A Critique of George G. Brenkert’s Ethical Interpretation of Marx’s Thought on Freedom

The contemporary American ethicist George G. Brenkert not only takes “freedom” as the core concept and fundamental value running through the entirety of Marx’s thought, but also excavates the ethical resources contained in Marx’s thought on freedom from the dimension of ethics, striving to construct a “Marxist ethics of freedom.” However, once this is done, the first question that must be addressed is: does Marx actually have an ethics? If the answer is affirmative, the further question that needs to be answered is: how should one view the relationship between historical materialism and ethics? What kind of ethics is Marx’s ethics? Following this line of thought, Brenkert, on the one hand, clarifies the relationship between Marx’s historical materialism and ethics, and on the other hand, explains that Marx possesses an ethics based on “freedom”; the former regards historical materialism as the methodology of “Marx’s meta-ethics,” while the latter regards “freedom” as “that virtue” on which Marx bases his argument, possessing normative significance. In his view, the two together constitute Marx’s unique ethical thought.

美国当代伦理学家乔治·布伦克特（George G.Brenkert）不仅把“自由”作为贯通马克思思想整体的核心观念和基本价值，而且从伦理学的维度挖掘马克思的自由思想所蕴含的伦理资源，力图建构一种“马克思的自由伦理学”。然而，一旦这样做，首先需要回应的质疑就是：马克思究竟有没有伦理学？假如答案是肯定的，需要进一步回答的问题是：如何看待历史唯物主义与伦理学的关系？马克思的伦理学是一种什么样的伦理学？循此思路，布伦克特一方面辨明了马克思的历史唯物主义与伦理学的关系，另一方面阐释了马克思拥有基于“自由”的伦理学；前者视历史唯物主义为“马克思的元伦理学”方法论，后者则视“自由”为马克思据以立论的“那个美德”，具有规范的意义。在他看来，二者共同构成了马克思独特的伦理学思想。

I. Historical Materialism as the Meta-Ethical Methodology of Marx

一、作为马克思的元伦理学方法论的历史唯物主义

Regarding ethics, Brenkert accepts the general distinction made by contemporary Western scholars, holding that ethics is not merely normative ethics which provides normative content; meta-ethics is also a necessary component, capable of providing foundational reflection and rational justification for the moral presuppositions of normative ethics. It is precisely in terms of meta-ethics that Brenkert, contrary to the view commonly held by technological determinists that historical materialism is incompatible with ethics, points out that historical materialism is not an obstacle to Marx’s ethics. By reinterpreting historical materialism, he refutes the widespread misunderstandings related to technological determinism, making historical materialism the methodological premise for Marx’s correction of previous ethics’ “persistent fall into moralism, abstraction, and otherworldliness.”

关于伦理学，布伦克特接受当代西方学者的一般界分，认为伦理学不仅仅是提供规范性内容的规范伦理学，元伦理学也是其必要的组成部分，可以为规范伦理学的道德预设提供前提性反思和合理性证明。正是就元伦理学而言，布伦克特一反技术决定论者通常认为历史唯物主义与伦理学不兼容的观点，指出历史唯物主义不是马克思伦理学的障碍，并通过对历史唯物主义的重新阐释驳斥了广为流行的技术决定论式的相关误解，使历史唯物主义成为马克思对以往的伦理学“持续陷入道德主义、抽象性和彼岸性”进行纠偏的方法论前提。

Brenkert analyzes that, within the framework of technological determinism, the essence of historical materialism lies in the explanatory priority of the decisive role of material productive forces on the basic structure of society and social development. Here, “productive forces,” composed of the means of production and labor power, include neither superstructural factors such as ethics, morality, and legal obligations, nor human beings themselves with their value orientations and interest demands; the people involved are merely labor capacity quantifiable as value in general and reified into labor products. Therefore, through this “decisive role” on the basic structure of society, such productive forces exclude the proper agency of human beings as subjective forces in historical development and abstract away the specific actions of individuals and the specific factors contained in the superstructure. Problems of determinism and even fatalism thus arise, leaving no place for ethics and morality. Under this traditional mode of understanding, historical materialism and ethics are clearly incompatible.

布伦克特分析道，在技术决定论的框架下，历史唯物主义的要义在于，物质生产力对社会基本结构和社会发展的决定性作用具有解释的优先性。其中，由生产资料和劳动力构成的“生产力”，既不包括伦理道德、法权义务等上层建筑因素，也不包括拥有价值取向、利益诉求的人本身，其所涉及的人只是可量化为价值一般、物化为劳动产品的劳动能力。因此，通过对社会基本结构的“决定性作用”，这种生产力排除了人作为历史发展中的主体性力量的应有担当，并抽象化了个人的具体行为和上层建筑所包含的具体因素。决定论乃至宿命论的问题由此产生，导致伦理道德无处安放。在这种传统的理解模式下，历史唯物主义与伦理道德显然是无法相容的。

In response to this misunderstanding, Brenkert begins his refutation by examining “productive forces” from Marx’s perspective. He first points out that, in Marx’s exposition, the extension of productive forces “includes not only tools, machines, labor power, knowledge, skills, and raw materials, but also revolutionary classes, communities, science, and the division of labor itself,” as well as “the mode of common activity, the collective (productive) force created by cooperation, state power and population growth,” “common economic and social knowledge, capital,” etc. Although these factors cannot form a new strict definition of Marx’s concept of “productive forces,” they at least indicate that the mechanical dichotomy between productive forces and relations of production by technological determinists belongs to a conceptualized abstract understanding, far removed from Marx’s relevant discussions based on concrete reality, because in reality, productive forces and relations of production necessarily interpenetrate each other, jointly constituting components of production.

针对这种误解，布伦克特从马克思视野中的“生产力”入手展开辩驳。他首先指出，在马克思的论述中，构成生产力外延的“不仅包括工具、机器、劳动力、知识、技能和原材料，而且包括革命阶级、共同体、科学和分工本身”，以及“共同活动的方式、协作创造的集体（生产）力、国家权力和人口的增长”、“共同的经济、社会知识、资本”等。这些因素虽然无法形成对马克思“生产力”概念的一种新的严格界定，但至少可以表明，技术决定论者对生产力与生产关系的机械二分属于概念化的抽象理解，与马克思基于具体实际的相关论述相去甚远，因为现实中的生产力与生产关系必然是相互渗透的，它们共同构成了生产的组成部分。

Since this broad “productive forces,” interpenetrating with relations of production, is closer to Marx’s understanding, then compared with the narrow “productive forces” of the aforementioned technological determinist type, “the mode of production, including both productive forces and relations of production,” is more consistent with the positioning of “the explanatory basis of historical materialism.” Brenkert further emphasizes that the rationality of attributing explanatory priority to the mode of production also lies in the fact that the mode of production compensates for the fundamental contradiction driving social and historical development—the dialectical contradiction between productive forces and relations of production—which cannot be formed by productive forces alone. History has proven that in the dialectical contradictory movement of social development, productive forces are not always the primary factor driving the historical process; innovation in relations of production can also promote historical progress under conditions where productive forces are relatively lagging.

既然这种与生产关系相互渗透的广义“生产力”更贴近马克思的理解，那么与上述技术决定论式的狭义“生产力”相比，“包括生产力与生产关系在内的生产方式”也就更符合“历史唯物主义的解释性基础（explanatory basis）”这一定位了。布伦克特进一步强调，将解释的优先性归于生产方式的合理性还在于，生产方式弥补了仅凭生产力无法形成的推动社会历史发展的根本矛盾——生产力与生产关系的辩证矛盾。历史已经证明，在社会发展的辩证矛盾运动中，生产力并非始终是推动历史进程的首要因素，生产关系的革新也有可能在生产力相对滞后的情况下推动历史进步。

Moreover, considering the connotation of productive forces alone, whether broad or narrow, the element of labor power is indispensable. Because only with the input of labor power can material instruments of labor and objects of labor be transformed into actual productive forces. And since labor power includes a person’s physical strength, intelligence, knowledge, skills, etc., it is impossible to exclude the “moral and value structure” possessed by the laborer as a holistic living being, as well as the judgment, willpower, control, guidance, and expressive abilities formed under its influence, because they also play a role in the production process that cannot be ignored. Therefore, the elements of productive forces participating in the production process not only have a material aspect, but the non-material characteristics of laborers, such as morality and value orientation, are also necessary components of productive forces. The two are closely linked, enabling productive forces to function in reality.

