The Logical Process of Lenin’s Understanding of Socialism
赵培:列宁认识社会主义的逻辑进程
After the victory of the second bourgeois revolution in Russia, the socio-political and economic crisis continued to intensify. In the course of revolutionary practice and socialist construction, Lenin creatively answered the fundamental questions of socialism, and his understanding of socialism deepened continuously. These understandings innovatively developed the theory of scientific socialism and occupy an important position in the world socialist movement. Clarifying the logical process of Lenin’s deepening understanding in practice is of great significance for scientifically grasping the complete picture of Lenin’s socialist thought and for summarizing and reflecting on the practical experience of socialism.
俄国第二次资产阶级革命胜利后,社会政治经济危机却不断加剧。列宁在革命实践和社会主义建设中,创造性地回答了社会主义的基本问题,对社会主义的认识不断深化。这些认识创新发展了科学社会主义理论,在世界社会主义运动中具有重要地位。厘清列宁在实践中深化认识的逻辑进程,对科学把握列宁社会主义思想全貌,总结反思社会主义实践经验具有重要意义。
I. Advancing the Revolution to Construct the Premise of Socialism
一、推进革命构筑社会主义前提
In Lenin’s view, “the fundamental question of every revolution is the question of state power.” [1]1 V. I. Lenin, “The Dual Power” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 38. After the February Revolution, a situation emerged in Russia where the bourgeois Provisional Government and the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies coexisted. The socialist revolution arrived at a completely new historical juncture. Lenin believed that the February Revolution had transferred state power into the hands of the bourgeoisie, and that “the Russian bourgeois revolution or bourgeois-democratic revolution has been completed.” [2]2 V. I. Lenin, “Letters on Tactics” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 43. Communists should immediately push the revolution to a new stage, that is, the stage of the socialist revolution.
在列宁看来,“一切革命的根本问题是国家政权问题”。“二月革命”后,俄国出现资产阶级临时政府与工兵代表苏维埃两个政权并存的局面。社会主义革命来到全新历史关口。列宁认为,“二月革命”使政权转移至资产阶级手中,“俄国资产阶级革命或资产阶级民主革命已经完成了”。共产党人应立刻将革命推向新阶段,即社会主义革命阶段。
Lenin’s proposition of continuing the revolution met with strong opposition from the Constitutional Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist Revolutionary Party, and the Mensheviks at the time, and was not even recognized within the Bolshevik Party itself. Opponents argued that although Russia had completed its bourgeois revolution, its productive forces were relatively backward, large-scale socialized production had not been universally established, small-scale production remained the main component of the social economy, and the development of the proletariat was insufficient; therefore, the conditions for a socialist revolution did not exist. At this time, the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, dominated by the Mensheviks, insisted on handing state power over to the bourgeois government. Their leaders not only failed to enlighten the revolutionary consciousness of the working class but also used bourgeois values and ideology to blur and eliminate the revolutionary consciousness of the workers and peasants. In Lenin’s words: “It entered into direct agreements with the bourgeois Provisional Government, made many actual concessions, and was itself constantly ceding positions to the bourgeoisie.” [3]3 V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 59. Facing the complex situation, at the historical juncture of the Russian socialist revolution, Lenin creatively applied the basic principles of Marxism in light of reality, developed the theory of socialist revolution, and attempted to answer the fundamental questions of socialism with new ideas.
列宁继续革命的主张遭到当时立宪民主党、社会民主党、社会革命党、孟什维克的强烈反对,甚至在布尔什维克内部,也不被认可。反对者认为,俄国虽然完成了资产阶级革命,但生产力相对落后,社会化大生产未普遍建立,小生产仍是社会经济主要成分,无产阶级发展不充分,因而不具备社会主义革命条件。此时,由孟什维克主导的工兵代表苏维埃,坚持主张将政权交给资产阶级政府。它的领袖们不仅不启发工人阶级的革命意识,还用资产阶级的价值与意识形态模糊、消除工农的革命意识。用列宁的话说:“它同资产阶级临时政府达成了直接的协议,作了许多实际的让步,是它自己把阵地不断让给资产阶级的。”面对复杂的形势,在俄国社会主义革命的历史关口,列宁结合实际,创造性地运用马克思主义基本原理,发展了社会主义革命理论,并尝试用新思路回答社会主义基本问题。
First, the direct basis for advancing the socialist revolution was Russia’s crisis and predicament. It was “the famine, the economic dislocation, the impending collapse, the horrors of war, and the painful wounds inflicted on humanity by the war” [4]4 V. I. Lenin, “The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It” (September 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 323. that compelled the proletarian party to take steps. The situation of dual power coexistence meant that society was actually in a state of anarchy. The imperialist war could not be ended, the domestic economic crisis was difficult to overcome, and the people lacked bread and peace. From May to July 1917, Lenin published numerous articles condemning the inaction of the bourgeois Provisional Government in ending the war and dealing with the economic crisis. They colluded with imperialist capitalists, constantly undermining the economy, causing the people to suffer, while they themselves used the war to amass wealth and make huge profits. Lenin pointed out: “The deeper the crisis caused by economic disruption and war, the more necessary it is to have the most perfect political form.” [5]5 V. I. Lenin, “The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It” (September 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 324. Realizing a perfect political form and healing the wounds caused by war and crisis required the people’s own organizational construction, “and not relying solely on a bunch of bourgeois politicians and officials occupying ‘fat jobs’.” [6]6 V. I. Lenin, “The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It” (September 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 325.
