Critical Theory Today

Today, the term “critical theory” is frequently applied in a broad sense to various traditions, such as Michel Foucault’s biopolitics, Guy Debord’s psychogeography, and Jacques Lacanian psychoanalysis. While these authors have undoubtedly expanded the scope of critical theory, this article focuses on the main views of the core theorists of the Frankfurt School, who were based at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt. In this regard, the signifier “critical theory” is best seen as a euphemism for “Marxist-influenced social research.” This is not to say that critical theory has a pure Marxist core that today risks being contaminated by post-structuralist and deconstructionist currents. On the contrary, an open, interdisciplinary sensibility is central to the Frankfurt School’s methodology. More precisely, as this article will discuss, the generational succession of Frankfurt School critical theory has maintained its coherence through a development rooted in German Idealism, a coherence that is sometimes continued by many diverse contemporary practitioners.

今天，“批判理论”这一术语经常以一种广义的方式被应用于各种不同的传统，如米歇尔·福柯的生命政治学、居伊·德波的心理地理学以及雅克·拉康式的精神分析学等。虽然这些作者无疑扩大了批判理论的范围，但本文聚焦的是法兰克福学派核心理论家的主要观点，他们以法兰克福大学社会研究所作为大本营。就这一点而言，“批判理论”这一能指最好被视为“受马克思主义影响的社会研究”的委婉说法。这并不是说“批判理论”有一个纯粹的马克思主义的内核，而这一内核在今天有被后结构主义和解构主义潮流所污染的风险。相反，一种开放的、跨学科的敏感性是法兰克福学派方法论的核心。更确切地说，正如本文将要讨论的，法兰克福学派批判理论的代际更迭，通过植根于德国观念论的思想发展而保持了其一贯性，这种一贯性有时会被许多殊异的当代实践者所延续。

Thus, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin, and Erich Fromm are the most familiar representatives of Frankfurt School critical theory. They were deeply influenced by the Left-Hegelian tradition and, to varying degrees, combined this tradition with distinct variants of Western Marxism and Freudian psychoanalysis. Classic texts of the first generation of critical theorists include Adorno and Horkheimer’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Adorno’s *Minima Moralia*, Marcuse’s *One-Dimensional Man*, Benjamin’s *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*, and Fromm’s *Escape from Freedom*. The central issue linking these works of the first generation of critical theorists is the rise of fascism and the increasingly totalizing, “one-dimensional” nature of capitalist society. In *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno outlines a darkly negative account of modernity, linking the development of conceptual thought itself to fascist terror. Despite Adorno’s erudition, the first generation of critical theorists is often seen as having reached a dead end, their theory offering no tangible possibility for liberation beyond the paralyzing injunction to “live life less wrongly.”

因此，西奥多·阿多诺、马克斯·霍克海默、赫伯特·马尔库塞、瓦尔特·本雅明和埃里希·弗洛姆等人是法兰克福学派批判理论中最为大家熟悉的代表人物。他们深受左翼黑格尔传统的影响，并在不同程度上将这一传统与鲜明的西方马克思主义和弗洛伊德精神分析的变体相结合。第一代批判理论家的经典文本包括阿多诺和霍克海默的《启蒙辩证法》、阿多诺的《最低限度的道德》、马尔库塞的《单向度的人》、本雅明的《机械复制时代的艺术作品》和弗洛姆的《逃避自由》。将第一代批判理论家的这些作品联系在一起的核心问题是法西斯主义的兴起，以及资本主义社会日渐总体化的、“单向度”的性质。在《启蒙辩证法》和《否定的辩证法》中，阿多诺概括了对现代性的阴暗消极的描述，将概念思维本身的发展与法西斯主义恐怖联系在一起。尽管阿多诺学识渊博，但第一代批判理论家经常被认为走进了死胡同，除了“少过错误的生活”（live life less wrongly）这一令人麻痹的禁令之外，他们的理论无法为解放提供切实的可能性。

Jürgen Habermas’s *Knowledge and Human Interests* attempts to overcome this impasse by situating critical theory within the concept of “human interests,” a concept far removed from both contemporary positivist philosophy and historicist hermeneutics. While *Knowledge and Human Interests* provided a new foundation for critical theory, it was Habermas’s *The Theory of Communicative Action*, which absorbed aspects of analytic philosophy, pragmatics, hermeneutics, and developmental psychology, that offered a substantive normative reorientation for the critical theory project. Building on Habermas’s post-metaphysical and intersubjective turn, Axel Honneth’s recognition-based critical theory is regarded as the third generation. By returning to the young Hegel’s Jena manuscripts, Honneth’s *The Struggle for Recognition* focuses on subjects’ feelings of “disrespect” or “misrecognition” as an internal entry point for social critique. In subsequent works—including *Reification* and *Freedom’s Right*—recognition remains central in Honneth’s account. Increasingly, one may even hear talk of a fourth generation of critical theory centered on the work of Rainer Forst. This article will outline the characteristics of each generation of critical theory in the first section.

于尔根·哈贝马斯的《知识与人类旨趣》试图通过将批判理论置于“人类旨趣”（human interests）的概念之中来克服这一僵局，这一概念与当代实证主义哲学和历史主义解释学都相去甚远。虽然《知识与人类旨趣》为批判理论提供了新的基础，但为批判理论规划提供具有实质意义的规范性再定向（normative reorientation）的却是哈贝马斯的《交往行为理论》，这部著作吸收了分析哲学、语用学、解释学和发展心理学的诸多方面。在哈贝马斯的后形而上学和主体间性转向的基础上，阿克塞尔·霍耐特的承认批判理论被视为第三代批判理论。通过返回青年黑格尔的耶拿手稿，霍耐特的《为承认而斗争》聚焦于主体的“蔑视”（disrespect）或“错误承认”（misrecognition）的感受，作为社会批判的内在切入点。在随后的著作——包括《物化》和《自由的权利》——中，承认在霍耐特的论述中始终保持着中心地位。越来越多的人甚至可能听说，围绕莱纳·福斯特的著作，已经出现了第四代批判理论。本文将在第一部分概述每一代批判理论的特点。

Despite differences between generations, each generation of critical theory has, to varying degrees, adhered to certain core concepts shared by critical theory, especially: a Hegelian understanding of “reason,” a commitment to the connection between philosophy and social research, the diagnosis of social pathologies, the exposure of false consciousness, and the methodology of immanent transcendence. These core themes will be explored in the second part of this article.

尽管各代之间存在差异，但每一代批判理论都在不同程度上坚持了对批判理论所共享的某些核心概念的看法，尤其是：对“理性”的黑格尔式的理解，对哲学与社会研究之间联系的承诺，对社会病理的诊断，对虚假意识的揭露，以及内在超越的方法论。这些核心主题将在本文的第二部分进行探讨。

The Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt was founded in 1923, and nearly a century later, today’s intellectual, political, and social challenges have changed significantly. As we will point out, while the core ideas of critical theory continue to offer special potential for social research today, this tradition faces multiple challenges that urgently require serious consideration. In particular, critical theory needs to openly engage with decolonial and post-colonial theory and non-Western experiences. Although it is entirely understandable that explaining Nazi terror was placed at the center after the Holocaust, a recurring blind spot of critical theorists is the role of imperialism and centuries of enslavement and dispossession outside Europe. However, as critical theorists embrace new traditions to explore these important dimensions of domination, maintaining an intellectual coherence is essential. Finally, in the face of the rise of Honneth’s increasingly idealized and theorized scholarship, critical theory must strive to maintain its unique connection between philosophy and social research.