而且，仅就生产力的内涵而言，无论是广义的还是狭义的生产力，劳动力要素都是不可或缺的。因为，只有投入劳动力，物质性的劳动工具和劳动对象才能转化成为现实的生产力。而既然劳动力包含了一个人的体力、智力、知识、技能等，那么也就无法把劳动者作为整体性生命存在所拥有的“道德和价值结构”以及在其影响下形成的判断力、意志力、控制力、引导力和表现力等排除在外，因为它们同样在生产过程中发挥着不容忽视的作用。因此，参与生产过程的生产力要素不仅有着物质性的一面，而且劳动者的道德、价值取向等非物质特性也是生产力的必要构成，两者紧密相连，才可能使生产力在现实中发挥作用。

At this point, through his reinterpretation of the extension and connotation of “productive forces,” Brenkert has secured a place for values within the explanatory basis of historical materialism, and historical materialism has thus released space for the existence of ethics. However, his intention in doing so is not to replace the values of ideology in the traditionally understood “superstructure” with these values that function within the “base,” but rather to emphasize, on the basis of defending the fundamental principles of historical materialism, the decisive role of the mode of production as a methodological premise running through it, and to defend the legitimacy of ethics, especially Marx’s ethics, by analyzing the distinction and connection between these two types of values.

至此，布伦克特通过对“生产力”的外延与内涵的重新释读，使价值在历史唯物主义的解释性基础中占据了一席之地，历史唯物主义也因此向伦理学释放了存在的空间。但是，他此举并非想要用这些在“基础”中发挥作用的价值来替代传统理解的“上层建筑”中意识形态的价值，而是试图在捍卫历史唯物主义基本原理的基础上强调把生产方式所具有的决定性作用作为贯穿其中的方法论前提，并通过剖析这两类价值的区别与联系来为伦理学、特别是马克思伦理学的正当性进行辩护。

First, according to Brenkert’s distinction, the values that function within the explanatory basis of historical materialism are those values that people hold and practice in their actual lives; “they constitute people’s social existence.” In contrast, the values in the superstructure are those institutionalized values that exist in social consciousness. The latter depend on the former in general because the former, as components of the mode of production, are directly driven to change by their own internal forces and other elements of the mode of production; while the dominant values in the latter are, in the final analysis, externally determined by social existence. It can be seen that what Brenkert insists on is precisely the methodological premise established by historical materialism through “affirming the foundational influential role of the mode of production in society.”

首先，按照布伦克特的区分，在历史唯物主义的解释性基础中发挥作用的价值是人们在实际生活中所持有和践行的那些价值，“它们构成了人的社会存在”；相比之下，上层建筑中的价值则是存在于社会意识中的那些被制度化的价值。后者之所以在总体上取决于前者，是因为前者作为生产方式的组成部分，是受自身内在力量及生产方式的其他要素的直接驱动发生变化的；而在后者中占主导地位的价值，归根结底是由社会存在外在地决定的。可以看出，布伦克特所坚持的，正是由历史唯物主义通过“认定生产方式在社会中具有基础性的影响作用”所奠定的方法论前提。

Secondly, in response to the misunderstanding of “technological determinism,” Brenkert makes two key points. (1) The “determining role in the last instance” of the mode of production does not refer to its sole, eternal, or conspicuous determining effect, but rather a determining effect that is faint yet does not hinder its continuous and foundational nature. (2) In the view of historical materialism, this determining effect is not an objective necessity completely external to human beings, but is “related to the influence and dominance that production activities, relations, and values have in people’s lives”; it “originates from the social relations presented by human activities and values,” and is “a determinacy brought about by human actions and the activities they create.” Therefore, in Marx’s view, historical necessity and subjective agency are not inherently contradictory or mutually exclusive. On the contrary, “Marx believed that communism would inevitably come because he believed that, under the current circumstances, people’s desires and needs would cause people to truly rise up against the existing order.”

其次，针对“技术决定论”的误解，布伦克特着重作出两点回应。（1）生产方式“归根结底的决定作用”不是指其唯一的、永恒的、显著的决定性，而是一种若隐若现却无碍于其持续性、基础性的决定作用。（2）在历史唯物主义看来，这种决定作用并非完全外在于人的客观必然性，而是“与生产活动、关系和价值在人们生活中所具有的影响和支配作用相关”，它“源于人类活动和价值所呈现的社会关系”，是“由人类行为及其活动创造所带来的决定性”。因而在马克思那里，历史必然性与主体能动性并非天然矛盾、相互排斥的关系，相反，“马克思相信共产主义必将到来，是因为他相信，在当前的情势下，人们的欲求和需要会使人真正地奋起反抗现存秩序”。

It is precisely under this methodological premise that Brenkert, by distinguishing between ethics based on two moral concepts—deontological ethics and virtue ethics—further responds to the question of whether Marx had an ethics, resolving the paradox in Marx’s thought that both rejects and criticizes morality while also containing moral critique. In Brenkert’s view, the assertion that Marx had no ethics is debatable. For, if one speaks of deontological ethics, it can indeed be said that Marx had no ethics. Toward the ethics of his time, Marx criticized that traditional ethics and moral outlook which “alienates itself from the deep concerns of daily life” and “directly leads to its own formalization in laws and regulations” and to “reform under the existing system”—particularly represented by deontological ethics, which is based on concepts such as rights, duties, justice, and guilt, and which points to the moral imperatives and behavioral norms that concrete actions with a sense of moral responsibility ought to follow. Thus, if deontological ethics is regarded as the mainstream or even the entirety of ethics, one would indeed conclude that Marx had no ethics. But in fact, this argument is untenable, because Marx’s lack of deontological ethics does not mean he lacked meta-ethics and virtue ethics.

正是在这一方法论前提下，布伦克特通过区分基于两种道德概念的伦理学——义务论伦理学与美德伦理学——进一步回应了关于马克思有无伦理学的质疑，解决了马克思思想中既拒斥和批判道德又蕴含道德批判的悖论。在布伦克特看来，那些认为马克思没有伦理学的论断是值得商榷的。因为，如果就义务论伦理学而言，的确可以说马克思没有伦理学。对他那个时代的伦理学，马克思批判了那种“疏离于日常生活的深层关切”而“直接导向其自身在法律法规中的形式化”和“现存制度下的改良”的传统伦理学和道德观——尤以基于权利、义务、正义、罪责等概念并指向具有道德责任感的具体行为应该遵循的道德律令和行为规范的义务论伦理学为代表。因而，如果把义务论伦理学视为伦理学的主流甚至全部，那的确会做出马克思没有伦理学的论断。但事实上，这个立论是站不住脚的，因为马克思没有义务论伦理学，并不意味着他就没有元伦理学和美德伦理学。

The meta-ethics of Marx as interpreted by Brenkert means that Marx did not recognize those transcendental, abstract, and universally applicable moral or ethical standards, but instead emphasized that morality and ethics must be understood within specific historical and economic structures, particularly grasped within specific modes of production—that is, “the moral standards peculiar to a given mode of production are justified through that mode of production.” [1]1 George G. Brenkert, *Marx’s Ethics of Freedom* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 82. He argues that Marx engaged in ethical inquiry throughout his life: “For example, he explored the relationship between morality and moral principles and their historical and material environment; he analyzed and criticized egoism, utilitarianism, bourgeois rights and freedom, fraternity, and other similar concepts.” [2]2 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, in *Marx/Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 6 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 506. Brenkert refers to these explorations by Marx as Marx’s meta-ethical inquiries: “This is equivalent to an examination of Marx’s meta-ethics, that is, an examination of his methodological thought concerning the nature of morality and moral justification.” [3]3 A phrase from Chapter 17 of the *Zhuangzi*, “Autumn Floods,” expressing a state of naturalness and self-sufficiency without conscious awareness of external authority.

布伦克特所阐释的马克思的元伦理学是指，马克思不认可那种先验的、抽象的、具有普适性的道德准则或伦理准则，而是强调道德、伦理必须放到特定的历史和经济结构去理解，特别是要在特定的生产方式中把握，即“某一特定的生产方式所特有的那些道德标准是通过这种生产方式得到证明的”。他认为，马克思毕生都在参与伦理学探讨，“例如，他探讨了道德和道德原则与其历史和物质环境之间的关系；他分析和批判了利己主义、功利主义、资产阶级的权利和自由以及博爱等其他类似的观念”。布伦克特把马克思的这些探讨称为马克思的元伦理学探讨：“这相当于是对马克思的元伦理学的考察，即对其涉及道德本质和道德正当性的方法论思想的考察。”

Brenkert believes that Marx’s rejection and critique of the deontological ethics of his time was not intended to construct a new deontological ethics, nor to reform deontological ethics in the spirit of historical materialism. In his view, Marx did indeed point out a developmental path for contemporary ethics, but what operates in Marx’s thought is not deontological ethics but virtue ethics. Virtue ethics aims to cultivate moral character or personality traits “associated with certain virtues, excellences of character, or rich ways of life.” [4]4 Soviet Marxist ethics refers to the official ethical theory developed in the Soviet Union, centered on the concept of “communist morality,” which was formulated as a set of norms and principles serving the construction of communism. Under the safeguard of Marx’s meta-ethics, it no longer, like deontological ethics, evades reality, appeals to an otherworldly realm, falls into the rut of traditional ethics’ universalism and rationalism, and degenerates into illusory, abstract, and ineffective moral preaching; instead, it can directly confront the real conditions of actual people, further penetrate into the level of social systems and social structures to inquire into the essence of human beings, question why human life has come to be as it is, and resort to the practice of changing the world.

