An Examination and Reflection on Sohn-Rethel’s Genetic Origin of “Historical Materialism” from the Perspective of Marxism

Historical materialism occupies a very important position in Marxist philosophy, and the intensity of scholarly research on it, both domestically and internationally, has never diminished. In Habermas’s view, on the one hand, the theory of communicative action is connected to the foundations of historical materialism; on the other hand, where historical materialism touches upon evolutionary theory, one encounters “problems that need to be considered in terms of communicative theory.” Hence, he attempts to use communicative theory to “reconstruct” historical materialism and insists that “communicative theory can contribute to a renewed historical materialism.” [1]1 Jürgen Habermas, *Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976), p. 9. The German philosopher Alfred Sohn-Rethel also devoted himself to exploring historical materialism. He once claimed to have “discovered the leading principle of historical materialism” and spent his life elaborating on it, with his achievements primarily embodied in his book *Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology* (hereinafter referred to as *Intellectual and Manual Labour*). [2]2 Alfred Sohn-Rethel, *Geistige und körperliche Arbeit: Zur Epistemologie der abendländischen Geschichte*, rev. ed. (Weinheim: VCH, Acta Humaniora, 1989). Sohn-Rethel’s “new” understanding of historical materialism mainly lies in “linking Marx’s historical materialism with the genetic question of ‘origin’.” That is to say, by exploring the historical-materialist origins of rational knowledge, reification, the subject, and other objects, Sohn-Rethel attempts to explain the genetic origin of historical materialism at the micro level. Theodor Adorno, in turn, summarized Sohn-Rethel’s theoretical inquiry into historical materialism with the proposition that “historical materialism is the recollection of origin.” [3]3 Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialektik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1966), p. 294. So, how exactly should we understand the interpretation of historical materialism made by Sohn-Rethel and Adorno, who link it with the genetic question of “origin”? What are the rationality and limitations of understanding historical materialism in this way? This article will answer the first question through a detailed examination of Sohn-Rethel’s investigation into the historical-materialist origins of rational knowledge and reification, and will answer the second question based on Marx’s analysis of the historical-materialist origin of the money form in *Capital*.

历史唯物主义在马克思主义哲学中处于十分重要的地位，国内外学者对它的研究热度始终不减。在哈贝马斯看来，一方面，交往行动理论与历史唯物主义的基础存在联系；另一方面，在历史唯物主义涉及进化理论的地方，会遇到“需要用交往理论来考虑的问题”，因而他试图引用交往理论来“重建”历史唯物主义，并坚持认为“交往理论能够对得到了更新的历史唯物主义做出贡献”。德国哲学家索恩－雷特尔同样致力于探讨历史唯物主义，他曾声称自己“发现了历史唯物主义的主导原理”，并终其一生予以阐释，其成果主要体现在他的著作《脑力劳动与体力劳动：西方历史的认识论》（后文简称“《脑力劳动与体力劳动》”）一书中。索恩－雷特尔对历史唯物主义所作的“新”的理解主要在于“将马克思的历史唯物主义与发生学意义上的‘起源’问题关联了起来”。也就是说，索恩－雷特尔通过对理性知识、物化和主体等对象的历史唯物主义起源的探寻，试图在微观层面阐释历史唯物主义的发生学起源。西奥多·阿多诺则用“历史唯物主义是对起源的回忆”这一命题来概括了索恩－雷特尔有关历史唯物主义的理论探究。那么，究竟该如何理解索恩－雷特尔和阿多诺将历史唯物主义与发生学意义上的“起源”问题联系起来，并在此基础上对历史唯物主义所作的解读呢？如此理解历史唯物主义，其合理性和局限性何在？本文将通过细致考察索恩－雷特尔对理性知识、物化的历史唯物主义起源的考察来回答第一个问题，同时依据马克思在《资本论》中关于货币形式的历史唯物主义的起源的分析来解答第二个问题。

I. Sohn-Rethel’s Investigation into the Historical-Materialist Origin of Rational Knowledge

一、索恩－雷特尔对理性知识之历史唯物主义起源的考察

The investigation into the historical-materialist origin of rational knowledge is, in a certain sense, one of the core contents explored by Sohn-Rethel in *Intellectual and Manual Labour*. It is precisely through this theoretical exploration that Sohn-Rethel attempts to link historical materialism with the genetic sense of “origin,” thereby enabling Adorno to propose the proposition that “historical materialism is the recollection of origin.” Furthermore, Sohn-Rethel claims that although Marx accurately asserted that human consciousness arises from human social practice, he “did not establish a materialist viewpoint on scientific knowledge.” [4]4 Sohn-Rethel, *Geistige und körperliche Arbeit*, p. 13. This view is clearly incorrect.

对理性知识之历史唯物主义起源的考察，一定意义上乃是索恩－雷特尔在《脑力劳动与体力劳动》一书中探讨的核心内容之一，也正是通过这一理论探索，索恩－雷特尔试图将历史唯物主义与发生学意义上的“起源”关联起来，进而阿多诺得以提出“历史唯物主义是对起源的回忆”这一命题。此外，索恩－雷特尔声称，尽管马克思准确论断了人的意识产生于人的社会实践，但却“并没有建立起关于科学知识的唯物主义观点”。这种观点显然是不正确的。

Sohn-Rethel’s investigation into the historical-materialist origin of rational knowledge is, in fact, an attempt to further explain, at the micro level, an important thesis of Marx’s historical materialism: that the social being of people determines their consciousness. Therefore, this article’s analysis of the proposition “historical materialism is the recollection of origin” begins first with this theoretical exploration by Sohn-Rethel. Sohn-Rethel critically points out that although Kant had already asked questions such as “how is pure mathematics possible?” and “how is pure natural science possible?” in an attempt to lay the foundation for the origin of rational knowledge, in Kant’s view, “the original, true question of origin became deformed, transformed into the task of merely carrying out an immanent analysis of ‘our cognitive faculty’.” [5]5 Ibid., p. 14. It can be considered that Kant’s investigation into the origin of rational knowledge is a kind of apriorism, non-historical materialism. Therefore, Sohn-Rethel criticizes Kant for merely “demonstrating the self-founding autonomy of intellectual labour” and persists in critically settling accounts with the apriorism represented by Kant, arguing that “the critical refutation of apriorism must necessarily be a refutation of the idealist position at the core of the apriorist argument.” [6]6 Ibid., p. 15.