法兰克福大学社会研究所成立于1923年，至今已近一个世纪，今天的思想、政治和社会挑战都已经发生了重大变化。正如我们将要指出的，虽然批判理论的核心思想时至今日继续为社会研究提供着特殊的潜能，但是这一传统面临着亟需认真考量的多重挑战。特别是，批判理论需要公开介入去殖民（decolonial）和后殖民（post-colonial）理论以及非西方的经验。尽管在大屠杀之后，解释纳粹恐怖被置于中心地位是完全可以理解的，但批判理论家们反复出现的盲点是，帝国主义的角色以及欧洲之外数个世纪的奴役和剥夺。不过，当批判理论家们接受新的传统用来探索这些重要的统治维度时，保持一种智识上的融贯性（an intellectual coherence）是必不可少的。最后，面对霍耐特日渐理想化和理论化的学术的崛起，批判理论必须努力保持其在哲学与社会研究之间建立的独特联系。

I. The Evolution and Development of Critical Theory

一、批判理论的发展演进

At first glance, critical theory presents a daunting landscape, requiring a basic understanding of Kantian and Hegelian philosophy, Freudian psychoanalysis, Marxist theory, the main principles of Carl Schmitt’s political theory, and twentieth-century history. However, by analyzing the development and main influences of different “generations” of critical theory, one can quickly see the coherence of this broader theoretical project—namely, its development from German Idealism into a social critical theory.

乍看起来，批判理论俨然一幅令人望而却步的景观，需要对康德和黑格尔哲学、弗洛伊德的精神分析、马克思主义理论、卡尔·施米特的政治理论的主要原则和20世纪的历史有基本的理解。不过，通过分析不同“世代”的批判理论的发展和主要影响，人们可以迅速看到这一更广泛的理论规划——即从德国观念论发展成为社会批判理论——的连贯性。

(1) Origins in Left-Hegelianism

（一）起源于左翼黑格尔主义

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant’s analysis focuses on transcendental metaphysical concepts, which are a priori and not derived from the subject’s lived experience. Hegel’s analysis of reason represents a substantial change from Kant. For Hegel, reason unfolds historically in the natural and social world. Kant’s critique of reason is eternal and ontological, whereas Hegel’s approach defines reason as distinctly historical and social in character. For Hegel, the critique of reason becomes a critique of social reality. Although critical theory has largely maintained its allegiance to Hegelianism, Kant’s legacy remains present today, especially in the works of Habermas and Forst.

在《纯粹理性批判》中，康德的分析聚焦于先验的形而上学观念，它们是先天的，而非源自于主体的生活经验。黑格尔对理性的分析相比康德而言有了实质性的变化。在黑格尔看来，理性是在自然界和社会世界中历史性地展开的。康德对理性的批判是永恒的、本体论的，而黑格尔的进路则将理性界定为具有鲜明的历史性和社会性特征。在黑格尔那里，对理性的批判变成了对社会现实的批判。尽管批判理论主要保留了对黑格尔主义的忠诚，但是康德的遗产今天依然在场，尤其是在哈贝马斯和福斯特等人的著作中更为明显。

In the outline of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic*, Hegel’s somewhat ambiguous concept of “reason” refers to the dominant ideas in the world, which shape both social reality and our perception of it. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel focuses on how the evolving understanding of freedom plays a central role in this process. For Hegel, freedom is not merely a “concept” or “idea”; it is an integral part of the modern world; as our understanding of “freedom” changes, society also struggles to resolve its underlying contradictions. However, this process is not seamless, and therefore a critique of reason is necessary: reason is considered incomplete, not fully formed, and unevenly developed. Hence, a rational critique of irrationality is indispensable.

在《精神现象学》和《逻辑学》的概述中，黑格尔有些含糊的“理性”概念指的是世界中的支配性思想，它们既塑造了社会现实，也塑造了我们对社会现实的感知。在《精神现象学》中，黑格尔着重阐述了对自由的不断发展的理解是如何在这一过程中发挥核心作用的。对于黑格尔来说，自由不仅仅是一个“概念”或“观念”，它还是现代世界的重要组成部分；随着我们对“自由”的理解的改变，社会也在努力解决其潜在的矛盾。然而，这一过程并非天衣无缝，因此需要对理性进行批判：理性被认为是不完整的、未完全形成的、不均匀发展的。因此，对非理性的理性批判是必不可少的。

“Right-wing Hegelianism” employs the Hegelian paradigm to provide a conservative defense of the current order, holding that the existing order is the best expression of the free unfolding of reason, whereas left-wing Hegelians critically focus on the gap between the idea of freedom and its manifestation in the social world. As Marcuse stated in *Reason and Revolution*: “Hegel did not claim that everything that exists is rational, but rather implied a cause for the determinate form of reality, namely, actuality. Actual reality is such a reality in which the contradictions between possibility and actuality have been overcome. Its result emerges through a process of change—a process in which determinate actuality realizes the possibilities inherent in it and consistent with it.” [1]1 Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955), p. 152. The translation of the quotation in the original text has been slightly adjusted for clarity in English. Besides emphasizing the critical and progressive way in which Hegel’s thought was taken up by left-wing Hegelians, this passage from Marcuse also demonstrates the method of immanent transcendence characteristic of critical theory. As Marcuse summarized, the possibility of realizing freedom and a more rational society lies in the latent contradictions existing within the social world that are in the process of being resolved. Therefore, reason does not merely refer to ideas that transcend the social world, but also to the as-yet-unmanifested possibilities latent within it. Contrary to the conservative interpretation of Hegel’s famous double proposition (the Doppelsatz)—“What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational”—left-wing Hegelians held that: “Actuality is by no means ‘real,’ but initially only a real possibility.” [2]2 This is a paraphrase of the left-wing Hegelian interpretation of Hegel’s Doppelsatz, as articulated by Marcuse in *Reason and Revolution*. Thus, reason is considered immanent within the social world. Similarly, Honneth, a former director of the Institute for Social Research, defined left-wing Hegelianism as the following “general proposition, namely, that every social form can be successful only if it maintains the most fully developed standards of rationality specific to it.” [3]3 Axel Honneth, *The Pathologies of Individual Freedom: Hegel’s Social Theory*, trans. Ladislaus Löb (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 19. Reason therefore constitutes the foundation of Hegel’s social ontology, and the dynamic handling of latent social contradictions is its essential characteristic.

“右翼黑格尔主义”采用黑格尔的范式为当前秩序提供了一种保守的辩护，认为现存秩序是自由展开的最佳表现，而左翼黑格尔主义者则批判性地聚焦于自由理念与其在社会世界中的表现之间的鸿沟。正如马尔库塞在《理性和革命》中所说：“黑格尔并未宣称现存的都是合理的，而是隐含了一个现实确定形式的原因，即实在。实际的现实就是这样的现实，它所包含的可能与实在的矛盾已被克服了。它的结果通过一个变化的过程——规定的实在要实现与表现在其中的可能性一致的过程——而产生。”除了强调黑格尔思想被左翼黑格尔主义者所接受的批判和进步的方式，马尔库塞的这段引文还展示了批判理论所特有的内在超越的方法。正如马尔库塞所概括的那样，实现自由和更合理社会的可能性，在于正在解决的社会世界中存在的潜在矛盾。因此，理性不仅仅是指超越社会世界的观念，而且指的是潜藏在其中的尚未显现的可能性。与对黑格尔著名的双语句（the Doppelsatz）——“凡是合乎理性的东西都是现实的；凡是现实的东西都是合乎理性的”——的保守性解读相反，左翼黑格尔主义者认为：“实在决不是‘现实’，但最初不过是一个现实的可能性。”因此，理性被认为是内在于社会世界之中的。同样，曾任社会研究所所长的霍耐特将左翼黑格尔主义界定为如下“一般命题，即每一种社会形式，只有在保持各自发展最为充分的合理性标准时才可能是成功的”。理性因此构成了黑格尔社会本体论的基础，对潜在社会矛盾的动态处理则是其本质特征。

(II) First-Generation Critical Theory

（二）第一代批判理论

This social and historical understanding of reason is particularly prominent in Horkheimer’s inaugural lecture upon assuming the directorship of the Institute for Social Research in 1931. In this lecture, he distinguished between “traditional theory and critical theory.” The “specialists” of traditional theory consider themselves objective masters of eternal truth, which they discover through the impartial authority of empirical science; in contrast, Horkheimer emphasized in his research program that the researcher is inherently political. The Frankfurt School’s research developed the above left-wing Hegelian themes, explicitly recognizing the influence of the social world on social researchers. However, Horkheimer did not merely wish to advance a neo-Hegelianism; the framework he proposed in that landmark lecture was a novel synthesis of Marx, Freud, Max Weber, and a deeply rooted left-wing Hegelian foundation. By drawing on these diverse influences, critical theory provided a form of immanent critique that is diagnostic, normative, and reconstructive. It is “critical” and “normative” because it is based on the imagination of an alternative, more rational society, even if the specific details remain elusive. This method is “diagnostic” because it seeks to uncover the deep pathologies of the existing social world, rather than merely identifying instances of injustice or illegality. The reconstructive nature of critical theory brings Hegelianism back to the center. Drawing on Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, critique is not merely a public denunciation of negative tendencies in the social order, but an immanent critique dedicated to identifying the existing but latent emancipatory and rational ideals within the social order.