布伦克特认为，马克思拒斥和批判他那个时代的义务论伦理学，并不是想要建构一种新的义务论伦理学，或者以历史唯物主义精神去改造义务论伦理学。在他看来，马克思的确为当代伦理学指出了一条发展路径，但在马克思的思想中发挥作用的并非义务论伦理学，而是美德伦理学。美德伦理学旨在培养“与某些美德、卓越的品质或丰富的生活方式相关联”的品德或性格特征，而在马克思的元伦理学的保驾护航下，它不再像义务论伦理学那样回避现实，诉求于彼岸，陷入传统伦理学的普遍主义和理性主义的窠臼，沦为虚幻、抽象、无效的道德说教；而是能够直面现实的人的真实境况，进而深入到社会制度、社会结构的层面追问人的本质，叩问人的生活状态何以至此，并诉诸改变世界的实践。

In summary, Marx’s meta-ethics can clarify the premises and lay the methodological foundation for the existence of his virtue ethics, and Brenkert thereby describes Marx’s ethics as a broad moral outlook that “unifies daily concerns with moral concerns.” [5]5 George G. Brenkert, *Marx’s Ethics of Freedom*, p. 7. Of course, to complete an effective construction of Marx’s ethics, one must also find some fundamental value that runs through the entire development of Marx’s thought. To this end, Brenkert found what he considers to have normative significance: “freedom.”

综上所述，马克思的元伦理学可以为其美德伦理学的存在廓清前提、奠定方法论基础，布伦克特也借此把马克思的伦理学描述为“将日常关切与道德关怀统一起来”的广义道德观。当然，要想完成对马克思的伦理学的有效构建，还必须寻找某种能够贯穿马克思思想发展始终的基本价值。为此，布伦克特找到了他认为具有规范性意义的“自由”。

II. “Freedom” as the Value of Marx’s Virtue Ethics

二、作为马克思美德伦理价值的“自由”

Brenkert states directly: “Marx’s ethics is an ethics of freedom.” [6]6 Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997), a liberal political philosopher, known for his distinction between negative and positive liberty, which he used to critique Marxist conceptions of freedom. He argues that Marx’s critique of capitalism is based on freedom, not on other values. This argument touches upon the then-hotly debated academic controversy over “whether Marx criticized capitalism as unjust based on justice.” In this debate, Brenkert clearly sides with Allen Wood, arguing that Marx did not criticize capitalist society as unjust. Because, in his view, “freedom” and “justice” exhibit a certain “asymmetry” in Marx; that is, according to the value distinction mentioned above, freedom, which contains an ontological dimension, belongs to the basic values practiced in the social base, while justice belongs to the values of the superstructure that are ideological, institutionalized, and subordinate to social production. [7]7 Allen W. Wood (b. 1942), an American philosopher known for his interpretation of Marx’s thought, particularly his argument that Marx did not base his critique of capitalism on a theory of justice. However, although Brenkert agrees that Marx did not criticize capitalism based on justice, he does not agree with Wood’s view that Marx criticized capitalism based on non-moral goods such as freedom, self-realization, and community. He points out that Wood’s practice of lumping freedom together with non-moral goods like self-realization and community is unremarkable and lacks differentiation, and it is even more inappropriate to regard the freedom Marx pursued as a non-moral good. [8]8 Ibid., p. 15.

布伦克特直言：“马克思的伦理学是一种自由的伦理学。”他认为，马克思对资本主义的批判是基于自由，而非其他价值。这一立论涉及当时学界热议的“马克思是否基于正义批判资本主义为不正义”的争论。在这一争论中，布伦克特明确地站在艾伦·伍德（Allen Wood）一边，认为马克思并没有批判资本主义社会不正义。因为，在他看来，“自由”与“正义”在马克思那里表现出某种“不对称性”，也就是说，按照上文提及的价值区分，包含本体论维度的自由属于社会基础中被践行的基本价值，而正义则属于上层建筑中作为意识形态的、被制度化的、从属于社会生产的价值。不过，布伦克特虽然认可马克思不是基于正义批判资本主义，但他并不认可伍德认为马克思是基于自由、自我实现和共同体等非道德的善批判资本主义的观点。他指出，伍德把自由与自我实现、共同体等非道德的善相提并论的做法乏善可陈、缺乏辨析，把马克思追求的自由视为非道德的善更是不妥。

Moreover, Brenkert also argues that it is untenable to regard values such as equality, human dignity, or interests based on utilitarian considerations as the grounds for Marx’s critique of capitalist society. He points out that among the many values, only “freedom” can bear the heavy responsibility of running through the entirety of Marx’s thought, becoming the more fundamental and more inclusive “cardinal virtue,” [9]9 Ibid., p. 22. and therefore “becomes a moral concept that can be clearly discerned throughout all of Marx’s writings.” [10]10 Ibid., p. 22. To this end, on the basis of interpreting Marx’s meta-ethics, he purposefully and emphatically offers a new interpretation of the normative content of Marx’s thought on freedom: “What does Marx mean by freedom? Most succinctly, freedom means that a person can live in such a way that, in common relationship with others, they can fundamentally determine the concrete totality including desires, abilities, and talents, which constitutes a person’s self-objectification. … Marx’s conception of freedom has three distinct yet interrelated aspects: (a) self-determination requires the realization of self-objectification through one’s desires, abilities, and talents; (b) a person’s self-objectification must be a concrete self-objectification involving others and nature; (c) self-determination is possible only in a harmonious common relationship with others. In short, for Marx, freedom is a special type of self-determination.” [11]11 Ibid., pp. 23-24. Through Brenkert’s specific analysis, these three aspects successively highlight the following three major characteristics of Marx’s thought on freedom.

不仅如此，布伦克特还认为，把平等、人的尊严抑或基于功利主义考量的利益等价值视为马克思批判资本主义社会的理据，是难以成立的。他指出，在众多价值中，只有“自由”可以担当起贯穿马克思思想整体的重任，成为更基础、也更具包容性的“那个最重要的美德”（the cardinal virtue），因此也“成为一个在马克思的全部著作中都可以得到明辨的道德概念”。为此，他在阐释马克思的元伦理学的基础上有的放矢且浓墨重彩地对马克思自由思想的规范性内涵做出了新的阐释：“马克思眼中的自由指什么？最简明扼要地说，自由是指一个人能够如此生活，即，在与他人的共同关系中能从根本上决定包括欲望、能力和天赋的具体的总体，它们构成了一个人的自我对象化。……马克思的自由观有三个截然不同却又相互关联的方面：（a）自我决定要求通过一个人的欲望、能力和天赋实现自我对象化；（b）一个人的自我对象化必定是一种涉及他人和自然的具体的自我对象化；（c）只有在与他人和谐的共同关系中，自我决定才是可能的。简言之，自由对于马克思而言就是一种特殊类型的自我决定。”通过布伦克特的具体分析，这三个方面依次凸显出马克思自由思想的如下三大特征。

First, as a form of self-determination, the particularity of Marx’s concept of freedom lies first in its possession of both normative and ontological significance; it is a process of self-creation accomplished through “creating new conditions and forms of life for oneself” [12]12 Ibid., p. 24. and through the active realization and full development of a person’s “desires, abilities, and talents,” [13]13 Ibid., p. 24. pointing both to the ontological mode of existence and state of life that life ought to realize, and also to the “basic virtues by which people ought to live,” [14]14 Ibid., p. 25. concretely constituted by a complex set of dispositions and character traits.

