The German Green Party’s Return to the Federal Government and the Direction of Its China Policy

In the 2021 German federal election for the 20th Bundestag, the German Green Party won 14.8% of the vote and 118 seats, trailing only the Social Democratic Party (SPD) (25.7% of the vote, 206 seats) and the Union parties (CDU/CSU) (24.1% of the vote, 197 seats). Not only did it regain its position as the third-largest party in the Bundestag after a 16-year hiatus, but it also successfully formed a “traffic-light coalition” with its former centre-left ally, the SPD, and the right-wing Free Democratic Party (FDP), securing five cabinet seats, including the Foreign Ministry. For the Green Party, this was undoubtedly its best electoral performance since the end of the Cold War; for Germany, this model of coalition government was also a first.

在2021年举行的德国第二十届联邦议会选举中，德国绿党获得了14.8%的得票率、118个议席，仅落后于社民党（25.7%的得票率、206个议席）和联盟党（24.1%的得票率、197个议席），不仅时隔16年后重新成为联邦议会第三大党，而且与中左翼的昔日盟友社民党以及右翼的自民党成功组建了“交通灯联盟”，占据了包括外交部长在内的五个内阁席位。对于绿党来说，这无疑是冷战结束以来的最好选举战绩；对于德国来说，这种模式的联合政府也属首次。

The German Green Party’s success in this election has sparked considerable speculation. In the view of some Western scholars, the Green Party’s victory and participation in government might help bridge social divides in Western countries. Some Chinese scholars, however, believe that the ascension of a left-leaning Green Party could negatively impact Sino-German and even Sino-European relations. So, what kind of political party is the German Green Party? After a long period of marginalization, why did it stand out in this election? Why was the “traffic-light coalition” successfully formed? What stance will the Green Party adopt and what role will it play in relations with China? This article aims to analyze these questions one by one within the analytical framework of parliamentary politics, in order to make a rational judgment about the foreign policy direction of the new German government involving the Green Party, especially its China policy.

德国绿党在这次选举中的成功给人们带来了很大的想象空间。在有的西方学者看来，德国绿党胜出并参与执政，可能有助于弥合西方国家的社会而有的中国学者则认为，具有左翼色彩的绿党上台，可能会给中德乃至中欧关系带来负面影响。那么，德国绿党到底是一个什么性质的政党？在经历了长期边缘化后，它为何能在这次大选中脱颖而出？“交通灯联盟”缘何成功组建？绿党在对华关系方面又会采取怎样的立场、发挥何种作用？对此，本文拟在议会政治的分析框架下逐一进行分析，以期对绿党参与的德国新政府的对外政策、尤其是对华政策走向作出理性判断。

I. The German Green Party: From Marginal Left to Moderate Centre

一、从边缘左翼到温和中间的德国绿党

Since its founding in West Germany in 1980, the German Green Party has consistently striven to participate in elections at various levels—local, federal, and European Parliament—using parliamentary politics to influence political trends both within Germany and across Europe, while continuously evolving in this process. If we take its participation in the federal government as a watershed, we can roughly divide the German Green Party’s development into three stages.

自1980年在联邦德国成立以来，德国绿党一直努力参与地方、联邦和欧洲议会等各个层级的选举，通过议会政治影响德国国内乃至欧洲的政治走向，同时在这个过程中不断自我演进。如果以其是否在联邦政府中执政为界标，我们大致可以将德国绿党的发展进程分成三个阶段。

The first stage was as a grassroots opposition party. At its inception, like other European Green parties, the German Green Party was a protest party with a left-leaning orientation, integrated from new social movements such as the ecology movement, peace movement, and feminist movement. It was an “anti-party” and “anti-parliamentary” force. However, its membership base was more diverse and its agenda broader, adhering to the values of “ecology, social justice, grassroots democracy, and nonviolence.” Its public slogan was “neither left nor right, but forward,” and its goal was not to seek governance but merely to participate in politics. Yet, in the actual process of political engagement, these positions and goals of the German Green Party constantly faced real-world challenges. Especially after entering the Bundestag and the European Parliament in the mid-to-late 1980s, and even governing in coalition at the state level, the party experienced internal debates between the fundamentalist “idealists” and the pragmatic “realists.” The former insisted on “moral purity” and wished to maintain an oppositional stance; the latter, grounded in “electoral feasibility,” advocated maximizing electoral gains and striving to demonstrate the party’s own strength and will through participation in government. This debate was temporarily resolved when the pragmatists won at the 1988 party congress. From then on, the German Green Party gradually transformed from a protest party into a party of participation, shifting from Euroscepticism to pro-Europeanism, eventually becoming a force committed to European integration. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the upheavals in Eastern Europe, and the setback to the socialist movement, the German Green Party absorbed some members from communist and social democratic parties. Particularly after the merger of the East and West German Green parties in 1993 to form “Alliance 90/The Greens” (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), although the party’s strength grew, ideological differences among its various factions also widened.

第一阶段是作为草根反对派。在成立之初，德国绿党和其他欧洲绿党一样，都是基于生态运动、和平运动、女权运动等新社会运动整合而成的具有左翼倾向的“反政党”、“反议会”的抗议性政党，只不过其成员来源更为多元、议题更为广泛，在价值取向上坚持“生态、社会、草根民主和非暴力”原则，公开口号是“既不向右，也不向左，只向前”，目标是不求执政、只为参政。然而，在实际参与政治的过程中，德国绿党的这些立场与目标不断遭遇现实挑战，尤其是在1980年代中后期进入联邦议院和欧洲议会，甚至在州政府层面联合执政后，该党党内一度出现了坚持原教旨主义的理想派与坚持现实主义的务实派之间的争论。前者坚持“道德纯洁性”，希望继续保持反对派的地位；后者立足“选举可行性”，主张选举战绩最大化，争取通过参政体现自我力量和意志。这场争论直到务实派在1988年党代会上获胜而暂时告一段落，德国绿党也由此逐渐从抗议性政党转型为参政党，从疑欧派转向亲欧派，直至成为力主欧洲一体化的力量。然而，在苏联解体、东欧剧变、社会主义运动受挫后，德国绿党吸纳了一些共产党和社会党成员，特别是1993年德国东西部绿党合并统一为“90联盟/绿党”（Bündnis 90/Die Grünen）后，虽然党的力量得到了壮大，但内部不同派别之间的意识形态分歧也进一步扩大。

The second stage was as a “junior partner” in a governing coalition. After more than a decade of experience and accumulation of strength through parliamentary activities at various levels, the German Green Party entered the federal government for the first time after the 1998 federal election, forming a “Red-Green coalition” with the SPD led by then-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. This marked its transformation from a protest party and parliamentary opposition into a party of government, becoming the “junior partner” in the ruling coalition. Participation in government undoubtedly provided an opportunity to put Green Party ideas into practice, but it also sowed the seeds for internal divisions and even splits. During its time in government, nearly one-third of the party’s members left, dissatisfied with the Green Party’s support for German participation in NATO military operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Before the 2002 federal election, the German Green Party was forced to revise its basic program for the first time, expanding its values from “ecology, social justice, grassroots democracy, and nonviolence” to “ecology, self-determination, expanded equality, vibrant democracy, nonviolence, and human rights.” Although no specific new proposals were put forward, the severe flooding in Germany that year boosted the Green Party, which emphasized ecological protection, allowing it to retain its position as the third-largest party in parliament and continue in the coalition government. In the 2005 federal election, the Green Party fell from the third-largest to the fifth-largest party in the Bundestag. The SPD, having lost the election, was forced to compromise with the Union parties (CDU/CSU) and join a grand coalition government led by Angela Merkel. From then on, the “Red-Green coalition” between the German Green Party and the SPD ceased to exist, and the Green Party began a 16-year period in opposition.