这种对理性的社会和历史的理解，在霍克海默1931年就任社会研究所所长的就职演讲中表现得尤为突出。在这次演讲中，他区分了“传统理论与批判理论”。传统理论的“专家们”自认为是永恒真理的客观的主人，他们通过实证科学的公正权威发现了这些真理；与此相反，霍克海默在其研究规划中强调，研究者在本质上是有政治性的。法兰克福学派的研究发展了上述左翼黑格尔主义的主题，明确地意识到了社会世界对社会研究者的影响。不过，霍克海默并非仅仅希望推进一种新黑格尔主义，他在那次标志性的演讲中提出的框架是对马克思、弗洛伊德、马克斯·韦伯以及根深蒂固的左翼黑格尔主义基础的一种全新整合。通过利用这些不同的影响，批判理论提供了一种诊断性、规范性和重构性的内在批判形式。它是“批判性的”和“规范性的”，因为它建立在对一种替代性的、更合理的社会的想象的基础上，即使具体的细节仍难以捉摸。这种方法是“诊断性的”，因为它试图发现现存社会世界的深层病理，而不仅仅是寻找不公正或不合法的表现。批判理论的重构性使得黑格尔主义重新成为中心。借助黑格尔的《精神现象学》，批判不仅是对社会秩序中的消极倾向予以公开谴责，而且是一种内在批判，致力于辨识社会秩序中现存但潜在的解放性、合理性理想。

The role played by Marxist theory in Horkheimer’s conception is complex. On the one hand, critical theory sought to transcend the concern with social justice, which was the core focus of classical Marxism. Instead, critical theory aimed at broader categories such as “domination,” “irrationality,” and “unfreedom.” However, contrary to the idealism of Hegel’s thought, critical theorists followed Marx’s materialist inversion of Hegelian dialectics: social reality is seen as the site where contradictions unfold, and the possibility of a better world is latent within the present. Yet, following Marx, the normative ideals of modern society cannot be realized due to the negative consequences brought about by capitalism, thereby hindering social development. Future possibilities are obstructed by the power of capitalist ideology and the reified forms of consciousness it induces. Therefore, Frankfurt School theorists considered the transformation of individual psychology to be as important as the transformation of social structures. Critique is crucial to the political nature of the research program, for it is through critique that critical sociology can determine the possibility of independent or critical thought. This possibility of critical thought exists, but only latently, and needs to be reconstructed through sociological investigation. Hence, overcoming “false consciousness” is central to the Frankfurt School project. Critical thought remains possible, but it is limited by the distortion of the subject’s cognitive capacities by the dominant forms of rationality in the social world. Critical theory was never a form of ideal theory dedicated to producing a “theory of justice” that could ultimately measure and critique the social order. Instead, critical theorists sought to identify possibilities in the present that could further promote the development of critical consciousness and enable the possibility of freedom. Consequently, the critique of the reified consciousness brought about by capitalism became a core objective, for which Frankfurt School theorists integrated developmental psychology and psychoanalysis. Marcuse’s *One-Dimensional Man* and Fromm’s *Escape from Freedom* represent a fruitful dialogue between the ideas of Weber, Marx, and Freud. However, while the first-generation critical theorists offered a unique diagnosis of reified reality, they failed to provide a viable emancipatory alternative. Their practical use of negativity powerfully critiqued the present reality but ultimately led to an impasse, making the already identified opportunities for liberation increasingly remote. Adorno clearly saw the possibility of non-subsumptive rationalities existing in the form of context-transcending modern art and the atonal works of Alan Berg. For the “generation of 1968” (soixante-huitards), Adorno appeared particularly out of touch, noble yet indulgent. Adorno’s repeated criticisms of mass culture, his contempt for Hollywood, and his open rejection of jazz—which he believed nurtured fascist tendencies—further exacerbated this tension. The critical theory of the Frankfurt School risked falling into the ivory tower of isolation.

马克思主义理论在霍克海默的构想中所扮演的角色是复杂的。一方面，批判理论试图超越对社会正义的关注，这是经典马克思主义的核心关切。相反，批判理论瞄准的是诸如“统治”“非理性”“不自由”等更广义的范畴。不过，与黑格尔思想的唯心主义相反，批判理论家们紧跟马克思对黑格尔辩证法的唯物主义颠倒：社会现实被视为矛盾展开的场所，而且更美好世界的可能性潜在于当下之中。然而，在马克思之后，由于资本主义带来的消极后果，现代社会的规范性理想无法实现，从而迟滞了社会的发展。未来的可能性被资本主义意识形态的力量及其所诱发的意识的物化形式所阻碍。因此，法兰克福学派的理论家们认为，个人心理的转变与社会结构的转型同等重要。批判对于研究规划的政治性至关重要，因为正是通过批判，批判的社会学才得以确定进行独立的或批判的思考的可能性。这种批判性思考的可能性是存在的，只不过是潜在的，需要通过社会学的调查来重建。因此，克服“虚假意识”是法兰克福学派规划的核心。批判性思考依然是可能的，但它受到了社会世界中占支配地位的理性形式对主体认知能力的扭曲的限制。批判理论从来不是这样一种形式的理想理论（ideal theory），它致力于产生一种“正义理论”，从而最终可以衡量和批判社会秩序。相反，批判理论家们试图确定当下的可能性，从而可以进一步促进批判意识的发展，并使自由的可能性得以实现。因此，对资本主义所导致的物化意识的批判就成了核心目标，法兰克福学派的理论家们为此整合了发展心理学与精神分析学。马尔库塞的《单向度的人》和弗洛姆的《逃避自由》就代表了韦伯、马克思与弗洛伊德的思想之间富有成效的对话。然而，虽然第一代批判理论家们对物化的现实进行了独特的诊断，但却未能提供一种切实可行的解放性替代方案。他们对否定性的实际运用，强有力地批判了当下现实，最终却陷入了一种僵局，从而使已经确定的解放机会变得日渐渺茫。阿多诺显然看到了非类属的合理性（non-subsumptive rationalities）以超越语境的现代艺术和阿兰·贝格（Alan Berg）的无调性作品的形式存在的可能性。对于“1968年的一代”（soixante-huitards）而言，阿多诺尤其显得格格不入，他高贵而放纵。阿多诺对大众文化的一再苛责，对好莱坞的蔑视，对爵士乐——他认为爵士乐孕育了法西斯主义倾向——的公然排斥，进一步加剧了上述张力。法兰克福学派的批判理论有堕入孤立象牙塔的危险。

(III) Habermas

（三）哈贝马斯

Habermas’s mature academic research attempts to reconstruct critical theory within the sociological tradition and return to the original connection between anti-positivist social research and philosophy. Although his initial attempt (namely *Knowledge and Human Interests*) successfully provided an alternative foundation for critical theory and pointed to the Adornian impasse, Habermas’s early works remain highly normative, unable to establish a clear link between social theory and epistemology. While Habermas’s *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* accepts the Adornian central theme of the decline of non-instrumental rationality, it was not until *The Theory of Communicative Action* in 1981 that Habermas achieved a genuine paradigm shift in critical theory. Social critical theory once again had a clear research objective: to attempt to discover opportunities for immanent transcendence within existing communicative structures. Unlike Adorno, Habermas argues that communicative action is as much a part of modernity as instrumental action. When Weber, Adorno, and Horkheimer focused on instrumental rationality, for Habermas this is merely part of a complex social whole. Communicative rationality is equally central in Habermas’s framework, which he argues is reflected in socialization, social institutions, identity construction, and the nature of intersubjective experiences. Emphasizing the divergence between Habermas’s *The Theory of Communicative Action* and Adorno’s *Negative Dialectics* is crucial. Adorno argues that the possibility of immanent transcendence is gradually disappearing; Habermas argues that modernity is the continuous accumulation of normative potential in communicative interaction. Thus, immanent critique no longer relies on radical negativity but instead locates the possibility of social transformation within existing forms of intersubjective praxis. As a result, critique is repositioned as more forward-looking and linked to the development of the self-understanding of subjects and society. Therefore, Habermas’s interpretation guides critical theorists toward empirical research on places where progressive development possibilities exist.