其一，作为一种自我决定，马克思的自由概念的特殊性首先在于它兼具规范性意义和本体论意义于一身，是一种通过“为自己创造新的条件和生活形式”以及通过对人的“欲望、能力和天赋”的积极实现和充分发展而完成的自我创造过程，既指向生活应该实现的本体论意义上的存在方式和生存状态，同时也指向由一系列复杂的气质和性格特征具体构成的“人应该赖以生存的基本美德”。

In response to the interpretation of Marx’s view of freedom by Bertell Ollman, Eugene Kamenka, and others through the theory of “self-realization,” Brenkert focuses on analyzing the inadequacy of the “self-realization” theory in interpreting Marx’s view of freedom, and how “self-determination” can avoid this situation and provide a more effective explanation. He points out that the “self-realization” theory often either understands Marx’s freedom in an empirical, descriptive sense, excluding its moral connotations; or unrealistically demands the full development of all of an individual’s abilities and talents, leading to merely formal moral obligations and responsibilities, and excluding the satisfaction of natural desires. In contrast, Marx’s “self-determined freedom” is based on the methodology of historical materialism, requiring the development of the self as a whole within reasonable limits, thereby avoiding the unrealistic fantasies and delusions into which the normative implications of the “self-realization” theory fall.

针对伯特尔·奥尔曼（Bertell Ollman）和尤金·卡门卡（Eugene Kamenka）等人以“自我实现”论诠释马克思的自由观，布伦克特着力分析了“自我实现”论在诠释马克思的自由观时的无能为力，以及“自我决定”何以能够避免此种情况，并作出更有效的阐释。他指出，“自我实现”论往往要么从经验性、描述性的意义上理解马克思的自由，并将其道德内涵排除在外；要么不切实际地要求充分发展个人的一切能力、天赋，从而导致徒有形式的道德义务、道德责任，并把对自然欲望的满足排除在外。相反，马克思的“自我决定的自由”基于历史唯物主义的方法论，要求在合理的限度内发展作为整体的自我，从而能够避免像“自我实现”论的规范性意涵那样陷入脱离实际的虚幻妄想。

Brenkert writes on this point: “Marx’s view does not require, as (at least) some theories of self-realization claim, that all of a person’s powers and talents be realized without exception. Marx did not make such a romantic and exaggerated understanding. Consequently, his view of freedom escapes the problems that the theory of self-realization often falls into but finds difficult to overcome. Nor does Marx’s thought imply that we inherently contain two different selves, one false and one ideal, and that only the latter should be realized.” “The problems common in the ethics of self-realization theory are not problems for Marx,” and people will not question that the “self-realization” of free persons as understood by Marx “might come at the expense of others.” As a subversion of the traditional view of freedom in speculative philosophy, the freedom in Marx’s eyes, because it belongs to a “practical problem” that can only be “resolved in a practical way,” is essentially different from Kantian transcendental freedom or freedom of the will, which seeks to break free from all determination and specific conditions.

布伦克特就此写道：“马克思的观点并不像（至少是）某些自我实现论所主张的那样，要求一个人的所有力量和天赋一概得到实现。马克思并没有做出这种浪漫而夸张的理解。因而，他的自由观摆脱了自我实现论常常陷入却又难以克服的问题。马克思的思想也不意味着我们内在地包含两种不同的自我，一种是虚假的，一种是理想的，而只有后者才是我们应该予以实现的。”“自我实现论的伦理学中普遍存在的问题对于马克思而言不是问题”，人们不会置疑马克思所理解的自由人的“自我实现可能以牺牲他人为代价”。作为对思辨哲学的传统自由观的颠覆，马克思眼中的自由因其属于只能“以实践的方式来解决”的“实践问题”，而在本质上有别于摆脱决定性和特定条件束缚的康德式的先验自由或意志自由。

Second, Brenkert believes that Marx’s thought on freedom should be grasped through the idea of “self-objectification.” He emphasizes that to achieve freedom in Marx’s vision, “the process of human self-objectification cannot merely treat others and nature as means, or as irrelevant, abstract objects of human will. On the contrary, humans must live in concrete social relations with others and nature.” This “self-objectification” is achieved under given conditions that incorporate the specific characteristics of “others and nature.” That is to say, freedom in Marx’s vision does not mean completely escaping the “realm of necessity” or taming the objective conditions of nature and society, but rather exercising reasonable control over them. Furthermore, we “must grasp the essence of humans by understanding human relations.” Therefore, he characterizes Marx’s ethics as “an ethics that seeks to grasp the root of things and thereby grasp humans themselves.”

其二，布伦克特认为，应透过“自我对象化”的思想来把握马克思的自由思想。他强调，要实现马克思视野中的自由，“人的自我对象化过程就不能仅仅把他人和自然当作手段，或者作为人的意志的无关紧要的、抽象的对象。相反，人必须生活在与他人和自然的具体的社会关系中”。这种“自我对象化”是在纳入“他人和自然”的具体特性的既定条件下实现的。也就是说，马克思视野中的自由不是要完全摆脱“必然王国”，实现对自然和社会客观条件的驯服，而是对它们的一种合理控制。此外，我们还“必须通过理解人的关系来把握人的本质”。是故，他把马克思的伦理学归结为“一种试图抓住事物根源从而抓住人本身的伦理学”。

This idea indicates that while Marx inherited Hegel’s concept of “objectification,” he also transcended Hegel through Feuerbach’s humanism. Its essence is: “objectification” should not treat things merely as “useful objects,” turning the “pure usefulness” of things into “human utility,” or using others as means to achieve one’s own ends, to possess and dominate “others and nature,” even replacing one’s own powers and qualities with those of the possessed, thereby reducing humans themselves to a thing-like existence; rather, it should, on the one hand, “grasp the aesthetic nature of things and nature,” and on the other hand, through interpersonal interaction, realize the exchange of individuals’ specific qualities and characteristics, enabling humans to recover their true essence “determined by individual characteristics.”

这一思想表明，马克思在继承黑格尔的“对象化”思想的同时，又经由费尔巴哈的人学完成了对黑格尔的超越。其要旨在于：“对象化”不应把物仅仅视为“有用的对象”，使物的“纯粹的有用性”变成“人的效用”，或把他人作为实现自身目的的手段，去占有和支配“他人和自然”，甚至以被占有者的力量和品质代替占有者的力量和品质，由此使人自己沦为像物一样的存在；而是要一方面通过“把握物和自然的审美性质”，另一方面通过人与人的交往，实现个人的具体品质、特征之间的交换，使人恢复由“个人特征决定的”本真本质。

Third, Brenkert emphasizes that Marx’s thought on freedom must be grasped within the context of harmonious relations with others. He believes that the “true community” is a necessary condition for realizing freedom in Marx’s vision, a community that achieves unity while respecting differences, harmonious yet diverse. It overcomes the opposition of “interests” in capitalist society, which is composed of atomized individuals, while also embodying members’ recognition of each other’s potentially different basic needs and desires. “By integrating into others and identifying with others, we may also attain freedom—a higher, more significant form of freedom.”

其三，布伦克特强调，必须在与他人的和谐关系中把握马克思的自由思想。他认为，“真正的共同体”是实现马克思视野中的自由的一个必要条件，是在尊重差异的基础上实现统一的、和而不同的共同体。它既克服了由原子式个人集合而成的资本主义社会的“利益”对立，又饱含着成员之间对彼此可能不同的基本需要和欲望的认同。“通过融入他人、认同他人，我们也可能获得自由——一种更高级、更具重要意义的自由。”

Unlike the two characteristics above, Brenkert here specifically points out the shortcomings of Marx’s understanding of freedom in this way: (1) Identification in reality varies in degree, nature, and scope; it may not avoid distinctions of intimacy and estrangement between people, nor is it solely related to material interests, but Marx did not explicitly address this complexity; (2) Marx was overly optimistic about “eliminating the authoritarian consequences that conflicts of interest might produce,” without fully considering the impact of limited, uncertain knowledge and different expectations and risk assessments; (3) “Marx’s vision of community places excessively high demands on social individuals,” requiring the “elimination of the bourgeois individual’s personality” and the formation of a community composed of individuals with “greater social consciousness and organization”; yet it fails to mention the “sense of guilt or shame” necessary for individual solidarity.