第二阶段是作为执政联盟中的“初级伙伴”。经过十余年在各个层级议会活动的锻炼和力量积蓄，德国绿党在1998年大选后第一次进入联邦政府，与时任德国总理格哈德·施罗德领导的社民党组成“红绿联盟”，从而实现了由抗议性政党和议会反对派向参政党的转变，成为执政联盟的“初级伙伴”。参政无疑给绿党的理念付诸实践提供了机会，但也为党内分歧甚至分裂埋下了隐患。参政期间，由于对绿党支持德国参与北约对科索沃和阿富汗的军事行动不满，该党近三分之一的党员脱党。在2002年联邦大选前，德国绿党被迫对其基本纲领作出了首次修改，将价值取向从“生态、社会、草根民主和非暴力”扩充为“生态、自决、扩大的平等和充满活力的民主、非暴力、人权”。尽管没有提出任何具体的新建议，但是由于德国当年出现了严重洪灾，强调生态保护的绿党还是获得了议会第三大党地位并继续参与联合政府。2005年联邦大选时，绿党从德国议会中的第三大党下降为第五大党，社民党则因选举失利不得不与联盟党（基民盟/基社盟）达成妥协，加入了安格拉·默克尔领导的执政联盟，组成大联合政府。自此，德国绿党与社民党组成的“红绿联盟”不复存在，绿党也开始了长达16年之久的在野历程。

The third stage was as an opposition party engaged in reflection and adjustment. Faced with electoral defeat and the disappointment of returning to opposition, the German Green Party engaged in self-reflection, attempting to integrate the long-standing internal views of the idealists and realists into a unified “radical realism.” At the same time, the German Green Party began to use its opposition status to make various adjustments. On the one hand, it seized the opportunity presented by the SPD’s weakening and erosion of its left-wing image due to its participation in the grand coalition, aiming to capture the centre-left political space and attract the SPD’s traditional voters. On the other hand, it experimented with different forms of coalition governments at the state level, not only forming a “Red-Green” coalition with the SPD in Baden-Württemberg but also a “Black-Green” coalition with the CDU in Hesse, and even a “Red-Red-Green” coalition with the SPD and the Left Party in Thuringia. In other words, the German Green Party became increasingly pragmatic and flexible in its policies, accepting coalitions with both centre-right and centre-left parties, as well as with the radical left. It even attempted negotiations with the CDU/CSU and the FDP in 2017 over a “Jamaica coalition.” Although these negotiations collapsed due to the FDP’s withdrawal, they still elevated the German Green Party’s political standing. Additionally, the German Green Party achieved considerable success in the 2009, 2014, and 2019 European Parliament elections, not only maintaining its position as the largest Green party among EU member states but also seeing its vote share and number of seats steadily increase. Particularly in the 2019 European Parliament election, the German Green Party jumped to become the second-largest party in Germany’s representation in the European Parliament, trailing only the CDU.

第三阶段是作为在野党的反思与调整。面对选举上的失利和重回在野党的失落，德国绿党进行了自我反思，试图将党内一直存在的理想派与现实派的观点整合为统一的“激进现实主义”。同时，德国绿党也开始利用在野党的地位进行各种调整：一方面，利用社民党因参与联合政府而导致左翼形象不断弱化和受损的契机，争取其中间偏左的政治空间，吸纳社民党的传统选民；另一方面，在州一级尝试参与不同形式的执政联盟，不仅在巴登-符腾堡州与社民党组成“红绿”联盟，而且在黑森州与基民盟组成“黑绿”联盟，同时还在图林根州与社民党、左翼党组成了“红红绿”联盟。也就是说，德国绿党在政策上越来越务实和灵活，既接受与中右、中左的联合，也接受与激进左翼的联合，甚至还在2017年尝试与基民盟/基社盟、自民党就“牙买加联盟”进行过谈判。尽管此次谈判由于自民党的退出而夭折，但还是提升了德国绿党的政治地位。同时，德国绿党还在2009年、2014年和2019年的三届欧洲议会选举中收获颇丰，不仅在欧盟成员国中始终保持着第一大绿党的地位，而且得票率和议席数也持续攀升。尤其是在2019年的欧洲议会选举中，德国绿党一跃成为德国在欧洲议会中仅次于基民盟的第二大党。

After more than 40 years of development and evolution, in terms of the political spectrum, the left-wing and idealist hues of the German Green Party at its founding have gradually faded, while the pragmatic style of the centre has grown stronger. In terms of political status, the German Green Party has evolved from a marginal force that was anti-party and anti-parliament into a key player in German politics and even the European Parliament.

经过40余年的发展演进，就政治光谱而言，德国绿党初创时的左翼和理想主义色彩逐渐褪去，中间派的务实作风渐浓；就政治地位来看，德国绿党已从原来反政党、反议会的边缘力量逐渐成长为德国政坛乃至欧洲议会中的关键角色。

II. Subjective and Objective Reasons for the German Green Party’s Continuous Growth

二、德国绿党不断发展壮大的主客观原因

In Western parliamentary politics, a party ultimately demonstrates its influence by participating in elections, and election results are deeply affected by both objective circumstances and subjective choices. After 16 years of accumulation, reflection, and adjustment, the German Green Party achieved impressive results in the 2021 federal election. Behind this victory, of course, lie both subjective and objective reasons.

在西方议会政治中，一个政党最终要通过参与选举来体现其影响，而选举结果又深受客观环境和主观选择的影响。德国绿党经过16年的积淀、反思和调整，在2021年的联邦大选中取得了不俗的战绩，这一胜利的背后当然也有其主客观原因。