索恩－雷特尔对理性知识之历史唯物主义起源的考察，事实上是想要在微观层面上进一步阐释马克思有关历史唯物主义的一个重要论断，即人们的社会存在决定人们的意识。因此，本文对“历史唯物主义是对起源的回忆”这一命题的分析，首先就从索恩－雷特尔的这一理论探索开始。索恩－雷特尔批判性地指出，尽管康德已经追问了“纯粹数学是如何可能的”以及“纯粹自然科学是如何可能的”这样的问题，试图为理性知识的起源奠定根基，但是，在康德那里，理性知识“最初的真正的起源问题变得畸形了，变成了执行单纯内在地分析‘我们的认识能力’这一任务”。可以认为康德关于理性知识起源的考察是一种先天论的，非历史唯物主义的。所以索恩－雷特尔批判康德只是在“证明脑力劳动的自我奠定的自律”，并且执着于对以康德为代表的先天论进行批判性清算，认为“对先天论的批判性反驳必然是对处于先天论之论证核心的唯心主义立场的反驳”。

Sohn-Rethel praises Marx for “from the very beginning conceiving of the time that controls the origin and change of forms as historical time, the time of natural history or the time of human history,” [7]7 Ibid., p. 16. but he believes that further explanation of the genetic origin of historical materialism is needed at the micro level. The difficulty of the problem lies in clarifying how people’s rational knowledge, rational thinking, and established concepts are gradually generated step by step from people’s social practice. Sohn-Rethel answers this question through the following two steps.

索恩－雷特尔称赞马克思“从一开始就将控制着形式的起源与变化的时间设想为历史的时间，自然历史的时间或人类历史的时间”，但他认为还需要从微观层面对历史唯物主义起源作出进一步的解释。问题的难点就在于，阐明人们的理性知识、理性思维、既成的概念等等，究竟是如何从人们的社会实践中一步步产生出来的？索恩－雷特尔是通过如下两个步骤来解答这一问题的。

First, Sohn-Rethel proposes a concept of real abstraction (*Realabstraktion*) that is different from thought abstraction. He points out: “In order to properly understand Marx’s work in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, with regard to the phenomenon of commodity abstraction or value abstraction revealed in the analysis of commodities, its aforementioned characteristics must be judged as a real abstraction.” [8]8 Ibid., p. 38. As for real abstraction, it “although exists only in human thought, does not originate from thought. It is directly of a social nature, its origin lying in the spatiotemporal domain of intercourse between human beings. It is not human beings, but their actions, their mutual actions, that produce this abstraction.” [9]9 Ibid., p. 38. For this exposition by Sohn-Rethel, we need to make two points of analysis: First, two types of abstraction can be distinguished: thought abstraction and real abstraction. What originates from thought itself is thought abstraction, while what originates from human actions or the mutual actions between people is real abstraction. Second, although real abstraction also exists in human thought, its primary source is not thought but human social practice. Perhaps explaining real abstraction in this way is still somewhat abstract; however, we can further grasp it with the help of the typical representative of real abstraction—commodity abstraction. According to Sohn-Rethel’s view, commodity abstraction is a typical real abstraction: “It is not created by thinkers; its origin is not in human thought, but in human action.” [10]10 Ibid., p. 39. Commodity abstraction actually refers to the abstraction of the commodity form, meaning that the commodity form is abstract; “abstractness envelops it entirely.” [11]11 Ibid., p. 40. In fact, the commodity form is a composite of natural form and value form; it is precisely the value form that makes the commodity form abstract. In Marx’s words, “Not an atom of matter enters into the objectivity of commodities as values.” [12]12 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1976), p. 138. The natural form of the commodity means that the commodity itself is first a sensuous, graspable thing, while its value form means that it is an embodiment of an abstract human social relation. Furthermore, the magnitude of value involved in the commodity form also stands as an abstract quantity in opposition to the commodity as a quantity of natural matter. Moreover, the magnitude of a commodity’s value is ultimately determined by the abstract human labor congealed in it. Therefore, the commodity is abstract. The key point is that commodity abstraction, this typical real abstraction, is not an abstraction that people first grasp in thought and then put into practice; rather, it directly originates from people’s social practical activities. On this, Marx points out: “They do not know it, but they do it.” [13]13 Ibid., pp. 166–167. Thus, the formation of commodity abstraction, i.e., real abstraction: first, it arises in people’s exchange activities, that is, in their concrete practical activities; second, this abstraction arises without people being aware of it, completed in a state of unconsciousness. This explains that the so-called commodity abstraction, real abstraction, indeed does not directly originate from people’s thought, and therefore it is a type of abstraction different from thought abstraction. Hence, Sohn-Rethel judges real abstraction as an abstraction different from thought abstraction and considers it to arise directly from human actions, from the activities between people.

首先，索恩－雷特尔提出了一种不同于思维抽象的现实抽象（Real Abstraction）概念。他指出：“为了恰当地理解马克思在《政治经济学批判》中所做的工作，就商品分析中所揭示出的商品抽象或价值抽象现象而言，必须将其上述特征判定为一种现实抽象”，至于现实抽象，它“虽然不过是存在于人的思维之中的，但是它却并不是源自思维的。它直接地是一种社会本性，其起源存在于人与人之间交往的时空领域之中。不是人，而是人的行为、人们之间的相互行为产生了这一抽象。”对于索恩－雷特尔的这一论述，我们需要作两点分析：其一，可以区分两种抽象，一是思维抽象，二是现实抽象。源自思维本身的即为思维抽象，而源自人的行为的或人们之间相互行为的则是现实抽象。其二，现实抽象虽然也存在于人的思维之中，但它的第一来源不是思维，而是人的社会实践。或许这样阐发现实抽象仍然有些抽象，不过，我们可以借助现实抽象的典型代表——商品抽象，来对它作进一步的把握。按照索恩－雷特尔的看法，商品抽象就是典型的现实抽象，“它不是由思想家创造出来的，它的起源不在人的思维之中，而在人的行动之中”。商品抽象其实意指的是商品形式抽象，也就是说商品形式是抽象的，“抽象性整个地笼罩在它的周围”。事实上，商品形式乃是自然形式和价值形式的复合体，恰恰是价值形式使得商品形式是抽象的，用马克思的话来说，“在商品体的价值对象性中连一个自然物质原子也没有”。商品的自然形式意味着商品本身首先是一个可感觉的、能把捉的物，而商品的价值形式则意味它乃是一种抽象的人的社会关系的体现。此外，商品形式所涉及的价值量也是作为一种抽象的量同商品作为自然物质的量相对立。再者，商品的价值量归根结底乃是由凝结在商品中的抽象的人类劳动所决定的。所以，商品是抽象的。问题的关键是，商品抽象这种典型的现实抽象，不是由人们首先在思维中作了把握之后再付诸实践的抽象，而是直接来源于人们的社会实践活动。对此，马克思指出：“他们在交换中使他们的各种产品作为价值彼此相等，也就使他们的各种劳动作为人类劳动而彼此相等。他们没有意识到这一点，但是他们这样做了。”由此可见，商品抽象也即现实抽象的形成：第一，是在人们的交换活动中，也就是在人们具体的实践活动中产生出来的；第二，这种抽象的产生是人们没有意识到的，是人们在无意识的状态下完成的，这就说明了所谓的商品抽象、现实抽象，的确不是从人们的思维中直接产生的，因而它是一种有别于思维抽象的抽象。由此，索恩－雷特尔将现实抽象判定为一种不同于思维抽象的抽象，并认为它直接产生于人的行为、人们相互之间的活动。