哈贝马斯成熟的学术研究试图在社会学传统中重建批判理论，并回到反实证主义的社会研究与哲学之间的原初关联。虽然他初次尝试（即《知识与人类旨趣》），就成功地为批判理论提供了替代性基础，并指出了阿多诺式的僵局，但哈贝马斯的早期著作仍然具有高度的规范性，无法在社会理论与认识论之间建立一种明确的关联。虽然哈贝马斯的《公共领域的结构转型》接受了非工具理性的衰落这一阿多诺式的中心主题，但直到1981年的《交往行为理论》，哈贝马斯才实现了批判理论中真正的范式转换。社会批判理论再一次有了一个明确的研究目标：试图在现存的交往结构中发现内在超越的机会。与阿多诺不同，哈贝马斯认为，交往行为与工具（行为）一样，都是现代性的一部分。当韦伯、阿多诺和霍克海默专注于工具理性时，对于哈贝马斯来说，这只是复杂的社会整体的一部分。交往理性在哈贝马斯的框架中同样处于中心地位，他认为这反映在社会化、社会制度、身份建构以及主体间性经验（intersubjective experiences）的本质上。强调哈贝马斯的《交往行为理论》与阿多诺的《否定的辩证法》之间的分歧是至关重要的。阿多诺认为，内在超越的可能性正在逐渐消失；哈贝马斯则认为，现代性是交往性沟通中规范性潜能的不断积累。因此，内在批判不再依赖于激进的否定性，而是将社会转型的可能性置于现存的主体间性实践（intersubjective praxis）的形式中。结果，批判被重新定位为更具前瞻性，并且与主体和社会的自我理解的发展相关联。因此，哈贝马斯的阐释指导着批判理论家们对存在进步发展可能性的地方进行实证研究。

Habermas’s work is also notable for bringing critical theory into dialogue with pragmatist thought, particularly drawing on the work of Karl-Otto Apel. In a sense, as a result of this dialogue, Habermas rejects the radical negativity of the first generation of critical theory. For Habermas, the objective conditions of society are not merely domination; there exist forms of intersubjective communication that transcend the current social world, whose manifest irrationality helps challenge the existing logic of domination. Habermas’s later works discover this possibility in law and democratic institutions, places he himself in his early works considered saturated with instrumentality.

哈贝马斯的著作还以将批判理论带入与实用主义思想的对话而著称，特别是借鉴了卡尔-奥托·阿佩尔的著作。在某种意义上，作为这种对话的结果，哈贝马斯拒绝了第一代批判理论的激进否定性。对于哈贝马斯来说，社会的客观状况并不仅仅是一种统治；存在着超越当前社会世界的主体间性交往的各种形式，其明显的非理性有助于挑战现有的统治逻辑。哈贝马斯后来的著作在法律和民主制度中发现了这种可能性，而他本人在其早期著作中认为这些地方充斥着工具性。

Habermas’s project is committed to breaking the impasse of the first-generation scholars. In this regard, he must be praised, especially for his research on social learning processes and his productive ability to work across multiple traditions. However, with the rise of digital platforms, his work on communicative rationality seems somewhat outdated. Twitter, WhatsApp, Bumble, Tinder, Facebook, etc., all blur the boundaries between communicative rationality and instrumental rationality. Contemporary scholarship increasingly challenges the dichotomy between the “system” and the “lifeworld,” which is central to Habermas’s social theory. Furthermore, while Habermas successfully escaped the intellectual paralysis of the late first-generation critical theory, this can be interpreted as coming at the cost of the unique critical efficacy of early critical theory. That explicit Marxian-Weberian analysis seems to have disappeared. Most problematically, Michael J. Thompson and others question the extent to which communicative interaction provides the possibility for immanent transcendence that Habermas claims. For Thompson, the view that there exists a form of intersubjective practice unaffected by neoliberal reification appears to present an untenable form of “new idealism.”

哈贝马斯的规划致力于打破第一代学者的僵局。在这一点上，他必须受到赞扬，尤其是他对社会学习过程的研究，以及他跨越多种传统的富有成效的研究能力。然而，随着数字平台的兴起，他关于交往理性的著作似乎有点过时。推特、WhatsApp、Bumble、Tinder、脸书等都融合了交往理性和工具理性的边界。当代学术日渐对“系统”和“生活世界”领域的二分发起挑战，这是哈贝马斯社会理论的核心。此外，虽然哈贝马斯成功摆脱了第一代批判理论晚期的思想麻痹，但这可以被解读为是以牺牲早期批判理论研究独特的批判效力为代价的。那种显性的马克思—韦伯式分析似乎已经不复存在。最成问题的是，迈克尔·J.汤普森等人质疑交往性沟通在多大程度上为哈贝马斯所主张的内在超越提供了可能性。对于汤普森来说，那种认为存在一种不受新自由主义物化影响的主体间性实践的观点，似乎呈现出的是一种站不住脚的“新观念论”形式。

(4) Honneth

（四）霍耐特

Honneth further develops the intersubjective turn in Habermas’s work, attempting to find the possibility of immanent transcendence in the subject’s experiences of suffering and disrespect. In Honneth’s conception, the individual subject is given a more important position than in first-generation critical theory; the individual’s experience of being denied recognition is the entry point for social critique. In this regard, Honneth’s method remains a form of immanent critique, as he attempts to identify the disjuncture between subjects’ expectations of recognition (emotional, legal, social) and their experiences of being denied. Similarly, especially in his early works, Honneth directs critical theory toward a micro-analytical direction. However, although Honneth’s method pays more attention to the details of individual emotional experience, his research exhibits a surprising consistency, which has attracted much criticism: for Honneth, it seems that all social pathologies are the result of problematic recognition relations. While recognition may provide important insights into certain dynamics of care work (such as racial or gender discrimination), Honneth has been heavily criticized for insisting that the recognition framework can capture the totality of social pathologies. In *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, Nancy Fraser comments on the problems raised by Honneth’s “perspectival monism.” In Fraser’s view, Honneth’s recognition approach fails to explain the irrationalities and contradictions of capitalism. For example, she comments on the structures and dynamics by which skilled, respected workers are forced to lay off due to general capitalist events (such as corporate mergers). Fraser points out that such commonplace capitalist dynamics cannot be satisfactorily understood through the lens of recognition. To deepen this theme, Lois McNay, in *Against Recognition*, argues that Honneth has fallen victim to “academic epistemological centrism.” By this she means that Honneth prioritizes the alleged universality of his preferred concept (such as recognition) over argumentative clarity and consistency.