第一,推进社会主义革命的直接依据,是俄国的危机与困境。将无产阶级组织起来,推进社会主义革命,“是饥荒,经济失调,即将临头的崩溃,战争的惨祸,以及战争给人类带来的惨痛的创伤”,迫使无产阶级政党采取步骤。两个政权并存的局面,使社会实际处于无政府状态。帝国主义战争无法终止,国内经济危机难以克服,人民缺少面包与和平。1917年5—7月,列宁发表大量文章,谴责资产阶级临时政府在终止战争和应对经济危机时的不作为。他们勾结帝国主义资本家,不断破坏经济,人民饱受苦难,自己却利用战争攫取财富,大发横财。列宁指出:“经济破坏和战争造成的危机愈深,就愈需要最完善的政治形式。”实现完善的政治形式,抹平战争和危机带来的创伤,需要人民自己的组织建设,“而不是专靠一批资产阶级政客和占据‘肥缺’的官吏去做”。
Second, from the perspective of the level of development of productive forces, Russia did not possess the conditions for implementing socialism at that time; Lenin acknowledged this. He repeatedly emphasized the argument in Point 8 of the April Theses: “Our immediate task is not to ‘introduce’ socialism, but only to immediately place the production and distribution of society’s products under the control of the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies.” [7]7 V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution” (The April Theses) (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 24. As for what specific measures should be taken after the revolution, Lenin’s principle was: “The Commune, i.e., the Soviets of Workers’ and Peasants’ Deputies, did not ‘introduce’, did not intend to ‘introduce’, and should not ‘introduce’ any reforms that were not absolutely mature in economic reality and in the consciousness of the vast majority of the people.” [8]8 V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 68. In the crisis, the incompetence and limitations of the bourgeois Provisional Government itself had been fully revealed, while “workers, soldiers, and peasants would be more capable than officials and police in dealing with practical difficulties such as increasing food production, improving food distribution, and improving soldiers’ provisions.” [9]9 V. I. Lenin, “Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?” (September 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 105. Lenin was deeply convinced: “The Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies can unleash the initiative of the masses faster and better than a parliamentary republic.” [10]10 V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 67. The Soviets, as an already formed form of proletarian state power, did not actually hold state power. Therefore, seizing state power from the bourgeoisie and advancing the socialist revolution became the premise for Russia’s march towards socialism, “this is a step towards socialism.” [11]11 V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 69.
第二,从生产力发展水平看,俄国当时不具备实施社会主义的条件,这一点列宁是承认的。他反复强调《四月提纲》第8条的论述:“我们的直接任务并不是‘实施’社会主义,而只是立刻过渡到由工人代表苏维埃监督社会的产品生产和分配。”至于革命后应采取哪些具体措施,列宁的原则是:“凡是在经济现实中和在绝大多数人民的意识中还没有绝对成熟的改革,公社即工农代表苏维埃都没有‘实施’,也不打算‘实施’,而且也不应当‘实施’。”在危机中,资产阶级临时政府自身的无能与局限已充分显现,而“工人、士兵和农民在处理增加粮食生产、改善粮食分配、改善士兵给养等等实际困难问题上,会比官吏和警察高明”。列宁深信:“工兵代表苏维埃会比议会制共和国更快更好地发挥人民群众的主动性。”苏维埃作为已经形成的、无产阶级政权形式,却不实际掌握政权。那么,从资产阶级手中夺取政权,推进社会主义革命,就成为俄国走向社会主义的前提,“这是走向社会主义的一个步骤”。
Third, in Lenin’s view, the main factor hindering the Russian socialist revolution was not the insufficient development of the proletariat, but rather “the insufficient level of consciousness and organization of the proletarians and peasants.” [12]12 V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 64. First, workers and peasants still harbored illusions about the bourgeois Provisional Government, failing to see that “it is an oligarchic, bourgeois government, not a government of the entire people; it will not give the people peace, bread, or full freedom,” [13]13 V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 63. so the revolutionary will of the proletarians and peasants was not yet firm. Second, the proletariat, especially the broad masses of peasants, had not yet been effectively organized. Lenin emphasized: “We do not advocate seizure of power by a minority; we are Marxists; we advocate the class struggle of the proletariat against petty-bourgeois fanaticism, against chauvinism-defencism, against phrasemongering, against reliance on the bourgeoisie.” [14]14 V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 72. Facing the unfavorable factors of the revolution, Lenin hoped that the communist party of the proletariat would completely separate itself from the petty bourgeoisie in the revolution, “to throw off the timidity of these petty bourgeois and carry out the class struggle of the proletariat.” [15]15 V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 73. At the same time, as social class contradictions intensified day by day, the people would increasingly shed their illusions about the bourgeoisie. At this point, if the communist party “unites to carry out the work proper to the proletarian class, more and more proletarians and poor peasants will come over to our side.” [16]16 V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 74.
第三,在列宁看来,阻碍俄国社会主义革命的主要因素不是无产阶级发展不充分,而是“无产者和农民的觉悟和组织程度不够”。一是工人和农民对资产阶级临时政府仍然抱有幻想,没有看到“它是寡头的、资产阶级的政府,不是全体人民的政府,它不会给人民和平、面包和充分的自由”,所以无产者和农民的革命意志尚不坚定。二是无产阶级特别是广大农民尚未有效地组织起来。列宁强调:“我们不主张由少数人夺权,我们是马克思主义者,我们主张用无产阶级的阶级斗争来反对小资产阶级的狂热,反对沙文主义—护国主义,反对空谈,反对依赖资产阶级。”面对革命的不利因素,列宁希望无产阶级的共产主义政党在革命中与小资产阶级彻底分离,“摆脱这些小资产者的畏缩心理,进行无产阶级的阶级斗争”。同时,随着社会阶级矛盾日益加剧,人民也会日益摆脱对资产阶级的幻想。此时,共产党“要团结起来进行无产阶级本阶级的工作,无产者和贫苦农民就会愈来愈多地转到我们方面来”。
In summary, Lenin used the Marxist view of class to analyze the special situation of dual power coexistence in Russia before the October Revolution; based on the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the workers and peasants, he elucidated the realistic basis for the Russian socialist revolution; according to historical materialism, he arrived at the scientific judgment that the socialist revolution was the premise for Russia’s march towards socialism, but was not equivalent to socialism itself; and he specifically proposed the revolutionary strategy of the communists in response to the difficulties facing the revolution. Guided by Lenin’s thought of continuing the revolution, the October Revolution ultimately broke out and quickly achieved victory, establishing the world’s first socialist state and worker-peasant government, turning socialism from theory into reality.
总之,列宁以马克思主义的阶级观,分析了十月革命前俄国两个政权并存的特殊局面;立足资产阶级与工农的矛盾,阐发俄国社会主义革命的现实依据;根据唯物史观,得出社会主义革命是俄国走向社会主义的前提,但不等同于社会主义的科学论断;对革命面临的困难,针对性地提出了共产党人的革命策略。在列宁继续革命思想的引领下,十月革命最终爆发,并迅速取得胜利,建立了世界上第一个社会主义国家和工农政权,使社会主义从理论变成现实。
II. Developing Production to Construct the Socialist Economic Base
二、发展生产建构社会主义经济基础
After the victory of the October Revolution, Soviet Russian society entered an important period of transition. In March 1918, under the leadership of Lenin and the Bolsheviks, Soviet Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany, extricating itself from the imperialist war, winning a precious period of peace for socialist construction, and shifting the focus of work from revolution to socialist construction. However, from the very beginning, socialist construction in Soviet Russia faced an extremely complex situation.