(I) Western societies suffer from the bitterness of political polarization

（一）西方社会饱尝政治极化之苦

For a long time, European and American countries have prided themselves on the democratic liberal order. However, since the 2008 global financial crisis, the West has entered a period of “democratic recession,” with problems such as economic crisis, social polarization, and political polarization erupting intensively and becoming increasingly severe. Right-wing populist forces in various countries have successively seized the discursive dominance of national construction, and the liberal order that the West has been fond of extolling has begun to “collapse in rites and music.” [4]4 “Red Socks Campaign” (Rote-Socken-Kampagne): A political campaign launched by the CDU/CSU in the 1990s and revived in later elections, warning voters against a coalition with the Left Party (or its predecessor, the Party of Democratic Socialism) by portraying it as a threat to democracy, referencing the red socks as a symbol of communist ideology. As the standard-bearer of Western society, the United States reached a historical peak of political polarization during the Donald Trump era. The Trump administration emphasized “white first” domestically, pursuing racism and nationalism, resulting in social撕裂 [5]5 The “Traffic Light Coalition” (Ampelkoalition) refers to a coalition government of the Social Democratic Party (red), the Free Democratic Party (yellow), and the Green Party (green), named after the colours of a traffic light. and racial conflict, hollowing out the social foundation of the democratic polity and depriving society of a stable basis. Externally, it emphasized “America First,” embracing protectionism, not only launching trade wars against a series of countries including China but also constantly “withdrawing from groups,” [6]6 The “Jamaica Coalition” (Jamaika-Koalition) refers to a coalition of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (black), the Free Democratic Party (yellow), and the Green Party (green), named after the colours of the Jamaican flag. disrupting the global economic order. It can be said that the right-wing populism and political polarization trend driven by Trump exists to varying degrees in countries on both sides of the Atlantic. This existence has allowed the people of European and American countries to witness a series of social disorders brought about by political polarization. In response, they expect to restore order. In recent years, European countries have indeed shown signs of returning to moderate politics. In 2020, Macron, through a new religious policy, cracked down on domestic extremist religious elements, firmly saying “no” to religious extremism, thereby effectively defending national consensus while also winning support from Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Cyprus, and the European Union. Macron’s success and the support of European countries for him indicate that France, and even Europe, has begun to reflect on and counter polarization politics. To a certain extent, this has curbed the trend of right-wing populism continuing to spread in Europe since Brexit and the election of Trump as US President.

长期以来，欧美国家一直以民主自由秩序自诩。然而，2008年全球金融危机以来，西方进入“民主衰退”时期，经济危机、社会分化、政治极化等问题集中爆发、日趋严重，各国的右翼民粹主义势力纷纷攫取国家建构的话语主导权，为西方所津津乐道的自由秩序开始“礼崩乐坏”。作为西方社会的旗手，美国在唐纳德·特朗普时期的政治极化可谓达至历史巅峰。特朗普政府对内强调“白人优先”，奉行种族主义、民族主义，结果造成社会撕裂和种族冲突，民主政体的社会基础被抽空，社会也失去了安定的基础；对外强调“美国优先”，拥抱保护主义，不仅对包括中国在内的一系列国家大打贸易战，而且不断“退群”，破坏了全球经济秩序。可以说，由特朗普推高的右翼民粹主义和政治极化风潮在大西洋两岸各国都有不同程度的存在，这种存在让欧美各国民众见证了政治极化带来的一系列社会乱象。作为回应，他们期待重建秩序。近年来，欧洲国家也确实有重回温和政治的迹象。2020年，马克龙更是通过宗教新政打击国内极端宗教分子，对宗教极端主义坚决说“不”，从而有力地捍卫了国家共识，同时也赢得了德国、荷兰、意大利、塞浦路斯以及欧盟的支持。马克龙的成功以及欧洲国家对他的支持，说明法国乃至欧洲开始对极化政治进行反思和反击，这在一定程度上起到了阻止英国脱欧和特朗普当选美国总统以来右翼民粹主义在欧洲持续蔓延的趋势。

Another example is that the European Parliament election is a weathervane of European politics. Compared with the 2014 European Parliament election, in the most recent 2019 European Parliament election, most Green parties in European countries achieved good results, giving rise to a “green wave,” with the German Green Party’s performance being the most prominent. If the German Green Party’s vote share (seats) in the 2014 European Parliament election declined compared to 2009, mainly because under the influence of the financial crisis, populist, nationalist, and anti-European integration

再比如，欧洲议会选举是欧洲政治的风向标，而与2014年的欧洲议会选举相比，在最近一次的2019年欧洲议会选举中，欧洲国家的大多数绿党都取得了较好的成绩，出现了“绿色浪潮”，尤其以德国绿党的表现最为突出。如果说德国绿党的得票率（席位）在2014年的欧洲议会选举中相比2009年有所下降，主要是因为在金融危机的影响下，民粹主义、民族主义、反欧洲一体化的极端政党主导了选举进程，那么在2019年欧洲议会选举中，反欧或疑欧的民粹主义力量整体表现有限，而亲欧的中间自由主义政党和生态主义绿党表现更为突出。这表明，欧洲民众在一定程度上认可了绿党已经褪去激进左翼和理想主义色彩的改革者形象。

Apart from the further decline in the status of traditional mainstream parties, there is a common reason for the success of Macron, who stands out as a model for countering polarised politics, and the rise of the “green wave” in the most recent European Parliament election: populist and nationalist extremist parties are increasingly unpopular, and the public desires moderate politicians and parties with a different political style, one that avoids creating opposition and division. This atmosphere on the European continent is clearly favourable for the German Green Party, which is increasingly moving toward a moderate centrist position.

除了传统主流政党的地位进一步下滑外，作为反击极化政治优等生的马克龙的成功以及欧洲议会最近一次选举中“绿色浪潮”的兴起还有一个共同原因，就是民粹主义和民族主义的极端政党越来越不受欢迎，民众希望出现有别于制造对立和分裂的、具有不同政治风格的温和派政治家和政党。在欧洲大陆出现这样的氛围，对于日益走向温和中间立场的德国绿党显然是有利的。

(II) The Hollowing Out of the Centre of German Domestic Politics

（二）德国国内政治中心出现空心化态势

The party that has long occupied an important position on the German political stage is first and foremost the centre-right Union parties [CDU/CSU]. After 16 years of Merkel’s governance, the public has grown weary of her, especially disadvantaged and marginalised groups who are deeply dissatisfied with the recent policy of opening the country’s doors to accept overseas immigrants and using German taxpayers’ money to bail out other eurozone member states. The federal government led by the Union parties has gradually lost popular support. In the 2017 election, 49% of German citizens expressed dissatisfaction with the government, and this proportion rose to 57% in 2021. It is evident that the vast majority of voters desire change. This desire for change prompts voters to lean more towards parties that can better plan for the future, and the Green Party appears to them to be a good choice. Moreover, since Merkel stepped down as party chair, the Union parties have failed to produce a political figure capable of maintaining internal unity; internal power struggles are fierce, and rifts have deepened. Armin Laschet, whose prestige and experience were insufficient to command universal respect, was elected as the Union parties’ candidate for chancellor mainly due to these internal struggles. These various adverse factors have led to a massive loss of traditional Union party voters, with approximately 920,000 former Union party voters switching to the Green Party, making them the largest source of all migrating voters for the Greens.

