The Elephant in the Room: The Crisis of European Left-Wing Parties

Over the past few decades, voices of criticism from European left-wing parties regarding the political development of the European Union have grown increasingly louder. Especially after the 2007–2008 financial crisis and the subsequent euro crisis, left-wing parties raised many critical opinions in response to the austerity policies introduced by the EU. At the same time, unemployment remained high, while the EU’s role as a social pillar failed to manifest itself. Neoliberal economic integration continued to operate at full throttle, strengthening the influence of the market over social development.

在过去的几十年，对于欧盟的政治发展，欧洲左翼政党中指责的声音越来越多。特别是在2007—2008年金融危机和随后的欧元危机之后，在回应欧盟出台的紧缩政策时，左翼政党提出了许多批评意见。与此同时，失业率居高不下，而欧盟作为社会支柱的作用却没有体现出来。新自由主义经济一体化开足马力持续运行，增强了市场对社会发展的影响力。

In any case, although criticism of the EU has been sharp, it has not been well reflected in the political strategies of the left. Indeed, particularly when reflecting on the various crises and political developments in Greece, significant new questions have been raised. In January 2015, after the Greek Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) won the general election and came to power, it abandoned its own political program. The government was more or less forcibly placed under EU management—or, as many critics argue, the Syriza government submitted to the EU, a submission that was politically defended not only by Syriza’s own representatives but also by representatives of most other left-wing parties and of “transform! europe.”

不管怎样，虽然对欧盟的批评一直很尖锐，但它们却并未在左翼的政治战略中得到很好的体现。的确，特别是在对希腊的种种危机和政治发展进行思考时，人们已经提出了具有重要意义的新质疑。2015年1月，希腊激进左翼联盟(Syriza)在赢得大选掌权后，放弃了自己的政治纲领。该政府或多或少被强制性地置于欧盟的管理之下——或者如许多批评家所言，希腊激进左翼联盟政府屈从于欧盟，这种屈从在政治上不仅得到了激进左翼联盟本身代表的支持，大多数其他左翼政党以及“改变欧洲组织”(transform! europe)的代表们也在为其进行辩护。

Critics within Syriza and other left-wing organizations in Europe have raised the question: Can the EU actually be reformed from within? The measures taken by the EU (or the Troika: the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) against other countries severely affected by the crisis—Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain—have further highlighted this issue. Is withdrawal from the Economic and Monetary Union, and subsequently from the eurozone or even the EU, an important political tool that the left should utilize? Or is it about building a socialized Europe by controlling and reforming the EU from within? Of course, the answer to this question is of major strategic significance for the European left.

激进左翼联盟内部和欧洲其他一些左翼组织的批评家，都提出了这样的疑问：欧盟究竟是否可以从内部进行改革？欧盟（或三驾马车：由欧盟委员会、欧洲央行和国际货币基金组织构成）针对遭受危机严重困扰的其他国家——爱尔兰、意大利、葡萄牙和西班牙——而采取的各种措施，使这一问题进一步凸显出来。退出经济和货币联盟、继而退出欧元区甚至欧盟，难道是左翼应该利用的重要政治工具吗？抑或是通过从内部控制并改革欧盟来构建一个社会化的欧洲？当然，对这一问题的回答对于欧洲左翼来说具有重大战略意义。

However, several major left-wing parties seem to lack both the capacity to address this issue and the willingness to engage in discussion. Consequently, the question of the relationship with the EU has become, in many respects, “the elephant in the room” for many such parties. This certainly includes discussions of Syriza’s governing experience, yet it seems difficult to place it on the agenda of European left-wing forums. Behind this reluctance, we discover different ways of understanding the role and character of the EU, especially how they have developed and evolved over a long period.

然而，几个主要左翼政党似乎既缺乏解决这一问题的能力，也缺乏参与讨论的意愿。因此，与欧盟的关系问题已经在很多方面成为众多此类政党的“房中象”(the elephant in the room)。其中当然包括对激进左翼联盟执政经验的讨论，不过，将它列入欧洲左翼论坛的议程，似乎有些困难。在这种不情愿的背后，我们发现了理解欧盟角色和特征的不同方式，尤其是长期以来它们是如何发展和演变的。

I. The Chaotic State of European Left-Wing Parties

一、混乱不堪的欧洲左翼政党

The strength of European left-wing parties is very weak, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Their characteristics stem from the following factors: over the past few decades, left-wing parties have been plagued by political and ideological crises and have not become the dominant force in responding to the economic crisis; the welfare state has come under attack, and inequality and poverty have become increasingly severe, and so on. It is mainly far-right forces that have managed to exploit people’s growing discontent. In the national elections held in EU member states in 2017 and 2018, right-wing parties doubled their votes, from 10.3 million to 22.1 million. Over the same period, left-wing parties stagnated, obtaining only about 10 million votes. In the European Parliament elections held in May 2019, support for left-wing parties further declined, while support for far-right parties climbed again.

无论从质还是从量上来说，欧洲左翼政党的力量都是很虚弱的。其特征源于如下因素：在过去几十年间，左翼政党受政治和意识形态危机困扰，没有成为应对经济危机的主导力量；福利国家遭到攻击，不平等和贫困现象日益严重，等等。主要是极右翼势力想方设法利用了人们与日俱增的不满。在2017年和2018年欧盟成员国举行的国内选举中，右翼政党赢得的选票实现了翻番，从1030万张上升到2210万张。同一时期，左翼政党却停滞不前，仅获得大约1000万张选票。在2019年5月举行的欧洲议会选举中，左翼政党的支持率进一步下降，而极右翼政党的支持率则再次攀升。

Over the past few decades, many left-wing parties have undergone a series of internal reorganizations. In Italy, traditional left-wing parties have all but disappeared, their clumsy political strategies having more or less buried them. In France, contradictory trends have emerged. Jean-Luc Mélenchon left the French Socialist Party in 2008 and co-founded the French Left Party, and has since been a leading figure in the French left. In 2009, Mélenchon established the Left Front electoral alliance on the basis of this party, which included the French Communist Party and other left-wing parties. However, the alliance between the Left Party and the Communist Party was fragile and ultimately collapsed. Consequently, the Left Front was formally dissolved in 2018. In any case, by then Mélenchon had already created another new organization, “France Unbowed.” This party (or movement) fielded Mélenchon as its candidate in the 2017 presidential election, successfully winning nearly 20% of the vote in the first round, but obtained less than 6.3% of the vote in the 2019 European elections. The French Communist Party, once powerful in tradition and history, is now at its lowest point ever, obtaining only 2.5% of the vote in the last election and, for the first time since 1979, being expelled from the European Parliament. The German Left Party performed poorly in the last election, losing a quarter of its support and obtaining only 5.5% of the vote.

在过去的几十年间，许多左翼政党进行了一系列内部改组。在意大利，传统左翼政党已所剩无几，其蹩脚的政治策略或多或少地葬送了它们自己。在法国，出现了矛盾的趋势。让-吕克•梅朗雄(Jean-Luc Mélenchon)于2008年退出法国社会党，并参与建立了法国左翼党，自那以来，他一直是法国左翼政党的领袖人物。2009年，梅朗雄在该党的基础上创建了法国左翼阵线选举联盟，其中包括法国共产党和其他左翼政党。然而，左翼党与法共之间的联盟很脆弱，并最终破裂。因此，左翼阵线于2018年正式解散。不管怎样，此时的梅朗雄已经创建了另一个新组织——“不屈服的法国”(France Unbowed)。该党(或称之为运动)在2017年总统大选中推举梅朗雄为候选人，在第一轮选举中成功赢得了近20%的选票，但在2019年的欧洲选举中却仅获得了不到6.3%的选票。在传统和历史上曾盛极一时的法共，如今正处于有史以来的最低谷，在上届选举中仅获得2.5%的选票，甚至于自1979年以来首次被逐出欧洲议会。德国左翼党在上届选举中表现不佳，又丧失了1/4的支持率，仅获得5.5%的选票。

In Eastern Europe, left-wing parties are few and far between. Only the Czech left-wing party, relying on the traditional influence of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, managed to secure representation in the 2019 European Parliament elections; in Slovenia, the newly established Left Party (Levica) performed well in the last national parliamentary election but failed in the EU elections; in Belgium, the Belgian Labor Party, with its clear class orientation and radical program, achieved notable electoral results (14.5% of the vote in the French-speaking region); in Greece, although the support rate for Syriza declined overall compared with other parties in the European Left Party (it had obtained 36% of the vote in the 2015 national election), it still achieved a relatively high vote share (well over 23% in the 2019 EU elections). That is to say, although Syriza acted as a faithful executor of the Troika’s brutal austerity policies, and this policy had a huge negative impact on Greek left-wing parties and even on more European left-wing parties, the party still received considerable support.