Next, after proposing the concept of real abstraction, Sohn-Rethel further demonstrates that real abstraction can transition into mental abstraction and thereby influence human thought. Sohn-Rethel recognizes that not all mental abstractions originate from real abstractions, while also acknowledging that some mental abstractions must indeed derive from real abstractions. However, how exactly does real abstraction transition into mental abstraction? This question had not been explored before Sohn-Rethel. In Sohn-Rethel’s view, “the transition from social real abstraction to mental abstraction suffers from a serious deficiency: for thinkers, the concept as a result has always been and remains incomprehensible, because they cannot approach its origin.” [14]14 Alfred Sohn-Rethel, *Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1978), p. 57. This statement implies that people have not yet successfully established a connection between mental abstraction and real abstraction—that is, they have not found the historical-materialist origin of mental abstraction. Therefore, Sohn-Rethel seeks to clarify “the manner in which real abstraction transitions into thought, and the role it plays in thought.” Sohn-Rethel identifies the answer to this question in money. In his view, money can become the key to the transition from real abstraction to mental abstraction for the following three reasons: First, money itself is a special commodity; in Marx’s words, “money is a commodity, an external object capable of becoming the private property of anyone,” [15]15 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 129. so commodity abstraction applies equally to money—that is, money is also abstract and constitutes a real abstraction. Second, it is precisely this real abstraction of money that can produce a “social-synthetic” result even when people are entirely unaware of what it is. Through money as an abstract intermediary, an abstract social network formed unconsciously envelops people, and thus people’s production, life, thought activities, and so forth all proceed under the influence of this abstract network. Hence, Sohn-Rethel asserts that “the social function of money, through its formal determinations, creates thought—namely, what Hegel called ‘metaphysical’ thought.” [16]16 Sohn-Rethel, *Intellectual and Manual Labour*, p. 59. Clearly, money itself represents real abstraction, and it is precisely capable of achieving social synthesis and forming a universal abstract network, thereby influencing people’s thought. Therefore, money is indeed the key to the transition from real abstraction to mental abstraction. Third, in Sohn-Rethel’s view, the theoretical subject—that is, the thinking subject—emerges “from the identification that people carry out through money.” [17]17 Ibid., p. 63. In this way, Sohn-Rethel links the theoretical subject to money, which is tantamount to saying that the mental abstraction of the subject is directly influenced by the real abstraction of money. Thus, through money and its social-synthetic function, Sohn-Rethel elucidates the manner in which real abstraction transitions into mental abstraction.

接着，在提出了现实抽象这一概念之后，索恩－雷特尔进一步证明现实抽象是可以向思维抽象过渡，并进而影响人的思维的。索恩－雷特尔认识到并非所有的思维抽象都来自现实抽象，同时也认识到必定有一些思维抽象是来源于现实抽象的。不过，现实抽象究竟是如何过渡到思维抽象的呢？这一问题在索恩－雷特尔之前还没有人进行探究。在索恩－雷特尔看来，“社会的现实抽象向思维抽象的转变存在着严重不足：对于思想家来说，作为结果的概念是并且一直是不可思议的，因为他们难以接近其起源”。这一论述意味着人们还没能成功建立起思维抽象与现实抽象之间的联系，也就是说没能为思维抽象找到其历史唯物主义的起源。因此，索恩－雷特尔力图阐明“现实抽象是以何种方式过渡到思维之中的，它在思维中扮演着何种角色”。索恩－雷特尔将问题的答案锁定在了货币上。在他看来，货币之所以能够成为现实抽象过渡到思维抽象的关键，其原因在于如下三点：第一，货币本身就是一种特殊的商品，用马克思的话说，“货币本身是商品，是可以成为任何人的私产的外界物”，因而商品抽象同样适用于货币，也就是说货币也是抽象的，并且也是一种现实抽象。第二，恰恰是货币这一现实抽象，能够在人们对其所是全无所知的情况下造成“社会—综合”的结果。通过货币这一抽象物作为中介，一张在人们无意识之下形成的抽象的社会网络便笼罩在了人们周围，由此人们的生产生活、思维活动等等无不是在这一抽象网络的影响下进行。因此，索恩－雷特尔断言“货币的社会功能通过其形式规定性创造出了思维，即黑格尔所称的‘形而上学的’思维”。可见，货币本身代表着现实抽象，而它又恰恰能够实现社会综合并形成普遍的抽象网络，进而影响人们的思维。因此，货币的确是现实抽象过渡到思维抽象的关键。第三，在索恩－雷特尔看来，理论主体，也就是能思维的主体，是“从人借助货币而进行的同一化中产生出来的”。这样一来，索恩－雷特尔将理论主体与货币也联系起来，而这就相当于是说，主体之思维抽象受到货币这一现实抽象的直接影响。如此，索恩－雷特尔通过货币及其社会综合功能阐明了现实抽象向思维抽象过渡的方式。

In summary, through two steps (first, proposing the concept of real abstraction; second, elucidating the manner in which real abstraction transitions into mental abstraction via money and its social-synthetic function), Sohn-Rethel has identified the historical-materialist origin of rational knowledge, locating it in human social existence and its practice. Therefore, by examining the historical-materialist origin of rational knowledge, Sohn-Rethel attempts to connect historical materialism with the genetic sense of “origin” at a concrete and micro level, thereby making the “historical materialism” he understands a kind of “historical materialism” that recollects the origin of an object.