十月革命胜利后,苏俄社会进入重要转折时期。1918年3月,在列宁和布尔什维克的主导下,苏俄与德国签订布列斯特和约,摆脱了帝国主义战争,为社会主义建设赢得宝贵和平时期,并将工作重心从革命转向社会主义建设。但是,苏俄社会主义建设一开始就面临极为复杂的局面。
In the spring and summer of 1918, foreign armed intervention and civil war broke out. Large swathes of Soviet Russia were occupied by Germany, the United States, Britain, and France. Domestic counter-revolutionary forces took the opportunity to launch rebellions, and the workers’ and peasants’ government was in crisis. Thereafter, the situation of the struggle constantly changed. Soviet Russia fought valiantly on all fronts and won a decisive victory in the civil war. In January 1920, the imperialists were forced to lift the blockade, and Soviet Russia once again gained an opportunity for peaceful development. But in late April 1920, the Polish landlords’ and bourgeoisie’s army, supported by the imperialists, launched a war. At the same time, Wrangel’s White Guard forces in Crimea launched a new offensive; the flames of war were rekindled, and socialist construction was again forced to be interrupted. Having experienced four years of imperialist war, the Soviet Russian economy was severely devastated. Socialist construction, begun under extremely difficult conditions, was an undertaking without precedent. At the same time, Soviet Russia’s socio-economic composition was complex; feudal economic relations and capitalist economic relations still existed, and scattered small-scale production remained the main mode of social production. Therefore, Soviet Russian socialist construction could neither find answers in the classical theories of scientific socialism nor rely on any available practical experience.
1918年春夏之交,外国武装干涉和国内战争爆发。苏俄大片国土被德、美、英、法侵占。国内反革命势力乘机发动叛乱,工农政权处在危机中。此后,斗争形势不断变化。苏俄在各条战线上奋勇斗争,取得国内战争决定性胜利。1920年1月,帝国主义被迫解除封锁,苏俄再次获得和平发展机会。但1920年4月下旬,波兰地主和资产阶级军队在帝国主义支持下发动战争。同时,克里木的弗兰格尔白卫军发动新的进攻,战火重新点燃,社会主义建设再次被迫中断。经历了四年帝国主义战争,苏俄经济严重破坏。在极端困难的条件下开启的社会主义建设,是前无古人的事业。同时,苏俄社会经济成分复杂,封建主义经济关系和资本主义经济关系依然存在,分散的小生产仍然是主要社会生产方式。所以,苏俄社会主义建设既不能在科学社会主义经典理论中寻找答案,也没有可供参考的现实经验。
The extremely complex situation contained two intertwined problems: first, how, under conditions of extreme economic hardship, to cope with imperialist armed intervention, win the civil war, and consolidate the workers’ and peasants’ government; second, how, on the old economic base, to establish new economic relations and construct the socialist economic base. In Lenin’s view, “these two aspects of the task of carrying out the socialist transformation are inseparable.” [17]17 V. I. Lenin, “Report on the Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government,” April 29, 1918. [18] Ibid. [19] V. I. Lenin, “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government,” April 1918. [20] Ibid. [21] V. I. Lenin, “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government,” April 1918. [22] The “surplus appropriation system” (prodrazvyorstka) was a policy of compulsory grain requisitioning from peasants at fixed prices, often with little or no compensation, implemented by the Soviet government during the Civil War. [23] V. I. Lenin, “Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.),” March 1919. [24] Ibid. [25] Ibid. [26] The concession system (kontsessiya) allowed foreign capitalists to lease and operate certain state-owned enterprises under Soviet control, as a means of attracting foreign capital and technology. [27] The tax in kind (prodnalog) replaced the surplus appropriation system, allowing peasants to keep a portion of their surplus after paying a fixed tax, thus providing an incentive for production. [28] V. I. Lenin, “The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments,” October 17, 1921. Moreover, the second task was more important, more arduous, and more urgent than the first: “If we fail to accomplish the second task, then any achievement, any victory in the cause of overthrowing the exploiters and fighting the international imperialists with armed force will come to naught, and the restoration of the old system will be inevitable.” [18]18 V. I. Lenin, “Report on the Tax in Kind,” Collected Works, vol. 32, p. 215. (All citations in this paragraph are from Lenin’s works of 1921.) From this it can be seen that Lenin had already recognized that establishing new economic relations, constructing the socialist economic base, and achieving the development of the productive forces were the keys to Soviet Russia’s advance toward socialism. He pointed out: “The deepest source of the strength needed to defeat the bourgeoisie, the only guarantee that this victory will be unshakeable, can only be a new, higher mode of social production, only the replacement of capitalist and petty-bourgeois production by large-scale socialist production.” [19]19 The surplus appropriation system (prodrazvyorstka) was a policy of War Communism (1918-1921) requiring peasants to surrender all surplus grain to the state at fixed prices. Of course, establishing new economic relations was more difficult than consolidating political power. “Because solving this task can by no means rely on heroic spirit displayed in a single moment, but requires the most persistent, most tenacious, and most rare heroic spirit displayed in a vast amount of daily work.” [20]20 V. I. Lenin, “The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments,” Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 62. In other words, faced with the complex economic reality of Soviet Russia, establishing new economic relations could not be accomplished overnight; it required continuous summarization and exploration in long-term practice to find the correct path to achieve this goal.