长期占据德国政治舞台重要位置的政党首先是中右翼的联盟党。在经历了默克尔长达16年的执政后，民众对其已有厌倦情绪，尤其是弱势边缘群体对其近年来敞开国门接纳海外移民并用德国纳税人的钱来救助其他欧元区成员国的做法大为不满，由联盟党主政的联邦政府渐渐失去民心。在2017年的选举中，有49%的德国公民对政府表示不满，而这一比例在2021年则上升至57%。可见，绝大多数选民都有求变心理。这种求变心理促使选民更倾向于支持能够更好地规划未来的政党，而绿党在他们看来便是一个不错的选择。此外，自默克尔卸任党主席以来，联盟党一直未能出现一位维持党内团结的政治人物，党内权力斗争激烈，裂痕加深。声望与资历都难以服众的阿明·拉舍特之所以当选为联盟党总理候选人，主要就是得益于内部斗争。种种不利因素使联盟党的传统选民大量流失，其中大约有92万原联盟党选民转向了绿党，成为绿党所有迁移选民中的最大来源。

Next, consider the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD). Since the 21st century, the German federal government has had three grand coalitions (2005–2009, 2013–2017, 2017–2021), all led by the Union parties, with the SPD in a subordinate position. Over more than a decade of joint governance, the Union parties and the SPD have continuously compromised with each other, and the subordinate SPD in particular has found it increasingly difficult to define itself, leaving voters unable to discern its stance. In voter perception surveys on party positions, the SPD’s image is the most blurred, with only 41% of voters able to confirm its stance; next is the Union parties, at 42%; the Green Party is the only party for which a majority of voters (56%) can clearly judge its position. Therefore, in this election, the SPD, which returned to the status of the largest party, saw its only direction of voter loss towards the Green Party, with 260,000 former SPD voters choosing the Greens in this election, making them the third-largest source of migrating voters for the Greens.

其次来看中左翼的社民党。21世纪以来，德国联邦政府有过三次大联合政府（2005—2009年、2013—2017年、2017—2021年），均为联盟党主导，社民党处于从属地位。在十多年的联合执政过程中，联盟党和社民党不断相互妥协，尤其是处于从属地位的社民党愈来愈难以定义自我，选民无法判断其立场。在关于政党立场的选民认知调查中，社民党的形象最为模糊，仅有41%的选民能够确认其立场；接着是联盟党，这一数据为42%；而绿党是唯一一个有半数以上选民能够清晰判断其立场的政党（56%）。所以，在这次选举中，重返第一大党地位的社民党，其选民流失的唯一趋向便是绿党，有26万原社民党选民在此次选举中选择了绿党，这成为绿党迁移选民中的第三大来源。

Finally, consider some far-right or far-left parties that, while not at the centre of German politics, still play an important role. For example, the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD), which has risen rapidly on the German political stage in recent years and once became the third-largest party in Germany, draws its voters mainly from the economically weaker eastern German states, where there is a serious outflow of young people. Those who remain support the AfD out of fear that their jobs will be taken by immigrants, but as the immigration issue fades, its support rate has gradually declined. Additionally, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), which has long played a balancing role in Germany’s power structure, was the fourth-largest party in the Bundestag before this election. Since abandoning the “black-yellow-green” coalition negotiations in 2017, it has gradually shifted to the right, thereby sharing a similar voter base with the AfD, and its support rate has also decreased. As the successor to the former East German Socialist Unity Party (SED), the German Left Party (Die Linke) is also plagued by internal factional strife. Not only are there numerous contradictions between the “Communist Platform” (KPF) faction and the “Democratic Socialist Forum” (FDS) faction, but the split within the leadership is also intensifying. Former party chairs Katja Kipping and Bernd Riexinger, former parliamentary group chair Sahra Wagenknecht, and her husband, former party chair and parliamentary group chair Oskar Lafontaine, have long engaged in public disputes and mutual attacks over differing policy positions on immigration, European integration, and the voter base, making it difficult for the Left Party to gain voter trust. Coupled with the fact that in the final weeks before the election, the Union parties resorted to old tactics, once again using the “Red Socks Campaign” [4]4 “Red Socks Campaign” (Rote-Socken-Kampagne): A political campaign launched by the CDU/CSU in the 1990s and revived in later elections, warning voters against a coalition with the Left Party (or its predecessor, the Party of Democratic Socialism) by portraying it as a threat to democracy, referencing the red socks as a symbol of communist ideology. to attack the far-left party and warning voters of the disaster that a “shift to the left” might bring, the Left Party, already burdened by its historical baggage, was significantly affected. Consequently, the SPD and the Green Party, both belonging to the left camp but with more moderate stances, absorbed many migrating voters from the Left Party. Polls show that in this election, 480,000 former Left Party voters chose the Green Party, making them the second-largest source of migrating voters for the Greens.

最后再看一些虽然并不处于德国政治中心、但仍发挥重要作用的极右翼或极左翼政党。比如，近年来在德国政治舞台上快速崛起并一度成为德国第三大党的右翼民粹主义政党——选择党，其选民主要在经济相对脆弱、年轻人口外流严重的德国东部各州，继续留在那里的人因担心自己的工作岗位被外来移民挤占而支持选择党，但是随着移民问题的淡化，其支持率也逐渐下降。此外，长期在德国权力结构中发挥平衡作用的自民党是这次选举前联邦议会的第四大党，该党自2017年放弃“黑黄绿”联盟谈判以来逐渐转向右翼，从此便与选择党拥有了类似的选民基础，支持率也有所降低。而作为原东德统一社会党的继承者，德国左翼党也饱受内部派系争斗的困扰，不仅“共产主义纲领”（KPF）派与“民主社会主义论坛”（FDS）派之间矛盾重重，而且领导层内部的分裂也愈演愈烈，前党主席卡佳·基平、伯恩德·里辛格与前议会党团主席莎拉·瓦根克内希特及其丈夫、前党主席及议会党团主席奥斯卡·拉方丹之间，也因在移民、欧洲一体化和选民基础等方面的政策立场不同而长期公开争斗，互相攻击，导致左翼党难以取得选民的信任。再加上大选前的最后几周，联盟党故技重施，再次利用“红袜子运动”攻击极左翼政党，并警告选民“左滑”可能带来的灾难，这让本就为历史包袱所累的左翼党受到不小影响。因此，同属左翼阵营、但立场更为温和的社民党和绿党吸收了不少左翼党的迁移选民。民调显示，此次选举中有48万原左翼党选民选择了绿党，成为绿党迁移选民中的第二大来源。

(III) The German Green Party’s Active Preparations Before the Election

（三）德国绿党在选举前积极准备

Taken together, the favourable international atmosphere and the hollowing out of the centre of German politics provided the Green Party with space for survival and development. These are external factors, but what truly allowed these external factors to take effect was the multi-faceted preparation made by the German Green Party itself before the election.