霍耐特进一步发展了哈贝马斯著作中的主体间性转向，试图在主体的痛苦和蔑视体验中找到内在超越的可能性。在霍耐特的构想中，个体主体被赋予了比第一代批判理论更为重要的地位；个体被拒绝承认的体验是社会批判的切入点。就此而言，霍耐特的方法仍然是一种内在批判的形式，他试图辨识主体对承认的期待（情感的、法律的、社会的）与他们被拒绝的体验之间的脱节。同样，尤其在早期著作中，霍耐特将批判理论引向了微观分析的方向。不过，尽管霍耐特的方法更多地关注个人情感体验的细节，但他的研究呈现出令人惊讶的一致性，这一点受到很多批评：对于霍耐特而言，似乎所有的社会病理都是有问题的承认关系的结果。虽然承认可能为照护工作的某些动力（例如种族歧视或性别歧视等）提供了重要的启示，但霍耐特还是因其坚持承认框架能够捕捉到社会病态的总体而备受批评。在《再分配，还是承认？——一个政治哲学对话》中，南茜·弗雷泽对霍耐特“视角一元论”（perspectival monism）所引发的问题进行了评论。在弗雷泽看来，霍耐特的承认进路未能解释资本主义的非理性和矛盾。例如，她评论了由于一般的资本主义事件（如公司合并）而导致技术熟练、受人尊敬的工人被迫下岗的结构和动力。弗雷泽指出，这种老生常谈的资本主义动力学无法通过承认的视角得到令人满意的理解。为了深化这一主题，路易斯·麦克尼在《反对承认》一书中指出，霍耐特已经成为“学院派认识论中心主义”的受害者。她的意思是，霍耐特将其偏爱的概念（例如承认）的所谓普遍性置于论证的清晰性和一致性之上。

Therefore, Honneth’s work has divided contemporary critical theorists. Undeniably, he has successfully developed an academic framework influential enough to impact sociology, transcending the narrow scope of the Frankfurt School circle, and his research is widely praised, especially by those in the traditions of the Essex School and the University of Jyväskylä. However, in a further extension of Habermasian themes, one might question the extent to which Honneth’s interpretation remains consistent with the original political objectives set out in Horkheimer’s inaugural address as director of the Institute for Social Research. For example, in Honneth’s *Freedom’s Right*, his method of normative reconstruction is used to identify positive, emancipatory features within the market order that are present, not merely potential. In Thompson’s view, this is not merely an occasional moment of uncritical defense of capitalism; rather, Honneth’s approach fundamentally departs from the Marxian-Weberian legacy of critical theory. In support of Thompson’s claim, one cannot imagine Adorno reacting positively to *Freedom’s Right*. Honneth should be regarded as a pivotal thinker in the development of the Frankfurt School, not only because he developed an influential critical theory of recognition but also because of his potential transition toward a more liberal political theory, especially the gradual shift toward ideal theory methodology in his work *Freedom’s Right*.

因此，霍耐特的工作在当代批判理论家中产生了分歧。不可否认，他成功地提出了一套学术框架，足以影响社会学，超越了法兰克福学派群英的狭隘范围，而且他的研究广受赞誉，特别是埃塞克斯学派和于韦斯屈莱学派传统中的那些人。然而，在对哈贝马斯式主题的进一步扩展中，人们可能会质疑，霍耐特的阐释在多大程度上与霍克海默作为社会研究所所长的就职演讲中所提出的原初政治目标保持了一致。例如，在霍耐特的《自由的权利》中，他的规范性重构方法被用来辨识市场秩序中积极的解放性特征，它们是存在的，而不仅仅是潜在的。在汤普森看来，这不仅仅是不假思索地为资本主义辩护的偶然时刻；毋宁说，霍耐特的进路从根本上就背离了批判理论的马克思—韦伯式遗产。为了支持汤普森的说法，人们无法想象阿多诺会对《自由的权利》作出积极的反应。霍耐特应该被视为法兰克福学派发展过程中一位举足轻重的思想家，这不仅是因为他发展了一种极具影响力的承认批判理论，也因为他向更具自由主义色彩的政治学的潜在过渡，尤其是在其著作《自由的权利》中逐渐向理想理论的方法论的过渡。

(5) A Fourth Generation of Critical Theory?

（五）第四代批判理论？

Critical theory did not end with Honneth’s theory of recognition. On the contrary, various alternative and heterogeneous themes have continuously emerged, directing critical theory toward competing and divergent paths. Forst’s critical theory of justification develops intersubjective and Kantian themes along the trajectory of Habermas and Honneth, and he is often regarded as a representative of the emerging fourth generation of critical theory. In this respect, Forst exhibits the clearest continuity with recent Frankfurt School thought. However, alongside Forst there are other theorists who increasingly seek integration with pluralized alternative traditions, such as Nancy Fraser, Rahel Jaeggi, Amy Allen, Andrew Feenberg, and others. We will return to this theme in the third part, discussing the challenges facing critical theory today.

批判理论并没有终结于霍耐特的承认理论。相反，各种替代性的和异质性的主题不断出现，批判理论被带向了相互竞争的不同方向。福斯特的辩护批判理论沿着哈贝马斯—霍耐特的轨迹发展了主体间性和康德式的主题，而且他经常被视为新兴的第四代批判理论的代表。在这方面，福斯特表现出了与近期法兰克福学派思想最清晰的连续性。不过，与福斯特并列的还有其他一些理论家，他们越来越多地寻求与多元化的替代性传统相结合，比如弗雷泽、拉埃尔·耶吉、艾米·埃伦、安德鲁·芬博格等人。我们将会在第三部分回到这一主题，讨论批判理论在今天所面临的挑战。

II. Key Themes of Critical Theory

二、批判理论的关键主题

Although there are clear differences among the aforementioned generations of critical theory, they generally maintain consistency in the following aspects.

尽管上述几代批判理论之间存在着明显的差异，但在如下几个方面大体上保持了一致性的特征。

(I) Reason

（一）理性

The importance of Hegel’s thought for critical theory cannot be overstated. Despite significant differences from the first generation, the works of Forst and Honneth maintain a clear orientation toward German idealism, particularly left-Hegelianism. In fact, the Hegelian understanding of “reason” is the most distinctive feature of critical theory, and it is this that gives the concept of critique its specific form. Reason is understood not merely as a cognitive capacity but as something that manifests itself in the social world. Therefore, a critique of reason simultaneously requires ideology critique and an analysis of the internal contradictions of social organization. It is this focus on the critique of reason that links the vastly different *Dialectic of Enlightenment* with *The Right to Freedom*. Adorno and Horkheimer provide a macro-structural analysis of the development of Enlightenment thought, while Honneth offers a normative reconstruction of dominant social and economic spheres; both are animated by engagement with the forms of reason manifested in the social world.

黑格尔的思想对于批判理论的重要性再怎么强调都不为过。尽管与第一代学者有着非常显著的差异，但福斯特和霍耐特的著作保持着明确的德国观念论、尤其是左翼黑格尔主义的取向。事实上，对“理性”的黑格尔式理解是批判理论最显著的特征，正是它赋予了批判概念以特定的形式。理性不仅被视为一种认知能力，而且被理解为在社会世界中显现出来。因此，理性批判同时需要意识形态批判和对社会组织内在矛盾的分析。正是这种对理性批判的关注将分歧巨大的《启蒙辩证法》与《自由的权利》联系起来。阿多诺和霍克海默对启蒙思想的发展进行了宏观结构上的分析，而霍耐特则对占支配地位的社会和经济领域进行了规范性重构，两者都因与社会世界中表现出来的理性形式的接触而充满活力。

(II) Immanent Transcendence

（二）内在超越

The methodology of immanent transcendence is closely tied to Hegel’s exposition of reason. Critical theorists identify contradictions existing within the social world in order to discern higher (less contradictory) forms of reason latent within it. Thus, critical theorists provide a form of immanent critique aimed at transcending the limitations of the current social formation. This method, initially excellently articulated by Horkheimer, persists in Honneth’s work. Honneth argues that subjects’ experiences of disrespect point toward a normative order immanent in the present, an order that current social relations cannot attain. Therefore, the rupture between subjects’ desire for respectful intersubjective relations and their negative experiences becomes the immanent entry point for Honneth’s critical theory of recognition.

内在超越的方法论与黑格尔对理性的阐释紧密相关。批判理论家通过分析存在于社会世界中的矛盾，来辨识潜在于社会世界中的高级（矛盾较少的）理性形式。于是，批判理论家们提供了一种内在批判的形式，旨在超越当前社会形态的局限。这种由霍克海默最初做了绝佳阐述的方法，在霍耐特的著作中仍然存在。霍耐特认为，主体的蔑视体验指向了一种潜在于当下的规范秩序，而这种秩序是当前的社会关系所无法达到的。因此，主体对受尊重的主体间性关系的渴望与他们的否定体验之间的断裂，就成为霍耐特的承认批判理论的内在切入点。

The methodology of immanent transcendence also crucially situates psychoanalysis within the critical theoretical tradition. As Honneth states in *Pathologies of Reason*, it is the subject’s anxious reaction to unresolved contradictions that connects critical theory’s interest in social transformation with the subject’s biological, lived reality. For example, neuroses triggered by Victorian-era sexual repression are seen as revealing the pathological nature of that social formation. However, this is not merely because the current social order is considered suboptimal, but because people know that a more rational, less oppressive form of social organization still exists within the social world, even if only potentially. The possibility of transcendence arises primarily from the social world itself.

