The Pendulum Effect of Latin American Political Development and the Characteristics of the New Left-Wing Wave

In the modern political process of Latin America, left-wing and right-wing political parties compete with each other, alternate in development, and take turns in power, presenting a unique pendulum effect of political development. After entering the new century, Latin America experienced a "Pink Tide" in which left-wing parties governed for over a decade. After 2014, the "Pink Tide" faded significantly, right-wing parties gained power in multiple countries, and the region saw a brief period of right-wing resurgence. In recent years, left-wing parties have successively returned to power in several Latin American countries, giving rise to the second round of left-wing waves since the new century. The emergence of this new left-wing wave in Latin American countries is both a result of the continued fermentation of the pendulum effect in Latin American political development and a reflection of the new realities of the region's economic, political, and social development. This new left-wing wave not only changes the political and social ecology of Latin America but will also have a significant impact on the domestic and foreign policies of Latin American countries.

在拉美现代政治进程中，左翼政党与右翼政党相互竞争、交替发展、轮流执政，呈现出政治发展的独特钟摆效应。进入新世纪后，拉美出现了左翼政党执政长达十几年的“粉红浪潮”。2014年后，“粉红浪潮”大面积褪色，右翼政党在多个国家取得执政地位，拉美地区出现了短暂的右翼回潮期。近年来，左翼政党又在多个拉美国家相继重新执政，催生了新世纪以来第二轮左翼浪潮。拉美国家新一轮左翼浪潮的出现，既是拉美政治发展钟摆效应持续发酵的结果，也体现了当前拉美地区经济、政治和社会发展的新现实。新一轮左翼浪潮不仅改变了拉美地区的政治社会生态，也会对拉美国家的内外政策产生重要影响。

I. The Pendulum Effect of Latin American Political Development and the Advent of the New Left-Wing Wave

一、拉美政治发展的钟摆效应与新一轮左翼浪潮的来临

From the late 19th to the early 20th century, a large number of left-wing political parties emerged in Latin America, and left-wing political forces grew rapidly. However, for a considerable period, the left was suppressed by the right and was generally weaker in strength. The victory in the World Anti-Fascist War in 1945 enhanced the political influence of the Latin American left. After the start of the Cold War, the living environment of the Latin American left deteriorated again, and the regional political process was basically dominated by the right. The victory of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 greatly boosted the morale of Latin American left-wing forces and spurred the spread of left-wing political movements worldwide after the 1960s. Subsequently, inspired by the May 1968 protests in France, the civil rights movement in the United States, and the decolonization movement in Africa, the Latin American left became more active, and its living environment improved. Scholar José Natanson even believed that this period saw the first left-wing wave in Latin American history. In the 1970s, right-wing authoritarian rule suppressed the development of the Latin American left. From the latter half of the 1970s to the 1980s, along with the consolidation of the democratization process in Latin American politics, the left was generally in a state of slow recovery from a low ebb, while the right still held a dominant position in most Latin American countries. From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the drastic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Latin American left-wing forces suffered another fatal blow, and the influence of the right rose again.

自19世纪末20世纪初开始，拉美地区出现了大批左翼政党，左翼政治力量快速增长。然而，在相当长的一段时期内，左翼一直受到右翼压制，总体实力较弱。1945年世界反法西斯战争的胜利，提高了拉美左翼的政治影响力。冷战开始后，拉美左翼的生存环境再度恶化，地区政治进程基本由右翼主导。1959年古巴革命的胜利，极大地鼓舞了拉美左翼力量的士气，并带动了1960年代后左翼政治运动在世界范围的蔓延。之后，在法国五月风暴、美国人权运动、非洲去殖民化运动的激励下，拉美左翼趋于活跃，生存环境有所改善。学者何塞·纳坦森(José Natanson)甚至认为，这一时期拉美出现了历史上第一次左翼浪潮。1970年代，右翼威权统治压制了拉美左翼的发展。从1970年代后半期到1980年代，伴随着拉美政治民主化进程的巩固，左翼总体处于从低潮缓慢复苏的过程中，右翼在多数拉美国家仍占据优势地位。1980年代末至1990年代初，随着冷战结束和苏东剧变，拉美左翼力量再次遭受致命打击，右翼的影响力再度上升。

In the late 20th century, Latin American countries began to widely implement neoliberal reforms. Although these reforms helped stabilize the macroeconomy, they also triggered serious social consequences, leading to intensified social contradictions and heightened social conflicts. Faced with numerous governance challenges, many traditional ruling parties in Latin America were either helpless or ineffective in their measures, gradually losing popular support. Left-wing parties timely put forward propositions to replace neoliberalism and explore alternative development paths, which resonated with many popular demands and won broad social support. Against this backdrop, from the end of the 20th century to the early 21st century, Latin American left-wing forces experienced a collective rise, with left-wing parties gaining power in multiple countries, forming the so-called "Pink Tide." In December 1998, Hugo Chávez was elected President of Venezuela and took office in early 1999, opening the new century's cycle of left-wing governance in Latin America. Subsequently, left-wing parties came to power through elections in Brazil (2002, 2006, 2010, 2014), Argentina (2003, 2007, 2011), the Dominican Republic (2004, 2008), Uruguay (2004, 2008, 2014), Chile (2000, 2006, 2014), Bolivia (2005, 2009, 2014), Ecuador (2006, 2009, 2013), Peru (2011), Nicaragua (2006, 2011), Paraguay (2008), El Salvador (2009, 2014), among others, with many left-wing parties achieving consecutive terms in office. Marco Schwartz believed that this left-wing "Pink Tide" was unprecedented in its scope. In the first decade of the 21st century, among the 20 major countries in Latin America, 13 were governed by the left. Except for Colombia, South America was almost entirely dominated by the left. After taking power, Latin American left-wing parties made varying degrees of corrections to the neoliberal model. Radical left-wing ruling parties in Venezuela and elsewhere even put forward socialist slogans and propositions, generating significant political and social impact.

20世纪后期，拉美国家开始普遍推行新自由主义改革，这些改革虽然有助于稳定宏观经济，但也引发了严重的社会后果，致使社会矛盾激化，社会冲突加剧。面对诸多治理难题，拉美不少传统执政党或束手无策，或措施不力，逐渐丧失了民心。左翼政党适时提出替代新自由主义、探索新发展道路的主张，与大众诉求产生了许多契合点，赢得了广泛的社会支持。在这种背景下，从20世纪末到21世纪初，拉美左翼出现了群体性崛起的态势，左翼政党在多国取得执政地位，形成了所谓的“粉红浪潮”。1998年12月，乌戈·查韦斯(Hugo Chávez )当选委内瑞拉总统，并于1999年初执政，开启了新世纪拉美左翼的执政周期。此后，左翼政党在巴西(2002年、2006年、2010年、2014年)、阿根廷(2003年、2007年、2011年)、多米尼加(2004年、2008年)、乌拉圭(2004年、2008年、2014年)、智利(2000年、2006年、2014年)、玻利维亚(2005年、2009年、2014年)、厄瓜多尔(2006年、2009年、2013年)、秘鲁(2011年)、尼加拉瓜(2006年、2011年)、巴拉圭(2008年)、萨尔瓦多(2009年、2014年)等多国通过大选上台执政，其中不少左翼政党实现了连续执政。马尔科·施瓦茨(Marco Schwartz)认为，此次左翼执政的“粉红浪潮”波及范围之广前所未有。在21世纪前10年，拉美20个主要国家中，有13个国家由左翼执政。除哥伦比亚外，南美地区几乎由左翼一统天下。拉美左翼政党执政后，对新自由主义模式进行了不同程度的修正，委内瑞拉等激进左翼执政党还提出了社会主义的口号和主张，产生了较大的政治和社会影响。