综上所述，索恩－雷特尔通过两个步骤（其一，提出现实抽象概念，其二，透过货币及其社会综合功能阐明现实抽象向思维抽象过渡的方式），探明了理性知识的历史唯物主义起源，将理性知识的起源定位到人的社会存在及其实践。因此，索恩－雷特尔通过考察理性知识的历史唯物主义起源，试图在具体而微观的层面上将历史唯物主义与发生学意义上的“起源”联系起来，从而使得他所理解的“历史唯物主义”成为一种对某对象的起源作回忆的“历史唯物主义”。

II. Sohn-Rethel’s Investigation of the Historical-Materialist Origin of Reification

二、索恩－雷特尔对物化之历史唯物主义起源的探究

Sohn-Rethel connects historical materialism with the genetic sense of “origin” and thereby attempts to offer a new interpretation of historical materialism. This goal is achieved not only through examining the historical-materialist origin of rational knowledge but also through investigating the historical-materialist origin of reification and subjectivity. In his work *Intellectual and Manual Labour*, Sohn-Rethel devotes a section to discussing the origin of reification, stating unequivocally that “the historical origin of reification (Verdinglichung) is exploitation.” [18]18 Ibid., p. 71. We can analyze this by answering two questions: First, what is the meaning of reification as understood by Sohn-Rethel? Second, through what argument does Sohn-Rethel demonstrate that reification originates from exploitation?

索恩－雷特尔将历史唯物主义与发生学意义上的“起源”联系起来，进而试图对历史唯物主义作出新阐发，这一目的的实现不仅仅是通过对理性知识的历史唯物主义起源的考察来完成的，同时也借助了对物化、主体性之历史唯物主义起源的考察。索恩－雷特尔在其作品《脑力劳动与体力劳动》中特地安排了一节内容对物化的起源进行了探讨，他开宗明义地指出，“物化（Verdinglichung）的历史起源是剥削”。对此，我们可以通过回答两个问题来加以分析：第一，索恩－雷特尔所理解的物化有何含义？第二，索恩－雷特尔是通过怎样的论证来阐明物化起源于剥削的？

Regarding the meaning of reification, Sohn-Rethel states: “Reification issues from the root of exploitation. In this root, identity, thing-form, and determinate being have their historical, human, and practical origin.” [19]19 Ibid. This statement indicates that the reification understood by Sohn-Rethel contains three levels of content.

关于物化的含义，索恩－雷特尔论述说：“物化出自剥削这一根源。在这根源中，同一性、物形式和定在有其历史的、属人的和实践的起源。”这一论述表明了索恩－雷特尔所理解的物化包含有三个层次的内容。

The first is identity. This level of reification, present in Marx, Lukács, and Adorno, actually means that individuals with rich thoughts and personal independence become highly identical persons, akin to replicated robots. For example, in *Capital*, when discussing “machinery and large-scale industry,” Marx points out the reification that the capitalist use of machinery imposes on workers: “The machine does not free the worker from work, but makes his work contentless,” and “the dead mechanism exists independently of the worker, and the worker is incorporated into it as a living appendage.” [20]20 Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, pp. 486-487. Thus, Marx believes that the reification of identity occurring in workers means that in capitalist society, due to the large-scale use of machinery, workers become appendages of the great machine; their rich individuality, spiritual freedom, and other human traits are devastated, and they are degraded into identical objects serving partial machines. Following Marx’s exposition of alienation, Lukács’s concept of reification also includes this level of meaning. He points out: “The worker must face the individual machine, the entrepreneur must face a certain type of machine development, and the technician must face the state of science and its profitable technical application, in such a way that the differences between them signify only quantitative differences, not directly qualitative differences in the structure of consciousness.” [21]21 Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness* (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1992), p. 156. Here, Lukács emphasizes not only the reification of workers in capitalist society but also that of entrepreneurs and technicians, who, because “the reified structure increasingly, fatefully, and decisively sinks into human consciousness,” become identical “persons”—with only quantitative differences, not qualitative differences in the structure of consciousness.

其一是同一性。物化所具有的这一层次的内涵，在马克思、卢卡奇以及阿多诺那里皆有，它实际上意味着具有丰富思想、个体独立性的人成了类似复制机器人之间的具有高度同一性的个人。例如马克思在《资本论》中论述“机器和大工业”时，就曾指出机器的资本主义运用给工人带来的物化，即“机器不是使工人摆脱劳动，而是使工人的劳动毫无内容”，“死机构独立于工人而存在，工人被当作活的附属物并入死机构”。可见，马克思认为，发生在工人身上的同一性的物化意味着，在资本主义社会中，由于机器的大规模运用，工人成为大机器的附属物，他们丰富的个性、精神的自由等属人的特质受到摧残，他们被降格为同一性的、服侍局部机器的物。卢卡奇循着马克思对异化的阐发而提出的物化，也包含有这一层次的内涵，他指出：“工人必须这样面对个别的机器，企业家必须这样面对一定类型的机器发展，技术员必须这样面对科学的状况和它在技术上运用的有利可图，使他们之间的区别只意味着量的差别，而不直接就是意识结构上的质的区别。”在这里，卢卡奇不仅强调了资本主义社会中工人的物化，还强调了企业家、技术员的物化，他们由于“物化结构越来越深入地、注定地、决定性地沉浸入人的意识里”，而成为同一性的“人”——只有量的差别，而无意识结构上的质的区别。

The second is thing-form. This level of reification means that human attributes and human social relations take on the form of things. Regarding this meaning of reification, Marx points out: “Some things are not commodities in themselves, such as conscience, honor, etc., but can be sold by their possessors for money, and through their price, acquire the commodity form.” [22]22 Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, p. 123. This statement clearly shows that Marx already saw that human attributes—including conscience and honor—take on the form of things in capitalist society. Furthermore, Marx also states: “In the eyes of the producers, the social relations between their private labors appear as what they are… as material relations between persons and social relations between things.” [23]23 Ibid., p. 90. Clearly, Marx here simultaneously sees that the social relations between people in capitalist society also take on the form of things.