在东欧，左翼政党少之又少。只有捷克的左翼政党，借助捷克共产党的传统影响，设法在2019年欧洲议会选举中获得了代表权；在斯洛文尼亚，新成立的左翼党(Levica)在国内上届议会选举中表现不俗，却在欧盟选举中折戟；在比利时，比利时工党(Belgian Labor Party)因其清晰的阶级定位和激进纲领，取得了不菲的选举业绩(在法语区获得14.5%的选票)；在希腊，与欧洲左翼党中的其他政党相比，左翼激进联盟的支持率尽管从总体上看下降了(在2015年国内选举中，该党曾获得36%的选票)，但依旧获得了较高的得票率(在2019年欧盟选举中其选票远远超过23%)。也就是说，虽然左翼激进联盟充当了三驾马车残酷紧缩政策的忠实执行者，且该政策对希腊左翼政党乃至更多的欧洲左翼政党都造成了巨大的消极影响，但该党依然获得了很多支持。

In the European Parliament, most left-wing parties belong to the European United Left/Nordic Green Left group (EUL/NGL), which after the May 2019 European Parliament elections had 41 members (11 fewer than in the previous term). This alliance is a mixture of parties with different tendencies, and the divisions between parties are often very puzzling. Some refuse to recognize these parties as traditional parties, and some even consider them not to be left-wing parties. The alliance forms and changes from time to time, sometimes making political adjustments for opportunistic purposes to ensure they do not split.

在欧洲议会中，大多数左翼政党隶属于欧洲联合左翼/北欧绿色左翼党团(European United Left/Nordic Green Left group，EUL/NGL)，2019年5月欧洲议会选举之后，该党团拥有41名议员(比上一届少了11名)。这种联盟是具有不同倾向性的政党构成的一种混合体，政党间的分裂总是让人很费解。一些人拒绝承认这些政党是传统意义上的政党，甚至有人认为它们不是左翼政党。联盟时组时变，有时出于投机目的进行政治调整，以确保它们不分裂。

At the same time, a struggle for leadership of the European left is ongoing through the continuous formation of new alliance initiatives. Some parties have disappeared; on the surface, nothing seems wrong, but in reality, problems abound. The question of the relationship with the EU has more or less become an important factor in the internal competition among the three current major left-wing party groups.

与此同时，一场争夺欧洲左翼领导权的斗争，正通过组建新联盟倡议持续展开。一些政党消亡了，表面上看不出什么问题，实则问题丛生。与欧盟的关系问题或多或少成为当前三大左翼党团之间内部竞争的重要因素。

The European Left (EL), founded in 2004, currently has 26 member parties and holds party status within the EU system. However, the European Left is more like an organizational network or coordination body than a well-organized party. In addition to this party, there are two other organizations in Europe dedicated to building competitive networks or alliances among left-wing parties: the “Democracy in Europe Movement 2025” (DiEM25) and Mélenchon’s “France Unbowed.”

欧洲左翼党(European Left，EL)成立于2004年，当前有26个成员党，在欧盟体制中具有政党地位。不过，欧洲左翼党更像是一个组织网络或协调机构，而不是一个组织良好的政党。除该党外，欧洲还有两个致力于在左翼政党间建设竞争性网络或联盟的组织——“欧洲民主运动2025”(Democracy in Europe Movement 2025，DiEM25)和梅朗雄的“不屈服的法国”。

One reason Mélenchon wanted to establish an alternative alliance was his dissatisfaction with the Party of the European Left and his opposition to the submissive approach of SYRIZA in Greece, as well as his attempt to create a distinct political image. Several years ago, after clashing with the French Communist Party, Mélenchon led the French Left Party out of the Party of the European Left. The new party he founded, "La France Insoumise" (Unsubmissive France), did not join the Party of the European Left. Before the 2019 European elections, Mélenchon actively worked to form an alternative organization to break free from the constraints of the European Union. He gained support from the Portuguese Left Bloc and the Spanish new party Podemos (We Can). In April 2018, these parties issued a joint statement titled "European Citizens' Revolution: The Lisbon Declaration – Now It's Up to the People!" [1]1 The "Lisbon Declaration" was a joint statement issued in April 2018 by several European left-wing parties, including La France Insoumise, the Portuguese Left Bloc, and Podemos, calling for a "citizens' revolution" to break from EU constraints. Shortly thereafter, left-wing parties from Denmark, Sweden, and Finland also joined the Lisbon Declaration.

梅朗雄之所以要建立一个替代性的联盟，部分原因是他对欧洲左翼党不满，且反对左翼激进联盟在希腊的屈从做法，并试图树立一种鲜明的政治形象。几年前，因与法共发生冲突，梅朗雄带领法国左翼党退出了欧洲左翼党。梅朗雄创建的新党“不屈服的法国”并未加入欧洲左翼党。2019年欧洲选举之前，梅朗雄积极行动，试图组建一个替代性组织以摆脱欧盟的束缚。他得到了葡萄牙左翼集团（Left Bloc）和西班牙新党“我们能”党（We Can）的支持，2018年4月，这些政党发表了名为《欧洲公民革命<里斯本宣言>：现在由人民决定！》的联合声明。不久之后，丹麦、瑞典和芬兰的左翼政党也加入了《里斯本宣言》。

The creator of the third alliance was Yanis Varoufakis, who, together with "Democracy in Europe Movement 2025" (DiEM25), established the "European Spring" alliance aimed at contesting the 2019 European elections. The core plan of this alliance was to achieve "A New Deal for Europe," inspired by Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal reforms in the United States during the 1930s. As for DiEM25, it neither positioned itself as a political party nor considered itself part of the left-right spectrum; it sought to unite relatively small and new organizations to build a broader alliance that transcended the Left Bloc and Podemos. This indicated that the movement was skeptical of Varoufakis's intention to form a larger, traditional left-wing party alliance. Varoufakis attempted to run as a German candidate in the European elections, and although he was unsuccessful, this provoked significant anger within the German Left Party. In the 2019 European Parliament elections, DiEM25 suffered a crushing defeat. However, in the subsequent Greek national elections, DiEM25's Greek member party won nine seats, including one for Varoufakis himself.

第三个联盟的创建者是亚尼斯·瓦鲁法基斯（Yanis Varoufakis），他与“欧洲民主运动2025”一起创建了旨在参加2019年欧洲选举的“欧洲之春”联盟。该联盟的核心计划就是实现“欧洲新政”（A New Deal for Europe），其灵感来自20世纪30年代富兰克林·D.罗斯福在美国实行的新政改革。至于“欧洲民主运动2025”，既没有自我定位成一个政党，也不认为自己属于左右翼谱系中的一员，它试图联合那些相对小而新的组织，建立一个超越左翼集团和“我们能”党的更加广泛的联盟。这表明，该运动对瓦鲁法基斯意图建立一个较大的传统左翼政党联盟的想法是持怀疑态度的。瓦鲁法基斯想把自己列为德国候选人参加欧洲选举，尽管没有获得成功，但却在德国左翼党内部激起巨大愤怒。在2019年欧洲议会选举中，“欧洲民主运动2025”铩羽而归。但是，在稍后举行的希腊国内选举中，该运动的希腊成员党却赢得9个席位，其中包括瓦鲁法基斯本人的席位。

Equally noteworthy is the emergence of Bonapartist tendencies [2]2 "Bonapartism" here refers to a political tendency where a party or movement is organized primarily around a charismatic leader seeking personal power, often at the expense of internal democracy, drawing on the historical model of Napoleon III's rule in France. (i.e., the individualistic tendency to build party organizations or movements aimed at winning political office for a single leader) in European politics. More importantly, this is a profound reflection of the cross-party crisis currently afflicting the European political spectrum. Among left-wing parties, Varoufakis's DiEM25 and Mélenchon's La France Insoumise both exhibit clear Bonapartist characteristics: loose organizations lacking democratic structures, reliance on electronic communications, a primary focus on media strategies, and entrenched leaders. Podemos may be more controlled by a group of scholars from the University of Madrid—who founded the party in 2014—but the leadership is unwilling to acknowledge this. With the development of "de-democratization" under Alexis Tsipras, SYRIZA has also shown the same tendency, despite its more traditional party structure.

同样值得注意的是，波拿巴主义倾向(即建立政党组织或运动旨在为其个人赢得政治职位的个人主义倾向)正在欧洲政治中浮现。更为重要的是，这是当前欧洲政治谱系中跨党派危机的深刻写照。从左翼政党来看，瓦鲁法基斯的“欧洲民主运动2025”和梅朗雄的“不屈服的法国”都带有鲜明的波拿巴主义特征：缺少民主结构的松散组织、对电子通讯的依赖、主要聚焦于媒体策略以及地位巩固的领导人等。“我们能”党有可能更多受到来自马德里大学学者集团——他们在2014年创建了该党——的控制，但领导层并不愿意承认这一点。随着亚历克西斯·齐普拉斯(Alexis Tsipras)治下“去民主化”的发展，希腊激进左翼联盟也表现出相同的倾向，尽管该党的政党结构更为传统。

II. Sharp Criticism of EU Policies

二、对欧盟政策的尖锐批评

Although certain EU policies are sometimes criticized, social democratic (parties) and mainstream European trade union movements have always been enthusiastic supporters of the European Union. In many countries, particularly the Scandinavian nations and, of course, France (along with the French Communist Party), left-wing parties once openly opposed the decision to join the EU. However, over time, demands for withdrawal from the EU have gradually weakened.