内在超越的方法论还至关重要地将精神分析置于批判的理论传统之中。正如霍耐特在《理性的病理学》中所说，正是主体对未解决矛盾的焦虑反应，将批判理论对社会转型的兴趣与主体的生物学的、活生生的现实联系起来。例如，维多利亚时代对性的压抑所引发的神经官能症，被视为揭示了该社会形态的病理性本质。然而，这并不仅仅因为当前的社会秩序被认为是次优的，而且因为人们知道，在社会世界中仍然存在着一种更合理的、更少压迫的社会组织形式的内核，即便是潜在其中。超越的可能性主要来自于社会世界本身。

(III) Philosophy and Social Research

（三）哲学与社会研究

As a form of philosophy-based social research, critical theory maintains a unique position because identifying contradictions in the normative order requires an anti-positivist methodology. Furthermore, critical theory has been widely recognized for its pronounced interdisciplinarity in social research. The possibility of immanent transcendence is not confined to a single social sphere but can exist in the economy, film, music, poetry, architecture, and even deep within the psyche. The distinctiveness of critical theory lies precisely in its integrative approach; its focus is not limited to a particular disciplinary perspective. In this regard, the classic works of critical theory transcend disciplinary boundaries: for instance, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* links Greta Garbo with Odysseus, and the Marquis de Sade with Hegel. Although there has been a recent turn toward analytic philosophy (e.g., Habermas’s debate with John Rawls), critical theory retains these aspects of interdisciplinary social concern.

作为一种以哲学为基础的社会研究形式，批判理论保持着独特的地位，因为，要识别规范秩序中的矛盾，就需要一种反实证主义的方法论。此外，批判理论在社会研究中一直以其显著的跨学科性而得到广泛认同。内在超越的可能性并不局限于单一的社会领域，而是可以存在于经济、电影、音乐、诗歌、建筑之中，甚至存在于心灵深处。批判理论的独特性正是在于其整合路径，它的关注点并不局限于某一特定的学科视野。就此而言，批判理论的经典著作超越了学科界限：比如，《启蒙辩证法》就将葛丽泰·嘉宝与奥德修斯、萨德侯爵与黑格尔的讨论联系起来。尽管最近转向了分析哲学（比如哈贝马斯与约翰·罗尔斯的争论），但批判理论仍然保留了这一跨学科的社会关注的各个方面。

Another notable feature is the use of disclosing critique, particularly evident in the texts of the first generation of critical theory. Looking back, critical theorists sought to identify contradictions within the dominant forms of social reason. This raises a pedagogical-methodological challenge: how can one articulate ideas whose very thought has become increasingly reified, when the transmission of information requires a certain degree of communicative rationality in the lifeworld? How does one tell others that our capacity for communication has been damaged? In this regard, *Minima Moralia* and *Dialectic of Enlightenment* are particularly striking for their unorthodox presentation, attempting to “disclose” the interests of their social research through allegory, cross-cutting, and exaggeration. This is not to say these texts lack “argumentation.” Rather, their mode of presentation is intended to appeal to the reader’s residual “non-reified” sensibilities.

另一个显著特征是对揭露性批判的运用，这一点在第一代批判理论的文本中尤其明显。回顾既往，批判理论家们试图在社会理性的主导形式中找出矛盾。这就提出了一个教育学—方法论上的挑战：当信息的传递需要在生活世界中存在一定程度的交往理性时，人们如何才能清晰地表达思想本身已经日渐物化的观念？一个人如何告诉别人我们的交往能力受到了损害？在这方面，《最低限度的道德》和《启蒙辩证法》因其非正统的表述而尤为突出，它们试图通过寓言、交叉和夸张来“揭露”其社会研究的利益。这并不是说，这些文本缺少“论证”。更确切地说，其呈现方式是为了吸引读者们残存的“未物化的”情感。

(IV) Diagnosis of Social Pathologies

（四）社会病理学诊断

Liberal social and political philosophy, represented by Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice*, focuses on creating a “theory of justice” as ideal theory. Critical theory research, in contrast, originates from the analysis of the existing social world. A further distinction between critical theory and the liberal tradition is that the former is not concerned with discovering instances of “injustice” or “illegitimacy,” but is consistently devoted to identifying and diagnosing social pathologies. This unusual signifier captures the “deeper” normative diagnostic aim of critical theory; unlike liberal scholarship, critical theorists aim to identify the obstacles that hinder subjects’ self-realization. Thus, Honneth’s critical theory of recognition is deployed to diagnose “pathologies of recognition.” Although there is increasing debate among critical theorists about the best framework for social pathologies, there is general agreement that the heuristic method can form a diagnostic, normative form of critique capable of capturing a wide range of social problems, many of which are inaccessible to liberal approaches. In *Pathologies of Reason*, Honneth convincingly presents “pathological diagnostic critique” as the “dynamite” of critical theory; this social-theoretical heuristic enables critical theorists to investigate various social ills.

以罗尔斯的《正义论》为代表的自由主义社会政治哲学关注的是创制一种作为理想理论的“正义理论”，批判理论研究则是发端于对现存社会世界的分析。批判理论与自由主义传统的进一步区分在于，前者关注的不是发现“不公正”或“不合法”的实例，而是始终致力于辨识和诊断社会的病理。这一不同寻常的能指抓住了批判理论“更深层的”规范性诊断目标；与自由主义学术不同，批判理论家旨在找出那些妨碍主体自我实现的障碍。于是，霍耐特的承认批判理论便被用于诊断“承认的病理”。尽管在批判理论家们之间关于社会病理学最佳框架的争论越来越多，但是人们普遍认为，启发式方法能够形成一种诊断性的、规范性的批判形式，可以捕捉大量的社会问题，其中许多问题是自由主义方法无法触及的。在《理性的病理学》中，霍耐特令人信服地将“病理学诊断批判”作为批判理论的“炸药”，这种社会理论的启发使得批判理论家能够探究各种社会弊病。

(V) False Consciousness

（五）虚假意识

One might consider that the ultimate thread connecting the many themes above is the attempt to expose and transcend false consciousness. Marx and Engels originally used the term “ideology” to refer to individuals’ distorted beliefs about their society. Scholars of the Frankfurt School held that those who reproduce these ideologies suffer from “false consciousness”; in other words, they are considered “deluded about their own beliefs.” Thus, false consciousness can be understood as the subject’s systematic self-denial of the origins of their cognitive content—including their norms and values, but more importantly their conceptual mode of engaging with the world. Drawing heavily on Gramsci and Lukács, scholars of the Frankfurt School regarded false consciousness as “a form of consciousness arising from the practical life of capitalist society.” Extending Marx’s writings on commodity fetishism, Gramsci’s analysis of the paradigm of hegemony, and Lukács’s work on reification, “false consciousness” represents the entire process by which the subject becomes alienated from their lifeworld. As revealed by Fromm and the early representatives of the Frankfurt School, in integrating Weberian, Marxist, and Freudian analyses, false consciousness links workers’ experience of capitalist society, their mistaken understanding of their own position within it, and the “naturalisation” of their reified self-awareness. Therefore, false consciousness is a major social ill, and the research agenda of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt offered the possibility of exposing the contradictions between the subject’s reified consciousness and the objective reality of the social world.