极端复杂的局面蕴含着两个相互交织的问题:一是如何在经济极端困难的情况下,应对帝国主义武装干涉,取得国内战争胜利,巩固工农政权;二是如何在旧的经济基础上,建立新的经济关系,建构社会主义经济基础。在列宁看来,“实现社会主义变革任务的这两个方面是分不开的”。而且,第二个任务比第一个任务更重要、更艰巨、更迫切,“如果我们完不成第二个任务,那么在推翻剥削者和用武力来抗击国际帝国主义者的事业中的任何成就、任何胜利就会付诸东流,旧制度的复辟就会不可避免”。由此可见,列宁已经认识到,建立新的经济关系,建构社会主义经济基础,实现生产力发展,是苏俄走向社会主义的关键。他指出:“战胜资产阶级所需力量的最深源泉,这种胜利牢不可破的唯一保证,只能是新的更高的社会生产方式,只能是用社会主义的大生产代替资本主义的和小资产阶级的生产。”当然,建立新的经济关系比巩固政权更加困难。“因为解决这个任务决不能靠一时表现出来的英勇气概,而需要在大量的日常工作中表现出来的最持久、最顽强、最难得的英勇精神。”换言之,面对苏俄复杂的经济现实,建立新的经济关系不能一蹴而就,需要在长期实践中不断总结探索实现这一目标的正确途径。
In practice, Lenin both advocated using political power to rapidly adjust economic relations, directly carrying out socialist transformation of economic relations through the state apparatus, and at the same time acknowledged that the transition to new economic relations was a long process requiring a gradual approach, gradually realizing the transition from small-scale production to socialist socialized large-scale production. If one were to “adopt hasty and rash administrative and legislative measures, this would only delay this transition and create difficulties for it.” [21]21 V. I. Lenin, “The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments,” Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 63. On the surface, the two lines of thought were diametrically opposed, but both had profound roots in reality. Using political power and the state apparatus to directly transform economic relations was for the sake of defending political power; hence, in policy, a series of extraordinary measures later called “War Communism” were adopted, mobilizing all human and material resources to defend the state. Grain monopoly was implemented through the “surplus appropriation system”; [22]22 V. I. Lenin, “The Tax in Kind,” Collected Works, vol. 32, p. 333. through the nationalization of enterprises, the abolition of money, and the prohibition of free trade, centralized production and distribution of materials were achieved to sustain the survival of the Red Army, urban workers, and Party and government personnel; through implementing the distribution principle of “he who does not work, neither shall he eat,” labor was militarized and made compulsory to promote social production. But it is worth noting that when the war situation tended to ease, Lenin was more inclined to use a gradual approach to establish new economic relations. Lenin pointed out that the economic base of the Russian petty bourgeoisie was mainly the middle peasants: “Only by recognizing this reality and elucidating the nature of petty commodity production can we correctly resolve issues such as the attitude toward the middle peasants.” [23]23 Ibid., p. 334. “To think of using some quick method, issuing an order from outside, from the side, to force it to transform is completely absurd.” [24]24 Ibid., p. 335. On the contrary, it was necessary to “overcome their backwardness by methods of ideological influence and by no means by methods of suppression.” [25]25 V. I. Lenin, “The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments,” Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 65. Thereafter, when peace was expected to arrive, Lenin’s attitude toward old economic relations began to change. He believed that capitalist economic relations such as the concession system [26]26 V. I. Lenin, “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government,” Collected Works, vol. 27, p. 245. had a positive role in restoring the economy, and even proposed that the capital of the bourgeoisie should be utilized to help Soviet Russia’s economic development. On the agricultural question, the compulsory measures in the grain monopoly increasingly aroused peasant discontent. After learning about the peasants’ demands and sentiments, Lenin began to consider adjusting agricultural policy and clearly proposed replacing the surplus appropriation system with a tax in kind. [27]27 V. I. Lenin, “The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments,” Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 66.
在实践中,列宁既主张过利用政权迅速调整经济关系,通过国家机器直接对经济关系进行社会主义改造,同时也承认,向新的经济关系过渡是一个漫长的过程,需要渐进的方式,逐步实现小生产向社会主义社会化大生产过渡。如果“采用急躁轻率的行政手段和立法手段,只会延缓这种过渡,给这种过渡造成困难”。表面上,两种思路截然对立,但背后都有深刻的现实根源。利用政权和国家机器直接改造经济关系是为了保卫政权,因而在政策上采取后来称为“战时共产主义”的一系列非常措施,调动一切人力、物力保卫国家。通过“余粮征集制”实行粮食垄断;通过企业国有化,取消货币,禁止自由贸易,实现物资集中生产与分配,以维持红军、城市工人和党政机关人员的生存;通过贯彻“不劳动、不得食”的分配原则,使劳动军事化、义务化,促进社会生产。但值得注意的是,当战局趋于缓和时,列宁更主张用渐进的方式建立新的经济关系。列宁指出,俄国小资产阶级的经济基础主要是中农,“只有承认这种现实,阐明小商品经济的性质,才能正确解决诸如对中农的态度问题”。“要想用某种快速的办法,下个命令从外面、从旁边去强迫它改造,那是完全荒谬的。”相反,要“用思想影响的办法而决不用镇压的办法来克服他们的落后性”。此后,在预期和平即将到来时,列宁对旧经济关系的态度开始转变,认为租让制等资本主义经济关系对恢复经济有积极作用,甚至提出应利用资产阶级的资本来帮助苏俄经济发展。在农业问题上,粮食垄断中的强制性措施日益引起农民的不满。在了解到农民的要求和情绪后,列宁开始考虑调整农业政策,并明确提出用粮食税代替余粮征集制。
In summary, from the victory of the October Revolution to the convening of the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in March 1921, Lenin’s understanding of socialism began to undergo a transformation. He clearly proposed that the Party’s focus of work should shift from revolution to construction, and that only by developing social production could the socialist economic base be constructed. But the political situation was unstable, and the struggle to consolidate political power lasted for three years. He was clear that Soviet Russia did not yet possess the conditions for implementing socialism, but in order to defend political power, he had no choice but to use the state apparatus to directly carry out socialist transformation of economic relations. After the war situation became clear, Lenin once again returned to gradual socialist construction, emphasizing that the proletarian state should utilize old relations of production to build the socialist economic base, and that only economic development could consolidate political power.
总之,从十月革命胜利后到1921年3月俄共(布)十大召开前,列宁对社会主义的认识开始转型。他明确提出党的工作重心要从革命转向建设,发展社会生产才能建构社会主义的经济基础。但政局不稳,巩固政权的斗争持续了三年。他清楚苏俄尚不具备实施社会主义的条件,但为了保卫政权,不得不利用国家机器直接对经济关系进行社会主义改造。在战争局势明朗后,列宁再次回到渐进式的社会主义建设,强调无产阶级政权应利用旧生产关系建设社会主义的经济基础,只有经济发展才能巩固政权。
III. Restoring the Market: A Circuitous Transition to Socialism
三、恢复市场向社会主义迂回过渡
In November 1920, Soviet Russia achieved total victory in the civil war, but the domestic economy was severely devastated, materials were extremely scarce, development was almost at a standstill, and social contradictions became acute once again. The surplus appropriation system was not terminated in time; the peasants obtained land but did not get the fruits of their own labor, and thus became intensely dissatisfied with the Bolsheviks. After the war, severe shortages of industrial raw materials and fuel led to the stoppage of the textile industry; almost all blast furnaces were extinguished, unable to produce steel and iron, which could only be sustained by existing stocks. To cope with the war, a large number of workers had joined the army and gone to the front, leading to a shortage not only of raw materials but also of manpower in the transport and industrial sectors. Finally, faced with comprehensive shortages, the state finances could only be sustained by issuing large quantities of currency, leading to a sharp depreciation of the ruble, the collapse of the unified monetary system, with many regions printing their own banknotes, forcing the state to adopt a system of payment in kind. Furthermore, in 1920, Soviet Russia suffered a historically rare drought, exacerbating the economic crisis. Large-scale famine appeared across the country, and the people’s basic material livelihood could not be guaranteed.