尽管欧盟的某些政策有时会遭到人们的批评，但社会民主主义(政党)和主流的欧洲工会运动始终是欧盟的热情支持者。在许多国家，特别是斯堪的纳维亚国家，当然还有法国(和法共一起)，其左翼政党都曾公开反对加入欧盟的决策。然而，随着时间的流逝，退出欧盟的要求也逐渐减弱。

What exactly has caused the relationship between numerous left-wing parties and the EU to become fraught with problems and nearly unpredictable? Historically, there are two main factors:

到底是什么原因使得众多左翼政党与欧盟的关系问题丛生而又几乎难以预测?从历史上看，主要有两大因素：

The first factor is that the ideological narrative accompanying the establishment of the EU (or the European Economic Community) consisted of two major goals: first, the EU should lay the foundation for lasting peace in Europe; second, the EU should serve as a tool for achieving social progress for Europeans. After the devastation of two world wars (both triggered by European nation-states), the political promise of peace held immense appeal. Consequently, nearly all political forces across the spectrum, from right to left, once supported and continue to support these goals. Moreover, through the continuous development of the welfare state in the postwar period, most people felt the arrival of social progress.

第一因素是伴随欧盟(或欧洲经济共同体)成立的意识形态叙事由两大重要目标组成：一是欧盟应该为实现欧洲持久和平奠定基础；二是欧盟应当成为欧洲人实现社会进步的工具。在历经两次世界大战(均由欧洲民族国家引发)的浩劫之后，和平的政治承诺具有极大的吸引力。因此，政治谱系中从右翼到左翼几乎所有政治力量，曾经并仍在支持这些目标。而且，通过战后时期福利国家的不断发展，多数人都感觉到了社会进步的来临。

The second major historical event was François Mitterrand's 14-year tenure as president of France (1981–1995). Mitterrand implemented a radical left-wing social democratic program, including extensive nationalization, economic redistribution, and greater political intervention in numerous areas. Within the labor movement, many saw this as the beginning of building a socialist Europe. However, Mitterrand's reforms collapsed in less than two years. The reasons for the failure of this political reform, and the possibility of implementing alternative policies, remain controversial. In any case, because France had already committed to joining the European Monetary System, this involved demands from the European Economic Community (now the EU). As was the case then, numerous demands from the EEC constrained the implementation of Mitterrand's policies. Consequently, Mitterrand had to submit to the EEC's demands, making his presidency the last attempt by social democrats to implement a broad socialist reform program in Europe (with the possible exception of the later failure of Sweden's wage-earner fund reforms in the 1980s). Drawing on this experience, Mitterrand and his finance minister Jacques Delors concluded that future socialist or social democratic (Keynesian) policies must be linked to the development of the European Economic Community rather than nation-states. Therefore, committing to European economic integration became the policy of the French Socialists and, eventually, of social democrats across Europe. But, as Martin Höpner, a social scientist at the Max Planck Institute in Cologne, put it: "To say that 'more Europe' will bring us closer to a social Europe is simply a myth."

第二个重要历史事件就是弗朗索瓦·密特朗(François Mitterrand)曾在法国执政长达14年时间(1981—1995)。密特朗实施了一项激进的左翼社会民主计划，包括广泛的国有化、经济再分配以及对众多领域进行更多的政治干预。在劳工运动中，许多人将此视为建设社会主义欧洲的发端。但是，仅仅维系了不到两年的时间，密特朗的改革就夭折了。关于这场政治改革失败的原因，以及实施其他政策的可能性，仍然是存有争议的。无论如何，因为法国当时已经承诺加入欧洲货币体系，所以这其中包含着来自欧共体(现在的欧盟)的要求。当时的情况如同现在一样，来自欧共体的众多要求制约了密特朗政策的推行。于是，密特朗不得不屈从于欧共体的要求，使得他的总统任期成为社会民主党人在欧洲实施广泛的社会主义改革计划的最后一次尝试(晚些时候瑞典在20世纪80年代进行的工薪族基金改革的失败可能是个例外)。凭借已有的经验，密特朗及其财长雅克·德洛尔(Jacques Delors)得出结论：未来的社会主义或社会民主主义(凯恩斯式)政策，必须与欧洲经济共同体而不是民族国家的发展联系在一起。因此，致力于发展欧洲经济一体化就成为法国社会党人的政策，并最终成为整个欧洲社会民主党人的追求。但是，正如科隆马克斯·普朗克研究所的社会科学家马丁·赫普纳(Martin Höpner)所言：“说‘更多的欧洲’将会使我们更接近一个社会化的欧洲，简直就是一个神话。”

To this day, the narrative of EU peace and social progress remains mainstream. However, French Socialists and others have begun to question this plan. They have found that while economic integration—deregulation—has been achieved, there has been little progress in what they call the social pillar. Although they claim to achieve the goal of controlling market forces through increasingly strengthened political governance and regulation, what people see is only the continuous strengthening of market forces, while the development of the social dimension remains difficult.

时至今日，欧盟和平与社会进步仍然是主流叙事的内容。然而，法国社会党人和其他人却开始质疑这一计划。他们发现，经济实现一体化了——解除了管制——但是，在他们称之为社会支柱的领域却并没有取得什么进展。虽然他们宣称要通过日益强化的政治治理和规制来实现管控市场力量的目标，但人们所看到的只是市场力量的不断加强，而社会维度的发展却举步维艰。

How could Socialist and Social Democratic politicians so easily believe that a supranational structure like the European Economic Community—with the free movement of the four factors (capital, goods, services, and people) as its core element and lacking democratic structures overall—could become a tool for building a social Europe? This remains an unresolved question. Even more incomprehensible is that this belief was retained after the adoption of the Single European Act (1986, establishing the EU single market), the Maastricht Treaty (1992, signed, leading to further integration and the creation of the EU), the Lisbon Treaty (2007, signed, a carefully crafted version of an EU constitution, but rejected in referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005), and a series of other neoliberal legislative texts, agreements, and treaties.

社会党以及社会民主党政治家如何轻易就相信，像欧洲经济共同体这样的超国家结构——以实现四大自由(资本、货物、服务和人员自由流动)为核心要素，而且整体上缺少民主架构——有可能成为建设社会化欧洲的工具?这依旧是一个悬而未决的问题。更不可思议的是，在《单一欧洲法案》(1986年确立欧盟单一市场)、《马斯特里赫特条约》(1992年签署，导致进一步一体化，创建欧盟)、《里斯本条约》(2007年签署，精心制定的欧盟宪法版本，但在2005年法国和荷兰两国全民公决中被否决)以及其他一系列新自由主义的立法文本、协议和条约等等均被采纳之后，这种信念依然被保留了下来。

Currently, two main developments are extremely important for understanding the growing criticism of the European Union within left-wing parties in recent years. One is the institutional and policy development of the EU following the 2008 financial crisis and the 2009 euro crisis; the other is the role the EU played in opposing the Greek Syriza government after the 2015 Greek general election.

当前，对于理解近年来左翼政党内部日益增强的对欧盟的批评来说，主要有两个方面的发展是极为重要的。一个是2008年金融危机以及2009年欧元危机之后欧盟的制度和政策发展；另一个就是2015年希腊大选之后，欧盟在反对希腊激进左翼联盟政府中所发挥的作用。

To rescue the financial markets from the severe financial and euro crises, or to save capitalism, national governments and the EU injected massive funds into private banks. This led to a sharp increase in fiscal deficits and government debt in many member states. The EU, in accordance with the Stability and Growth Pact, demanded that member states restore economic balance, resulting in substantial cuts to public budgets, significant declines in public-sector wages, explosive growth in unemployment, and severe impacts on labor rights, pensions, and working conditions (so-called internal devaluation, i.e., eurozone countries no longer have the opportunity to devalue their own currencies). The social pillars of the EU were no longer simply set aside—they were strongly shaken, and criticism from left-wing parties and popular discontent arrived in tandem.

为了从严重的金融危机和欧元危机中挽救金融市场，抑或为了挽救资本主义，各国政府和欧盟向私人银行注入了大量资金。这导致许多成员国财政赤字和政府债务大增。欧盟根据《稳定与增长公约》，要求各成员国恢复经济平衡，从而导致公共预算大幅削减，公共部门工资出现较大幅度下降，失业率呈现爆炸式增长，劳工权利、养老金和劳动条件受到很大影响(所谓内部贬值，即欧元区国家不再有机会使本国货币贬值)。欧盟的社会支柱不再被简单地搁置起来了——它们遭到强烈冲击，而左翼政党的批评和人们的不满也不约而至。

The actions of the “Troika” [3]3 The “Troika” refers to the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, which jointly supervised the bailout programs for Greece during the eurozone crisis. against the Greek Syriza government drew even more criticism from left-wing parties. How brutal was the force when the European Central Bank, to pressure the Greek government into submission and flaunt its power, used its monopoly to stop injecting funds into Greek banks? How helpless was a single (small) member state when facing such power? The Tsipras government was neither capable nor willing—nor prepared—to use the only means available to it, namely exiting the Economic and Monetary Union and the eurozone to resist this power, and ultimately had to submit.

“三驾马车”针对希腊激进左翼联盟政府的行动，遭到左翼政党更多的批评。欧洲央行为了逼迫希腊政府就范并炫耀其权力，利用其垄断权停止向希腊银行注资，这种强力何其残酷?当面对这种权力的时候，单一(小的)成员国又是何其无奈?齐普拉斯政府既无能力也不愿意——也没有任何准备——动用它们唯一可以利用的手段，即退出经济和货币联盟以及欧元区来对抗这种权力，最终却只能就范。

3. Can the EU Be Reformed from Within?

三、能从内部改革欧盟吗?