人们可能会认为，连接上述诸多主题的终极线索是试图揭露并超越虚假意识。马克思和恩格斯最初使用“意识形态”这一术语来指称个人对其社会的扭曲信念。法兰克福学派的学者们认为，那些再生产这些意识形态的人正遭受着“虚假意识”的折磨；换句话说，他们被认为“对自己的信仰感到迷惑”。因此，虚假意识可以被理解为主体对其认知内容——包括他们的规范和价值观，但更重要的是他们与世界接触的概念方式——起源的系统性自我否定。在大量借鉴葛兰西和卢卡奇的基础上，法兰克福学派的学者们将虚假意识视为“资本主义社会生活实践中产生的意识形式”。通过延伸马克思关于商品拜物教的篇章、葛兰西对霸权范式的分析以及卢卡奇关于物化的著作，“虚假意识”代表了主体与他们的生活世界相异化的整个过程。正如弗洛姆和早期法兰克福学派的代表人物所揭示的那样，在整合韦伯式的、马克思主义的和弗洛伊德式的分析的过程中，虚假意识将工人对资本主义社会的体验、他们对自己在资本主义社会中所处位置的错误理解以及他们物化的自我意识的“自然化”（naturalisation）联系在一起。因此，虚假意识是一种主要的社会弊病，法兰克福大学社会研究所的社会研究议程为揭露主体的物化意识与社会世界的客观现实之间存在的矛盾提供了可能性。

III. Contemporary Challenges Facing Critical Theory

三、批判理论面临的当代挑战

Today, critical theory continues to provide a distinctive approach to conducting social research, but this tradition faces multiple challenges. While far from exhaustive, these challenges can be categorized as follows: (1) challenges arising from engaging with non-Western experiences and decolonial scholarship; (2) the risk of losing intellectual coherence due to the proliferation of various research approaches; (3) the potential dilution of the focus of social research with the acceptance of more ideal theory and liberal perspectives.

今天，批判理论继续为进行社会研究提供了独特的进路，但这一传统面临着多重挑战。虽然远非详尽无遗，但这些挑战可以分为如下几类：（1）介入非西方经验和去殖民学术所带来的挑战；（2）由于各种研究进路的激增而面临着丧失智识上的融贯性的风险；（3）随着对更多理想理论和自由主义观点的接受，社会研究的关注重点面临被稀释的可能。

(I) Eurocentrism and Decoloniality

（一）欧洲中心主义与去殖民性

Recently, Allen’s *The End of Progress* has sharply highlighted the Eurocentrism of critical theory. Although postcolonial and decolonial research is increasingly popular in academia, the dominant approaches to critical theory today remain largely rooted in Western perspectives and inevitably focus on the historical conditions of an ostensibly “Western modernity.” Glen S. Coulthard’s *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition* stands in stark contrast to the mainstream critical theory of recognition championed by Honneth. A core assumption of many interpretations of recognition theory is that the modern nation-state facilitates legal recognition through its judicial system. From this perspective, struggles for recognition can successfully conclude with inclusion and acceptance within state institutions. As Coulthard, Thomas McCarthy, and George Steinmetz have argued, in the context of centuries of slavery and systemic racism, such a friendly reconciliation with the state is both inappropriate and untenable. On the contrary, as Coulthard argues, politics based on mutual recognition do not promote equal, peaceful coexistence but instead often help reproduce various forms of colonialism. Therefore, politics based on intersubjectivity and recognition are insufficient. In the terms of the century-defining debate between Fraser and Honneth, redistribution must take priority over recognition. This is increasingly evident in demands for the restitution of historical water and land rights.

最近，埃伦的《进步的终结》一书将批判理论的欧洲中心主义尖锐地凸显出来。尽管后殖民和去殖民的研究在学术界日益流行，但今天占主导地位的批判理论进路仍然在很大程度上植根于西方视角，并且不可避免地聚焦于明显的“西方现代性”的历史状况。格林·S.库尔撒德的《红皮肤，白面具：拒绝承认的殖民政治》与霍耐特倡导的主流的承认批判理论形成了鲜明对比。许多承认理论阐释的一个核心假设是，现代民族国家通过其司法系统促进了法律上的承认。从这样的角度看，争取承认的斗争可以成功地以国家制度内的包容和接受而告终。正如科塔德、托马斯·麦卡锡和乔治·施泰因梅茨所反对的，在几个世纪的奴隶制和系统性种族主义的背景下，这种与国家的友好和解既是不合适的，也是站不住脚的。恰恰相反，正如科塔德所说，建立在相互承认基础上的政治并未促进平等的、和平的共处，反而往往有助于再生产各种形式的殖民主义。因此，基于主体间性和承认的政治是不够的。用弗雷泽与霍耐特的那场世纪辩论中的话语来说，再分配必须优先于承认。这在要求归还历史上的用水权利和土地权利方面表现得越来越明显。

Although this particular critique targets the dominant interpretation of recognition, the failure of critical theory to engage with non-Western experiences is not a recent phenomenon. As Edward Said noted, it is noteworthy that critical theory’s sharp critique of modernity did not address centuries of colonial oppression and genocide. Of course, many Frankfurt School theorists considered the Nazi Holocaust the culmination of modernity, which partly explains the focus on the European experience of barbarism and totalitarianism. But it is curious that the analysis of anti-Semitism was not quickly linked to the analysis of non-Western experiences of colonialism and racism.

虽然这一特定的批评针对的是占主导地位的承认阐释，但批判理论未能介入非西方经验并不是最近才出现的现象。正如爱德华·萨义德所说，值得注意的是，批判理论对现代性的尖锐批判并没有涉及数个世纪以来的殖民压迫和种族灭绝。当然，许多法兰克福学派的理论家认为，纳粹大屠杀是现代性的顶峰，这在一定程度上解释了对欧洲经历的野蛮状态和集权主义的关注。但令人好奇的是，对反犹主义的分析并没有迅速地与对殖民主义和种族主义的非西方经验的分析联系起来。

With the sluggish dialogue between critical theory and decolonial thought, two distinct problems now emerge. These are the focal issues discussed above: why the horrors of colonialism were not addressed before, and how to develop conceptual tools to facilitate social research on their legacy. However, Allen’s work poses a more fundamental challenge to critical theory, arguing that the dominant concepts themselves are complicit in colonial and racializing projects. This critique suggests that critical theory requires new normative foundations and entirely different conceptual apparatuses. While there is broad consensus that critical theorists need to move beyond a narrow European frame of reference to engage with different dimensions of domination, Allen’s broader claim—that the Left-Hegelian legacy underpinning critical theory needs reassessment—remains contested.

随着批判理论与去殖民思想迟缓的对话，现在出现了两个截然不同的问题。也就是上面讨论过的焦点问题：为什么以前没有处理殖民主义的恐怖问题，以及如何开发概念工具来促进对其遗产的社会研究？不过，埃伦的研究对批判理论提出了一个更为根本性的挑战，她认为，占主导地位的概念本身就是殖民化和种族化规划的同谋。这一批评表明，批判理论需要新的规范性基础以及完全不同的概念装置。虽然批判理论家需要超越狭隘的欧洲参照框架来介入统治的不同维度，关于这一点已经达成了广泛共识，但对埃伦更广泛的主张——需要重新评估作为批判理论之基础的左翼黑格尔主义遗产——仍然存在争议。

(II) Coherence

（二）融贯性

When critical theory engages with these important issues from different directions, pre-existing fault lines inevitably become exposed. Today, critical theory has increasingly come to represent “progressive social and political thought,” and its German Idealist legacy is gradually fading within these new theoretical constructions. Consequently, many authors and schools not belonging to the Left-Hegelian tradition are increasingly categorized as “critical theorists,” such as Pierre Bourdieu’s critical sociology, Luc Boltanski’s critical pragmatism, French post-structuralism, postcolonial and decolonial theory, and critical realism. This cross-fertilization of different traditions has yielded many achievements; for example, Allen’s work integrates Foucault and Adorno, while Feenberg synthesizes Marcuse and Gilbert Simondon. As a recent new book indicates, critique today needs systematic re-evaluation in light of changed historical conditions and many other critical traditions—such as Foucault’s lecture “What is Critique?”