From the second decade of the 21st century, especially after 2015, the pendulum of Latin American political development clearly swung back to the right, and left-wing forces suffered setbacks, even major blows. In 2009, Honduran left-wing President Manuel Zelaya's push for a constitutional referendum failed, and he was overthrown by a right-wing "coup," forced into exile abroad. In 2010, right-wing coalition candidate Sebastián Piñera was elected President of Chile, ending the 20-year consecutive governance of the Chilean left-wing coalition since 1990. In 2012, Paraguayan left-wing President Fernando Lugo was impeached by the right-wing-controlled Congress on grounds of "poor performance." After 2014, international market prices for bulk commodities continued to fall, and the Latin American economy entered a downward cycle, triggering social unrest and spreading public discontent. Right-wing forces in Latin America used public discontent to intensify their counterattack, leading to successive changes in ruling parties characterized by "left retreat, right advance," the large-scale fading of the "Pink Tide," and the resurgence of right-wing forces in many countries. In 2015, the left-wing party that had governed Argentina for 12 consecutive years lost power. That same year, the left-wing ruling party in Venezuela lost its long-held control of Congress since 1999. In 2016, Brazilian left-wing President Dilma Rousseff was impeached by the right-wing-controlled Congress. That same year, the government of Peruvian left-wing President Ollanta Humala ended its term, and a right-wing government came to power. In 2017, the Ecuadorian left-wing ruling party, the PAIS Alliance, was severely impacted in the general election, barely retaining power, and its presidential candidate Lenín Moreno shifted to the right after taking office, deviating from the established governing line. In 2018, right-wing candidate Jair Bolsonaro defeated the left-wing party candidate to be elected President of Brazil, not only changing the domestic political landscape but also significantly altering the political map of Latin America. In 2019, the left-wing party that had governed El Salvador for 10 consecutive years lost the general election and its ruling position. That same year, although the left-wing Movement for Socialism in Bolivia won the general election, the Organization of American States, which observed the election, determined that there had been electoral fraud. Under pressure from right-wing forces, then-President Evo Morales was forced to resign and go into exile, ending the party's nearly 14-year history of consecutive governance. Based on the above series of events, many analysts believe that the "Pink Tide" that began at the turn of the century has basically ended, and the right and neoliberalism have "resurged" in Latin America.

从21世纪第二个10年起，特别是2015年以后，拉美政治发展的钟摆明显向右回调，左翼力量受挫，甚至遭受重大打击。2009年，洪都拉斯左翼总统马努埃尔·塞拉亚(Manuel Zelaya)推动的修宪公投失败，其本人被右翼“政变”推翻，被迫流亡国外。2010年，右翼联盟候选人塞巴斯蒂安·皮涅拉(Sebastián Piňera)当选智利总统，智利左翼政党联盟自1990年起连续执政20年的进程中断。2012年，巴拉圭左翼总统费尔南多·卢戈(Fernando Lugo)被右翼控制的国会以“履职不力”为由罢免。2014年后，国际市场大宗商品价格持续下跌，拉美经济随之进入下行周期，引发社会动荡，民众不满情绪扩散。拉美地区右翼力量利用民众的不满情绪加大反攻力度，致使该地区接连发生“左退右进”的执政党更迭，“粉红浪潮”大面积褪色，右翼力量在不少国家重新抬头。2015年，连续执政12年的阿根廷左翼政党失去执政地位。同年，委内瑞拉左翼执政党失去自1999年执政以来对国会的长期掌控。2016年，巴西左翼总统迪尔玛·罗塞夫(Dilma Rousseff)被右翼控制的国会弹劾。同年，秘鲁左翼的奥良塔·乌马拉(Ollanta Humala)政府任期届满下台，右翼政府上台执政。2017年，厄瓜多尔左翼执政党主权祖国联盟在大选中受到严重冲击，险些丧失执政地位，该党总统候选人莱宁·莫雷诺(Lenín Moreno)执政后立场右转，偏离既定执政路线。2018年，右翼的雅伊尔·博索纳罗(Jair Bolsonaro)击败左翼政党候选人当选巴西总统，不仅改变了该国国内政治力量的格局，也极大地改变了拉美地区的政治版图。2019年，连续执政10年的萨尔瓦多左翼政党在大选中败北，丧失了执政地位。同年，玻利维亚左翼的争取社会主义运动党虽然在大选中获胜，但被观察选举的美洲国家组织认定在选举中舞弊，在右翼力量的逼迫下，时任总统埃沃·莫拉莱斯(Evo Morales)被迫辞职并流亡国外，中断了该党连续执政近14年的历史。许多分析家根据上述一系列事件认为，始于世纪之交的“粉红浪潮”基本结束，右翼和新自由主义在拉美“回潮”。

Recently, the pendulum of Latin American political development has swung left again, and the political influence of left-wing forces has increased to some extent. Some scholars describe this trend as the second wave of Latin American leftism or Latin American progressivism in the new century, while Ángel Arellano directly calls it a new “Pink Tide.” In 2018, Mexico’s left-wing National Regeneration Movement party won the general election and came to power, greatly encouraging the Latin American left, which was then in a trough, and immediately produced a “contagion effect” in the region. In the 2019 Argentine general election, Alberto Fernández, the candidate of the left-wing Frente de Todos, was elected president, and the left-wing party returned to power in Argentina, maintaining its status as the largest party in parliament. In the 2020 Bolivian general election, Luis Arce, the candidate of the left-wing Movement for Socialism party, was elected president, and the party returned to power, winning more than half the seats in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, occupying a dominant position in the national legislature. In 2021, five Latin American countries held general elections; except for Ecuador, left-wing parties won in four countries—Peru, Chile, Nicaragua, and Honduras—further widening the region’s political left turn. In Peru, Pedro Castillo, the candidate of the left-wing Free Peru party, was elected president, and a change of ruling party favorable to the left occurred. In Chile, Gabriel Boric, the candidate of the left-wing Approve Dignity coalition, composed of the Communist Party and other emerging left-wing forces, was elected president, and Chilean politics once again saw a left-right flip. In Honduras, Xiomara Castro, the candidate of the left-wing Liberty and Refoundation party, was elected president, and another change of ruling party favorable to the left occurred. In Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, the leader of the left-wing Sandinista National Liberation Front, was re-elected again, continuing the party’s continuous rule since 2007. In addition, Venezuela’s left-wing ruling party gained an absolute advantage in the 2021 local elections, winning 20 of 23 governor positions, further consolidating its ruling base. In 2022, Colombia and Brazil will hold general elections, and left-wing parties have already shown strong competitiveness; if they win, the leftward swing of the pendulum of Latin American political development will further increase.

近期，拉美政治发展的钟摆再次向左转，左翼力量的政治影响力有所增强。有学者将这种态势称为新世纪后拉美左翼或拉美进步主义的第二次潮流，安格尔·阿雷亚诺(Angel Arellano)则直接将其称为新一轮“粉红浪潮”。2018年，墨西哥左翼的“国家复兴运动”党在大选中获胜并上台执政，给当时陷于低潮的拉美左翼以极大的鼓舞，并随即在拉美地区产生了“传染效应”。在2019年的阿根廷大选中，左翼的全民阵线候选人阿尔贝托·费尔南德斯(Alberto Fernández)当选总统，左翼政党在阿根廷重新执政，并继续保持议会第一大党地位。在2020年的玻利维亚大选中，争取社会主义运动党候选人路易斯·阿尔塞(Luis Arce)当选总统，该党重新执政，并在参众两院均获得半数以上席位，在国家立法机构中占据优势地位。2021年，拉美有五个国家举行大选，除厄瓜多尔外，左翼政党在秘鲁、智利、尼加拉瓜、洪都拉斯四国胜出，拉美地区政治左转幅度进一步加大。在秘鲁，左翼的自由秘鲁党候选人佩德罗·卡斯蒂略(Pedro Castillo)当选总统，秘鲁发生了有利于左翼发展的执政党更迭。在智利，由共产党和其他新兴左翼力量组成的赞成尊严联盟候选人加夫列尔·博里奇(Gabriel Boric)当选总统，智利政坛再次出现左右翻转。在洪都拉斯，左翼的自由与重建党候选人希奥玛拉·卡斯特罗(Xiomara Castro)当选总统，该国也发生有利于左翼的执政党更迭。在尼加拉瓜，左翼政党桑地诺民族解放阵线领导人丹尼尔·奥尔特加(Daniel Ortega)再次连选连任，延续了该党2007年以来连续执政的局面。此外，委内瑞拉左翼执政党在2021年的地方选举中占得绝对优势，该党及盟友获得了23个州长职位中的20个，执政基础进一步巩固。2022年，哥伦比亚和巴西等国家将举行大选，左翼政党已经显示出强大竞争力，届时如能取胜，拉美政治发展钟摆的左转幅度将进一步加大。