1920年11月,苏俄在国内战争中取得全面胜利,但国内经济已严重破坏,物资极为匮乏,发展几乎停滞,社会矛盾重新激烈起来。余粮征集制没有及时终止,农民获得土地,却得不到自己生产的果实,于是对布尔什维克强烈不满。战后工业原料和燃料严重短缺,导致纺织业停顿,几乎所有高炉熄火,无法生产钢铁,只能靠存货维持。为应对战争,大量工人参军到前线,导致交通运输和工业部门不仅缺原料,还缺人手。最后,面对全面短缺,国家财政只能靠大量发行货币维持,导致卢布大幅贬值,统一货币体系崩溃,许多地区自行印刷纸币,国家不得不实行实物工资制。此外,1920年,苏俄遭遇历史罕见的旱灾,加剧了经济危机。全国出现大面积饥荒,人民基本物质生活无法保障。
The severe economic crisis brought about intense social upheaval. The peasants’ discontent rapidly spread among idle workers and soldiers who could not be demobilized, eventually evolving into peasant uprisings, worker revolts, and soldier mutinies. These events greatly shocked the Bolsheviks and represented the most dangerous political and economic crisis since the establishment of Soviet power. Lenin engaged in profound reflection after the crisis and admitted mistakes. He pointed out that in a country like Soviet Russia, which was economically and culturally backward, “a direct transition to purely socialist forms and purely socialist distribution is beyond our strength.” [28]28 Dual power refers to the period between the February Revolution and the October Revolution of 1917, when the Provisional Government and the Soviets (councils) of workers’ and soldiers’ deputies coexisted as competing centers of authority. To extricate itself from the predicament, in March 1921, the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) convened its Tenth Congress, terminated the policy of War Communism, and made a series of adjustments to economic policy in order to restore social production and promote economic recovery. These adjustments were explicitly termed the “New Economic Policy” at the All-Russian Conference of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) held in May of the same year.
严重的经济危机带来剧烈的社会动荡。农民的不满情绪在赋闲的工人和无法复员的军人中迅速蔓延,最终演变为农民起义、工人暴动、士兵叛乱。这些事件极大地震撼了布尔什维克,是苏维埃政权建立以来最危险的政治经济危机。列宁在危机后进行深刻反思,并承认错误。他指出:在苏俄这样经济文化落后的国家,“向纯社会主义形式和纯社会主义分配直接过渡,是我们力所不及的”。为摆脱困境,1921年3月,俄共(布)召开十大,终止战时共产主义政策,并对经济政策做一系列调整,以恢复社会生产,促进经济复苏。这些调整在同年5月召开的俄共(布)十大全国会议上被明确称为“新经济政策”。
The essence of the New Economic Policy was to use the restoration of the market economy as a means of making concessions to the economic interests of the broad peasantry, small producers, and private traders, with the aim of mobilizing initiative, rapidly restoring social production, and reviving the economy. Faced with severely damaged productive forces, “it was necessary to take the swiftest, most resolute, and most urgent measures to improve the living conditions of the peasants and raise their productive forces.” [18]18 V. I. Lenin, “Report on the Tax in Kind,” Collected Works, vol. 32, p. 215. (All citations in this paragraph are from Lenin’s works of 1921.) “To increase grain production and harvests, and to increase the procurement and transport of fuel, it was imperative to improve the living conditions of the peasants and raise their productive forces.” Fully accommodating the interests of the peasants and effectively improving their lives required changing grain policy. “The most urgent task was to adopt measures that could immediately raise the peasants’ economic productive forces.” “This change consisted of replacing the surplus appropriation system [19]19 The surplus appropriation system (prodrazvyorstka) was a policy of War Communism (1918-1921) requiring peasants to surrender all surplus grain to the state at fixed prices. with a tax in kind.” Besides restoring grain production, Lenin also stressed the need to rapidly restore small-scale industry and small-scale production. Given the severe destruction of the domestic economy, it was impossible to immediately restore large-scale, state-run socialist production; therefore, “it was necessary to help restore small-scale industry to a certain extent, because it required no machinery, no state or large-scale reserves of raw materials, fuel, or grain, yet could immediately provide considerable help to the peasant economy and raise its productive forces.” To mobilize the initiative of small producers, it was necessary to accommodate their interests. Consequently, the Council of People’s Commissars ultimately revoked the Supreme Council of the National Economy’s decision to nationalize enterprises employing more than five workers. Small and medium-sized enterprises were no longer managed according to an administrative structure; instead, they adopted independent economic accounting, used monetary payments, freely disposed of their products and income, and assumed sole responsibility for their profits and losses. Through this reform, two-thirds of enterprises in Soviet Russia were no longer managed by the central authorities. When enterprises shed the administrative management model and became autonomous, self-financing entities, the initiative of small producers and small-scale industry was greatly mobilized, and social production, especially small-scale production, was rapidly restored. With surplus grain in the hands of peasants, coupled with goods produced by small-scale industry and small enterprises, the demand for commodity exchange and free trade inevitably arose—this was the inevitable result of implementing the New Economic Policy. Lenin initially opposed market activities such as commodity buying and selling and free trade, considering them capitalist economic activities illegal under the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, at that time Soviet Russia simply did not have enough industrial products to exchange with peasants for surplus grain. Therefore, it was impossible to eliminate commodity buying and selling through comprehensive product exchange. Especially after the implementation of the tax in kind and the encouragement of restoring small-scale production, the restoration of the market economy was an inevitable outcome. It was in this sense that Lenin regarded the New Economic Policy as a reform focused on the interests of the people, a kind of concession, “a concession we made to the peasant as a trader, that is, a concession to the principle of private buying and selling.” [20]20 V. I. Lenin, “The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments,” Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 62.