Many people’s first reaction is that the EU must be reformed through the joint struggle of European left-wing parties. However, at the same time, new contradictions have emerged. Some leftists have begun to raise a decisive question: Can the EU be reformed from within? What happens if a left-wing party wins a national election but is prevented from implementing its domestic policies? The submission of the Greek Syriza government to the EU/Troika provides strong evidence for this discussion, making exiting the eurozone or even the EU (i.e., a Grexit) a possible strategy.

许多人的第一反应就是必须通过欧洲左翼政党的联合斗争对欧盟进行改革。然而，与此同时，新的矛盾又出现了。一些左翼人士开始提出一个具有决定性意义的问题：能从内部改革欧盟吗?如果左翼政党赢得国内大选，却被阻止实施其国内政策，又会发生什么呢?希腊激进左翼联盟政府对欧盟/三驾马车的屈从，为这一讨论提供了强有力的佐证，退出欧元区甚至欧盟(即希腊脱欧)，成为一种可能的战略。

Yanis Varoufakis has become a leading advocate for reforming the EU from within. After breaking with Syriza, he founded the “European Democracy Movement 2025” (DiEM25). In the founding document of this movement, three demands are made of the EU: first, immediate transparency in the work of all major EU institutions; second, within one year, through existing institutions and creative interpretations of existing treaties and clauses, returning responsibilities for public debt, banking, immigration, and distribution policies to the parliaments of member states; third, within two years, convening a constitutional convention to transform Europe into a fully democratic state by 2025, with a sovereign parliament that respects national autonomy and shares power with national parliaments, along with elected regional and local parliaments.

瓦鲁法基斯已经成为主张从内部改革欧盟的主要代表人物。他与希腊激进左翼联盟决裂后创立“欧洲民主运动2025”，在该运动的成立文件中，对欧盟提出三项要求：一是所有欧盟主要机构的工作立即实现透明化；二是通过现有机构以及对现有条约和条款的创造性解释，在一年之内将公共债务、银行、移民以及分配政策等职责归还各成员国议会；三是在两年内召开制宪会议，到2025年将欧洲转变成一个完全民主的国家，拥有一个尊重各国自治并与各国议会分享权力的主权议会，以及经由选举产生的地区和地方议会。

In an interview with *Jacobin* magazine, Varoufakis discussed his and DiEM25’s goal of changing the EU from within: “Therefore, our responsibility is to prove to Europeans that it is very possible—though certainly not easy—to take over EU institutions, reorient their policies and practices according to the Europe they desire, and launch a grassroots debate about the democratic EU we need.”

在一次接受《雅各宾》杂志采访时，瓦鲁法基斯谈到了他本人及“欧洲民主运动2025”从内部改变欧盟的目标：“因此，我们的责任就是向欧洲人证明，按照他们向往的欧洲来接管欧盟机构、重新调整其政策和实践，并从基层开展关于我们所需要的民主欧盟的大辩论，这是非常有可能的，当然并不容易。”

That’s all there is to it! It must be admitted that this sounds quite naive, especially since this policy is neither supported by an analysis of power relations and power structures within the EU, nor does it formulate a mature strategy to guide practical struggle, nor has it won popular support.

仅此而已!必须承认，这听上去相当幼稚，尤其是这一政策既没有将对欧盟内部权力关系和权力结构的分析作为支撑，也没有制定指导斗争实践的成熟策略，而且也没有得到人们的拥护。

Some leftists oppose exiting the EU on principle and ideologically. They believe that the EU, and even the Economic and Monetary Union, represents a historic step beyond the nation-state and should be defended. In this view, exiting the Economic and Monetary Union or the EU is not only futile but also risks sliding into collusion with far-right nationalists and authoritarian forces. Therefore, the EU must be defended in the name of internationalism, while at the same time its neoliberal policies must be resisted. Many social democrats support these ideas, although there is rarely any struggle against neoliberalism within their ranks. A considerable portion of left-wing parties also supports these views.

一些左翼人士在原则上和意识形态上对退出欧盟持反对态度。他们认为，欧盟甚至经济和货币联盟，代表了一种超越民族国家的历史性进步，应该加以捍卫。在这种情况下，退出经济和货币联盟抑或脱欧，不仅徒劳无益，而且有滑向与极右翼民族主义者和专制势力沆瀣一气的危险。因此，必须以国际主义的名义来捍卫欧盟，而与此同时，也必须抵制其新自由主义政策。许多社会民主党人对上述思想持支持态度，尽管他们内部很少发生反对新自由主义的斗争。左翼政党中相当一部分人也是这些观点的支持者。

Costas Lapavitsas, a professor of economics at the University of London, was elected as a Greek MP as a Syriza candidate in January 2015, but broke with the party and Tsipras after the Syriza government submitted to the Troika. Lapavitsas has been very active in this debate. To those who see the EU as an international project that needs support, Lapavitsas points out:

科斯塔斯·拉帕维塔斯(Costas Lapavitsas)是伦敦大学经济学教授，2015年1月，他曾以激进左翼联盟候选人的身份当选为希腊议会议员，但在激进左翼联盟政府屈从于“三驾马车”后，他与该党和齐普拉斯分道扬镳。拉帕维塔斯非常积极地参与了这场辩论。对于那些将欧盟视为一项需要得到支持的国际化工程的人，拉帕维塔斯指出：

This is the problem with today’s European left-wing parties. As an inherently progressive force, their attachment to the EU hinders their own progress; in fact, they have become integrated into the framework of European neoliberal capitalism. Left-wing parties have increasingly severed their ties with their traditional supporters—Europe’s poor masses—and thus have had to look elsewhere for political representation. … Inevitably, the vacuum created by left-wing parties has been steadily filled by some of the worst political forces in European history, including far-right parties.

这就是当今欧洲左翼政党的问题所在。作为一种固有的先进力量，对欧盟的依附阻碍了它们自身的进步，实际上它们已融入欧洲新自由主义资本主义的框架之中。左翼政党已经日益明显地割断了它与其传统支持者——欧洲穷苦大众——的联系，因此，它们不得不到其他地方去寻找政治代言人。……不可避免的是，左翼政党所创造的真空，已经被欧洲历史上某些最糟糕的政治力量稳步填补，其中就包括极右翼政党。

Today, Lapavitsas and other leftists see the EU as an obstacle to implementing a radical left-wing program, especially given the Greek lesson. They argue that both the EU and the Economic and Monetary Union contain numerous structural and institutional barriers. In a previous article, I summarized six such barriers:

如今，拉帕维塔斯和其他左翼人士都将欧盟视为实施激进左翼纲领的障碍，尤其是鉴于希腊的教训。他们认为，无论欧盟还是经济和货币联盟，都存在大量结构性和制度性障碍。在先前的一篇文章中，我曾概括了六种障碍性因素：

(1) The democratic deficit, which has been increasing rather than decreasing in recent years;

(一)民主赤字，近些年来一直在增加而不是减少；

(2) Constitutionalized neoliberalism, which renders socialism and Keynesianism illegal within the EU;

(二)宪政化的新自由主义，使得社会主义和凯恩斯主义在欧盟处于非法地位；

(3) Irreversible legislation, with treaty amendments requiring unanimous consent;

(三)不可逆转的立法，修改条约需要全体一致同意；

(4) The euro as an economic straitjacket, with the central bank beyond democratic control;

(四)欧元成为一种经济上的束缚，而央行又处于民主控制之外；

(5) Uneven development among member states, making joint struggle extremely difficult;

(五)成员国发展不均衡，联合抗争极为困难；

(6) The extended power of the European Court of Justice, with the so-called “Laval Quartet” [4]4 The “Laval Quartet” refers to four rulings by the European Court of Justice (Viking, Laval, Rüffert, and Commission v. Luxembourg) that prioritized the freedom to provide services over national labor laws and collective bargaining rights, weakening trade union power. as a typical case (in 2007 and 2008, the European Court of Justice issued four rulings that weakened trade union rights);

(六)欧洲法院权力延展，所谓的“拉瓦尔四重奏”就是一个典型案例(2007年和2008年，欧洲法院宣布四项裁决削弱了工会的权利)；

Now we can add another:

现在我们可以再补充一项：

(7) A comprehensive system of financial sanctions for violations of treaties, although the possible sanctions included in the Stability and Growth Pact were temporarily suspended during the COVID-19 crisis.

(七)针对违反条约行为的一套综合的金融制裁体系，尽管《稳定与增长公约》中包含可能实施的制裁在新冠病毒危机期间已经被暂时搁置起来。

4. Plan B: Violating Treaties

四、B计划：违反条约

However, the struggle to reform the EU from within, while not a revolution to overthrow the EU, may still be the most important position for most left-wing parties, at least in practice, as a path to creating another Europe. Another position has gradually formed around the “Plan B” pioneered by Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Since Plan B was launched, this strategy has undergone some changes in both form and content. This plan was proposed based on the lessons of the failure of Syriza in Greece, with the aim of preventing a recurrence of similar events.