不同于上述两个特征，布伦克特在此特别指出了马克思这样理解自由所存在的不足：（1）现实中的认同存在程度、性质、范围的差异，它可能无法避免人与人之间的亲疏远近之别，也不仅仅与物质利益相关，但马克思对这种复杂性没有明确表态；（2）马克思对于“消除利益冲突可能产生的威权后果”过于乐观，没有充分考虑有限的、不确定的认识以及不同的期望和风险评估可能带来的影响；（3）“马克思的共同体视野对社会性个人的要求过高”，他要求“消灭资产者的个性”，由“更具社会意识和组织性”的个人组成共同体；却未提及个人的团结性所需要的“罪恶感或羞耻感”。

By elaborating on the three dimensions of freedom centered on “self-determination,” Brenkert believes he has relatively comprehensively presented Marx’s ethics of freedom. Regarding Marx’s ethics, Brenkert offers a pertinent overall judgment: “Marx’s ethics is best understood as an approach to solving ethical problems, rather than a set of final answers.” He points out that Marx’s fragmentary discussions of relevant basic concepts, while leaving vast room for interpretation for later generations, may also leave openings for certain vulgarized understandings. In this regard, he specifically discusses the misreading of Marx’s thought on freedom by Isaiah Berlin and others.

通过以“自我决定”为核心展开对自由的三个维度的阐释，布伦克特自认为已较为全面地展现了马克思的自由伦理学。关于马克思的伦理学，布伦克特有一个恰中肯綮的总体判断：“马克思的伦理学最有理由被理解为解决伦理学问题的一个途径，而不是一套最终的答案。”他指出，马克思对相关基本概念只言片语的论述在为后人留下巨大解释空间的同时，也可能为某些庸俗化的理解保留了可乘之隙。于此，他特别谈到以赛亚·伯林（Isaiah Berlin）等人对马克思自由思想的误读。

In 1958, Berlin published his essay “Two Concepts of Liberty,” distinguishing between so-called “negative liberty” and “positive liberty,” and from the standpoint of the classical liberal tradition, expressed concern about the authoritarian threat implicit in positive liberty. Subsequently, Berlin’s distinction between the two concepts of liberty became an unavoidable topic when discussing freedom, and Marx was often categorized as a representative of “positive liberty.” In response, Brenkert, while acknowledging that freedom in Marx’s vision is indeed “social, collective, and positive” human freedom and human emancipation, representing an enrichment and expansion of the bourgeois “political, individual, and negative” freedom, does not accept the practice of applying Berlin’s dichotomy to this comparative perspective, nor does he believe that Berlinian positive liberty can effectively encompass the rich connotations of Marx’s thought on freedom.

1958年，伯林发表《两种自由概念》一文，区分了所谓的“消极自由”与“积极自由”，并站在古典自由主义传统的立场上对积极自由隐含的专制威胁表示担忧。此后，伯林关于两种自由的区分一度成为探讨自由问题时绕不开的一个话题，而马克思也往往被归入“积极自由”代言人的阵营。对此，布伦克特虽然承认马克思视野中的自由的确是“社会的、集体的、积极的”人的自由和人类解放，是对资产阶级“政治的、个人的、消极的”自由的丰富和拓展；但他并不认可用伯林的划分去套用这一对比视角的做法，也不认为伯林式的积极自由能够有效涵盖马克思自由思想的丰富内涵。

Brenkert’s specific rebuttals mainly include: (1) Marx sought to overcome and transcend the various constraints and limitations capitalism imposes on freedom through active social revolutionary practice, thereby striving for emancipation from class oppression and class relations; he “was clearly concerned with both positive and negative liberty, and both are components of his concept of freedom”; (2) Marx’s thought belongs to the objectivist philosophical tradition; for him, there is no distinction between a “true self and an empirical self,” “nor any attempt to impose the former on the latter,” nor does he base his views on his own subjective judgment, “believing that what capitalists truly want is what he believes is best for them”; (3) Berlin’s distinction merely identifies “two different aspects and dimensions” of Marx’s “unified view of freedom,” which is unhelpful for understanding Marx’s view of freedom; in comparison, Gerald MacCallum’s “triadic” conception of freedom is more applicable.

布伦克特的具体反驳主要包括：（1）马克思试图通过积极的社会革命实践去摆脱和克服资本主义对自由的种种制约和限制条件，进而谋求从阶级压迫、阶级关系中获得解放，他“显然既关心积极自由，也关心消极自由，二者都是他的自由概念的组成部分”；（2）马克思的思想属于客观主义的哲学传统，在他那里不存在“真实自我与经验自我”的区分，“也没有试图把前者强加于后者”，更没有以他自己的主观判断为依据，“认为资本家真正想要的，就是他相信对他们而言最好的东西”；（3）伯林区分的只是马克思所持有的“统一的自由观”的“两个不同的方面和面向”，这对于理解马克思的自由观并无裨益，相较而言，杰拉尔德·麦卡勒姆（Gerald MacCallum）的“三位一体”的自由理解反而更适用。

Another significant challenge related to Berlin comes from the value position of pluralism. Berlin points out: “Liberty is liberty, not equality, fairness, justice, culture, nor human happiness or a quiet conscience.” “Liberty is not merely the absence of frustration; to define liberty in this way would expand the meaning of the word until it means too much or nothing at all.” [1]1 George G. Brenkert, *Marx’s Ethics of Freedom* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 82. From this perspective, liberty is merely one value among many that may potentially conflict; so-called “liberty in a broad sense” would not only sacrifice the clarity of the concept of liberty but might also, in the pursuit of “moral consistency,” exclude other values, or “impose a monism of values upon all individuals.” [2]2 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, in *Marx/Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 6 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 506. This is indeed directly opposed to Brenkert’s view that Marx “elevated the value of freedom to the ultimate value of all values.”

与伯林相关的另一个重要质疑来自多元论的价值立场。伯林指出：“自由就是自由，既不是平等、公平、正义、文化，也不是人的幸福或良心的安稳。”“自由并不只是不存在任何一种挫折；这样定义自由将扩张这个词的意义以致它含义太多或含义全无。”由此看来，自由只是诸多可能存在冲突的价值中的一种，所谓“广义的自由”不仅会牺牲自由概念的清晰性，而且可能在追求“道德一致性”的过程中排斥其他价值，或“将一种价值一元论强加于所有个人”。这的确是与布伦克特认为马克思“把自由这一价值提升为一切价值的终极价值”的观点针锋相对。

In response to this, Brenkert argues: (1) In Marx’s vision, freedom, as the most fundamental value, is inclusive, not exclusive or singular; this “broadly inclusive connotation of freedom can open people’s horizons and propose new ideas”; (2) The objective development of history precisely reflects a history of striving for and fighting for freedom. Under this view of history, the reason Marx criticizes capitalist society and demands the abolition of private property and the division of labor is fundamentally that they plunge people into a state of unfreedom. In other words, Marx does not deny that private property and the division of labor might still exist in communist society, but they must exist in a non-exploitative manner conducive to freedom; (3) A free life is a whole that “maintains moral consistency” between private life in the sphere of civil society and public life in the sphere of the political state. It requires not only the necessary guarantee of external conditions but also the development (or at least non-deprivation) of “certain” human capacities and the rational autonomy concerning choices of specific ways of life as its necessary internal components.

对此，布伦克特回应道：（1）马克思视野中的自由作为最基本的那个价值，是包容的，而不是唯一的、排他的，这种“广泛包容的自由内涵可以为人们打开视野，提出新思想”；（2）历史的客观发展所反映的正是争取自由、为自由奋斗的历史，在这种历史观下，马克思之所以批判资本主义社会、要求消灭私有制和分工，根本上是因为它们使人陷入了不自由的境地，换言之，马克思并不否认私有财产、劳动分工可能在共产主义社会仍然存在，但必须是以非剥削性的、有利于自由的方式存在；（3）自由的生活是在市民社会领域的私人生活与政治国家领域的公共生活之间的一个“保有道德一致性”的整体，它不仅需要外在条件的必要保障，而且人的“某些”能力的发展（至少不被剥夺）以及关乎具体生活方式选择的理性自主性也是其必要的内在组成。

It is not difficult to see that Brenkert does his utmost to mobilize the theoretical resources available to him from an ethical perspective to defend Marx’s ethics of freedom. On the one hand, he attempts to stand on Marx’s ground and, from an ethical perspective, challenge the doubts and criticisms of Marx’s ethics. In active dialogue with these “theoretical opponents,” he excavates the appeal of Marx’s ethics, allowing the unique features of Marx’s ethics of freedom to be more effectively highlighted. On the other hand, although his defense is replete with praise for the superiority of Marx’s ethics over contemporary ethics, he simultaneously does not forget to make as objective and fair an assessment as possible of its own merits and demerits.