II. General Characteristics of the Latin American Left and the Characteristics of the New Left-Wing Wave

二、拉美左翼的一般特性与新一轮左翼浪潮的特点

First, within the Latin American left, although the political tendencies of various forces differ, their basic political stances and policy proposals share commonalities or similarities. In summary, the commonalities in the political stances and policy proposals of the Latin American left include at least four aspects: (1) Their main social base is the middle and lower social strata; they typically represent the interests and demands of these strata, advocate for changing unreasonable social orders, and call for the redistribution of social rights and interests; (2) They have an anti-elitist preference, favor expanding the scope and degree of political participation, advocate for advancing mass politics, and have a “populist” tendency; (3) They favor a certain degree of government intervention in economic activities and emphasize social equity; (4) In foreign policy, they have a “de-Americanization” orientation, especially opposing U.S. intervention in Latin American affairs, and favor the integrated development of Latin American countries.

首先，在拉美左翼内部，各派力量的政治倾向虽有所不同，但基本的政治立场和政策主张有共同或类似之处。概括地说，拉美左翼的政治立场和政策主张的共性至少包含四个方面：(1)主要社会基础是中下社会阶层，通常代表这些阶层的利益和诉求，主张变革不合理的社会秩序，要求社会权利与利益的重新分配；(2)具有反精英主义的偏好，赞成扩大政治参与范围和程度，主张推进大众政治，有“民众主义”倾向；(3)赞成政府对经济活动进行一定程度的干预，强调社会公平；(4)在对外政策上有“去美国化”取向，尤其反对美国对拉美事务的干预，赞成拉美国家的一体化发展。

Second, the line between the left and the right in Latin America is not clearly demarcated. When discussing Latin American politics, academia often uses the terms “center-left” or “center-right” in addition to “left” and “right.” After entering the 21st century, as a group of center-left parties came to power, the boundary between the left and the right in Latin America became even more blurred, and there is no unified standard for which parties are left-wing and which are right-wing. For example, Arellano considers the government of Leonel Fernández Reyna of the Dominican Liberation Party (2004–2012), the government of Martín Torrijos of Panama’s Democratic Revolutionary Party (2004–2009), and the government of Laurentino Cortizo (2019–) as left-wing governments. Schwartz, meanwhile, also considers the government of René Préval in Haiti (1996–2001) and that of Jean-Bertrand Aristide (2001–2004), as well as the government of Alan García in Peru (2006–2011), as left-wing governments. However, many scholars do not recognize the left-wing attributes of the aforementioned governments.

其次，拉美的左翼与右翼之间并非界线分明。学界在论及拉美政治时，除“左”、“右”的术语外，还经常使用“中左”或“中右”的概念。进入21世纪后，随着一批中左翼政党上台执政，拉美左翼与右翼之间的界线更加模糊，对于哪些政党是左翼，哪些政党是右翼，也没有统一的标准。例如，阿雷亚诺把多米尼加解放党的莱奥内尔·费尔南德斯(Leonel Ferandez Reyna)政府(2004—2012)、巴拿马民主革命党的马丁·托里霍斯(Martin Torrijos)政府(2004—2009)和劳伦蒂诺·科尔蒂索(Laurentino Cortizo)政府(2019—)视为左翼政府。施瓦茨则把海地的勒内·普雷瓦尔(René Préval)政府(1996—2001)和让-贝特朗·阿里斯蒂德(Jean-Bertrand Aristide)政府(2001—2004)、秘鲁的阿兰·加西亚(Alan García)政府(2006—2011)也视为左翼政府。但是，也有不少学者并不认同上述政府的左翼属性。

Third, the Latin American left is constantly changing; whether left or right, their political stances, policy proposals, interest demands, and social and mass bases change and adjust with the times, and the left and right evolve into each other. For example, Chile’s Christian Democratic Party was traditionally regarded as a center-right party, but after Chile’s democratization in the 1990s, it shed its right-wing tradition and identity and became an important member of the center-left governing coalition. Similarly, some left-wing parties have gradually degenerated into right-wing parties. For example, Peru’s American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, which once advocated armed struggle, was considered the first populist party in Latin America; during its rule in the 1980s, it implemented radical populist policies, but after entering the 21st century, many people believe it has become a “center-right” party, and its political stances and policy proposals have been severely criticized by the country’s traditional left-wing parties.

再次，拉美的左翼是不断变化的，无论是左翼还是右翼，其政治立场、政策主张、利益诉求、社会和群众基础会随时代变迁而变化和调整，左右翼互相演化。例如，智利的基督教民主党在传统上被视为中右翼政党，但自智利1990年代实现民主化后，该党摆脱了右翼政党的传统和身份，成为中左翼执政联盟的重要成员。同样，有些左翼政党则逐渐蜕变成右翼政党。例如，崇尚武装斗争的秘鲁阿普拉党曾被认为是拉美地区的第一个民众主义政党，在 1980年代执政期间实施过激进的民粹主义政策，但进入21世纪后，许多人认为它已经变成了“中右翼”政党，其政治立场和政策主张也遭到该国传统左翼政党的严厉批评。

Since the new century, the two left-wing waves in Latin America have followed similar historical trajectories, both achieving ruling status through fierce competition in general elections. In both left-wing waves, the ruling left-wing parties had similar support groups; their rise to power was supported by various left-wing parties (including traditional communist and socialist parties, as well as numerous national and regional new left-wing parties) and social movements that grew after the end of the 20th century. The ruling left-wing parties in both waves reflected, to a certain extent, the traditional populist political characteristics of Latin America. However, compared with the “Pink Tide” that emerged at the beginning of this century, the new wave of the Latin American left has its own uniqueness. The specific manifestations are as follows:

新世纪以来，拉美地区的两次左翼浪潮有着类似的历史轨迹，都是通过大选中的激烈竞争取得执政地位。在两次左翼浪潮中，左翼执政党也有着类似的支持群体，它们的上台执政均得到了各类左翼政党(包括传统的共产党和社会党，以及众多全国性和地区性新型左翼政党)和20世纪末以后成长起来的社会运动等力量的支持。两次浪潮中的左翼执政党都在一定程度上体现出拉美传统的民众主义政治特色。然而，与本世纪初兴起的“粉红浪潮”相比，新一轮拉美左翼浪潮有自身的独特性。具体表现如下：

First, the backgrounds and environments in which they occur are not the same.