然而，从内部改革欧盟的斗争，虽然算不上是推翻欧盟的革命，但它仍有可能是大多数左翼政党最重要的立场，至少在实践上，是创建另一个欧洲的途径。围绕着梅朗雄首创的B计划，逐渐形成了另一种立场。自B计划启动以来，这一策略无论在形式还是内容上都发生了某种变化。这一计划是在希腊激进左翼联盟失败教训的基础上提出来的，其目的就是防止类似事情再度发生。

The policy consists of two components: first, formulating a clear action plan to confront EU institutions in the event of a left-wing party victory in a member state; second, establishing a European alliance of parties, movements, and economists to develop a common strategy for implementing this policy—a strategy that combines unilateral negotiations with exiting the eurozone, various existing treaties, conventions, and other agreements.

该政策包括两个组成部分：其一，制定明确的行动计划，以在成员国左翼政党获胜的情况下与欧盟各机构相对抗；其二，建立一个由政党、各种运动以及经济学家组成的欧洲联盟，以便制定实现这一政策的共同战略——一种将单边磋商与退出欧元区、各种现行条约、公约和其他协议结合起来的战略。

In January 2016, Mélenchon, together with Varoufakis, former Italian Finance Minister Stefano Fassina, former German Social Democratic government Finance Minister and Left Party leader Oskar Lafontaine, and others, jointly organized the first meeting of Plan B in Paris. After this meeting, Varoufakis withdrew from Plan B because he established “European Democracy Movement 2025” – its goal was clearly to reform the EU from within. Plan B operates in the form of a loose and flexible organizational network, with varying levels of meeting participation. Initially, the meeting participants were mainly from various left-wing parties, trade unions, social movements, and other organizations. In any case, it gradually evolved into a limited network of left-wing parties.

2016年1月，梅朗雄与瓦鲁法基斯、意大利前财长斯特凡诺•法西纳(Stefano Fassina)、德国社会民主党政府前财长兼左翼党领导人奥斯卡•拉方丹(Oskar Lafontaine)等人，在巴黎共同组织召开了B计划第一次会议。此次会议之后，瓦鲁法基斯因建立了“欧洲民主运动2025”——其目标显然是要从内部改革欧盟——而退出B计划。B计划以某种松散灵活的组织网络形式来运行，会议的参与程度不断变化。最初，会议参加者主要是来自各左翼政党、工会、社会运动和其他组织。不管怎样，它渐渐地演变成了一个有限的左翼政党网络。

How to understand this initiative, especially how to implement it when the political situation permits, remains ambiguous. The following points, though not exhaustive, can give us a general understanding of Plan B:

关于如何理解这一倡议、特别是当政治形势允许的时候如何贯彻实施它，仍然是含糊不清的。以下各要点，尽管并不详尽，可以让我们对B计划有一个大致了解：

(1) Its main focus is: when left-wing parties win government power in one or more member states and begin to implement policies that conflict with EU regulations, what can they do, and what should they do?

(一)其重点关注的是，当左翼政党赢得一个或多个成员国政府权力并开始贯彻实施与欧盟规章相冲突的政策时，它们能做什么、又应该做什么?

(2) Plan B will be implemented when Plan A is rejected. Plan A targets ordinary consultations with EU institutions, aiming to reach agreement on the policies pursued within the framework of EU treaties and laws.

(二)B计划将在A计划遭拒的情况下实施。A计划针对的是与欧盟机构进行的普通协商，着眼于在欧盟条约和法律框架内就所奉行的政策达成一致意见。

(3) Activating Plan B will mean that a left-wing government does not accept the various restrictions imposed by the EU, but instead focuses on implementing its own economic and political reforms at the national level, openly and proactively suspending relevant treaties, while simultaneously mobilizing support for this process at the European level.

(三)激活B计划，将意味着左翼政府不接受欧盟强加的各种限制，而是着眼于在全国范围内实施自己的经济和政治改革，公开和主动中止相关条约，同时在欧洲层面进行支持这一进程的动员。

At times, one might get the impression that Plan B mainly serves as an early warning, or as a tactical maneuver during Plan A negotiations. Perhaps Mélenchon believes that France is strong and important enough to implement policies that violate EU regulations merely through the threat of doing so. If this is indeed the case, he is highly likely to underestimate the powerful economic and political forces that any left-wing government – even in France – would face.

某些时候，人们可能会产生这样的印象，即B计划主要发挥的是预警作用，或者是A计划进行协商时的一种战术运用。也许梅朗雄会认为，法国足够强大足够重要，仅仅通过威胁手段，就可以实施各种违反欧盟规制的政策。果真如此的话，他极有可能低估了某个左翼政府——即使在法国——即将面对的强大经济政治力量。

Over decades, capitalist forces have gained astonishing status and institutional power through the neoliberal offensive and the increasingly authoritarian neoliberal supranational structure established via the EU. These forces will not willingly give up all this without a struggle.

几十年来，资本主义各种势力已经通过新自由主义进攻和经由欧盟而建立的一套日益独裁的新自由主义超国家构造，获得了惊人的地位和制度性权力。不经过斗争，这些势力是不会情愿放弃这一切的。

The flaw of Plan B lies in its lack of a strategic analysis and assessment of these power relations. If such a strategy is implemented, the possibility of a full-scale confrontation with the EU must be considered. Therefore, a government choosing to implement this plan must be prepared to prioritize the Economic and Monetary Union (Eurozone) and EU membership on its agenda. Particularly under the influence of the financial crisis and the euro crisis, the EU has formulated and implemented many conventions and regulations that forcibly impose its demands on member states, including extensive sanctions for any violations. Hence, Plan B must be more specific, more aggressive, and, as a prerequisite for any potential future mobilization, must be widely known.

B计划的缺陷在于，对上述这些权力关系缺乏战略性分析评估。如果实施这样的战略，就必须考虑与欧盟全面对抗的可能性。因此，选择实施这一计划的政府，必须准备好将经济和货币联盟(欧元区)以及欧盟成员国置于优先议程。特别是在金融危机和欧元危机的影响下，欧盟已经制定并实施了许多公约和规制，对成员国强行施加其要求，包括对任何违反行为的广泛制裁。因此，B计划必须是更加具体的、更具有攻击性的，而作为未来任何潜在动员的先决条件，也必须是广为人知的。

The degree of party support for Plan B is also a question worth considering. For some parties far from government power, Plan B is clearly just a theoretical model. For other parties, divisions over the EU issue remain a problem, as demonstrated by the “Stockholm Plan B Conference” held in April 2019. At this conference, representatives of Poland’s small party “Left Together,” the British Labour Party, and Ireland’s Sinn Féin became staunch supporters of the EU. Representatives discussed several political challenges facing Europe today. Although criticism of EU neoliberalism remained widespread, the Plan B strategy itself did not seem to become a major topic.

政党对于B计划的支持程度，也是一个值得思考的问题。对于一些远离政府权力的政党而言，B计划显然只是一个理论模型。而其他政党在欧盟问题上的分歧依旧是一个问题，2019年4月召开的“斯德哥尔摩B计划会议”就证明了这一点。在此次会议上，波兰的小党“左翼一起党”(Left Together)、英国工党以及爱尔兰新芬党的代表都变成了欧盟的忠实支持者。代表们讨论了当今欧洲面临的几个政治挑战问题，尽管对欧盟新自由主义的批评仍然广泛存在，但B计划战略本身似乎并未成为一个重要议题。

5. “Becoming Cannon Fodder for Racism and Nationalism”

五、“充当种族主义和民族主义的炮灰”

Although left-wing parties are sharply critical of the EU, and some parties more or less believe that violating EU agreements may be necessary under certain circumstances, a reverse political development has also emerged. As far-right parties’ hostility toward the EU grows day by day, the stance of many left-wing politicians and activists who were initially strongly critical of the EU has also wavered. This situation was particularly striking during the Brexit campaign. In the campaign leading up to the referendum on June 23, 2016, I visited several people with left-wing leanings who might have joined the movement and voted for Brexit, but ultimately did not do so because they did not want to become cannon fodder for racism and nationalism. The reason is that far-right parties and their movements became the main driving force of the Brexit campaign, so racism, xenophobia, and right-wing nationalism dominated.

尽管左翼政党对欧盟的批评很尖锐，而且一些政党也或多或少地认为，在某些情况下，违反欧盟协议也许是必要的。与此同时还出现了一种反向的政治发展。由于极右翼政党对欧盟的敌意与日俱增，最初对欧盟持强烈批评态度的许多左翼政治家和活动家的立场也出现了摇摆。这种情况在英国脱欧运动期间尤其引人注目。在2016年6月23日全民公决之前的脱欧运动中，我曾拜访过几个有左翼倾向的人士，他们原本有可能投身这场运动并投票支持英国脱欧，但最终并没有那样做，因为他们不想成为种族主义和民族主义的炮灰。原因在于，极右翼政党及其运动成为脱欧运动的主要驱动力，因而种族主义、仇外主义以及右翼民族主义占据了主导地位。

Even before the Brexit campaign, the fear among some left-wing parties of cooperating with EU-hostile far-right parties was growing. Over so many years, I have frequently attended gatherings and meetings of European left-wing networks and left-wing organizations, and I have often felt this fear. Besides worrying about being tied to racism and nationalism, some also believe that leaving the EU or fragmenting the EU would only strengthen right-wing parties, and history has shown this to be very dangerous for Europe. Therefore, the logical conclusion is that the EU must be changed from within through social struggle.