不难看出，布伦克特尽其所能地动用他基于伦理学视角所能动用的理论资源，为马克思的自由伦理学辩护：一方面，他试图站在马克思的立场上并基于伦理学的视角，挑战对马克思伦理学的质疑和批判，在与这些“理论对手”的积极对话中挖掘马克思伦理学的魅力，使马克思自由伦理学的独到之处得以更有效地凸显出来；另一方面，虽然他在辩护过程中对马克思伦理学相较于当代伦理学的卓越之处不乏溢美之辞，但同时也不忘对其本身的利弊得失作出尽可能客观、公正的评价。

III. Contributions and Deficiencies of Brenkert’s Ethical Interpretation

三、布伦克特伦理学阐释的贡献与缺陷

Evaluating Brenkert’s ethical interpretation of Marx’s thought on freedom must be situated within the context of constructing a Marxist ethics, even though Brenkert does not aim to construct a Marxist ethics but rather to interpret an ethics that “returns to Marx.” And his interpretation indeed has its significance. Consider this: if a Marxist ethics were already established, it would have to respond to the following question: In the founders of Marxism, especially Marx, is there an ethics? If an affirmative answer cannot be given directly, then are there ethical resources within it that can be excavated? Or must one answer why there is none. Brenkert’s book *Marx’s Ethics of Freedom* precisely attempts to answer this series of questions, and his focus is on providing an ethical interpretation of Marx’s thought on freedom. Today, this interpretation of Brenkert’s appears to be a mixed success.

评价布伦克特对马克思自由思想的伦理学阐释，必须将其置于建构马克思主义伦理学的语境下来考察，尽管布伦克特并非想要建构马克思主义伦理学，而是试图阐释“回到马克思的”伦理学。而他的这一阐释的确有其意义。试想，假如马克思主义伦理学业已成立，就必须回应下述问题：在马克思主义创始人特别是马克思那里，有没有伦理学？假如无法直接作出肯定的回答，那么其中有没有可以挖掘的伦理学资源？抑或必须回答为什么没有的问题。而布伦克特的《马克思的自由伦理学》一书正是试图回答这一系列问题，他的用力所在就是对马克思的自由思想进行伦理学阐释。布伦克特的这一阐释在今天看来显然是成败参半。

(I) Shortcomings of Brenkert’s Ethical Interpretation

（一）布伦克特伦理学阐释的不足之处

The most obvious shortcoming of Brenkert’s interpretation is that he ethicizes many of Marx’s ideas—especially historical materialism and the thought on freedom. The result is that his interpretation either universalizes ethics or narrows Marx’s thought. This is specifically manifested in the following four aspects.

布伦克特的阐释最明显的不足就在于，他把马克思的很多思想——尤其是历史唯物主义和自由思想——都伦理学化了，结果导致他的阐释不是使伦理学泛化，就是把马克思的思想窄化。这具体体现在以下四个方面。

First, the shortcomings Brenkert points out regarding “Marx’s ethics of freedom” are mostly conclusions he draws only by examining it from an ethical perspective. For example, his conclusions that Marx lacks consideration of “concrete moral issues of privacy and individuality” and that “there is always a tension between the individual and the universal” are judgments that can only be made by treating Marx entirely as an ethicist. However, this is not the case. When we truly “return to” Marx, an undeniable theoretical fact is that the key issue in Marx’s thinking is not how ethics can be effective, nor is he exploring the moral norms individuals should follow. Rather, he attempts to penetrate this surface to investigate and excavate the deeper essence of society. Although Marx’s thought indeed contains profound insights into what a truly effective ethics would be, he is, after all, not thinking on the level of perfecting the individual, but on the level of what kind of social system is conducive to the free development of human beings. While such a mode of thinking can certainly provide resources and reference for ethics, and its reasonableness can be found when examined from an ethical perspective, it is by no means something that ethical thinking can encompass. To deny this would lead either to narrowing Marx’s critical thought into ethics or to universalizing ethics into an all-encompassing theory that blurs disciplinary boundaries.

其一，布伦克特针对“马克思的自由伦理学”思想所指出的不足，多是他基于伦理学视角去审视才得出的。例如，他得出的马克思在“私人性和个体性的具体道德问题”上缺乏考量、“在个别与普遍之间始终存在张力”等诸如此类的结论，都是只有把马克思完全视为一个伦理学家才可能做出的判断。但是，情况并非如此。当我们真正“回到”马克思时，不容忽视的一个理论事实是：马克思思考问题的关键并非伦理学如何才是有效的，他也不是在探讨个体所应该遵循的道德规范，而是试图透过这一表象去探察、挖掘更深层次的社会本质。虽然马克思的思想中确实隐含着关于真正有效的伦理学的真知灼见，但他毕竟不是在完善个人的层面上思考问题，而是在什么样的社会制度才有利于人的自由发展的层面上进行思考的。这样的思考方式固然可以为伦理学提供资源和借鉴，从伦理学视角去审视的话也能发现其合理之处，但它绝不是伦理学思考所能涵盖的。否认这一点，就会导致或者把马克思的批判思想窄化为伦理学，或者把伦理学泛化为一种包罗万象的、模糊了学科边界的理论。

Second, in Brenkert’s specific argumentation, a tendency towards pan-ethicism is visible everywhere, with “ethical” discourse leaping from between the lines. Based on his argument, we can deduce from Marx’s discussions of moral or ethical phenomena that Marx possesses a moral philosophy or ethics, and interpret this ethics as Marx’s broad moral view with freedom as the highest principle and core. Such argumentation is not uncommon in current academic research. But if one can reason in this way, could one also say that any discipline that studies “phenomena” can be collectively called “phenomenology”? If so, then such “ethics” research and “phenomenology” research could indeed conquer the world. In his specific analysis, Brenkert not only fails to distinguish between moral and non-moral values but also often subsumes values that are different from moral values and may not necessarily have moral significance. For instance, he states that in Marx’s view, private property is regarded as an “evil,” and “the abolition of money, exchange value, wage labor, and the abolition of private property in general” has a “moral necessity”; even the “true community” has normative significance, because Marx once said, “brotherhood of man is no mere phrase with them, but a fact of life, and the nobility of man shines upon us from their work-hardened forms.” [3]3 A phrase from Chapter 17 of the *Zhuangzi*, “Autumn Floods,” expressing a state of naturalness and self-sufficiency without conscious awareness of external authority. This is tantamount to enshrining morality as the supreme arbiter, judging everything by moral standards.

其二，在布伦克特的具体论证中，泛伦理学倾向随处可见，字里行间都跳跃着“伦理学”话语。依据他的论证，我们可以从马克思拥有关于道德或伦理现象的讨论，推导出马克思拥有道德哲学或伦理学，并把这种伦理学解释为马克思以自由为最高准则和核心的广义道德观。这样的论证在如今的学术研究中并不少见，但假若可以如此推论，那是否也可以说，但凡对“现象”有所研究的各种不同学科都可以统称为“现象学研究”？如是，那这样的“伦理学”研究和“现象学”研究的确能够包打天下。而在具体分析中，布伦克特不仅没有对道德价值与非道德价值作出区分，还往往把不同于道德价值的、不一定具有道德意义的价值也统摄其中。如他所说，在马克思那里，私有财产被视为一种“恶”，“消灭货币、交换价值、雇佣劳动以及在总体上消灭私有财产”具有“道德的必要性”；就连“真正的共同体”也具有规范性意义，因为马克思曾说，“人与人之间的兄弟情谊在他们那里不是空话，而是真情，并且他们那由于劳动而变得坚实的形象向我们放射出人类崇高精神之光”。这无异于把道德奉为“皋比”，一切都以道德作为评判标准。

Third, Brenkert’s ethical interpretation weakens the rich and insightful connotations of many of Marx’s ideas, blurring the essential distinction between Marx and the moralists he criticized. The tendency towards pan-ethicism ultimately prevents Brenkert from truly standing on the ground of historical materialism and effectively breaking free from the inherently rationalist and universalist mode of thinking of the ethical perspective itself. Consequently, he interprets the community in Marx’s vision merely from the perspective of interests and individual identification, which is not applicable here, arguing that this community is “composed of reflective, rational beings who are aware that they are not divided by their interests but rather united by them.” [4]4 Soviet Marxist ethics refers to the official ethical theory developed in the Soviet Union, centered on the concept of “communist morality,” which was formulated as a set of norms and principles serving the construction of communism. Clearly, such a perspective is narrow. It not only fails to recognize that interests and identification are insufficient to serve as the premise for community to transcend rights and justice but also blurs the essential distinction between Marx and Kant, Proudhon, and the utopian socialists [5]5 George G. Brenkert, *Marx’s Ethics of Freedom*, p. 7. against whom Marx was always vigilant.