第一，发生的背景和环境不尽相同。

The first left-wing wave occurred during a period of economic upswing in Latin America, when the environment for left-wing governments to govern was relatively favorable. After 2003, the Latin American economy experienced a "golden decade," with an average annual growth rate of 4.8% from 2003 to 2008. Relying on robust economic growth, Latin American countries successfully withstood the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis, with economic growth rates of 5.9%, 4.5%, 2.8%, and 2.9% respectively from 2010 to 2013. Economic growth provided the fiscal support for left-wing governments to implement poverty reduction and other social programs. The context for the new left-wing wave is more complex. After 2014, the Latin American economy entered a downward channel, with consecutive negative growth in 2015 and 2016, low growth of only 1.1% in 2017 and 2018, and a growth rate of merely 0.1% in 2019. At the same time, affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, Latin American countries saw a sharp decline in export demand and a slump in tourism, with the regional economy falling by 6.8% in 2020, the lowest growth in 120 years. Although driven by favorable factors such as accelerated vaccination, the gradual resumption of work and production, accumulated demand increases, rising international commodity prices, and the recovery of major world economies, the Latin American economy began a strong recovery in 2021, with a growth rate rising to 6.2%, but this was based on a nearly 7% sharp decline in 2020. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) predicts that the Latin American economic growth rate will drop to 2.1% in 2022, still difficult to change the low-growth situation that had already emerged before the pandemic. In the near term, the Latin American economy cannot yet shake off the negative impact of the pandemic. In the medium to long term, structural problems that limit Latin American economic growth, such as irrational industrial structure, low investment and productivity, an excessively high proportion of informal employment, and severe inequality and poverty, remain difficult to eradicate, and these problems are bound to have a negative impact on economic activity and the labor market. Due to the deterioration of the economic environment, the policy implementation capacity of left-wing governments will face more constraints.

第一次左翼浪潮发生于拉美经济上升期，左翼政府执政的环境相对有利。2003年后，拉美经济出现了“黄金十年”,其中2003—2008年年均增长4.8%。凭借强劲的经济增长，拉美国家成功抵御了2008年全球金融危机的冲击，2010—2013年四年间的经济增长分别为5.9%、4.5%、2.8%和2.9%。经济增长为左翼政府减贫以及其他社会计划的实施提供了财政支撑。新一轮左翼浪潮发生的背景则更为复杂。2014年后，拉美经济步入下行通道，2015年和2016年连续负增长，2017年和2018年仅实现了1.1%的低速增长，2019年增长率更是只有0.1%。同时，受新冠肺炎疫情的影响，拉美国家的出口需求锐减、旅游业萧条，2020年的地区经济下降6.8%,为120年以来的最低增长。虽然在疫苗接种加速、复工复产逐步展开、累积的需求增加、国际大宗商品价格上涨和世界主要经济体复苏等有利因素的带动下，2021年的拉美经济开始强势复苏，增长率升至6.2%,但这是在2020年大幅下降近7%的基础上发生的。联合国拉美经济委员会(CEPAL)预计，2022年的拉美经济增速将降至2.1%,仍难以改变疫情前就已出现的低增长局面。从近期看，拉美经济尚无法摆脱疫情的负面影响。从中长期看，限制拉美经济增长的产业结构不合理、投资和生产率偏低、非正规性就业比重过高、不平等和贫困严重等结构性问题仍难以根除，这些问题势必会对经济活动和劳工市场造成消极影响。由于经济环境恶化，左翼政府的政策执行能力将受到更多约束。

Second, the priority options of government policies differ.

第二， 政府政策的优先选项不同。

In both left-wing waves, Latin American left-wing governments endorsed combining justice, equality, and freedom, advocated for achieving social fairness, promoted sustainable development, and emphasized not simply pursuing the speed of economic growth but rather pursuing the rational distribution of wealth. However, in the two waves, the priority options of left-wing government policies differed. During the first left-wing wave, although left-wing governments in Latin American countries varied in their degree of radicalism, their leaders basically won voter support by opposing neoliberal slogans. During the election campaigns, they criticized the "Washington Consensus" and neoliberal policies, arguing that they had caused unprecedented poverty and inequality in the Latin American region. Therefore, after these left-wing leaders came to power, they made significant adjustments to the previous neoliberal policy orientations, priority goals of social policies, and directions of structural reforms of right-wing and center-right governments, emphasizing the abandonment of the neoliberal model and the exploration of new development models and new development paths. Radical leftists represented by Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa even regarded the "Washington Consensus" and neoliberal reforms as the root of all evil in Latin America. In contrast, the left-wing governments that came to power in this current left-wing wave have relatively pragmatic policy propositions and demands for change, only advocating reforms in certain aspects, without fundamentally negating the country's development model and development path, nor simply attributing Latin America's development difficulties to external factors such as the United States and the International Monetary Fund.

在两次左翼浪潮中，拉美左翼政府都赞成将公正、平等、自由结合起来，主张实现社会公平，促进可持续发展，强调不单纯追求经济增长速度，更要追求财富的合理分配。但是，在两次浪潮中，左翼政府的政策优先选项不同。在第一次左翼浪潮期间，拉美各国的左翼政府尽管激进程度不同，但领导人基本是凭借反对新自由主义的口号取得选民支持的，在竞选过程中均对“华盛顿共识”和新自由主义政策提出了批评，认为它们在拉美地区造成了前所未有的贫困和不平等。因而，这些左翼领导人上台执政后，均对此前右翼和中右翼政府新自由主义的政策取向、社会政策的优先目标、结构改革的方向等做出了较大调整，强调放弃新自由主义模式，探索新发展模式和新发展道路。以查韦斯、莫拉莱斯和拉斐尔·科雷亚(Rafael Correa)为代表的激进左翼甚至把“华盛顿共识”和新自由主义改革视为拉美的万恶之源。相比之下，在本轮左翼浪潮中执政的左翼政府，其政策主张和变革诉求相对务实，只倡导在某些方面进行改革，并没有对国家的发展模式和发展道路进行颠覆性否定，也没有简单地把拉美发展的困境归结为美国和国际货币基金组织等外部因素。

Third, the governing line is more moderate.

第三，执政路线更加温和。

During the first left-wing wave, the policy propositions and governance programs of Latin American left-wing governments were heavily radical. Left-wing standard-bearers like Chávez put forward the thought and theory of "21st Century Socialism in Latin America," advocating for replacing the capitalist and neoliberal models, and raising slogans of opposing the traditional system, opposing the political elite, and achieving social change. Radical left-wing governments promoted constitutional and political reforms, attempting to replace representative democracy with direct democracy; they advocated for leveraging the government's regulatory role, strengthening state control over the economy, and enhancing state control over strategic sectors such as resources, energy, electricity, and telecommunications through continuous nationalization. The forces that rose in this current left-wing wave are not traditional left-wing parties, but emerging left-wing forces with a tendency for change that have suddenly emerged in recent social movements. For example, the left-wing ruling parties in countries like Peru, Honduras, and Chile have not been established for long. Given the special political, economic, and social environment of Latin America, these new left-wing ruling parties have adopted a more moderate governing approach to maintain and stabilize their governing base. Many left-wing parties and leaders have stepped back from their previous radical positions, striving to avoid radical changes that might trigger more social confrontation. Peruvian President Pedro Castillo proposed relatively radical policy propositions during the election campaign, including nationalizing multiple major areas such as the mining industry, demanding that the government obtain 70% of mining industry revenue, and "not allowing large companies to continue plundering the country." However, after taking office, his stance and governing line became more moderate, striving to downplay the radical color of his governance program, seeking stable economic policies, and attempting to enhance the confidence of international investors. Chilean President Gabriel Boric actively shed the "excessive" propositions raised during the election campaign, tending to lean towards the centrist line upheld by previous governments. Xiomara Castro, who proposed building "socialism" in Honduras during the election campaign, also began implementing moderate policies after taking office. At the regional level, whether it is the emerging left-wing parties that came to power in this current left-wing wave in countries like Peru, Chile, and Honduras, or the left-wing ruling parties in countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua with many years of governing experience, they all tend to adopt a moderate governing approach and policies.