综合来看，有利的国际氛围以及德国政治中心空心化为绿党提供了生存与发展空间，这些是外因，而真正能够让这些外因发挥作用的还是来自德国绿党自身在选举前所做的多方准备。

On the one hand, in contrast to the populist rhetoric of the Alternative for Germany and the exclusionary political discourse of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, the German Green Party has adopted a new political discourse, advocating active engagement, communication and interaction, and promoting an optimistic rather than a pessimistic and fearful discourse strategy, in order to respond to changes in voter sentiment. To maintain its own distinctive party character, the Green Party reaffirmed traditional values in its election manifesto, reshaped environmental issues, advocated an ecological economy, and promoted climate-friendly development. On 3 August 2021, the Green Party submitted its “Save the Climate, Protect Humanity: Climate Protection Emergency Programme for the Next Federal Government,” which proposed ten plans including accelerating the development of renewable energy, bringing forward the phase-out of coal to 2030, transforming the federal budget into a climate budget, making the EU a climate pioneer, and advancing climate diplomacy, thereby effectively consolidating its traditional voter base. It can be seen that in this election, 82% of Green Party voters chose the party because they endorsed its election manifesto. Furthermore, while adhering to traditional issues such as environmental protection, the German Green Party also focused on learning from experience and lessons, changing its past scepticism toward the free market and its simplistic approach of emphasising “prohibitions,” and instead advocating cooperation with enterprises to advance environmental protection, while stressing the need to seek a balance between protecting the ecology and protecting the market, avoiding environmental protection at the expense of social justice. In this way, the German Green Party “combined the ethical concept of responsible politics with the promotion of citizens’ material well-being,” thereby further eliminating the internal factional struggle between “moral purity” and “electoral feasibility,” and presenting a more decisive and unified image. This clear, unified party image became one of the important reasons the Green Party attracted voters.

一方面，有别于德国选择党的民粹主义言论和基民盟/基社盟的排他性政治话语，德国绿党采取了新的政治话语，主张积极的接触、沟通和互动，倡导一种乐观主义的、而不是悲观和恐惧的话语策略，以呼应选民的情绪变化。为了保持自身鲜明的政党特色，绿党在竞选纲领中重申传统价值观，重塑环保议题，主张生态经济，促进气候友好型发展。2021年8月3日，绿党在其提交的《拯救气候，保护人类：下一届联邦政府的气候保护应急方案》中提出了加快发展可再生能源、将淘汰煤炭提前到2030年、将联邦预算转变为气候预算、使欧盟成为气候先锋、推进气候外交等10条计划，从而有效地稳固了本党的传统选民。可以看到，此次选举中有82%的绿党选民都是由于赞成其竞选纲领而选择了绿党。此外，在坚持环保等传统议题的基础上，德国绿党还注重吸取经验教训，改变过去对自由市场的怀疑态度和一味强调“禁止”的简单做法，转而倡导与企业合作推进环保，并强调要在保护生态与保护市场之间寻求平衡，避免以牺牲社会正义为代价来保护环境。这样一来，德国绿党就“将伦理意义上的责任政治理念与促进公民物质福祉结合起来”，从而进一步消除了党内一直存在的“道德纯洁性”与“选举可行性”之间的派别之争，表现出更为果断且统一的形象。这种清晰、统一的政党形象成为绿党吸引选民的重要原因之一。

On the other hand, to enhance internal party unity, the German Green Party on 19 April 2021 elected pragmatic party members Annalena Baerbock and Robert Habeck as co-leaders, and nominated the former as its candidate for chancellor, striving to unify the party’s quarrelling factions onto a realist path. Of course, as the Green Party’s chancellor candidate, Baerbock also had relatively obvious weaknesses. For example, compared with the chancellor candidates nominated by the Union parties and the Social Democratic Party, Armin Laschet and Olaf Scholz, Baerbock was younger, lacked political experience and government work experience, and was also implicated in scandals such as resume fraud and plagiarism in her writings, causing the Green Party’s approval ratings to decline. However, opinion polls showed that only 10% of Green Party voters believed that the performance of the chancellor candidate had an important influence on their vote. That is to say, Baerbock’s personal weaknesses did not have a decisive impact on the Green Party’s election results.

另一方面，为了增强党内团结，德国绿党于2021年4月19日推选了党内务实派成员安娜莱娜·贝尔伯克和罗伯特·哈贝克担任联合领导人，并推选前者作为总理候选人，力图将争吵不休的党内各派别统一到现实主义的道路上来。当然，作为绿党总理候选人，贝尔伯克也有较为明显的弱点。比如，相比联盟党和社民党推举的总理候选人拉舍特和奥拉夫·朔尔茨（Olaf Scholz），贝尔伯克更年轻，缺少从政经历和政府工作经验，还涉嫌履历造假、著作抄袭等丑闻，绿党的支持率也因此下滑。但是，民调显示，仅有10%的绿党选民认为总理候选人的表现对其投票有重要影响。也就是说，贝尔伯克个人的弱点并没有对绿党的选举结果产生决定性影响。

III. The Successful Formation of the “Traffic Light Coalition”

三、“交通灯联盟”的成功组建

In recent years, the hollowing-out and fragmentation of the German party landscape have deepened, with the federal parliament evolving from the previous three-party system of the Union parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Free Democratic Party to the current coexistence of six parties. According to the German constitution, only a party or governing coalition that secures more than half the seats in the federal parliament can form a cabinet, and the fragmentation of parties in the parliament today makes it increasingly difficult for a single party, or even two parties, to form a coalition government. Regarding the results of the 2021 election, since neither the Union parties nor the Social Democratic Party was willing to cooperate again with the other to form a grand coalition, a three-party coalition was an inevitable choice. Therefore, immediately after the election, both the Social Democratic Party and the Union parties sought to lead the formation of the new government, with the Green Party and the Free Democratic Party, which followed closely behind, becoming the “kingmakers.” The Social Democratic Party ultimately chose to cooperate with the Green Party and the Free Democratic Party and successfully formed a cabinet, mainly based on the following five factors.

近年来，德国政党格局空心化、碎片化程度加深，联邦议会由以前联盟党、社民党和自民党的三足鼎立发展到现今六个政党并存。根据德国宪法，在联邦议会中取得半数以上议席的政党或执政联盟才可以组阁，而如今议院中政党的碎片化使单一政党、甚至两个政党联合组建政府变得越来越困难。就2021年大选结果而言，由于联盟党与社民党均无意再次与对方合作组成大联合政府，三个政党联合组阁已是必然选择。因此，在大选刚结束时，社民党与联盟党都寻求主导新一届政府的组建，紧随其后的绿党与自民党成为了“造王者”。而社民党最终选择与绿党、自民党合作并成功组阁，主要基于以下五个方面的因素。

The first is the legitimacy factor. Since German reunification, there has never been a precedent in which the largest party in the federal parliament failed to form a cabinet, leading the second-largest party to take the lead in forming a cabinet. Although the Social Democratic Party only narrowly surpassed the Union parties in this election, to a certain extent it still reflected voters’ preference for supporting a federal government led by the Social Democratic Party. If the Green Party and the Free Democratic Party had chosen to cooperate with the Union parties, which had lost the election, it would not only have negatively affected their own image but also shaken public confidence in democratic procedures and the federal government. Therefore, for the Green Party and the Free Democratic Party, prioritising negotiations with the Social Democratic Party was the more legitimate choice.