其三，布伦克特的伦理学阐释弱化了马克思很多富有真知灼见的思想内涵，模糊了马克思与他所批判的道德论者之间的本质区别。泛伦理学倾向使布伦克特最终没能真正站在历史唯物主义的高度，有效摆脱伦理学视角本身固有的理性主义和普遍主义的思考方式，由此导致他仅仅从利益和并不适用于此的个体认同层面阐释马克思视野中的共同体，认为这种共同体是“由反思的、理性的存在者组成的，他们意识到自己没有因为利益而分裂，反而是由这些利益团结起来的”。显然，这样的视角是狭窄的，它不仅没有意识到利益和认同并不足以成为共同体超越权利、正义的前提，而且模糊了马克思与康德、蒲鲁东以及马克思始终警惕的空想社会主义者之间的本质区别。

Fourth, Brenkert’s handling and interpretation of Marx’s texts is also biased; some important texts and ideas are filtered out by Brenkert’s ethical “sieve.” Although Brenkert attempts to avoid, on the one hand, failing to utilize textual resources such as the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* and the *Grundrisse* as Howard Selsam did, and on the other hand, limiting himself to Marx’s early works to interpret his overall thought as Kamenka did, and tries to find some balance between these two approaches, because he is constrained by an ethical perspective, Brenkert generally still follows Kamenka’s path, dwelling excessively on the newly discovered manuscripts (especially the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*) to interpret Marx’s ethical thought. Consequently, in Brenkert’s exposition, there is an unavoidable tendency to over-rely on Marx’s early thought and to attempt to use the young Marx’s thought to govern the entirety of Marx’s thought, resulting in important turning points in the evolution of Marx’s thought being obscured within the coherence of his overall thought. Theoretically, this manifests as a convergence with the humanist trend of Western Marxism.

其四，布伦克特在对马克思文本的处理和解读上也有失偏颇，一些重要的文本和思想被布伦克特的伦理学“筛子”过滤掉了。尽管布伦克特试图避免像霍华德·塞尔萨姆（Howard Selsam）那样未能运用《1844年经济学哲学手稿》《政治经济学批判大纲》等文本资源，抑或如卡门卡那样局限于马克思的早期著作来解读其思想整体，并试图在这两种情形之间寻找某种平衡；但因囿于伦理学的视角，布伦克特总体上仍然是沿着卡门卡的路子，过多停留于新发现的手稿（特别是《1844年经济学哲学手稿》），对马克思的伦理思想进行解读。所以，在布伦克特的阐发中，不免有过于倚重马克思的早期思想、试图以青年马克思的思想统摄马克思的思想整体的倾向，导致马克思思想演进中的重要转折也被遮蔽在其思想整体的连贯性之中。这在理论上表现为与西方马克思主义的人道主义思潮的合流。

(2) The Main Contributions of Brenkert’s Ethical Interpretation

（二）布伦克特伦理学阐释的主要贡献

Just as pantheism contains an implicit critique of religion and theology—once the religious cloak of pantheism is removed, it is not difficult to discover the rational elements within it—so too does Brenkert’s pan-ethical interpretation contain a reasonable understanding of Marx’s thought. Once we strip away the ethical cloak Brenkert bestows upon Marx’s thought on freedom, the rational components implicit in his interpretation of Marx’s historical materialism and thought on freedom, as well as the objective and pertinent views revealed in his refutation of various misinterpretations of Marx’s thought, remain highly insightful.

正如泛神论蕴含着对宗教和神学的批判，一旦祛除泛神论所披的宗教外衣，就不难发现其中内含的合理性因素一样，布伦克特的泛伦理学阐释也隐含着他对马克思思想的合理理解。一旦我们揭去布伦克特赋予马克思自由思想的伦理学外衣，在他对马克思的历史唯物主义、自由思想的阐释中所隐含的合理性成分，及其在批驳对马克思思想的种种误读中所表露出来的客观中肯的观点，仍然是非常富有洞见的。

First, Brenkert’s interpretation of historical materialism is constructive. As he observes, in understanding historical materialism, people often find it difficult to grasp the dialectical unity between the regularity of history and the initiative of historical subjects in making choices, and they tend to cling to one extreme. For instance, technological determinism and vulgar economic determinism exhibit this situation; according to their understanding, historical materialism and ethics are incompatible, which leads to the inability of historical subjects to exercise their initiative. In contrast, Brenkert points out that when Marx emphasized historical inevitability, he did not negate the role of “people’s needs, wishes, and desires.” “The advent of communism is inevitable not because it is unrelated to people’s desires and needs. The situation is precisely the opposite.” [1]1 George G. Brenkert, *Marx’s Ethics of Freedom* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 82.

首先，布伦克特对历史唯物主义的阐释富有建设性。正如他所看到的，在对历史唯物主义的理解方面，人们常常难以把握历史的规律性与历史主体选择的主动性之间的辩证统一关系，而往往容易偏执一端。比如，技术决定论和庸俗的经济决定论就存在这样的情形，按照它们的理解，历史唯物主义与伦理道德是不可能相容的，这就会导致历史主体的主动性无从发挥。与此相反，布伦克特则指出，当马克思强调历史必然性时，并没有否定“人们的需求、愿望和欲求”的作用，“共产主义的到来之所以是不可避免的，不是因其无关乎人们的欲求和需要。情况恰恰相反”。

Although Brenkert offers a new interpretation of historical materialism based on the purpose of defending Marx’s ethics, his interpretation has obvious positive significance for both historical materialism and contemporary ethics. On the one hand, he resolves, in an ethical manner, “the problem of determinism attributed to historical materialism, which contains oversimplified understandings”; on the other hand, he thereby points out a direction for the development of contemporary ethics. If contemporary ethics is to avoid degenerating into empty moral preaching lacking a sense of history and to enable theory to take root, it must absorb the spirit of historical materialism and incorporate the historical dimension and material production factors into the basic considerations of ethics. It can be said that through his reinterpretation of historical materialism, Brenkert highlights the non-material factors inherent in human agency, thereby reasonably revealing and demonstrating the value dimension and moral implications inherent in historical materialism itself.

尽管布伦克特是基于为马克思的伦理学辩护这一目的而对历史唯物主义作出新的解释，但他的解释对历史唯物主义和当代伦理学都有着显而易见的积极意义。一方面，他以伦理学的方式解决了“被归因于历史唯物主义的、包含过分简单化理解的决定论问题”；另一方面，他也由此指出了当代伦理学的一个发展方向。当代伦理学要避免沦为缺乏历史感的空洞道德说教，使理论能够落地，就必须吸收历史唯物主义的精神，把历史维度和物质生产因素纳入伦理学的基本考量之中。可以说，通过对历史唯物主义的重新阐释，布伦克特突出了人的能动性所内在包含的非物质性因素，从而合理地揭示和彰显出历史唯物主义本身蕴含的价值维度和道德意蕴。

Second, Brenkert regards freedom as Marx’s most core and fundamental value appeal, grasping the uniqueness and important position of freedom in Marx’s thought. Nowadays, more and more scholars do not accept the assertion that Marx had no value appeal. So, what exactly is Marx’s value appeal? In response, Brenkert believes the answer is freedom. Because only freedom is the most important value running through the entire process of Marx’s thought. Whether it is Marx’s argument for the swerve of atoms in his doctoral dissertation, or the statement in the *Communist Manifesto* that “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all,” [2]2 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, in *Marx/Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 6 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 506. both implicitly contain Marx’s declaration of freedom. Compared with freedom, justice, equality, rights, etc., are insufficient to constitute Marx’s value appeal, because even in communist society, there will still be an appeal for freedom, although at that time it will be similar to a state where “the people all say ‘I am natural’”; [3]3 A phrase from Chapter 17 of the *Zhuangzi*, “Autumn Floods,” expressing a state of naturalness and self-sufficiency without conscious awareness of external authority. but there will be no space for equality, rights, or justice to exist; these values will be sealed in the conceptual museum of history.

其次，布伦克特把自由视为马克思最核心、最根本的价值诉求，把握到了自由在马克思思想中的独特性和重要地位。现在，越来越多的学者不太认可马克思没有价值诉求这样的论断。那么，马克思的价值诉求到底是什么？对此，布伦克特认为，答案就是自由。因为，唯有自由才是贯穿马克思的整个思想过程的那个最重要的价值，无论是马克思在其博士论文中对原子偏斜运动的论证，还是《共产党宣言》中所说的“每个人的自由发展是一切人的自由发展的条件”，都暗含着马克思的自由宣言。相较于自由来说，正义、平等、权利等都不足以成为马克思的价值诉求，因为即使到了共产主义社会，也依然有对自由的诉求，尽管那时已是类似于“百姓皆谓我自然”的状态；但却没有平等、权利、正义的存在空间，这些价值将被尘封于历史的观念博物馆中。

If one must construct a Marxian ethics, then Brenkert’s approach of taking freedom as the core category of Marxian ethics can be considered profound, and his construction is in no way inferior to Soviet Marxist ethics. [4]4 Soviet Marxist ethics refers to the official ethical theory developed in the Soviet Union, centered on the concept of “communist morality,” which was formulated as a set of norms and principles serving the construction of communism. This is because communist morality, as the core category of Soviet Marxist ethics, is not a morality that will exist in communist society, but rather a set of moral requirements derived for the purpose of realizing the communist cause; and if communist society indeed has its own morality (even if it might be in a pan-ethical sense), then it is not an exaggeration to consider it to be “freedom.”