在第一次左翼浪潮期间，拉美左翼政府的政策主张和施政纲领的激进色彩较重。查韦斯等左翼旗手提出“拉丁美洲的21世纪社会主义”的思想和理论，主张替代资本主义和新自由主义模式，提出反传统体制、反政治精英、实现社会变革的口号。激进左翼政府推动宪法和政治改革，试图用直接民主取代代议制民主；主张发挥政府的调控作用，强化国家对经济的控制，通过持续的国有化加强国家对资源能源、电力电讯等战略部门的控制。在本轮左翼浪潮中崛起的并非传统左翼政党，而是在近期社会运动中异军突起的、具有变革倾向的新兴左翼力量。例如，秘鲁、洪都拉斯、智利等国家的左翼执政党建党时间都不长。鉴于拉美特殊的政治经济和社会环境，这些新的左翼执政党为维护和稳固执政基础采取了更加温和的执政方针，许多左翼政党和领导人从之前的激进立场上后撤，极力避免进行可能引发更多社会对抗的激进变革。秘鲁总统卡斯蒂略在竞选中提出了较激进的政策主张，包括对采矿业等多个重大领域进行国有化改革、要求政府获取矿产业收益的70%、“不允许大型公司继续掠夺国家”等。但是，其执政后的立场和执政路线却趋于温和，极力淡化执政纲领的激进色彩，寻求稳健的经济政策，试图增强国际投资者的信心。智利总统博里奇主动剥离竞选期间提出的“过激”主张，倾向于向此前历届政府秉持的中间路线靠拢。竞选期间曾提出在洪都拉斯建设“社会主义”主张的卡斯特罗，执政后也开始实施温和政策。从地区层面看，无论是在本轮左翼浪潮中上台执政的秘鲁、智利、洪都拉斯等国家的新兴左翼政党，还是已有多年执政经验的委内瑞拉、玻利维亚、尼加拉瓜等国家的左翼执政党，都倾向于采取温和化的执政方针和政策。

Fourth, in foreign policy, especially in relations with the United States, they are more pragmatic.

第四，在对外政策、特别是与美国的关系方面更加务实。

During the first left-wing wave, although not all Latin American left-wing governments were fiercely anti-American, some Latin American countries, especially radical left-wing governments in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, still displayed strong anti-American tendencies. Many left-wing governments harbored hostility towards the United States, opposed its imperialist and hegemonic policies, condemned US interference in Latin American affairs, criticized and resisted the US-proposed "Free Trade Area of the Americas Initiative," and sang a "rival tune" to the United States on some sensitive international issues. Latin American left-wing rulers also proposed alternative initiatives with obvious anti-American tendencies, such as the "Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas" (later renamed the "Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America"), vigorously promoting the integration process in the Latin American region and advancing truly free, equal, just, and peaceful integration among Latin American countries. Some left-wing rulers also opposed the intervention of international financial institutions dominated by the United States and other developed countries, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in the development process of Latin American countries. Compared with the first left-wing wave, the foreign policies of many left-wing governments in this current left-wing wave, especially their attitude towards the United States, are more moderate and pragmatic, and they seem less interested in geopolitical anti-Americanism. In 2019, the government of Andrés Manuel López in Mexico signed the revised United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement with the United States and Canada, and signed an agreement with the US government to control illegal immigration. In 2021, after being elected President of Chile, Gabriel Boric expressed his hope to maintain good relations with the United States. Honduran President Xiomara Castro expressed her hope to promote a pragmatic cooperative relationship with the United States. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who was preparing to run in the 2022 Brazilian presidential election, also expressed his hope to get along well with the United States.

在第一轮左翼浪潮期间，虽然不是所有拉美左翼政府都激烈反美，但是部分拉美国家，特别是委内瑞拉、玻利维亚、厄瓜多尔、尼加拉瓜等激进的左翼政府，仍然表现出强烈的反美倾向。许多左翼政府对美国抱有敌意，反对美国的帝国主义和霸权政策，谴责美国干涉拉美事务，批评和抵制美国提出的“美洲自由贸易区倡议”,在一些敏感性国际问题上同美国唱“对台戏”。拉美左翼执政者们还提出了具有明显反美倾向的替代性倡议，如“玻利瓦尔美洲替代计划”(后更名为“玻利瓦尔美洲联盟”),极力推进拉美地区的一体化进程，推进拉美国家间真正自由、平等、公正、和平的一体化。一些左翼执政者还反对美国等发达国家主导的国际货币基金组织和世界银行等国际金融机构干预拉美国家的发展进程。与第一轮左翼浪潮相比，本轮左翼浪潮中的许多左翼政府的对外政策，特别是对美国的态度，更加温和务实，对在地缘政治上反美似乎不太感兴趣。2019年，墨西哥的安德烈斯·曼努埃尔·洛佩斯(Andrés Manuel López)政府与美国和加拿大签署了修订后的《美国—墨西哥—加拿大协定》,并与美国政府签署了控制非法移民的协议。2021年，博里奇在当选智利总统后表示，希望与美国保持良好关系。洪都拉斯总统卡斯特罗则表示，希望推动与美国的务实合作关系。正在备选2022年巴西大选的路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉(Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva)也表示，希望能与美国友好相处。

Fifth, there is a lack of a "bellwether" with a leading role for regional left-wing forces.

第五，缺少对地区左翼力量有引领作用的“领头羊”。

During the first left-wing wave, Latin American left-wing governments were divided into moderate and radical types, each with its own leading country. The moderate left, led by Brazil, established the Union of South American Nations in 2011, which became an important regional organization promoting Latin American integration at the time. Venezuela, as the leader of the radical left, consistently pursued a "revolutionary diplomacy" in Latin America, providing economic support to other left-wing governments, offering oil, funds, and other assistance at preferential prices to relevant countries, vigorously expanding the influence of the "Bolivarian Revolution," and jointly establishing the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America in 2006 with Cuba, actively promoting cooperation with other Latin American left-wing governments. In the current left-wing wave, however, Latin America lacks a regional leading country. Brazil is still governed by a right-wing government; Mexico's López Obrador government lacks the capacity to lead other left-wing countries in the region; and Venezuela has fallen into a severe economic, social, and governance crisis, unable to provide oil and other economic support to other Latin American left-wing countries as it once did. The Union of South American Nations, established during the first left-wing wave, is on the verge of disintegration, with most countries having withdrawn; its current members are limited to a few countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Guyana, and Suriname, and it has lost its leading role in regional cooperation and integration. Due to the absence of a regional leader, regional cooperation issues have been weakened on the agendas of most Latin American left-wing governments. Most left-wing leaders are preoccupied with addressing domestic challenges, lowering the tone of promoting regional integration and losing the momentum and enthusiasm for advancing regional cooperation. As things stand, Latin American left-wing governments have not shown significant interest in revitalizing regional cooperation mechanisms or establishing new ones.

在第一轮左翼浪潮期间，拉美左翼政府分温和与激进两类，两类政府都有自己的领头羊。温和左翼以巴西为领头羊，巴西等温和左翼政府于2011年主导建立了“南美国家联盟”,该机构成为当时促进拉美一体化进程的重要区域组织。委内瑞拉是激进左翼的领头羊，一直在拉美推行“革命外交”,为其他左翼政府提供经济支持，以优惠价格向相关国家提供石油、资金和其他援助，极力扩展“玻利瓦尔革命”的影响力，并于2006年与古巴一起主导建立了“玻利瓦尔美洲联盟”,积极推动与其他拉美左翼政府的合作。而在本轮左翼浪潮中，拉美左翼缺少地区性领头羊。巴西目前仍由右翼政府执政，墨西哥的洛佩斯政府缺乏对地区其他左翼国家的引领，委内瑞拉则陷入了严重的经济、社会和治理危机，已无力像以前那样为其他拉美左翼国家提供石油及其他经济支持。第一次左翼浪潮期间建立的“南美国家联盟”已濒临解体，多数国家“退群”,目前成员仅剩委内瑞拉、玻利维亚、圭亚那和苏里南等少数国家，丧失了对区域合作和地区一体化的引领作用。由于缺少地区性引领者，区域合作议题在多数拉美左翼政府执政日程中被弱化。多数左翼执政者忙于应对国内难题，降低了推进地区一体化的声调，失去了推动区域合作的动力和热情。从目前情况看，拉美左翼政府还没有对重振区域合作机制或建立新机制表现出明显的兴趣。

Sixth, the governing foundation is even weaker.