新经济政策的实质是以恢复市场经济为手段,对广大农民、小生产者、私商经济利益的让步,目的是调动积极性,迅速恢复社会生产,复苏经济。面对严重破坏的生产力,“必须立刻采取迅速的、最坚决的、最紧急的办法来改善农民的生活状况和提高他们的生产力”。“要增加粮食的生产和收成,增加燃料的收购和运输,非得改善农民的生活状况,提高他们的生产力不可。”充分照顾农民利益,切实改善他们生活,就必须改变粮食政策。“现在最迫切的就是采取那种能够立刻提高农民经济生产力的办法。”“这种改变就是用粮食税来代替余粮收集制。”除了恢复粮食生产,列宁还强调要将小工业、小生产迅速恢复起来。在国内经济严重破坏的情况下,不可能立刻恢复大规模的、国营的社会主义生产,所以“在一定程度上帮助恢复小工业是必要的,因为它不需要机器,不需要国家的和大批的原料、燃料和粮食的储备,却能够立刻给农民经济以相当帮助并提高其生产力”。为调动小生产者的积极性,就得照顾小生产者的利益。所以,人民委员会最终撤销了最高国民经济委员会关于超过5名工人的企业实行国有化的决定。中小企业不再按照行政架构实行管理,而是采取独立经济核算,使用货币支付,自由支配产品和收入,自负盈亏。通过改革,苏俄2/3的企业不再由中央管理,企业褪去行政管理模式,变为自主经营、自负盈亏时,小生产和小工业的积极性极大地调动起来,社会生产特别是小生产得到迅速恢复。农民手中有了余粮,加上小工业、小企业生产的物资,必然引起商品交换和自由买卖的需求,这是实施新经济政策的必然结果。列宁起初反对商品买卖、自由贸易等市场行为,认为它们是资本主义的经济活动,在无产阶级专政下是非法的。但是,当时的苏俄根本没有足够的工业产品向农民换取余粮。因此,不可能用全面产品交换消灭商品买卖。特别是在实行粮食税,鼓励恢复小生产后,市场经济恢复起来是必然结果。正是这个意义上,列宁认为新经济政策是着眼于人民利益的改革,是一种让步,是“我们向作为商人的农民作了让步,即向私人买卖的原则作了让步”。
In the practice of implementing the New Economic Policy, Lenin’s understanding of socialist economic relations changed. He acknowledged: “The attempt to introduce the principles of socialist production and distribution in the simplest, swiftest, and most direct way has failed.” [21]21 V. I. Lenin, “The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments,” Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 63. Given the situation in 1921, a direct transition to socialism, an immediate completion of socialist transformation, and the establishment of socialist economic relations were unrealistic. Since the direct path was impassable, only a roundabout path could be relied upon. By adjusting economic policy, allowing private buying and selling, and restoring market principles, “the petty bourgeoisie and capitalism will inevitably revive on the basis of a certain (even if only local) freedom of trade.” [22]22 V. I. Lenin, “The Tax in Kind,” Collected Works, vol. 32, p. 333. Lenin believed this outcome was unavoidable; therefore, “instead of trying to prohibit or block the development of capitalism, we should strive to channel this development into the track of state capitalism.” [23]23 Ibid., p. 334. He worked to make state capitalism “serve as an intermediate link between small-scale production and socialism, as a means, a path, a method of raising the productive forces.” [24]24 Ibid., p. 335. At this point, Lenin’s understanding of using state capitalism to transition to a socialist economy had already taken shape. The crux of the issue lay in how to combine the worker-peasant state power with capitalism, making it a proletarian state capitalism, or, in other words, how to combine the socialist system with the principles of the market economy. Lenin believed that the task of the proletarian state power was not to eliminate free trade, commodity buying and selling, and the market mechanism, but to become the supervisor and manager of the market. He pointed out, “At that time, the question of our economy’s relationship to the market, to commerce, was not even raised,” [25]25 V. I. Lenin, “The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments,” Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 65. while “now our task is not so much to expropriate the expropriators as to calculate, supervise, raise labor productivity, and strengthen discipline.” [26]26 V. I. Lenin, “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government,” Collected Works, vol. 27, p. 245. Through the practice of the New Economic Policy, Lenin saw the value of this combination more clearly. He stated: “We have now discovered the appropriate degree of combination of private interest, i.e., the interest of private buying and selling, with the state’s inspection and supervision of this interest, the appropriate degree of subordination of private interest to the common interest, which was the stumbling block for many socialists in the past.” [27]27 V. I. Lenin, “The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments,” Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 66. Lenin believed that although this combination was not socialism, it laid a solid foundation for building socialism.
在实施新经济政策的实践中,列宁对社会主义经济关系的认识转变了。他承认:“用最简单、迅速、直接的办法来实行社会主义的生产和分配原则的尝试已告失败。”根据1921年的形势,向社会主义直接过渡,立刻完成社会主义改造,建立社会主义经济关系是不现实的。直接的办法走不通,就只能依靠迂回的办法。通过调整经济政策,允许私人买卖,恢复市场原则,“小资产阶级和资本主义就会在一定的(即使只是地方性的)贸易自由基础上复活”。列宁认为,这种结果是不可避免的,因此,“不去试图禁止或堵塞资本主义的发展,而努力把这一发展纳入国家资本主义的轨道”。努力使国家资本主义“作为小生产和社会主义之间的中间环节,作为提高生产力的手段、途径、方式和方法”。此时,列宁关于利用国家资本主义向社会主义经济过渡的认识已经形成。问题的关键在于,如何将工农政权和资本主义结合起来,使之成为无产阶级的国家资本主义,或者说,如何将社会主义制度与市场经济的原则结合起来。列宁认为,无产阶级政权的任务不是要消灭自由贸易、商品买卖和市场机制,而是应成为市场的监督者和管理者。他指出,“当时根本没有提出我们的经济同市场、同商业的关系问题”,而“现在我们的任务,与其说是剥夺剥夺者,不如说是计算、监督、提高劳动生产率和加强纪律”。经过新经济政策的实践,列宁更加清楚地看到了这种结合的价值。他指出:“现在我们发现了私人利益即私人买卖的利益与国家对这种利益的检查监督相结合的合适程度,发现了私人利益服从共同利益的合适程度,而这是过去许许多多社会主义者碰到的绊脚石。”列宁认为,这种结合虽然不是社会主义,但为建成社会主义打下坚实基础。
IV. Summary and Reflections
四、总结与思考
Lenin’s development and transformation in his understanding of socialism occurred during a period of radical social change in Soviet Russia. Strictly speaking, although Soviet Russia had initiated socialist construction, apart from the worker-peasant state power, there was almost no socialist foundation in the economic sphere. During this period of radical change, how should the Russian socialist revolution be viewed? What path of socialism should be chosen? Regarding these fundamental questions of socialism, Lenin’s understanding was constantly developing and changing. At different stages, some understandings even exhibited contradictions and conflicts. This creates difficulties for a scientific understanding of Lenin’s socialist thought. Therefore, it is very necessary to clarify the logical process of Lenin’s understanding of socialism.