一是合法性因素。两德统一后，德国还从未出现过联邦议会第一大党组阁失败、从而由第二大党牵头组阁的先例。这次大选虽然社民党只以微弱优势超过联盟党，但在一定程度上仍反映了选民更倾向于支持一个由社民党主政的联邦政府。如果绿党与自民党选择与在选举中失败的联盟党合作，那么不仅会对自身形象造成负面影响，还会动摇民众对民主程序和联邦政府的信心。因此，对于绿党和自民党来说，优先与社民党进行谈判才是更具合法性的选择。

The second is the historical experience factor. At the federal government level, the Green Party’s only previous participation in government was the “Red-Green” coalition with the Social Democratic Party from 1998 to 2005. At the state level, the Green Party currently participates in government in ten federal states, including five states where it cooperates with the Social Democratic Party, three states where it cooperates with the Union parties, and two states where it cooperates with both the Social Democratic Party and the Union parties. Therefore, in terms of governing experience, the Green Party has richer experience in coalition government with the Social Democratic Party, and the cooperation model is also more mature. In addition, in May 2016, the Social Democratic Party won the state parliament election in Rhineland-Palatinate and subsequently formed the first state-level “Traffic Light Coalition” government with the Green Party and the Free Democratic Party. In another election five years later, the Social Democratic Party won again, and the state government maintained the “Traffic Light” model. This five-year experience of this model at the state level provided a foundation and confidence for the three-party coalition negotiations after this election.

二是历史经验因素。在联邦政府层面，绿党唯一一次参与执政，便是1998—2005年与社民党合作组成“红绿”政府。在州级层面，绿党目前共参与了10个联邦州的执政，其中与社民党合作的联邦州有5个，与联盟党合作的联邦州有3个，同时与社民党、联盟党合作的联邦州有2个。因此，就执政经验而言，绿党与社民党联合执政的经验更丰富，合作模式也更成熟。此外，2016年5月，社民党在莱茵兰-普法尔茨州议会选举中获胜，随后与绿党、自民党组建了第一个州级的“交通灯联盟”政府。在5年后的又一次选举中，社民党再次获胜，州政府仍保持“交通灯”模式。这一模式在联邦州层面的5年经验使这次大选后的三党组阁谈判有了基础和信心。

The third is the governing programme factor. On the German political spectrum, the three parties are not aligned, especially the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party on the one hand and the Free Democratic Party on the other, which are far apart. However, in this election, the election manifestos of the three parties were all adjusted to some extent, and they moved toward each other. Some scholars have distinguished the election manifestos of Germany’s major political parties along two dimensions: economic policy and social policy. On the “left-right” axis of economic policy, the Green Party and the Social Democratic Party are relatively close, both more supportive of state intervention, while the Free Democratic Party is at the far right end, except for the Alternative for Germany, placing greater emphasis on market freedom. On the progressive-traditional dichotomy of social policy, the three parties are relatively close, all more inclined to pursue social change. However, compared with their own 2017 election manifestos, the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party, while pursuing reform, both began to lean slightly toward supporting market freedom. At the same time, the Free Democratic Party, while supporting market freedom, leaned toward supporting state intervention. The convergence in the overall direction of the three parties’ manifestos and the proximity of their positions increased the chances of the three parties forming a “Traffic Light Coalition.”

三是执政纲领因素。在德国政治光谱上，三党并不一致，尤其是社民党、绿党同自民党之间更是相去甚远。但是，在这次大选中，三党的竞选纲领都有所调整，而且相向而行。有学者从经济政策和社会政策两个维度对德国各主要政党的竞选纲领进行了区分。在经济政策的“左右”向度上，绿党与社民党较为接近，都更支持国家干预，而自民党则处在除选择党以外的最右端，更加强调市场自由。在社会政策的进步与传统两分法中，三党较为接近，都更追求社会变革。然而，与自身2017年的选举纲领相比，社民党与绿党在追求改革的同时，都开始略微偏向支持市场自由。与此同时，自民党则在支持市场自由的基础上倾向于支持国家干预。三党纲领在整体方向上的趋同以及定位上的接近增加了三党组成“红绿灯联盟”的机会。

The fourth is the voter psychology factor. According to a survey report released by the German polling institute Infratest Dimap on 7 October 2021, 63% of voters believed that the Social Democratic Party candidate Scholz would be an excellent chancellor; in contrast, only 14% believed that the Union parties candidate Laschet was competent to serve as chancellor. Regarding the future coalition formation of the parties, the “Traffic Light Coalition” received the highest expectation value, with 53% of voters supporting it. As for the “Jamaica Coalition,” the majority held an unfavourable view. To respond to voter demands, the Green Party and the Free Democratic Party should naturally take public opinion into consideration in the coalition negotiations.

四是选民心理因素。根据德国民调机构迪麦颇公司（Infratest Dimap）2021年10月7日发布的调查报告，63%的选民认为社民党候选人朔尔茨会是一位优秀的总理；与此相对，只有14%的人认为联盟党候选人拉舍特能胜任总理一职。关于各政党未来的组阁情况，“交通灯联盟”获得最高期待值，有53%的选民支持。而对于“牙买加联盟”，多数人持不看好的态度。为回应选民诉求，绿党与自民党理应将民意纳入组阁谈判的考虑中。

Fifth, the factor of party willingness. The SPD’s opportunity to regain the position of the largest party was hard-won, as 16 years had passed since it last held power; thus the SPD, which had been in a subordinate position in the grand coalition, naturally cherished this chance to form a government. For the Green Party, it was even more willing to participate in a government led by the SPD, because the two parties had experience governing together in a federal coalition and were closer in values than other parties. The FDP had withdrawn from exploratory coalition talks with the CDU/CSU after the 2017 election, leading to a “difficult birth” for the new government; this not only negatively affected its own image but also cast a shadow over relations between the two parties. Therefore, the FDP was also inclined to ally with the SPD and more willing to seek common ground while reserving differences in negotiations, to avoid repeating the failure of the previous talks. Thus, when the election results emerged, the Green Party took the lead in holding talks with the FDP and formally announced exploratory talks with the SPD to form a new government on October 6. On October 15, the three parties reached a preliminary agreement on forming a government. On October 21, the “traffic light coalition” began formal negotiations. On November 24, the three parties published the contents of the coalition agreement, and the coalition negotiations concluded smoothly. Finally, on December 8, SPD candidate Olaf Scholz was sworn in as Chancellor, Green Party leader Robert Habeck became Vice Chancellor and Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Protection, and Annalena Baerbock became Foreign Minister, officially unveiling the new German government.