其二是物形式。这一层次的物化意味着人的特质以及人的社会关系等采取了物的形式。这一含义的物化，马克思指出：“有些东西本身并不是商品，例如良心、名誉等等，但是也可以被它们的占有者出卖以换取金钱，并通过它们的价格，取得商品形式。”这一论述非常明显地展示出马克思已然看到资本主义社会中属人的特质——包括良心、名誉等采取了物的形式。此外，马克思还指出：“在生产者面前，他们的私人劳动的社会关系就表现为现在这个样子……表现为人们之间的物的关系和物之间的社会关系。”显然，马克思在这里同时看到了资本主义社会中人与人的社会关系也采取了物的形式。

The third is Dasein. Sohn-Rethel states, “Dasein is the negation of the historical origin of reification.” It is not difficult for us to find that the reification expressed by “Dasein” refers to treating a certain object as a constant existence, thereby neglecting the historical origin of this object. In fact, Marx also discussed this level of reification. In the *Communist Manifesto*, when criticizing the bourgeoisie, Marx said: “Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law for all, a will whose essential character and direction are determined by the economic conditions of existence of your class.” [24]24 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), Chapter 2. The English translation here follows the standard version; the Chinese text in the original paragraph is a paraphrase. This statement precisely indicates the reification of bourgeois consciousness, that is, the bourgeoisie regards the capitalist mode of production and its relations of ownership as eternal, as a kind of “Dasein.” Therefore, the reification understood by Sohn-Rethel has certain similarities with the reification understood by Marx, although there are also differences between the two.

其三是定在。索恩－雷特尔说，“定在是对物化的历史起源的否定”。我们不难发现“定在”所表达的物化意指的是将某种对象视为一种恒定的存在，进而忽视这种对象的历史起源。其实，这一层次的物化内涵，马克思也曾论述过。在《共产党宣言》中，马克思在批判资产阶级时曾说：“你们的利己观念使你们把自己的生产关系和所有制关系从历史的、在生产过程中是暂时的关系变成永恒的自然规律和理性规律”。这一论述正是表明了资产阶级意识的物化，即资产阶级将资本主义生产方式及其所有制关系视为是永恒的，视为是一种“定在”。所以，索恩－雷特尔所理解的物化与马克思所理解的物化具有一定相似，不过两者也有所不同。

How exactly does Sohn-Rethel argue that reification originates from exploitation? In fact, from Marx’s critique of the reification existing in capitalist society, we can already grasp that the emergence of reification is closely related to developed commodity production and its specific mode of production, or mode of exploitation. To say that Marx emphasized developed commodity production as one of the preconditions for the emergence of reification is because, when discussing reification in *Capital*, Marx clearly pointed out: “The division of the product of labour into a useful thing and a thing possessing value occurs in practice only when exchange has already acquired a sufficient extension and importance.” [25]25 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Chapter 1, Section 4: “The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret Thereof.” The English translation follows the standard edition. What is referred to here as “the division of the product of labour into a useful thing and a thing possessing value” actually means the transformation of the product of labour into a commodity, because a commodity has the dual attributes of use-value and exchange-value, and this transformation can only be completed when exchange is sufficiently extensive and important. Only when this division of the product of labour is completed can social relations between people be gradually replaced or obscured by relations between things and between commodities, and this is precisely the basis for the emergence of reification. Therefore, from this dimension, it is not unreasonable that Marx believed the emergence of reification is highly correlated with developed commodity production. Of course, in Marx’s view, the emergence of reification is also closely related to the specific mode of production of capitalism. We will not discuss this point in detail here, but will only follow the first condition pointed out by Marx for the emergence of reification to further analyze how Sohn-Rethel locates the origin of reification in exploitation.

索恩－雷特尔究竟是如何论证物化起源于剥削的呢？实际上，我们在马克思对资本主义社会存在的物化的批判中已经能够把握到，物化的产生是与发达的商品生产以及其特有生产方式或者说剥削方式密切相关的。说马克思强调发达商品生产是物化产生的前提条件之一，乃是因为马克思在《资本论》中论及物化时明确指出，“劳动产品分裂为有用物和价值物，实际上只是发生在交换已经十分广泛和十分重要的时候”。这里所言的“劳动产品分裂为有用物和价值物”实际上就是指劳动产品转变为商品，因为商品具有使用价值和交换价值双重属性，而这一转变是需要在交换十分广泛和重要的时候才能完成的。只有当劳动产品的这种分裂完成，人们的社会关系才能逐渐由物的关系及商品之间的关系所取代或掩盖，而这恰恰是物化产生之基础。因此，从这个维度来看，马克思认为物化的产生与发达的商品生产高度相关是不无道理的。当然，在马克思那里，物化的产生还与资本主义特有的生产方式密切相关，这一点我们在这里不作过多论述，而只是沿着马克思为物化的产生所指出的第一个条件来进一步分析索恩－雷特尔是如何将物化的起源定位到剥削的。

In fact, Sohn-Rethel acknowledges Marx’s conclusion that the emergence of reification is highly correlated with developed commodity production. In his words, “developed commodity exchange is related to reification—which is characterized by identity, the form of the thing, and Dasein.” But he simultaneously believes: “Before the exchange of means of subsistence as values, i.e., before commodity exchange can become a form of social intercourse, exploitation must already have arisen. Commodity exchange developed out of exploitation, not the other way around.” [26]26 Alfred Sohn-Rethel, *Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology* (1978), Chapter 1. The English translation is a rendering of the Chinese paraphrase. Here, we can see that Sohn-Rethel believes “commodity exchange developed out of exploitation.” In Sohn-Rethel’s view, the thesis that reification arises from developed commodity production is not problematic, but the origin of developed commodity production is exploitation; therefore, he believes that the historical materialist origin of reification should be exploitation. Sohn-Rethel further points out: “Reification is the result of the splitting of the identity between man’s right to produce and his right to consume, a splitting that occurs through exploitation.” [27]27 Ibid. To better understand this statement, we need to know that the stage where “the identity of man’s right to produce and his right to consume” is not separated corresponds to the primitive community without exploitation, a community that is “a human group bound by blood ties, which obtains its means of subsistence only from its own labor.” [28]28 Ibid. In Sohn-Rethel’s view, only in this community are “man’s right to produce and his right to consume” truly identical; here there is no exploitation and no reification. Once the true identity of “man’s right to produce and his right to consume” is broken, reification will appear accordingly. Obviously, Sohn-Rethel believes it is exploitation that breaks this identity: “Reification can be explained by the following: when the connection between production and consumption necessary for life is no longer linked within the identity of these people, then it must seek its connection in the identity of these things, in other words, in commodities. The cause of this destruction is exploitation.” [29]29 Ibid. In short, Sohn-Rethel believes that exploitation destroys “the identity of man’s production and consumption,” and once this identity is destroyed, people have to rely on commodities, these things, to achieve a “new” connection, and at this point reification arises.