倘若非要建构一种马克思的伦理学，那么布伦克特以自由作为马克思伦理学的核心范畴的做法算得上深刻，他的建构也毫不逊色于苏联的马克思主义伦理学。因为，共产主义道德作为苏联马克思主义伦理学的核心范畴，并非将会存在于共产主义社会中的道德，而是为实现共产主义事业衍生出的一套道德要求；而如果共产主义社会确有其道德（尽管它可能是泛伦理学意义上的），那么认为它就是“自由”也就并不为过。

Third, Brenkert is very vigilant against treating Marx’s thought dogmatically, rather than grasping it dialectically and developmentally as a whole. As he says, if one wants to truly grasp the essence of historical materialism, one should neither regard Marx as a flawless intellectual saint nor treat him as a scientist predicting historical development. Returning to Marx’s texts, whether in the prefaces to the *Communist Manifesto* or in his later reflections on Eastern society, one can clearly feel that Marx himself strongly disliked his thought being treated as dogma by the world. Furthermore, it should also be noted that his thought itself was not only formed through continuous development, but also his early critiques of religion, morality, and philosophy are consistent with the “external critique” he conducted after establishing historical materialism. Marx’s thought is a coherent intellectual whole.

再次，布伦克特非常警惕以教条主义的态度对待马克思，而非从整体上辩证地、发展地把握马克思的思想。如他所说，如果想要真正把握历史唯物主义的精髓，就既不应把马克思当作毫无瑕疵的思想圣人，也不宜视其为预言历史发展的科学家。回到马克思的文本来看，无论是在《共产党宣言》的序言中，还是在他晚年对东方社会的思考中，都能明显感受到他本人非常反感自己的思想被世人当作教条。此外还应看到，他的思想本身不仅是在不断发展中形成的，而且他早期的宗教批判、道德批判、哲学批判与他创立历史唯物主义后所进行的“外在批判”是一脉相承的，马克思的思想是一个具有连贯性的思想整体。

Additionally, Brenkert, from a modern perspective, particularly emphasizes that people in different eras should not uncritically accept Marx’s thought, nor should they attribute the errors of his later so-called admirers or followers to Marx himself, nor should they demand that Marx foresee the enormous destructive effects of technological development since the 20th century and the “complexity and uncertainty of the relationship between human values and social systems and political systems” [5]5 George G. Brenkert, *Marx’s Ethics of Freedom*, p. 7. and many other variables. Moreover, there is a certain gap between the various new situations in the actual development of history and Marx’s somewhat optimistic predictions of historical progress.

另外，布伦克特站在现代人的视角特别强调，处于不同时代的人们更不应该不加反思地接受马克思的思想，抑或是把后来他的所谓推崇者、追随者的误入歧途归咎于他本人，也不应该苛求马克思对20世纪以来技术发展带来的巨大破坏作用以及“人类价值及社会制度与政治制度之间关系的复杂性和不确定性”等诸多变数有所预见。何况，现实历史发展的种种新形势与马克思略显乐观主义的历史进步论预想之间存在着一定的差距。

Finally, Brenkert is also effective in refuting erroneous assertions. When interpreting Marx’s thought on freedom, in order to avoid talking to himself and out of respect for the views of existing commentators, Brenkert often develops his arguments through dialogue and refutation. For example, when interpreting Marx’s thought on freedom as a theory of “self-determination,” he conducts a series of comparative arguments against the already dominant theory of “self-realization,” ultimately demonstrating that the “self-realization” theory still fails to escape the limitations of the Kantian theory of “free will,” and only the “self-determination” theory conforms to Marx’s original intention and can highlight Marx’s inheritance of Hegel’s thought on freedom. Furthermore, as supplementary argumentation, he does not hesitate to engage in lengthy refutations of Berlin’s [6]6 Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997), a liberal political philosopher, known for his distinction between negative and positive liberty, which he used to critique Marxist conceptions of freedom. and others’ misinterpretations of freedom, and engages in dialogue with Wood [7]7 Allen W. Wood (b. 1942), an American philosopher known for his interpretation of Marx’s thought, particularly his argument that Marx did not base his critique of capitalism on a theory of justice. and others, thereby demonstrating his unequivocal ability to grasp the crucial points of his theoretical opponents.

最后，布伦克特在批驳错误论断方面也是富有成效的。在阐释马克思的自由思想时，为了避免自说自话，同时也出于对已有论者的观点的尊重，布伦克特常以对话、驳议的方式展开论证。比如，在对马克思的自由思想做“自我决定”论的解读时，他就针对已经占据主流的“自我实现”论展开一系列比较论证，最终表明，“自我实现”论仍然未能跳出康德式的“自由意志”论的局限，而只有“自我决定”论才贴合马克思的本意，并能凸显出马克思对黑格尔自由思想的继承。此外，作为辅助论证，他不惜对伯林等人的自由误读进行大篇幅的批驳，并与伍德等人展开对话，从而表现出他在抓住理论对手的要害方面毫不含糊。

In sum, Brenkert’s ethical interpretation of Marx’s thought on freedom can be described as “success and failure both stem from the same source.” [15]15 A Chinese idiom (成也萧何，败也萧何) meaning that the same person or factor is responsible for both success and failure. It originates from a historical story about Han Xin, a general of the Han dynasty, whose rise and fall were both orchestrated by the prime minister Xiao He. For Marx’s thought, whether one insists on an ethical or a non-ethical interpretation, and ultimately interprets freedom as a moral good or a non-moral good, all such readings constitute a biased misreading of Marx’s thought as a whole. They can neither effectively resolve the tension between “the particular and the universal,” nor help in understanding Marx’s solution to the problem of the unity of fact and value. In fact, Brenkert’s claim that Marx is deficient with regard to the question of the universal applicability of morality and the specific moral questions of the individual is not a shortcoming of Marx’s thought on freedom itself, but rather a defect arising from Brenkert, as an interpreter, examining it through the lens of ethics.

总之，布伦克特对马克思自由思想的伦理学阐释可谓“成也萧何，败也萧何”。对于马克思的思想来说，无论是执着于伦理学的阐释还是非伦理学的阐释，乃至最后对自由作出属于道德的善抑或非道德的善的解读，都是对马克思的思想整体有失偏颇的误读，既不能有效化解“个别与普遍”之间的张力，也无助于理解马克思对事实与价值统一难题的解决。事实上，布伦克特指称马克思在道德的普遍适用性问题以及个人的具体道德问题上有所欠缺，实则并非马克思自由思想本身的不足，而是布伦克特作为一个诠释者，借由伦理学视角加以审视所导致的缺陷。

However, just as Brenkert, when evaluating the contribution of Marx’s ethics, does not advocate judging it by its possible flaws and problems or “measuring it by the sum of its errors,” so too should we not evaluate Brenkert’s contribution primarily on the basis of the inadequacies in his interpretation of Marx’s thought on freedom. In any case, he is a courageous, active, and insightful contemporary scholar.

不过，正如布伦克特在评价马克思伦理学的贡献时，不主张以其中可能存在的瑕疵和问题来评断或“以其失误的总和来衡量”一样，对于布伦克特，我们也不宜以他在阐释马克思的自由思想时的不足为主要依据来评价他的贡献。无论如何，他都是一位勇于探索的、积极的、富有洞察力的当代学者。

(Authors: Qu Xuan, Department of Philosophy Teaching and Research, Party School of the Guangdong Provincial Committee of the CPC (Guangdong Academy of Governance); Lin Jinping, School of Marxism, Sun Yat-sen University)

（作者：曲轩，中共广东省委党校（广东行政学院）哲学教研部；林进平，中山大学马克思主义学院）

(This article is a phased result of the National Social Science Fund Youth Project “Research on Basic Issues of Anglo-American Marxist Political Philosophy since the New Century”)

（本文系国家社会科学基金青年项目“新世纪以来英美马克思主义政治哲学基本问题研究”的阶段性成果）

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