五是政党意愿因素。社民党重返第一大党的机遇来之不易，距离其上一次主政已过去了16年之久，因而在大联合政府中处于从属地位的社民党当然格外珍惜这次组阁机会。对于绿党来说，当然更愿意参与社民党主导下的政府，因为两党有过联邦政府联合执政的经历，而且在价值理念上也比其他政党更为接近。自民党曾在2017年大选后中途退出与联盟党的组阁试探性谈判，导致新政府“难产”，这不仅给其自身形象带来了一定的负面影响，也给两党关系留下了阴影，因此自民党也会倾向于选择与社民党结盟，并在谈判中更愿意求同存异，以避免上次谈判失败的教训。所以，当选举结果出来后，绿党率先与自民党展开会谈，并于10月6日正式宣布与社民党开展组建新政府的试探性会谈。10月15日，三党就组阁问题初步达成一致。10月21日，“交通灯联盟”开启正式谈判。11月24日，三党公布联盟协议内容，组阁谈判顺利结束。最终，12月8日，社民党候选人朔尔茨宣布就任总理，绿党领导人哈贝克任副总理兼经济与气候保护部部长，贝尔伯克任外交部长，新一届德国政府正式亮相。

IV. The German Green Party’s Policy Proposals toward China

四、德国绿党的对华政策主张

In the recent German federal election, China became a major topic of heated debate among the participating parties. The governing coalition partners—the Greens, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and the Free Democratic Party (FDP)—all expressed concern about China and, to varying degrees, criticized Merkel’s China policy as “too soft” and “economy-first.” However, comparatively speaking, the Green Party’s ideological coloration is more pronounced, and its stance toward China is more hardline. This can be glimpsed from the party’s election platform’s policy proposals on China and its various statements. We should maintain sufficient vigilance in this regard.

在德国本次大选中，中国成为各参选政党激辩的重要议题。联合执政的绿党、社民党和自民党都表达了对中国的关注，也不同程度地批评过默克尔对华“过于软弱”和“经济至上”。但是，比较而言，绿党的意识形态色彩明显，对华立场更为强硬。这一点可以从该党竞选纲领中的对华政策主张及其各种言论中窥见一斑。对此，我们应该保持足够的警惕。

First, in terms of the overall tone toward China, the Green Party explicitly defines China as a “competitor, cooperation partner, and systemic rival” for Germany and Europe. This is a basic stance that the Green Party has repeatedly clarified and emphasized in its election platform and by its two co-chairs on various occasions. In its election platform, the Green Party explicitly states that it will pursue a value-based foreign policy that defends human rights and guarantees peace, and in the foreign policy section it lists China separately, treating it as a systemic rival. Baerbock, the Green Party chair who now serves as Foreign Minister in the new German federal government, stated in an interview as a candidate for Chancellor that Germany must strive for a policy of “dialogue and toughness” toward China. She argued that while it is difficult for Germany to simply sever relations with China, it must uphold its own values. In the agreement reached by the three parties after the election results emerged, although there was no clear positioning on China policy, it stated that in the future Germany will “pursue multilateral cooperation worldwide, especially close ties with those countries that share our democratic values.” Clearly, emphasizing alliances based on democratic values has become a consensus among the three parties, and China is seen as an “alien” outside this alliance.

首先，在对华基调上，绿党明确将中国定位为德国和欧洲的“竞争者、合作伙伴和系统性对手”。这是绿党在竞选纲领中以及该党两位联合主席在不同场合都一再明确和强调的基本立场。绿党在竞选纲领中明确表示，推行捍卫人权、保障和平的价值观外交，并在对外政策章节将中国单列出来，视为系统性对手。此次在德国新联邦政府中担任外交部长一职的绿党主席贝尔伯克，在作为总理候选人接受采访时就曾表示，德国必须争取对中国采取“对话和强硬”政策。她认为，德国虽然难以简单地断绝与中国的关系，但必须坚持自己的价值观。在选举结果出来后三党会谈达成的协议中，尽管没有就对华政策进行明确定位，但却表示未来将“在世界范围内开展多边合作，特别是与那些分享我们民主价值观的国家密切联系”。显然，强调基于民主价值观的联盟已成为三党的共识，而中国是处于这个联盟之外的“异己”。

Second, in terms of economic and trade relations, the German Green Party hopes to continue developing trade relations with China, striving for the best market access and competitive environment for domestic investment. All major German parties, including the Green Party, fully recognize the need for constructive dialogue and cooperation with China in the economic and trade sphere; maintaining good economic and trade relations with China has become an important external condition for Germany’s economic and social development. However, the Green Party one-sidedly exaggerates China’s heterogeneity in values and its influence and unfair competition in areas such as technology and the economy. During the election campaign, Green Party co-chair Baerbock repeatedly stated explicitly that if the Green Party participated in forming a new government, it would tighten German and European trade policy toward China, emphasizing that trade must be linked to environmental protection and “human rights,” and threatening that “without human rights, there will be no business.” Clearly, this will interfere with future Sino-German economic cooperation, obstruct the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) between China and the EU, and could even lead to its collapse.

其次，在经贸关系方面，德国绿党希望继续发展对华贸易关系，为本国投资争取最佳的市场准入和竞争环境。包括绿党在内的德国各主要政党都充分认识到，必须与中国进行建设性对话并在经贸领域寻求合作，与中国搞好经贸关系已经成为德国经济社会发展的一个重要外部条件。但是，绿党又片面夸大中国在价值观上的异质性，以及在科技、经济等领域的影响力和不公平竞争。德国绿党联合主席贝尔伯克在竞选过程中曾多次明确表示，若德国绿党参与组建新政府，将收紧德国和欧洲的对华贸易政策，强调贸易必须与环保和“人权”挂钩，扬言“没有人权就不做生意”。显然，这会对未来的中德经济合作形成干扰，给《中欧全面投资协定》（CAI）的落地带来阻挠，甚至导致其流产。

Third, regarding China’s internal affairs, the German Green Party insists on starting from so-called human rights principles, constantly accusing China of “viol

再次，在中国的内政方面，德国绿党坚持从所谓的人权原则出发，不断指责中国“侵犯人权”“压制言论自由” “强制劳动”等。另外，绿党的主要票源地巴伐利亚州是“东突”分子在德国境内的主要活动基地，未来由绿党参加的新政府也许会在涉疆、涉藏等问题上加大对中国的施压力度。

Finally, in the area of climate change and environmental protection, the Greens hope to engage in constructive dialogue with China while emphasizing that this must not come at the expense of third countries or “human rights and civil rights.” Ecological protection is a very important field in the constructive cooperation between Germany and China. Resolving global issues of concern to the Greens and their governing coalition partners, such as climate change and carbon neutrality, requires China’s cooperation. This is the fundamental reason why Green Party leaders stress that “ties with China cannot be severed.” However, while emphasizing “joint efforts” and “compliance with sustainable production standards and transparent roadmaps,” the Greens also stress that the purpose is to “address China’s climate crisis,” implicitly pointing to China’s international responsibility for environmental protection. At the same time, they still do not forget “human rights principles,” demanding that “cooperation with China must never come at the expense of third countries or human and civil rights.” Therefore, ecological and climate protection policies can serve both as a new breakthrough for the new German government to open Sino-German cooperation and as another pretext for pressuring China.