第六，执政根基更为薄弱。

During the first left-wing wave, the governing foundation of left-wing parties was relatively solid. Many left-wing parties not only had clear advantages in presidential elections but also held a majority of seats in congress, or were themselves the largest party in parliament, wielding dominant power in national legislative bodies and providing strong support for effective governance. In contrast, in the current left-wing wave, most left-wing governing parties do not have a solid foundation; they have not won support from the vast majority of voters in elections and have failed to secure a majority of seats in national legislative bodies, making it difficult to escape the predicament of a weak government. In 2021, during Peru's general election, although Castillo ultimately won the presidency, he received only 13.36% of the vote in the first round and narrowly won by a slim margin in the second round; his party won only 32 of the 130 seats in parliament, making governance difficult and leaving it unable to escape right-wing constraints. In Chile's general election, Boric was also only elected president in the second round; in the first round, he received only 25.8% of the vote, even lower than the right-wing candidate's share; in the parliamentary election, his coalition, Apruebo Dignidad, won only 37 of 155 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 4 of 43 seats in the Senate. In Honduras's general election, although Castro, the candidate of the Liberty and Refoundation Party, was elected president, the party won only 50 of 128 seats in parliament. In the 2021 midterm elections, Mexico's left-wing governing party lost 55 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, weakening its dominant position, and major reforms promoted by the government will face stronger constraints. Argentina's Frente de Todos also lost ground in the midterm parliamentary elections, further increasing governing pressure. Bolivia's left-wing governing party was defeated in local elections, winning only one-third of governorships nationwide, reducing its influence over local affairs.

在第一轮左翼浪潮期间，左翼执政党根基相对牢固。许多左翼政党不仅在总统选举中优势明显，而且在国会中占有多数席位，或本身就是议会第一大党，在国家立法机构中具有主导权，可为政府有效施政提供有力支撑。相比之下，在本轮左翼浪潮中，多数左翼执政党的根基并不牢固，在选举中并没有得到绝大多数选民的支持，在国家立法机构未能占有多数席位，难以摆脱弱势政府的窘境。2021年，在秘鲁大选中，虽然卡斯蒂略最终当选总统，但其在首轮投票中只获得13.36%的选票，在总统选举第二轮对决中仅以微弱优势险胜；在议会130个席位中，其所在政党仅获32席，施政步履维艰，难以摆脱右翼掣肘。在智利大选中，博里奇也是在第二轮投票中才最终当选总统，在首轮投票中，他只获得25.8%的选票，甚至低于右翼候选人所获选票；在议会选举中，其所在的赞成尊严联盟在众参两院分别仅占155个席位中的37席和43个席位中的4席。在洪都拉斯大选中，自由与重建党候选人卡斯特罗虽当选总统，但该党在议会128个席位中仅获50席。在2021年的中期选举中，墨西哥左翼执政党在众议院的席位减少55席，优势地位有所削弱，政府推进的重大改革将遭遇更强大的掣肘。阿根廷 “全民阵线”也在议会中期选举中失利，执政压力进一步增大。玻利维亚左翼执政党则在地方选举中败北，仅获全国1/3的省长职务，对地方事务的影响力下降。

Seventh, left-wing governing parties are increasingly unable to achieve the goal of continuous or long-term governance.

第七，左翼执政党越来越难以实现连续或长久执政的目标。

During the first left-wing wave, the phenomenon of left-wing presidents being re-elected consecutively was very common, occurring in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. If we count from the start of left-wing party governance in Venezuela in 1999 to the loss of governing status by Argentina's left-wing party in 2015, the Latin American "Pink Tide" lasted about fifteen or sixteen years. Currently, left-wing governing parties in Latin America are increasingly unable to achieve continuous governance, and party alternation or government turnover is likely to become the norm in elections across Latin American countries. The left-wing governing cycle is expected to shorten, and the new left-wing wave is unlikely to last for over a decade. The recent return of the left to power in some Latin American countries stems more from public dissatisfaction with the current situation and the performance of right-wing governments than from ideological identification with left-wing parties. If left-wing parties cannot achieve good results within their limited terms and meet public expectations, it will be difficult for them to achieve continuous governance. Constrained by both internal conditions and the external environment, the recently elected Latin American left-wing governing parties will find it hard to achieve satisfactory results in the short term. Some observers believe that large-scale social protest waves will resurge in Latin America, posing a major threat to left-wing governing parties, and predict that the frequency of the pendulum effect in Latin American politics will accelerate, with the cycle of left-right alternation becoming more frequent.

在第一次左翼浪潮期间，左翼总统连选连任现象非常普遍，在阿根廷、巴西、委内瑞拉、厄瓜多尔、玻利维亚等国都曾发生。如果从1999年委内瑞拉左翼政党执政算起，到2015年阿根廷左翼政党丧失执政地位为止，拉美“粉红浪潮”持续了十五六年。而在当前，拉美左翼执政党越来越难以实现连续执政，政党轮替或政府更迭或将成为拉美各国选举的基调。左翼执政周期预计将会缩短，新一轮左翼浪潮恐难持续十几年。近期左翼在一些拉美国家重新执政，更多地是源于民众对当前形势及右翼执政业绩的不满，而不是源于对左翼政党意识形态的认同。如果左翼政党不能在有限的执政期内取得良好业绩，不能满足民众预期，就很难实现连续执政。受内部条件和外部环境的双重制约，最近上台的拉美左翼执政党很难在短期内取得令人满意的业绩。有观察家认为，大规模社会抗议浪潮将在拉美卷土重来，会对左翼执政党构成重大威胁，预计拉美政治钟摆效应的频次将加快，左右更替的周期将更加频繁。

III. Reasons for the Emergence of a New Left-Wing Wave in Latin America

三、拉美出现新一轮左翼浪潮的原因

The emergence of this new left-wing wave in Latin America shares common or similar roots with the previous "Pink Tide," but also has its unique causes. Natanson believes that the latest left-wing wave is not a simple return to the traditional left, but the rise of a new left with characteristics of a new era. Schwartz also argues that the emergence of the latest left-wing wave is related not only to the particularities of domestic politics in various Latin American countries but also to numerous deep-seated reasons, including the intensification of poverty and inequality under the impact of economic crisis, growing dissatisfaction with democracy and institutions, the collapse of traditional party systems, and public anger over corruption. In summary, the main reasons for the emergence of this new left-wing wave in Latin America are as follows:

拉美本轮左翼浪潮的出现与上一次“粉红浪潮”有着共同的或类似的根源，但又有其独特的原因。纳坦森认为，最近一轮左翼浪潮并不是向传统左翼的简单回归，而是具有新时代特征的新左翼的崛起。施瓦茨也认为，最新一轮左翼浪潮的出现既与拉美各国国内政治的特殊性有关，又有众多深层次的原因，包括经济危机冲击下贫困和不平等的加剧、对民主和体制不满情绪的日益增加、传统政党制度的瓦解以及人们对腐败的愤怒等。概括地说，拉美本轮左翼浪潮出现的主要原因如下：

First, the new left-wing wave is an inevitable result of the pendulum effect in Latin American political development. If the emergence of the left-wing "Pink Tide" at the beginning of this century was mainly due to various social strata hoping to correct the defects of the neoliberal development model led by previous right-wing governments and its negative social consequences, then the emergence of the new left-wing wave stems more from various sectors of society hoping to reverse the predicament of economic and social development through the alternation of governing parties. Looking at Latin American history, during periods of rapid economic growth and relative political and social stability, public satisfaction with the government is usually higher, and governing parties find it easier to achieve continuous governance; during periods of economic downturn and political and social instability, public resentment toward the government increases, and governing party turnover is generally more likely to occur. After 2015, the left in Latin America experienced a regional ebb, with a batch of right-wing parties coming to power one after another. After right-wing governments took office, not only did they fail to reverse the downward economic trend, but many countries even fell into deep economic crisis and recession, with social conditions continuing to deteriorate. Under the dual impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the severe global economic recession, Latin America's economy contracted by 6.8% in 2020, with per capita decline reaching as high as 7.6%. Although Latin America's economic growth in 2021 was higher than expected, it was insufficient to reverse the negative effects of the pandemic, let alone ensure sustained economic growth. The lagging effects of the severe economic recession continue to ferment, with countries facing the grim situation of persistently high unemployment and poverty rates, worsening inequality, and increasing social unrest. Various sectors of Latin American society generally hope to reverse the economic and social predicament through the alternation of governing parties.