甚至在英国脱欧运动之前，部分左翼政党对与敌视欧盟的极右翼政党合作的恐惧与日俱增。这么多年来，我多次参加欧洲左翼网络和左翼组织的集会和会议，常常能感受到这种恐惧。一些人除了担心与种族主义和民族主义绑在一起外，他们还相信，退出欧盟或使欧盟碎片化，都只会加强右翼政党的力量，而历史已经证明，这对于欧洲是非常危险的。因此，符合逻辑的结论是，必须通过社会斗争从内部变革欧盟。

The Swedish Left Party is a recent best example of why the above view has gained recognition among European left-wing parties. On the one hand, the party is part of the Plan B network; on the other hand, at its meeting in February 2019, the party decided to abandon its previous stance of advocating Sweden’s exit from the EU. In an interview, party leader Jonas Sjöstedt listed three reasons for this decision: first, the political reality has changed dramatically, especially the increasingly severe climate crisis, and also because of the rise of right-wing extremism; second, the Swedish Left Party “will never support racism and nationalism” (referring to the Brexit campaign); third, the Party of the European Left is becoming increasingly critical of the EU, so the Swedish Left Party has more allies in how it views the EU. Therefore, Sjöstedt pointed out that the Party of the European Left must face today’s EU squarely and strive to build a better EU.

关于上述观点何以在欧洲左翼政党中得到认可，瑞典左翼党是近期一个最好的例子。一方面，该党属于B计划网络的一部分；另一方面，在2019年2月的会议上，该党决定放弃其先前主张瑞典脱欧的立场。在一次访谈中，该党领导人乔纳斯·舍斯特德（Jonas Sjöstedt）列出了做出这种决定的三条理由：第一，政治现实已经发生了巨大变化，尤其是气候危机日益严重，同时也是因为右翼极端主义的崛起；第二，瑞典左翼党“绝不会支持种族主义和民族主义”（指英国脱欧运动）；第三，欧洲左翼党对欧盟越来越具有批判性，因而瑞典左翼党在如何看待欧盟的问题上拥有了更多的盟友。因此，舍斯特德指出，欧洲左翼党必须正视今天的欧盟，并努力建设一个更好的欧盟。

From media reports or interviews with Sjöstedt, it is not entirely clear whether abandoning the policy stance of leaving the EU is merely a tactical expedient based on the current situation, or whether it signifies a lasting, principled strategic change. There is a huge difference between the two positions, because they are based on two very different assessments of EU reform. Under Sweden’s current circumstances, there are many tactical reasons not to prioritize a slogan like “exit the EU.” In a situation like that of Greece, where a left-wing party has won government power, this issue becomes crucial. The demand to leave the EU or the Eurozone is no longer a purely theoretical question; it determines the possibility of a left-wing government implementing its policies or succumbing to the EU.

从媒体报道或从对舍斯特德的采访来看，放弃脱欧的政策立场仅仅是基于当今形势作出的策略性的权宜之计，还是意味着一种持久的原则性的战略变化，并不是十分清楚。两种立场之间存在巨大差异，原因在于它们建立在对欧盟改革两种迥异的评估基础之上。在瑞典目前的局势下，不把“退出欧盟”这样的口号置于优先地位，具有很多策略性理由。在类似于希腊那种情形下，左翼政党赢得了政府权力，这一问题就变得至关重要了。退出欧盟或欧元区的要求，不再是纯理论问题，它们决定着左翼政府贯彻其政策或屈从于欧盟的可能性。

In the interview, when directly asked, “Is it a good strategy to abandon a political demand just because someone who disagrees with you raises it?” Regarding this question, Sjöstedt’s answer raised new questions: “I believe that the critical stance toward the EU, which is dominant in Nordic countries, must draw a clear line with nationalism and racism. We differ from the stance of the UK Independence Party, and we do not support anti-EU racists. There is a chasm separating us from them. This must be clearly understood.”

在访谈中，当被直接提问“因为与你意见相左的人提出了一项政治要求，你就废止它，这是一种好的策略吗?”关于这一问题，舍斯特德的回答引出了新的问题：“我认为，在北欧国家占主流的批评欧盟的立场，必须与民族主义和种族主义划清界限。我们既与英国独立党的立场不同，也不支持反欧盟的种族主义者。我们之间有一道鸿沟将彼此隔离。对此必须有清醒的认识。”

To understand this political logic is not an easy thing. If there really is a chasm separating the Swedish Left Party’s criticism of the EU from the racist and nationalist criticism of the EU, where does the problem lie? Why does the Left Party need to modify some of its EU policies so as not to collude with racism and nationalism? If it is necessary to pursue a completely different policy, even if it leads to a rupture in relations with the EU, is it not important for the Left Party to offer a well-founded critique of the EU and its policies?

要理解这种政治逻辑，并不是一件很容易的事情。如果真的有一条鸿沟将瑞典左翼党对欧盟的批评与种族主义和民族主义者对欧盟的批评割裂，问题又出在哪里?左翼党为什么需要对其部分欧盟政策作出更改，以免与种族主义和民族主义同流合污?如果有必要推行一种完全不同的政策，即使会导致与欧盟关系的决裂，左翼党也要对欧盟及其政策进行有理有据的批评，这难道不重要吗?

As Sjöstedt [8]8 Jonas Sjöstedt, leader of the Swedish Left Party from 2012 to 2020. has pointed out, the fact that the Brexit movement was dominated by nationalist and xenophobic agendas provides strong evidence that the Labour Party, Momentum [9]9 Momentum is a grassroots left-wing political organisation that campaigns within and in support of the British Labour Party, founded in 2015 after the election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader. (which supports the British Labour Party in elections), and the trade union movement failed to criticise the EU and the far-right parties. They could have used people’s dissatisfaction with the EU and its policies, politicised it, and transformed it into a struggle against an increasingly authoritarian neoliberal EU.

正如舍斯特德所指出的，脱欧运动由民族主义和仇外议程所主导的这一事实，为批判工党、造势运动党(Momentum，在选举中支持英国工党)和工会运动没有对欧盟和极右翼政党提出批评提供了有力证据。它们原本可以利用人们对欧盟及其政策的不满，将其政治化，并将它转化为一场反对日益专制的新自由主义欧盟的战斗。

In any case, the Labour Party, Momentum, and even most members of the British trade union movement are staunch supporters of the EU project. Over the years, a huge reservoir of legitimate discontent with the neoliberal EU has accumulated among the European populace, but they themselves have given up the opportunity to become the representative and spokesperson of this force. In other words, they have ceded the monopoly on fierce criticism of the EU to far-right parties, thereby also ceding to far-right parties the power to incorporate this struggle into their political and ideological framework. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the Brexit movement took on nationalist and xenophobic characteristics.

不管怎样，工党和造势运动党甚至英国工会运动的大多数成员，都是欧盟计划的忠实支持者。多年来，欧洲民众已经积聚了巨大的合法反对新自由主义欧盟的不满力量，但他们自己放弃了成为这一力量的代表和代言人的机会。换言之，他们将激烈批评欧盟的垄断权转让给了极右翼政党，因而也使极右翼政党垄断了将这一斗争纳入其政治和意识形态框架的权力。这样，英国脱欧运动具有了民族主义和仇外特征也就丝毫不值得奇怪了。

VI. Low-Level Class Struggle

六、低层次的阶级斗争

The political development of society cannot exist in isolation from class struggle. Although the national conditions of each country differ, it is no new insight that European left-wing parties and trade union movements are in crisis. In this crisis, the prominent role and characteristics of the EU are manifested in the process of political and economic development from Keynesianism to neoliberal hegemony. The introduction and operation of the single currency, the euro, marked a key step in the neoliberal reforms represented by the EU. This also gave capitalist forces a superior position in their struggle with the labour movement, which inevitably had a profound impact on European left-wing parties.

社会的政治发展不能脱离阶级斗争而孤立地存在。尽管各国国情各不相同，但欧洲左翼政党和工会运动处于危机之中已经不是什么新观点。在这场危机中，欧盟的显著作用和特征，体现在从凯恩斯主义到新自由主义霸权的政治经济发展过程之中。单一货币欧元的引入及其运行，标志着代表欧盟的新自由主义改革迈出了关键一步。这同时也使得资本主义力量在与劳工运动的斗争中处于优势地位，也必然会对欧洲的左翼政党产生深远影响。

After the 2007–2009 financial crisis and the euro crisis, the EU’s conservative austerity policies were further strengthened. At the same time, they took on an increasingly authoritarian form, were institutionalised through new legislation (such as the “Six-Pack,” the “Two-Pack,” the European Semester mechanism, the Fiscal Compact, etc.), and granted the European Court of Justice a more prominent role through the “Laval Quartet.” [10]10 The “Laval Quartet” refers to four rulings by the European Court of Justice (Viking, Laval, Rüffert, and Luxembourg) between 2007 and 2008 that prioritised the EU’s internal market freedoms over national labour rights and collective bargaining. Abolishing the welfare state and defeating the trade union movement have become integral components of the modern EU’s institutions and politics; the EU is no longer a means of achieving social progress.