事实上，索恩－雷特尔承认马克思所总结的物化的产生与发达的商品生产高度相关，用他的话来说则是“发达的商品交换是与物化——其以同一性、物的形式和定在为特征——相关的”，但他同时认为：“在将生活资料作为价值来交换，即商品交换能够成为社会交往形式之前，剥削必然已经产生了。商品交换是从剥削中发展出来的，而不是相反。”在这里，我们可以看到，索恩－雷特尔认为“商品交换是从剥削中发展出来的”。在索恩－雷特尔看来，物化产生于发达商品生产这一论点没有问题，但发达商品生产的起源乃是剥削，因而他认为物化的历史唯物主义起源应当是剥削。索恩－雷特尔进一步指出：“物化是人的生产权与消费权之间同一性分裂的结果，这种分裂是由于剥削而发生的。”为了更好地理解这一论述，我们需要知道，“人的生产权与消费权的同一性”没有分离的阶段对应的乃是没有剥削的原始共同体，这种共同体是“以血缘为纽带的人类群体，这种群体只从自己的劳动中获得生活资料”。在索恩－雷特尔看来，只有在这一共同体中，“人的生产权与消费权”才是真正的同一的，这里不存在剥削，也不存在物化。而“人的生产权与消费权”的真正的同一性一旦被打破，物化就会随之出现。显然，索恩－雷特尔认为是剥削打破了这种同一性，“物化可由如下这点来解释：当生活所必需的生产与消费的关联不再在这些人的同一性当中联结着时，那么它就必须在这些物的同一性中，换言之，必须在商品中寻找其联结。这种摧毁的原因就是剥削”。简言之，索恩－雷特尔认为是剥削摧毁了“人的生产与消费的同一性”，而这种同一性一旦被摧毁，人们就不得不借助于商品这种物来实现“新”的联结，此时物化也就随之产生。

In summary, Sohn-Rethel identifies the origin of reification as exploitation. It must be clear that his understanding, especially regarding the question of which determines which between commodity production and exploitation, differs from Marx’s exposition and also contains misunderstandings. Here, this article examines Sohn-Rethel’s analysis of the historical materialist origin of reification only to show that, at the micro level, Sohn-Rethel attempts to link historical materialism with the genetic sense of “origin,” thereby trying to expand the understanding of historical materialism.

综合来看，索恩－雷特尔将物化的起源认定为剥削。必须要清楚的是，他的这一理解，特别是关于商品生产与剥削之间究竟是何者决定何者的问题，与马克思所作的阐发是有所出入的，而且也是存在误区的。在这里，本文考察索恩－雷特尔对物化之历史唯物主义起源的分析仅仅是想表明，索恩－雷特尔在微观层面上试图将历史唯物主义与发生学意义上的“起源”进行联系，由此试图拓展有关历史唯物主义的理解。

III. Marx’s Analysis of the Historical Materialist Origin of the Money Form

三、马克思对货币形式之历史唯物主义起源的分析

Is Sohn-Rethel’s understanding of historical materialism by linking it with the genetic sense of “origin” completely unrelated to Marx’s historical materialism? The answer is no. In fact, Marx used the method of historical materialism to trace the origins of the money form, primitive accumulation of capital, fetishism, and so on. That is to say, Marx did indeed link historical materialism with the problem of “origin.” This is based on the following four reasons: First, since its emergence, money has always occupied an exceptionally important position in human society; second, in the current world, money remains an important bond connecting relations between people; third, with the development of money into virtual currency, the mystery surrounding money has become increasingly complex, thereby affecting people’s understanding and grasp of money; fourth, Marx explicitly pointed out that his revelation of the origin of the money form was something bourgeois economists had never done. Accordingly, we can find that at the micro level, Sohn-Rethel’s understanding of historical materialism and Marx’s historical materialism are related in a certain sense.

索恩－雷特尔将历史唯物主义与发生学意义上的“起源”联系起来对历史唯物主义所作的理解，与马克思的历史唯物主义是不是毫无联系呢？答案是否定的。事实上，马克思运用历史唯物主义这一方法对货币形式、资本原始积累、拜物教等等的起源作了追溯。也就是说，马克思的确曾将历史唯物主义与“起源”问题相联系。这是基于如下四个原因：其一，货币自其产生以来，一直在人类社会中占据着异常重要的地位；其二，在当前世界，货币仍然是联通人与人之间关系的重要纽带；其三，随着货币向虚拟货币的发展，围绕在货币之上的谜愈加复杂，从而影响了人们对货币的认识和把握；其四，马克思曾明确指出，他对货币形式起源的揭示，是资产阶级经济学家未曾做过的。据此，我们可以发现在微观层面上，索恩－雷特尔所理解的历史唯物主义与马克思的历史唯物主义之间在一定意义上具有关联性。

Marx provided a detailed analysis of the origin of the money form in *Capital*. In the section “The Value-Form, or Exchange-Value” of *Capital*, Marx states: “The commodities possess a common value-form, the money-form, which stands in stark contrast to the motley natural forms of their use-values. But here we are to do something the bourgeois economy has never even attempted: to show the origin of this money-form, i.e., to trace the development of the expression of value contained in the value-relation of commodities from its simplest, most inconspicuous form to the dazzling money-form. The riddle of money will then disappear.” [30]30 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Chapter 1, Section 3: “The Value-Form, or Exchange-Value.” The English translation follows the standard edition. From this statement, we can grasp the following three points. First, Marx explicitly states here that he intends to indicate the origin of the money form. Considering that when writing *Capital*, Marx had already mastered the method of historical materialism, his analysis of the origin of the money form is naturally based on historical materialism. Therefore, from this perspective, Marx’s tracing of the origin of the money form precisely demonstrates that the historical materialism he understands has a dimension of recalling the origin of a certain object. Second, the tracing of the origin of the money form is something bourgeois economics never intended to do, and thus it is also an unexplored field. Third, in Marx’s view, once the origin of the money form is revealed, the mystery surrounding money is also solved. Thus, it can be seen that correctly revealing the historical materialist origin of the money form is of great significance.