最后，在气候变化与环境保护方面，绿党希望与中国开展建设性对话，同时强调不能以牺牲第三国或“人权和公民权利”为代价。在德国与中国开展的建设性合作中，生态保护是其中一个非常重要的领域，要解决绿党和执政盟友所关心的气候变化、碳中和等全球性议题，需要中国的合作，这也是绿党领导人之所以强调“不能与中国切断联系”的根本原因。但是，绿党在强调“共同努力”、“遵守可持续生产标准和透明路线图”的同时，也强调目的是为了“应对中国的气候危机”，暗指中国对环境保护的国际责任；同时仍然不忘“人权原则”，“要求与中国间的合作绝不能以牺牲第三国或人权和公民权利为代价”。因此，生态环境和气候保护政策既可以成为德国新政府开启中德合作的新突破口，也有可能成为其对中国施压的又一个借口。

V. Conclusion

五、结语

Although the German Green Party has shed much of the strong idealism of its founding period and gradually moved toward realism, its ideological coloration remains pronounced, and it still adheres to traditional values. To some extent, this is an important factor that helped the Greens win the election and enter government, and it may also become an important driving force for adjusting Germany’s foreign relations. Therefore, we should maintain a relatively clear-headed understanding of the impact of the Greens’ return to the federal government and their China policy.

德国绿党尽管已褪去初创时浓厚的理想主义色彩，逐渐走向现实主义，但意识形态色彩仍然明显，对传统的价值观依然坚守。这一点在某种程度上是促成绿党赢得选举进而参政的一个重要因素，同时也有可能成为推动德国对外关系调整的一个重要动力。因此，对于绿党重返联邦政府及其对华政策的影响，我们应有一个相对清醒的认识。

First, we should not simplistically judge that the rise of the German Green Party, due to its left-wing coloration, is more conducive to the development of Sino-German and Sino-European relations. In fact, in this federal election, almost all major German parties mentioned China in their election platforms. Comparatively, in the German Green Party’s election platform, the section on China policy is the longest and the tone is the hardest. The party one-sidedly exaggerates China’s heterogeneity in terms of values and its influence in science, technology, and economics. This attitude will, to a certain extent, influence the views of the German public and other political parties toward China, and may even directly push the German government and the EU to adjust their current China policy in a more hardline direction. This has been confirmed by research reports from multiple research institutions, including the Mercator Institute for China Studies.

首先，不能因德国绿党的左翼色彩而简单地判断其上台更有利于中德关系、中欧关系的发展。事实上，在这次联邦大选中，德国几乎所有主要政党都在自己的竞选纲领中提到中国，相比之下，在德国绿党的竞选纲领中，对华政策的篇幅最大，态度也最为强硬。该党片面夸大中国在价值观方面的异质性以及在科技和经济方面的影响力，这种态度会在一定程度上影响德国民众和其他政党对中国的看法，甚至会直接推动德国政府乃至欧盟调整现行对华政策，并趋于强硬。这一点已被包括德国智库墨卡托中国研究中心（Mercator Institute for China Studies）在内的多个研究机构的研究报告所确认。

Second, the German Green Party’s hardline stance toward China does not mean it is pro-American. In fact, the Greens have repeatedly called on Germany and the EU not to rely excessively on external forces, where “external forces” include both China and the United States. In the view of Robert Habeck, co-leader of the German Greens, Europe follows a social-ecological market economy, which differs from both China and the United States. However, the differences with China are not only policy-related but also value-based, which is why China is regarded as a systemic rival. Similarly, the German Greens’ attitude toward China and Russia differs. Relatively speaking, they are more hardline when mentioning Russia, while when mentioning China, alongside expressing a hardline stance, they also acknowledge the necessity of dialogue and cooperation with China. Clearly, the German Greens’ goal is to build a strong European value community capable of effectively withstanding crises, in order to reduce dependence on external forces—and this is not directed solely at China.

其次，德国绿党对华强硬并不意味着亲美。实际上，绿党多次呼吁德国和欧盟不要过度依赖外部力量，这里的外部力量既包括中国，也包括美国。在德国绿党联合领导人哈贝克看来，欧洲是社会—生态市场经济，与中美都有差别。只不过与中国的差异，除了政策上的，还有价值观上的，因此将中国视为系统性对手。同样，德国绿党对中俄的态度也是有区别的，相对而言，它提及俄罗斯时更为强硬，而提及中国时，则在表达强硬态度的同时，也承认与中国开展对话合作的必要性。显然，德国绿党的目标是建设一个强大的、能够有效抵御危机的欧洲价值共同体，以减少对外部势力的依赖，而不单单针对中国。

Finally, there is no necessary connection between the German Green Party’s tough stance during the election campaign and its governing policies after taking office. From the perspective of its electoral strategy, the emphasis on and toughness toward China during the campaign were more a consideration for winning votes. Once in power, the German Green Party must face political reality and confront a dilemma: on the one hand, based on the “principle of values,” it must adopt a tough attitude toward China; on the other hand, in the face of global challenges such as climate change, the pandemic, terrorism, and immigration, it has no choice but to cooperate with China. Moreover, Germany’s economic development itself cannot be separated from China; China has been Germany’s most important trading partner for five consecutive years. If the German Green Party cannot balance these two aspects, it will encounter what former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder called “the limitations of a ‘moral diplomacy’ that simply places values above real interests,” and it will be even less likely to provide a way out and a model for the divided Western democracies to escape the predicament of political polarization, as some Western scholars expect.

最后，德国绿党竞选时的强硬态度与其执政后的施政方针没有必然联系。从其选举策略上看，竞选时对中国的重视和强硬，更多地是出于争取选票的考虑。一旦执政，德国绿党就必须面对政治现实，面临两难选择：一方面基于“价值观原则”，要对中国采取强硬态度；另一方面，面对全球性挑战，如气候变化、疫情、恐怖主义、移民等问题，又不得不与中国合作，况且德国经济发展本身也离不开中国，中国已经连续5年成为德国最重要的贸易伙伴。如果德国绿党不能平衡好这两方面的关系，就会出现德国前总理施罗德所说的“将价值观简单地置于现实利益之上的‘道德外交’的局限性”，更不可能像西方学者所期待那样，为分裂的西方民主国家走出政治极化困境提供出路和示范。

In view of this, after the German Green Party participates in governing and occupies the position of foreign minister, Germany’s relationship with China may face adjustment or even reconstruction, while at the same time there is also the possibility and room for improvement. This possibility and space come not only from the practical needs after its participation in government but also from the consensus between the two countries on related concepts, such as sustainable development, the aspiration for peace, and non-violence.

有鉴于此，德国绿党参与执政并占据了外交部长席位后，德国与中国的关系或将面临调整甚至重构，同时也有向好的可能性与努力空间。这种可能性和空间既来自其参与执政后的现实需要，也来自两国在相关理念上的共识，例如，可持续性发展、向往和平、非暴力等主张。

(Authors: Xuan Chuanshu, School of Marxism, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences; Key Research Base of the Ministry of Education, Center for the Study of the Great Founding Spirit of the CPC at East China University of Political Science and Law; Zhao Xiaohui, Institute of Information, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences)

（作者：轩传树，上海社会科学院马克思主义学院，教育部重点研究基地高校中国共产党伟大建党精神研究中心华东政法大学分中心；赵晓慧，上海社会科学院信息研究所）

(This article is a phased result of the National Social Science Fund Major Project “Research on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics under the Broad Vision, Large Pattern, and Great Trend of World Socialism.”)

（本文系国家社会科学基金重大项目“世界社会主义发展大视野大格局大趋势下的中国特色社会主义研究”的阶段性成果。）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心