共产党领导的最本质特征和社会主义的历史必然性。习近平总书记指出，“数千年来，中华民族走着一条不同于其他国家和民族的文明发展道路。我们开辟了中国特色社会主义道路不是偶然的，是我国历史传承和文化传统决定的。”[63]

The historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU, evolving through the Khrushchev period, the Brezhnev period, and the Gorbachev period, formed a system of discourse centered on core concepts such as "the party of the whole people," "humane, democratic socialism," and "new thinking," with negation as its main body, greatly undermining the Marxist faith of Soviet Communists. The trend of historical nihilism is an erroneous trend that must be constantly guarded against in the construction of socialist modernization. Drawing lessons from the generation of historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU is of great significance for us to effectively block the infiltration of Western ideology in terms of discourse strategy and to avoid falling into certain discourse traps deliberately set by the West.

苏共党内历史虚无主义话语历经赫鲁晓夫时期、勃列日涅夫时期和戈尔巴乔夫时期，形成了一套以“全民的党”“人道的、民主的社会主义”“新思维”等为核心概念，以否定主义为主体的话语体系，极大地破坏了苏联共产党人的马克思主义信仰。历史虚无主义思潮是社会主义现代化建设中要时刻警惕的一种错误思潮。汲取总结苏共党内历史虚无主义话语生成的教训，对于我们在话语策略上有效阻击西方意识形态的渗透，避免落入西方有意设置的某些话语陷阱，具有重要的意义。

(About the author: Ren Chengjin, Professor at Shandong University of Science and Technology)

（作者简介：任成金，山东科技大学教授）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心