列宁对社会主义认识的发展与转变,发生在苏俄社会急剧变革的时期。严格地说,苏俄虽然开启了社会主义建设,但除了工农政权之外,在经济方面几乎没有社会主义的基础。在急剧变革的时期,如何看待俄国的社会主义革命?应该选择什么样的社会主义道路?对上述社会主义基本问题,列宁的认识是不断发展变化的。甚至在不同阶段,一些认识存在对立和冲突。这对科学理解列宁的社会主义思想造成困难。因此,厘清列宁认识社会主义的逻辑进程就十分必要。
First, in answering the fundamental questions of socialism, Lenin consistently adhered to the principle of understanding based on reality. Lenin advocated continuing the revolution, transforming the bourgeois revolution into a socialist revolution. The basis for this argument was the situation of dual power [28]28 Dual power refers to the period between the February Revolution and the October Revolution of 1917, when the Provisional Government and the Soviets (councils) of workers’ and soldiers’ deputies coexisted as competing centers of authority. and the resulting state of anarchy. At that time, economic development was stagnant, the interests of the people were neglected, and the bourgeois government would certainly not fulfill its promises of achieving peace and giving the people bread. The acute class contradictions in Russian society determined that the socialist revolution was the condition for restarting social development. After seizing state power, Lenin proposed shifting the focus of work to socialist construction as quickly as possible. This was because the fundamental task of socialism was to eliminate classes. To eliminate classes, it was fundamentally necessary to develop the productive forces and eliminate the economic base that gives rise to classes. During the Civil War, defending state power and the Soviet Republic was the overriding task. The policy of War Communism was “forced upon us by war and economic ruin.” [29]29 V. I. Lenin, “Report on the Tax in Kind,” Collected Works, vol. 32, p. 218. After restoring peace and embarking on socialist construction, Lenin recognized that the backwardness of productive forces in Soviet Russia was the root cause of the more urgent and difficult tasks of socialist construction. After the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), [30]30 The Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), held in March 1921, formally adopted the New Economic Policy, replacing War Communism. Soviet Russia replaced War Communism with the New Economic Policy, using the market economy and state capitalism to make a roundabout transition to socialism. The realistic basis for this was still the reality of Soviet Russia’s economic and cultural backwardness. In short, practical problems were the logical starting point for Lenin’s answers to the fundamental questions of socialism. As he himself said: “The time has passed when arguments about socialism were based on books… Today we can only talk about socialism based on experience.” [31]31 V. I. Lenin, “Speech at the First All-Russian Congress of Councils of the National Economy,” Collected Works, vol. 27, p. 411.
第一,列宁在回答社会主义基本问题时,始终坚持以现实为依据的认识原则。列宁主张继续推进革命,变资产阶级革命为社会主义革命。其立论依据,是两个政权并存的局面,以及由此造成的无政府状态。此时,经济发展停滞,人民利益无人关切,资产阶级政府更不会兑现实现和平、给人民面包的承诺。俄国社会激烈的阶级矛盾决定了社会主义革命是重启社会发展的条件。在夺取政权后,列宁提出将工作重心尽快转向社会主义建设。因为,社会主义的根本任务是要消灭阶级。要消灭阶级,在根本上是通过发展生产力,消灭产生阶级的经济基础。在国内战争期间,保卫政权和苏维埃共和国是压倒一切的任务。战时共产主义政策,是“战争和经济破坏迫使我们实行的”。在恢复和平,开启社会主义建设后,列宁认识到,苏俄生产力发展落后,是社会主义建设更加紧迫、更加困难的根源。俄共(布)十大后,苏俄用新经济政策代替战时共产主义,利用市场经济和国家资本主义向社会主义迂回过渡,其现实依据仍是苏俄经济文化落后的现实。总之,现实问题是列宁回答社会主义基本问题的逻辑起点。正如他所说:“根据书本争论社会主义纲领的时代也已经过去了,……今天只能根据经验来谈论社会主义。”
Second, taking reality as the logical starting point means that when problems and tasks change, ideological understanding inevitably develops accordingly. Therefore, in terms of ideological understanding, the emergence of situations of opposition and mutual negation between earlier and later positions is entirely logical. But this does not mean that there is no internal logical relationship between changing ideological understandings. On the contrary, grounded in the national conditions of Russia’s economic and cultural backwardness, Lenin’s understanding of the basic questions of socialism was logically consistent. First, the bourgeois revolution created a de facto anarchic situation, class contradictions became increasingly acute, and the vacillation and compromise of the petty bourgeoisie made it inevitable for Russia to move toward socialist revolution. Second, the purpose of the proletariat’s seizure of political power through socialist revolution is to abolish classes. Therefore, socialist revolution in economically and culturally backward countries does not equate to the construction or implementation of socialism, but rather to the establishment of the political foundation for new economic relations. Communists need to further utilize political power and the state apparatus to liberate the productive forces, achieve economic development, and create the conditions for the final abolition of classes. Finally, in the practice of promoting economic development and liberating the productive forces, due to the relatively low level of development of the productive forces, old economic relations cannot be artificially abolished. Hence, the task of the worker-peasant political power is not to eliminate old economic relations by administrative and command methods, but to bring old economic relations under the supervision, calculation, management, and organization of state power, making them factors that promote the development of a socialist economy and intermediate links in the transition to socialism.