当批判理论从不同的方向来介入这些重要问题时，早先存在的断层线（fault lines）就不可避免地暴露出来。今天的批判理论已经日益成为“进步的社会和政治思想”的代表，其德国观念论的遗产在这些新的理论建构中逐渐消失。于是，很多不属于左翼黑格尔主义传统的作者和学派越来越多地被归类为“批判理论家”，比如皮埃尔·布迪厄的批判社会学、吕克·博尔坦斯基的批判实用主义、法国的后结构主义、后殖民和去殖民理论以及批判实在论。这种不同传统的交叉融合已经取得了许多成绩，比如，埃伦的著作整合了福柯与阿多诺，芬博格则综合了马尔库塞与吉尔伯特·西蒙栋（Gilbert Simondon）。正如最近的一本新书所表明的，今天的批判需要根据变化了的历史状况和许多其他的批判传统——如福柯的演讲《什么是批判？》——进行系统性的重估。

While the limitations of the classic texts of critical theory become increasingly apparent in the context of decolonial scholarship, this enthusiastic integration of different traditions risks replacing problematic Eurocentrism with an even more problematic total incoherence. As Left-Hegelian concepts are gradually supplanted by multiple different traditions, critical theory faces the risk of lacking a coherent social theory. Today, many of the methods adopted by critical theorists are incompatible and are associated with divergent understandings of political practice and critique. As Allen demonstrates, Foucault’s work has practical value for critical theory, but his methodology and political commitments are fundamentally different from the Frankfurt School approach. Therefore, we argue that, for critical theory to remain coherent as a political and social research project, a moderate self-revision of Left-Hegelianism would be valuable. Productive dialogue is crucial for keeping the tradition fresh and for enabling critical theorists to engage with previously neglected and troubling gaps. Equally, this goal must be achieved through coherent social theory, philosophy, and political commitments.

虽然批判理论的经典文本的局限性在去殖民主义学术背景下日渐明显，但这种对不同传统的狂热整合却有可能在取代有问题的欧洲中心主义的同时，代之以更有问题的总体不融贯性（total incoherence）。随着左翼黑格尔主义的概念逐渐被多种不同的传统所取代，批判理论面临着缺乏一种融贯性的社会理论的风险。今天，批判理论家们所采用的许多方法都是不相容的，并且与对政治实践和批判的分歧性理解有关。正如埃伦所表明的，福柯的著作对于批判理论来说是具有实际价值的，但他的方法论和政治承诺与法兰克福学派的进路则有着根本的不同。因此，我们认为，为了使批判理论作为一种政治和社会研究规划保持融贯性，对左翼黑格尔主义进行温和的自我修正将是有价值的。对于保持传统的新鲜感以及促进批判理论家介入那些以往被忽略的令人不安的空白来说，富有成效的对话至关重要。同样，必须通过融贯的社会理论、哲学和政治承诺，这一目标才能达成。

(III) Social Research

（三）社会研究

In Horkheimer’s landmark essay “Traditional and Critical Theory,” the original research program closely linked sociology with philosophy. Today, critical theory has become an increasingly philosophical enterprise, with most of its prominent practitioners being philosophers rather than sociologists or psychoanalysts. Although Jaeggi attempts to return to that sociological-philosophical spirit, philosophy seems to be rapidly proliferating within the critical theory tradition. It should be noted that Honneth’s *Freedom’s Right* proposes a “theory of justice” whose program is clearly liberal and at the same time philosophical, thereby forming a sharp contrast with Horkheimer’s original conception. In my view, this apparent demise of sociological-philosophical critical theory should not be seen merely as a retreat into philosophical abstraction and ideal theory. Rather, over the past few decades, sociology as a discipline has failed to adequately consider macrosociological factors; the relative quiescence of critical sociological theory should be understood as coinciding with this broader trend.

在霍克海默的标志性演讲《传统理论与批判理论》中，最初的研究规划将社会学与哲学紧密地联系在一起。今天，批判理论已成为一项日益哲学化的规划，大多数著名的实践者都是哲学家，而不是社会学家或精神分析学家。尽管耶吉试图回归那种社会学—哲学精神，但哲学似乎正迅速地在批判理论传统中繁殖。需要注意的是，霍耐特的《自由的权利》提出了一种“正义理论”，其规划显然是自由主义的，同时又是哲学的，由此与霍克海默的最初构想形成了鲜明的对比。在我看来，这种明显的社会学—哲学批判理论的消亡不应仅仅被视为向哲学抽象和理想理论退却的结果。相反，几十年来，社会学作为一门学科未能充分考虑宏观社会学的因素；批判性理论社会学的相对沉寂应该是与这一更广义的动向相吻合的。

The original program of the first generation of critical theory sought to find immanent paths of transcendence within the social world; it was an enterprise of social research. Although the above-mentioned criticisms of critical theory today are quite valid, this methodology of immanent transcendence has not been called into question; it remains a sophisticated and coherent model for conducting anti-positivist social research. Thus, the challenge is: on the one hand, sociology must embrace progressive social research; on the other hand, critical theorists must return to their original program of social research.

第一代批判理论的最初规划是在社会世界中寻找潜在的超越路径，这是一项社会研究的事业。尽管今天对批判理论提出了上述十分有效的批评，但是这种内在超越的方法论并未受到质疑，它仍然是进行反实证主义的社会研究的一种复杂而融贯的模式。因此，挑战在于：一方面，社会学要接受进步的社会研究；另一方面，批判理论家要回归他们原初的社会研究规划。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

In this article, we have attempted to offer a sober assessment of the strengths of contemporary critical theory. While we believe that the concepts provided by the Frankfurt School’s critical theory remain useful for advancing contemporary social research, for the tradition to remain relevant it must engage in a dialogical negotiation with its critics. Honneth remains the dominant figure in contemporary critical theory. His theory of recognition as critique has successfully integrated critical theory into more mainstream sociological fields. However, as Thompson and Stathis Kouvelakis have revealed, the sacrifice required to gain entry into liberal academic circles is the abandonment of the core Marxist-Weberian themes that were the greatest appeal of the Frankfurt School program. Consequently, the prospect that critical theorists may splinter into smaller, competing camps seems a grim one. Although the future of Frankfurt School critical theory is uncertain, there remains ample room for robust interdisciplinary research on the basis of its core left-Hegelian concepts and methodology.

在本文中，我们一直试图对当今批判理论的力量进行一种审慎的评估。尽管我们认为法兰克福学派的批判理论所提供的概念对于推进当代社会研究仍然有用，但要使传统保持相关性，它就必须与其批评者进行协商性的对话。霍耐特仍然是当代批判理论的主导性人物。他的承认批判理论成功地将批判理论融入了更为主流的社会学领域。不过，正如汤普森和斯塔西斯·库韦拉基斯所揭示的，若想融入自由主义学术圈子，所需要做出的牺牲就是放弃核心的马克思主义—韦伯主义主题，而这原本是法兰克福学派规划的最大魅力。因此，批判理论家们有可能分裂成更小的、相互竞争的阵营，这似乎是一个严峻的前景。虽然法兰克福学派批判理论的未来并不确定，但在其核心的左翼黑格尔主义概念和方法论的基础上，仍然有足够的空间进行强有力的跨学科研究。

(Authors: Gerard Delanty, School of Law, Politics and Sociology, University of Sussex; Neal Harris, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Oxford Brookes University; Translator: Sun Haiyang, Department of Philosophy, Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC [National Academy of Governance])

（作者：杰拉德·德朗蒂（Gerard Delanty），英国苏塞克斯大学法律、政治和社会学院；尼尔·哈里斯（Neal Harris），英国牛津布鲁克斯大学人文与社会科学学院；译者：孙海洋，中央党校（国家行政学院）哲学部）

Online Editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心

(This article was originally published in *Routledge International Handbook of Contemporary Social and Political Theory*, edited by G. Delanty and S. P. Turner, New York: Routledge, 2022. This translation is a phased outcome of the Tianjin Municipal Philosophy and Social Sciences Planning Project “Marx’s Critique and Transcendence of Kant’s Ethical Thought.”)

（本文原载《劳特里奇当代社会政治理论国际手册》（G.Delanty and S.P.Turner（eds.）, Routledge International Handbook of Contemporary Social and Political Theory, New York: Routledge, 2022）。本译文系天津市哲学社会科学规划项目“马克思对康德伦理思想的批判与超越”的阶段性成果。）