2007—2009年金融危机和欧元危机之后，欧盟保守的财政紧缩政策再次得到加强，同时，它采取了越来越专制的形式，并通过新的立法（如“六部立法”“两部立法”、欧洲学期机制、金融协定等）使其实现制度化，并通过“拉瓦尔四重奏”赋予欧洲法院更显著的地位。废除福利国家和挫败工会运动已经成为现代欧盟制度和政治不可或缺的组成部分，欧盟已经不再是实现社会进步的手段。

This change has greatly weakened the trade union movement, causing Western European trade unions to lose half their members between 1980 and 2015. The decline was greatest in the private sector. “Deindustrialisation” or the relocation of industrial enterprises to Asia and other low-cost countries (the globalisation strategy of capital) has further weakened trade union movements in traditionally strong, well-organised, and militant regions. Moreover, the erosion of trade union rights stipulated in labour law—including restrictions on the right to negotiate and the right to strike—combined with rising unemployment, has weakened the bargaining power of trade unions.

这种变化极大地削弱了工会运动的力量，使得西欧工会在1980—2015年间损失了一半会员。其中，私营部门下降的幅度最大。在亚洲和其他低成本国家的“去工业化”或对工业企业进行重新布局(资本的全球化战略)，则导致传统上力量比较强大、组织良好、善于斗争的地区的工会运动遭到进一步削弱。而且，在劳动法中规定的工会权利因遭到破坏而发生变化——包括谈判权利和罢工权利受到限制——的同时，失业率的上升又削弱了工会的谈判实力。

The EU’s eastward enlargement and the establishment of a common labour market played a particularly important role. This is not only because of the huge wage differentials between Eastern and Western EU member states, but also because of mass unemployment, which in the worst-affected crisis countries (Greece, Spain) climbed to 30%, with youth unemployment even double that. This gives employers considerable leeway to hire non-union labour, pits workers against each other, and leads to a labour market rife with social dumping and lawlessness.

欧盟东扩和共同劳动市场的建立扮演了特别重要的角色。这不仅仅是因为东、西欧成员国之间存在巨大的工资差异，还有大规模的失业率，在危机最严重的国家(希腊、西班牙)已经攀升至30%，而年轻人的失业率甚至是它的两倍。这使得雇主拥有很大的余地去雇佣工会之外的劳工，造成工人之间彼此对立，导致劳工市场充斥社会倾销和无法无天的乱象。

Under these circumstances, the trade union movement has been forced onto the defensive and has undergone a profound political and ideological crisis. In particular, the vast majority of organised trade unions at the European level have clearly become alienated from the members they are supposed to protect. They still cling to the historic compromise between labour and capital, which, although it formed the basis for growth and prosperity in the post-war period, has been undermined by the shift in the balance of power in favour of employers. Thus, the brutal austerity policies implemented by the EU can be understood as a policy mistake, rather than as an expression of class conflict. The task then becomes, through social dialogue, to persuade governments and employers that the current policy is wrong and must be corrected, rather than mobilising for struggle to transform the balance of class forces.

在这种情况下，工会运动不得不处于守势并经历了一场深刻的政治和意识形态危机。特别是欧洲层面绝大多数有组织的工会，显然已经疏远了它们本应保护的会员。它们仍旧坚持劳工与资本之间达成的历史性妥协，这种妥协虽然构成了战后时期增长与繁荣的基础，但是却在权力天平已经向雇主倾斜时遭到其破坏。因此，欧盟所实施的残酷的紧缩政策可以理解为一种政策错误，而不是一种阶级利益冲突的表现。这样，任务就变成了通过社会对话促使政府和雇主相信现行政策是错误的，必须予以纠正，而不是为了实现阶级力量平衡的转化而进行斗争动员。

The crisis of left-wing parties must be interpreted against the background of these developments in class struggle—in which the trade union movement is embedded in social partnership, ideology, and generally low-level class struggle. Therefore, it is understandable that left-wing parties are in danger of becoming more closely integrated with the EU’s political-administrative apparatus headquartered in Brussels, and this is not due to any special external pressure.

对于左翼政党的危机，必须将其置于上述这些阶级斗争发展——工会运动扎根于社会伙伴关系、意识形态和总体上低层次的阶级斗争之中——的背景下来进行解读。因此，可以理解的是，左翼政党处在与总部位于布鲁塞尔的欧盟政治—行政机构更加紧密融合的危险境地，并不是因遭受到来自外部的特殊压力所造成的。

VII. The European Left: A Diagnosis

七、欧洲左翼：一种诊断

As we have seen, European left-wing parties are heterogeneous organisations. For most of the 20th century, two dominant political tendencies emerged within the labour movement: communism and social democracy. With the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the breakdown of the class compromise in Western Europe, both political projects seemed to have reached their end. The traditional communist parties of Western Europe—from the Moscow-oriented type to the reformed Eurocommunist variants (Italy and Spain)—gradually declined. In the past few years, we have also witnessed the successive collapse of social democratic parties. Those that have survived, reduced in number, have more or less abandoned their traditional ideologies and largely adopted the soft policies of neoliberalism.

正如我们所看到的，欧洲左翼政党是一种异质化的组织。在20世纪大多数时间里，劳工运动中主要出现了两种占支配地位的政治倾向：共产主义和社会民主主义。随着东欧集团的崩溃和西欧阶级妥协的破裂，两大政治方案似乎都走到了尽头。西欧的传统共产主义政党，从以莫斯科为取向的类型到经历改革的欧洲共产主义变种(意大利和西班牙)，都逐渐没落了。在过去的几年时间里，我们还经历了社会民主党接踵而至的垮台。而那些幸存下来的数量有所减少，或多或少已经放弃了其传统意识形态，并在很大程度上接受了新自由主义的柔性政策。

Among the current European left-wing parties, some are newly formed, including mergers or reorganisations of various small groups and parties, but they do not necessarily maintain strong ties with past historical traditions. Most of them are politically relatively moderate organisations. They have shallow roots in the working class and the trade union movement. Such parties rarely develop a well-thought-out socialist strategy or a profound analysis of economic and power relations. Instead, they have a strong social-liberal and social-democratic orientation (which in recent years has gained more space as the traditional parties with those ideologies have become increasingly neoliberal).

当前欧洲左翼政党中有一些是新近成立的，包括各种小团体和政党的合并或重组，但却未必与以往的历史传统保持着牢固的联系。其中大多数在政治上是相对温和的组织。它们在工人阶级以及工会运动中根基不深。此类政党很少制定完善的社会主义战略或对经济和权力关系进行深刻分析。与此相反，它们却具有极大的社会—自由主义和社会—民主主义倾向(近些年来，随着具有那些意识形态的传统政党的新自由主义倾向越来越明显，这种观点获得了更大的空间)。

With few exceptions, left-wing parties have a stronger parliamentary orientation, focus on a limited number of single issues that attract public attention, and seek media coverage, but their ability to mobilise the grassroots is extremely weak. Therefore, we can conclude that we are in a “Gramscian moment”: the old is dying, and the new cannot be born. [11]11 This refers to the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci’s concept of an interregnum, a period of crisis where the old social order is dying but the new one has not yet emerged, often associated with his *Prison Notebooks*.

除了少数一些例外，左翼政党具有更为强烈的议会指向，聚焦于大众关注的数量有限的单一议题，并寻求媒体的关注，但动员社会底层力量的能力却极为虚弱。因此，我们可以得出结论，我们正处在一个“葛兰西时刻”(Gramscian moment),旧的行将灭亡，新的无法诞生。

Wolfgang Streeck, a German sociology professor, honorary director of the Max Planck Institute, and former Social Democrat, describes the disadvantage and further decline of left-wing parties in the 2019 European Parliament elections as follows:

德国社会学教授沃尔夫冈•施特雷克(Wolfgang Streeck)，是马克思•普朗克研究所的名誉所长、前社会民主党人，他这样描述左翼政党在2019年欧盟选举中的劣势和进一步衰落：

“These are times of rapid political loyalty shifts. But if not now, when could left-wing parties hope to win more support from European workers and middle-class reformers at the ballot box? An explanation for the catastrophic failure of the left is urgently needed… The first and most fundamental reason is obviously the overall lack of a realistic anti-capitalist, or at least anti-neoliberal, left-wing political strategy for the EU. There has not even been a debate on the key question of whether the EU can be an instrument of anti-capitalist politics.” [12]12 Wolfgang Streeck, *Zwischen Globalismus und Demokratie: Politische Ökonomie im ausgehenden Neoliberalismus* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2021), p. 196.

如今是政治忠诚迅速转换的时代。但是，如果不是现在的话，那么，什么时候左翼政党才有希望在选举中获得欧洲工人和中产阶级改革派更多的支持?现在迫切需要对左翼的灾难性失败作出解释……首要的也是最根本的原因，显然就是整体上缺乏一套针对欧盟的现实主义的反资本主义或至少是反新自由主义的左翼政治战略。甚至对于欧盟能否成为反资本主义政治的工具这一关键问题，都没有展开辩论。

The goal of many European left-wing parties is often to enter government as a coalition partner of a dominant neoliberal social democratic party. For the vast majority of left-wing parties that have tried this approach in countries such as France, Italy, Norway, and Denmark, they have experienced everything from negative to disastrous consequences. Nevertheless, left-wing parties in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and the Nordic states, whether or not they have served in such governments, still harbor this ambition. Spain’s “Podemos” party, founded in 2014, is neither a left-wing nor a right-wing party; it opposes the elite and the political class (as they call it). This party once allied with the United Left, adjusted itself, and joined a coalition government with the Socialist Party.