第二,以现实为逻辑起点就意味着,当问题和任务变化时,思想认识必然随之发展。因此,在思想认识上,出现前后对立、相互否定的情况是完全合乎逻辑的。但这并不意味着,处在变化中的思想认识之间没有内在逻辑关系。相反,立足于俄国经济文化落后的国情,列宁对社会主义基本问题的认识在逻辑上是一贯的。首先,由资产阶级革命造成了实际上的无政府局面,阶级矛盾日益激烈,小资产阶级的摇摆与妥协,使俄国走向社会主义革命成为必然。其次,无产阶级通过社会主义革命掌握政权的目的是为了消灭阶级。所以,经济文化落后国家的社会主义革命不等于建成或实施社会主义,而是建立新的经济关系的政治基础。共产党人需要进一步利用政权和国家机器,解放生产力,实现经济发展,为最终消灭阶级创造条件。最后,在促进经济发展、解放生产力的实践中,由于较低的生产力发展水平,旧的经济关系不可能被人为地取消。所以,工农政权的任务不是用行政和命令的手段消灭旧的经济关系,而是要将旧的经济关系纳入国家政权的监督、计算、管理和组织中,使其成为促进社会主义经济发展的因素,成为向社会主义过渡的中间环节。
Third, so-called logic is judgment under given premises. Lenin’s understanding of the basic questions of socialism was premised on the national conditions of Soviet Russia’s economic and cultural backwardness. The premises of the classical Marxist writers’ understanding, however, differed from Lenin’s; they considered the basic questions of socialism under the premise of the full development of capitalism. Therefore, when the premise of understanding changes, conclusions different from those of the classical Marxist writers inevitably emerge. It is in this sense that Lenin innovated and developed classical scientific socialist theory. This innovation and development are mainly reflected in two aspects: First, on the question of socialist revolution, it is entirely possible for economically and culturally backward countries to achieve victory in socialist revolution independently, before the advanced capitalist countries. This is because revolution is not only the natural result of the development of the productive forces, but also the inevitable product of acute class contradictions and intense class struggle. Second, on the question of socialist construction, the main task of communists who have already seized political power is not to further expropriate the expropriators, nor can they directly abolish old economic relations by relying on the power of the regime. On the contrary, communists must learn to utilize the market economy, explore effective ways to combine the market economy with socialism, liberate the productive forces, and lay the economic foundation for the genuine realization of socialism. Of course, Lenin’s understanding still had limitations. He always believed that the market economy was a capitalist economic relation and did not belong to the category of socialism. This understanding could cause ideological confusion, leading to the contradiction that the market economy and socialism are incompatible. Therefore, this was also the ideological and cognitive root cause of the eventual forced termination of the New Economic Policy. [32]32 The New Economic Policy (NEP) was a policy introduced by Lenin in 1921 that temporarily permitted limited market mechanisms and private enterprise in Soviet Russia, replacing the more radical War Communism. It was gradually abandoned by Stalin in the late 1920s.
第三,所谓逻辑,是一定前提下的判断,列宁关于社会主义基本问题的认识,是以苏俄经济文化落后的国情为前提的。而马克思主义经典作家的认识前提与列宁不同,他们是在资本主义充分发展的前提下,思考社会主义基本问题的。因此,当认识前提变了,必然会得出不同于马克思主义经典作家的结论。正是在这个意义上,列宁创新和发展了经典科学社会主义理论。这种创新与发展主要体现在两个方面:一是在社会主义革命问题上,经济文化落后国家先于发达资本主义国家,单独取得社会主义革命胜利是完全可能的。因为革命不仅是生产力发展的自然结果,更是阶级矛盾尖锐和阶级斗争激烈的必然产物。二是在社会主义建设问题上,已夺取政权的共产党人,其主要任务不是进一步剥夺剥夺者,更不能靠政权力量直接取消旧的经济关系,相反,共产党人要学会利用市场经济,探索市场经济和社会主义相结合的有效途径,解放生产力,为真正实现社会主义,打下经济基础。当然,列宁的认识仍有局限。他始终认为市场经济是资本主义的经济关系,不属于社会主义范畴。这种认识会引起思想困惑,导致市场经济与社会主义不相容的矛盾。所以,这也是新经济政策最终被迫终止的思想认识根源。
(The author is Deputy Director and Associate Professor of the Institute of Basic Principles and Classical Works of Marxism, School of Marxism, Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC [National Academy of Governance].)
(作者为中央党校[国家行政学院]马克思主义学院马克思主义基本原理与经典著作研究所副所长、副教授)
Online editor: Tongxin
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Notes
- V. I. Lenin, “The Dual Power” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 38. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “Letters on Tactics” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 43. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 59. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It” (September 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 323. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It” (September 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 324. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It” (September 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 325. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution” (The April Theses) (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 24. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 68. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?” (September 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 105. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 67. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 69. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 64. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 63. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 72. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 73. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution” (April 1917), *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 74. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “Report on the Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government,” April 29, 1918. [18] Ibid. [19] V. I. Lenin, “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government,” April 1918. [20] Ibid. [21] V. I. Lenin, “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government,” April 1918. [22] The “surplus appropriation system” (prodrazvyorstka) was a policy of compulsory grain requisitioning from peasants at fixed prices, often with little or no compensation, implemented by the Soviet government during the Civil War. [23] V. I. Lenin, “Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.),” March 1919. [24] Ibid. [25] Ibid. [26] The concession system (kontsessiya) allowed foreign capitalists to lease and operate certain state-owned enterprises under Soviet control, as a means of attracting foreign capital and technology. [27] The tax in kind (prodnalog) replaced the surplus appropriation system, allowing peasants to keep a portion of their surplus after paying a fixed tax, thus providing an incentive for production. [28] V. I. Lenin, “The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments,” October 17, 1921. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “Report on the Tax in Kind,” Collected Works, vol. 32, p. 215. (All citations in this paragraph are from Lenin’s works of 1921.) ↩
- The surplus appropriation system (prodrazvyorstka) was a policy of War Communism (1918-1921) requiring peasants to surrender all surplus grain to the state at fixed prices. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments,” Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 62. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments,” Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 63. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “The Tax in Kind,” Collected Works, vol. 32, p. 333. ↩
- Ibid., p. 334. ↩
- Ibid., p. 335. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments,” Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 65. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government,” Collected Works, vol. 27, p. 245. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments,” Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 66. ↩
- Dual power refers to the period between the February Revolution and the October Revolution of 1917, when the Provisional Government and the Soviets (councils) of workers’ and soldiers’ deputies coexisted as competing centers of authority. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “Report on the Tax in Kind,” Collected Works, vol. 32, p. 218. ↩
- The Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), held in March 1921, formally adopted the New Economic Policy, replacing War Communism. ↩
- V. I. Lenin, “Speech at the First All-Russian Congress of Councils of the National Economy,” Collected Works, vol. 27, p. 411. ↩
- The New Economic Policy (NEP) was a policy introduced by Lenin in 1921 that temporarily permitted limited market mechanisms and private enterprise in Soviet Russia, replacing the more radical War Communism. It was gradually abandoned by Stalin in the late 1920s. ↩