第一，新一轮左翼浪潮是拉美政治发展钟摆效应的必然结果。如果说本世纪初左翼“粉红浪潮”的出现主要是因为社会各阶层希望纠正此前右翼政府主导的新自由主义发展模式缺陷及其所导致的消极社会后果，那么新一轮左翼浪潮的出现更多地则是因为社会各界希望通过执政党的轮替来扭转经济和社会发展的困局。纵观拉美发展史，在经济快速增长、政治和社会相对稳定的时期，民众对政府的满意度通常较高，执政党较容易实现连续执政；而在经济下行、政治和社会不稳定的时期，民众对政府的怨恨增加，通常更易发生执政党更迭。2015年后，拉美左翼出现了地区性退潮，一批右翼政党相继上台执政。右翼政府执政后，非但没有扭转经济下行趋势，不少国家甚至深陷经济危机和衰退，社会形势持续恶化。受新冠肺炎疫情和世界经济严重衰退双重影响，2020年拉美经济下降6.8%,人均降幅高达7.6%。2021年，拉美经济增长虽然高于预期，但不足以扭转疫情的负面影响，更不足以确保经济持续增长。经济大幅衰退的滞后效应仍在继续发酵，各国面临失业率和贫困率居高不下、不平等加剧、社会动荡加重的严峻形势，拉美社会各界普遍希望通过执政党更迭来扭转经济和社会困局。

Second, the left-wing’s advocacy of social equality is more attractive to the populace under the current economic and social circumstances, helping to facilitate the return to power of Latin American left-wing parties. During the “golden decade” of the Latin American economy after 2003, left-wing governments intensified public social policies, and the region’s social situation markedly improved. From 2005 to 2012, public spending on social policies in Latin American countries grew at twice the rate of economic growth, with social expenditure as a share of GDP rising from 14% to 19%. Between 2000 and 2013, the number of poor people in Latin America nearly halved, and the poverty rate fell from 41.7% to 27.9%, its lowest level in history; poverty reduction was considered a major achievement of left-wing governments. During the right-wing governing cycle that began after 2015, economic recession and the subsequent spread of the COVID-19 pandemic caused a decline in governments’ capacity for social spending, rising unemployment, and worsening poverty, wiping out the poverty reduction gains of more than a decade since the turn of the century. In terms of unemployment, the average unemployment rate in Latin America was 8.4% in 2019, rising to 10.6% by the end of 2020, with the number of unemployed reaching 30.1 million; the employment situation for young people aged 15–24 deteriorated severely, with one in four young people unemployed. In the second quarter of 2021, the average unemployment rate in Latin America remained above 10%. In terms of poverty, the regional poverty rate and extreme poverty rate in 2019 reached 30.5% and 11.3% respectively, regressing to levels around 2012, and by 2020 they had risen further to 33.7% and 12.5%. Alongside rising unemployment and poverty, income distribution worsened further; the Gini coefficient for Latin America rose by 2.9% in 2020, inequality intensified, and social polarization became increasingly severe. Israel Navarro argues that, facing these difficulties, the Latin American left has exploited the situation with polarizing rhetoric of a new class-struggle type, placing voters in a debate between protecting the privileges of a minority and protecting the interests of the poor majority, thereby prompting voters to abandon the right and choose the left.

第二，左翼的社会平等主张在当前的经济和社会形势下对民众更有吸引力，有助于促成拉美左翼政党重新执政。在2003年后的拉美经济“黄金10年”期间，左翼政府加大了社会公共政策力度，地区社会形势明显好转。2005年至2012年，拉美国家用于社会政策的公共支出增长速度是经济增长速度的2倍，社会支出占GDP的比重由14%提高到19%。2000年至2013年，拉美贫困人口减少了近一半，贫困率从41.7%降至27.9%,处于历史最低水平，减贫成功被认为是左翼政府的主要业绩。在2015年后开始的右翼执政周期内，经济衰退以及随后新冠肺炎疫情的扩散则造成了政府的社会支出能力下降，失业增加，贫困现象加剧，导致新世纪以来十几年的减贫成果荡然无存。在失业率方面，2019年，拉美地区的平均失业率为8.4%,2020年底更是达到10.6%,失业人口增至3010万，其中15—24岁的青年人就业状况严重恶化，每4名青年中就有1人失业。2021年第二季度，拉美地区的平均失业率仍在10%以上。在贫困率方面，2019年的地区贫困率和赤贫率分别达到30.5%和11.3%,倒退至2012年前后的水平，2020年又分别增至33.7%和12.5%。在失业和贫困增加的同时，收入分配更趋恶化，2020年的拉美地区基尼系数上涨2.9%,不平等状况进一步加剧，社会分化日益严重。伊斯雷尔·纳瓦罗(Israel Navarro)认为，面对困境，拉美左翼以新阶级斗争式的极化言论对此加以利用，把选民置于是保护少数人的特权、还是保护占人口多数的穷人的利益的争论中，促使选民抛弃右翼、选择左翼。

Third, the public’s anti-establishment and anti-incumbent mentality has been steadily fermenting, fueling changes in ruling parties and the return of the left to power. The people of Latin America lack basic trust in the transparency of public-sector policy implementation, the credibility of state institutions and systems, and the governance capacity of governments to resolve structural ills through reform; they have even developed a habitual negative expectation. As the pandemic spread, leading to economic recession, frequent corruption scandals, and intensified social contradictions, public disappointment with government credibility and governance capacity reached its peak. Many people have even developed a mentality of opposing whoever is in power, using it to vent their dissatisfaction and anger toward state institutions and their efficiency. Under these circumstances, the alternation of ruling parties and government turnover has become the main theme of elections in Latin America. In the 2021 general elections, except for Nicaragua, countries such as Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and Honduras all experienced changes in ruling parties. Except in Ecuador, left-wing parties won in the other countries. Navarro and others argue that, in the view of most voters, left-wing candidates who won recent elections—such as López in Mexico, Fernández in Argentina, Arce in Bolivia, Castillo in Peru, Castro in Honduras, and Boric in Chile—do not necessarily represent left-wing positions but rather anti-system forces. In other words, voters cast their ballots for them not because they believe in left-wing ideology, but because they hope to punish the current government through their vote. As Paulo Velasco points out, “the consequences of public discontent can only be borne by the ruling party.” Voters dissatisfied with the then right-wing government chose to break with it and cast their votes for left-wing party candidates.