马克思在《资本论》中对货币形式的起源作了详细的分析。在《资本论》的“价值形式或交换价值”这一小节中，马克思指出：“商品具有同它们使用价值的五光十色的自然形式成鲜明对照的、共同的价值形式，即货币形式。但是在这里，我们要做资产阶级经济学从来没有打算做的事情：指明这种货币形式的起源，就是说，探讨商品价值关系中包含的价值表现，怎样从最简单的最不显眼的样子一直发展到炫目的货币形式。这样，货币的谜就会随着消失。”从这一论述中，我们可以把握住如下三点。第一，马克思在这里明确表示他要指明货币形式的起源，考虑到写作《资本论》时，马克思早已掌握历史唯物主义这一方法，因而他在对货币形式的起源作分析的时候，自然是立足于历史唯物主义基础之上的。因此，从这一层面来看，马克思对货币形式起源的追溯恰好能够表明他所理解的历史唯物主义具有对某对象的起源作回忆的向度。第二，对货币形式的起源的追溯，是资产阶级经济学从来没打算做的事情，因而这也是一个未曾探索的领域。第三，在马克思看来，随着货币形式的起源被揭示出来，有关货币的神秘性也就被破解了。由此可见，对货币形式的历史唯物主义起源作出正确的揭示是具有重要意义的。

Marx once pointed out: “As soon as we have understood that the origin of money lies in the commodity itself, the main difficulty in the analysis of money is overcome.” The crux of the issue is precisely how the money form develops out of the commodity itself. In response, Marx elaborated in detail through four value forms. The first is the most elementary value form, namely the “simple, isolated, or accidental form of value,” whose more graphic expression is “x commodity A = y commodity B.” In Marx’s view, the analysis of this simple form of value is the most difficult, because “the secret of all value forms lies hidden in this simple form of value.” In fact, the difficulty in understanding this simple form of value arises from the following accompanying problems: First, what significance do the commodities on each side of the value equation respectively represent? Second, on what basis can two entirely different commodities in function and nature be equated? Third, is the quantitative proportion in the exchange between the two commodities accidental, or does it follow a corresponding law?

马克思曾指出：“只要理解了货币的起源在于商品本身，货币分析上的主要困难就克服了。”问题的关键是，货币形式究竟如何从商品本身发展而来呢？对此，马克思通过四种价值形式作了详细阐发。第一种是最初始的价值形式，即“简单的、个别的或偶然的价值形式”，其更为形象化的表达式为“x量商品A＝y量商品B”。在马克思看来，对这一简单价值形式的分析是最为困难的，因为“一切价值形式的秘密都隐藏在这个简单的价值形式中”。其实，理解这一简单的价值形式之所以存在困难，是因为有如下问题与之相伴随：一是价值等式两边的商品各自代表着怎样的意义？二是功能和性质等完全不同的两个商品之间究竟凭借什么可以画上等号？三是两个商品之间交换时量上的比例究竟是偶然的还是有其相应的规律？

To accurately grasp the simple form of value, Marx provided detailed answers to these three questions. Regarding the first question, Marx held that commodity A on the left side of the equation is in the relative value form, and its commodity value is expressed as relative value, while commodity B on the right side is in the equivalent form, serving as an equivalent. In Marx’s view, “the relative value form and the equivalent form are two mutually dependent, mutually conditional, and inseparable elements of the same value expression… These two forms are always distributed among different commodities that enter into a value relation with each other.” Since commodity A and commodity B occupy the relative value form and the equivalent form respectively, their functions differ. That is, in this value form, the value of commodity A is reflected by commodity B; in Marx’s words, “the body of commodity B becomes a mirror for the value of commodity A.” Regarding the second question, Marx’s answer was that the human labor congealed in commodities is the basis for the equation “x commodity A = y commodity B.” That is, the reason two different commodities can be regarded as equal is that they both contain human labor. Regarding the third question, Marx pointed out that the quantitative proportion of exchange between two different commodities is not accidental but is determined by the necessary labor time expended on them. At the same time, Marx also noted that the necessary labor time expended in producing commodities changes “with every change in the productivity of labor.” Therefore, the quantitative proportion of exchange between two different commodities is also not fixed; it is precisely this point that created difficulties for many economists in studying the value of commodities.

为了准确地把握简单的价值形式，马克思对这三个问题都作了详细的解答。针对第一个问题，马克思认为，处于等式左边的商品A是处在相对价值形式，其商品价值表现为相对价值，而处于等式右边的商品B则处于等价形式，起等价物的作用。在马克思看来，“相对价值形式和等价形式是同一价值表现的互相依赖、互为条件、不可分离的两个要素……这两种形式总是分配在通过价值表现互相发生关系的不同的商品上”。由于商品A和商品B分别处于相对价值形式和等价形式上，因而它们所起的作用是不同的。也就是说，在这一价值形式中，商品A的价值是由商品B反映出来的，用马克思的话来说，“商品B的物体成了反映商品A的价值的镜子”。针对第二个问题，马克思给出的答案是，商品中凝结的人类劳动是“x量商品A＝y量商品B”这一等式成立的基础。也就是说，两种不同的商品之所以能够被看作是相等的，乃是因为它们都包含了人类劳动。针对第三个问题，马克思指出，两个不同商品之间交换的量的比例并不是偶然的，而是由耗费在它们之上的必要的劳动时间所决定的。同时，马克思还指出，生产商品所耗费的必要的劳动时间，乃是随着“生产力的每一次变化而变化的”。因此，两种不同商品之间交换的量的比例也并非是固定的，恰恰是这一点给许多经济学家研究商品的价值造成了困难。