许多欧洲左翼政党的目标，通常就是作为一个占主导地位的奉行新自由主义的社会民主党的联盟伙伴进入政府任职。对于在法国、意大利、挪威以及丹麦等国尝试过这一方法的绝大多数左翼政党来说，它们体验了从消极到灾难性后果的一切经历。尽管如此，诸如德国、荷兰以及北欧国家的左翼政党，无论它们是否曾在这样的政府中任职，都仍然怀有这样的野心。成立于2014年的西班牙“我们能”党，既非左翼政党，也不是右翼政党，反对精英阶层和政治阶层（它们这样称呼它），该党曾与联合左翼党结盟，进行自我调整并加入了社会党的联合政府。

This “suicidal” tendency is difficult to understand, especially when we find that left-wing parties that do not join such governments but merely offer significant support to social-democratic-led governments, rather than supporting governments composed of various right-wing parties, generally fare much better. These parties have shown that they have better opportunities to advance their own policies, including the chance to mobilize grassroots forces, rather than compromising behind closed doors in parliamentary chambers. Swedish historian, newspaper editor, and author Åsa Linderborg has analyzed this dilemma in an article on the development of the Swedish Left Party:

这种“自杀”倾向很难理解，特别是当我们发现，不加入这种政府但却仅限于给予社会民主党主导的政府以重大支持、而不是支持由各种右翼政党组成的政府，采取这种策略的左翼政党通常情况要好得多。这些政党已经表明，它们拥有更好的机会来推行自己的政策，包括有机会动员下层力量，而不是躲在议会密室中达成妥协。瑞典历史学家、报刊编辑和作者奥萨•林德堡(Åsa Linderborg)在一篇有关瑞典左翼党发展的文章中，已经对这一难题进行了剖析：

“It is not easy to summarize the performance of the Left Party. Although it is the only party with anti-capitalist critical force, for 25 years it has been committed to becoming a legitimate partner of the Social Democrats. For years, it has supported policies pushed by the right wing of the Social Democrats, including tax cuts and the weakening of redistribution policies. It has voted for budget regulations that harm the Swedish economy. The result has been deepening class inequality and extreme concentration of social wealth. The welfare state and democratic institutions have thus been undermined.”

要对左翼党的表现进行总结并不容易。它虽然是唯一具备反资本主义批判力量的政党，但是，25年来，该党却一直致力于成为社会民主党的合法合作伙伴。多年来，该党一直支持社会民主党右翼推行的政策，包括削减税收、削弱再分配政策。它们投票支持危害瑞典经济的预算条例。其结果是阶级不平等加深，社会财富极度集中。福利国家和民主制度由此而遭破坏。

More signs indicate that many left-wing parties lack coherence in their relationship with the European Union. For example, an increasing number of left-wing parties support the Plan B strategy, which is extremely demanding and confrontational. Yet, at the same time, they do little to advance this strategy; instead, they pursue policies at the level of the European Parliament and nation-states that do not reflect this confrontational stance, which inadvertently or otherwise becomes part of the strategy of reforming the EU from within.

更多迹象表明，许多左翼政党与欧盟的关系是缺乏连贯性的。例如，越来越多的左翼政党支持B计划战略，这一计划要求极为严格，也具有对抗性。而与此同时，它们却很少在推动这一战略的发展方面有所作为，相反，它们在欧洲议会和民族国家层面追求一种并不能反映这种对抗性的政策，而这种对抗性恰恰会在不经意间或以其他方式，成为从内部改革欧盟战略的组成部分。

Violating EU treaties under specific conditions does not mean that left-wing parties must always make “treaty violation” their most basic demand. This is a matter of strategy and tactics. Strengthening the mobilization of left-wing forces, as a starting point, must be based on a case-by-case analysis, including a concrete analysis of real social power relations. In situations of sharpened class struggle, any left-wing party may repeat the mistake of SYRIZA, [13]13 SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) is a Greek left-wing political party that came to power in 2015 on an anti-austerity platform but subsequently accepted a third bailout agreement with the EU, imposing further austerity measures. allowing EU institutions and treaties to impose powerful obstacles to its progressive development. The possibility and necessity of exiting the eurozone or even the EU will not arise according to our will. The choice will be brutal: either abandon the struggle for social(ist) reform and remain in the EU, or break with the EU to continue the struggle. For any genuine left-wing party, surrender has never been a bright path.

在特定条件下违反欧盟条约，并不意味着左翼政党必须始终将“违反条约”作为最基本的诉求。这属于战略和策略问题。加强左翼力量的动员，作为一个起点，必须建立在具体情况具体分析的基础之上，包括对现实社会权力关系的具体分析。在阶级斗争尖锐的情况下，任何左翼政党都有可能重蹈激进左翼联盟的覆辙，即导致欧盟机构和条约对其进步发展施加强大障碍。退出欧元区甚或欧盟的可能性和必然性的出现，不会以我们的意志为转移。选择必将是残酷的：要么放弃社会(主义)改革的战斗，仍旧留在欧盟内；要么与欧盟决裂以继续斗争。对于任何真正的左翼政党而言，投降从来都不是一条光明大道。

Indeed, to win the struggle of violating EU treaties or choosing to exit the eurozone or even the EU, large-scale mobilization from below is necessary, and external forces must be united. To this end, party organizations, party members, and coalition partners must be fully prepared for this struggle. Unfortunately, the current situation is not as one would wish.

诚然，违反欧盟条约或选择退出欧元区甚或欧盟，要取得这场斗争的胜利，必须自下而上进行大规模动员，必须团结外部力量。为此，党组织、党员以及联盟伙伴都必须为这场斗争做充足的准备。不幸的是，当前的情况并不如人所愿。

If left-wing parties, out of fear of being grouped with racists and nationalists, do not want to pursue anti-EU policies, the difficulties facing their EU policy will only intensify, even if this overall stance might be limited to specific events like the Brexit referendum. The opposite is true. If the goal of left-wing parties is truly to weaken the EU as an authoritarian neoliberal power center, then exiting the EU would become a powerful tool at their disposal. The Brexit movement itself is not the root cause of the rise and strengthening of far-right parties across Europe, nor is it the main reason these parties have come to power in Italy, Austria, Hungary, and Poland. What is responsible for the rise of nationalism and far-right parties is not left-wing parties’ radical criticism of the EU, but the EU’s current policies themselves, which have destroyed the normal lives of countless workers, fueling growing discontent and a persistent sense of helplessness.

如果左翼政党因恐惧与种族主义者和民族主义者为伍而不想实行反欧盟的政策，那么，它们的欧盟政策所面临的困难只会加剧，尽管这种总体立场有可能仅仅局限在具体的英国脱欧公投等事件上。事实恰恰相反。如果左翼政党的目标真的是削弱作为专制的新自由主义权力中心的欧盟的地位，那么，退出欧盟就将成为左翼政党可资利用的有力工具。脱欧运动本身并不是造就欧洲各国极右翼政党并加强其力量的根源，也不是导致这些政党在意大利、奥地利、匈牙利和波兰等国上台执政的主因。应该对民族主义和极右翼政党崛起负责的不是左翼政党对欧盟的激进批评，而是欧盟的现行政策本身，正是这些政策摧毁了无数工人的正常生活，诱发了人们日益增长的不满和持续的无助感。

For left-wing parties, the only way out of this crisis is to wage their own struggle, on the other side of the far-right abyss of criticism, by advancing internationalism, solidarity, and anti-racist politics to oppose and critique the authoritarian neoliberal EU. The development of an internationalist, solidaristic, and united Europe is predicated on defeating the institutionalized, authoritarian neoliberal EU, replacing it with a unified Europe built on democracy, solidarity, and self-determination.

对于左翼政党而言，度过这场危机的唯一出路，就是开展自己的斗争，在极右翼批评深渊的另一端，通过推进国际主义、团结一致以及反种族主义政治，去反对和批判专制的新自由主义欧盟。一个国际主义的、团结而统一的欧洲的发展，是以挫败制度化的、专制的新自由主义欧盟为先决条件的，取代它的将是一个建立在民主、团结和自决基础上的统一欧洲。

To achieve this goal, it is necessary to recognize the serious political and ideological crisis facing European left-wing parties, to study and analyze the role and characteristics of the EU, and to formulate a genuine anti-capitalist strategy. In this regard, the Plan B strategy will play an important role in supporting and promoting its further development. This requires the formulation of strategy and its clear articulation; if developed properly, this process could facilitate the necessary radicalization of European left-wing parties. (Notes omitted)

为了实现这一目标，就必须承认欧洲左翼政党面临的严重政治和意识形态危机，必须对欧盟的作用和特征进行研究和剖析，必须制定真正的反资本主义战略。由此而论，B计划战略将发挥支持并推动其进一步发展的重要作用。这就需要制定战略并作出清晰阐释，如果发展得当，这一过程有可能促成欧洲左翼政党实现必要的激进化。（注释略）

(The author is a Norwegian scholar, writer, trade union advisor, and activist. The translators are from the School of Foreign Languages, Hebei Normal University.)

（作者系挪威学者、作家、工会顾问和活动家，译者单位：河北师范大学外国语学院）

Online editor: Zhang Jian

网络编辑：张剑