第三，民众反建制和反执政党的心态不断发酵，助推了执政党更迭和左翼重新执政。拉美地区民众对公共部门政策实施的透明度、国家机构和制度的公信力以及政府通过改革解决结构性积弊的治理能力都缺乏基本信任，甚至形成了一种惯性的负向预期。随着疫情扩散导致经济衰退、腐败丑闻频发、社会矛盾激化，民众对政府信誉及其治理能力的失望升至顶点。许多人甚至滋生了谁执政就反对谁的心态，借此抒发对国家机构及其工作效率的不满和愤怒。在此情况下，执政党轮替和政府更迭成为拉美地区选举的主基调。在2021年的大选中，除尼加拉瓜外，厄瓜多尔、秘鲁、智利、洪都拉斯等国都发生了执政党更迭。除厄瓜多尔外，在其他国家都是左翼政党获胜。纳瓦罗等人认为，在多数选民看来，墨西哥的洛佩斯、阿根廷的费尔南德斯、玻利维亚的阿尔塞、秘鲁的卡斯蒂略、洪都拉斯的卡斯特罗、智利的博里奇等在近期大选中获胜的左翼候选人并不一定必然代表左翼的立场，而是代表着反体制的力量。换言之，选民们投他们的票，并不是因为相信左翼的意识形态，而是希望通过投票对现政府予以惩罚。正如保罗·贝拉斯科(Paulo Velasco)所指出的，民众不满“所造成的后果只能由执政党来承担”。选民对当时的右翼政府不满，选择与其切割，并把选票投给左翼政党候选人。

IV. Prospects for the Development of the Latin American Left

四、拉美左翼的发展前景

The emergence of a new left-wing wave indicates that the Latin American left possesses strong vitality. The resurgence of left-wing forces has significantly altered the political ecology and balance of political forces in Latin America. However, left-wing ruling parties in Latin America face enormous governing pressures, and the development of the left is subject to numerous constraints, making it difficult to fundamentally reverse the pendulum effect of the region’s political development.

新一轮左翼浪潮的出现表明，拉美左翼有着强大的生命力。左翼力量再次崛起极大地改变了拉美地区政治生态和政治力量的对比。但是，拉美左翼执政党面临着巨大的执政压力，左翼发展受到诸多约束，难以从根本上扭转地区政治发展的钟摆效应。

On the one hand, the environment for the growth of the Latin American left is relatively favorable, and there remains new space for left-wing development. Latin American countries have long lacked profound social change, resulting in persistent phenomena of “social exclusion” and “marginalization.” Consequently, the broad lower and middle classes have demands for changing unequal social structures and achieving social justice, and left-wing ideas and propositions hold great appeal and mobilizing power. In the first decade and more of the 21st century, Latin American countries, leveraging favorable conditions of sustained economic growth, made notable progress in poverty reduction, improving income distribution, and promoting social equity, but they did not fundamentally resolve entrenched social problems. In the vast majority of Latin American countries, unequal income distribution remains severe; social wealth is highly concentrated in the hands of a few; poverty is widespread; and the public’s sense of injustice remains strong, with over 90% of Latin Americans believing that income distribution in their country is unfair or extremely unfair. After 2020, the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic further highlighted the vulnerability of Latin American societies. In 2021, among Latin America’s population of over 600 million, the numbers of poor and extremely poor reached 201 million and 86 million respectively. Under these circumstances, public dissatisfaction with the status quo and the desire for change align relatively well with the propositions of the Latin American left. As long as the problems of poverty and social injustice in Latin America are not fundamentally improved, left-wing ideas and left-wing parties will continue to maintain great appeal, influence, and vitality, and the Latin American left still has room for further growth.

一方面，拉美地区左翼成长的环境相对有利，左翼发展仍有新空间。拉美国家长期缺乏深刻的社会变革，致使“社会排斥”“边缘化”现象一直很严重，因此广大中下阶层拥有改变不平等社会结构、实现社会公平的诉求，左翼的思想和主张有着巨大的吸引力和号召力。进入21世纪后的十多年间，拉美国家利用经济持续增长的有利条件，在减贫疏困、改善收入分配和推动社会公平方面取得了明显的进步，但并未从根本上解决固有的社会问题。在绝大多数拉美国家，收入分配不公问题依然严重，社会财富高度集中在少数人手中，贫困现象十分普遍，民众的不公平感依旧强烈，有90%以上的拉美人认为本国收入分配不公或极度不公。2020年后，新冠肺炎疫情的蔓延进一步凸显了拉美社会的脆弱性。2021年，在拉美6亿多人口中，贫困和赤贫人口分别高达2.01亿和0.86亿。在这种情况下，民众对现状的不满及对改变现状的渴望与拉美左翼的主张较为吻合。只要拉美地区的贫困和社会不公问题得不到根本改善，左翼思想和左翼政党就会继续保持巨大的号召力、影响力和生命力，拉美左翼仍有进一步成长的空间。

On the other hand, constrained by numerous institutional and systemic factors, the governing prospects of Latin American left-wing ruling parties remain highly uncertain. The multiparty system is a basic feature of Latin American political systems, with concepts such as representative democracy, checks and balances, multiparty competition, and alternation of ruling parties deeply entrenched. The elite groups that have long controlled the process of Latin American development, in order to protect their vested interests, will not readily accept any party or politician governing indefinitely. Due to historical inertia, some Latin American voters have also developed “fatigue” and concern about the adverse consequences of any single party or politician governing for a long time. Even if some Latin American left-wing parties achieve good governing performance, it is difficult for them to break free from the constraints and restrictions of the existing system. Under these circumstances, achieving alternation of ruling parties through competitive elections is the “norm” in Latin American political development; any party can only survive and develop through coexistence and competition with other parties. Therefore, under the existing institutional arrangements, most Latin American left-wing parties will likely find it difficult to achieve long-term continuous governance. Furthermore, the prospects for left-wing governance are also limited by the inherent defects of Latin American political systems. The systems of Latin American countries lack the capacity for self-repair and self-regulation; state power institutions often become arenas for party competition rather than platforms for cooperation, with major parties obstructing and undermining each other, severely damaging the functions and efficiency of state institutions. In many Latin American countries, major parties lack consensus on major issues such as national development, often placing the narrow interests of their own party, or even individual leaders, above the long-term and fundamental interests of the nation. Many parties and politicians form alliances for temporary gain and split over narrow self-interest, prioritizing the pursuit of their own narrow interests and lacking the capacity to seek consensus. In this environment where multiparty competition and the risk of ruling-party alternation are normalized, Latin American left-wing ruling parties cannot break free from the constraints of the existing system, nor can they ensure long-term governance. (Notes omitted)

另一方面，受诸多制度和体制性约束的影响，拉美左翼执政党的执政前景仍具有较多不确定性。多党制是拉美国家政治制度的基本特点，代议制、权力制衡、多党竞争和执政党轮替等理念根深蒂固。长期掌控拉美发展进程的精英集团为维护既得利益，不会轻易接受任何政党或政治家无限期执政。出于历史惯性，拉美部分选民也对某一政党或政治家长期执政产生的不良后果产生了“厌倦”和担忧。即使一些拉美左翼政党能取得较好的执政业绩，也很难突破既有体制的束缚和制约。在这种情况下，通过竞争性选举实现执政党更替是拉美政治发展的“常态”,任何政党都只能在与其他政党的共存与竞争中谋生存、求发展。因此，在现有的制度安排下，拉美多数左翼政党恐难以实现长期连续执政。此外，左翼执政前景还受拉美国家政治制度自身缺陷的限制。拉美国家的制度缺乏自我修复和自我调节能力，国家权力机构通常会成为政党角逐的舞台而非合作的平台，主要政党相互掣肘、互相拆台，严重损害了国家机构的功能和效率。不少拉美国家的主要政党在国家发展等重大问题上缺乏共识，常将本党派、甚至领导人个人的狭隘利益置于国家的长远和根本利益之上。许多政党和政治家为获得暂时利益而结盟，为狭隘的私利而分裂，把寻求各自的狭隘利益放在首位，缺乏寻求共识的能力。在这种多党竞争和执政党更替风险常态化的环境中，拉美左翼执政党也无法突破现有体制等束缚，更无法确保自己能长久执政。（注释略）

Online Editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