“Historical materialism highlights the foundational, processual, and conditional nature of prior production (material production).” After elaborating on the simple form of value, Marx proceeded to analyze the second form of value, namely the “total or expanded form of value.” The expanded form of value is not complex; in fact, compared with the simple form of value, its only difference is that the commodity in the relative value form remains fixed, while the commodity in the equivalent form changes continuously. In more graphic terms, this is expressed as “x commodity A = y commodity B, or = z commodity C, or = m commodity D, or = n commodity E…” Subsequently, Marx transitioned from the second form of value to the analysis of the third form of value, namely the general form of value. In fact, the general form of value can be seen as derived from inverting the expanded form of value, because, contrary to the expanded form of value, in the general form of value the commodity in the relative value form changes continuously, while the commodity in the equivalent form remains unchanged. Moreover, in the general form of value, the commodity occupying the equivalent form “acquires the character of a universal equivalent.” Finally, Marx discussed the transition from the third form of value to the fourth form of value, namely the money form. The money form differs from the general form of value only in that the general commodity occupying the equivalent form in the general form of value is replaced by special commodities such as gold and silver. In Marx’s words, the sole advance of the money form over the general form of value is that “the form of direct and universal exchangeability, i.e., the universal equivalent form, has now, by social custom, become finally united with the peculiar natural form of the commodity gold.”

“唯物史观凸显了先产（物质生产）的基础性、过程性和条件性”，在对简单的价值形式进行详细阐发之后，马克思进入到对第二种价值形式的分析中，即“总和的或扩大的价值形式”。扩大的价值形式并不复杂，实际上，它与简单的价值形式相比，其不同之处仅仅在于，处在相对价值形式位置的商品固定不变，而处在等价形式位置的商品则不断变化。对此，用更形象化的表达方式来说，就是“x量商品A＝y量商品B，或＝z量商品C，或＝m量商品D，或＝n量商品E……”。而后，马克思由第二种价值形式过渡到对第三种价值形式的分析，即一般价值形式。事实上，一般价值形式可以看作是由扩大的价值形式所作的颠倒而得来的，这是因为与扩大的价值形式恰好相反，在一般价值形式之中，处在相对价值形式位置的商品不断变化，而处在等价形式位置的商品则保持不变。此外，在一般价值形式中，那个处在等价形式位置的商品，便“获得了一般等价物的性质”。最后，马克思论述了第三种价值形式向第四种价值形式即货币形式的过渡。货币形式与一般价值形式的区别仅仅在于，那个在一般价值形式中占据等价形式位置的一般商品由金、银等特殊的商品所取代。用马克思的话来说就是，货币形式相对于一般价值形式的唯一进步之处在于，“能直接地一般地交换的形式，即一般等价形式，现在由于社会的习惯最终地同商品金的独特的自然形式结合在一起了”。

In summary, through the four value forms—the simple form of value, the expanded form of value, the general form of value, and the money form—Marx precisely expounded the manner in which the commodity form transitions to the money form, thereby concluding that “the simple commodity form is the embryo of the money form.” In this way, Marx successfully revealed the origin of the money form. Since Marx, at the time of writing *Capital*, had already fully mastered the method of historical materialism, his analysis of the origin of the money form demonstrates that the historical materialism he understood indeed possesses a dimension of recollecting the origin of a given object. Therefore, in this sense, the historical materialism studied by Sohn-Rethel and summarized by Adorno as “historical materialism as a recollection of origins” does have a certain relevance to the historical materialism expounded by Marx.

综上所述，马克思通过简单的价值形式、扩大的价值形式、一般价值形式以及货币形式这四种价值形式，精准地论述了商品形式向货币形式过渡的方式，从而认为“简单的商品形式是货币形式的胚胎”。如此一来，马克思便成功地对货币形式的起源作出了揭示。由于写作《资本论》时的马克思早已充分掌握历史唯物主义这一方法，因而马克思对货币形式的起源所作的分析，就证明了他所理解的历史唯物主义的确具有对某对象的起源进行回忆的向度。因此，从这个意义来说，索恩－雷特尔所研究的，并由阿多诺所概括的作为“对起源回忆的历史唯物主义”与马克思所阐发的历史唯物主义就具有一定的关联性。

IV. Conclusion

四、结 语

Marx once said: “The anatomy of man is a key to the anatomy of the ape.” This statement shows that Marx recognized the difficulty in grasping certain “origin” issues. That humans evolved from apes is a common consensus; the grasp of the anatomy of the ape, i.e., the grasp of the biological origin of humans, can be aided by the anatomy of man itself. Therefore, Marx in fact already attended to the connection between historical materialism and “origin” in the genetic sense. Thus, by examining the historical materialist origins of rational knowledge, reification, and other objects, Sohn-Rethel attempted to link historical materialism with the “origin” issue at the micro level, thereby understanding historical materialism as “historical materialism as a recollection of origins.” This theoretical effort has certain reference significance for understanding historical materialism. However, because the historical materialism understood by Sohn-Rethel focuses excessively on the micro-foundations of historical materialism, unilaterally emphasizes the dimension of “recollection of origins” in historical materialism, and simultaneously neglects the grand perspective and rich connotations of historical materialism, it is in essence fundamentally different from the historical materialism expounded by Marx. We must maintain a clear understanding of this. (Notes omitted)

马克思曾经说过：“人体解剖对于猴体解剖是一把钥匙”。这一论述表明了马克思早已认识到对于某些“起源”问题的把握是困难的，人是由猿进化而来，这已是人们的共识，人们对猴体解剖的把握，也就是对人的生物学起源的把握，可以借助人体解剖本身。因此，马克思事实上已经关注到历史唯物主义与发生学意义上的“起源”之间的关联。所以，索恩－雷特尔通过对理性知识以及物化等对象的历史唯物主义起源的考察，试图在微观层面上将历史唯物主义与“起源”问题联结起来，从而将历史唯物主义理解为“作为对起源回忆的历史唯物主义”，这一理论努力对于理解历史唯物主义具有一定的参考意义。但是，索恩－雷特尔所理解的历史唯物主义由于过于关注历史唯物主义的微观基础，片面强调历史唯物主义“对起源回忆”的向度，同时忽视了历史唯物主义的宏大视野及其丰富内涵，因而实质上与马克思所阐发的历史唯物主义有根本区别。对此，我们必须保持清醒的认识。（注释略）

(The author is a researcher at the School of Philosophy and Sociology, Lanzhou University)

（作者系兰州大学哲学社会学院研究员）

Online editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